[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 88 (Monday, May 9, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 24373-24382]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-2233]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-570-867]


Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields From the People's 
Republic of China: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce (``the Department'') is conducting 
the second administrative review of the antidumping duty order on 
automotive replacement glass (``ARG'') windshields from the People's 
Republic of China (``PRC'') covering the period April 1, 2003, through 
March 31, 2004. We have preliminarily determined that sales have been 
made below normal value. If these preliminary results are adopted in 
our final results of this review, we will instruct U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (``CBP'') to assess antidumping duties on entries of 
subject merchandise during the period of review (``POR''), for which 
the importer-specific assessment rates are above de minimis.
    Interested parties are invited to comment on these preliminary 
results. We will issue the final results no later than 120 days from 
the date of publication of this notice.

EFFECTIVE DATE: May 9, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jon Freed or Will Dickerson, Import 
Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 
20230; telephone: (202) 482-3818 and (202) 482-1778, respectively.

Background

    On April 4, 2002, the Department published in the Federal Register 
the antidumping duty order on ARG windshields from the PRC. See 
Antidumping Duty Order: Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields from 
the People's Republic of China, 67 FR 16087. On April 1, 2004, the 
Department published a notice of opportunity to request an 
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on ARG windshields 
from the PRC for the period April 1, 2003, through March 31, 2004. See 
Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended 
Investigation: Opportunity to Request Administrative Review, 69 FR 
17129. On April 21, 2004, Pilkington North America, Inc. (``PNA''), an

[[Page 24374]]

importer of subject merchandise during the POR, requested an 
administrative review of Changchun Pilkington Safety Glass Company 
Limited and Wuhan Yaohua Pilkington Safety Glass Company Limited 
(collectively ``the Pilkington JVs''), producers from which it imported 
the subject merchandise (with PNA, collectively ``Pilkington''). On 
April 24, 2004, Dongguan Kongwan Automobile Glass, Ltd. (``Dongguan 
Kongwan''), and Peaceful City, Ltd. (``Peaceful City'') requested an 
administrative review of their sales to the United States during the 
POR. On April 26, 2004, Fuyao Glass Industry Group Company, Ltd. 
(``Fuyao'') requested an administrative review of its sales to the 
United States during the POR. On April 29, 2004, Shenzhen CSG 
Automotive Glass Co., Ltd. (``CSG'') requested an administrative review 
of its sales to the United States during the POR.\1\ The petitioners in 
the original investigation did not request an administrative review of 
any parties. On May 27, 2004, the Department published in the Federal 
Register a notice of the initiation of the antidumping duty 
administrative review of ARG windshields from the PRC for the period 
April 1, 2003, through March 31, 2004. See Initiation of Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for 
Revocation in Part, 69 FR 30282 (``Initiation Notice'').
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    \1\ Shenzhen CSG Automotive Glass also listed the following 
variations of the company names that may have been used during the 
POR: Shenzhen Benxun AutoGlass Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen Benxun Automotive 
Glass Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen Benxun Automotive Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen 
Benxun AutoGlass Co., Ltd., d/b/a Shenzhen CSG Automotive Glass Co., 
Ltd.; Shenzhen CSG (former name Benxun) Automotive Glass Co., Ltd.; 
Shenzhen CSG Automotive Glass Co., Ltd. (Shenzhen Benxun Automotive 
Co., Ltd.); and Shenzhen CSG Automotive Glass Co., Ltd. (Shenzhen 
Benxun Automotive Glass Co., Ltd.). Subsequent to CSG's request for 
an administrative review, the Department determined that CSG is a 
successor-in-interest to Shenzhen Benxun, which received a separate 
rate in the investigation of this proceeding. See Notice of Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Changed Circumstances Review: Automotive 
Replacement Glass Windshields From the People's Republic of China, 
69 FR 43388 (July 20, 2004).
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    On October 12, 2004, the Department published a notice of partial 
rescission, which rescinded the administrative review with regard to 
the following companies: Dongguan Kongwan, Fuyao, and Peaceful City. 
See Certain Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields From the People's 
Republic of China: Notice of Partial Rescission of the Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 69 FR 60612. On December 3, 2004, the Department 
published a notice in the Federal Register extending the time limit for 
the preliminary results of review until March 31, 2005. See Extension 
of Time Limit for the Preliminary Results of the Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review: Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields from 
the People's Republic of China, 69 FR 70224. Additionally, on March 22, 
2005, the Department published a notice in the Federal Register further 
extending the time limit for the preliminary results of review until 
May 2, 2005. See Extension of Time Limit for Preliminary Results of the 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Automotive Replacement Glass 
Windshields from the People's Republic of China, 70 FR 14445.

CSG

    On June 14, 2004, the Department issued its antidumping 
questionnaire to CSG. CSG submitted its Section A questionnaire 
response on July 13, 2004, and its Sections C and D responses on July 
22, 2004.\2\ The Department issued a Section A-D supplemental 
questionnaire to CSG on December 21, 2004, to which CSG responded on 
January 13, 2005. The Department issued a second Section A-D 
supplemental questionnaire to CSG on January 28, 2005, to which CSG 
responded on February 8, 2005. From February 28, 2005, through March 4, 
2005, the Department conducted a sales and factors-of-production 
verification at CSG's facilities in Shenzhen, PRC. On April 8, 2005, 
the Department issued a request to CSG for it to make certain 
corrections to its U.S. sales database, to which CSG responded on April 
12, 2005.
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    \2\ Letter from Robert Bolling to Shenzhen CSG Automotive Glass 
Company, Limited, Section A, C, D, and E Questionnaire for the 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review on Automotive Replacement 
Glass Windshields from the People's Republic of China (June 14, 
2004).
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Pilkington

    On June 14, 2004, the Department issued its antidumping 
questionnaire to Pilkington. Pilkington submitted its Section A 
questionnaire response on July 12, 2004, and its Sections C and D 
responses on July 21, 2004. From December 2004 to April 2005, the 
Department issued and Pilkington responded to four Section A-D 
supplemental questionnaires.

Period of Review

    The POR is April 1, 2003, through March 31, 2004.

