[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 100 (Wednesday, May 25, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30151-30156]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-2631]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement Regarding Revision to the 
Completion Time in STS 3.6.1.3, ``Primary Containment Isolation 
Valves'' for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors Using the 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) 
relating to changes to the completion time (CT) in Standard Technical 
Specification (STS) 3.6.1.3 ``Primary Containment Isolation Valves 
(PCIVs).'' The proposed change to the Technical Specifications (TS) 
would extend to 7 days the CT (or allowed outage time (AOT)) to restore 
an inoperable PCIV or isolate the affected penetration flow path for 
selected primary containment penetrations with two (or more) PCIVs and 
for selected primary containment penetrations with only one PCIV. This 
change is based on analyses provided in a generic topical report (TR) 
submitted by the Boiling Water Reactors Owner's Group (BWROG). The 
BWROG participants in the TS Task Force (TSTF) proposed this change to 
the STS in Change Traveler No. TSTF-454, Revision 0. This notice also 
includes a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) 
determination relating to this matter.
    The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently 
process amendments to incorporate this change into plant-specific TS 
for General Electric boiling water reactors (BWRs). Licensees of 
nuclear power reactors to which the models apply can request amendments 
conforming to the models. In such a request, a licensee should confirm 
the applicability of the SE and NSHC determination to its plant. The 
NRC staff is requesting comments on the model SE and model NSHC 
determination before announcing their availability for referencing in 
license amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires 60 days from the date of this 
publication. Comments received after this date will be considered if it 
is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure 
consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail.
    Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, 
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail 
Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
    Submit comments by electronic mail to: [email protected].
    Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, One White Flint North, Public File Area O1-F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bhalchandra Vaidya, Mail Stop: O-7D1, 
Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-3308.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process [CLIIP] for Adopting Standard Technical 
Specifications Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 
2000. The CLIIP is intended to improve the efficiency and transparency 
of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed 
changes to the STS in a manner that supports subsequent license 
amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the 
public to comment on proposed changes to the STS following a 
preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change 
will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. This notice is 
soliciting comment on a proposed change to the STS that changes the 
PCIV CTs for the BWR/4 and BWR/6 STS, NUREG-1433, Revision 3 and NUREG-
1434, Revision 3, respectively. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to 
evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to 
either reconsider the change or proceed with announcing the 
availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those 
licensees opting to apply for the subject change to TSs are responsible 
for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable 
technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific 
information. Each amendment application made in response to the notice 
of availability would be processed and noticed in accordance with 
applicable NRC rules and procedures.
    This notice involves an increase in the allowed CTs to restore an 
inoperable PCIV or isolate the affected penetration flow path when 
selected PCIVs are inoperable at BWRs. By letter dated September 5, 
2003, the BWROG proposed this change for incorporation into the STS as 
TSTF-454, Revision 0. This change is based on the NRC staff-approved 
generic analyses contained in the BWROG TR NEDC-33046, ``Technical 
Justification to Support Risk-Informed Primary Containment Isolation 
Valve AOT Extensions for BWR Plants,'' submitted on May 3, 2002, as 
supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as approved by the NRC 
by letter and Safety Evaluation dated October 8, 2004, accessible 
electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management 
System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic

[[Page 30152]]

Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS Accession No. ML042660055) at the 
NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do 
not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the 
documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room 
Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by 
e-mail to [email protected].

Applicability

    This proposed change to revise the TS CTs for selected PCIVs is 
applicable to General Electric BWRs.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the NRC staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed 
by TSTF-454, Revision 0, using the CLIIP to address the seven plant-
specific conditions and the one commitment identified in the model SE, 
as follows:

