[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 65 (Wednesday, April 6, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 17330-17334]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-6814]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 64

[CC Docket No. 98-67; FCC 05-48]


Provision of Improved Telecommunications Relay Services and 
Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals With Hearing and Speech 
Disabilities

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule; petition for reconsideration.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) grants petitions filed by Sprint Corporation (Sprint) and 
WorldCom, Inc. (MCI) seeking reconsideration of the Commission's March 
14, 2003, Order on Reconsideration (IP Relay Reconsideration Order). 
This matter derives from the April 2002 IP Relay DeclaratoryRuling and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & 
FNPRM), which recognized IP Relay as a form of telecommunications relay 
service (TRS), authorized compensation for IP Relay providers from the 
Interstate TRS Fund, and waived certain mandatory minimum standards as 
they apply to the provision of IP Relay.

DATES: The petitions were granted as of March 9, 2005.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Chandler, Consumer & 
Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-1475 (voice), (202) 418-0597 
(TTY), or e-mail: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Order 
on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 98-67, FCC 05-48, adopted March 1, 
2005, released March 9, 2005. The full text of the Order on 
Reconsideration and copies of any subsequently filed documents in this 
matter will be available for public inspection and copying during 
regular business hours at the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals 
II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The 
complete text of this Order on Reconsideration and copies of 
subsequently filed documents in this matter may also be purchased from 
the Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing Inc. 
(BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 
20554. Customers may contact BCPI at their Web site: http://www.bcpiweb.com or call 1-800-378-3160.To request materials in 
accessible formats for people with disabilities (Braille, large print, 
electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to [email protected] or 
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 
(voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY). The Order on Reconsideration can also be 
downloaded in Word or Portable Document Format (PDF) at: http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/dro. On April 22, 2002, the Commission released the IP 
Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM, CC Docket No. 98-67, FCC 02-121; 
published at 67 FR 39386, June 11, 2002 and 67 FR 39929, June 11, 2002, 
finding that IP Relay is a form of TRS and that on an interim basis the 
cost of providing all IP Relay calls could be compensated from the 
Interstate TRS Fund. On March 14, 2003, the Commission released the IP 
Relay Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 98-67, FCC 03-46; 
published at 68 FR 18826, April 16, 2003, which granted an extension of 
the waivers granted in the IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM for a 
period of five years. The Commission also granted the requested waiver 
of the requirement to provide one-line hearing carry over (HCO) for a 
period of five years. This document does not contain new or modified 
information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. In addition, it does not contain 
any new or modified ``information collection burden for small business 
concerns with fewer than 25 employees,'' pursuant to the Small Business 
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see U.S.C. 
3506(c)(4).

Synopsis

    On April 14, 2003, Sprint filed a petition for ``limited 
reconsideration'' of the IP Relay Reconsideration Order, requesting 
that the Commission reconsider its decision not to make the waivers 
granted in the IP Relay Reconsideration Order retroactive, and 
therefore not to compensate providers of IP Relay (Sprint) during the 
time period in which they offered the service but may not have been 
complying with the then non-waived HCO and pay-per-call requirements.
    Sprint makes numerous arguments in support of its petition. It 
argues that there is no legal bar to providing payment for services 
rendered before the grant of the HCO and pay-per-call waivers, 
distinguishing the cases cited by the Commission for the proposition 
that the retroactive application of waivers is not favored. Sprint 
asserts, for example, that the waivers it seeks are ``merely to correct 
mistakes made by the Commission in the [IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & 
FNPRM] as of the date of that ruling.'' Sprint also argues that the IP 
Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM was not ``final'' because of the 
pendency of the petitions for reconsideration, and that therefore the 
risk Sprint took was that the Commission might deny its petition for 
waiver of the 900 pay-per-call and HCO requirements on the merits 
(which, had that occurred, would have precluded it from reimbursement), 
but not that the Commission might grant the petition but disallow 
reimbursement.
    Sprint also argues that ``rigid adherence to all TRS requirements 
is inconsistent with other TRS precedent.'' Sprint asserts that the 
Commission has found in other contexts that TRS providers are eligible 
for compensation even if they do not meet every requirement of the 
Commission's rules, stating that ``absolute compliance with each 
component of the rules may not always be necessary to fulfill the 
purposes of the statute and the policy objectives of the implementing 
rules, and that not every minor deviation would justify withholding 
funding from a legitimate TRS provider.'' In this regard, Sprint 
emphasizes that the Commission has recognized that HCO and pay-per-call 
services are infrequently used, and that therefore IP Relay providers, 
like Sprint, have substantially complied with the TRS mandatory minimum 
standards.
    Sprint also contends that the Commission ``cannot lawfully single 
out Sprint for non-payment'' of compensation, asserting that the 
Commission's conclusion in the IP Relay Reconsideration Order that it 
is not technically feasible to provide HCO and pay-per-call services 
via IP Relay means that no IP Relay provider could have been providing 
these services in compliance with the rules during the period between 
the release of the April 2002 IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM and 
the waiver grant in the

