[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 98 (Monday, May 23, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29497-29510]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-10230]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-05-61-B (Auction No. 61); DA 05-1047]


Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Licenses Auction, 
Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments 
and Other Auction Procedures

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the procedures and minimum opening 
bids for the upcoming auction of licenses of Automated Maritime 
Telecommunications System (AMTS) spectrum. This document is intended to 
familiarize prospective bidders with the procedures and minimum opening 
bids for this auction.

DATES: Auction No. 61 is scheduled to begin on August 3, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, 
WTB: For legal questions: Howard Davenport at (202) 418-0660. For 
general auction questions: Debbie Smith, Roy Knowles or Barbara Sibert 
at (717) 338-2888. For service rule questions: Public Safety and 
Critical Infrastructure Division, WTB: Jeff Tobias or James Shaffer at 
(202) 418-0680. Media Contact: Lauren Patrich at (202) 418-7944.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 61 
Procedures Public Notice released on April 21, 2005. The complete text 
of the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice, including attachments, 
as well as related Commission documents, are available for public 
inspection and coping during regular business hours at the FCC 
Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room 
CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 61 Procedures Public 
Notice and related Commission documents may also be purchased from the 
Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. 
(BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 
20554, telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may 
contact BCPI

[[Page 29498]]

at its Web site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com. The Auction No. 61 Procedures 
Public Notice and related documents are also available on the Internet 
at the Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/61/.

I. General Information

A. Introduction

    1. The Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice announces the 
procedures and minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of 
licenses of Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) 
spectrum, scheduled for August 3, 2005 (Auction No. 61). On February 2, 
2005, in accordance with Section 309(j)(4) of the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) 
released a public notice seeking comment on reserve prices or minimum 
opening bids and the procedures to be used in Auction No. 61. The 
Bureau received two comments, one reply comment, and a response to the 
reply comment in response to the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, 
70 FR 7270, February 11, 2005.
i. Background of Proceeding
    2. The Maritime Services provide for the unique distress, 
operational and personal communication needs of vessels at sea and on 
inland waterways. AMTS is a maritime service that was established in 
1981 as an alternative to VHF public coast service (VPCS). In the 
Public Coast Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice, 62 FR 
40281, July 28, 1997, the Commission described AMTS as a specialized 
system of public coast stations providing integrated and interconnected 
marine voice and data communications, somewhat like a cellular phone 
system, for tugs, barges, and other commercial vessels on waterways.
    3. Section 309(j)(2) of the Communications Act formerly stated that 
mutually exclusive applications for initial licenses or construction 
permits were auctionable if the principal use of the spectrum was for 
subscriber-based services, and competitive bidding would promote the 
expressed objectives of the Communications Act. The Commission 
concluded that the public coast service, including VPCS, high seas, and 
AMTS public coast stations, was a Commercial Mobile Radio Service 
(CMRS) and subsequently decided that mutually exclusive applications 
for public coast station licenses would be resolved through competitive 
bidding.
    4. On August 5, 1997, after release of the Public Coast Second 
Report and Order and Second Further Notice, President Clinton signed 
into law the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (``Balanced Budget Act''), 
which expanded the Commission's auction authority by amending Section 
309(j) of the Communications Act to provide that all mutually exclusive 
applications for initial licenses or construction permits shall be 
auctioned, with certain exceptions not applicable here.
    5. In the Public Coast Second Report and Order and Second Further 
Notice, the Commission adopted AMTS rules that permit service on land, 
so long as marine-originating communications receive priority. In the 
Public Coast Second Memorandum Opinion and Order and Fifth Report and 
Order, 67 FR 48560, July 25, 2002, the Commission adopted a geographic 
licensing system for AMTS with service areas (AMTSAs) based upon 
maritime VPCS areas (VPCSA), with the modification that the inland 
VPCSAs would be consolidated into a single, inland geographic service 
area. The Commission announced that it would conduct an auction to 
resolve mutually exclusive applications for AMTS licenses. 
Additionally, the Commission concluded that the general competitive 
bidding rules, and the rules regarding the participation of small 
businesses in auctions that were applied to the auction of VPC 
licenses, should be used for auctioning AMTS licenses.
    6. On February 2, 2005, the Bureau released the Auction No. 61 
Comment Public Notice announcing that Auction No. 61 will commence on 
August 3, 2005, setting forth a complete list of licenses for Auction 
No. 61, and seeking comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bid 
amounts and other auction procedures.
ii. Licenses To Be Auctioned
    7. Auction No. 61 will offer ten licenses in the AMTS Service in 
the 217/219 MHz bands. Licenses will be offered in each of 10 AMTSAs 
where available. These licenses remained unsold in Auction No. 57, 
which closed on September 15, 2004. For Auction No. 61, licenses are 
not available in each spectrum block in every market. A complete list 
of the licenses available in Auction No. 61 and their descriptions is 
included in Attachment A of the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice 
at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/61/.
    8. The following table contains the AMTS block/frequency bands 
cross-reference list for Auction No. 61:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                            Geographic area    Number of
              Block                          Frequency bands (MHz)             Total bandwidth            Pairing                 type         licenses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A...............................  217.5-218.0/219.5-220.0...................  1 MHz............  2 x 500 kHz.............  AMTSA............           9
B...............................  217.0-217.5/219.0-219.5...................  1 MHz............  2 x 500 kHz.............  AMTSA............           1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Note: The above table displays the band edges of spectrum blocks 
A and B using the twenty 25 kHz channels that comprise each block as 
listed in 47 CFR 80.385(a)(2). It should be noted that pursuant to 
47 CFR 80.481, licensees are not required to use 25 kHz 
channelization and may choose any channelization scheme; however, 
regardless of the channelization scheme used, emissions at these 
band edges must be attenuated within the limitation that would be 
required under 47 CFR 80.211 if the licensee were using 25 kHz 
channels.

B. Rules and Disclaimers

i. Relevant Authority
    9. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly 
with the Commission's rules, particularly those relating to the AMTS 
service contained in Title 47, Part 80, of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and those relating to application and auction procedures, 
contained in Title 47, Part 1, of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
Prospective applicants must also be thoroughly familiar with the 
procedures, terms and conditions (collectively, terms) contained in the 
Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice; the Auction No. 61 Comment 
Public Notice; Public Coast Second Memorandum Opinion and Order and 
Fifth Report and Order; and the Public Coast Fourth Report and Order 
and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making (as well as prior and 
subsequent Commission proceedings regarding competitive bidding 
procedures, application requirements, and obligations of Commission 
licensees).
    10. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders,

[[Page 29499]]

