[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 115 (Thursday, June 16, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35153-35155]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-11866]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-03-14455]


Pipeline Safety: Public Meeting on Applying, Interpreting, and 
Evaluating Data From In-Line Inspection Devices

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice; public meeting.

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SUMMARY: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's 
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is hosting a public meeting to discuss 
concerns it has with how operators are applying, interpreting, and 
evaluating data acquired from In-Line Inspection Devices (ILI), and 
OPS's expectations about how operators should be effectively 
integrating this data with other information about the operator's 
pipeline. The meeting will be held Thursday, August 11, 2005, in 
Houston, TX, and is open to all interested parties.

DATES: The public meeting will be held Thursday, August 11, 2005, from 
8:30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held in Houston, TX. The meeting 
location has not been determined yet and will be made available on 
http://ops.dot.gov shortly.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joy Kadnar (PHMSA/OPS) at 202-366-
0568; [email protected], regarding the subject matter of this notice. 
For information regarding meeting logistics, please contact Veronica 
Garrison at (202) 366-4996; [email protected] or Janice Morgan 
at (202) 366-2392; [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Subsequent to information acquired from 
integrity management program inspections and problems discovered during 
accident investigations, OPS has become concerned with performance 
issues associated with in-line inspection devices and how the data from 
these devices is being integrated with other information on the 
pipeline system. So that OPS can share these concerns in a public 
forum, OPS invites public participation in a meeting to be held 
Thursday, August 11, 2005, to discuss the characterization--
discrimination, interpretation, and evaluation--of data acquired from 
ILI devices.
    ILI technology has been used for approximately 20 years and has 
become the preferred method used by pipeline operators to ensure the 
integrity of their pipeline assets. However, as demonstrated by recent 
accidents on hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline systems, some 
pipelines that were inspected by ILI devices continue to fail.
    OPS will share its findings from these accidents and from recent 
Integrity Management Program (IMP) inspections. OPS needs to determine 
if the problem resides in the technology or in the secondary and 
tertiary stages of the ILI data evaluation--data characterization, 
validation, and mitigation. Specifically, is the problem data analysis, 
peer review of technicians involved in data review, lack of common 
standards for data review, detection thresholds, data validation, or 
the understanding of each tool's strengths and weaknesses? A secondary 
objective of this meeting is for OPS to understand how the government, 
pipeline operators, standards organizations, and ILI vendors can help 
improve pipeline assessment using ILI technology. At this public 
meeting, OPS will highlight effective practices and use this medium to 
share these practices with the public.

[[Page 35154]]

    The preliminary agenda for this meeting includes briefings on the 
following topics:
     OPS's Experiences on Data Extracted using ILI Devices.
     OPS Case Studies.
     Hazardous Liquid IMP Inspection Experiences.
     Views of Pipeline Operators.
     Perspective from ILI Vendors.
     Focus of Independent ILI Data Analysts.
     ILI Standards--

    --Personnel Qualification and Vendor Reports;
    --ILI Flaw Detection Criteria;
    --ILI Data Discrimination;
    --Field Evaluation of ILI Data--Statistical Sampling, Flaw 
Thresholds, and Tolerances;
    --Contractual Criteria for Defect Reports.
     Next Steps.