Scope of Order

    The products covered by this order are ARG windshields, and parts 
thereof, whether clear or tinted, whether coated or not, and whether or 
not they include antennas, ceramics, mirror buttons or VIN notches, and 
whether or not they are encapsulated. ARG windshields are laminated 
safety glass (i.e., two layers of (typically float) glass with a sheet 
of clear or tinted plastic in between (usually polyvinyl butyral)), 
which are produced and sold for use by automotive glass installation 
shops to replace windshields in automotive vehicles (e.g., passenger 
cars, light trucks, vans, sport utility vehicles, etc.) that are 
cracked, broken or otherwise damaged.
    ARG windshields subject to this order are currently classifiable 
under subheading 7007.21.10.10 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of 
the United States (HTSUS). Specifically excluded from the scope of this 
order are laminated automotive windshields sold for use in original 
assembly of vehicles. While HTSUS subheadings are provided for 
convenience and Customs purposes, our written description of the scope 
of this order is dispositive.

Verification

    As provided in section 782(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 
(``the Act''), we verified information provided by CSG. We used 
standard verification procedures, including on-site inspection of the 
manufacturers' and exporters' facilities, and examination of relevant 
sales and financial records.
    The Department conducted the verification at CSG's facilities in 
Shenzhen, Guangdong Province from February 28, 2005, through March 4, 
2005. Our verification results are outlined in the verification report 
for CSG. For further details see Verification of Sales and Factors of 
Production of CSG in the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of 
Automotive Replacement Glass (``ARG'') Windshields from the People's 
Republic of China (``PRC''), dated May 2, 2005 (``CSG Verification 
Report'').

Nonmarket Economy Country Status

    In every case conducted by the Department involving the PRC, the 
PRC has been treated as a non-market economy (``NME'') country. In 
accordance with section 771(18)(C)(i) of the Act, any determination 
that a foreign country is an NME country shall remain in effect until 
revoked by the administering authority. See Tapered Roller Bearings and 
Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the People's Republic of 
China: Preliminary Results 2001-2002 Administrative Review and Partial 
Rescission of Review, 68 FR 7500 (February 14, 2003). None of the 
parties to this proceeding has contested such treatment.

[[Page 24375]]

Accordingly, we calculated normal value (``NV'') in accordance with 
section 773(c) of the Act, which applies to NME countries.

Surrogate Country

    When the Department is investigating imports from an NME country, 
section 773(c)(1) of the Act directs it to base normal value on the NME 
producer's factors of production, valued in a surrogate market-economy 
country or countries considered to be appropriate by the Department. In 
accordance with section 773(c)(4) of the Act, in valuing the factors of 
production, the Department shall utilize, to the extent possible, the 
prices or costs of factors of production in one or more market-economy 
countries that are: (1) At a level of economic development comparable 
to that of the NME country; and (2) significant producers of comparable 
merchandise. The sources of the surrogate factor values are discussed 
under the ``normal value'' section below and in Preliminary Results of 
Review of the Order on Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields from 
the People's Republic of China: Factor Valuation, Memorandum from Jon 
Freed, Case Analyst, through Robert Bolling, Program Manager, Office 
VIII to the File, dated May 2, 2005 (``Factor Valuation Memo'').
    The Department has determined that India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the 
Philippines, and Egypt are countries comparable to the PRC in terms of 
economic development. See Memorandum from Ron Lorentzen to Laurie 
Parkhill: Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Automotive 
Replacement Glass Windshields from the People's Republic of China 
(PRC): Request for a List of Surrogate Countries (``Policy Letter''), 
dated December 16, 2004. Customarily, we select an appropriate 
surrogate country based on the availability and reliability of data 
from the countries that are significant producers of comparable 
merchandise. For PRC cases, the primary surrogate country has often 
been India if it is a significant producer of comparable merchandise. 
In this case, we have found that India is a significant producer of 
comparable merchandise. See Memo to File through Wendy Frankel and 
Robert Bolling from Will Dickerson: Automotive Replacement Glass 
Windshields (``ARG'') from the People's Republic of China; Selection of 
a Surrogate Country, March 9, 2005 (``Surrogate Country Memo'').
    The Department used India as the primary surrogate country, and, 
accordingly, has calculated normal value using Indian prices to value 
the PRC producers' factors of production, when available and 
appropriate. See Surrogate Country Memo and Factor Valuation Memo. We 
have obtained and relied upon publicly available information wherever 
possible.
    In accordance with 19 CFR 351.301(c)(3)(ii), for the final results 
in an antidumping administrative review, interested parties may submit 
publicly available information to value factors of production within 20 
days after the date of publication of these preliminary results.

Affiliation/Collapsing--the Pilkington JVs

    Pilkington is comprised of several different corporations and joint 
ventures, including PNA and the Pilkington JVs. During the POR, PNA 
only sold subject merchandise in the U.S. from three of the Pilkington 
JVs, with the vast majority of subject merchandise being sourced from 
Changchun Pilkington Safety Glass Company Limited (``CPS''). In the 
first administrative review, the Department analyzed record evidence on 
affiliation and found the Pilkington JVs to be affiliated under section 
771(33)(E), (F) and (G) of the Act, by virtue of Pilkington Plc's 
control over the four Pilkington JVs. See Automotive Replacement Glass 
Windshields From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 69 FR 25547-49 (May 7, 2004); 
see also, Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Automotive 
Replacement Glass Windshields from the People's Republic of China: 
Collapsing of Affiliated Parties, dated April 29, 2004 (``Collapsing 
Memo--AR1''). The Department has placed the Collapsing Memo--AR1 on the 
record of this administrative review and served all parties on the 
administrative protective order service list. See Memorandum to the 
File from Will Dickerson: Collapsing Memo from First Administrative 
Review, April 12, 2005, (``Collapsing Memo--AR2''). Based on 
Pilkington's questionnaire responses in this POR, the Department has 
determined that none of the facts concerning Pilkington's ownership and 
control relationships have changed from the first administrative 
review. Therefore, the Department maintains its prior determination 
that the affiliation provisions of section 771(33)(E), (F), and (G) are 
met because Pilkington Plc continues to exercise control over the 
Pilkington JVs through its ownership share and ability to influence the 
sales of the Pilkington JVs.
    The Department further determined in the first administrative 
review that, pursuant to 19 CFR 351.401(f), the Pilkington JVs should 
be collapsed for margin calculation purposes. Specifically, the 
Department found that all four of the Pilkington JVs have production 
facilities for producing similar or identical products that would not 
require substantial retooling in order to restructure manufacturing 
priorities. See Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields From the 
People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 69 FR 25547-9 (May 7, 2004); see also Collapsing 
Memo--AR2 at 5. The Department further found significant potential for 
manipulation of the Pilkington JVs' price or production due to the 
level of common ownership, the extent to which board members sit on the 
boards of each of the Pilkington JVs, and the intertwining of the 
operations of the Pilkington JVs through Pilkington Plc. See id.
    Based on Pilkington's questionnaire responses from this review, the 
Department finds that the facts with regard to the criteria set forth 
in 19 CFR 351.401(f) have not changed and that the Pilkington JVs 
should be collapsed because (1) the Pilkington JVs are affiliated, (2) 
each has production facilities for producing similar or identical 
products that would not require substantial retooling of either 
facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities, and (3) 
there is a significant potential for manipulation of price or 
production. See Collapsing Memo--AR2 for a full discussion of our 
determination. For the preliminary results, we have determined that the 
Pilkington JVs are affiliated and collapsed; however the Department 
intends to conduct further inquiry into this matter prior to issuing 
its final results.