and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or 
supplement the information contained in the Bureau's public notices at 
any time, and will issue public notices to convey any new or 
supplemental information to applicants. It is the responsibility of all 
applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with all 
public notices pertaining to this auction.
ii. Prohibition of Collusion
    11. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process, Sec.  
1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibits applicants for any of the 
same geographic license areas from communicating with each other during 
the auction about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements unless such 
applicants have identified each other on their FCC Form 175 
applications as parties with whom they have entered into agreements 
under Sec.  1.2105(a)(2)(viii). Thus, applicants for any of the same 
geographic license areas must affirmatively avoid all discussions with 
each other that affect, or in their reasonable assessment have the 
potential to affect, bidding or bidding strategy. This prohibition 
begins at the short-form application filing deadline and ends at the 
down payment deadline after the auction. This prohibition applies to 
all applicants regardless of whether such applicants become qualified 
bidders or actually bid. For purposes of this prohibition, Sec.  
1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines applicant as including all controlling 
interests in the entity submitting an application to participate in the 
auction, as well as all holders of partnership and other ownership 
interests and any stock interest amounting to 10 percent or more of the 
entity, or outstanding stock, or outstanding voting stock of the entity 
submitting a short-form application, and all officers and directors of 
that entity.
    12. Applicants for licenses in any of the same geographic license 
areas are encouraged not to use the same individual as an authorized 
bidder. A violation of the anti-collusion rule could occur if an 
individual acts as the authorized bidder for two or more competing 
applicants, and conveys information concerning the substance of bids or 
bidding strategies between the applicants he or she is authorized to 
represent in the auction. A violation could similarly occur if the 
authorized bidders are different individuals employed by the same 
organization (e.g., law firm or consulting firm). In such a case, at a 
minimum, applicants should certify on their applications that 
precautionary steps have been taken to prevent communication between 
authorized bidders and that applicants and their bidding agents will 
comply with the anti-collusion rule. However, the Bureau cautions that 
merely filing a certifying statement as part of an application will not 
outweigh specific evidence that collusive behavior has occurred, nor 
will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when warranted.
    13. The Commission's anti-collusion rule allows applicants to form 
certain agreements during the auction, provided the applicants have not 
applied for licenses covering any of the same geographic areas. In 
addition, applicants that apply to bid for all markets will be 
precluded from communicating with all other applicants until after the 
down payment deadline. However, all applicants may enter into bidding 
agreements before filing their FCC Form 175, as long as they disclose 
the existence of the agreement(s) in their Form 175. If parties agree 
in principle on all material terms prior to the short-form filing 
deadline, those parties must be identified on the short-form 
application pursuant to Sec.  1.2105(c), even if the agreement has not 
been reduced to writing. If the parties have not agreed in principle by 
the filing deadline, an applicant would not include the names of those 
parties on its application, and may not continue negotiations. By 
signing their FCC Form 175 short-form applications, applicants are 
certifying their compliance with Sec.  1.2105(c).
    14. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to 
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its 
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any 
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that 
application. Thus, Sec.  1.65 requires auction applicants that engage 
in communications of bids or bidding strategies that result in a 
bidding agreement, arrangement or understanding not already identified 
on their short-form applications to promptly disclose any such 
agreement, arrangement or understanding to the Commission by amending 
their pending applications. In addition, Sec.  1.2105(c)(6) requires 
all auction applicants to report prohibited discussions or disclosures 
regarding bids or bidding strategy to the Commission in writing 
immediately but in no case later than five business days after the 
communication occurs, even if the communication does not result in an 
agreement or understanding regarding bids or bidding strategy that must 
be reported under Sec.  1.65.
    15. Applicants that are winning bidders will be required to 
disclose in their long-form applications the specific terms, 
conditions, and parties involved in all bidding consortia, joint 
ventures, partnerships, and other arrangements entered into relating to 
the competitive bidding process. Any applicant found to have violated 
the anti-collusion rule may be subject to sanctions, including 
forfeiture of its upfront payment, down payment or full bid amount, and 
may be prohibited from participating in future auctions. In addition, 
applicants are reminded that they are subject to the antitrust laws, 
which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the 
marketplace. If an applicant is found to have violated the antitrust 
laws in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding 
process, it may be subject to forfeiture of its upfront payment, down 
payment, or full bid amount and may be prohibited from participating in 
future auctions.
    16. A summary listing of documents issued by the Bureau addressing 
the application of the anti-collusion rule may be found in Attachment E 
of the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice.
iii. Interference Protection
    17. Incumbent AMTS site-based licensees are entitled to co-channel 
protection by AMTS geographic area licensees. Among other licensing and 
technical rules, AMTS geographic area licensees will be required to 
afford interference protection to incumbent systems, on a fixed 
separation basis as provided in Sec.  80.385(b)(1). Geographic area 
licensees must also provide co-channel interference protection to other 
geographic area licensees in accordance with Sec. Sec.  80.479(b) and 
80.70(a) of the Commission's rules.
    18. Incumbents will be prohibited from renewing, transferring, 
assigning, or modifying their licenses in any manner that extends their 
system's service area or results in their acquiring additional 
frequencies, unless there is consent from each affected geographic area 
licensee. If an incumbent fails to construct, discontinues operations, 
or otherwise has its license terminated, the spectrum covered by the 
incumbent's authorization will automatically revert to the geographic 
area licensee.
    19. In addition, AMTS licensees that cause interference to 
television reception or to the U.S. Navy Space Surveillance System 
(SPASUR) system must cure the problem or discontinue operations.

[[Page 29500]]

iv. Coordination Requirements
    20. AMTS geographic area licensees may place stations anywhere 
within their service areas to serve vessels or units on land, so long 
as incumbent operations are protected, marine-originating traffic is 
given priority and certain major waterways are served. However, 
geographic area licensees must individually license any base station 
that requires an Environmental Assessment pursuant to Sec.  1.1307 of 
the Commission's Rules or international coordination, or would affect 
the radio frequency quiet zones described in Sec.  80.21 of the 
Commission's rules, or would require broadcaster notification and an 
engineering study described in Sec.  80.215(h) of the Commission's 
rules.
    21. AMTS licensees must obtain written consent from all affected 
licensees prior to using AMTS frequencies for mobile-to-mobile 
communications.
v. Due Diligence
    22. The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the 
use of this spectrum for particular services. Applicants should be 
aware that a Commission auction represents an opportunity to become a 
Commission licensee in this service, subject to certain conditions and 
regulations. A Commission auction does not constitute an endorsement by 
the Commission of any particular services, technologies or products, 
nor does a Commission license constitute a guarantee of business 
success. Applicants should perform their individual due diligence 
before proceeding as they would with any new business venture.
    23. Applicants are reminded that there are a number of incumbent 
licensees already licensed and operating on frequencies that will be 
subject to the upcoming auction, such as AMTS Station licensees. Such 
incumbents must be protected from harmful interference by AMTS Station 
geographic area licensees in accordance with the Commission's rules. 
These limitations may restrict the ability of such AMTS geographic area 
licensees to use certain portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or 
provide service to certain areas in their geographic license areas. The 
Bureau therefore cautions potential applicants in formulating their 
bidding strategies to investigate and consider the extent to which AMTS 
frequencies are occupied by incumbents.
    24. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated 
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such 
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make 
use of licenses available in Auction No. 61.
    25. In establishing the AMTS service, the Commission considered the 
potential for interference to television reception, particularly 
Channels 13 and 10. Consequently, geographic licensees will be required 
to file individual applications for authority to operate a new AMTS 
transmitter within 169 kilometers (105 miles) of a Channel 13 
television station or 129 kilometers (80 miles) of a Channel 10 
television station, or with an antenna height greater than 61 meters 
(200 feet) above ground. Such applications must include an engineering 
study showing how harmful interference to television reception will be 
avoided, and the applicant must notify each television station that may 
be affected so that the broadcaster can comment on the proposed 
construction. Moreover, any AMTS licensee that causes such interference 
must cure the problem or cease operations. AMTS licensees are permitted 
to construct ``fill-in'' sites without filing individual applications, 
but such sites are fully subject to the requirement that AMTS stations 
cause no harmful interference to television reception, and must 
discontinue operations if unable to meet this requirement.
    26. In addition, AMTS operations must not cause harmful 
interference to the United States Navy's SPASUR which operates in the 
216.880-217.080 MHz band. Also, law enforcement tracking operations are 
currently authorized on a primary basis in certain markets in AMTSAs 3, 
4, 6, 9 and 10 on a frequency in block A. These operations are 
scheduled to be converted to non-AMTS frequencies by 2007. It is the 
responsibility of bidders to be aware of these and all other technical 
or regulatory matters affecting the spectrum licenses available in this 
auction.
    27. With respect to the geographic boundaries for AMTSAs, the 
Commission defined the AMTSA boundaries to include ``the adjacent 
waters under the jurisdiction of the United States.'' Regarding the 
boundary between AMTSA 3, which includes the west coast of Florida, and 
AMTSA 4, which includes the Gulf of Mexico EA-like area, the Bureau 
hereby clarifys that, for AMTSA 3, the boundary extends only to the 
limit of the U.S. territorial waters in the Gulf (12-nautical mile 
limit); and the boundary for AMTSA 4 extends from the 12-nautical mile 
line outward to the broadest geographic limits consistent with 
international agreements.
    28. To date, no existing agreements between the United States and 
Mexico or Canada restrict AMTS channel availability in the Mexican and 
Canadian border areas. Licensees will, however, be subject to any 
future agreements regarding international assignments and coordination 
of such channels; and it is the responsibility of applicants to be 
familiar with all relevant governing international agreements; and that 
such agreements and amendments thereto may affect the use, utility or 
value of the spectrum at issue.
    29. Applicants should also be aware that certain pending and future 
applications (including those for modification), petitions for 
rulemaking, requests for special temporary authority, waiver requests, 
petitions to deny, petitions for reconsideration, informal oppositions, 
and applications for review before the Commission may relate to 
particular applicants or incumbent licensees or the licenses available 
in Auction No. 61. In addition, pending and future judicial proceedings 
may relate to particular applicants or incumbent licensees, or the 
licenses available in Auction No. 61. Prospective bidders are 
responsible for assessing the likelihood of the various possible 
outcomes, and considering their potential impact on spectrum licenses 
available in this auction.
    30. Applicants should perform due diligence to identify and 
consider all proceedings that may affect the spectrum licenses being 
auctioned. The Bureau notes that resolution of such matters could have 
an impact on the availability of spectrum for Auction No. 61. In 
addition, although the Commission may continue to act on various 
pending applications, informal objections, petitions, and other 
requests for Commission relief, some of these matters may not be 
resolved by the time of the auction.
    31. Applicants may obtain information about incumbent licenses that 
may have an effect on availability of licenses in Auction No. 61 
through the Bureau's licensing databases on the World Wide Web at 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls. Applicants may query the database online 
and download a copy of their search results if desired. Detailed 
instructions on using License Search (including frequency searches and 
the GeoSearch capability) and downloading query results are available 
online by selecting the ``?'' button at the upper right-hand corner of 
the License Search screen. Applicants should direct questions regarding 
the search capabilities to the FCC ULS/Technical Support hotline at 
(877) 480-3201,

