[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 119 (Wednesday, June 22, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36169-36174]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-12319]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-05-63-A (Auction No. 63); DA 05-1555]


Multichannel Video Distribution and Data Service Comment Public 
Notice

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commissi

[[Page 36170]]

on.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of 22 Multichannel Video 
Distribution and Data Service (``MVDDS'') licenses scheduled to 
commence on December 7, 2005 (Auction No. 63). This document also seeks 
comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bids and other procedures 
for Auction No. 63.

DATES: Comments are due on or before June 28, 2005, and reply comments 
are due on or before July 6, 2005.

ADDRESSES: Parties who file by paper must file an original and four 
copies of each filing. U.S. Postal Service first class, express and 
priority mail must be addressed to the Office of the Secretary, 445 
12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554. Comments and reply comments 
must also be sent by electronic mail to the following address: 
[email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Brian Carter at 
(202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Roy Knowles, Debbie 
Smith or Barbara Sibert at (717) 338-2888. For service rules questions: 
Mindy Littell (legal) or Michael Pollack (technical) at (202) 418-2487.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Public 
Notice released on June 9, 2005 Auction No. 63 Comment Public Notice. 
The complete text of the Auction No. 63 Comment Public Notice, 
including attachments and any related Commission documents is available 
for public inspection and copying during regular business hours at the 
FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 63 Comment Public 
Notice and related Commission documents may also be purchased from the 
Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. 
(BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC, 
20554, telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may 
contact BCPI at its Web site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering 
documents from BCPI, please make sure you provide the appropriate FCC 
document number (for example, DA05-1555 for the Auction No. 63 Comment 
Public Notice). The Auction No. 63 Comment Public Notice and related 
documents are also available on the Internet at the Commission's Web 
site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/63/.
    1. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) announces the 
auction of 22 MVDDS licenses. This auction is scheduled to commence on 
December 7, 2005. Auction No. 63 will offer the MVDDS licenses that 
remained unsold in Auction No. 53, which closed on January 27, 2004. 
These licenses authorize the use of one block of unpaired spectrum in 
the 12.2-12.7 GHz band and may be used for any digital fixed one-way 
non-broadcast service, including direct-to-home/office wireless 
service. Mobile and aeronautical services are not authorized. Two-way 
services may be provided by using other spectrum or media for the 
return or upstream path. Licenses are not available in every market. A 
complete list of the licenses available in Auction No. 63 is included 
as Attachment A of the Auction No. 63 Comment Public Notice.
    2. Auction No. 63 will use the FCC's Integrated Spectrum Auction 
System (ISAS or FCC Auction System), which is the Commission's new 
auction application filing and bidding system and is an extensive 
redesign of the previous auction application and bidding systems. The 
redesign includes FCC Form 175 application enhancements such as 
discrete data elements in place of free-form exhibits and improved data 
accuracy through automated checking of FCC Form 175 applications. 
Enhancements have also been made to the FCC Form 175 application search 
function. The auction bidding system has also been updated for easier 
navigation, customizable results, and improved functionality.
    3. The following table describes the licenses that will be offered 
in Auction No. 63:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               Geographic area       Number of
      Frequency band  (GHz)           Total Bandwith          Pairing                type            Licenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12.2-12.7........................  500 MHz............  Unpaired...........  MVDDS Service Area.              22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Section 309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 
requires the Commission to ``ensure that, in the scheduling of any 
competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is 
allowed * * * before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and 
comment on proposed auction procedures * * *.'' Consistent with the 
provisions of Section 309(j)(3) and to ensure that potential bidders 
have adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific rules 
that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission 
directed the Bureau, under its existing delegated authority, to seek 
comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start 
of each auction. The Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following 
issues relating to Auction No. 63.

