[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 79 (Tuesday, April 26, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 21562-21570]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-8259]



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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 23, et al.



Security Considerations on the Flightdeck of Transport Category 
Airplanes; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 79 / Tuesday, April 26, 2005 / 
Proposed Rules  

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 121, and 129

[Docket Nos. 2002-11032; 2002-12504, and 2003-15653]
RIN 2120-AI54 (Formerly 2120-AH56), -AH70, and -AH96


Security Considerations on the Flightdeck of Transport Category 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Disposition of comments on final rule.

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SUMMARY: Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the agency has 
published six amendments and has held one public meeting on standards 
for reinforcing flightdeck doors. The FAA sought public comments for 
each amendment, but all six were effective immediately on publication. 
The agency disposed of some comments that related specifically to the 
reinforced door requirements in later amendments. This action disposes 
of the remaining comments.

ADDRESSES: You may review the public dockets (Docket Nos. 2002-11032, 
2002-12504, and 2003-15653) in the Dockets Office between 9 a.m. and 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Dockets 
Office is on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the Department 
of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 
DC 20590-0001. Also you may review the public docket on the Internet at 
http://dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For part 25 issues, contact Jeff 
Gardlin, Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch (ANM-115), Transport Airplane 
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; 
telephone (425) 227-2136, facsimile (425) 227-1149, e-mail: 
[email protected]. For part 121, contact Joe Keenan, Air Carrier 
Operations Branch (AFS-220), Flight Standards Services, Federal 
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 
20591; telephone (202) 267-9579; facsimile (202) 267-5229; e-mail: 
[email protected]. For part 129, contact Marlene Livack, International 
Programs & Policy Office (AFS-50) 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202) 385-4678;, facsimile (202) 385-
4561, e-mail: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On September 11, 2001, the United States experienced terrorist 
attacks when aircraft were commandeered and used as weapons. These 
actions demonstrated a need to improve the design, operational, and 
procedural security of the flightdeck. On November 19, 2001, Congress 
enacted Public Law 107-71, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(the Act), which specifies that improved flightdeck security must be 
applied to aircraft operating in passenger or intrastate air 
transportation. Section 104 of the Act directed the FAA to issue a 
final rule, without seeking public comment prior to adoption addressing 
the security requirement for aircraft that are currently required to 
have flightdeck doors.
    As a result, the FAA issued a series of Special Federal Aviation 
Regulations (SFAR 92) and four final rules without notice, and held a 
public meeting.
     Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR-92) (66 FR 
51546, October 9, 2001; 66 FR 52835, October 17, 2001; 66 FR 58650, 
November 21, 2001; and 67 FR 12820, March 19, 2002; Docket No. FAA-
2002-10770) first allowed, and then required, the installation of 
internal locking devices on the flightdeck doors.
     On January 15, 2002, we amended Title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR) parts 25 and 121 to set new standards for 
flightdeck doors (Amendment Nos. 25-106 and 121-288; 67 FR 2118; Docket 
No. FAA-2002-11032). Section 25.795 was amended to set standards for 
reinforcing flightdeck doors. The new standards require them to resist 
forcible intrusion and ballistic penetration. Section 121.313(f) was 
amended to mandate installation of the reinforced doors on certain 
airplanes not later than April 9, 2003. The affected airplanes included 
transport category all-cargo airplanes operated under part 121 which 
had flightdeck doors installed on or after January 15, 2002.
     On June 21, 2002, the FAA amended 14 CFR part 129 to apply 
similar standards to foreign operators operating into the United States 
(Amendment No. 129-33; 67 FR 42450; Docket No. FAA-2002-12504). Section 
129.28 requires installation of the reinforced door not later than 
April 9, 2003. The affected airplanes include transport category all-
cargo airplanes operated under part 129 which had flightdeck doors 
installed on or after June 21, 2002. A public meeting to address the 
amendment was held on July 30.
     On December 23, 2002, we amended part 129 as a result of 
input received from a public hearing held on July 30, 2002, and 
comments received as a result of the rulemaking (Amendment No. 129-36; 
67FR79822; Docket No. FAA-2002-12504). The amendment clarifies the 
applicability of the part 129 regulations for foreign operators.
     On July 18, 2003, the FAA issued Amendment Nos. 121-299 
and 129-38. These amendments provided an alternative means of 
compliance to operators of all-cargo airplanes that are required to 
have a reinforced security flightdeck door. The rule allows operators 
of large cargo airplanes to either install reinforced flightdeck doors 
or adopt enhanced security procedures approved by the Transportation 
Security Administration. We also changed the cargo portion of the rule 
to replace the April 9, 2003, compliance date with October 1, 2003, to 
correspond to section 355 of the Consolidated Appropriations 
Resolution, Public Law 108-7.
    In Amendment Nos. 121-299 and 129-38, the FAA also disposed of some 
comments that had been received for the earlier amendments that related 
specifically to the reinforced door requirements. At that time, we 
indicated that we would respond later, in a separate document, to all 
other comments. This action represents that document.

Discussion of Comments

Amendment Nos. 25-106/121-288 (Parts 25 and 121)

    Thirty-two commenters, representing airlines, aerospace 
manufacturers, a labor organization, and individuals, responded to the 
request for comments. Two of these commenters submitted comments 
directly to the FAA without entering them in the public docket because 
of their security-sensitive nature; their comments will not be 
discussed for that reason. Some comments that were submitted before the 
regulation and associated advisory were published (http://www.faa.gov/regulations/) were actually addressed in those documents. These 
comments address cargo operations, applying the rule more broadly, the 
performance standards test methods, inflight access to the flightdeck, 
and the availability of advisory material. Comments also address the 
FAA's assessment of the cost of the rule.