[[Page 29501]]

option two. Potential bidders may research the Media Bureau's licensing 
database on the Internet in order to determine the location of Channel 
13 or Channel 10 television stations. Television station information is 
contained in the Media Bureau's TVQ TV Database and may be researched 
on the Internet at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/video/tvq.html.
    32. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding 
the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any 
third party databases, including, for example, court docketing systems. 
To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all 
information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, applicants 
may obtain or verify such information from independent sources or 
assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases. 
Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees 
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been 
provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into the database.
    33. Potential applicants are strongly encouraged to physically 
inspect any sites located in, or near, the service area for which they 
plan to bid, and also to familiarize themselves with the environmental 
assessment obligations described in section I.B.7.
vi. Bidder Alerts
    34. As is the case with many business investment opportunities, 
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction No. 61 to 
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors.
    35. Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes is 
available from the FTC at (202) 326-2222 and from the SEC at (202) 942-
7040. Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment 
schemes should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Fraud 
Information Center at (800) 876-7060. Consumers who have concerns about 
specific proposals regarding Auction No. 61 may also call the FCC 
Consumer Center at (888) CALL-FCC ((888) 225-5322).
vii. National Environmental Policy Act Requirements
    36. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding the 
National Environmental Policy Act (``NEPA''). The construction of a 
wireless antenna facility is a federal action and the licensee must 
comply with the Commission's NEPA rules for each such facility.

C. Auction Specifics

i. Auction Date
    37. The auction will begin on Wednesday, August 3, 2005, as 
announced in the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice. With respect to 
commenters seeking a delay of the start of Auction No. 61, for reasons 
explained in the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice, the Bureau 
does not believe it would be in the public interest to do so.
ii. Auction Title
    38. Auction No. 61--AMTS.
iii. Bidding Methodology
    39. The bidding methodology for Auction No. 61 will be simultaneous 
multiple round bidding. The Commission will conduct this auction over 
the Internet using the FCC's Integrated Spectrum Auction system 
(``ISAS'' or ``FCC Auction System''), and telephonic bidding will be 
available as well. Qualified bidders are permitted to bid 
telephonically or electronically.
iv. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
ISAS Orientation Session April 21, 2005
Auction Seminar May 25, 2005
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens May 25, 2005; 
12 p.m. ET
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Deadline June 9, 
2005; 6 p.m. ET
Upfront Payments (via wire transfer) July 8, 2005; 6 p.m. ET
Mock Auction August 1, 2005
Auction Begins August 3, 2005
v. Requirements for Participation
    40. Those wishing to participate in the auction must:
     Submit a short-form application (FCC Form 175) 
electronically by 6 p.m. eastern time (ET), June 9, 2005.
     Submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance 
Advice Form (FCC Form 159) by 6 p.m. ET, July 8, 2005.
     Comply with all provisions outlined in the Auction No. 61 
Procedures Public Notice.
vi. General Contact Information

General Auction Information:
    General Auction Questions..........  FCC Auctions Hotline (888) 225-
    Seminar Registration...............   5322, option two; or (717) 338-
                                          2888, Hours of service: 8
                                          a.m.--5:30 p.m. ET, Monday
                                          through Friday.
Auction Legal Information:
    Auction Rules, Policies,             Auctions and Spectrum Access
     Regulations.                         Division, (202) 418-0660.
Licensing Information:
    Rules, Policies, Regulations.......  Public Safety and Critical
    Licensing Issues...................   Infrastructure Division, (202)
    Due Diligence......................   418-0680.
    Incumbency Issues..................
Technical Support:
    Electronic Filing..................  FCC Auctions Technical Support
    FCC Auction System.................   Hotline (877) 480-3201, option
                                          nine; or (202) 414-1250 (202)
                                          414-1255 (TTY), Hours of
                                          service: 8 a.m.--6 p.m. ET,
                                          Monday through Friday.
Payment Information:
    Wire Transfers.....................  FCC Auctions Accounting Branch,
    Refunds............................   (202) 418-0578 (202) 418-2843
                                          (Fax).
Telephonic Bidding.....................  Will be furnished only to
                                          qualified bidders.
FCC Copy Contractor:
    Additional Copies of Commission      Best Copy and Printing, Inc.,
     Documents.                           445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-
                                          B402 Washington, DC 20554,
                                          (800) 378-3160 http://
                                          www.bcpiweb.com
Press Information--FCC Forms...........  Lauren Patrich (202) 418-7944,
                                          (800) 418-3676 (outside
                                          Washington, DC), (202) 418-
                                          3676 (in the Washington area),
                                          http://www.fcc.gov/formpage.html.
FCC Internet Sites.....................  http://www.fcc.gov
                                         http://wireless.fcc.gov/
                                          auctions
                                         http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls.
 


[[Page 29502]]

II. Short-Form (FCC Form 175) Filing Requirements

    41. Guidelines for completion of the short-form (FCC Form 175) are 
set forth in Attachment C of the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public 
Notice. Applicants to participate in Auction No. 61 must file FCC Form 
175 electronically by 6 p.m. ET on June 9, 2005. All applicants must 
certify on their FCC Form 175 applications under penalty of perjury 
that they are legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified 
to hold a license.

A. Preferences for Small Businesses and Others

i. Size Standards for Bidding Credits
    42. In the Public Coast Third Report and Order and Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 63 FR 40059, July 27, 1998, the Commission adopted 
bidding credits to promote and facilitate the participation of small 
businesses in auctions of public coast licenses. A bidding credit 
represents the amount by which a bidder's winning bids are discounted. 
The size of the bidding credit depends on the average of the aggregated 
annual gross revenues for each of the preceding three years of the 
bidder, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates 
of its controlling interests.
    43. For Auction No. 61 bidding credits will be available to small 
businesses and very small businesses, or consortia thereof, as follows:
     A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues 
that do not exceed $3 million for the preceding three years (``very 
small business'') will receive a 35 percent discount on its winning 
bids.
     A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues 
that exceed $3 million and do not exceed $15 million for the preceding 
three years (``small business'') will receive a 25 percent discount on 
its winning bids.
    44. Bidding credits are not cumulative; a qualifying applicant 
receives the 35 percent or 25 percent bidding credit on its winning 
bid, but only one credit per license.
    45. Applicants should note that they will be required to provide 
information regarding revenues attributable to the applicant and 
related parties on their FCC Form 175 short-form applications to 
establish that they satisfy the eligibility requirements to qualify as 
a small business or very small business (or consortia of a small 
business or very small business) for this auction. See Bidding Credit 
Revenue Disclosures section, in Attachment C of the Auction No. 61 
Procedures Public Notice.
ii. Installment Payments
    46. Installment payment plans will not be available in Auction No. 
61.

B. License Selection

    47. In Auction No. 61, applicants must select the licenses on which 
they want to bid from the ``Eligible Licenses'' list. The applicant may 
select all the licenses in the list (by using the SELECT ALL option) or 
select and add individual licenses from the list. Be advised that there 
is no opportunity to change license selection after the short-form 
filing deadline. It is critically important that you confirm your 
license selection because the FCC Auction System will not accept bids 
on licenses that an applicant has not selected on its FCC Form 175.