Conditions

    1. Because not all penetrations have the same impact on core damage 
frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), incremental 
conditional core damage frequency (ICCDP), or incremental conditional 
large early release frequency (ICLERP), a licensee's application must 
provide supporting information that verifies the applicability of TR 
NEDC-33046, including verification that the PCIV configurations for the 
specific plant match the licensing topical report (LTR) and the risk 
parameter values used in the LTR are bounding for the specific plant. 
Any additional PCIV configurations or non-bounding risk parameter 
values not evaluated by the LTR should be included in the licensee's 
plant-specific analysis. [Note that PCIV configurations or non-bounding 
risk parameter values outside the scope of the LTR will require NRC 
staff review of the specific penetrations and related justifications 
for the proposed CTs.]
    2. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies that external event risk, either through quantitative or 
qualitative evaluation, will not have an adverse impact on the 
conclusions of the plant-specific analysis for extending the PCIV AOTs.
    3. Because TR NEDC-33046 was based on generic plant 
characteristics, each licensee adopting the TR must provide supporting 
information that confirms plant-specific Tier 3 information in their 
individual submittals. The licensee's application must provide 
supporting information that discusses conformance to the requirements 
of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), as they relate to the 
proposed PCIV AOTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93.01, Section 
11, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.182, including verification 
that the licensee's maintenance rule program, with respect to PCIVs, 
includes a LERF/ICLERP assessment as part of the maintenance rule 
process.
    4. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies that a penetration remains intact during maintenance 
activities, including corrective maintenance activities. Regarding 
maintenance activities where the pressure boundary would be broken, the 
licensee must provide supporting information that confirms that the 
assumptions and results of the LTR remain valid. This includes the 
assumption that maintenance on a PCIV will not break the pressure 
boundary for more than the currently allowed AOT.
    5. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies the operability of the remaining PCIVs in the associated 
penetration flow path before entering the AOT for the inoperable PCIV.
    6. Simultaneously entering the extended AOT for multiple PCIVs and 
the resulting impact on risk were not specifically evaluated by the 
BWROG. However, TR NEDC-33046 does state that multiple PCIVs can be out 
of service simultaneously during extended AOTs and does not preclude 
the practice. Therefore, since the current STS also allows separate 
condition entry for each penetration flow path, the licensee's 
application will provide supporting information that verifies that the 
potential for any cumulative risk impact of failed PCIVs and multiple 
PCIV extended AOT entries has been evaluated and is acceptable. The 
licensee's Tier 3 configuration risk management program (10 CFR 
50.65(a)(4)) must provide supporting information that confirms that 
such simultaneous extended AOT entries for inoperable PCIVs in separate 
penetration flow paths will not exceed the RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 
acceptance guidelines, as confirmed by the analysis presented in TR 
NEDC-33046, and that adequate defense-in-depth for safety systems is 
maintained.
    7. The licensee shall provide supporting information that verifies 
that the plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) quality is 
acceptable for this application in accordance with the guidelines given 
in RG 1.174. To ensure the applicability of TR NEDC-33046, to a 
licensee's plant, additional information on PRA quality will be 
required from each licensee requesting an amendment in the following 
areas:
    a. Justification that the plant-specific PRA reflects the as-built, 
as-operated plant.
    b. Applicable PRA updates including individual plant examinations/
individual plant examinations of external events (IPE/IPEEE) findings.
    c. Conclusions of the peer review including any A or B facts and 
observations (F and Os) applicable to the proposed PCIV extended CTs.
    d. The PRA quality assurance program and associated procedures.
    e. PRA adequacy, completeness, and applicability with respect to 
evaluating the proposed PCIV extended AOT plant specific impact.

Commitment

    1. The RG 1.177 Tier 3 program ensures that while the plant is in a 
limiting condition for operation (LCO) condition with an extended AOT 
for an inoperable PCIV, additional activities will not be performed 
that could further degrade the capabilities of the plant to respond to 
a condition the inoperable PCIV or system was designed to mitigate and, 
as a result, increase plant risk beyond that assumed by the LTR 
analysis. A licensee's implementation of RG 1.177 Tier 3 guidelines 
generally implies the assessment of risk with respect to CDF. However, 
the proposed PCIV AOT impacts containment isolation and consequently 
LERF as well as CDF. Therefore, a licensee's configuration risk 
management program (CRMP), including those implemented under the 
maintenance rule of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), must be enhanced to include a 
LERF methodology/assessment and must be documented in a licensee's 
plant-specific submittal.
    The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative 
approach or proposing the changes without providing the information 
described in the above 7 conditions, or making the requested 
commitment. Variations from the approach recommended in this notice 
may, however, require additional review by the NRC staff and may 
increase the time and resources needed for the review.