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Cargo Operation

    Ten commenters address the need to extend the requirements for 
flightdeck door improvements to all-cargo operations.
     Comment: Commenters were divided on whether (1) the 
current requirements should be extended to any all-cargo airplane 
operating in part 121 service, or (2) the current requirements should 
be rescinded for all-cargo airplanes that have flightdeck doors 
installed and carry persons aft of the flightdeck.
    Response: The FAA believes the proponents of each argument make 
many good points on an issue that is not simple. We believe that (1) 
all-cargo operations need to be treated consistently, and (2) 
improvements in security are necessary for all-cargo operations that 
permit the carriage of persons, whether on the flightdeck or aft of it. 
For reasons of security, the details surrounding all the issues will 
not be discussed here. However, based on all available information, the 
FAA adopted Amendment Nos.121-299 and 129-38, which permit operators to 
adopt security programs, in lieu of installation of a reinforced 
flightdeck door in certain situations. Regardless of whether the 
operator has a flightdeck door installed on its airplanes, the operator 
is still subject to security requirements of the TSA and FAA. These 
actions were taken in coordination with the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) and are discussed further elsewhere in this 
document.

Rule Applicability

    Three commenters address extending the existing standards to other 
types of airplanes operating in part 121 service.
     Comments: Two commenters state that improved flightdeck 
doors were impractical for other than transport category airplanes, and 
would not have a practical impact on security in any case. They point 
out that many of these airplanes do not have separate flightdecks and, 
on those that do, the structure necessary to support a reinforced 
flightdeck door is not present. They note that emergency egress from 
these airplanes is frequently predicated on there being no obstacle 
between the flightdeck and emergency exits, and the installation of 
flightdeck door would compromise egress. Similarly, these commenters 
note that other airworthiness requirements (such as accommodating rapid 
decompression) would be very difficult to address were a flightdeck 
door installed where none previously existed.
     One commenter encourages adoption of similar standards for 
commuter category airplanes (part 23). He argues for an equivalent 
approach to security for airplanes operating in commercial passenger 
service.
    Response: After extensive discussion with the TSA to determine the 
threat/risk present and the most appropriate method of mitigation, we 
do not plan to extend the requirements for reinforced flightdeck doors 
beyond their current applicability. If additional action is needed to 
extend these requirements to commuter category airplanes, we will do so 
in separate rulemaking, and we will address any egress problems.
     Comment: One commenter proposes 75,000 pounds as the lower 
weight limit on airplanes required to comply with this requirement.
    Response: The FAA disagrees. The proposed weight limit would 
exclude a large number of significant size regional jets and airplanes 
operating in part 121 service. As discussed in the preamble, the FAA 
has already established the need for a door between the flightdeck and 
the passenger cabin and includes airplanes less than 75,000 pounds. 
Certain airplanes should have flightdeck doors, and this requirement 
establishes performance criteria for those doors. To arbitrarily 
establish a weight limit for incorporation of the performance 
requirements would diminish the effect of the rule and reduce the 
overall level of safety and security.

Performance Standards

    Six commenters address the severity of the standards for intrusion 
and ballistic penetration resistance. These commenters state that one 
or both standards were not severe enough.
     Comment: Commenters addressing the intrusion requirements 
point out that there are ways to achieve higher than a 300 Joule (300J) 
impact, and that the existing standard might not be adequate. One 
commenter at the FAA public meeting on flightdeck security for foreign 
operators questioned the adequacy of tension load requirements and 
stated that the values required could easily be exceeded.
    Response: We considered several factors in establishing the 
requirement at 300 Joules. Based on the comments, we revisited the 
standard and have concluded that it is adequate. First, the rule 
requires that the impact be applied on very localized areas of the 
door. In virtually all instances where higher than 300J could be 
exerted, the impact would be spread over a greater area, effectively 
reducing the severity of the impact locally. Second, as noted in the 
rule, the intent of the requirement is not to make the door 
impenetrable, but to significantly add to its ability to resist an 
intruder, until other measures can be taken. Given the measures 
necessary to actually generate more than 300J, the FAA is confident 
that the current standard provides the level of protection necessary to 
satisfy the intent of the requirement and significantly upgrade 
security and safety.
    Regarding the tension load requirement, it is possible to exert a 
higher force on the doorknob or handle in some cases; however, the FAA 
has concluded that this is not a practical concern. The installation 
configuration of flightdeck doors on airplanes and the basic 
frangibility of the doorknob does not compromise the intrusion 
resistance of the door.
     Comment: One commenter suggests that the standard be 
modified to address a time element i.e., duration of an attack.
    Response: We expect other measures would be invoked before an 
intruder could sustain a prolonged attack on the door. In addition, 
such a requirement is not suitable as a certification standard unless a 
quantifiable way of measuring performance can be standardized. The FAA 
is unaware of any such standard and, given the severity of the impact 
and tension load requirements, is satisfied that the existing intrusion 
standard is adequate.
     Comment: One commenter suggests modifying the ballistic 
penetration standard to require testing in conditions of extreme 
humidity. The commenter notes that many ballistic materials can lose 
their performance characteristics when wet, and is concerned that issue 
is not being addressed.
    Response: Prolonged exposure to very high humidity can affect 
ballistic performance. This is not, however, a practical concern for 
commercial airplanes. To the degree that humidity does vary in the 
airplane, it is typically very low, and any exposure to higher humidity 
would be for far shorter times than would be necessary to noticeably 
affect the performance of the material. The FAA does not plan to change 
the standard.
     Comment: One commenter objects to the language in Advisory 
Circular 25.795-2, which notes that protrusion of the bullet (i.e., 
partial penetration) is acceptable, as long as no penetration occurs. 
The commenter suggests that bullets should not be allowed to protrude 
through the door.
    Response: We do not agree. As long as no penetration of the bullet 
or fragments occurs, the door will have met its objective. From a 
certification standpoint, this is a readily achievable standard that 
does not require interpretation. On the other hand, a