C. Consortia and Joint Bidding Arrangements

    48. Applicants will be required to indicate on their applications 
whether they have entered into any explicit or implicit agreements, 
arrangements or understandings of any kind with any parties, other than 
those identified, regarding the amount of their bids, bidding 
strategies, or the particular licenses on which they will or will not 
bid. Applicants will also be required to identify on their short-form 
applications any parties with whom they have entered into any 
consortium arrangements, joint ventures, partnerships or other 
agreements or understandings that relate in any way to the licenses 
being auctioned, including any agreements relating to post-auction 
market structure. If an applicant has had discussions, but has not 
reached a joint bidding agreement by the short-form deadline, it would 
not include the names of parties to the discussions on its applications 
and may not continue such discussions with applicants for any of the 
same geographic license areas after the deadline.
    49. A party holding a non-controlling, attributable interest in one 
applicant will be permitted to acquire an ownership interest in, form a 
consortium with, or enter into a joint bidding arrangement with other 
applicants for licenses in the same geographic license area provided 
that (i) the attributable interest holder certifies that it has not and 
will not communicate with any party concerning the bids or bidding 
strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it holds an 
attributable interest, or with which it has formed a consortium or 
entered into a joint bidding arrangement; and (ii) the arrangements do 
not result in a change in control of any of the applicants. While the 
anti-collusion rules do not prohibit non-auction related business 
negotiations among auction applicants, applicants are reminded that 
certain discussions or exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject 
matters because they may convey pricing information and bidding 
strategies.

D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements

    50. All applicants must comply with the uniform Part 1 ownership 
disclosure standards and provide information required by Sec.  1.2105 
and 1.2112 of the Commission's rules. Specifically, in completing FCC 
Form 175, applicants will be required to fully disclose information on 
the real party or parties-in-interest and ownership structure of the 
bidding entity. The ownership disclosure standards for the short form 
are set forth in Sec.  1.2112 of the Commission's rules.

E. Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures

    51. Entities applying to bid as small businesses or very small 
businesses (or consortia of small businesses or very small businesses) 
will be required to disclose on their FCC Form 175 short-form 
applications the gross revenues for the preceding three years of each 
of the following: (1) The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its 
controlling interests, and (4) the affiliates of its controlling 
interests. Certification that the average annual gross revenues for the 
preceding three years do not exceed the applicable limit is not 
sufficient. In order to comply with disclosure requirements for bidding 
credit eligibility, an applicant must provide separately for itself, 
its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its 
controlling interests, the gross revenues for each of the preceding 
three years. If the applicant is applying as a consortium of small 
businesses or very small businesses, this information must be provided 
for each consortium member.
    52. Controlling interest standard. The Commission uses a 
``controlling interest'' standard for attributing to auction applicants 
the gross revenues of their investors and affiliates in determining 
small business eligibility for future auctions. The Commission has 
modified its rules governing the attribution of gross revenues for 
purposes of determining small business eligibility. These changes 
included exempting the gross revenues of the affiliates of a rural 
telephone cooperative's officers and directors from attribution to the 
applicant if certain specified conditions are met. The Commission also 
clarified that in calculating an applicant's gross

[[Page 29503]]

revenues under the controlling interest standard, the personal net 
worth, including personal income, of its officers and directors will 
not be attributed to the applicant.
    53. Control. The term ``control'' includes both de facto and de 
jure control of the applicant. Typically, ownership of at least 50.1 
percent of an entity's voting stock evidences de jure control. De facto 
control is determined on a case-by-case basis. The following are some 
common indicia of de facto control:
     The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50 percent of 
the board of directors or management committee;
     The entity has authority to appoint, promote, demote, and 
fire senior executives that control the day-to-day activities of the 
licensee; or
     The entity plays an integral role in management decisions.
    54. Attribution for small business and very small business 
eligibility. In determining which entities qualify as small businesses 
or very small businesses, the Commission will consider the gross 
revenues of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests, 
and the affiliates of its controlling interests. The Commission does 
not impose specific equity requirements on controlling interest 
holders. Once the principals or entities with a controlling interest 
are determined, only the revenues of those principals or entities, the 
affiliates of those principals or entities, and the applicant and its 
affiliates will be counted in determining small business eligibility.
    55. A consortium of small businesses or very small businesses is a 
``conglomerate organization formed as a joint venture between or among 
mutually independent business firms,'' each of which individually must 
satisfy one of the definitions of small business or very small business 
in Sec. Sec.  1.2110(f), 80.1252. Thus, each consortium member must 
disclose its gross revenues along with those of its affiliates, its 
controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. 
The Bureau notes that although the gross revenues of the consortium 
members will not be aggregated for purposes of determining eligibility 
for small business or very small business, this information must be 
provided to ensure that each individual consortium member qualifies for 
any bidding credit awarded to the consortium.

F. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

    56. Each applicant must indicate on its FCC Form 175 application 
under penalty of perjury whether or not the applicant, its affiliates, 
its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling 
interests, as defined by Sec.  1.2110, have ever been in default on any 
Commission licenses or have ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt 
owed to any Federal agency. In addition, each applicant must certify on 
its FCC Form 175 application under penalty of perjury that the 
applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the 
affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by Sec.  1.2110, is 
not in default on any payment for Commission licenses (including down 
payments) and that it is not delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any 
Federal agency. Prospective applicants are reminded that submission of 
a false certification to the Commission is a serious matter that may 
result in severe penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license 
revocations, exclusion from participation in future auctions, and/or 
criminal prosecution.
    57. Former defaulters--i.e., applicants, including their 
attributable interest holders, that in the past have defaulted on any 
Commission licenses or been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any 
Federal agency, but that have since remedied all such defaults and 
cured all of their outstanding non-tax delinquencies--are eligible to 
bid in Auction No. 61, provided that they are otherwise qualified. 
However, as discussed infra in Section III.E.3, former defaulters are 
required to pay upfront payments that are fifty percent more than the 
normal upfront payment amounts.
    58. Current defaulters--i.e., applicants, including their 
attributable interest holders, that are in default on any payment for 
Commission licenses (including down payments) or are delinquent on any 
non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency--are not eligible to bid in 
Auction No. 61.

G. Other Information

    59. Applicants owned by minorities or women, as defined in Sec.  
1.2110(c)(2), may identify themselves in filling out their FCC Form 175 
short-form application regarding this status. This applicant status 
information is collected for statistical purposes only and assists the 
Commission in monitoring the participation of ``designated entities'' 
in its auctions.

H. Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175)

    60. After the short-form filing deadline (6 p.m. ET June 9, 2005), 
applicants may make only minor changes to their applications. 
Applicants will not be permitted to make major modifications to their 
applications (e.g., change their license selections, change the 
certifying official, change control of the applicant, or change bidding 
credit eligibility). Permissible minor changes include, for example, 
deletion and addition of authorized bidders (to a maximum of three) and 
addresses and phone numbers of the applicants and their contact 
persons. Applicants must press the SUBMIT button in the FCC Auction 
System for the changes to be submitted and considered by the 
Commission. After the revised application has been submitted, a 
confirmation page will be displayed that states the submission time and 
date, along with a unique file number. In addition, applicants should 
submit a letter, briefly summarizing the changes, by electronic mail to 
the attention of Margaret Wiener, Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access 
Division, at the following address: [email protected]. The electronic 
mail summarizing the changes must include a subject or caption 
referring to Auction No. 61 and the name of the applicant. The Bureau 
requests that parties format any attachments to electronic mail as 
Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word documents.

I. Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 
175)

    61. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to 
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its 
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any 
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that 
application. Amendments reporting substantial changes of possible 
decisional significance in information contained in FCC Form 175 
applications will not be accepted and may in some instances result in 
the dismissal of the FCC Form 175 application.

III. Pre-Auction Procedures

A. Auction Seminar--May 25, 2005

    62. On Wednesday, May 25, 2005, the Commission will sponsor a 
seminar for parties interested in participating in Auction No. 61 at 
the Federal Communications Commission, located at 445 12th Street, SW., 
Washington, DC. The seminar will provide attendees with information 
about pre-auction procedures, completing FCC Form 175, auction conduct, 
the FCC Auction System, auction rules, and the AMTS service rules.

[[Page 29504]]

    63. For individuals who are unable to attend, Audio/Video of this 
seminar will be available via webcast from the FCC's Audio/Video Events 
page at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/.

B. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)--Due June 9, 2005

    64. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants must 
first submit an FCC Form 175 application. This application must be 
submitted electronically and received at the Commission no later than 6 
p.m. ET on June 9, 2005. Late applications will not be accepted. There 
is no application fee required when filing an FCC Form 175. However, to 
be eligible to bid, an applicant must submit an upfront payment. See 
Section III.E, below.