[[Page 17331]]

March 2003 IP Relay Reconsideration Order. Therefore, according to 
Sprint, it is improper to refuse to compensate Sprint for its provision 
of IP Relay when the Commission has compensated other providers during 
that period for providing the same service. (AT&T received compensation 
for its provision of IP Relay beginning in June 2002. MCI received 
compensation for its provision of IP Relay beginning in April 2002.) 
Sprint notes that there are two ways to cure this inequity: compensate 
Sprint for the service it provided during the period, or institute 
enforcement actions against other IP Relay providers to require them to 
return compensation received during the period. Sprint favors the first 
approach, which it argues is in the public interest.
    On May 16, 2003, MCI filed a petition styled ``Petition for 
Clarification and/or Reconsideration.'' See WorldCom, Inc. d/b/a MCI, 
Petition for Clarification and/or Reconsideration, filed May 16, 2003. 
MCI requests that the Commission reconsider its apparent decision to 
eliminate two-line HCO as a means of satisfying the HCO mandatory 
minimum standard, asserting that the HCO requirement ``only made sense 
as two-line HCO,'' and clarify the meaning of the now-waived pay-per-
call mandatory minimum standard and whether it was satisfied by 
attempting to have the pay-per-call service accept alternate billing 
information, i.e., a billing method other than automatic billing to the 
caller's telephone bill. MCI also asserts that providers should be 
compensated for providing IP Relay service even if they did not meet 
the pay-per-call and HCO standards. Although MCI does not expressly 
support Sprint's position, it argues that absolute compliance with all 
mandatory minimum standards is not the standard the Commission has 
used, that the Commission in the past has issued retroactive waivers to 
promote the public interest, and that in the circumstances of this 
matter--including the fact that new technologies are involved--the 
public interest supports compensating the providers for the IP Relay 
services provided.
    On May 22, 2003, Sprint's and MCI's petitions were placed on public 
notice. See Petitions for Reconsideration of Action in Rulemaking 
Proceedings, Public Notice, Report No. 2608, released May 22, 2003. 
Hamilton and consumer groups (filing jointly) filed comments, and both 
Sprint and MCI filed reply comments. Hamilton filed comments on both 
the April 28, 2003, and June 16, 2003 petitions. TDI, the National 
Association of the Deaf (NAD), SHHH, and the Deaf and Hard of Hearing 
Consumer Advocacy Network (collectively, the Joint Commenters) filed a 
joint comment on the Sprint petition on May 16, 2003. On July 1, 2003, 
Sprint and MCI filed reply comments. Hamilton asserts that the 
Commission was correct in denying retroactive compensation for the 
provision of IP Relay during the time period in which the service was 
offered but was not in compliance with the non-waived mandatory minimum 
standards and, further, that the providers that were compensated for 
such service should be required to return the compensation received. 
Hamilton had earlier filed comments on April 28, 2003, which were 
resubmitted on June 16, 2003. Hamilton states that the Commission's 
decision to deny retroactive compensation treats all IP Relay providers 
equally, and that all compensation paid to IP Relay providers prior to 
the IP Relay Reconsideration Order was improper because no IP Relay 
provider was capable of meeting the HCO and pay-per-call standards. 
Hamilton further argues that the public interest is best served by 
competition in the IP Relay market. It notes that it did not begin 
providing IP Relay until after the HCO and pay-per-call waivers were 
granted in the IP Relay Reconsideration Order, and asserts that only 
