[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 144 (Thursday, July 28, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43721-43725]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-4011]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Announcement of a Public Meeting To Discuss Selected Topics for 
the Review of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Regulations and Guidance for 
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) reassessment of 
emergency preparedness following September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
concluded that the planning basis for emergency preparedness (EP) 
remains valid. However, as part of our continuing EP review, some 
enhancements are being considered to EP regulations and guidance due to 
the terrorist acts of 9/11; technological advances; the need for 
clarification based upon more than 20 years of experience; lessons 
learned during drills and exercises; and responses to actual events.
    Therefore, the NRC will hold a one and one-half-day public meeting 
to obtain stakeholder input on selected topics for the review of EP 
regulations and guidance for commercial nuclear power plants and to 
discuss EP-related issues that arose during an NRC/FEMA workshop at the 
2005 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness (NREP) Conference.

[[Page 43722]]


DATES: Wednesday, August 31, 2005, 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. and Thursday, 
September 1, 2005, 8 to 12:30 p.m.

ADDRESSES: Bethesda North Marriott Hotel and Conference Center, 5701 
Marinelli Road, North Bethesda, Maryland 20852. (Go to http://www.BethesdaNorthMarriott.com for additional hotel information.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Moody, Mail Stop O6H2, Office 
of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 1-800-368-5642, 
extension 1737; or e-mail [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    Meeting Purpose: The purpose of the meeting is to discuss selected 
topics for the review of EP regulations and guidance for commercial 
nuclear power plants and to obtain stakeholder input. The selected 
topics also include EP-related issues that arose during the 2005 NREP 
Conference, NRC/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) workshop. In 
addition to the comments provided by attendees during the discussion of 
the above topics, the NRC is accepting written comments.
    Meeting Overview: The first day of the meeting will cover topics 
pertaining to potential changes to EP regulations and guidance for 
commercial nuclear power plants. This portion of the meeting will be 
conducted as a roundtable discussion among participants who have been 
invited to represent the broad spectrum of interests in the area of EP. 
The spectrum includes representatives from State, local, and Tribal 
governments, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/FEMA, NRC, advocacy 
groups, and the nuclear industry. The meeting is open to the public, 
and all attendees, including State, local, and tribal governments not 
represented at the roundtable, will have an opportunity to offer 
comments and ask questions at selected points throughout the meeting. 
Any questions regarding the roundtable discussion should be directed to 
the meeting facilitator, Francis ``Chip'' Cameron by phone at 301-415-
1642 or e-mail [email protected].
    The second day of the meeting will include a discussion of 
unanswered comments and questions captured during an NRC/FEMA workshop 
at the 2005 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference 
(NREP). During the workshop, Emergency Preparedness Directorate (EPD) 
staff captured all unanswered comments and questions brought forth by 
stakeholders in a ``Parking Lot.'' Since the NREP Conference, the staff 
has worked with FEMA to develop responses to the ``Parking Lot'' 
comments and questions. This part of the meeting is to discuss the NRC/
FEMA responses to the NREP ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions in a 
town hall-type setting. All attendees are encouraged to participate in 
the discussion.
    The public meeting notice and agenda, as well as the responses to 
the ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions from the NREP Conference, 
can be found on the Internet at: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
    Updated Meeting Information: The NRC encourages all participants to 
check frequently the following Web site for the most current 
information on the meeting. New information will be added to this Web 
site periodically: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
    Submitting Comments: Comments related to the review of EP 
regulations and guidance may be sent to Mr. Robert Moody, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, Mail Stop O6H2, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. Comments may also be hand-
delivered to the NRC at the above address from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. 
during Federal workdays. To be considered, written comments must be 
received at the NRC by the close of business on Monday, October 17, 
2005. Comments provided during the roundtable discussions will be 
captured in the meeting transcript, and along with any written 
comments, will be evaluated by the NRC staff.
    Electronic comments may be submitted via the following Web site: 
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html. 
Electronic comments must be sent no later than the close of business on 
October 17, 2005.
    Meeting Transcript: A transcript of the meeting should be available 
electronically on or about September 15, 2005, and accessible on the 
Internet at: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
    Primary EP Regulations: To facilitate discussion and comment, the 
primary EP regulations within the scope of review are as follows: 10 
CFR 50.47; 10 CFR 50.54(q); Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
    These regulations are available on the NRC EP Web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html.
    Primary EP Guidance Documents: A list of the primary EP guidance 
documents that are within the scope of the review are as follows and 
are also available on the NRC EP Web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html.
    1. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation 
of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of 
Nuclear Power Plants''.
    2. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3, ``Criteria for Protective 
Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents''.
    The following EP guidance documents are also within the scope of 
the review. However, they are currently only available electronically 
in NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): 
(Note: ADAMS is the NRC's online document management system at http://www.nrc.gov).
    1. NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response 
Facilities'' (ADAMS number ML051390358).
    2. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan 
Requirements'' (ADAMS number ML051390367).
    Brief History: Since 1958, applicants for nuclear power plant 
operating licensees have been required to have procedures for coping 
with a radiological emergency. In 1970, the Commission approved new 
emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in Appendix E to title 10 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 50. The few public comments 
received on the proposed regulations applauded the Commission for its 
effort to strengthen radiological EP requirements.
    The responsibility for carrying out the plans in the event of an 
accident remained in the hands of local and State governments. In 1973, 
the Commission issued guidance to local and State governments, 
including a checklist of 154 items that should be considered in their 
plans. In 1977, in response to advice from the Advisory Committee on 
Reactor Safety, the Commission published Regulatory Guide 1.101, 
``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors,'' 
which gave nuclear plant licensees more detailed information on what 
should be included in emergency plans. Also, about this time, the 
Conference of (State) Radiation Control Program Directors asked the 
Commission to make a determination of the most severe accident basis 
for which radiological emergency response plans should be developed by 
offsite agencies. In response, the Commission and the Environmental 
Protection Agency formed a task force. The NRC/EPA task force submitted 
a report in December 1978, NUREG-0396, ``Planning Basis for the 
Development of State and Local