C. Application Processing and Minor Corrections

    65. After the deadline for filing the FCC Form 175 applications has 
passed, the FCC will process all timely submitted applications to 
determine which are acceptable for filing, and subsequently will issue 
a public notice identifying: (1) Those applications accepted for 
filing; (2) those applications rejected; and (3) those applications 
which have minor defects that may be corrected, and the deadline for 
resubmitting such corrected applications.

D. Upfront Payments--Due July 8, 2005

    66. In order to be eligible to bid in the auction, applicants must 
submit an upfront payment accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice Form 
(FCC Form 159). After completing the FCC Form 175, filers will have 
access to an electronic version of the FCC Form 159 that can be printed 
and faxed to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA. All upfront payments must 
be received at Mellon Bank by 6 p.m. ET on July 8, 2005.
i. Making Auction Payments by Wire Transfer
    67. Wire transfer payments must be received by 6 p.m. ET on July 8, 
2005. To avoid untimely payments, applicants should discuss 
arrangements (including bank closing schedules) with their banker 
several days before they plan to make the wire transfer, and allow 
sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed before 
the deadline.
    68. Applicants must fax a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to 
Mellon Bank at (412) 209-6045 at least one hour before placing the 
order for the wire transfer (but on the same business day). On the 
cover sheet of the fax, write ``Wire Transfer--Auction Payment for 
Auction Event No. 61.'' In order to meet the Commission's upfront 
payment deadline, an applicant's payment must be credited to the 
Commission's account by the deadline. Applicants are responsible for 
obtaining confirmation from their financial institution that Mellon 
Bank has timely received their upfront payment and deposited it in the 
proper account.
    Please note that:
     All payments must be made in U.S. dollars.
     All payments must be made by wire transfer.
     Upfront payments for Auction No. 61 go to a lockbox number 
different from the lockboxes used in previous FCC auctions, and 
different from the lockbox number to be used for post-auction payments.
     Failure to deliver the upfront payment by the July 8, 
2005, deadline will result in dismissal of the application and 
disqualification from participation in the auction.
ii. Amount of Upfront Payment
    69. In 47 CFR Part 1, 62 FR 13540, March 21, 1997, the Commission 
delegated to the Bureau the authority and discretion to determine 
appropriate upfront payment(s) for each auction. In addition, in 47 CFR 
Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 65 FR 52323, August 29, 2000, the 
Commission ordered that former defaulters, i.e., applicants that have 
ever been in default on any Commission license or have ever been 
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, be required 
to pay upfront payments 50 percent greater than non-former defaulters. 
For purposes of this calculation, the ``applicant'' includes the 
applicant itself, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and 
affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by Sec.  1.2110 of 
the Commission's rules.
    70. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment would determine a 
bidder's initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding 
units on which a bidder may place bids. In order to bid on a license, 
otherwise qualified bidders that applied for that license on Form 175 
must have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number 
of bidding units assigned to that license. At a minimum, therefore, an 
applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to establish 
eligibility to bid on at least one of the licenses applied for on Form 
175, or else the applicant will not be eligible to participate in the 
auction. An applicant does not have to make an upfront payment to cover 
all licenses for which the applicant has applied on Form 175, but 
rather to cover the maximum number of bidding units that are associated 
with licenses on which the bidder wishes to place bids and hold 
provisionally winning bids at any given time.
    71. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed upfront payments on a license-by-license basis using a formula 
based on bandwidth and the license area population: $0.005 * MHz * 
License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per license.
    72. The specific upfront payments and bidding units for each 
license are set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 61 Procedures 
Public Notice.
    73. In calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should 
determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to 
be active on (bid on or hold provisionally winning bids on) in any 
single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that number 
of bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an applicant 
should add together the upfront payments for all licenses on which it 
seeks to bid in any given round. Applicants should check their 
calculations carefully, as there is no provision for increasing a 
bidder's eligibility after the upfront payment deadline.

                                Example: Upfront Payments and Bidding Flexibility
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                          Bidding      Upfront
             Market number                      Block               Market name            units       payment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMTSA001...............................  A.................  Northern Atlantic........      184,000     $184,000
AMTSA006...............................  A.................  Southern Pacific.........      170,000      170,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 29505]]

    74. Former defaulters should calculate their upfront payment for 
all licenses by multiplying the number of bidding units on which they 
wish to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the number of bidding 
units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will divide the 
upfront payment received by 1.5 and round the result up to the nearest 
bidding unit. If a former defaulter fails to submit a sufficient 
upfront payment to establish eligibility to bid on at least one of the 
licenses applied for on its Form 175, the applicant will not be 
eligible to participate in the auction.
iii. Applicant's Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds of 
Upfront Payments
    75. The Commission will use wire transfers for all Auction No. 61 
refunds. To ensure that refunds of upfront payments are processed in an 
expeditious manner, the Commission is requesting that all pertinent 
information as listed below be supplied to the FCC. Applicants can 
provide the information electronically during the initial short-form 
filing window after the form has been submitted. Wire Transfer 
Instructions can also be manually faxed to the FCC, Financial 
Operations Center, Auctions Accounting Group, ATTN: Gail Glasser, at 
(202) 418-2843. All refunds will be returned to the payer of record as 
identified on the FCC Form 159 unless the payer submits written 
authorization instructing otherwise. For additional information, please 
call Gail Glasser at (202) 418-0578.

E. Auction Registration

    76. Approximately ten days before the auction, the FCC will issue a 
public notice announcing all qualified bidders for the auction. 
Qualified bidders are those applicants whose FCC Form 175 applications 
have been accepted for filing and have timely submitted upfront 
payments sufficient to make them eligible to bid on at least one of the 
licenses for which they applied.
    77. All qualified bidders are automatically registered for the 
auction. Registration materials will be distributed prior to the 
auction by overnight mail. The mailing will be sent only to the contact 
person at the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 and will 
include the SecureID cards which will be required to place bids (or 
access the FCC Auction System) and the telephonic bidding phone number.
    78. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration mailing 
will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified bidder that 
has not received this mailing by noon on Thursday, July 28, 2005, 
should contact the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2888. Receipt of this 
registration mailing is critical to participating in the auction, and 
each applicant is responsible for ensuring it has received all of the 
registration material.
    79. Qualified bidders should note that lost SecurID cards can be 
replaced only by appearing in person at the FCC headquarters, located 
at 445 12th St., SW., Washington, DC 20554. Only an authorized 
representative or certifying official, as designated on an applicant's 
FCC Form 175, may appear in person with two forms of identification 
(one of which must be a photo identification) in order to receive 
replacements. Qualified bidders requiring replacements must call 
technical support prior to arriving at the FCC.

F. Remote Electronic Bidding

    80. The Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet, and 
telephonic bidding will be available as well. Qualified bidders are 
permitted to bid telephonically or electronically. Each applicant 
should indicate its bidding preference `` electronic or telephonic--on 
the FCC Form 175. In either case, each authorized bidder must have its 
own SecurID card, which the FCC will provide at no charge. Each 
applicant with one authorized bidder will be issued two SecurID cards, 
while applicants with two or three authorized bidders will be issued 
three cards. For security purposes, the SecurID cards, the telephonic 
bidding phone number, and the Integrated Spectrum Auctions System 
(ISAS) Bidder's Guide are only mailed to the contact person at the 
contact address listed on the FCC Form 175. Please note that each 
SecurID card is tailored to a specific auction; therefore, SecurID 
cards issued for other auctions or obtained from a source other than 
the FCC will not work for Auction No. 61.
    81. Please note that the SecurID cards can be recycled, and the 
Bureau encourages bidders to return the cards to the FCC. The Bureau 
will provide pre-addressed envelopes that bidders may use to return the 
cards once the auction is over.

G. Mock Auction

    82. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a mock 
auction on Monday, August 1, 2005. The mock auction will enable 
applicants to become familiar with the FCC Auction System prior to the 
auction. Participation by all bidders is strongly recommended. Details 
will be announced by public notice.

IV. Auction Event

    83. The first round of bidding for Auction No. 61 will begin on 
Wednesday, August 3, 2005. The initial bidding schedule will be 
announced in a public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is 
released approximately 10 days before the start of the auction.