I. Auction Structure

A. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design

    5. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction 
No. 63 in a simultaneous multiple-round auction. This methodology 
offers every license for bid at the same time with successive bidding 
rounds in which bidders may place bids on individual licenses. The 
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility

    6. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine 
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking 
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license 
area and the value of similar spectrum. The upfront payment is a 
refundable deposit made by each bidder to establish eligibility to bid 
on licenses. Upfront payments related to the specific spectrum subject 
to auction protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide 
the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments 
owed at the close of the auction. With these guidelines in mind for 
Auction No. 63, the Bureau proposes to calculate upfront payments on a 
license-by-license basis as follows:
    7. The upfront payment for each license in Auction No. 63 is based 
on 50 percent of the corresponding minimum opening bid amount from 
Auction No. 53, with a minimum of $1,000 per license. The specific 
proposed upfront payment for each license available in Auction No. 63 
is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 63 Comment Public 
Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    8. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront 
payment submitted by a bidder will determine

[[Page 36171]]

the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may place bids. 
This limit is a bidder's initial bidding eligibility. Each license is 
assigned a specific number of bidding units equal to the upfront 
payment listed in Attachment A of the Auction No. 63 Comment Public 
Notice, on a bidding unit per dollar basis. Bidding units for a given 
license do not change as prices rise during the auction. A bidder's 
upfront payment is not attributed to specific licenses. Rather, a 
bidder may place bids on any combination of licenses it selected on its 
FCC Form 175 as long as the total number of bidding units associated 
with those licenses does not exceed the bidder's current eligibility. 
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction; it can only remain 
the same or decrease. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, 
an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units upon 
which it may wish to be active (bid on or hold provisionally winning 
bids on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount 
covering that total number of bidding units. Provisionally winning bids 
at the end of the auction become the winning bids. The Bureau seeks 
comment on this proposal.

C. Activity Rules

    9. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific 
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of 
the auction. A bidder that does not satisfy the activity rule either 
will lose bidding eligibility or use an activity rule waiver.
    10. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into two stages, each 
characterized by a different activity requirement. The auction will 
start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes that the auction generally will 
advance from Stage One to Stage Two when the auction activity level, as 
measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new provisionally 
winning bids, is approximately twenty percent or below for three 
consecutive rounds of bidding. However, the Bureau further proposes 
that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by 
announcement during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the 
Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder activity, 
including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the 
percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there 
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in 
revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
    11. For Auction No. 63, the Bureau proposes the following activity 
requirements:
    Stage One: In each round of the first stage of the auction, a 
bidder desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility is required 
to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its 
current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity 
level will result in a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility 
for the next round of bidding unless an activity rule waiver is used. 
During Stage One, a bidder's reduced eligibility for the next round 
will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round activity 
by five-fourths (\5/4\).
    Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to be active on 95 
percent of its current bidding eligibility. During Stage Two, a 
bidder's reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the bidder's current round activity by twenty-nineteenths 
(\20/19\).
    12. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that 
believe these activity rules should be modified should explain their 
reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. 
Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and 
suggested alternative activity rules.

D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

    13. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current 
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round 
being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies 
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity 
rule waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a 
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of bidding 
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from 
placing a bid in a particular round.
    14. The FCC Auction System assumes that bidders with insufficient 
activity would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if available) 
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding round where a 
bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless: (1) The 
bidder has no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder 
overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing 
eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum requirement. Note: If a bidder 
has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the required activity 
level, its eligibility will be permanently reduced, possibly 
eliminating the bidder from further bidding in the auction. A bidder 
with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its bidding eligibility 
rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the bidder must 
affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the 
bidding round by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function in the FCC 
Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently 
reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as 
described above. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not 
be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
    15. A bidder may apply an activity rule waiver proactively as a 
means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder 
proactively applies an activity rule waiver (using the ``apply waiver'' 
function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in which no 
bids or withdrawals are submitted, the auction will remain open and the 
bidder's eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by 
the FCC Auction System in a round in which there are no new bids or 
withdrawals will not keep the auction open. Note: Applying a waiver is 
irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted that waiver cannot 
be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
    16. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 63 be 
provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used at the 
bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth 
above. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

    17. For Auction No. 63, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice 
or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, 
or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding 
activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason 
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In 
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the 
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its 
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend 
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes

[[Page 36172]]

that exercise of this authority is solely within the discretion of the 
Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for situations 
in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers. The 
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