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``partial protrusion'' could be interpreted in many ways and could lead 
to non-standardized application of the requirement, for no real gain in 
safety.
     Comment: Two commenters believe that the ballistic and 
intrusion requirements should be considered in combination with each 
other, or with other failures. These commenters believe that the 
standard should require, for example, that the door retain its 
intrusion and ballistic resistance after the airplane experiences a 
rapid decompression. The commenters suggest that the scenario whereby 
the airplane experiences a rapid decompression and is subsequently 
targeted for terrorist action is sufficiently likely to require 
regulatory action.
    Response: We do not agree. A rapid decompression sufficient to 
compromise the integrity of the flightdeck door is a very severe and 
infrequent event. The likelihood of this event, coupled with an 
intruder on board, is extremely small. If the airplane experiences such 
rapid decompression, it is unlikely that an intruder would be able to 
carry out an action against the airplane because of the resultant 
damage that would affect the flying conditions.
    Finally, the practicality of designing a door that would provide 
adequate venting for rapid decompression while still being intrusion 
and ballistically resistant is questionable at best. Satisfying 
decompression requirements without consideration of maintaining 
security proved to be a very difficult certification issue; the FAA 
doubts that such designs could be implemented in a timely manner, if at 
all. With regard to whether the intrusion and ballistic requirements 
should be considered in combination with each other, the FAA notes that 
the current requirements are focused on preventing intrusion into the 
flightdeck. As such, the ballistic requirements include consideration 
of any failure that would permit the door to be opened, in addition to 
the penetration resistance of the door itself. The FAA considers that 
this provision adequately addresses the existing fleet and will provide 
a high level of security. For future airplanes, the FAA will consider 
the need to require penetration resistance following tests for 
intrusion. Such a requirement would be more practical on new airplanes 
than for a retrofit application and, while the improvement in security 
is likely to be small, such designs may be more readily developed for a 
new design with minimal cost.

Emergency Access to the Flightdeck

    One commenter addresses the requirement for inflight access by 
flight attendants in the event the crew becomes incapacitated.
    Response: In accordance with Sec.  121.587(b), certificate holders 
are already required to have FAA-approved procedures for opening, 
closing, and locking the flightcrew compartment door. These procedures 
may include the use of an FAA certificated electronic access system. 
While the use of highly sophisticated systems for flightcrew 
compartment access is not presently required, many certificate holders 
have elected to use these systems voluntarily. The FAA has concluded 
that the current requirements are sufficiently safe as written, and no 
change is necessary.

Advisory Material

    Four commenters addressed the advisory material.
     Comment: One commenter that filed comments before the FAA 
issued the regulation and advisory materials states that language in 
draft advisory material reflects a product bias. He recommends that 
such language be changed. A trade association commenter supports this 
position.
     Response: The FAA modified the final version of the 
advisory material to reflect more generic language, although there was 
never any intended endorsement of one product type over another. No 
further comments on this topic were received during the comment period.
     Comment: Two commenters request additional advisory 
material. One commenter requests an advisory circular (AC) to address 
the access systems discussed above. The other commenter requests 
advisory material on minimum requirements for dispatch with regard to 
the performance of the flightdeck door.
    Response: Before issuing the rule, the FAA maintained a guidance 
memorandum and a list of ``frequently asked questions.'' (See Web site 
at: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/324ED6824765F7ED86256E600053490F?OpenDocument.) This 
memorandum effectively serves as advisory material for the access 
system. The FAA will consider whether a dedicated AC is needed for the 
access system, however, there is no current plan for a separate AC.
    The FAA has also developed a policy for use by the Flight 
Operations Evaluation Boards that establishes Master Minimum lists that 
the operators use to determine acceptable dispatch configurations. This 
document is available at http://www.opspecs.com to all interested 
parties and satisfies the request for guidance.

Other Designs

     Comment: Two commenters state that a double door 
arrangement, creating a chamber between the two doors outside the 
flightdeck should be required. One commenter proposes designs for such 
an arrangement, while one commenter refers to similar configurations 
used by a foreign airline.
    Response: We do not agree. Using two flightdeck doors will 
typically magnify all other compliance issues, as discussed in the 
preamble. In particular, venting for rapid decompression, emergency 
egress, and smoke evacuation would be much more difficult to address 
with two doors instead of one. The principal advantage of a double door 
arrangement is that it separates the flightdeck from the cabin and both 
doors would not have to be open at the same time.
    With regard to the foreign operator that has this arrangement, the 
FAA notes that this is a voluntary configuration that is used on only 
one aircraft type. In addition, that operator has experienced problems 
in satisfying certification requirements. While the FAA acknowledges 
that such designs are possible, to retrofit them into existing 
airplanes would be very complicated and would require a longer 
compliance time than is considered prudent. For new airplanes, such 
designs might be more feasible, and the FAA will consider whether the 
benefits of a double door arrangement would outweigh the costs in any 
future rulemaking. At this time, however, no action is planned.

Flightdeck Bulkhead

     Comment: Two commenters propose that the bulkhead that 
separates the flightdeck from the passenger cabin be subject to the 
same standards as the flightdeck door.
    Response: The FAA agrees and is in the process of proposing 
requirements to adopt the same standards into part 25 that are 
currently required for the flightdeck door. This requirement would 
apply to new type design and would not require retrofit. For the 
existing fleet, the flightdeck door represents the most significant 
security weakness. The bulkheads are typically much more substantial 
and contain equipment and features on the flightdeck that provide 
inherent protection. While it would undoubtedly be an improvement to 
apply the same standards to the bulkheads of airplanes

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in the existing fleet, the FAA concludes that this modification would 
be very difficult and expensive for an incremental improvement in 
security. To the extent that an operator can accomplish this 
modification readily on a particular airplane type, the FAA would 
encourage it to do so.

Funding

     Comment: Two commenters state that, since certain cargo 
operators are being required to modify airplanes, they should be 
eligible for reimbursement from government funding.
    Response: While not strictly relevant to this rulemaking, part 121 
cargo operators were eligible for reimbursement.

Amendment No. 121-299 (Part 121)

    Eight commenters responded to the final rule request for comments: 
four individuals, one cargo airline association, one cargo airline 
holding company, one U.S. cargo airline, and one foreign cargo airline. 
Comments generally were supportive of the rule. They addressed security 
procedures and screening, door installation costs, surveillance 
cameras, the rule compliance date, and applicability.