A. Auction Structure

i. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction
    84. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to award all licenses in Auction No. 61 in a simultaneous 
multiple round auction. In a simultaneous multiple round auction, all 
licenses are available during the entire auction, and bids are accepted 
on any license until the auction concludes. The Bureau concludes that 
it is operationally feasible and appropriate to auction the AMTS 
licenses through a simultaneous multiple round auction. Unless 
otherwise announced, bids will be accepted on all licenses in each 
round of the auction. This approach, the Bureau believes, allows 
bidders to take advantage of synergies that exist among licenses and is 
administratively efficient.
ii. Eligibility and Activity Rules
    85. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder 
would determine the initial (maximum) eligibility (as measured in 
bidding units) for each bidder. The Bureau received no comments on this 
issue.
    86. For Auction No. 61 the Bureau adopts this proposal. The amount 
of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder determines initial bidding 
eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may 
place bids. Note again that each license is assigned a specific number 
of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in Attachment A of 
the Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice on a bidding unit per 
dollar basis. Bidding units for a given license do not change as prices 
rise during the auction. A bidder's upfront payment is not attributed 
to specific licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on any 
combination of licenses as long as the total number of bidding units 
associated with those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility. 
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction; it can only remain 
the same or decrease. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, 
an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units it

[[Page 29506]]

may wish to bid on (or hold provisionally winning bids on) in any 
single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total 
number of bidding units. The total upfront payment does not affect the 
total dollar amount a bidder may bid on any given license.
    87. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific 
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of 
the auction.
    88. A bidder's activity level in a round is the sum of the bidding 
units associated with licenses on which the bidder is active. A bidder 
is considered active on a license in the current round if it is either 
the provisionally winning bidder at the end of the previous bidding 
round and does not withdraw the provisionally winning bid in the 
current round, or if it submits a bid in the current round (see 
``Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid Increment Amounts'' in Section 
IV.B.3, below). The minimum required activity is expressed as a 
percentage of the bidder's current eligibility, and increases by stage 
as the auction progresses. Because these procedures have proven 
successful in maintaining the pace of previous auctions (as set forth 
under ``Auction Stages'' in Section IV.A.3 and ``Stage Transitions'' in 
Section IV.A.4, below), the Bureau adopts them for Auction No. 61.
iii. Auction Stages
    89. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to conduct the auction in two stages and employ an activity 
rule. The Bureau received no comments on this proposal.
    90. The Bureau adopts its proposals for the activity rules and 
stages. Below are the activity levels for each stage of the auction. 
The Bureau reserves the discretion to further alter the activity 
percentages before and/or during the auction.
    Stage One: During the first stage of the auction, a bidder desiring 
to maintain its current bidding eligibility will be required to be 
active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its current 
bidding eligibility in each bidding round. Failure to maintain the 
required activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's 
bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity 
rule waiver is used). During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the 
next round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round 
activity (the sum of bidding units of the bidder's provisionally 
winning bids and bids during the current round) by five-fourths (5/4).
    Stage Two: During the second stage of the auction, a bidder 
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to be 
active on 90 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to 
maintain the required activity level will result in a reduction in the 
bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an 
activity rule waiver is used). During Stage Two, reduced eligibility 
for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's 
current round activity (the sum of bidding units of the bidder's 
provisionally winning bids and bids during the current round) by ten-
ninths (10/9).

    Caution: Since activity requirements increase in Stage Two, 
bidders must carefully check their activity during the bidding 
period of the first round following a stage transition to ensure 
that they are meeting the increased activity requirement. This is 
especially critical for bidders that have provisionally winning bids 
and do not plan to submit new bids. In past auctions, some bidders 
have inadvertently lost bidding eligibility or used an activity rule 
waiver because they did not re-verify their activity status at stage 
transitions. Bidders may check their activity against the required 
activity level by either logging in to the FCC Auction System or by 
accessing the ``Bidder Summaries'' on the public results page.

    91. Because the foregoing procedures have proven successful in 
maintaining proper pace in previous auctions, the Bureau adopts them 
for Auction No. 61.
iv. Stage Transitions
    92. Thus, the auction will start in Stage One and will generally 
advance to the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) when, in 
each of three consecutive rounds of bidding, the provisionally winning 
bids have been placed on 20 percent or less of the licenses being 
auctioned (as measured in bidding units). In addition, the Bureau will 
retain the discretion to regulate the pace of the auction by 
announcement. This determination will be based on a variety of measures 
of bidder activity, including, but not limited to, the auction activity 
level, the percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on 
which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage 
increase in revenue. The Commission believes that these stage 
transition rules, having proven successful in prior auctions, are 
appropriate for use in Auction No. 61.
v. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
    93. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that each bidder in the auction would be provided three 
activity rule waivers. Bidders may use an activity rule waiver in any 
round during the course of the auction. The Bureau received no comments 
on this issue.
    94. Based upon the Bureau's experience in previous auctions, the 
Bureau adopts its proposal that each bidder be provided three activity 
rule waivers. Bidders may use an activity rule waiver in any round 
during the course of the auction. Use of an activity rule waiver 
preserves the bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's 
activity in the current round being below the required minimum activity 
level. An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding 
and not to a particular license. Activity rule waivers can be either 
applied proactively by the bidder (known as a ``proactive waiver'') or 
applied automatically by the FCC Auction System (known as an 
``automatic waiver'') and are principally a mechanism for auction 
participants to avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in the event that 
exigent circumstances prevent them from placing a bid in a particular 
round. The Bureau is satisfied that its practice of providing three 
waivers over the course of the auction provides a sufficient number of 
waivers and flexibility to the bidders, while safeguarding the 
integrity of the auction.
    95. The FCC Auction System assumes that bidders with insufficient 
activity would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if available) 
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver at the end of any round where a bidder's 
activity level is below the minimum required unless: (1) There are no 
activity rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder overrides the 
automatic application of a waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby 
meeting the minimum requirements. If a bidder has no waivers remaining 
and does not satisfy the required activity level, the eligibility will 
be permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from further 
bidding in the auction.
    96. A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must 
affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the 
bidding round by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function in the FCC 
Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently 
reduced to

[[Page 29507]]

bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as described 
in ``Auction Stages'' (see Section IV.A.3 above). Once eligibility has 
been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding 
eligibility.
    97. Finally, a bidder may apply an activity rule waiver proactively 
as a means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder 
proactively applies an activity waiver (using the ``apply waiver'' 
function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in which no 
bids or withdrawals are submitted, the auction will remain open and the 
bidder's eligibility will be preserved. However, an automatic waiver 
applied by the FCC Auction System in a round in which there are no new 
bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction open. Note: Applying a 
waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted that 
waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
vi. Auction Stopping Rules
    98. For Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposed to employ a 
simultaneous stopping rule approach. The Bureau also sought comment on 
a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified 
version of the stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses 
after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, places a 
withdrawal, or submits any new bids on any license on which it is not 
the provisionally winning bidder.
    99. The Bureau further proposed retaining the discretion to keep 
the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers are submitted 
and no previous provisionally winning bids are withdrawn in a round. In 
this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had applied a 
waiver.
    100. In addition, the Bureau proposed that it reserve the right to 
declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes 
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final 
round(s) and the auction will close.
    101. The Bureau proposed to exercise these options only in 
circumstances such as where the auction is proceeding very slowly, 
where there is minimal overall bidding activity or where it appears 
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of 
time. Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt 
to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the 
number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the 
minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there 
is still a high level of bidding activity.
    102. The Bureau received no comments concerning the auction 
stopping rules; therefore the Bureau adopts the above proposals. 
Auction No. 61 will begin under the simultaneous stopping rule 
approach, and the Bureau will retain the discretion to invoke the other 
versions of the stopping rule.
vii. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
    103. Because the Bureau's approach to notification of delay during 
an auction has proven effective in resolving exigent circumstances in 
previous auctions, the Bureau adopts its proposed auction cancellation 
rules. By public notice or by announcement during the auction, the 
Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of 
natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security 
breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or weather necessity, 
or for any other reason that affects the fair and competitive conduct 
of competitive bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole 
discretion, may elect to resume the auction starting from the beginning 
of the current round, resume the auction starting from some previous 
round, or cancel the auction in its entirety. Network interruption may 
cause the Bureau to delay or suspend the auction. The Bureau emphasize 
that exercise of this authority is solely within the discretion of the 
Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for situations 
in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers.