II. Bidding Procedures

A. Round Structure

    18. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 63 over the Internet. 
Telephonic bidding will also be available. The toll free telephone 
number through which telephonic bidding may be accessed will be 
provided to bidders.
    19. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public 
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the 
auction. The simultaneous multiple-round format will consist of 
sequential bidding rounds, each followed by the release of round 
results. Details regarding the location and format of round results 
will be included in the same public notice.
    20. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, 
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

    21. Section 309(j) calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods 
for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum opening bid 
amount when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the Commission 
determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid amount is not in 
the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has 
directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid 
amount and/or reserve price prior to the start of each auction.
    22. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below 
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can 
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid amount, on 
the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the 
auction below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to 
accelerate the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often 
has the discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the 
auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid amount and the 
reserve price to be the same amount.
    23. In light of Section 309(j)'s requirements, the Bureau proposes 
to establish minimum opening bid amounts for Auction No. 63. The Bureau 
believes a minimum opening bid amount, which has been used in other 
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.
    24. Specifically, for Auction No. 63, the Bureau proposes to 
calculate minimum opening bids on a license-by-license basis as 
follows:
    The minimum opening bid amount for each license in Auction No. 63 
is based on a 50 percent reduction of the corresponding minimum opening 
bid amount from Auction No. 53, with a minimum of $1,000 per license.
    25. The specific minimum opening bid amount for each license 
available in Auction No. 63 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction 
No. 63 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this 
proposal.
    26. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts 
will result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not 
reasonable amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they 
should explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an 
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims 
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening 
bid amount levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bid 
amounts, the Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the 
amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the 
availability of technology to provide service, the size of the 
geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum 
bands and any other relevant factors that could reasonably have an 
impact on valuation of the MVDDS spectrum. The Bureau also seeks 
comment on whether, consistent with Section 309(j), the public interest 
would be served by having no minimum opening bid amount or reserve 
price.

C. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid Increments

    27. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a 
given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Auction System 
will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for each license.
    28. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be equal 
to its minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally 
winning bid for the license. After there is a provisionally winning bid 
for a license, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that license will 
be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning bid plus an 
additional amount. The minimum acceptable bid amount will be calculated 
by multiplying the provisionally winning bid amount times one plus the 
minimum acceptable bid percentage--e.g., if the minimum acceptable bid 
percentage is 5 percent, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal 
(provisionally winning bid amount) * (1.05), rounded. The Bureau will 
round the result using its standard rounding procedures.
    29. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each license consist of the 
minimum acceptable bid amount and additional amounts calculated using 
the minimum acceptable bid amount and the bid increment percentage. The 
Bureau will round the results using our standard rounding procedures. 
The first additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times the sum of one plus the bid increment 
percentage, rounded--e.g., if the bid increment percentage is 5 
percent, the calculation is (minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 + 
0.05), rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05, rounded; the 
second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable 
bid amount times the sum of one plus two times the bid increment 
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.10, 
rounded; the third additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times the sum of one plus three times the bid 
increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 
1.15, rounded; etc. Note that the bid increment percentage need not be 
the same as the minimum acceptable bid percentage.
    30. In the case of a license for which the provisionally winning 
bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal 
the second highest bid received for the license.
    31. For Auction No. 63, the Bureau proposes to use a minimum 
acceptable bid percentage of five percent. This means that the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for a license will be approximately five percent 
greater than the provisionally winning bid amount for the license. The 
Bureau proposes to use a bid increment percentage of five percent.
    32. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid percentage, and the 
bid increment percentage if it determines that circumstances so 
dictate. The Bureau

[[Page 36173]]

will do so by announcement in the FCC Auction System during the 
auction. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.

D. Provisionally Winning Bids

    33. At the end of a bidding round, a provisionally winning bid for 
each license will be determined based on the highest bid amount 
received for the license. In the event of identical high bid amounts 
being submitted on a license in a given round (i.e., tied bids), the 
Bureau proposes to use a random number generator to select a single 
provisionally winning bid from among the tied bids. If the auction were 
to end with no higher bids being placed for that license, the winning 
bidder would be the one that placed the selected provisionally winning 
bid. However, the remaining bidders, as well as the provisionally 
winning bidder, can submit higher bids in subsequent rounds. If any 
bids are received on the license in a subsequent round, the 
provisionally winning bid again will be determined by the highest bid 
amount received for the license.
    34. A provisionally winning bid will remain the provisionally 
winning bid until there is a higher bid on the same license at the 
close of a subsequent round, unless the provisionally winning bid is 
withdrawn. Provisionally winning bids at the end of the auction become 
the winning bids. Bidders are reminded that provisionally winning bids 
confer credit for activity.