Background

    ILI is the preferred technology to assure pipeline integrity. The 
OPS IMP inspections have revealed that many operators elect to use ILI 
devices to inspect their ``piggable'' pipeline sections to evaluate the 
condition of the pipe wall. OPS also found that many pipeline operators 
now use high-resolution and deformation ILI tools.
    OPS is concerned about the secondary and tertiary evaluations being 
performed after ILI data is acquired because of several accidents that 
have occurred throughout the U.S. in the recent past. According to 
OPS's experience, failures have occurred on pipelines inspected by all 
types of ILI tools. The following are some examples of pipelines that 
failed relatively soon after the pipelines were inspected, the data was 
analyzed, and the findings were reported to the pipeline operators:
     In 1999, a small hazardous liquid pipeline operator used a 
state-of-the-art tool and mischaracterized a ``wrinkle with a crack'' 
as a ``T-piece.'' A few months later the pipeline ruptured at the 
location of this wrinkle. Most appurtenances and fittings like a T-
Piece will be welded to the main pipe. However, there were no girth 
welds on either side of this mischaracterized T-piece as is typical for 
a T-piece.
     In 2003, a hazardous liquid pipeline that was inspected 
just about a year before, failed in service. OPS's investigation 
revealed that general corrosion caused the failure. On analyzing the 
data, OPS gathered that the ILI tool detected some pitting and the 
maximum pit depth was reported to be less that 50% of remaining wall. 
However, from a metallurgical analysis of the pipe segment OPS 
discovered 27 corrosion pits varying from 18% wall loss to 95% wall 
loss. The pipe failed where the wall loss was 95%.
     In February 2004, a natural gas pipeline operator launched 
a geometry pig but the tool missed a series of wrinkles. One of those 
wrinkles ruptured. During our post-incident investigation OPS 
discovered that other wrinkles in the pipe were called out as pipe wall 
thickness changes although there were no girth welds adjacent to the 
location where the wall thickness changed.
     Another hazardous liquid pipeline that was inspected seven 
times with different tools in a span of 10 years ruptured in 2004. The 
rupture was determined to have been caused by general corrosion. The 
general corrosion was detected by an ILI tool launched before the most 
recent ILI run.
     In October 2004, a hazardous liquid pipeline operator 
launched three tools--a geometry pig, a corrosion detection pig, and an 
axial flaw detection pig--in relative succession to conduct a baseline 
assessment and to comply with the IMP regulations. About six months 
after these tools were launched, the pipeline's seam split.
     In November 2003, incipient third party damage caused 
another hazardous liquid pipeline to rupture just eight months after it 
was pigged. Our investigation revealed several longitudinal scratches 
and gouges on the pipe surface that were undetected by the ILI device.
    From our IMP inspections, OPS has also learned that pipeline 
operators do not have a consistent, standardized process to evaluate 
and assess data extracted by ILI devices. For example, some pipeline 
operators provide guidance to ILI vendors, contract field inspection 
personnel, and company personnel on how to assess ILI data. Others rely 
entirely on the ILI vendor or may actively participate in data 
extraction, or may even conduct an independent peer review of the ILI 
data if they have in-house expertise.
    For corrosion anomalies, pipeline operators use different 
interaction criteria. Some pipeline operators want only the deepest pit 
reported on each pipe length. Others want all pit depths reported. One 
pipeline operator directed the ILI vendor to report all anomalies, 
especially those with signatures that are indecipherable. OPS believes 
this to be a good practice, although it is not universally applied.
    OPS believes that most of the pipeline failures that occurred on 
pipeline segments that were inspected with ILI tools could have been 
prevented with the correct application of technology. The failures that 
OPS investigated have revealed that the larger problem may be with the 
machine-man interface during the latter stages of data analyses. 
Specifically, should the repositories of flaw signatures that ILI 
vendors use be improved? Must there be more attention expended on the 
peer review of technicians? Is the sample size used to confirm 
electronic data adequate or must it be increased? Should the data 
extraction process be more stringently monitored?
    Pipeline operators use a variety of surveying, monitoring, and 
testing practices to assure the integrity of their assets. Different 
practices may be used independently, or as supplements to others to 
assess pipeline integrity. ILI is just one of many integrity assurance 
practices used by the pipeline industry. An ILI using a smart device is 
one method to interrogate the pipe wall to detect irregularities that 
could decrease the pressure containment strength of the pipe.
    An ILI device is a computerized, self-contained device that is 
inserted into the pipeline. These ILI devices are propelled forward by 
the fluid flowing through the pipeline and record information of the 
pipe wall as they travel through the pipeline. An ILI tool can detect, 
measure, record, and display irregularities in the pipe wall. These 
irregularities may represent corrosion, cracks, laminations, geometric 
deformations (dents, gouges, ovality, wrinkles, ripples, buckles), and 
other defects.
    Specialized ``smart pigs'' rely on various technologies to detect 
and determine the existence and severity of features in the pipeline. 
Corrosion tools use a magnetic field or ultra-sound to detect and 
record changes in the wall thickness of the pipe (crack detection tools 
most commonly use ultrasound) generating a signal into the pipe wall, 
which, based on how the signal is reflected back, detects cracks. 
Geometry tools examine a number of characteristics using mechanical 
fingers or electromagnetic waves to measure deviations in a pipeline's 
internal diameter or to show the position of dents in the pipe.
    OPS is concerned that some pipelines continue to fail after being 
inspected by ILI tools. OPS will discuss its concerns at this public 
forum and share its expectations on how operators integrate this data. 
During this public meeting, OPS will seek answers to the following 
questions:
     What are operators' experiences and expectations with the 
capabilities of ILI technology?

[[Page 35155]]

     Is there a gap in understanding ILI tool data submitted by 
vendors of this technology?
     Do ILI technology vendors educate their clients about the 
limitations of the tool being recommended for the application?
     What defect detection and report criteria are used? Is it 
developed jointly by the vendor and the pipeline operator?
     How are tool defect identification tolerances applied in 
reported criteria?
     Is there a formal detection, validation, and mitigation 
process used to evaluate defects? How is it communicated to the 
pipeline operator?
     What process is used to arrive at the number of 
confirmatory digs to corroborate the data extracted by the ILI device?
     Are the standards developed for ILI technology appropriate 
for the current state ILI deployment? Does the guidance meet the needs 
of the large or small pipeline operator who is the first-time user of 
such technology?
    OPS expects at this public meeting to inform on the following:
     The technique and criteria used to report defects;
     Information exchange between the ILI vendor and pipeline 
operator during the secondary and tertiary stages of flaw 
characterization;
     The currency and adequacy of performance standards for 
vendors of assessment technologies;
     Sufficiency and relevance of performance standards for ILI 
assessment technology; and
     Stages in data discrimination: Detection, validation, and 
mitigation.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on June 10, 2005.
Joy Kadnar,
Director of Engineering and Emergency Support, Office of Pipeline 
Safety.
[FR Doc. 05-11866 Filed 6-15-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P