Separate Rates

    In an NME proceeding, the Department presumes that all companies 
within the country are subject to government control and should be 
assigned a single antidumping duty rate unless the respondent 
demonstrates the absence of both de jure and de facto government 
control over its export activities. See Notice of Final Determination 
of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Bicycles From the People's Republic 
of China, 61 FR 19026 (April 30, 1996). CSG and Pilkington each 
provided company-specific separate rates information and stated that 
they met the standards for the assignment of separate rates. In 
determining whether companies should

[[Page 24376]]

receive separate rates, the Department focuses its attention on the 
exporter, in this case CSG and the Pilkington JVs, rather than the 
manufacturer, as our concern is the manipulation of dumping margins. 
See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: 
Manganese Metal from the People's Republic of China, 60 FR 56045 
(November 6, 1995). Consequently, the Department analyzed whether the 
exporters of the subject merchandise, CSG and the Pilkington JVs, 
should receive a separate rate.
    The Department's separate rate test is not concerned, in general, 
with macroeconomic, border-type controls (e.g., export licenses, 
quotas, and minimum export prices), particularly if these controls are 
imposed to prevent dumping. The test focuses, rather, on controls over 
the investment, pricing, and output decision-making process at the 
individual firm level. See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at 
Less Than Fair Value: Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From 
Ukraine, 62 FR 61754 (November 19, 1997); Tapered Roller Bearings and 
Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, from the People's Republic of 
China; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 
61276 (November 17, 1997); and Notice of Preliminary Determination of 
Sales at Less than Fair Value: Honey from the People's Republic of 
China, 60 FR 14725 (March 20, 1995).
    To establish whether a firm is sufficiently independent from 
government-control to be entitled to a separate rate, the Department 
analyzes each exporting entity under a test arising out of the Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sparklers from the 
People's Republic of China, 56 FR 20588, (May 6, 1991), as modified by 
Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Silicon 
Carbide from the People's Republic of China, 59 FR 22585, (May 2, 1994) 
(``Silicon Carbide''). Under the separate rates criteria, the 
Department assigns separate rates in NME cases only if the respondent 
can demonstrate the absence of both de jure and de facto government 
control over export activities. See Silicon Carbide and Notice of Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Furfuryl Alcohol from 
the People's Republic of China, 60 FR 22544 (May 8, 1995).

A. Absence of De Jure Control

    The Department considers the following de jure criteria in 
determining whether an individual company may be granted a separate 
rate: (1) An absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an 
individual exporter's business and export licenses; and (2) any 
legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies.

B. Absence of De Facto Control

    As stated in previous cases, there is some evidence that certain 
enactments of the PRC central government have not been implemented 
uniformly among different sectors and/or jurisdictions in the PRC. See 
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Preserved 
Mushrooms from the People's Republic of China, 63 FR 72255 (December 
31, 1998). Therefore, the Department has determined that an analysis of 
de facto control is critical in determining whether respondents are, in 
fact, subject to a degree of government control which would preclude 
the Department from assigning separate rates. The Department typically 
considers four factors in evaluating whether each respondent is subject 
to de facto government control of its export functions: (1) Whether the 
exporter sets its own export prices independent of the government and 
without the approval of a government authority; (2) whether the 
respondent has authority to negotiate and sign contracts, and other 
agreements; (3) whether the respondent has autonomy from the government 
in making decisions regarding the selection of its management; and (4) 
whether the respondent retains the proceeds of its export sales and 
makes independent decisions regarding disposition of profits or 
financing of losses.
CSG
    CSG has placed on the record statements and documents to 
demonstrate absence of de jure control. In its questionnaire responses, 
CSG reported that, other than paying taxes and renewing its business 
licenses, it has no relationship with any level of the PRC government. 
CSG stated that it has complete independence with respect to its export 
activities. CSG submitted a copy of the Foreign Trade Law of the PRC to 
demonstrate that there is no centralized control over its export 
activities. CSG also reported that the subject merchandise is not 
subject to export quotas or export control licenses. Furthermore, CSG 
stated that the local Chamber of Commerce in the PRC does not 
coordinate any export activities for CSG. CSG reported that it is 
required to obtain a business license, which is issued by the Shenzhen 
Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau. Through questionnaire 
responses and at verification, we examined each of these laws and CSG's 
business license and determine that they demonstrate an authority for 
establishing the absence of de jure control over the export activities 
and evidence in favor of the absence of government control associated 
with CSG's business license.
    In support of demonstrating an absence of de facto control, CSG has 
asserted the following: (1) CSG established its own export prices; (2) 
CSG negotiated contracts without guidance from any government entities 
or organizations; (3) CSG made its own personnel decisions; and (4) CSG 
retained the proceeds of its export sales and independently used 
profits according to its business needs. Additionally, CSG's 
questionnaire responses indicate that it does not coordinate with other 
exporters in setting prices. This information supports a preliminary 
finding that there is an absence of de facto government control of the 
export functions of CSG. Consequently, we preliminarily determine that 
CSG has met the criteria for the application of separate rates.
    The evidence placed on the record of this administrative review by 
CSG demonstrates an absence of government control, both in law and in 
fact, with respect to its exports of the merchandise under review. As a 
result, for the purposes of these preliminary results, the Department 
is granting a separate, company-specific rate to CSG, the exporter 
which shipped the subject merchandise, ARG windshields, to the United 
States during the POR.
Pilkington
    Pilkington placed on the record statements and documents to 
demonstrate absence of de jure control. In its questionnaire responses, 
Pilkington reported that it has complete independence with respect to 
its export activities and that neither any PRC legislative enactments 
nor any other formal government measures control any aspect of its 
export activities. Pilkington also reported that the subject 
merchandise is not subject to export quotas or export control licenses. 
Further, Pilkington reported that there are no legislative enactments 
by the government that centralize control of the export activities of 
the Pilkington JVs. Furthermore, Pilkington stated that the local 
Chamber of Commerce in the PRC does not coordinate any export 
activities for the Pilkington JVs.
    Pilkington reported that it is required to obtain business 
licenses, which are issued by the Changchun Industrial and Commercial 
Administration Bureau for CPS; the Shanghai Industrial and Commercial 
Administrative Bureau for