[[Page 43723]]

Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light 
Water Nuclear Power Plants.'' Among other recommendations, this report 
recommended that for planning purposes, a plume exposure pathway 
emergency planning zone (EPZ) of about a 10-mile radius and the 
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ about a 50-mile radius.
    Emergency response planning received close scrutiny by Congress and 
the Commission in the wake of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. 
Congressional oversight committees quickly made it clear that they 
wanted the Commission to upgrade emergency response planning. The final 
regulations related to TMI were issued in August 1980, when 10 CFR 
50.47 was issued and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 was revised. Since 
that time, implementation of the regulations and guidance, 
technological advances, and lessons learned from actual events and 
drills and exercises have revealed areas for potential enhancements and 
increased clarity. In addition, the staff has undertaken a number of 
studies to improve the state of knowledge in the area of radiological 
EP.
    The most important event in shaping the course of nuclear power 
since the Three Mile Island Accident in 1979 was the coordinated attack 
of terrorists on this nation on September 11, 2001. To enhance the 
interfaces among safety, security and emergency preparedness, the NRC 
created a new office, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 
(NSIR), and subsequently an Emergency Preparedness Directorate within 
NSIR, to address the implications of 9/11 on nuclear power plants. NSIR 
has worked hard to develop improved security and preparedness for 
nuclear power plants over the past few years. In addition, following 
the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff conducted a formal 
evaluation of the emergency planning basis in view of the threat 
environment that has existed since the terrorist attacks. This 
evaluation addressed all aspects of nuclear power plant emergency 
preparedness requirements. In doing so, the evaluation determined that 
emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants remains strong, but 
identified several areas for enhancement. These areas for enhancement 
are the subjects for the first half-day of the meeting.
    Review of EP Regulations and Guidance: The NRC staff is conducting 
a review of EP regulations and guidance to determine where enhancements 
are needed. The staff will summarize the results of its review, 
including comments from stakeholders, in a paper to the NRC 
Commissioners. The paper will include a framework of potential changes 
to EP guidance and, if necessary, to EP regulations, along with next 
steps, prioritization, and resource estimates. This effort will be 
conducted in cooperation with FEMA. Federal EP regulations state that 
NRC and FEMA will provide an opportunity for the other agency to review 
and comment on guidance prior to adoption as formal agency guidance.
    Questions to Promote Discussion: The following questions have been 
developed to promote attendee discussion, to obtain attendee input, and 
to be considered by attendees to help focus their input in each area. 
Due to their generic nature, they may be applicable to any of the 
agenda topics. Other questions to promote discussion appear after the 
summary for each agenda item later in this notice.
    1. How can Federal, State, local and tribal governments best 
respond to protect public health and safety to a rapidly developing 
security event that has already been broadcast in the media?
    2. What approaches work best to minimize the impact of enhanced 
rules and/or guidance on local and State government?
    3. What enhancements to EP regulations and guidance would help you 
to more effectively and efficiently implement them in a post-9/11 
threat environment?
    4. What EP regulations and guidance should be enhanced based upon 
advances in technology?
    Agenda Items--Enhancements in Response to the Post 9/11 Threat 
Environment (Onsite):

1. Security-Based Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) and Emergency 
Action Levels (EALs)

    As a result of improvements in Federal agencies' information 
sharing and assessment capabilities, security-based emergency 
declarations could be accomplished in a more anticipatory manner than 
the current declarations for security events. Therefore, the NRC is 
considering modifications to security-based ECL definitions and EAL 
thresholds in an effort to recognize those improvements.
    Suggested question to promote discussion: How will public health 
and safety be enhanced by having security-based ECLs and EALs?

