[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 63 (Monday, April 4, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 16990-16995]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-6650]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

14 CFR Part 256

[Docket No. OST-2005-20826]
RIN 2105-AD44


Display of Joint Operations in Carrier-Owned Computer 
Reservations Systems Regulations

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Department's rules currently prohibit each airline that 
owns, controls, or operates a computer reservations system (``CRS'' or 
``system'') from denying system access to two or more carriers whose 
flights share a single designator code and discriminating against any 
carrier because the carrier uses the same designator code as another 
carrier. The Department recently determined that its comprehensive 
rules governing CRS operations should be terminated because they are no 
longer necessary. The Department is initiating this proceeding to 
consider whether it should also terminate the rules governing the 
treatment of code-sharing airlines by airlines that own, control, or 
operate a system.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before May 4, 2005. Reply 
comments must be submitted on or before May 19, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by DOT DMS Docket Number 
OST-2005-20826 by any of the following methods:
     Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for 
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590-001.
     Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this 
rulemaking. For detailed instructions on submitting comments and 
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public 
Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this 
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change 
to http://dms.dot.gov. including any personal information provided. 
Please see the Privacy Act heading under Regulatory Notices.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-
401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal Holidays.
    Due to security procedures in effect since October 2001 on mail 
deliveries, mail received through the Postal Service may be subject to 
delays. Commenters should consider using an express mail firm to ensure 
the timely filing of any comments not submitted electronically or by 
hand. Late filed comments will be considered to the extent possible.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Ray, Office of the General 
Counsel, 400 Seventh St. SW., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366-4731.
    Electronic Access: You can view and download this document by going 
to the

[[Page 16991]]

website of the Department's Docket Management System (http://dms.dot.gov/). On that page, click on ``search.'' On the next page, 
type in the last five digits of the docket number shown on the first 
page of this document. Then click on ``search.'' An electronic copy of 
this document also may be downloaded by using a computer, modem, and 
suitable communications software from the Government Printing Office's 
Electronic Bulletin Board Service at (202) 512-1661. Internet users may 
reach the Office of the Federal Register's home page at: http://www.nara.gov/fedreg and the Government Printing Office's database at: 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/index.html.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

A. Introduction

    We have had two sets of rules governing airline computer 
reservations systems (``CRSs'' or ``systems'') (although the systems 
now are also commonly called global distribution systems, or GDSs, we 
will refer to them as CRSs for purposes of this rulemaking). One set of 
rules, 14 CFR Part 255, established comprehensive requirements 
governing the systems' relationships with airlines and the systems' 
travel agency customers. These rules covered any system that was owned 
or marketed by an airline or airline affiliate. 14 CFR 255.2. The other 
set, 14 CFR Part 256, concerned the systems' treatment of airlines that 
share the same two-symbol designator code, the code used by the systems 
and other sources of airline information to identify the airline 
offering the seats being sold (the codes for America West and U.S. 
Airways, for example, are HP and US). This set of rules prohibits the 
airlines that own, control, or operate each system from denying access 
to the system to two or more airlines whose flights share a single 
designator code and from discriminating against any airline because 
that airline uses the same designator code as another airline.
    The federal agency formerly responsible for the economic regulation 
of the airline industry, the Civil Aeronautics Board (``the Board''), 
adopted both the comprehensive rules (Part 255) and the rules governing 
the treatment of airlines that code-share (Part 256) in the same year, 
1984, on the basis of a common economic and competitive analysis. 49 FR 
12675 (March 30, 1984) (Part 256); 49 FR 32540 (August 15, 1984) (Part 
255). The Board adopted the rules barring systems from discriminating 
against code-sharing airlines in an expedited proceeding to keep 
Apollo, the system then controlled by United, from carrying out its 
plan to deny access to any airline that used another airline's code.
    Our comprehensive CRS rules included a sunset date to ensure that 
we would reexamine whether the rules remained necessary and were 
effective. 57 FR 43780, 43829-43830 (September 22, 1992). As a result 
of our most recent reexamination of those rules, completed in 2003, we 
determined that the CRS rules had become unnecessary. We allowed most 
of the rules to expire on January 31, 2004, their sunset date, and 
terminated the remaining rules on July 31, 2004. 69 FR 976, 977 
(January 7, 2004).
    The rules governing the systems' treatment of code-sharing 
airlines, Part 256, have not had a sunset date. However, because the 
Board adopted those rules and the comprehensive rules governing CRS 
operations, Part 255, on the basis of the same factual analysis and 
competitive rationale, our findings that industry changes have made the 
comprehensive rules unnecessary requires us to reexamine whether the 
rules on the treatment of code-sharing airlines are still necessary. 
After considering that question, we are proposing to terminate these 
rules as well.
    We ask the parties to submit comments that thoroughly discuss the 
factual and policy issues raised by our proposal to eliminate the rules 
and to provide detailed information on the proposal and on the amount 
of its likely benefits and costs.
    Comments will be due thirty days after publication of this notice, 
and reply comments will be due fifteen days thereafter. After 
considering the comments, we will issue a final rule.