[[Page 24377]]

Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington Autoglass Company Limited (``SYPA''); the 
Guilin Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau for GPS, and the 
Wuhan Industrial and Commercial Administrative Bureau for Wuhan Yaohua 
Pilkington Safety Glass Company Limited (``WYP''). Pilkington reported 
that the licenses need to be renewed annually for CPS, SYPA, and GPS, 
or at the end of the JVs' scheduled existence, in the case of WYP. 
Pilkington reported that the business licenses allow a business entity, 
such as the Pilkington JVs, to operate in the PRC as a producer and 
exporter of automotive glass. We examined each of these licenses and 
determine that they demonstrate an authority for establishing the de 
jure decentralized control over the export activities of the Pilkington 
JVs and evidence in favor of the absence of government control.
    In support of an absence of de facto control, Pilkington asserted 
the following: (1) The Pilkington JVs established their own export 
prices; (2) the Pilkington JVs negotiated contracts without guidance 
from any government entities or organizations; (3) the Pilkington JVs 
made their own personnel decisions; and (4) the Pilkington JVs retained 
the proceeds of their export sales and used profits according to their 
business needs. Additionally, Pilkington's questionnaire responses 
indicate that the Pilkington JVs do not coordinate with other exporters 
in setting prices or in determining which companies will sell to which 
markets. This information supports a preliminary finding that there is 
an absence of de facto government control of the export functions of 
the Pilkington JVs. Consequently, we preliminarily determine that 
Pilkington has met the criteria for the application of separate rates.
    The evidence placed on the record of this administrative review by 
Pilkington demonstrates an absence of government control, both in law 
and in fact, with respect to the Pilkington JVs exports of the 
merchandise under review. As a result, for the purposes of these 
preliminary results, the Department is granting a separate, company-
specific rate to the Pilkington JVs, the exporters which shipped the 
subject merchandise to the United States during the POR.

Partial Adverse Facts Available

    As discussed in detail below, we have preliminarily determined that 
the use of partial adverse facts available is warranted for certain 
U.S. sales that were not reported by CSG.
    The Department finds that the use of facts available is warranted 
pursuant to section 776 (a) of the Act. Sections 776(a)(2)(A) and 
776(a)(2)(B) of the Act provide that the Department shall use facts 
available when an interested party withholds information that has been 
requested by the Department or when an interested party fails to 
provide the information requested in a timely manner and in the form 
requested. CSG failed to provide information regarding certain U.S. 
sales of subject merchandise in a timely manner. The verification 
agenda sent to CSG prior to their verification stated that:

verification is not intended to be an opportunity for submitting new 
factual information. New information will be accepted at 
verification only when: (1) The need for that information was not 
evident previously, (2) the information makes minor corrections to 
information already on the record, or (3) the information 
corroborates, supports, or clarifies information already on the 
record. Please provide a list of any corrections to your responses 
to the verifiers at the beginning of verification.

    Letter from the Department to CSG: Verification Agenda, February 
18, 2005, at page 2.
    At the beginning of verification, CSG identified other corrections 
to its responses, but it did not identify these unreported sales at 
that time. See CSG Verification Report at page 9. On the second day of 
verification, CSG informed the Department that it had not included 
certain invoices for sales to the United States in its section C 
database. CSG explained that it had discovered these invoices in 
preparation of the quantity and value of sales reconciliation segment 
of the verification. Because the data on these sales were not provided 
in a timely manner, at the beginning of verification, the Department 
declined to accept these data during verification.
    CSG did not provide complete information regarding its U.S. sales 
by the deadline for submitting such information, and consequently, the 
Department lacked information necessary to conduct a complete and 
accurate analysis of CSG's U.S. sales of subject merchandise. See 
sections 776(a)(1) and 776(a)(2)(B) of the Act. Because the 
administrative record is incomplete with regard to these unreported 
U.S. sales, the Department must use facts otherwise available in 
conducting its analysis of CSG's U.S. sales that were unreported. See 
section 776(a) of the Act.
    Section 776(b) of the Act provides that the Department may use 
adverse inferences when an interested party has failed to cooperate by 
not acting to the best of its ability to comply with the Department's 
request for information. In applying facts available to these certain 
sales, adverse inferences are warranted because CSG failed to cooperate 
by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with the 
Department's requests to report all U.S. sales in a timely manner.
    CSG had numerous opportunities to present complete and accurate 
information regarding its U.S. sales. In its original submission, CSG 
stated that it had reported all of its U.S. sales of subject 
merchandise in its Section C database. See CSG's Section C and D 
Response, July 22, 2004, at page C-2. CSG submitted a revised Section C 
database in response to a supplemental questionnaire on January 13, 
2005. Moreover, CSG submitted a second revised Section C database and a 
reconciliation of the quantity and value of U.S. sales to its audited 
financial statements on February 8, 2005. As a part of the February 8, 
2005, sales reconciliation, the unreported invoices were included in a 
nine-page listing of CSG's U.S. sales, but nothing in the 
reconciliation package indicated that these sales were not reported in 
CSG's Section C database. Finally, CSG had the opportunity to present 
these sales at the beginning of verification, but it failed to identify 
these sales. CSG did not identify these sales until the second day of 
verification, after the time allowed to provide the Department any 
minor corrections to its questionnaire responses. See Letter from the 
Department to CSG: Verification Agenda, February 18, 2005, at page 2. 
CSG's failure to report these sales when it had numerous opportunities 
to do so, and when the sales were clearly known to it at least as early 
as February 8, 2005, demonstrates that it failed to cooperate by not 
acting to the best of its ability to report all of its sales in a 
timely manner. As adverse facts available, we have applied the PRC-wide 
rate from the petition to these certain sales. See Preliminary Results 
of Review of the Order on Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields from 
the People's Republic of China: CSG Autoglass Program Analysis 
Memorandum, May 2, 2005 (``CSG Analysis Memorandum'').