E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

    35. For Auction No. 63, the Bureau proposes the following bid 
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding 
round, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that 
round. By removing selected bids in the FCC Auction System, a bidder 
may effectively unsubmit any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal 
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
    36. A bidder may withdraw its provisionally winning bids using the 
``withdraw bids'' function in the FCC Auction System. A bidder that 
withdraws its provisionally winning bid(s) is subject to the bid 
withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission's rules. The Bureau 
seeks comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.
    37. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 63 FR 770, January 7, 
1998, the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals 
facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of 
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the 
course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some 
instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The 
Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit 
the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission 
stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion, 
consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw 
bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the 
Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal 
procedures.
    38. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each 
bidder in Auction No. 63 to withdrawing provisionally winning bids in 
no more than one round during the course of the auction. To permit a 
bidder to withdraw bids in more than one round may encourage insincere 
bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The 
round in which withdrawals may be used will be at each bidder's 
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the 
Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of provisionally 
winning bids that may be withdrawn in the round in which withdrawals 
are used. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment 
provisions specified in the Commission's rules. The Bureau seeks 
comment on this proposal.

F. Stopping Rule

    39. The Bureau has discretion ``to establish stopping rules before 
or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction 
within a reasonable time.'' For Auction No. 63, the Bureau proposes to 
employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping 
rule means that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding 
closes simultaneously on all licenses.
    40. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the 
first round in which no bidder submits any new bids, applies a 
proactive waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning bids. Thus, 
unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding will remain open on all 
licenses until bidding stops on every license.
    41. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to 
exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 63:
    i. Use a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The 
modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after 
the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, places a 
withdrawal or submits any new bids on any license for which it is not 
the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding 
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the 
provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction open under this 
modified stopping rule. The Bureau further seeks comment on whether 
this modified stopping rule should be used at any time or only in stage 
two of the auction.
    ii. Keep the auction open even if no bidder submits any new bids, 
applies a waiver or places any withdrawals. In this event, the effect 
will be the same as if a bidder had applied a waiver. The activity 
rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder with insufficient 
activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a remaining 
activity rule waiver.
    iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes 
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final 
round(s) and the auction will close.
    42. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain 
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very 
slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely 
that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time. 
Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to 
increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number 
of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum 
bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still 
a high level of bidding activity. The Bureau seeks comment on these 
proposals.

III. Conclusion

    43. Comments are due on or before June 28, 2005, and reply comments 
are due on or before July 6, 2005. All filings must be addressed to the 
Commission's Secretary Attn: WTB/ASAD, Office of the Secretary, Federal 
Communications Commission. Parties who file by paper must file an 
original and four copies of each filing. U.S. Postal Service first-
class, Express, and Priority mail should be addressed to 445 12th 
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554. Filings can be sent by hand or 
messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class 
or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. Because of the disruption of 
regular mail and other deliveries in

[[Page 36174]]

Washington, DC, the Bureau also requires that all comments and reply 
comments be filed electronically. Comments and reply comments and 
copies of material filed with the Commission pertaining to Auction No. 
63, must be sent by electronic mail to the following address: 
[email protected]. The electronic mail containing the comments or reply 
comments must include a subject or caption referring to Auction No. 63 
Comments and the name of the commenting party. The Bureau requests that 
parties format any attachments to electronic mail as Adobe[reg] 
Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word documents. Copies of comments 
and reply comments will be available for public inspection between 8 
a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Monday through Thursday and 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on 
Fridays in the FCC Reference Information Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th 
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554, and will also be posted on the Web 
page for Auction No. 63 at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/63/.
    44. This proceeding has been designated as a permit-but-disclose 
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons 
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda 
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance 
of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects 
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and 
arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to 
oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose 
proceedings are set forth in section 1.1206(b) of the Commission's 
rules.

Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division.
[FR Doc. 05-12319 Filed 6-21-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P