B. Background

    As we have explained in our other CRS rulemakings, the systems 
efficiently provide travel agents with comprehensive information and 
booking capabilities on airlines and other travel suppliers, such as 
hotel and rental car companies. See, e.g., 67 FR 69366, 69370 (November 
15, 2002). Each system provides information and booking capabilities on 
the airlines that ``participate'' in the system, that is, agree to make 
their services saleable through the system and to pay the fees required 
for participation. A CRS presents displays that integrate the services 
of all participating airlines. The displays show schedules and fares 
and whether specific flights and fares are available. A travel agent 
can compare the services offered by different airlines and determine 
which would best meet a customer's needs. The agent can reserve seats 
and issue tickets through the system. 67 FR 69370.
    The basis for our past adoption of CRS regulations was the systems' 
important role in the distribution of airline tickets (and their 
ownership by airlines). Airlines obtained a large majority of their 
bookings from travel agents, and travel agents relied on a system to 
determine what services and fares were available for their customers 
and to make bookings. Each travel agency office typically relied 
entirely or almost entirely on one system to carry out these functions. 
If an airline did not participate in one of the systems, the travel 
agents using that system could not readily obtain information and make 
bookings on that airline, which would therefore lose a significant 
amount of business. As a result, almost every airline had to 
participate in each of the systems, so airlines had no bargaining 
leverage with the systems. 67 FR 69375-69382; 69 FR 980.
    With one small exception, each of the systems operating in the 
United States was developed and owned by one airline, which had the 
ability and incentive to operate its system in ways that would 
prejudice airline competition. 67 FR 69367, 69375-69376.
    Soon after the systems were first offered to travel agencies, the 
systems' impact on airline competition became a matter of concern. For 
example, an airline owning a system would bias the system's display of 
airline services so that flights operated by rival airlines were 
difficult to find, even when a competitor's flights met the travel 
agency customer's needs better than did the owner airline's flights. 
The Board therefore began a rulemaking to determine whether it should 
adopt regulations governing the systems' role in airline distribution. 
The Board first issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking. 48 FR 
41171 (September 14, 1983). After considering the comments responding 
to that notice, the Board decided that it should propose comprehensive 
rules governing CRS operations, and submitted a draft notice of 
proposed rulemaking to the Office of Management and Budget for review. 
While the Board's proposal was under review at OMB, several smaller 
airlines complained to the Board that Apollo, the system controlled by 
United, had announced that it would no longer display services operated 
by one airline under another airline's code. They alleged that Apollo's 
change in policy would substantially injure their marketing efforts. 49 
FR 9430-9431.