Public Notices

    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 60 days of the date of this publication. Following the NRC 
staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of this notice, the 
NRC staff may reconsider the proposed change or may proceed with 
announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent notice 
(perhaps with some changes to the SE or

[[Page 30153]]

proposed NSHC determination as a result of public comments). If the NRC 
staff announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to 
adopt the change will submit an application in accordance with 
applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. The NRC staff will, 
in turn, issue for each application a notice of consideration of 
issuance of amendment to facility operating license(s), a proposed NSHC 
determination, and an opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance 
of an amendment to operating license(s) will also be issued to announce 
the revised requirements for each plant that applies for and receives 
the requested change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Consolidated Line Item Improvement
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler No. TSTF-454, 
Revision 0, ``Increase PCIV Completion Times From 4 hours, 24 hours 
[note that the 24-hour portion was withdrawn], and 72 hours to 7 days 
(NEDC-33046)''

1.0 Introduction

    By application dated [ ] , [Licensee] (the licensee) requested 
changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for [facility]. The 
proposed changes would revise TS 3.6.1.3, ``Primary Containment 
Isolation Valves (PCIVs),'' by extending to 7 days the completion time 
(CT) to restore an inoperable PCIV or isolate the affected penetration 
flow path for selected primary containment penetrations with two (or 
more) PCIVs and for selected primary containment penetrations with only 
one PCIV.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    The existing Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3, 
requires that each PCIV be operable. The operability of PCIVs ensures 
that the containment is isolated during a design-basis accident (DBA) 
and is able to perform its function as a barrier to the release of 
radioactive material. For boiling water reactor (BWR)/4 plants, if a 
PCIV is inoperable in one or more penetrations, the current required 
action is to isolate or restore the inoperable PCIV to operable status 
within 4 hours for penetrations with 2 PCIVs (except for the main steam 
line, in which case 8 hours is allowed), and within 4 hours for 
penetrations with a single PCIV (except for excess flow check valves 
(EFCVs) and penetrations with a closed system, and for other cases if 
justified with a plant-specific evaluation, in which case 72 hours is 
allowed). Regarding the leakage rate of EFCVs, 72 hours is also 
currently allowed to restore EFCV leakage to within limit. For BWR/6 
plants, the current required actions are the same as those for the BWR/
4 plants with the exception that there are no TSs for EFCVs. The times 
specified for performing these actions were considered reasonable, 
given the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative 
importance of ensuring containment integrity during plant operation. In 
the case of a single EFCV PCIV or a single PCIV and a closed system, 
the specified CT takes into consideration the ability of the instrument 
and the small pipe diameter (associated with the EFCV) or the closed 
system to act as a penetration boundary.
    On May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, the 
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group (BWROG) submitted the generic 
Topical Report (TR) NEDC-33046, which provided a risk-informed 
justification for extending the TS allowed outage time (AOT) (also 
referred to as completion time), for a specific set of inoperable PCIVs 
from the current 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. Specifically, for BWR/4 
plants, if a PCIV is inoperable in one or more penetrations, the 
proposed action is to isolate or restore the inoperable PCIV to 
operable status within 7 days for penetrations with 2 PCIVs (except for 
the feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs) and the residual heat removal 
(RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, in which case the 4 hours is 
kept, and except for the main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs), in 
which case the 8 hours is kept); and within 4 hours for penetrations 
with a single PCIV, except for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed 
system, in which case 7 days is allowed (and except for other cases if 
justified with a plant-specific evaluation, in which case the 72 hours 
is kept). Regarding the leakage rate of EFCVs, 7 days is also proposed 
to restore EFCV leakage to within the limit. For BWR/6 plants, the 
proposed actions are the same as those for the BWR/4 plants with the 
exception that for penetrations with 2 PCIVs, there is an additional 
exception to the 7-day AOT (for the low pressure core spray system 
PCIVs, in which case the 4 hours is kept); and with the exception that 
there are no TSs for EFCVs.
    The NRC staff used the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, 
``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed 
Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis, 
1998,'' and RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed 
Decision Making: Technical Specifications, 1998,'' in performing its 
review of this TR. RG 1.174 provides the guidelines to determine the 
risk level associated with the proposed change. RG 1.177 provides a 
three-tiered approach to evaluate the risks associated with proposed 
license amendments. The first tier evaluates the probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) model and the impacts of the changes on plant 
operational risk. The second tier addresses the need to preclude 
potentially high risk configurations, should additional equipment 
outages occur during the AOT. The third tier evaluates the licensee's 
configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that the removal 
of equipment from service immediately prior to or during the proposed 
AOT will be appropriately assessed from a risk perspective. The NRC 
staff's safety evaluation (SE) dated October 8, 2004, also discusses 
the applicable regulations and additional applicable regulatory 
criteria/guidelines that were considered in its review of TR NEDC-
33046.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