2. Prompt NRC Notification

    In the post-9/11 environment, there is the potential for 
coordinated attacks on multiple facilities. Prompt notification of the 
NRC is particularly important during a security event to support 
subsequent notifications made by the NRC to other licensees and 
initiate the Federal response in accordance with the National Response 
Plan. The NRC is considering modifications to require an abbreviated 
notification to the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible after the 
discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the facility, but not 
later than 15 minutes from discovery.
    Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What public health 
and safety benefits can be derived from an early notification of a 
security event to a central location, such as the NRC Operations 
Center? (2) How should early notifications of security events be 
sequenced to best protect public health and safety?

3. Onsite Protective Actions

    While actions, such as site assembly, personnel accountability, 
site evacuation, etc., are appropriate for some emergencies, other 
actions may be more appropriate for a terrorist attack, particularly an 
aircraft attack. Licensees have made protective measure changes in 
response to the NRC Order of February 25, 2002, but certain security-
based scenarios could warrant consideration of other onsite protective 
measures. The NRC is considering a range of protection measures for 
site workers to address this threat.
    Suggested question to promote discussion: What is the most 
effective way to implement offsite protective actions, such as site 
evacuation of non-responder personnel or accounting for personnel 
following release from the site, during a terrorist threat or strike?

4. Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation

    The ERO is expected to be staged in a manner that supports rapid 
response to limit or mitigate site damage or the potential for an 
offsite radiological release. Some licensees have chosen not to 
activate elements of the ERO during a security-based event until the 
site is secured. It is prudent to fully activate emergency response 
organization members for off-normal hours events to promptly staff 
alternative facilities. During normal working hours, licensees should 
consider deployment of onsite emergency response organization personnel 
to an alternative facility near the site.
    Suggested question to promote discussion: During a terrorist event, 
would there be impediments that would preclude effective recall to the 
site of station emergency response personnel during a terrorist event, 
and how could they be overcome?

[[Page 43724]]

5. Drill and Exercise Program

    Current assessments indicate that licensee measures are available 
to mitigate the effects of terrorist acts. Consequently, such acts 
would not create an accident that causes a larger release or one that 
occurs more quickly than those already addressed by the EP planning 
basis. However, the condition of the plant after such an event could be 
very different from the usual condition practiced in more conventional 
nuclear power plant emergency preparedness (EP) drills and exercises. 
In light of the foregoing and of the post-9/11 threat environment, 
licensees should exercise and test security-based EP capabilities as an 
integral part of the licensee's emergency response capabilities.
    Suggested question to promote discussion: How can security-based 
drills and exercises be most effective in training, practicing and 
assessing coordinated response roles and responsibilities?
    Additional Information Related to the Onsite Agenda Items: NRC 
Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for 
Security-based Events,'' dated July 18, 2005, provides additional 
information to help attendees understand the above topics. This 
document is available in ADAMS at number ML051740058 or on the Internet 
at: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.
    Agenda Items--Enhancements in Response to the Post 9/11 Threat 
Environment (Offsite):

6. Enhanced Offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)

    The current PAR guidance contained in Supplement 3, ``Criteria for 
Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,'' to NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1 (see the NRC website) specifies that the licensee 
should issue a PAR based on plant conditions that involve actual or 
projected severe core damage or loss of control of the facility (i.e., 
at a general emergency). In the event of an emergency classification 
based on a security event, the NRC is soliciting comments regarding the 
receipt of a PAR from a licensee at the site area emergency or possibly 
at the alert classification level.
    Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What value to public 
health and safety would a recommendation to ``go indoors and monitor 
the emergency alert system'' at a site area emergency classification 
provide during a security event? (2) What benefits or possible 
consequences would occur for stakeholders, if such a recommendation 
were made during a security event?