B. Bidding Procedures

i. Round Structure
    104. The initial schedule of bidding rounds will be announced in 
the public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is released 
approximately 10 days before the start of the auction. Each bidding 
round is followed by the release of round results. Multiple bidding 
rounds may be conducted in a given day. Details regarding round results 
formats and locations will also be included in the qualified bidders 
public notice.
    105. The FCC has discretion to change the bidding schedule in order 
to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, 
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors.
ii. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
    106. Section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 
calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable 
reserve price will be required or a minimum opening bid established 
when applications for FCC licenses are subject to auction (i.e., 
because they are mutually exclusive), unless the Commission determines 
that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is not in the public 
interest. Consistent with this mandate, the Commission directed the 
Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or 
reserve price prior to the start of each auction. Among other factors, 
the Bureau must consider the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels 
of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the 
size of the geographic service areas, the extent of interference with 
other spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors that could have an 
impact on the spectrum being auctioned. The Commission concluded that 
the Bureau should have the discretion to employ either or both of these 
mechanisms for future auctions.
    107. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 61 and to 
retain discretion to lower the minimum opening bids. Specifically, for 
Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposed the following license-by-license 
basis using a formula based on bandwidth and license area population: 
$0.005 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license.
    108. In the alternative, the Bureau sought comment on whether, 
consistent with the Sec.  309(j), the public interest would be served 
by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.
    109. The Bureau adopts its proposal. The minimum opening bid 
amounts the Bureau adopts for Auction No. 61 are reducible at the 
discretion of the Bureau. The Bureau emphasize, however, that such 
discretion will be exercised, if at all, sparingly and early in the 
auction, i.e., before bidders lose all waivers and begin to lose 
substantial eligibility. During the course of the auction, the Bureau 
will not entertain requests to reduce the minimum opening bid amount on 
specific licenses.
    110. The specific minimum opening bid amounts for each license 
available in Auction No. 61 are set forth in Attachment A of the 
Auction No. 61 Procedures Public Notice.

[[Page 29508]]

iii. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid Increment Amounts
    111. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to use a minimum acceptable bid increment of five percent. 
This means that the minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be 
approximately five percent greater than the provisionally winning bid 
amount for the license. The minimum acceptable bid amount will be 
calculated by multiplying the provisionally winning bid amount times 
one plus the minimum acceptable bid percentage--e.g., if the minimum 
acceptable bid percentage is 5 percent, the minimum acceptable bid 
amount calculation is (provisionally winning bid amount) * (1 + 0.05), 
rounded or (provisionally winning bid amount) * (1.05), rounded. The 
Bureau will round the result using the Bureau's standard rounding 
procedures. The Bureau further proposed to retain the discretion to 
change the minimum acceptable bid amounts and bid increments amounts if 
it determines that circumstances so dictate. The Bureau received no 
comment on this issue. The Bureau will begin the auction with a minimum 
acceptable bid percentage of 5%.
    112. In each round, each eligible bidder will be able to place a 
bid on a particular license for which it applied in any of nine 
different amounts. The FCC Auction System will list the nine acceptable 
bid amounts for each license. Until a bid has been placed on a license, 
the minimum acceptable bid amount for that license will be equal to its 
minimum opening bid amount.
    113. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each license consist of 
the minimum acceptable bid amount and eight other bid amounts based on 
the bid increment percentage. The first additional acceptable bid 
amount, above the minimum acceptable bid amount, equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times one plus the bid increment percentage, 
rounded--e.g., if the bid increment percentage is 5 percent, then the 
next bid amount will equal (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05, 
rounded, the second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times one plus two times the bid increment 
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.10, 
rounded; the third additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times one plus three times the bid increment 
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.15, 
rounded, etc. The Bureau will begin the auction with a bid increment 
percentage of 5%. Note that the bid increment percentage need not be 
the same as the minimum acceptable bid percentage.
    114. In the case of a license for which the provisionally winning 
bid amount has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will 
equal the amount of the second highest bid amount received for the 
license. The additional bid amounts above the minimum acceptable bid 
amount are calculated using the bid increment percentage as described 
in the previous paragraph.
    115. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid percentage, and the 
bid increment percentage if it determines that circumstances so 
dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the FCC Auction 
System. The Bureau may also use its discretion to adjust the minimum 
bid increment amount without prior notice if circumstances warrant.
iv. Provisionally Winning Bids
    116. At the end of each bidding round, a provisionally winning bid 
amount will be determined based on the highest bid amount received for 
each license. A high bid from a previous round is referred to as a 
``provisionally winning bid.'' A ``provisionally winning bid'' will 
remain the provisionally winning bid until there is a higher bid on the 
same license at the close of a subsequent round. Bidders are reminded 
that provisionally winning bids are counted as activity for purposes of 
the activity rule.
    117. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to use a random number generator to select a provisionally 
winning bid in the event of identical high bid amounts being submitted 
on a license in a given round (i.e., tied bids). No comments were 
received on this proposal. Therefore, the Bureau adopts its proposal. A 
Sybase[reg] SQL pseudo-random number generator based on the L'Ecuyer 
algorithms will be used to assign a random number to each bid. The tied 
bid having the highest random number will become the provisionally 
winning bid. Eligible bidders, including the provisionally winning 
bidder, will be able to submit a higher bid in a subsequent round. If 
no bidder submits a higher bid in subsequent rounds, the provisionally 
winning bid from the previous round will win the license, unless that 
provisionally winning bid was withdrawn. If any bids are received on 
the license in a subsequent round, the provisionally winning bid will 
once again be determined based on the highest bid amount received for 
the license.
v. Bidding
    118. During a round, a bidder may submit bids for as many licenses 
as it wishes (subject to its eligibility), withdraw provisionally 
winning bids from previous bidding rounds, remove bids placed in the 
same bidding round, or permanently reduce eligibility. Bidders also 
have the option of making multiple submissions and withdrawals in each 
round. If a bidder submits multiple bids for a single license in the 
same round, the system takes the last bid entered as that bidder's bid 
for the round. Bidders should note that the bidding units associated 
with licenses for which the bidder has removed or withdrawn its bid do 
not count towards the bidder's activity at the close of the round.
    119. Please note that all bidding will take place remotely either 
through the FCC Auction System or by telephonic bidding. (Telephonic 
bid assistants are required to use a script when entering bids placed 
by telephone. Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow 
sufficient time to bid by placing their calls well in advance of the 
close of a round. Normally, five to ten minutes are necessary to 
complete a telephonic bid submission). There will be no on-site bidding 
during Auction No. 61.
    120. A bidder's ability to bid on specific licenses in the first 
round of the auction is determined by two factors: (1) the licenses 
applied for on FCC Form 175 and (2) the upfront payment amount 
deposited. The bid submission screens will allow bidders to submit bids 
on only those licenses for which the bidder applied on its FCC Form 
175.
    121. In order to access the bidding function of the FCC Auction 
System, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round using the 
password generated by the SecurID card and a personal identification 
number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are strongly encouraged to 
print a ``round summary'' for each round after they have completed all 
of their activity for that round.
    122. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on 
a given license in any of nine different amounts. For each license, the 
FCC Auction System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts 
in a drop-down box. Bidders may use the drop-down box to select from 
among the nine bid amounts. The FCC Auction System also includes an 
``upload'' function that allows bidders to upload text files containing 
bid information.

[[Page 29509]]