large IP Relay providers can provide service before a waiver is granted 
and gamble on retroactive compensation. Finally, Hamilton emphasizes 
that maintenance of the high quality of service demanded by TRS users, 
including IP Relay users, depends on enforcement of the mandatory 
minimum standards, and that allowing retroactive compensation would 
give IP Relay providers an incentive to ignore the TRS mandatory 
minimum standards and provide lower quality service. Hamilton cautions 
that reliance on the Publix Show Cause Order could lead to a ``slippery 
slope'' with the Commission authorizing compensation for ever-greater 
departures from the TRS mandatory minimum standards.
    The Joint Commenters support Sprint's petition and request that the 
Commission compensate all providers of IP Relay service even if they 
did not provide HCO and 900 call services. They assert that ``the 
unique circumstances of this case justify reimbursing Sprint and other 
similarly-situated carriers for the IP Relay services they rendered to 
deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals.'' They further assert that it 
would be unjust to penalize Sprint for not providing services that the 
Commission has found to be ``technically infeasible to provide.'' 
Finally, they assert that in light of ``these unique circumstances, 
where deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals benefited from a wider range 
of service alternatives and the FCC ultimately determined that it was 
technically infeasible to provide the minimum requirements at issues, 
the best way for the Commission to accomplish th[e] objective [of 
encouraging new services] and promote the future deployment of 
innovative TRS services is to grant Sprint's Petition.''
    In its reply, Sprint asserts that Hamilton's assertion that it 
would be harmed by allowing Sprint and others retroactive compensation 
is inaccurate because by not providing IP Relay service, Hamilton 
incurred no costs. Sprint also states that competitive harm would be 
more likely to occur if the Commission refuses to provide retroactive 
compensation, because potential providers of new TRS services will be 
deterred from beginning service until all uncertainties about standards 
are completely resolved. In its reply, MCI asserts that, in fact, it 
complied with the HCO and pay-per-call standards as articulated in the 
IP Relay Declaratory Ruling and FNPRM by providing two-line HCO and 
pay-per-call standards to the extent possible. MCI also states that 
retroactive waivers and compensation will benefit the public by 
compensating IP Relay providers for costs they actually incurred in 
providing service, and that the Commission supports reimbursement where 
the mandatory minimum standards have been substantially complied with. 
Finally, MCI denies that retroactive waivers will encourage rule 
violations, asserting that the circumstances that gave rise to the 
initiation of IP Relay service were unusual and unlikely to recur.
    We conclude that, in the unique circumstances of this proceeding, 
Sprint is entitled to compensation for its provision of IP Relay prior 
to the March 2003 IP Relay Reconsideration Order. At the same time, we 
take this opportunity to again remind providers that, as a general 
matter, they must offer TRS services in compliance with all non-waived 
mandatory minimum standards to be eligible for compensation from the 
Interstate TRS Fund.
    First, based on our review of this proceeding as a whole, we find 
that we cannot conclude that Sprint was in fact offering IP Relay 
service in violation of our rules. We recognize that the initial IP 
Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM was not entirely clear in describing 
what providers had to do to meet the requirements to provide HCO and 
pay-per-call service. As MCI has noted, for example, the HCO 
requirement could