7. Abbreviated Notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs)

    The regulations in Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 (to see the 
regulations go to http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html) require the licensee to have the capability to 
notify responsible ORO personnel within 15 minutes after declaring an 
emergency. While licensees and OROs are proficient with notification 
transmission and receipt, the notification process itself takes several 
minutes for the licensee to fill out the form, obtain authorization, 
and notify the OROs, perform repeat backs, and verify the notification. 
The NRC is soliciting offsite officials' comments on the receipt of an 
abbreviated initial notification to enhance emergency response in the 
case of a rapidly developing security event.
    Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) What public health 
and safety benefit would be derived from an abbreviated notification to 
the ORO during a security event? (2) How could such an abbreviated 
notification be effectively implemented during an onsite security 
event?

8. Backup Power to Siren Systems

    FEMA is in the process of revising its guidance documents to 
reflect the technological advances that have taken place since they 
were originally published. By congressional direction, this guidance 
will require that all warning systems be operable in the absence of 
alternating current (AC) supply power. FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for 
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' is currently under revision. Once the revised guidance 
becomes available, the NRC will be considering regulatory approaches to 
implement the revised guidance and effect necessary Alert and 
Notification System (ANS) upgrades.
    Suggested question to promote discussion: Should the NRC require 
that the ANS be operable in the absence of AC power, or are there 
backup alerting methods that can reliably alert the public in a timely 
manner under reasonably anticipated conditions that would be an 
adequate substitution for backup power?
    Agenda Item--Protective Action Recommendation Guidance:
    Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) (to review the Planning 
Standard go to http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/regs-guidance-comm.html) requires that a range of protective actions be 
developed for the protection of the public. Guidance related to the 
implementation of a range of protective actions is provided in 
Supplement 3 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (see the NRC Web site above) and 
EPA-400-R-92-001 (see http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/related-information.html). While each guidance document contains the 
same basic protective action concepts of evacuation, shelter, and, as a 
supplement, potassium iodide, the NRC is considering changes to clarify 
the responsibilities of the licensee to recommend PARs, and State, 
local, and Tribal officials to make the final decision regarding, which 
protective action(s) is/are implemented. The NRC is also considering 
the need to more clearly define sheltering. In addition, the NRC is 
considering the need to enhance guidance related to the updating and 
use of evacuation time estimates.
    Suggested questions to promote discussion: (1) How can the 
responsibilities of the licensee and State, local, and Tribal officials 
be clarified relative to protective actions to protect public health 
and safety? (2) How can sheltering (for discussions on sheltering see 
EPA-400-R-92-001, ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective 
Actions for Nuclear Incidents'' can be found on the NRC Web site at: 
http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/related-information.html) be more clearly defined? (3) How can guidance related 
to the updating and use of evacuation time estimates be enhanced?
    Additional Information Related to Protective Actions: The following 
information and electronic addresses are provided to help attendees 
better understand the topic related to protective actions:
    1. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-13, ``Consideration of 
Sheltering in Licensee's Range of Protective Action Recommendations,'' 
August 2, 2004 (ADAMS number ML041210046)
    2. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-13, Supplement 1, 
``Consideration of Sheltering in Licensee's Range of Protective Action 
Recommendations,'' March 10, 2005 (ADAMS number ML050340531)
    3. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-08, ``Endorsement of Nuclear 
Energy Institute (NEI) Guidance `Range of Protective Actions for 
Nuclear Power Plant Accidents','' June 6, 2005 (ADAMS number 
ML050870432)
    Background Information for the NREP Parking Lot Issues: On April 
11, 2005, at the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
Conference, NRC and FEMA conducted a workshop with State/local/tribal 
stakeholders, along with licensee representatives. The

[[Page 43725]]

workshop, ``Emergency Preparedness Enhancements in the Post-9/11 
Environment,'' covered a broad range of EP topics, including proposed 
9/11-related enhancements regarding offsite preparedness/response. The 
workshop was attended by stakeholders nation-wide.
    During the workshop, EPD staff recorded all comments and questions 
brought forth by stakeholders in a ``Parking Lot.'' NRC and FEMA 
promised stakeholders that they would provide responses to these 
comments and questions. Since NREP, the staff has worked with FEMA to 
develop responses to the ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions. This 
part of the meeting is intended to discuss the NRC/FEMA responses to 
the NREP ``Parking Lot'' comments and questions, that will be included 
on the following Web site on or about August 1: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/epreview2005.html.

    Dated in Rockville, Maryland, the 22nd day of July 2005.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Nader L. Mamish,
Director, Emergency Preparedness Directorate, Division of Preparedness 
and Response, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
[FR Doc. E5-4011 Filed 7-27-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P