Security Procedures and Screening

     Comment: One individual suggests that security measures 
should be as effective and enforced as stringently for all cargo 
operations as they are for passenger operations and that security 
screening would be more effective than hardened doors.
    Response: Security screening procedures for cargo operations are 
different from those used for passenger flights because of the limited 
number of occupants permitted on board and the airport environment into 
which cargo airplanes operate. This rule provides operators with an 
option of upgrading flightdeck doors or adopting a TSA-approved 
security program.
     Comment: One commenter recommends increasing the number of 
personnel that would be responsible for ensuring only authorized 
persons are granted access to operational areas and the aircraft. 
Another commenter suggests arming the pilots.
    Response: Air cargo operators are already performing screening 
measures for the limited number of occupants allowed on all-cargo 
airplanes. Requiring a new crewmember position, such as a security 
guard, is beyond the scope of this rule. Arming of pilots in all-cargo 
operations is underway in accordance with Section 609 of Public Law 
108-76.
     Comment: A cargo airline holding company requests the FAA 
provide more specificity about the nature of the security procedures. 
The commenter states: (1) The TSA has, in effect, nullified an FAA 
regulation conferring specific benefits on carriers and criticizes 
TSA's action as likely to erode the business opportunities for a number 
of carriers, create a discriminatory regulatory environment that 
disadvantages some carriers, and favor others; (2) the FAA should 
reinforce its intent by publishing a supplemental notice advising the 
TSA to develop security based procedures for carriers, rather than 
requiring reinforcing flightdeck doors; and (3) each carrier should be 
permitted to tailor its procedures to its particular operation.
    Response: The FAA responds in the following manner: (1) We do not 
agree that the TSA security program required by this rule has nullified 
an FAA regulation or created a discriminatory environment within the 
air cargo industry; (2) while the FAA collaborates with the TSA on 
matters that concern both organizations, the TSA makes the final 
determination concerning content of security programs that are subject 
to their approval; and (3) the TSA-approved program contains a 
provision for air carriers to request alternative procedures to those 
specified in the program.

Surveillance Cameras

     Comment: Two individual commenters suggested installation 
of a video system or monitor that would allow the flightcrew to see an 
individual requesting entry onto the flightdeck. One individual 
commenter suggested that installation of surveillance cameras would be 
more cost effective than installation of a door.
    Response: The FAA does not oppose the use of video monitoring 
systems.
    Use of surveillance cameras implies installation of a flightdeck 
door, or similar barrier, if one does not already exist. The FAA did 
not mandate a video system in addition to a flightdeck door in this 
rule. Most flightdeck doors have a viewing device that permits the crew 
to see a person in the area outside the flightdeck door before allowing 
access.

Compliance Date

     Comment: A cargo airline states its vendor would not be 
able to meet the October 1, 2003, deadline and asks about options for 
all-cargo operators beyond the deadline date.
    Response: For security reasons, the FAA did not extend the 
compliance deadline.

Applicability to Fleet

     Comment: A cargo airline association opposes the 
requirement for a TSA security program to apply to all airplanes in an 
operator's fleet, including those with hardened doors, if a single 
airplane within that fleet requires the security program. The commenter 
requests the FAA amend the rule to apply to an individual aircraft, 
rather than an entire fleet of that aircraft type.
    Response: The FAA disagrees. The FAA rule requires a hardened door 
or implementation of an approved TSA security program. Under Title 49 
CFR 1544, 1546, and 1550.7(b), the TSA security program requires all 
all-cargo operators to have a TSA-approved program applicable to every 
all-cargo aircraft in its fleet. Accordingly, because the FAA rule is 
based on the TSA security program, and the security program applies to 
all all-cargo aircraft in a fleet, the FAA does not intend to amend 
this final rule.

Amendment Nos. 129-33 and -36 (Part 129)

    Thirty-seven commenters responded to the part 129 final rules and 
July 30 public meeting. Most commenters support the rule. Commenters 
included airline and pilot associations, air carriers, and individuals. 
They addressed security, the rule compliance date, harmonization 
efforts with foreign authorities, access to the cockpit, requirements 
for reinforced doors on all-cargo airplanes, and cost and funding.

Balanced Approach to Security

     Comment: One association cautions against discarding all 
previous procedures and solutions that served well before the September 
11 terrorist attacks. The commenter recommends solving the problem on 
the ground by screening passengers, staff, luggage, cargo, and 
equipment. The commenter suggests balancing safety, security, and 
financial concerns proportionately so the security costs do not hinder 
people from flying and or the security process does not dampen their 
desire to fly.
    Response: The FAA and the TSA have worked together on risk and 
threat assessments to determine applicability of proposed security 
requirements to airplane design and operation. For the last several 
years, we focused attention on the certification and installation of 
reinforced flightdeck doors. We, however, are working other security 
related initiatives as well. Both the FAA and the TSA expect to 
continue to coordinate closely to ensure a systemic approach to 
aviation security.

[[Page 21566]]

Coordination and Harmonization by Regulatory Authorities

     Comment: Three commenters, including two associations and 
one operator, ask that, before introducing more legislation, the 
European Union, the United States, and the ICAO coordinate more with 
foreign governments, operators, and stakeholders, including part 129 
air carriers.
    One of the associations states it believes that States must work 
together in a cooperative manner, with input from the industry to 
ensure harmonized implementation of globally recognized standards.
    Response: The FAA currently does, to a great extent, and will 
continue to work and coordinate with other regulatory authorities on 
standards and recommended practices.

Authority To Grant Access to the Cockpit and Operational Procedural 
Requirements for Locking the Door

