[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 83 (Monday, May 2, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22719-22722]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-2070]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[IA-05-021]
In the Matter of Andrew Siemaszko; Order Prohibiting Involvement
in NRC-Licensed Activities
Mr. Andrew Siemaszko was previously employed as a system engineer
at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse) operated by
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or Licensee). The Licensee
holds License No. NPF-3 which was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or Commission)
[[Page 22720]]
pursuant to 10 CFR part 50 on April 22, 1977. The license authorizes
the operation of Davis-Besse in accordance with the conditions
specified therein. The facility is located on the Licensee's site near
Oak Harbor, Ohio.
On February 16, 2002, Davis-Besse was shut down for refueling and
inspection of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) reactor pressure
vessel (RPV) head penetration nozzles. Using ultrasonic testing, the
Licensee found cracks in three CRDM penetration nozzles and on March 6,
2002, the Licensee discovered a cavity in the RPV head in the vicinity
of CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3. The cavity measured approximately 5
to 7 inches long, 4 to 5 inches wide, and penetrated though the 6.63
inch-thick low-alloy steel portion of the RPV head, leaving the
stainless steel clad material (measuring 0.202 to 0.314 inches-thick)
as the sole reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. A smaller
cavity was also found near CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 2.
The Licensee had conducted a root cause evaluation and determined
that the cavities were caused by boric acid from the RCS released
through cracks in the CRDM penetration nozzles. The Licensee conducted
limited cleaning and inspections of the RPV head during the Twelfth
Refueling Outage (12RFO) that ended on May 18, 2000. However, neither
the limited RPV head cleaning nor the resultant inspections during
12RFO were sufficient to ensure that the significant boric acid
deposits on the RPV head were only a result of CRDM flange leakage as
supposed and were not a result of RCS pressure boundary leakage.
On March 6 and March 10, 2002, the Licensee provided information to
the NRC concerning the identification of a large cavity in the RPV head
adjacent to CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3. The NRC conducted an
Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at the Davis-Besse Station
from March 12 to April 5, 2002, to determine the facts and
circumstances related to the significant degradation of the RPV head.
The results of the AIT inspection were documented in NRC Inspection
Report No. 50-346/2002-03, issued on May 3, 2002. A follow-up special
inspection was conducted from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and on October
2, 2002, the NRC issued the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report No.
50-346/2002-08 documenting ten apparent violations associated with the
RPV head degradation. Based upon an investigation into the causes for
the apparent violations documented in the special inspection report,
the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) determined that the apparent
violations involved deliberate failures to comply with NRC requirements
and regulations. The OI investigation results were documented in OI
Report No. 3-2002-006, dated August 22, 2003 and the matter remains
under Federal investigation.
Based on the results of the special inspection conducted by the NRC
staff and the OI investigation, the NRC determined that Mr. Andrew
Siemaszko engaged in deliberate misconduct that caused the Licensee to
be in violation of the NRC requirement to maintain and provide to the
NRC materially complete and accurate information, 10 CFR 50.9.
Andrew Siemaszko, a System Engineer at Davis-Besse Station, was
responsible for ensuring the RPV head was cleaned during April 2000.
Davis-Besse Work Order No. 00-001846-000 described the problem to be
resolved as:
Large boron accumulation was noted on the top of the RX
[reactor] head and on top of the insulation. Boric acid corrosion
may occur * * * Work Description * * * Clean boron accumulation from
top of reactor head and on top of insulation. See Andrew Siemaszko
(Plant Engineering) * * * for additional details.
On April 25, 2000, in the ``Failure Evaluation/Description of Work
Performed'' section of Work Order No. 00-001846-000, Mr. Siemaszko
wrote ``work performed without deviation.''