[[Page 17332]]

reasonably be read to mean that providers must provide 2-line HCO 
(given the reference to the ``text leg'' of the call and the need for 
appropriate customer premises equipment). Similarly, the discussion of 
the pay-per-call requirement expressly notes that the CA can make such 
a call by passing along the caller's credit card number. MCI maintains 
that it satisfied these two requirements in those ways. We do not find 
that that is an unreasonable interpretation of those requirements as 
they were spelled out in the IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM. At 
the same time, however, Sprint asserted it could not meet those 
requirements based, as is now apparent, on its interpretation of what 
meeting those requirements entailed (i.e., one-line HCO and providing 
900 service by passing along the ANI of the calling party into the 
signaling stream). If, however, the HCO and pay-per-call requirements 
could be met by means other than those understood by Sprint, then 
Sprint may not, in fact, have been offering IP Relay in violation of 
the mandatory minimum standards. In other words, Sprint was offering 
the service in violation of the mandatory minimum standards, and 
therefore could have been ineligible for compensation on that basis, 
only if its interpretation of what the HCO and pay-per-call 
requirements entail was the only reasonable interpretation of those 
requirements as described in the IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM.
    Upon our review of the record in these proceeding as set forth 
above, we cannot conclude that Sprint's interpretation of the HCO and 
900 call requirements is the only reasonable interpretation of those 
rules, and therefore we cannot conclude that Sprint was in fact 
offering IP Relay service in violation of the rules. Sprint's 
interpretation of those requirements as described in the IP Relay 
Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM is not necessarily correct because those 
requirements were not made sufficiently clear, and therefore that we 
cannot conclude that its assertions that it was offering the service in 
violation of our rules is necessarily true. In this regard, we note 
that we recently granted Sprint's petition on 711 access to pay-per-
call services, stating that we ``do not require that pay-per-calling be 
available through TRS in any particular manner or via a particular 
technology.'' We further stated that ``Sprint's solution provides pay-
per-call functionality to TRS users, and * * * there can be multiple 
ways to provide this particular functionality.'' Therefore, in the 
absence of a specific directive on how a particular functionality must 
be offered, we cannot conclude that a provider is violating a service 
requirement simply because that functionality is offered one way rather 
than another.
    Second, as a matter of equity, the fact that all parties agree that 
it was not technologically feasible to provide one-line HCO and 900 
service as understood by Sprint, and that for this reason the 
Commission ultimately waived those requirements in the IP Relay 
Reconsideration Order, supports the conclusion that Sprint should not 
be penalized for not offering these services in the manner it described 
(i.e., for not doing what no one could do) prior to the IP Relay 
Reconsideration Order. We believe that it would be unfair to penalize 
Sprint for either its candor in acknowledging that these requirements 
could not be met (as it understood them), or for a mistaken belief as 
to what these services entailed, particularly when the discussion of 
these features in the initial IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM is 
ambiguous. Further, it is implicit in the IP Relay Reconsideration 
Order that these requirements should have been waived in the initial IP 
Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM.
    Third, upon our complete review of the record, we believe our 