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    As a result of the competitive harm that could result from Apollo's 
proposed policy change, the Board proposed and, after reviewing the 
comments, adopted as Part 256 the rules that prohibit airlines that 
own, control, or operate a system from discriminating against an 
airline because the airline offered its services under another 
airline's code. As noted, the Board relied on the industry and 
competitive analysis developed in its rulemaking on the comprehensive 
CRS regulations. 49 FR 9430; 49 FR 12675.
    Soon after the Board proposed the rules governing the treatment of 
code-sharing airlines, the Board issued its notice of proposed 
rulemaking on the adoption of comprehensive CRS rules. 49 FR 11644 
(March 27, 1984). The Board later adopted those proposed rules, with 
some revisions, as Part 255. Among other things, those rules barred 
systems from biasing their primary displays and from charging 
discriminatory booking fees. 49 FR 32540 (August 15, 1984).
    The Board adopted both the comprehensive rules and the rules 
governing the treatment of code-sharing airlines under its authority 
under section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act, then 49 U.S.C. 1381, 
later recodified as 49 U.S.C. 41712, to prohibit unfair and deceptive 
practices and unfair methods of competition (we will refer to the 
section under its traditional name, section 411).
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's adoption of Parts 255 and 
256. United Air Lines v. CAB, 766 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1985).

C. Basis for Proposed Termination of Rules

    The factual basis for our recent decision to terminate all of the 
comprehensive CRS rules suggests that we should also terminate the rule 
governing the treatment of code-sharing airlines. As noted above, we 
concluded that the on-going developments in airline distribution and 
the CRS business in recent years had substantially eroded the basis for 
CRS regulations and made the rules unnecessary. The two major 
developments were the increasing importance of the Internet in airline 
distribution and the divestiture by U.S. airlines of all CRS ownership 
interests.
    The Internet's growing use by consumers and travel agents has 
created alternative channels for airline bookings and the dissemination 
of information on schedules and fares. Airlines have been encouraging 
many consumers to book their travel directly through an airline website 
rather than through a travel agent. 67 FR 69373-69374. Travel agents 
are increasingly checking Internet sites to see whether better fares 
and flights are available than those displayed in the system they use. 
69 FR 980. Airlines also began offering special discounts, commonly 
known as webfares, to consumers who booked tickets through the 
airline's own website, and they have used their control over access to 
their webfares to obtain better terms for CRS participation. 67 FR 
69373; 69 FR 979-980. Because these developments are establishing 
market discipline for the terms and quality of the systems' services 
offered airlines, we concluded that the comprehensive rules had become 
unnecessary. 69 FR 984.
    Secondly, all of the U.S. airlines that held an ownership interest 
in a system have divested those interests. The Board had adopted the 
original rules because each significant system was then controlled by 
an airline, and the airline owner had the incentive and the ability to 
use its system to distort airline competition. 67 FR 69373. Now, in 
contrast, none of the systems is owned or controlled by any U.S. 
airline or airline affiliate, and only Amadeus has any airline owners. 
69 FR 979. In our final decision in our reexamination of the 
comprehensive rules, we found that the systems should have no incentive 