    123. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for that license will be equal to its minimum 
opening bid amount. Once there is a provisionally winning bid on a 
license, the FCC Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid 
amount for that license for the following round, as described in 
Section IV.B.3.
    124. Finally, bidders are cautioned to select their bid amounts 
carefully because, as explained in the following section, bidders that 
withdraw a provisionally winning bid from a previous round, even if the 
bid was mistakenly or erroneously made, are subject to bid withdrawal 
payments.
vi. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
    125. In the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, the Commission 
proposed bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. With respect to bid 
withdrawals, the Commission proposed limiting each bidder to 
withdrawals in no more than one round during the course of the auction. 
The round in which withdrawals are used would be at the bidder's 
discretion. The Bureau received no comments on this issue.
    126. Procedures. Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has 
the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the 
``remove bids'' function in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may 
effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal 
payments. Removing a bid will affect a bidder's activity for the round 
in which it is removed, i.e., a bid that is removed does not count 
toward bidding activity. These procedures will enhance bidder 
flexibility during the auction, and therefore the Bureau adopts them 
for Auction No. 61.
    127. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. 
However, in later rounds, a bidder may withdraw provisionally winning 
bids from previous rounds using the ``withdraw bids'' function in the 
FCC Auction System (assuming that the bidder has not reached its 
withdrawal limit). A provisionally winning bidder that withdraws its 
provisionally winning bid from a previous round during the auction is 
subject to the bid withdrawal payments specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g). 
Note: Once a withdrawal is submitted during a round, that withdrawal 
cannot be unsubmitted.
    128. In previous auctions, the Bureau had detected bidder conduct 
that, arguably, may have constituted strategic bidding through the use 
of bid withdrawals. While the Commission continues to recognize the 
important role that bid withdrawals play in an auction, i.e., reducing 
risk associated with efforts to secure various licenses in combination, 
the Commission concludes that, for Auction No. 61, adoption of a limit 
on the use of withdrawals to one round per bidder is appropriate. By 
doing so the Bureau believes that it strikes a reasonable compromise 
that will allow bidders to use withdrawals. The Commission's decision 
on this issue is based upon the Bureau's experience in prior auctions, 
particularly the PCS D, E and F block and 800 MHz SMR auctions, and is 
in no way a reflection of the Bureau's view regarding the likelihood of 
any speculation or ``gaming'' in this auction.
    129. The Bureau will therefore limit the number of rounds in which 
bidders may place withdrawals to one round. The round will be at the 
bidder's discretion and there will be no limit on the number of bids 
that may be withdrawn in the round. Withdrawals during the auction will 
be subject to the bid withdrawal payments specified in 47 CFR 
1.2104(g). Bidders should note that abuse of the Commission's bid 
withdrawal procedures could result in the denial of the ability to bid 
on a market.
    130. If a provisionally winning bid is withdrawn, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount will equal the amount of the second highest bid 
received for the license, which may be less than, or in the case of 
tied bids, equal to, the amount of the withdrawn bid. To set the 
additional bid amounts, the second highest bid amount also will be used 
in place of the provisionally winning bid in the formula used to 
calculate bid increment amounts. The Commission will serve as a ``place 
holder'' provisionally winning bidder on the license until a new bid is 
submitted on that license.
    131. Calculation. Generally, the Commission imposes payments on 
bidders that withdraw high bids during the course of an auction. If a 
bidder withdraws its bid and there is no higher bid in the same or 
subsequent auction(s), the bidder that withdrew its bid is responsible 
for the difference between its withdrawn bid and the provisionally 
winning bid in the same or subsequent auction(s). In the case of 
multiple bid withdrawals on a single license, within the same or 
subsequent auctions(s), the payment for each bid withdrawal will be 
calculated based on the sequence of bid withdrawals and the amounts 
withdrawn. No withdrawal payment will be assessed for a withdrawn bid 
if either the subsequent winning bid or any of the intervening 
subsequent withdrawn bids, in either the same or subsequent 
auctions(s), equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid. Thus, a bidder that 
withdraws a bid will not be responsible for any withdrawal payments if 
there is a subsequent higher bid in the same or subsequent auction(s). 
This policy allows bidders most efficiently to allocate their resources 
as well as to evaluate their bidding strategies and business plans 
during an auction while, at the same time, maintaining the integrity of 
the auction process. The Bureau retains the discretion to scrutinize 
multiple bid withdrawals on a single license for evidence of anti-
competitive strategic behavior and take appropriate action when deemed 
necessary.
    132. Section 1.2104(g)(1) of the rules sets forth the payment 
obligations of a bidder that withdraws a high bid on a license during 
the course of an auction, and provides for the assessment of interim 
bid withdrawal payments. As amended, Sec.  1.2104(g)(1) provides that 
in instances in which bids have been withdrawn on a license that is not 
won in the same auction, the Commission will assess an interim 
withdrawal payment equal to 3 percent of the amount of the withdrawn 
bids. The 3 percent interim payment will be applied toward any final 
bid withdrawal payment that will be assessed after subsequent auction 
of the license. Assessing an interim bid withdrawal payment ensures 
that the Commission receives a minimal withdrawal payment pending 
assessment of any final withdrawal payment. Section 1.2104(g) provides 
specific examples showing application of the bid withdrawal payment 
rule.
vii. Round Results
    133. Bids placed during a round will not be made public until the 
conclusion of that bidding period. After a round closes, the Bureau 
will compile reports of all bids placed, bids withdrawn, current 
provisionally winning bids, new minimum acceptable bid amounts, and 
bidder eligibility status (bidding eligibility and activity rule 
waivers), and post the reports for public access. Reports reflecting 
bidders' identities for Auction No. 61 will be available before and 
during the auction. Thus, bidders will know in advance of this auction 
the identities of the bidders against which they are bidding.
viii. Auction Announcements
    134. The FCC will use auction announcements to announce items such 
as schedule changes and stage transitions. All FCC auction 
announcements will be available by

[[Page 29510]]

clicking a link in the FCC Auction System.

V. Post-Auction Procedures

A. Down Payments and Withdrawn Bid Payments

    135. After bidding has ended, the Commission will issue a public 
notice declaring the auction closed and identifying winning bidders, 
down payments, final payments, and any withdrawn bid payments due.
    136. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, each winning bidder must submit sufficient funds (in addition 
to its upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money on deposit 
with the Commission for Auction No. 61 to 20 percent of the net amount 
of its winning bids (gross bids less any applicable small business, or 
very small business bidding credits). In addition, by the same 
deadline, all bidders must pay any bid withdrawal payments due under 47 
CFR 1.2104(g), as discussed in ``Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal,'' 
Section IV.B.6. (Upfront payments are applied first to satisfy any 
withdrawn bid liability, before being applied toward down payments.)

B. Final Payments

    137. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of 
the net amount of its winning bids within 10 business days after the 
deadline for submitting down payments.

C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

    138. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly completed 
long-form application (FCC Form 601) for each license won through 
Auction No. 61. Winning bidders that are small businesses or very small 
businesses must demonstrate their eligibility for small business or 
very small business bidding credits. See 47 CFR 1.2112(b).

D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)

    139. At the time it submits its long-form application (FCC Form 
601), each winning bidder also must comply with the ownership reporting 
requirements as set forth in 47 CFR 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112. An 
ownership disclosure record was automatically created in the Universal 
Licensing System (ULS) for any applicant that submitted an FCC Form 
175. However, winning bidders will be required to review and confirm 
that it is complete and accurate as of the date of filing Form 601. 
Further instructions will be provided to auction winning bidders at the 
close of the auction.

E. Tribal Land Bidding Credit

    140. A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy 
facilities and provide services to federally recognized tribal lands 
that are unserved by any telecommunications carrier or that have a 
wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85 percent is eligible to 
receive a tribal land bidding credit as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2107 and 
1.2110(f). A tribal land bidding credit is in addition to, and separate 
from, any other bidding credit for which a winning bidder may qualify.

F. Default and Disqualification

    141. Any high bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the 
close of the auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment 
within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-
form application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise 
disqualified) will be subject to the payments described in 47 CFR 
1.2104(g)(2). In such event the Commission may re-auction the license 
or offer it to the next highest bidder (in descending order) at its 
final bid. In addition, if a default or disqualification involves gross 
misconduct, misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, the 
Commission may declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to 
bid in future auctions, and may take any other action that it deems 
necessary, including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing 
licenses held by the applicant.

G. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance

    142. All applicants that submit upfront payments but are not 
winning bidders for a license in Auction No. 61 may be entitled to a 
refund of their remaining upfront payment balance after the conclusion 
of the auction. No refund will be made unless there are excess funds on 
deposit from the applicant after any applicable bid withdrawal payments 
have been paid. All refunds will be returned to the payer of record, as 
identified on the FCC Form 159, unless the payer submits written 
authorization instructing otherwise.
    143. Bidders that drop out of the auction completely may be 
eligible for a refund of their upfront payments before the close of the 
auction. Qualified bidders that have exhausted all of their activity 
rule waivers, have no remaining bidding eligibility, and have not 
withdrawn a provisionally winning bid during the auction must submit a 
written refund request. If you have completed the refund instructions 
electronically, then only a written request for the refund is 
necessary. If not, the request must also include wire transfer 
instructions, Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) and FCC Registration 
Number (FRN). Send refund requests to: Federal Communications 
Commission, Financial Operations Center, Auctions Accounting Group, 
Gail Glasser, 445 12th Street, SW., Room 1-C864, Washington, DC 20554.
    144. Bidders are encouraged to file their refund information 
electronically using the Refund Information icon in the FCC Form 175, 
but bidders can also fax their information to the Auctions Accounting 
Group at (202) 418-2843. Once the information has been approved, a 
refund will be sent to the party identified in the refund information.

Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 05-10230 Filed 5-20-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P