Mr. Siemaszko initiated Condition Report (CR) No. 2000-1037 on
April 17, 2000, and described the condition as:
Inspection of the Reactor Head indicated accumulation of boron
in the area of the CRD [control rod drive] nozzle penetrations
through the head. Boron accumulation was also discovered on top of
the thermal insulation under the CRD flanges. Boron accumulated on
the top of the thermal insulation resulted from the CRD leakage. The
CRD leakage issues are discussed in CR 2000-0782.
Entered in the ``Remedial Actions'' Section of CR No. 2000-1037
was,
Accumulated boron deposited between the reactor head and the
thermal insulation was removed during the cleaning process performed
under W.O. (Work Order) 00-001846-000. No boric acid induced damage
to the head surface was noted during the subsequent inspection.
Also included on Condition Report No. 2000-0137 was,
MODE 4 RESTRAINT--Complete all actions necessary to restore
equipment to allow the Mode change. When all actions are complete,
document on a Cause/Action Sheet (ED83242B) and provide a copy of
the CR to Quality Programs.
Information that Mr. Siemaszko told OI during a sworn, transcribed
interview indicated that Mr. Siemaszko knew at the completion of 12RFO
that the RPV head had not been cleaned of all boric acid deposits, yet
he provided information on Condition Report No. 2000-0137 and Work
Order No. 00-001846-000 indicating that the RPV head was cleaned of
boric acid deposits.
The Licensee removed the restraint to changing operations to Mode 4
on April 27, 2000, based, in part, on the information provided to the
Licensee by Mr. Siemaszko that the reactor vessel had been cleaned of
boric acid deposits, as documented on CR No. 2000-1037 and Work Order
No. 00-001846-000.
10 CFR part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires that the
Licensee establish measures to ensure that conditions adverse to
quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations,
defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly
identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse
to quality, the measures shall ensure that the cause of the condition
is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The
identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the
cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be
documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.
10 CFR part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, requires, in part, that
the Licensee maintain sufficient records to furnish evidence of
activities affecting quality, including records of work performance.
Condition Report (CR) No. 2000-1037 described a significant
condition adverse to quality and the corrective actions taken to
preclude repetition. Work Order No. 00-001846-000 is a record of an
activity affecting quality and documented work performance.
Review of documents and videotapes concerning the inspection of the
RPV head during 12RFO, that ended on May 18, 2000, and the inspections
of the RPV head during Refueling Outage 13, that began on February 12,
2002, indicated that boric acid deposits remained on the RPV head
following 12RFO. This is contrary to information Mr. Siemaszko
documented in: (1) Work Order No. 00-001846-000 that work was performed
without deviation; and (2) CR No. 2000-1037 that the accumulated boron
deposited between the reactor head and the thermal insulation was
removed during the cleaning process performed and no boric acid induced
damage to the head surface was noted during the subsequent inspection.
10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by statute
or by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be
maintained by
[[Page 22721]]
the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.
Based on the above information, the NRC concludes that Mr.
Siemaszko deliberately provided materially incomplete and inaccurate
information in CR No. 2000-1037 and Work Order No. 00-001846-000, that
are records the NRC requires the Licensee to maintain. The information
provided by Mr. Siemaszko in CR No. 2000-1037 and Work Order No. 00-
001846-000 was material to the NRC because the presence of boric acid
deposits on the RPV head is a significant condition adverse to quality
that went uncorrected, in part, due to Mr. Siemaszko's incomplete and
inaccurate description of the work activities and corrective actions.
Based on the above, Mr. Andrew Siemaszko, while employed by the
Licensee, engaged in deliberate misconduct that has caused the Licensee
to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.9 by deliberately providing to the
Licensee information that he knew to be incomplete or inaccurate in a
respect material to the NRC, in violation of 10 CFR 50.5. The NRC
determined that these violations were of very high safety and
regulatory significance because they documented a pattern of deliberate
inaccurate or incomplete documentation of information that was required
to be maintained or submitted to the NRC. Had the NRC been aware of
this incomplete and inaccurate information, the NRC would likely have
taken immediate regulatory action to shut down the plant and require
the licensee to implement appropriate corrective actions.