Corroboration of Secondary Information

    Section 776(c) of the Act provides that, when the Department relies 
on secondary information rather than on information obtained in the 
course of an investigation as facts available, it must, to the extent 
practicable, corroborate that information from independent sources 
reasonably at its disposal. Secondary information is defined in the

[[Page 24378]]

Statement of Administrative Action (``SAA'') as ``information derived 
from the petition that gave rise to the investigation or review, the 
final determination concerning subject merchandise, or any previous 
review under section 751 concerning the subject merchandise.'' See SAA 
at 870. The SAA provides that to ``corroborate'' means simply that the 
Department will satisfy itself that the secondary information to be 
used has probative value. See id. The SAA also states that independent 
sources used to corroborate may include, for example, published price 
lists, official import statistics and customs data, and information 
obtained from interested parties during the particular investigation. 
See Id. As noted in Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished 
and Unfinished, from Japan, and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or 
Less in Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, from Japan; 
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and 
Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews, 61 FR 57391, 57392 
(November 6, 1996), to corroborate secondary information, the 
Department will, to the extent practicable, examine the reliability and 
relevance of the information used.
    The adverse facts available rate we are applying for the unreported 
sales in question was corroborated in the investigation. See Memorandum 
from Jon Freed to Robert Bolling: Preliminary Results in the 
Antidumping Administrative Review of Automotive Replacement Glass 
Windshields from the People's Republic of China: First Administrative 
Review Corroboration Memorandum, dated April 29, 2004 (``First Review 
Corroboration Memo''), with attached Memorandum from Edward Yang to 
Joseph Spetrini: Preliminary Determination in the Antidumping 
Investigation of Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields from the 
People's Republic of China: Total Facts Available Corroboration 
Memorandum for All Others Rate, dated September 10, 2001 
(``Corroboration Memo''). The Department has received no information to 
date that warrants revisiting the issue of the reliability of the rate 
calculation itself. See e.g., Certain Preserved Mushrooms from the 
People's Republic of China: Final Results and Partial Rescission of the 
New Shipper Review and Final Results and Partial Rescission of the 
Third Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 68 FR 41304, 41307-41308 
(July 11, 2003) (The Department relied on the corroboration memorandum 
from the investigation to assess the reliability of the petition rate 
as the basis for an adverse facts available rate in the administrative 
review). No information has been presented in the current review that 
calls into question the reliability of this information. Thus, the 
Department finds that the information contained in the petition is 
reliable.
    With respect to the relevance aspect of corroboration, the 
Department will consider information reasonably at its disposal to 
determine whether a margin continues to have relevance. Where 
circumstances indicate that the selected margin is not appropriate as 
adverse facts available, the Department will disregard the margin and 
determine an appropriate margin. For example, in Fresh Cut Flowers from 
Mexico: Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review, 61 FR 6812 
(February 22, 1996), the Department disregarded the highest margin in 
that case as adverse best information available (the predecessor to 
facts available) because the margin was based on another company's 
uncharacteristic business expense resulting in an unusually high 
margin. Similarly, the Department does not apply a margin that has been 
discredited. See D&L Supply Co. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1220, 1221 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (the Department will not use a margin that has been 
judicially invalidated).
    To assess the relevancy of the rate used, the Department compared 
the margin calculations of other respondents in this administrative 
review with the petition rate. The Department found that the petition 
rate was within the range of the highest margins calculated on the 
record of this administrative review. See Memorandum to the File: 
Corroboration of the PRC-wide Rate, May 2, 2005. Because the record of 
this administrative review contains margins within the range of the 
petition margin, we determine that the rate from the petition continues 
to be relevant for use in this administrative review. Further, the rate 
used is currently applicable to all exporters subject to the PRC-wide 
rate.
    As the petition rate is both reliable and relevant, we determine 
that it has probative value. As a result, the Department determines 
that the petition rate is corroborated for the purposes of this 
administrative review and may reasonably be applied to certain sales 
for CSG as partial adverse facts available. Accordingly, we determine 
that the highest rate from any segment of this administrative 
proceeding (i.e., the petition rate of 124.50 percent) is in accord 
with section 776(c)'s requirement that secondary information be 
corroborated (i.e., have probative value).
    Because this is a preliminary margin, the Department will consider 
all margins on the record at the time of the final results for the 
purpose of determining the most appropriate final margin for these 
unreported sales. See Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at 
Less Than Fair Value: Solid Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate From the 
Russian Federation, 65 FR 1139 (January 7, 2000).

Date of Sale

    19 CFR 351.401(i) states that ``in identifying the date of sale of 
the subject merchandise or foreign like product, the Secretary normally 
will use the date of invoice, as recorded in the exporter or producer's 
records kept in the normal course of business.''

CSG

    After examining the questionnaire responses and the sales 
documentation placed on the record by CSG, we preliminarily determine 
that invoice date is the most appropriate date of sale for CSG. We made 
this determination based on evidence on the record which demonstrates 
that CSG's invoices establish the material terms of sale to the extent 
required by our regulations. Thus, the evidence on the record does not 
rebut the presumption that invoice date is the proper date of sale. See 
Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: 
Saccharin From the People's Republic of China, 67 FR 79054 (December 
27, 2002).

Pilkington

    After examining the sales documentation placed on the record by 
Pilkington, we preliminarily determine that invoice date is the most 
appropriate date of sale for Pilkington. We made this determination 
based on evidence on the record which demonstrates that Pilkington's 
invoices establish the material terms of sale to the extent required by 
our regulations. Thus, the evidence on the record does not rebut the 
presumption that invoice date is the proper date of sale. See id.

Normal Value Comparisons

    To determine whether sales of ARG windshields to the United States 
by CSG and Pilkington were made at less than normal value (``NV''), we 
compared export price (``EP'') or constructed export price (``CEP'') to 
NV, as described in the ``Export Price,'' ``Constructed Export Price'' 
and ``Normal Value'' sections of this notice.

[[Page 24379]]

Export Price

    In accordance with section 772(a) of the Act, EP is the price at 
which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold) 
before the date of importation by the producer or exporter of the 
subject merchandise outside of the United States to an unaffiliated 
purchaser in the United States or to an unaffiliated purchaser for 
exportation to the United States, as adjusted under section 772(c) of 
the Act. In accordance with section 772(a) of the Act, we used EP for 
all of CSG's U.S. sales because the subject merchandise was sold 
directly to the unaffiliated customers in the United States prior to 
importation and because CEP was not otherwise indicated for those 
transactions.

