

Dated: April 20, 2005.

J. Robert Flores,

Vice-Chair, Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

[FR Doc. 05-8244 Filed 4-25-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-18-P

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

[Notice 05-080]

Notice of Prospective Patent License

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

ACTION: Notice of Prospective Patent License.

SUMMARY: NASA hereby gives notice that Penske Racing South, Inc. of 136 Knob Hill Road, Mooresville, NC 28117-6847, has applied for a Partially Exclusive license to practice the inventions described and claimed in U.S. Patent No(s). 4,829,035, entitled "Reactivation Of A Tin Oxide-Containing Catalyst," 4,855,274, entitled "Process For Making A Noble Metal On Tin Oxide Catalyst," 4,912,082, entitled "Catalyst For Carbon Monoxide Oxidation," 4,991,181, entitled "Catalyst For Carbon Monoxide Oxidation," 5,585,083, entitled "Catalytic Process For Formaldehyde Oxidation," and 6,132,694, entitled "Catalyst For Oxidation Of Volatile Organic Compounds," all of which are assigned to the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Written objections to the prospective grant of a license should be sent to Langley Research Center.

DATES: Responses to this notice must be received by May 11, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Helen M. Galus, Patent Attorney, Langley Research Center, Mail Stop 141,

Hampton, VA 23681-2199. Telephone 757-864-3227; Fax 757-864-9190.

Keith T. Sefton,

Deputy General Counsel (Administration and Management).

[FR Doc. 05-8337 Filed 4-25-05; 8:45 am]

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Dated: April 18, 2005.

Keith T. Sefton,

Deputy General Counsel, Administration and Management.

[FR Doc. 05-8336 Filed 4-25-05; 8:45 am]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Application for License To Export Major Components for Nuclear Reactors

Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(b)(1) "Public notice of receipt of an application," please take notice that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received the following request for an export license. Copies of the request are available electronically through ADAMS and can be accessed through the Public Electronic Reading Room (PERR) link <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> at the NRC home page.

A request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene may be filed within 30 days after publication of this notice in the **Federal Register**. Any request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene shall be served by the requestor or petitioner upon the applicant, the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555; the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555; and the Executive Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.

In its review of an application for a license to export major components of a utilization facility as defined in 10 CFR part 110 and noticed herein, the Commission does not evaluate the health, safety or environmental effects in the recipient nation of the facility to be exported. The information concerning the application follows.

NRC EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION FOR MAJOR COMPONENTS FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS

Name of applicant Date of application Date received Application No., Docket No.	Description	End use	Country of destination
Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation. March 18, 2005 March 21, 2005 XR170 11005552	Five (5) complete reactor coolant pumps, including motors, related equipment and spare parts as specified in 10 CFR Part 110 Appendix A item (4). Approximate Dollar Value: Proprietary.	Qinshan Phase 2, Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 Nuclear Power Reactors.	People's Republic of China.

Dated this 12th day of April 2005 at Rockville, Maryland.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Margaret M. Doane,

Deputy Director, Office of International Programs.

[FR Doc. 05-8266 Filed 4-25-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-368]

Entergy Operations, Inc.; Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2; Exemption

1.0 Background

Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 which authorizes operation of the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) nuclear power plant. The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of a pressurized water reactor located in Pope County, Arkansas.

2.0 Request/Action

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), part 50, appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 57, regarding closed system containment isolation valves (CIVs), states:

Each line that penetrates primary reactor containment and is neither part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere shall have at least one containment isolation valve which shall be either automatic, or locked closed, or capable of remote manual operation. This valve shall be outside containment and located as close to the containment as practical. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve.

By application dated October 30, 2003, and supplemented by a letters dated July 1, November 15, and December 3, 2004, and March 3, 2005, the licensee requested a permanent exemption from 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GDC 57 for certain CIVs at ANO-2. Specifically, the licensee requests an exemption for the applicable manual upstream CIV associated with the emergency feedwater (EFW) system steam trap and the applicable manual upstream CIV associated with the atmospheric dump valve (ADV) drain steam trap. This will allow the plant to operate at power with these CIVs open, rather than locked closed.

The CIVs under review are located on main steam lines outside containment, but upstream of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The main steam and feedwater lines inside containment, in combination with the secondary side of the steam generators, constitute closed systems inside containment, so GDC 57 applies. The CIVs are not automatic or capable of remote manual operation, and the licensee does not wish to keep them locked closed.

3.0 Discussion

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) when special circumstances are present.

Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present in that plant operation with the applicable manual upstream CIV associated with the EFW system steam trap and the applicable manual upstream CIV associated with the ADV drain steam trap in the closed position is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GDC 57. The staff's rationale is as follows.

Operation With the EFW Steam Trap CIVs and the ADV Drain Steam Trap CIVs Open

The steam supply lines for the ANO-2 EFW pump and the ADVs tap off of the "A" and "B" main steam headers outside containment and upstream of the MSIVs. The steam supply from the "B" main steam header has a steam trap upstream of the EFW pump turbine isolation valve, which is a GDC 57 boundary valve. Therefore, the upstream CIV for this steam trap is subject to GDC 57. The manual isolation valves for this steam trap (which include the upstream CIV) are normally open during power operation. Keeping the EFW steam trap isolation valves closed during operation potentially threatens the operability of the steam-driven EFW pump. It is noted that the EFW steam trap for the "A" EFW pump turbine is located downstream of the turbine isolation valve. The ADV associated with the "A" main steam header has a drain steam trap whose isolation valves are also maintained open during power operation. The upstream CIV for this steam trap is also subject to GDC 57. Keeping the ADV drain steam trap

isolation valves closed during operation could cause the potential for waterhammer when an ADV line is opened and damage the piping associated with the ADV, due to condensate buildup. Since these applicable CIVs (associated with the EFW and ADV drain steam traps) are manual CIVs and do not have remote closure capability, GDC 57 requires that they be locked closed. Therefore, the licensee requests an exemption from the requirements of GDC 57 to keep these CIVs open during operation.

Operating with the ANO-2 EFW steam trap and ADV drain steam trap CIVs open results in the secondary system pressure boundary inside containment providing the only barrier against the release of radioactivity to the environment through the steam trap piping. However, the licensee has evaluated the effects of these valves being open during power operation (provided below) and has shown this to have no impact on the consequences of any of the events evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Operating with the EFW steam trap CIVs closed and the ADV drain steam trap CIV closed could compromise the operability of the EFW pump turbine and damage the piping associated with the ADV, due to condensate buildup.

Of the 36 events listed in Chapter 15 of the ANO-2 SAR, only ten involve a radiation dose evaluation. The waste gas decay tank rupture and the fuel handling accident need not be evaluated since they cannot physically involve the EFW and ADV steam trap CIVs. Additionally, the malfunction of the turbine gland sealing system can also be eliminated from evaluation since it is bounded by the turbine trip event, which will be discussed below. The remaining seven events are turbine trip, loss of alternating current (AC) power, excess heat removal, main steam/feed line break, loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) forced flow, loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and steam generator tube rupture.

For the turbine trip, loss of AC power, excess heat removal, and main steam/feed line break, no post-event RCS activity is involved in the dose estimate since the RCS integrity is not compromised. Having the EFW and ADV steam trap CIVs open would not impact this event since the containment isolation function is not a factor.

For the loss of RCS forced flow, only the reactor coolant pump shaft seizure has a dose estimate, and that dose estimate is based on a normal cool down to shutdown cooling with no secondary isolations assumed. Therefore, having