As a direct result of these violations, the NRC determined that
FENOC started up and operated the plant, for the last operating cycle
prior to the February 16, 2002, shutdown without: (1) Fully
understanding or characterizing the condition of the reactor pressure
vessel head and the control rod drive penetrations; (2) determining the
cause of significant boric acid build up on the reactor pressure vessel
head, the control rod drive penetrations, and several other components
in the reactor containment building; (3) properly identifying the
presence of ongoing reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage
and taking appropriate corrective actions; and, (4) identifying a very
significant ongoing degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head
which required a number of years to reach the level of material wastage
observed in March 2002. Finally, the NRC determined that the inaccurate
and incomplete information provided by Mr. Siemaszko contributed to
continued operation of the plant with ongoing reactor coolant system
pressure boundary leakage and the significant degradation of the
reactor pressure vessel head, a significant condition adverse to
quality.
The NRC must be able to rely on the Licensee and its employees to
comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide
information and maintain records that are complete and accurate in all
material respects. Mr. Siemaszko's action caused the Licensee to
violate 10 CFR 50.9 and raised serious doubt as to whether he can be
relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and to provide complete and
accurate information to the NRC.
Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the
Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public
will be protected if Mr. Siemaszko is permitted to be involved in NRC-
licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and interest
require that Mr. Siemaszko be prohibited from any involvement in NRC-
licensed activities for a period of five years from the effective date
of this Order. Additionally, Mr. Siemaszko is required to notify the
NRC of his first employment in NRC-licensed activities for a period of
five years following the prohibition period.
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 30.10, and 10 CFR 150.20, it is
hereby ordered that:
1. Mr. Andrew Siemaszko is prohibited for five years from the
effective date of this Order from engaging in NRC-licensed activities.
The NRC considers NRC-licensed activities to be those activities that
are conducted pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the
NRC, including those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted
pursuant to the authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
2. If Mr. Siemaszko is currently involved with another licensee in
NRC-licensed activities, he must immediately cease those activities,
and inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone number of the
employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the employer.
3. For a period of five years after the five year period of
prohibition has expired, Mr. Siemaszko shall, within 20 days of
acceptance of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed
activities or his becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as
defined in Paragraph IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555, of the name, address, and telephone number of the employer or
the entity where he is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed
activities. In the notification, Mr. Siemaszko shall include a
statement of his commitment to compliance with regulatory requirements
and the basis why the Commission should have confidence that he will
now comply with applicable NRC requirements.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Siemaszko
of good cause.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Andrew Siemaszko must, and any
other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to
this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order within 90 days of
the date of this Order. However, since this enforcement action is being
proposed prior to the U.S. Department of Justice completing its review
of the OI investigation results, consideration may be given to
extending the response time for submitting an answer as well as the
time for requesting a hearing, for good cause shown. A request for
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555,
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may
consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the
answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically
admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall
set forth the matters of fact and law on which Mr. Siemaszko or other
person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order
should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall
be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies
also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General
Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address,
to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road,
Lisle, IL 60532-4352, and to Mr. Siemaszko if the answer or hearing
request is by a person other than Mr. Siemaszko. Because of continuing
disruptions in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it
is requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to
the Secretary of the Commission either by means of
[[Page 22722]]
facsimile transmission to (301) 415-1101 or by e-mail to
[email protected] and also to the Office of the General Counsel
either by means of facsimile transmission to (301) 415-3725 or by e-
mail to [email protected]. If a person other than the Mr. Siemaszko
requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the
manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and
shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR Sec. 2.309.
If a hearing is requested by Mr. Siemaszko or a person whose
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section IV above shall be effective and final 90 days from
the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension
expires if a hearing request has not been received.
Dated this 21st day of April 2005.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ellis W. Merschoff,
Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs, Office of the Executive
Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E5-2070 Filed 4-29-05; 8:45 am]
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