[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 144 (Thursday, July 28, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43721-43725]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-4011]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Announcement of a Public Meeting To Discuss Selected Topics for
the Review of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Regulations and Guidance for
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of meeting.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) reassessment of
emergency preparedness following September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
concluded that the planning basis for emergency preparedness (EP)
remains valid. However, as part of our continuing EP review, some
enhancements are being considered to EP regulations and guidance due to
the terrorist acts of 9/11; technological advances; the need for
clarification based upon more than 20 years of experience; lessons
learned during drills and exercises; and responses to actual events.
Therefore, the NRC will hold a one and one-half-day public meeting
to obtain stakeholder input on selected topics for the review of EP
regulations and guidance for commercial nuclear power plants and to
discuss EP-related issues that arose during an NRC/FEMA workshop at the
2005 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness (NREP) Conference.
[[Page 43722]]
DATES: Wednesday, August 31, 2005, 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. and Thursday,
September 1, 2005, 8 to 12:30 p.m.
ADDRESSES: Bethesda North Marriott Hotel and Conference Center, 5701
Marinelli Road, North Bethesda, Maryland 20852. (Go to http://www.BethesdaNorthMarriott.com for additional hotel information.)
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Moody, Mail Stop O6H2, Office
of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 1-800-368-5642,
extension 1737; or e-mail [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Meeting Purpose: The purpose of the meeting is to discuss selected
topics for the review of EP regulations and guidance for commercial
nuclear power plants and to obtain stakeholder input. The selected
topics also include EP-related issues that arose during the 2005 NREP
Conference, NRC/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) workshop. In
addition to the comments provided by attendees during the discussion of
the above topics, the NRC is accepting written comments.
Meeting Overview: The first day of the meeting will cover topics
pertaining to potential changes to EP regulations and guidance for
commercial nuclear power plants. This portion of the meeting will be
conducted as a roundtable discussion among participants who have been
invited to represent the broad spectrum of interests in the area of EP.
The spectrum includes representatives from State, local, and Tribal
governments, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/FEMA, NRC, advocacy
groups, and the nuclear industry. The meeting is open to the public,
and all attendees, including State, local, and tribal governments not
represented at the roundtable, will have an opportunity to offer
comments and ask questions at selected points throughout the meeting.
Any questions regarding the roundtable discussion should be directed to
the meeting facilitator, Francis ``Chip'' Cameron by phone at 301-415-
1642 or e-mail [email protected].
The second day of the meeting will include a discussion of
unanswered comments and questions captured during an NRC/FEMA workshop
at the 2005 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference
(NREP). During the workshop, Emergency Preparedness Directorate (EPD)
staff captured all unanswered comments and questions brought forth by
stakeholders in a ``Parking Lot.'' Since the NREP Conference, the staff
has worked with FEMA to develop responses to the ``Parking Lot''
comments and questions. This part of the meeting is to discuss the NRC/
FEMA responses to the NREP ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions in a
town hall-type setting. All attendees are encouraged to participate in
the discussion.
The public meeting notice and agenda, as well as the responses to
the ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions from the NREP Conference,
can be found on the Internet at: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Updated Meeting Information: The NRC encourages all participants to
check frequently the following Web site for the most current
information on the meeting. New information will be added to this Web
site periodically: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Submitting Comments: Comments related to the review of EP
regulations and guidance may be sent to Mr. Robert Moody, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, Mail Stop O6H2, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. Comments may also be hand-
delivered to the NRC at the above address from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m.
during Federal workdays. To be considered, written comments must be
received at the NRC by the close of business on Monday, October 17,
2005. Comments provided during the roundtable discussions will be
captured in the meeting transcript, and along with any written
comments, will be evaluated by the NRC staff.
Electronic comments may be submitted via the following Web site:
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Electronic comments must be sent no later than the close of business on
October 17, 2005.
Meeting Transcript: A transcript of the meeting should be available
electronically on or about September 15, 2005, and accessible on the
Internet at: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Primary EP Regulations: To facilitate discussion and comment, the
primary EP regulations within the scope of review are as follows: 10
CFR 50.47; 10 CFR 50.54(q); Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
These regulations are available on the NRC EP Web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html.
Primary EP Guidance Documents: A list of the primary EP guidance
documents that are within the scope of the review are as follows and
are also available on the NRC EP Web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html.
1. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation
of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of
Nuclear Power Plants''.
2. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3, ``Criteria for Protective
Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents''.
The following EP guidance documents are also within the scope of
the review. However, they are currently only available electronically
in NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
(Note: ADAMS is the NRC's online document management system at http://www.nrc.gov).
1. NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response
Facilities'' (ADAMS number ML051390358).
2. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan
Requirements'' (ADAMS number ML051390367).
Brief History: Since 1958, applicants for nuclear power plant
operating licensees have been required to have procedures for coping
with a radiological emergency. In 1970, the Commission approved new
emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in Appendix E to title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 50. The few public comments
received on the proposed regulations applauded the Commission for its
effort to strengthen radiological EP requirements.
The responsibility for carrying out the plans in the event of an
accident remained in the hands of local and State governments. In 1973,
the Commission issued guidance to local and State governments,
including a checklist of 154 items that should be considered in their
plans. In 1977, in response to advice from the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safety, the Commission published Regulatory Guide 1.101,
``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors,''
which gave nuclear plant licensees more detailed information on what
should be included in emergency plans. Also, about this time, the
Conference of (State) Radiation Control Program Directors asked the
Commission to make a determination of the most severe accident basis
for which radiological emergency response plans should be developed by
offsite agencies. In response, the Commission and the Environmental
Protection Agency formed a task force. The NRC/EPA task force submitted
a report in December 1978, NUREG-0396, ``Planning Basis for the
Development of State and Local
[[Page 43723]]
Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light
Water Nuclear Power Plants.'' Among other recommendations, this report
recommended that for planning purposes, a plume exposure pathway
emergency planning zone (EPZ) of about a 10-mile radius and the
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ about a 50-mile radius.
Emergency response planning received close scrutiny by Congress and
the Commission in the wake of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident.
Congressional oversight committees quickly made it clear that they
wanted the Commission to upgrade emergency response planning. The final
regulations related to TMI were issued in August 1980, when 10 CFR
50.47 was issued and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 was revised. Since
that time, implementation of the regulations and guidance,
technological advances, and lessons learned from actual events and
drills and exercises have revealed areas for potential enhancements and
increased clarity. In addition, the staff has undertaken a number of
studies to improve the state of knowledge in the area of radiological
EP.
The most important event in shaping the course of nuclear power
since the Three Mile Island Accident in 1979 was the coordinated attack
of terrorists on this nation on September 11, 2001. To enhance the
interfaces among safety, security and emergency preparedness, the NRC
created a new office, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
(NSIR), and subsequently an Emergency Preparedness Directorate within
NSIR, to address the implications of 9/11 on nuclear power plants. NSIR
has worked hard to develop improved security and preparedness for
nuclear power plants over the past few years. In addition, following
the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff conducted a formal
evaluation of the emergency planning basis in view of the threat
environment that has existed since the terrorist attacks. This
evaluation addressed all aspects of nuclear power plant emergency
preparedness requirements. In doing so, the evaluation determined that
emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants remains strong, but
identified several areas for enhancement. These areas for enhancement
are the subjects for the first half-day of the meeting.
Review of EP Regulations and Guidance: The NRC staff is conducting
a review of EP regulations and guidance to determine where enhancements
are needed. The staff will summarize the results of its review,
including comments from stakeholders, in a paper to the NRC
Commissioners. The paper will include a framework of potential changes
to EP guidance and, if necessary, to EP regulations, along with next
steps, prioritization, and resource estimates. This effort will be
conducted in cooperation with FEMA. Federal EP regulations state that
NRC and FEMA will provide an opportunity for the other agency to review
and comment on guidance prior to adoption as formal agency guidance.
Questions to Promote Discussion: The following questions have been
developed to promote attendee discussion, to obtain attendee input, and
to be considered by attendees to help focus their input in each area.
Due to their generic nature, they may be applicable to any of the
agenda topics. Other questions to promote discussion appear after the
summary for each agenda item later in this notice.
1. How can Federal, State, local and tribal governments best
respond to protect public health and safety to a rapidly developing
security event that has already been broadcast in the media?
2. What approaches work best to minimize the impact of enhanced
rules and/or guidance on local and State government?