3.1 Statement of Proposed Changes

    The proposed changes to TS 3.6.1.3 include:
    1. For the Condition of one or more penetration flow paths with one 
PCIV inoperable in a penetration flow path with two [or more] PCIVs, 
the Completion Times for isolating the affected penetration (in 
Standard Technical Specification (STS) 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1) are 
revised from ``4 hours except for main steam line AND 8 hours for main 
steam line,'' to ``4 hours for feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs), 
residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, and 
Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System PCIVs (NUREG-1434 only) AND 8 
hours for main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) AND 7 days except 
for FWIVs, RHR shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, LPCS System PCIVs 
(NUREG-1434 only), and MSIVs.'' For PCIVs not analyzed in NEDC-33046 
(i.e., FWIVs and MSIVs), the current Completion Times of 4 hours and 8 
hours (of STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1) are maintained; 4 hours for 
FWIVs and 8 hours for main steam lines (i.e., MSIVs as described in the 
current Bases for STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1). For PCIVs analyzed 
in NEDC-33046 that did not meet the criterion for extension (i.e., RHR 
shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs (for all BWRs) and LPCS System 
PCIVs (for BWR/5 and BWR/6 designs only), the current Completion Time 
(of 4 hours of STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1) is maintained. The 
Completion

[[Page 30154]]

Time for other PCIVs, associated with penetrations with two [or more] 
PCIVs, is extended to 7 days.
    2. For the Condition of one or more penetration flow paths with one 
PCIV inoperable in a penetration flow path with only one PCIV, the 
Completion Times for isolating the affected penetrations (STS 3.6.1.3 
Required Action C.1) are revised from ``4 hours except for excess flow 
check valves (EFCVs) and penetrations with a closed system AND 72 hours 
for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed system,'' to ``4 hours except 
for excess flow check valves (EFCVs) and penetrations with a closed 
system AND [72 hours] [7 days] for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed 
system.'' (For NUREG-1434, the Completion Times for STS 3.6.1.3 
Required Action C.1 are revised from ``4 hours except for penetrations 
with a closed system AND 72 hours for penetrations with a closed 
system,'' to ``4 hours except for penetrations with a closed system AND 
[72 hours] [7 days] for penetrations with a closed system.'')
    3. For the Condition of one or more [secondary containment bypass 
leakage rate,] [MSIV leakage rate,] [purge valves leakage rate,] 
[hydrostatically tested line leakage rate,] [or] [EFCV leakage rate] 
not within limit, the Completion Time for restoring leakage rate to 
within limit, when the leakage rate exceeded is the EFCV leakage rate 
(in STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action D.1), is revised from ``[72 hours]'' to 
``[7 days]'' by adding a new Completion Time, ``[AND 7 days for EFCV 
leakage].'' (The EFCV leakage rate Completion Time change is not 
applicable to NUREG-1434.)