Constructed Export Price

    In accordance with section 772(b) of the Act, CEP is the price at 
which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold) in 
the United States before or after the date of importation by or for the 
account of the producer or exporter of such merchandise or by a seller 
affiliated with the producer or exporter, to a purchaser not affiliated 
with the producer or exporter, as adjusted under subsections (c) and 
(d). In accordance with section 772(b) of the Act, we used CEP for all 
of Pilkington's sales because it sold subject merchandise to its 
affiliated company in the United States, which in turn sold subject 
merchandise to unaffiliated U.S. customers. We compared NV to 
individual EP and CEP transactions, in accordance with section 
777A(d)(2) of the Act.

CSG

    We calculated EP for CSG based on delivered prices to unaffiliated 
purchasers in the United States. We made deductions from the U.S. sale 
price for movement expenses in accordance with section 772(c)(2)(A) of 
the Act. These included foreign inland freight from the plant to the 
port of exportation, domestic brokerage, ocean freight, marine 
insurance, U.S. brokerage, and inland freight from port to unaffiliated 
U.S. customer. We made deductions to the U.S. sale price for 
commissions paid, U.S. customs duties, and fees associated with 
importing the subject merchandise into the United States.

Pilkington

    For Pilkington's sales, we based the CEP on delivered prices to 
unaffiliated purchasers in the United States. In accordance with 
section 772(d)(1) of the Act, we made deductions for discounts, 
rebates, and movement expenses from the U.S. sale price. Movement 
expenses included expenses for foreign inland freight from the plant to 
the port of exportation, foreign inland insurance, domestic brokerage, 
marine insurance, international freight, U.S. duty, and inland freight 
from warehouse to unaffiliated U.S. customer. In accordance with 
section 772(d)(1) of the Act, the Department additionally deducted 
credit expenses, inventory carrying costs, and direct and indirect 
selling expenses from the U.S. price, all of which relate to commercial 
activity in the United States. We calculated Pilkington's credit 
expenses and inventory carrying costs based on the Federal Reserve 
short-term rate. See Preliminary Results of Review of the Order on 
Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields from the People's Republic of 
China: Pilkington North America (``PNA'') Program Analysis for the 
Preliminary Results of Review Memorandum from Will Dickerson, Case 
Analyst, through Robert Bolling, Program Manager, Office VIII to the 
File, dated May 2, 2005 (``Pilkington Analysis Memo''). Finally, we 
deducted CEP profit, in accordance with sections 772(d)(3) and 772(f) 
of the Act.

Normal Value

    Section 773(c)(1) of the Act provides that the Department shall 
determine the NV using a factors-of-production methodology if: (1) The 
merchandise is exported from a non-market economy country; and (2) the 
information does not permit the calculation of NV using home-market 
prices, third-country prices, or constructed value under section 773(a) 
of the Act. The Department will base NV on factors of production 
because the presence of government controls on various aspects of these 
economies renders price comparisons and the calculation of production 
costs invalid under our normal methodologies.
    Factors of production include: (1) Hours of labor required; (2) 
quantities of raw materials employed; (3) amounts of energy and other 
utilities consumed; and (4) representative capital costs. We used 
factors of production reported by respondents for materials, energy, 
labor, by-products, and packing.
    In accordance with 19 CFR 351.408(c)(1), the Department will 
normally use publicly available information to value factors of 
production, but when a producer sources an input from a market economy 
and pays for it in market-economy currency, the Department will 
normally value the factor using the actual price paid for the input. 
See 19 CFR 351.408(c)(1); see also Lasko Metal Products v. United 
States, 43 F. 3d 1442, 1445-1446 (Fed. Cir. 1994). However, when the 
Department has reason to believe or suspect that such prices may be 
distorted by subsidies, the Department will disregard the market-
economy purchase prices and use surrogate values to determine the NV. 
See Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair 
Value: Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields from the People's 
Republic of China (``PRC''), 67 FR 11670 (March 15, 2002).
    CSG and Pilkington reported that some of their inputs were sourced 
from market economies and paid for in a market-economy currency. See 
Factor Valuation Memorandum for a listing of these inputs. Pursuant to 
19 CFR 351.408(c)(1), we used the actual price paid by respondents for 
inputs purchased from a market-economy supplier and paid for in a 
market-economy currency, except when prices may have been distorted by 
subsidies. Specifically, we did not use respondents' actual prices for 
any market-economy purchases from Indonesia, Thailand or Korea, and 
also did not use import statistics from these countries in valuing any 
factors of production, i.e., for material inputs, packing materials, 
and by-product credits. The Department determined in the investigation 
and the first administrative review that there is reason to believe or 
suspect that Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand maintain broadly available, 
non-industry specific export subsidies that may benefit all exporters 
to all markets. It is the Department's consistent practice that, where 
the facts developed in U.S. or third-country countervailing duty 
findings include the existence of subsidies that appear to be used 
generally (in particular, broadly available, non-industry specific 
export subsidies), it is reasonable for the Department to consider that 
it has particular and objective evidence to support a reason to believe 
or suspect that prices of the inputs from the country granting the 
subsidies may be subsidized. See Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts 
Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, from the People's Republic of China; 
Final Results of the 1998-1999 Administrative Review, Partial 
Rescission of Review, and Determination Not to Revoke Order in Part, 66 
FR 1953 (January 10, 2001), and accompanying Issues and Decision 
Memorandum at Comment 1, see also, Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts 
Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, from the People's Republic of China; 
Final

[[Page 24380]]