to operate in ways designed to distort airline competition, because 
none of them are owned or controlled by U.S. airlines or airline 
affiliates. 69 FR 990-991. While Amadeus is owned in part by three 
European airlines, it also has substantial public ownership, its 
airline owners should have no motive to undermine airline competition 
within the United States, and its U.S. market share is less than ten 
percent. 69 FR 986. We recognized that a system might be willing to 
take steps to prejudice airline competition if compensated for doing so 
by an airline, for example, by selling display bias, but there is no 
certainty that such conduct will occur or, if it did, that it would 
substantially harm consumers. We accordingly concluded that the 
possibility of display bias did not warrant the continuation of 
industry-wide rules, especially in light of the systems' declining 
market power. 69 FR 994. While we could not predict precisely how 
systems will respond to the industry's deregulation, we expected that 
consumers and participants in the airline distribution business will 
benefit from the rules' termination. 69 FR 978. We stated, moreover, 
that we intend to monitor the effects of the CRS industry's 
deregulation and that we will take appropriate action if a system 
engages in conduct that would violate section 411. 69 FR 978, 986.
    The rules on the treatment of code-sharing airlines, unlike the 
comprehensive rules, have never contained a sunset date that would 
cause us to reconsider whether the rules remained necessary. However, 
the findings on which we based our decision to terminate the 
comprehensive rules suggest that we should also terminate the Part 256 
rules governing the systems' treatment of airlines that share codes. 
The Board adopted those rules largely to protect airline competition 
from potential efforts by the airlines that controlled the systems to 
create displays that discriminated against competing airlines that 
shared codes. As noted, the Board began the rulemaking due to United's 
plan to eliminate code-sharing airlines from Apollo's displays. The 
complete divestiture of their CRS ownership interests by the U.S. 
airlines that had controlled the systems has eliminated the primary 
basis for the Board's original adoption of these rules.
    Furthermore, as we found in our reexamination of the comprehensive 
rules, because the Internet has created alternative sources of 
information and booking capabilities for airlines and travel agents, 
market forces are beginning to discipline the systems' prices and terms 
for airline participation. If an airline believes that a system's 
display of its services is unreasonable or unfair, the airline should 
have some ability at least to lower its level of participation. The 
airlines' ability to reject unacceptable terms for CRS participation 
should continue to grow. Furthermore, travel agencies have an interest 
in obtaining full, accurate, and useful information on airline 
services, and they have the ability to choose between systems. 69 FR 
1005. These factors should encourage the systems to display information 
on airline services in a manner that will meet the needs of travel 
agents. Eliminating the rules may give a system additional flexibility 
to tailor its displays to meet travel agent and consumer demands and 
may result in more useful displays. We therefore have tentatively 
determined that the rules governing the systems' treatment of code-
sharing airlines are no longer necessary and should be ended.
    In addition, as noted above, these rules cover only airlines that 
own, control, or operate a system, not the systems themselves, and 
Amadeus' airline owners are therefore the only firms required to comply 
with the rules. Applying the rules only to Amadeus' owner airlines 
appears illogical and