3.2 Evaluation of Proposed Changes

    The NRC staff's SE on TR NEDC-33046, dated October 8, 2004, found 
that based on the use of bounding risk parameters for General Electric 
(GE)-designed plants, for the proposed increase in the PCIV AOT from 4 
hours (for penetrations with 2 or more PCIVs) or 72 hours (for 
penetrations with a single EFCV PCIV, and penetrations with a single 
PCIV and a closed system) or 72 hours (for EFCV leakage) to 7 days, the 
risk impact of the proposed 7-day AOT for the PCIVs as estimated by 
core damage frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), 
incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP), and 
incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP), is 
consistent with the acceptance guidelines specified in RG 1.174, RG 
1.177, and NRC staff guidance outlined in Chapter 16.1 of NUREG-0800. 
The NRC staff found that the risk analysis methodology and approach 
used by the BWROG to estimate the risk impacts were reasonable and of 
sufficient quality.
    The NRC staff's October 8, 2004, SE also found the following. The 
Tier 2 evaluation did not identify any risk-significant plant equipment 
configurations requiring TS, procedure, or compensatory measures. TR 
NEDC-33046 implements a CRMP (Tier 3) using 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) to 
manage plant risk when PCIVs are taken out-of-service. PCIV reliability 
and availability will also be monitored and assessed under the 
maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) to confirm that performance continues 
to be consistent with the analysis assumptions used to justify extended 
PCIVs AOTs.
    The NRC staff's October 8, 2004, SE also found that the following 
conditions and commitment must be addressed by licensees adopting TR 
NEDC-33046 in plant-specific applications that seek approval of TSTF-
454, Revision 0 for their plants:
Conditions
    1. Because not all penetrations have the same impact on core damage 
frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), incremental 
conditional core damage frequency (ICCDP), or incremental conditional 
large early release frequency (ICLERP), a licensee's application must 
provide supporting information that verifies the applicability of TR 
NEDC-33046, including verification that the PCIV configurations for the 
specific plant match the licensing topical report (LTR) and the risk 
parameter values used in the LTR are bounding for the specific plant. 
Any additional PCIV configurations or non-bounding risk parameter 
values not evaluated by the LTR should be included in the licensee's 
plant-specific analysis. [Note that PCIV configurations or non-bounding 
risk parameter values outside the scope of the LTR will require NRC 
staff review of the specific penetrations and related justifications 
for the proposed CTs.]
    2. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies that external event risk, either through quantitative or 
qualitative evaluation, will not have an adverse impact on the 
conclusions of the plant-specific analysis for extending the PCIV AOTs.
    3. Because TR NEDC-33046 was based on generic plant 
characteristics, each licensee adopting the TR must provide supporting 
information that confirms plant-specific Tier 3 information in their 
individual submittals. The licensee's application must provide 
supporting information that discusses the conformance to the 
requirements of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), as they 
relate to the proposed PCIV AOTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 
93.01, Section 11, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.182, 
including verification that the licensee's maintenance rule program, 
with respect to PCIVs, includes a LERF/ICLERP assessment as part of the 
maintenance rule process.
    4. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies that a penetration remains intact during maintenance 
activities, including corrective maintenance activities. Regarding 
maintenance activities where the pressure boundary would be broken, the 
licensee must provide supporting information that confirms that the 
assumptions and results of the LTR remain valid. This includes the 
assumption that maintenance on a PCIV will not break the pressure 
boundary for more than the currently allowed AOT.
    5. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies the operability of the remaining PCIVs in the associated 
penetration flow path before entering the AOT for the inoperable PCIV.
    6. Simultaneously entering the extended AOT for multiple PCIVs and 
the resulting impact on risk were not specifically evaluated by the 
BWROG. However, TR NEDC-33046 does state that multiple PCIVs can be out 
of service simultaneously during extended AOTs and does not preclude 
the practice. Therefore, since the current STS also allows separate 
condition entry for each penetration flow path, the licensee's 
application will provide supporting information that verifies that the 
potential for any cumulative risk impact of failed PCIVs and multiple 
PCIV extended AOT entries has been evaluated and is acceptable. The 
licensee's Tier 3 configuration risk management program (10 CFR 
50.65(a)(4)) must provide supporting information that confirms that 
such simultaneous extended AOT entries for inoperable PCIVs in separate 
penetration flow paths will not exceed the RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 
acceptance guidelines, as confirmed by the analysis presented in TR 
NEDC-33046, and that adequate defense-in-depth for safety systems is 
maintained.
    7. The licensee shall provide supporting information that verifies 
that the plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) quality is 
acceptable for this application in accordance with the guidelines given 
in RG 1.174. To ensure the applicability of TR NEDC-33046, to a 
licensee's plant, additional information on PRA quality will be