Results of 1999-2000 Administrative Review, Partial Rescission of 
Review, and Determination Not To Revoke Order in Part, 66 FR 57420 
(November 15, 2001), and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at 
Comment 1. At the time of the original investigation, we supported our 
finding that prices paid by the PRC producers to their suppliers of 
float glass from Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia may have been 
subsidized by referring to 40 determinations by the United States of 
specific countervailable export subsidy programs in Korea, Thailand, 
and Indonesia. See Import Administration's Subsidy Enforcement 
Electronic Library for Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/esel/eselframes.html. There is additional evidence that 
these countries continue to provide such subsidies. See e.g., Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 68 FR 37122 (June 23, 
2003), Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain 
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products From Thailand, 66 FR 50410 
(October 3, 2001), and Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty 
Determination and Alignment with Final Antidumping Duty Determination: 
Bottle-Grade Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Resin From Thailand, 69 
FR 52862 (August 30, 2004). Therefore, the Department continues to find 
that there is reason to believe or suspect that prices paid for inputs 
from Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia may be subsidized and are, 
therefore, unreliable. Accordingly, we have determined that 
disregarding market-economy input prices from Korea, Thailand, and 
Indonesia in favor of surrogate prices results in a more accurate 
dumping analysis. The Department is not in a position to verify whether 
or not the reported market-economy purchases were distorted in fact by 
these non-industry specific export subsidies. However, the fact that 
each of these countries maintains non-industry specific export 
subsidies, broadly available to all exporters, gives rise to the 
Department's presumption that the exporters of float glass and other 
reported market-economy inputs to CSG and Pilkington may have 
benefitted from these non-industry specific export subsidies. 
Therefore, we will not use export prices from these countries, either 
as actual prices for market-economy purchases or as statistics on 
imports into India, the surrogate country. See Final Determination of 
Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Automotive Replacement Glass 
Windshields From The People's Republic of China, 67 FR 6482 (February 
12, 2002), and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at Comment 
1, see also Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields From the People's 
Republic of China: Final Results of Administrative Review, 69 FR 61790 
(October 21, 2004), and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at 
Comment 5.

Factor Valuations

    In accordance with section 773(c) of the Act, we calculated NV 
based on factors of production reported by respondents for the POR. To 
calculate NV, the reported per-unit factor quantities were multiplied 
by publicly available Indian surrogate values (except as noted below). 
In selecting the surrogate values, we considered the quality, 
specificity, and contemporaneity of the data. As appropriate, we 
adjusted input prices by including freight costs to make them delivered 
prices. Specifically, we added to Indian import surrogate values a 
surrogate freight cost using the shorter of the reported distance from 
the domestic supplier to the factory or the distance from the nearest 
seaport to the factory where appropriate (i.e., where the sales terms 
for the market-economy inputs were not delivered to the factory). This 
adjustment is in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F. 3d 1401 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). For a detailed description of all surrogate values 
used for respondents, see Factor Valuation Memorandum.
    Except as noted below, we valued raw material inputs using the 
weighted-average unit import values derived from the World Trade 
Atlas[reg] online (``Indian Import Statistics''). See Factor Valuation 
Memorandum. The Indian Import Statistics we obtained from the World 
Trade Atlas were published by the DGCI&S, Ministry of Commerce of 
India, which were reported in rupees and are contemporaneous with the 
POR. Where we could not obtain publicly available information 
contemporaneous with the POR with which to value factors, we adjusted 
the surrogate values using the Indian Wholesale Price Index (``WPI'') 
as published in the International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund.

CSG

    CSG reported that it sourced much of its raw material inputs from 
market-economy suppliers and paid for them in market-economy 
currencies. See CSG Analysis Memorandum at page 3. For these 
preliminary results, in accordance with 19 CFR 351.408(c)(1), the 
Department has used the market-economy prices for CSG's inputs with two 
exceptions. First, because the Department has reason to believe or 
suspect that market-economy prices from Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea 
may be subsidized, we have not used the companies' reported actual 
prices for blue float glass, ink, and dilution medium and instead have 
valued these using Indian Import Statistics. In addition, we did not 
include some of CSG's purchases of green glass, solar glass, and clear 
PVB, which were sourced from either Indonesia, Thailand, or Korea, in 
the calculation of the average price paid by CSG for these materials. 
However, we based the value for green glass, solar glass, and clear PVB 
on CSG's actual purchases because it had significant market-economy 
purchases of these materials from suppliers in other market-economy 
countries.
    Second, in order to demonstrate that prices paid to market-economy 
sellers for some portion of a given input are representative of prices 
paid overall for that input, the amounts purchased from the market-
economy supplier must be meaningful. See Antidumping Duties; 
Countervailing Duties; Final Rule, 62 FR 27296, 27366 (May 19, 1997). 
Where the quantity of the input purchased from market-economy suppliers 
was insignificant, the Department will not rely on the price paid by an 
NME producer to a market-economy supplier because it cannot have 
confidence that a company could fulfill all its needs at that price. 
CSG's reported information demonstrates that the quantity of ink, 
molding, and antenna lead which it sourced from market-economy 
suppliers was so small as to be insignificant when compared to the 
quantity of the same input it sourced from PRC suppliers or suppliers 
located in Indonesia, Thailand, or Korea. See CSG's Second Supplemental 
Response, Exhibit D-4, (February 8, 2005). Therefore, because the 
amount of ink, molding, and antenna lead that was purchased from 
suppliers in market-economy countries is insignificant, we did not use 
the price paid by CSG for these inputs and instead used Indian Import 
Statistics.
    CSG reported that it sourced clear float glass, kerosene oil, 
silicone powder, mirror brackets, antenna lead, molding, mirror bracket 
glue, conducting glue, and solder within the PRC. Therefore, we have 
used Indian Import Statistics to value each of these inputs. CSG 
reported that it recovered

[[Page 24381]]

scrap PVB and shattered glass for resale. The Department has offset the 
respondents' cost of production by the amount of a reported by-product 
(or a portion thereof) where CSG indicated that the by-product was sold 
and/or where the record evidence clearly demonstrates that the by-
product was re-entered into the production process. See Factor 
Valuation Memorandum for a complete discussion of by-product credits 
given and the surrogate values used. To value recovered shattered 
glass, the Department used Indian Import Statistics reported for 
imports under HTS 7001, described in the Indian tariff schedule as 
``Cullet and other Waste and Scrap of Glass; Glass in the Mass.'' In 
finding a surrogate value for recovered scrap PVB, the Department used 
the HTS number for recovered PVB that was used in the previous segments 
of this proceeding to derive a surrogate value from Indian Import 
Statistics.
    To value electricity, we used values from the International Energy 
Agency to calculate a surrogate value in India for 2000, and adjusted 
for inflation. The Department used the same source in the investigation 
and the first administrative review. No interested parties submitted 
information or comments regarding these surrogate values and the 
Department was unable to find a more contemporaneous surrogate value. 
Therefore, the Department inflated the International Energy Agency 2000 
Indian price for electricity, which results in a surrogate value for 
electricity usage during the POR of $0.092/kilowatt-hour.
    To value water, we used the same information as in the previous 
segments of this proceeding. In the investigation and the first 
administrative review, the Department used the average water tariff 
rate as reported in the Asian Development Bank's Second Water Utilities 
Data Book: Asian and Pacific Region (published in 1997), based on the 
average Indian rupee per cubic meter rate for three cities in India 
during 1997. No interested parties submitted information or comments 
regarding this surrogate value and the Department was unable to find a 
more contemporaneous surrogate value. Therefore, the Department 
inflated the 1997 rupee price for water and converted it to U.S. 
dollars, which results in a surrogate value for water of $0.321/metric 
ton.
    For direct labor, indirect labor, crate building labor, and packing 
labor, consistent with 19 CFR 351.408(c)(3), we used the PRC 
regression-based wage rate as reported on Import Administration's home 
page, Import Library, Expected Wages of Selected NME Countries, revised 
in November 2004, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/wages/02wages/02wages.html. The 
source of these wage rate data on the Import Administration's web site 
is the Yearbook of Labour Statistics 2002, ILO, (Geneva: 2002), Chapter 
5B: Wages in Manufacturing. The years of the reported wage rates range 
from 1996 to 2001. Because this regression-based wage rate does not 
separate the labor rates into different skill levels or types of labor, 
we have applied the same wage rate to all skill levels and types of 
labor reported by the respondent.
    To value factory overhead, selling, general and administrative 
expenses (``SG&A''), and profit, we used the 2003 audited financial 
statements for the Indian producer of laminated and tempered automotive 
safety glass, Saint-Gobain Sekurit India Limited (``St.-Gobain''). See 
Factor Valuation Memorandum for a full discussion of the calculation of 
these ratios from St.-Gobain's financial statements.
    Finally, we used Indian Import Statistics to value material inputs 
for packing. We used Indian Import Statistics data for the period April 
2003 through March 2004. See Factor Valuation Memorandum.