3. What enhancements to EP regulations and guidance would help you
to more effectively and efficiently implement them in a post-9/11
threat environment?
4. What EP regulations and guidance should be enhanced based upon
advances in technology?
Agenda Items--Enhancements in Response to the Post 9/11 Threat
Environment (Onsite):
1. Security-Based Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) and Emergency
Action Levels (EALs)
As a result of improvements in Federal agencies' information
sharing and assessment capabilities, security-based emergency
declarations could be accomplished in a more anticipatory manner than
the current declarations for security events. Therefore, the NRC is
considering modifications to security-based ECL definitions and EAL
thresholds in an effort to recognize those improvements.
Suggested question to promote discussion: How will public health
and safety be enhanced by having security-based ECLs and EALs?
2. Prompt NRC Notification
In the post-9/11 environment, there is the potential for
coordinated attacks on multiple facilities. Prompt notification of the
NRC is particularly important during a security event to support
subsequent notifications made by the NRC to other licensees and
initiate the Federal response in accordance with the National Response
Plan. The NRC is considering modifications to require an abbreviated
notification to the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible after the
discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the facility, but not
later than 15 minutes from discovery.
Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What public health
and safety benefits can be derived from an early notification of a
security event to a central location, such as the NRC Operations
Center? (2) How should early notifications of security events be
sequenced to best protect public health and safety?
3. Onsite Protective Actions
While actions, such as site assembly, personnel accountability,
site evacuation, etc., are appropriate for some emergencies, other
actions may be more appropriate for a terrorist attack, particularly an
aircraft attack. Licensees have made protective measure changes in
response to the NRC Order of February 25, 2002, but certain security-
based scenarios could warrant consideration of other onsite protective
measures. The NRC is considering a range of protection measures for
site workers to address this threat.
Suggested question to promote discussion: What is the most
effective way to implement offsite protective actions, such as site
evacuation of non-responder personnel or accounting for personnel
following release from the site, during a terrorist threat or strike?
4. Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation
The ERO is expected to be staged in a manner that supports rapid
response to limit or mitigate site damage or the potential for an
offsite radiological release. Some licensees have chosen not to
activate elements of the ERO during a security-based event until the
site is secured. It is prudent to fully activate emergency response
organization members for off-normal hours events to promptly staff
alternative facilities. During normal working hours, licensees should
consider deployment of onsite emergency response organization personnel
to an alternative facility near the site.
Suggested question to promote discussion: During a terrorist event,
would there be impediments that would preclude effective recall to the
site of station emergency response personnel during a terrorist event,
and how could they be overcome?
[[Page 43724]]
5. Drill and Exercise Program
Current assessments indicate that licensee measures are available
to mitigate the effects of terrorist acts. Consequently, such acts
would not create an accident that causes a larger release or one that
occurs more quickly than those already addressed by the EP planning
basis. However, the condition of the plant after such an event could be
very different from the usual condition practiced in more conventional
nuclear power plant emergency preparedness (EP) drills and exercises.
In light of the foregoing and of the post-9/11 threat environment,
licensees should exercise and test security-based EP capabilities as an
integral part of the licensee's emergency response capabilities.
Suggested question to promote discussion: How can security-based
drills and exercises be most effective in training, practicing and
assessing coordinated response roles and responsibilities?
Additional Information Related to the Onsite Agenda Items: NRC
Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for
Security-based Events,'' dated July 18, 2005, provides additional
information to help attendees understand the above topics. This
document is available in ADAMS at number ML051740058 or on the Internet
at: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Agenda Items--Enhancements in Response to the Post 9/11 Threat
Environment (Offsite):
6. Enhanced Offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
The current PAR guidance contained in Supplement 3, ``Criteria for
Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,'' to NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1 (see the NRC website) specifies that the licensee
should issue a PAR based on plant conditions that involve actual or
projected severe core damage or loss of control of the facility (i.e.,
at a general emergency). In the event of an emergency classification
based on a security event, the NRC is soliciting comments regarding the
receipt of a PAR from a licensee at the site area emergency or possibly
at the alert classification level.
Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What value to public
health and safety would a recommendation to ``go indoors and monitor
the emergency alert system'' at a site area emergency classification
provide during a security event? (2) What benefits or possible
consequences would occur for stakeholders, if such a recommendation
were made during a security event?