     Comment: One association suggests the need for additional 
training and operations procedures to include communications and a way 
to visually monitor the area adjacent to the cockpit door. The 
commenter states that the cockpit door is one of the emergency exits 
and that new technical procedures and solutions must not hinder the 
emergency operation.
    Response: We agree and recognize that good communications and 
interaction between the flightcrew and cabin attendants has a positive 
influence on flight safety and security. A closed and locked door, 
however, can be a challenge to effecting good communications. Thus, the 
FAA currently requires training and operations procedures to include 
communications and a way to visually verify the identity of an 
individual prior to granting access to the flightdeck for U.S. 
airlines. The FAA also requires foreign air carriers to have procedures 
in place to prevent access to the flightdeck that are acceptable to the 
national authority having oversight.
    The FAA is considering rulemaking to propose requirements for 
visually monitoring the area outside and adjacent to the flightdeck and 
for alerting the flightcrew to any suspected threats and is attempting 
to harmonize the proposal with other national authorities.
     Comment: One association states that the captain should 
retain final authority on when to lock the door. This same association 
and one individual commenter state the captain should have discretion 
on whom to admit to the flightdeck.
    Response: The FAA disagrees. The events of September 11, 2001, 
emphasized the need to maintain the integrity of the flightdeck and 
command of the aircraft at all costs. In response to the Transportation 
Security Act, the FAA required operators to adopt operational changes 
restricting access to the flightdeck in flight. Because of the demands 
on aviation safety and security, Amendment No. 129-33 adopted Sec.  
129.28(d), which required procedures to restrict access to the 
flightdeck. This action is consistent with Amendment 27 to Annex 6, 
Part 1 of the ICAO standards, which includes the requirement to lock 
the flightdeck door.
     Comment: One operator states the FAA and manufacturers 
should ensure that Phase II door designs and procedural requirements 
are such that the flight crew does not have to vacate control seats to 
allow entry to the flightdeck and that current Phase II door designs do 
not cause intrusive noise in the crew rest area.
    Response: The FAA agrees that requirements for sleeping quarters 
must be met, including the procedures associated with entry into the 
flightdeck. While the rule does not specifically address this issue, 
since the issue does not relate to flightdeck security per se, each 
carrier will have to satisfy its national authority that these 
requirements continue to be met. Up to now, all approvals for long 
range airplanes include provisions that enable the crew to operate the 
flightdeck door lock without having to leave their seat. The rule 
requires part 129 air carriers to have procedures in place, acceptable 
to the civil aviation authority responsible for oversight, that prevent 
unauthorized persons access to the flightdeck. As such, the operator 
has the discretion to install video systems, acceptable to its civil 
aviation authority, to monitor the areas external to the cockpit and 
authorize entry to the flightdeck without requiring the pilots to 
vacate their control seats. ICAO has adopted standards associated with 
monitoring the area outside the flight deck and discretely alerting the 
flightcrew of suspected threats.
     Comment: One commenter states that Sec.  129.28 should 
include detailed emergency exit procedures for pilots and that doors 
should have two-person integrity on all internal locking devices to 
assure proper security procedures are followed. This commenter also 
suggests that detailed emergency exit procedures should be included for 
pilots who are locked behind the reinforced doors in the event of an 
accident or other emergencies. Finally, the commenter states the 
proposed rule neglects to cover how authorized persons may exit the 
flightdeck during abnormal situations.
    Response: The flightdeck door is already subject to several 
requirements that affect its structural integrity, including: 
protection during decompression, emergency egress considerations, and 
the capability for rescue personnel to enter the flightdeck in the 
event the flightcrew is unable to egress on its own. After reviewing 
several design proposals, the FAA has determined that the requirements 
can be accommodated by proper door design and installation. As a result 
aircraft meeting the requirements of this rule should continue to meet 
all the requirements necessary to maintain a valid certificate of 
airworthiness from the country of registry.

Requirement To Have a Reinforced Door and Lock the Cockpit Door on All-
Cargo Airplanes

     Comments: One operator suggests rephrasing Sec.  129.28 
(a)(2) and 129.28 (c) to read ``* * * between the pilot compartment and 
any other compartment when occupied by persons other than those listed 
in 129.28 (d)(3).'' The operator states this will exclude all-cargo 
airplanes that carry only persons listed in 129.28 (d)(3) from the 
requirements to reinforce the door. The operator also states this would 
solve the issue of conflicting requirements on those all-cargo 
airplanes (such as the MD-11) equipped with an airworthiness placard 
requiring that the cockpit door be latched open during taxi, takeoff 
and landing.
     Another operator states that certification requirements 
for the MD-11 require the door to remain open during takeoff and 
landing for emergency egress. This operator asks how it can comply with 
both the rule and certification requirements when they are in conflict 
since the rule requires the door to be closed and locked.
    Response: The rule, as written, provides the relief suggested by 
the commenters. If an all-cargo airplane does not have a door, then the 
entire airplane is defined as a flightdeck. Section 129.28 (d) defines 
those individuals who can be admitted to the flightdeck. If only those 
individuals identified in Sec.  129.28(d)(3) are carried on an all-
cargo airplane, no door is required. Although this meets the intent of 
the FAA's regulatory requirement, the TSA may impose additional 
security requirements on all-cargo airplanes.

[[Page 21567]]