[[Page 30155]]

required from each licensee requesting an amendment in the following 
areas:
    a. Justification that the plant-specific PRA reflects the as-built, 
as-operated plant.
    b. Applicable PRA updates including individual plant examinations/
individual plant examinations of external events (IPE/IPEEE) findings.
    c. Conclusions of the peer review including any A or B facts and 
observations (F and Os) applicable to the proposed PCIV extended CTs.
    d. The PRA quality assurance program and associated procedures.
    e. PRA adequacy, completeness, and applicability with respect to 
evaluating the proposed PCIV extended AOT plant specific impact.
Commitment
    1. The RG 1.177 Tier 3 program ensures that while the plant is in a 
limiting condition for operation (LCO) condition with an extended AOT 
for an inoperable PCIV, additional activities will not be performed 
that could further degrade the capabilities of the plant to respond to 
a condition the inoperable PCIV or system was designed to mitigate and, 
as a result, increase plant risk beyond that assumed by the LTR 
analysis. A licensee's implementation of RG 1.177 Tier 3 guidelines 
generally implies the assessment of risk with respect to CDF. However, 
the proposed PCIV AOT impacts containment isolation and consequently 
LERF as well as CDF. Therefore, a licensee's configuration risk 
management program (CRMP), including those implemented under the 
maintenance rule of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), must be enhanced to include a 
LERF methodology/assessment and must be documented in a licensee's 
plant-specific submittal.
Staff Findings
    The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed TS changes and finds that 
they are consistent with previous staff reviews of TR NEDC-33046 as 
supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as approved by the NRC 
by letter and Safety Evaluation dated October 8, 2004, and TSTF-454, 
Revision 0, and are acceptable. The NRC staff has also reviewed the 
licensee's supporting information and the statements regarding the 
above conditions and commitment and finds them acceptable. Therefore, 
the NRC staff finds that the increase in the CTs from 4 hours (for 
penetrations with 2 or more PCIVs) or 72 hours (for penetrations with a 
single EFCV PCIV, and penetrations with a single PCIV and a closed 
system) or 72 hours (for EFCV leakage) to 7 days is justified.

4.0 Regulatory Commitment

    The licensee's letter dated [ ], contained the following regulatory 
commitment:

[State the licensee's commitment and ensure that it satisfies the 
commitment in this SE, in Section 3.2 above.]

    The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation 
and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the 
above regulatory commitment are best provided by the licensee's 
administrative processes, including its commitment management program. 
The above regulatory commitment does not warrant the creation of a 
regulatory requirement (item requiring prior NRC approval of subsequent 
changes).

5.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [State] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The 
State official had [choose one: (1) No comments, or (2) the following 
comments--with subsequent disposition by the staff].

6.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. The NRC staff has 
determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the 
amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that 
may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in 
individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The 
Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no 
public comment on such finding (XX FR XXXXX). Accordingly, the 
amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set 
forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that: (1) There is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by the operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 
the health and safety of the public.