7. Abbreviated Notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs)
The regulations in Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 (to see the
regulations go to http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html) require the licensee to have the capability to
notify responsible ORO personnel within 15 minutes after declaring an
emergency. While licensees and OROs are proficient with notification
transmission and receipt, the notification process itself takes several
minutes for the licensee to fill out the form, obtain authorization,
and notify the OROs, perform repeat backs, and verify the notification.
The NRC is soliciting offsite officials' comments on the receipt of an
abbreviated initial notification to enhance emergency response in the
case of a rapidly developing security event.
Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What public health
and safety benefit would be derived from an abbreviated notification to
the ORO during a security event? (2) How could such an abbreviated
notification be effectively implemented during an onsite security
event?
8. Backup Power to Siren Systems
FEMA is in the process of revising its guidance documents to
reflect the technological advances that have taken place since they
were originally published. By congressional direction, this guidance
will require that all warning systems be operable in the absence of
alternating current (AC) supply power. FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' is currently under revision. Once the revised guidance
becomes available, the NRC will be considering regulatory approaches to
implement the revised guidance and effect necessary Alert and
Notification System (ANS) upgrades.
Suggested question to promote discussion: Should the NRC require
that the ANS be operable in the absence of AC power, or are there
backup alerting methods that can reliably alert the public in a timely
manner under reasonably anticipated conditions that would be an
adequate substitution for backup power?
Agenda Item--Protective Action Recommendation Guidance:
Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) (to review the Planning
Standard go to http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html) requires that a range of protective actions be
developed for the protection of the public. Guidance related to the
implementation of a range of protective actions is provided in
Supplement 3 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (see the NRC Web site above) and
EPA-400-R-92-001 (see http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/related-information.html). While each guidance document contains the
same basic protective action concepts of evacuation, shelter, and, as a
supplement, potassium iodide, the NRC is considering changes to clarify
the responsibilities of the licensee to recommend PARs, and State,
local, and Tribal officials to make the final decision regarding, which
protective action(s) is/are implemented. The NRC is also considering
the need to more clearly define sheltering. In addition, the NRC is
considering the need to enhance guidance related to the updating and
use of evacuation time estimates.
Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) How can the
responsibilities of the licensee and State, local, and Tribal officials
be clarified relative to protective actions to protect public health
and safety? (2) How can sheltering (for discussions on sheltering see
EPA-400-R-92-001, ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective
Actions for Nuclear Incidents'' can be found on the NRC Web site at:
http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/related-information.html) be more clearly defined? (3) How can guidance related
to the updating and use of evacuation time estimates be enhanced?
Additional Information Related to Protective Actions: The following
information and electronic addresses are provided to help attendees
better understand the topic related to protective actions:
1. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-13, ``Consideration of
Sheltering in Licensee's Range of Protective Action Recommendations,''
August 2, 2004 (ADAMS number ML041210046)
2. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-13, Supplement 1,
``Consideration of Sheltering in Licensee's Range of Protective Action
Recommendations,'' March 10, 2005 (ADAMS number ML050340531)
3. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-08, ``Endorsement of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) Guidance `Range of Protective Actions for
Nuclear Power Plant Accidents','' June 6, 2005 (ADAMS number
ML050870432)
Background Information for the NREP Parking Lot Issues: On April
11, 2005, at the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Conference, NRC and FEMA conducted a workshop with State/local/tribal
stakeholders, along with licensee representatives. The
[[Page 43725]]
workshop, ``Emergency Preparedness Enhancements in the Post-9/11
Environment,'' covered a broad range of EP topics, including proposed
9/11-related enhancements regarding offsite preparedness/response. The
workshop was attended by stakeholders nation-wide.
During the workshop, EPD staff recorded all comments and questions
brought forth by stakeholders in a ``Parking Lot.'' NRC and FEMA
promised stakeholders that they would provide responses to these
comments and questions. Since NREP, the staff has worked with FEMA to
develop responses to the ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions. This
part of the meeting is intended to discuss the NRC/FEMA responses to
the NREP ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions, that will be included
on the following Web site on or about August 1: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
Dated in Rockville, Maryland, the 22nd day of July 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Nader L. Mamish,
Director, Emergency Preparedness Directorate, Division of Preparedness
and Response, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
[FR Doc. E5-4011 Filed 7-27-05; 8:45 am]
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