Security on All-Cargo Airplanes

    Six commenters, including one association and five air carriers 
recommend that all-cargo airplanes either be exempted from the 
flightdeck door requirements or that the deadline for implementation be 
extended. They suggest that the nature of cargo operations is different 
from passenger operations and actions necessary to enhance flightdeck 
security can also be different. Several commenters expressed similar 
concerns as part 121 operators about extending the compliance 
deadlines.
     Comments: One commenter states that all-cargo airlines, 
especially those operated on a charter basis, pose the least risk of 
having airplanes used as weapons by terrorists since all-cargo charter 
operations do not publish a schedule for service. Also, it would be 
difficult to know in advance when an aircraft would be operated.
     Both the association and one air carrier suggest that it 
is possible to implement operational and security procedures, such as 
background checks, to ensure adequate security and provide an 
alternative means of compliance.
     Two air carriers cite the inconsistency of the regulation 
because cargo airplanes without flightdeck doors are not subject to the 
provisions of the regulation. One carrier contends that this 
inconsistency fails to effectively enhance flightdeck security. The 
second carrier states the rule places it at a competitive disadvantage 
against air carriers whose fleet is designed and operated with no doors 
without improving the security environment. According to the second 
carrier, the crew exits the flightdeck regularly to visit the galley or 
lavatory, perform routine inspection, or in the event no flight 
attendants are available, ensure the area is clear and secure before a 
flightcrew member exits. The carrier states that in the event of an 
intrusion when a flightcrew member is absent from the flightdeck, a 
reinforced door will prevent that return to the flightdeck to assist 
the other flightcrew member(s).
     Another air carrier expressed concern at the July 30, 
2002, public meeting, that it would be physically impossible to modify 
all affected aircraft by April 9, 2003. The commenter suggests making 
U.S. passenger carriers a higher priority because they present a higher 
security risk.
     One carrier comments that the FAA did not amend part 121 
to require reinforced flightdeck doors on all cargo operations until 
Federal Express petitioned it to do so. The commenter indicates and 
there is no evidence in the public record that the reinforced cockpit 
door requirement has appreciably increased aircraft security or reduced 
the threat of a terrorist attack in the U.S. The carrier urges the FAA 
to develop a policy for granting exemptions to all cargo carriers that 
have developed enhanced all-cargo security programs that provide for 
equivalent, or perhaps greater, levels of security than that brought 
about by the installation of reinforced doors.
     Comment: One air carrier states that the purpose of the 
rule can better be served with less economic impact if the FAA would 
focus specifically on carriers posing a significant risk and apply the 
rule with flexibility in light of what carriers can feasibly 
accomplish. The commenter argues that putting foreign all-cargo 
carriers on the same timetable as the more risk-prone U.S. passenger 
carriers may actually compromise security as it may result in some 
passenger aircraft being delayed in favor of freighter aircraft for 
which the commenter asserts the flightdeck door retrofit accomplishes 
very little increase in real security.
    Response: The FAA found many of the points made by these commenters 
to be persuasive. In recognizing that differences exist in the design 
and operation of all-cargo airplanes, the FAA allowed all-cargo 
carriers to opt for an alternate means of compliance by adopting 
enhanced security procedures approved by the TSA in lieu of installing 
a reinforced door.
     Comment: One association indicates that it supports 
reinforced doors on all cargo aircraft. The commenter cites the 
following factors that, when combined, increase the opportunity for a 
terrorists attack: (1) Limited ground security procedures in place at 
cargo operations versus those in place for passenger carrying 
operations; (2) company employees carried as ``passengers'' or 
``occupants'' on cargo aircraft, have far less scrutiny than fare-
paying passengers in common carriage; (3) ramp areas for cargo 
operations are less controlled than in typical passenger operations; 
and (4) cargo operations lack the benefit of flight attendant or 
passenger intervention in the event of an unwanted intruder on an 
aircraft.
    Response: The FAA believes that improvements in security are 
necessary for all-cargo operations that permit the carriage of persons, 
whether on the flightdeck or aft of it. For reasons of security, the 
details surrounding all the issues will not be discussed here. However, 
based on all available information, the FAA adopted Amendment Nos.121-
299 and 129-38, which permit operators to adopt security programs, in 
lieu of installation of a reinforced flightdeck door in certain 
situations. These actions were taken in coordination with the TSA and 
are discussed further elsewhere in this document.

Overflight Operations

     Comments: One association believes that an aircraft on an 
overflight could potentially pose a threat if the aircraft were 
commandeered. The commenter states that although the FAA does not have 
the means for surveillance of foreign carriers unless they are on the 
ground, aircraft conducting overflight of the U.S. operating under part 
129 must be required to comply with the requirement to install a 
reinforced door.
     One air carrier asks if the addition of the word 
``overflight'' is intentional in Sec.  129.28.
    Response: The FAA excluded overflights in Amendment No. 129.36, in 
which we state:

    In general, the FAA has no practical means of conducting 
surveillance of foreign carriers other than on the ground within the 
United States. Accordingly, we are changing the phrase ``within the 
United States or on overflights'' to read ``within the United 
States, except for overflights'' in Sec.  129.28.

The FAA's position does not prevent the TSA or other Federal agencies, 
from imposing such security requirements.

Editorial and Technical Changes

     Comments: One commenter proposes all carriers entering the 
United States be required to have annual certification for the 
durability and safe operation of the flightdeck door.
     One commenter suggests Sec.  129.28(c) include that 
flightdeck door locks be impenetrable by unauthorized keys or other 
devices.
     One commenter suggests editorial changes to Sec.  
129.28(c).
    Response: The FAA's intent is to keep requirements consistent with 
those of parts 25 and 121. Therefore, no changes in wording were made.
     Comment: One air carrier suggests using the effective date 
of the rule, June 21, 2002, as a cockpit door installation reference 
date instead of January 15, 2002, in Sec.  129.28 (a)(2).
    Response: The FAA agrees and the date has been changed by Amendment 
No. 129-38.
     Comment: One commenter recommends including provisions for 
airplanes being ferried for maintenance to the U.S.
    Response: The FAA disagrees because the rule already allows for 
maintenance ferry flights as long as no passengers are on board.

[[Page 21568]]

     Comment: One carrier suggests including a termination date 
of April 8, 2003, for the purposes of the requirements of Sec.  129.28 
(a).
    Response: The FAA disagrees. The provision that an airplane must 
have a reinforced door meeting certain resistance and ballistic 
penetration requirements supercedes the ``Phase 1'' locking requirement 
for the flightdeck door.
     Comment: One commenter supports the intent of the rule but 
suggests restricting additional items to be carried on board the 
aircraft. The commenter also suggests that the flightcrew needs an 
alternative to help the crew without leaving the cockpit.
    Response: ICAO has recognized the need for the aircraft crew to 
operate as a team and provides guidance material for use by airlines in 
developing training programs that ensure both cabin and flight crews 
can act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of 
unlawful interference. These requirements are outlined in the ICAO 
standards on training programs. The FAA agrees with this concept and is 
considering rulemaking to require a means for the cabin crew to 
discretely notify the flightcrew in the event of suspicious activity or 
security breaches.
    Identification of items prohibited to be carried aboard air 
carriers is the responsibility of the TSA and is beyond the scope of 
this rule.
     Comment: One air carrier states that the original Sec.  
129.13 requires that aircraft carry current airworthiness certificates 
(COA). The air carrier submits that the new except clause can be read 
as a waiver to the requirement to carry a COA. The commenter states 
this would introduce a discrepancy with Article 29 of the Chicago 
Convention that requires every aircraft used internationally to carry a 
valid COA.
    Response: After September 11, the FAA issued a series of SFARs that 
first allowed, and then required the installation of internal locking 
devices on flightdeck doors pending installation of reinforced doors. 
Section 129.28(a) adopted a requirement for a similar improvement in 
flightdeck security for foreign air carriers. This requirement was 
consistent with SFAR 92. As noted in the preamble of the SFARs, the 
required modifications had the potential to compromise other 
airworthiness standards. As a result, Sec.  129.28(b) provided relief 
from the otherwise applicable provisions of Sec.  129.13 only until 
April 9, 2003, because of the short deadline. Because the FAA does not 
directly regulate airworthiness of foreign registered aircraft, 
modifications required by Sec.  129.28(a) may have also required relief 
from the country of registry. Based on communications with other 
national authorities, the FAA determined that most were prepared to 
grant such relief and this amendment should not have created a 
conflict. In the event a country was not willing to grant such relief, 
the FAA was prepared to work out a mutually acceptable solution. This 
issue, however, became moot after April 9, 2003, because Sec.  
129.28(b) was only applicable until April 9, 2003 to provide relief 
from a short deadline. Any requested deviations submitted after April 
9, 2003 were handled as a normal deviation request, and not under Sec.  
129.28(b).