Pilkington

    Pilkington reported that, during the POR, it made all of its raw 
material purchases from market-economy suppliers and paid for them in 
market-economy currencies. Pilkington reported market-economy purchases 
for clear float glass, green float glass, PVB, ceramic ink, mirror 
buttons, silver paste, and powder. See Factor Valuation Memorandum at 
pages 4 and 5. For these preliminary results, in accordance with 19 CFR 
351.408(c)(1), the Department has used the market-economy prices for 
Pilkington's inputs with one exception. Specifically, based on the fact 
that the Department has reason to believe or suspect that market-
economy prices from Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea may be subsidized, 
we have disallowed the use of the companies' reported actual prices for 
clear float glass and green float glass purchased from one or more of 
these countries, and have valued these using Indian Import Statistics.
    Pilkington reported that it sells its recovered scrap glass to 
float glass manufacturers for meltdown. The Department has offset the 
respondents' cost of production by the amount of a reported by-product 
(or a portion thereof) where respondents indicated that the by-product 
was sold. To value sales of scrap glass, the Department used Indian 
Import Statistics reported for imports under HTS 7001, described in the 
Indian tariff schedule as ``Cullet and other Waste and Scrap of Glass; 
Glass in the Mass.'' The surrogate values for packing, labor, 
electricity, water, overhead, SG&A, and profit were applied in the same 
manner as explained above in the CSG section.

Weighted-Average Dumping Margin

    The weighted-average dumping margins are as follows:

          Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields from the PRC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Weighted-
            Producer/manufacturer/exporter r              average margin
                                                             (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CSG.....................................................            5.67
Pilkington..............................................            0.91
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Disclosure

    The Department will disclose calculations performed for these 
preliminary results to the parties within five days of the date of 
publication of this notice in accordance with 19 CFR 351.224(b). Any 
interested party may request a hearing within 30 days of publication of 
these preliminary results. See 19 CFR 351.310(c). Any hearing, if 
requested, will be held two days after the scheduled date for 
submission of rebuttal briefs. See 19 CFR 351.310(d). Interested 
parties may submit case briefs and/or written comments no later than 30 
days after the date of publication of these preliminary results of 
review. See 19 CFR 351.309(c)(ii). Rebuttal briefs and rebuttals to 
written comments, limited to issues raised in such briefs or comments, 
may be filed no later than 35 days after the date of publication. See 
19 CFR 351.309(d). Further, we would appreciate that parties submitting 
written comments also provide the Department with an additional copy of 
those comments on diskette. The Department will issue the final results 
of this administrative review, which will include the results of its 
analysis of issues raised in any such comments, within 120 days of 
publication of these preliminary results, pursuant to section 
751(a)(3)(A) of the Act.

Assessment Rates

    Upon issuance of the final results, the Department will determine, 
and CBP shall assess, antidumping duties on all appropriate entries. 
The Department will issue appropriate assessment instructions directly 
to CBP upon completion of this review. If these preliminary results are 
adopted in our final results of review, we will direct

[[Page 24382]]

CBP to assess the resulting rate against the entered customs value for 
the subject merchandise on each importer's/customer's entries during 
the POR.

Cash-Deposit Requirements

    The following cash-deposit requirements will be effective upon 
publication of the final results of this administrative review for all 
shipments of the subject merchandise entered, or withdrawn from 
warehouse, for consumption on or after the publication date, as 
provided for by section 751(a)(2)(C) of the Act: (1) The cash deposit 
rate for each of the reviewed companies will be the rate listed in the 
final results of review (except where the rate for a particular company 
is de minimis, i.e., less than 0.5 percent, no cash deposit will be 
required for that company); (2) for previously investigated companies 
not listed above, the cash deposit rate will continue to be the 
company-specific rate published for the most recent period; (3) if the 
exporter is not a firm covered in this review, a prior review, or the 
original less than fair value (``LTFV'') investigation, but the 
manufacturer is, the cash deposit rate will be the rate established for 
the most recent period for the manufacturer of the merchandise; and (4) 
the cash deposit rate for all other manufacturers or exporters will 
continue to be the ``PRC-wide'' rate of 124.5 percent, which was 
established in the LTFV investigation. These deposit requirements, when 
imposed, shall remain in effect until publication of the final results 
of the next administrative review.

Notification to Importers

    This notice also serves as a preliminary reminder to importers of 
their responsibility under 19 CFR 351.402(f) to file a certificate 
regarding the reimbursement of antidumping duties prior to liquidation 
of the relevant entries during this review period. Failure to comply 
with this requirement could result in the Secretary's presumption that 
reimbursement of antidumping duties occurred and the subsequent 
assessment of double antidumping duties.
    We are issuing and publishing these preliminary results of review 
in accordance with sections 751(a)(2)(B) and 777(i)(1) of the Act, and 
19 CFR 351.221(b).

    Dated: May 2, 2005.
Joseph A. Spetrini,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. E5-2233 Filed 5-6-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P