conclusion best comports with the public interest. Sprint provided the 
IP Relay service for which it now seeks compensation, and had it not 
handled those calls, the calls would have been handled either by other 
IP Relay providers or as traditional TRS calls. Further, Sprint began 
offering IP Relay service when it was a new service, involving, for 
relay, new technology that providers and consumers desired to have 
available as soon as possible. Consumers place great emphasis on having 
access to the latest TRS innovations as soon as they are 
technologically available in the market. For example, in response to 
the 2002 IP Relay Public Notice seeking comment on MCI's petition 
seeking clarification that IP Relay is a form of TRS compensable from 
the Interstate TRS Fund, the Commission received numerous comments from 
individuals urging the Commission to expeditiously recognize IP Relay 
as a form of TRS so that the new service would quickly be available to 
consumers. See IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM at paragraph 6, note 
12. The fact that the IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM waived many 
of the mandatory minimum standards for this service shows that as new 
technologies develop and are applied to relay, it is not always easy to 
fit them into the pre-existing regulatory regime, especially a regime 
developed when relay calls were made entirely over the PSTN. Therefore, 
there may be more uncertainty as to what pre-existing requirements mean 
when applied to new technology. In addition, Sprint repeatedly told the 
Commission that it could not, in its view, offer HCO and 900 services, 
and repeatedly asked that we promptly waive these requirements (and 
compensate it for its ongoing service). Therefore, this is not a case 
where a provider was ``caught'' violating longstanding rules (indeed, 
as we have noted, we have not concluded that Sprint was violating the 
rules at all). Finally, as MCI has noted, it is unlikely that the set 
of circumstances that led the Commission to first deny the waivers, 
then to grant them upon reconsideration, and now to have to determine 
what the Commission initially intended in requiring those services, 
will occur again.
    Further, although we are not unmindful that Hamilton has likely 
suffered some disadvantage from its decision to delay offering the 
service until the HCO and pay-per-call issues were resolved, Sprint and 
other providers that offered IP Relay during this period did incur real 
costs in doing so. For example, money was paid out for the salaries of 
CAs and managers, for the equipment necessary to provide the service, 
and for other ancillary costs related to providing service. Further, 
any harm Hamilton might have suffered from not offering the service is 
not dependent on whether Sprint (and the other providers) may be 
compensated for the service they offered, but from the fact that they 
offered it at all and therefore were first to the market.
    Finally, as the parties have noted, we recognize that in the 
context of an enforcement action against a TRS provider and in 
determining whether the provider complied with the standards of Sec.  
64.604 and therefore was entitled to compensation from the fund, we 
stated that ``absolute compliance with each component of the rules may 
not always be necessary to fulfill the purposes of the statute * * *, 
and that not every minor deviation would justify withholding funding 
from a legitimate TRS provider.'' We also stated that ``a TRS provider 
is eligible for TRS Fund reimbursement if it has substantially complied 
with Sec.  64.604.'' We need not address, however, whether Sprint is 
entitled to compensation under that standard because we have concluded 
that Sprint did not offer the service in violation of the rules given 
their initial ambiguity. At the same time, we do note that the number 
of HCO and 900 calls handled by the providers at that time