Business Aircraft and Those With a Seating Capacity of Less Than 20 
Passenger Seats

     Comments: Two air carriers and one air carrier association 
urge the FAA to exclude business aircraft and those transport category 
airplanes originally type certificated with 19 seats or less.
     One association opposes limiting the security requirements 
based upon size of aircraft or type of mission.
    Response: The FAA agrees with the first set of position. Amendment 
No. 129.36 exempts transport category airplanes originally type 
certificated with 19 or less passenger seats or transport category all-
cargo airplanes with a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or less from 
the flightdeck door requirements. This requirement is effectively 
equivalent to the part 121 requirements for flightdeck security.
    The FAA disagrees with the other position for the reasons stated in 
the preamble of Amendment No. 129-36. Part 129 covers the operational 
equivalent to both parts 121 and 135 in terms of size of airplanes used 
and scope of operations conducted. The FAA's intent was to have 
consistent flightdeck security requirements for parts 121 and 129. The 
application of the current requirement is effectively equivalent to 
airplanes of the same size as those used in part 121 operations. The 
FAA has not applied the flightdeck security requirements to carriers 
operating under part 135 in the United States and did not intend for 
the requirements to be extended to the types of airplanes operated 
under part 135.

Funding for New Security Requirements

     Comment: One airline association commented that it 
believes governments have direct responsibility for aviation security 
and it's funding to include protection of citizens. The association 
states that the security threat against airlines is a manifestation of 
the threat against the state and, therefore, the cost of aviation 
security should be borne by the states from general revenues and not 
from user fees.
    Response: Discussion of funding is beyond the scope of this rule.

Costs of Reinforcing the Flightdeck Doors

    Ten commenters, representing airlines, manufacturers, and 
associations, address the FAA's estimated cost. (Note: In response to 
the comments it received on the first rule, the FAA increased its 
estimate of the costs of the security doors in the later rulemakings.)
     Comments: All the commenters state the initial estimate of 
$12,000 to $17,000 was too low. Two state a door kit for a B-747-200 
costs between $190,000 and $195,000. One states that a door kit for a 
B-747-400 costs $38,500. Three report that the cost of a door kit for a 
widebody is $39,000. Six state that the cost of a door kit for a 
narrowbody is between $23,000 and $40,000.
    Response: When we initially estimated the security door kit cost, 
no security doors had been certificated to the new standards. 
Consequently, our estimate was based on preliminary responses from 
potential vendors. Subsequently, in the final rule for large cargo 
airplanes, the FAA revised its estimated cost for the security door kit 
to be between $42,000 and $50,000 for a narrowbody airplane, $50,000 
and $60,000 for a widebody airplane, and $210,000 for a B-747-100/200/
300. By way of comparison, a non-security flightdeck door costs about 
$5,600.
    The difference between our initial cost estimate and the current 
security door kit prices can be largely attributed to technological 
complexities that were not anticipated and to additional door features 
that are not required by the final rule. One technological complexity 
is the safety issue associated with flightdeck decompression 
situations. Coping with this complexity required more design and 
bulkhead modification than the FAA had anticipated. Similarly, the 
amount of destructive testing necessary to certificate the doors and 
the amount of these costs to recover from the kit prices were greater. 
However, security door kits also contain items beyond the requirements 
of the rule (e.g., remote keypad entry systems) that make the door kit 
price greater than the cost necessary to meet the new standards. As a 
result, although the kit prices overestimate the actual cost of a door 
that would meet the FAA requirements, the prices in the previous 
paragraph are those faced by the

[[Page 21569]]

operators, notwithstanding volume discounts for bulk purchases.

Labor Cost of Door Installation

     Comment: An individual commenter states all [flightdeck] 
doors should be corrected, saving money in the long run. The commenter 
goes on to state that airlines are already spending money on security 
and that either option will result in expenditure.
    Response: Most commenters state their support of a security program 
as an alternate means of compliance for cargo airline security 
requirements. However, a hardened door remains available as an option 
to operators that elect to take this course of action.
     Comment: One individual disagrees that a cost savings will 
be realized by a security program, but asks who will pay for security 
screening.
    Response: As indicated in the rule, if all airlines in the cargo 
industry chose to develop a TSA approved security program instead of 
installing hardened flightdeck doors, operators will save a total of 
about $68.117 million between 2003 and 2013. Should an individual 
operator, however, determine that it is more advantageous to install a 
hardened flightdeck door, the operator has the option to do so. 
Security screening is covered by TSA regulations and not addressed in 
this rule.
     Comment: A cargo airline asked how the new security 
program implementation would be funded. The commenter states that a 
large air cargo airline would require, on average, about $250,000 
initially, with annual costs of about $120,000.
    Response: This rule does not provide funding for security programs.
     Comment: Six commenters indicate the FAA's initial 
estimate of labor cost of $3,000 is too low and that the retrofit and 
installation cost should be between $3,000 and $50,000 per door.
    Response: We agree that our initial labor cost estimate was too 
low. We believe, however, that most of the commenters overestimated the 
amount of hours needed to retrofit flightdeck doors. In Amendment No. 
121.299, the FAA determined that it takes between 72 and 96 labor hours 
(at a cost of $5,760 to $7,680) to install and fully test reinforced 
doors and associated systems for most airplanes. It takes about 172 
hours ($13,760) to retrofit a B-747-100/200/300. However, the FAA now 
estimates that retrofitting an Airbus widebody takes between 250 to 300 
labor hours (a cost of $20,000 to $24,000).