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendment extends 
the completion time (CT) for penetration flow paths with one valve 
inoperable from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. The change is applicable 
to both primary containment penetrations with two (or more) primary 
containment isolation valves (PCIVs) and with one PCIV. This change is 
not applicable to the feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs), the residual 
heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, the low 
pressure core spray (LPCS) PCIVs (boiling water reactor (BWR)/6 only), 
the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), and [list of plant-specific 
valves].
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The 
proposed changes revise the completion times (CTs) for restoring an 
inoperable primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) (or isolating the 
affected penetration) within the scope of the Boiling Water Reactor 
(BWR) Owners Group (BWROG) Topical Report (TR) NEDC-33046, ``Technical 
Justification to Support Risk-Informed Primary Containment Isolation 
Valve AOT [Allowed Outage Time] Extensions for BWR Plants,'' submitted 
on May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as 
approved by the NRC by letter and Safety Evaluation (SE) dated October 
8, 2004, from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs are not accident 
initiators in any accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the 
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly 
increased.
    PCIVs, individually and in combination, control the extent of 
leakage from the primary containment following an accident. The 
proposed CT extensions apply to the reduction in redundancy in the 
primary containment isolation function by the PCIVs for a limited 
period of time, but do not alter the ability of the plant to meet the 
overall primary containment leakage

[[Page 30156]]

requirements. In order to evaluate the proposed CT extensions, a 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) evaluation was performed in TR 
NEDC-33046, submitted on May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated 
July 30, 2003, and as approved by the NRC by letter and SE dated 
October 8, 2004. The PRA evaluation concluded that, based on the use of 
bounding risk parameters for the General Electric (GE)-designed plants, 
the proposed increase in the PCIV CTs from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 
days does not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall 
primary containment leakage requirements. It also concluded that the 
proposed changes do not result in an unacceptable incremental 
conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) or incremental conditional 
large early release probability (ICLERP) according to the guidelines of 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177. As a result, there would be no significant 
increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The 
proposed changes revise the CTs for restoring an inoperable PCIV (or 
isolating the affected penetration) within the scope of TR NEDC-33046 
submitted on May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 
2003, and as approved by the NRC by letter and Safety Evaluation dated 
October 8, 2004, from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs, 
individually and in combination, control the extent of leakage from the 
primary containment following an accident. The proposed CT extensions 
apply to the reduction in redundancy in the primary containment 
isolation function by the PCIVs for a limited period of time, but do 
not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall primary 
containment leakage requirements. The proposed changes do not change 
the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The 
proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no 
new or different type of equipment will be installed). Therefore, the 
proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety. The proposed changes revise the CTs for restoring an 
inoperable PCIV (or isolating the affected penetration) within the 
scope of the TR NEDC-33046 submitted on May 3, 2002, as supplemented by 
letter dated July 30, 2003, and as approved by the NRC by letter and SE 
dated October 8, 2004, from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs, 
individually and in combination, control the extent of leakage from the 
primary containment following an accident. The proposed CT extensions 
apply to the reduction in redundancy in the primary containment 
isolation function provided by the PCIVs for a limited period of time, 
but do not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall primary 
containment leakage requirements. In order to evaluate the proposed CT 
extensions, a PRA evaluation was performed in TR NEDC-33046 submitted 
on May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as 
approved by the NRC by letter and SE dated October 8, 2004. The PRA 
evaluation concluded that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters 
for GE-designed plants, the proposed increase in the PCIV CTs from 4 
hours or 72 hours to 7 days does not alter the ability of the plant to 
meet the overall primary containment leakage requirements. It also 
concluded that the proposed changes do not result in an unacceptable 
ICCDP or ICLERP according to the guidelines of RG 1.177. Therefore, the 
proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    Based on the above, the proposed change involves no significant 
hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), 
and accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is 
justified.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of May, 2005.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Herbert N. Berkow,
Director, Project Directorate IV, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-2631 Filed 5-24-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P