[[Page 17333]]

was de minimis and that, as is now apparent, no provider could offer 
HCO and pay-per-call service as understood by Sprint.
    Although we conclude that, in view of the unusual circumstances of 
this matter, payment to Sprint is warranted for the IP Relay service it 
provided, we caution all TRS providers, current and potential, that we 
expect them to offer service in compliance with all non-waived 
mandatory minimum standards. It bears repeating that TRS is an 
accommodation for persons with disabilities. As such, TRS providers are 
required to offer service that is functionally equivalent to voice 
telephone service, as defined by all non-waived mandatory minimum 
standards applicable to the particular form of TRS. It is therefore the 
consumers of TRS who suffer when the service is not provided consistent 
with our rules. We will remain vigilant in ensuring that providers do 
not offer service that short-changes the intended beneficiaries of 
these services. To that end, the leverage that we have is to deny 
compensation from the Interstate TRS Fund for the provision of service 
that is not in compliance with our rules. This Order on 
Reconsideration, therefore, should not be read to suggest that common 
carriers and others can provide regulated services in contravention of 
our rules, with the hope that they nevertheless will eventually be 
rewarded for providing service. We view the circumstances of this case 
to be unique, and trust that this will prove to be the case.
    For the reasons set forth above, we grant Sprint's Petition for 
Limited Reconsideration and MCI's Petition for Clarification and/or 
Reconsideration to the extent they seek that Sprint be compensated for 
its provision of IP Relay prior to the release of the March 14, 2003, 
IP Relay Reconsideration Order. As a result, IP Relay providers who 
provided service between the date of the IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & 
FNPRM, released April 22, 2002, and the date of the IP Relay 
Reconsideration Order, released March 14, 2003, are entitled to receive 
compensation for the IP Relay service they provided during that period 
notwithstanding whether, or how, they offered HCO and pay-per-call 900 
services.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), (the RFA, 
see 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., has been amended by the Contract with America 
Advancement Act of 1996, Public Law Number 104-121, 110 Statute 847 
(1996) (CWAAA). Title II of the CWAAA is the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Act of 1996 (SBREFA)), requires that a regulatory 
flexibility analysis be prepared for rulemaking proceedings, unless the 
agency certifies that ``the rule will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.'' 5 U.S.C. 605(b). 
The RFA generally defines ``small entity'' as having the same meaning 
as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small 
governmental jurisdiction.'' 5 U.S.C. 605(b). In addition, the term 
``small business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small business 
concern'' under the Small Business Act. 5 U.S.C. 601(3) (incorporating 
by reference the definition of ``small business concern'' in the Small 
Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 601(3), the 
statutory definition of a small business applies ``unless an agency, 
after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration and after opportunity for public comment, establishes 
one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the 
activities of the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the 
Federal Register.'' A small business concern is one which: (1) Is 
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of 
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the 
Small Business Administration.
    The Commission concludes in this item that public interest is best 
served by compensating Sprint for its provision of IP Relay services 
prior to the March 2003 IP Relay Reconsideration Order that waived the 
HCO and pay-per-call requirements for IP Relay service. The Commission 
believes that it would be unfair to penalize Sprint and withhold 
compensation for the following reasons: (1) Sprint had a mistaken 
belief as to what constituted satisfaction of the HCO and pay-per-call 
requirements which may have been fostered by a discussion of the 
requirements in the initial IP Relay Declaratory Ruling & FNPRM that 
can be read to be ambiguous; (2) the IP Relay Reconsideration Order 
demonstrates that HCO and pay-per-call requirements should have been 
waived at the onset; (3) no IP Relay provider could offer HCO and pay-
per-call services as understood by Sprint; and (4) Sprint acknowledged 
and repeatedly notified the Commission that based upon their 
interpretation of the mandatory minimum standards for TRS calls they 
could not meet the requirements for the provision of HCO and pay-per-
call IP Relay calls.
    This item affects IP Relay providers, but imposes no regulatory 
burden upon them. Currently, only four entities are providing IP Relay: 
AT&T, Hamilton, MCI, and Sprint. Moreover, this item imposes no 
significant economic impact on small entities, but in fact confers a 
benefit rather than an adverse impact on small entities by compensating 
an entity that provided a nascent service in good faith. Even if the 
compensation to Sprint could be hypothetically construed as a 
significant economic impact, the fact that only four entities provide 
the service, and that only one company is receiving compensation, means 
that no ``substantial number of small entities'' is affected.
    Therefore, certification is in order since both prongs of the legal 
test--i.e., (a) no significant economic impact; and (b) no impact upon 
a substantial number of small entities--are satisfied. The entity 
affected by the item is not a small entity; and if the entity were 
small, there is no significant economic impact since the result of the 
Order is a benefit. Finally, if the economic impact were to 
hypothetically be construed as a significant economic impact, there are 
not a substantial number of small entities affected by this Order on 
Reconsideration. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that the 
requirements of this Order on Reconsideration will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Report to Congress

    The Commission will send a copy of this Order on Reconsideration, 
including a copy of this final certification, in a report to Congress 
and the General Accounting Office pursuant to the Congressional Review 
Act of 1996. See 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). In addition, the Order on 
Reconsideration and this final certification will be sent to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, and will be 
published in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. 605(b).

Ordering Clauses

    Pursuant to the authority contained in sections 1, 2, and 225 of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, and 
225, that this Order on Reconsideration IS ADOPTED.
    The Petition for Limited Reconsideration filed by Sprint IS GRANTED 
to the extent indicated herein.
    The Petition for Clarification and/or Reconsideration filed by MCI 
IS GRANTED to the extent indicated herein.

[[Page 17334]]

    The Commission's Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 
Information Center, SHALL SEND a copy of this Order on Reconsideration, 
including a copy of this final certification, to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 05-6814 Filed 4-5-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P