Number of Out-of-Service Days

     Comments: The FAA had initially estimated that 
retrofitting the security doors would involve 1 out-of-service day. In 
Amendment No. 121.299, the FAA revised the estimate to 2-to 4-out of 
service days. Two commenters state that it would take about 10 days or 
less to retrofit the door electrical system and the bulkhead 
reinforcement vent for Airbus twin aisle airplanes. Another commenter 
states that it would take 6 to 7 days of down time to complete the 
retrofit on the Airbus twin aisle airplanes. Another commenter states 
that it will take 4 days to retrofit its B-747-400s. A final commenter 
states that it was taking 3 days to retrofit their single aisle 
airplanes although they hoped to be able to reduce that to 2 days.
    Response: The FAA agrees that its initial estimate of 1 out-of-
service day was too low. As installers became more familiar with the 
procedures, the vendors and some airline maintenance supervisors told 
us that 2 days out of service was their experiences for Boeing 
airplanes, other than the B-747-100/200. Those B-747s were taking 6 to 
8 days to install because the weight of the doors was too much for the 
first level ceiling to support and the ceiling needed to be reinforced. 
We disagree with the 10-day estimate for Airbus airplanes. These same 
individuals told us that it took them 4 days to install the doors on 
Airbus airplanes. At the time of the comments, the security door kits 
were months from being certificated and significant installation issues 
had not been answered at that time.

Value of Out-of-Service Time

     Comments: One association comments that one of its member 
carriers loses $350,000 per out-of-service day. Another commenter 
reports that it costs $140,000 per day in parking fees and lost revenue 
to ground one of its airplanes. Another commenter states that the out-
of-service losses will be greater than the costs to retrofit the 
security doors.
    Response: The FAA has used an average lease rate for the various 
airplanes models to proxy the losses to the aviation system from taking 
an airplane out of service. These daily rates range from about $4,750 
to $14,000--depending on the airplane model. We disagree with the 
magnitudes of these losses because the reported losses do not consider 
offsetting gains. For example, while individual airline A loses revenue 
on the day its airplane is grounded, rather than canceling their trips, 
most of the passengers will re-book their flights on airline B or on 
another Airline A flight. When airline B grounds its airplane, most of 
those passengers will re-book their flights on airline A or on another 
airline B flight rather than canceling the trip. These subsequent 
offsetting gains are not accounted for in the reported out-of-service 
time costs. Thus, when the entire airline as a whole is considered over 
the period of compliance, the losses are not as large as those reported 
in the comments.

Total Fleet Retrofitting Cost

     Comment: One association estimates a total cost of $30 
million for the door kits and labor to retrofit its members' 632 
affected airplanes.
     Response: We agree. The average cost per airplane is about 
$47,750, which is a reasonable estimate.

Maintenance and Fuel Costs

    Comment: One airline states that it would incur an annual cost of 
$50,000 for maintenance and fuel costs due to these security doors.
     Response: We agree. It is early in the life history of 
these doors and the need to replace or repair them any more frequently 
than the doors they replaced is unknown. Given that unknown aspect, in 
the cargo airplane final rule, the FAA conservatively assumed that the 
door is replaced every 5 years for an average annual maintenance cost 
of $10,000. The FAA also assumed that the average safety door system 
adds 100 pounds to a large airplane. This additional weight would have 
minimal impacts on weight and distance limitations. Based on a study by 
the Washington Consulting Group, Impact of Weight Changes on Aircraft 
Fuel Consumption, March 1994, p.16, each pound of weight increases fuel 
consumption by 12.25 gallons per year. The resulting total fuel 
increase is 1,225 gallons per year, which, at a price of $1 per gallon 
results in a $1,225 fuel consumption increase. The result is a total 
estimated increased maintenance and fuel cost of $11,225.

Economic Analysis

     Comment: One commenter suggests that the FAA adjust the 
benefits and costs section to specifically address the cost of the B-
747-100/200/300 and reconsider whether the rule is still cost-
beneficial for all kinds of operations, including all-cargo operations.
    Response: The FAA disagrees. The potential catastrophic losses from 
a terrorist using a cargo airplane are similar to the potential losses 
from a terrorist using a passenger airplane. Consequently, the FAA 
determines that

[[Page 21570]]

the potential benefits would outweigh even recalculated costs.

Transportation Security Administration Activity

    The Aviation and Transportation Security Act enacted by Congress on 
November 19, 2001, transferred airplane security to the TSA, but the 
physical airplane structure and the operational rules of airplanes 
remain the responsibility of the FAA. The TSA worked very closely with 
the FAA in developing and coordinating the flightdeck security rules, 
as well as providing an alternative means for cargo operators who are 
required to have a reinforced cargo door.
    Additionally, as an interim step, the TSA issued security 
directives to require random inspection of air cargo and to require 
foreign all-cargo air carriers to comply with the same cargo security 
procedures that domestic air carriers must follow. Passenger aircraft 
that carry cargo and all-cargo planes, both foreign and domestic, will 
be subject to the random inspections on flights within, into, and out 
of the U.S. For longer term action, the TSA is implementing a broad Air 
Cargo Strategic Plan that employs a layered approach to security 
critical elements of the entire air cargo supply chain. The plan 
incorporates a threat-based risk management approach to ensure that all 
cargo deemed high-risk is inspected. It focuses on strategies to secure 
air cargo perimeters, facilities, equipment, and personnel. Enhanced 
background checks on persons who have access to cargo or cargo aircraft 
and required screening of persons transported aboard cargo planes are 
among many measures that will be adopted.

Conclusion

    After consideration of the comments submitted in response to the 
final rules and in view of actions being implemented by the TSA for 
safe air cargo operations, the FAA has determined that no further 
rulemaking action is necessary.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on April 19, 2005.
Marion C. Blakey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 05-8259 Filed 4-25-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P