[[Page 16993]]

potentially inequitable, when Amadeus has the smallest market share in 
the United States and has airline owners that should have little 
interest in distorting competition within this country.
    We do not expect systems to adopt the practices now barred by Part 
256, denials of system access to airlines that code-share and 
discrimination against such airlines. Code-sharing has become a 
widespread practice and, among other things, has formed the basis for 
the development of international alliances between U.S. and foreign 
airlines, such as the Star Alliance, oneworld, and SkyTeam. We have 
found that code-sharing can provide significant consumer benefits. 67 
FR 69396-69397. As a result, we assume that travel agents will demand 
that systems provide displays that show airline services marketed under 
code-share arrangements. Systems may also choose to offer displays that 
limit the display of code-share services, as some have being doing. 69 
FR 1005. Any decision by a system to change or limit the display of 
code-sharing services, however, should reflect the system's response to 
market demands, not a decision to distort airline competition by 
creating displays that discriminate against all code-share services. 
The systems' vigorous competition for travel agency customers should 
cause them to provide displays that satisfy travel agent preferences.

Regulatory Process Matters

Regulatory Assessment and Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment

1. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment
    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, 
requires Federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal or private mandate likely to result in the expenditures by 
State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector, of more than $100 million annually.
    The proposed rule would not result in expenditures by the private 
sector or by State, local, or tribal governments because we propose to 
eliminate the rules. In addition, no such government operates a system 
or airline that is or has been subject to our regulations.
2. Regulatory Assessment
    Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review (58 FR 51735, 
October 4, 1993), defines a significant regulatory action as one that 
is likely to result in a rule that may have an annual effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more, or that may adversely affect, in a 
material way, the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, 
local, or tribal governments or communities. Regulatory actions are 
also considered significant if they are likely to create a serious 
inconsistency or interfere with the actions taken or planned by another 
agency, if they establish novel policy issues, or if they materially 
alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan 
programs or the rights and obligations of the recipients of such 
programs.
    The Department's Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, 
February 26, 1979) outline similar definitions and requirements with 
the goal of simplifying and improving the quality of the Department's 
regulatory process. They state that a rule will be significant if it is 
likely to generate much public interest.
    This proposed regulation would be a significant regulatory action 
under the Executive Order, since CRS rules have long been a subject of 
public controversy. The Department's tentative assessment of the likely 
costs and benefits for this proposal is set forth below. This proposal 
has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget under the 
Executive Order.
    This preliminary economic analysis seeks to assess the potential 
economic and competitive consequences of our proposed rules on computer 
reservations systems, airlines, and travel agencies and to evaluate the 
benefits to the industry and the traveling public. We tentatively find, 
as discussed below, that the elimination of the rules barring airline-
owned systems from discriminating against airlines that code-share 
should not harm airlines, travel agencies, or consumers, or have a 
material effect on firms in the airline or airline distribution 
businesses or on consumers.
    The Civil Aeronautics Board originally adopted the rules barring 
discrimination against airlines that shared the same code when each of 
the systems was owned by an airline and when each airline owner had the 
ability and the incentive to use its system to prejudice the 
competitive position of rival airlines. The systems' conduct at that 
time justified the Board's action. The Board proposed these rules as a 
result of United's plan to eliminate code-share services from the 
displays offered by Apollo, the system then owned by United, a plan 
that would harm several of United's competitors. Airlines then relied 
on travel agents for the large majority of their revenues, and travel 
agents relied on the systems to determine what airline services were 
available, to make bookings, and to issue tickets.
    The industry conditions that caused the Board to adopt the rules 
barring discrimination against code-sharing airlines no longer exist. 
No system is currently owned by a U.S. airline or airline affiliate. No 
system should have an incentive to discriminate against code-share 
services in order to distort airline competition. The share of airline 
revenues produced by travel agents has been falling. Many travel agents 
now use multiple sources of information to investigate options for 
their customers and no longer rely almost entirely on one of the 
systems to determine what airline flights and fares are available. As a 
result, airlines have been obtaining some bargaining leverage against 
the systems, and a system's failure to display airline services in an 
unbiased manner will no longer deny travel agents the ability to 
electronically obtain complete information on airline service options. 
The systems' competition for travel agency customers will give the 
systems an incentive to provide displays that meet the travel agents' 
needs for more accurate, complete, and useful information. The 
airlines' growing bargaining leverage with the systems should encourage 
systems to provide access to their services on terms which are 
consistent with airline marketing strategies.
    The rules barring discrimination against code-sharing airlines may 
limit the ability of Amadeus, the only system now subject to the rules, 
to respond to travel agency preferences to create displays less 
cluttered with code-shares, and may keep travel agents from obtaining 
displays that meet their needs. Even if the rules impose no burden on 
Amadeus, however, there is no apparent justification for maintaining 
them.
    For the same reasons on which we based our decision to terminate 
the comprehensive rules, our elimination of the rules barring 
discrimination against airlines that share codes should have no 
significant economic impact on airlines, travel agencies, or consumers. 
First, because the existing rule covers only airlines that own, 
operate, or control a system, only the smallest of the four systems 
operating in the United States--Amadeus--is subject to the rule. 
Secondly, no system should have an incentive to distort competition in 
the U.S. airline industry, because no system is owned or controlled by 
a U.S. airline or airline affiliate. Amadeus' principal owners are 
three European airlines. In addition, public shareholders own a

[[Page 16994]]

substantial amount of Amadeus' stock, and Amadeus' management must 
operate the business for the benefit of all of its shareholders, not 
just its airline shareholders. Code-sharing is a much more widespread 
practice now than it was when the Board adopted these rules, and no 
system is likely to block the display of services operated under code-
share arrangements. For these reasons, we do not expect Amadeus or any 
other system to begin discriminating against airlines that share codes.
    We request interested persons to provide us with detailed 
information about the possible consequences of this proposal, including 
its benefits, costs, and economic and competitive impacts.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Statement

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., was 
enacted by Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily 
and disproportionately burdened by government regulations. The act 
requires agencies to review proposed regulations that may have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
For purposes of this rule, small entities include smaller U.S. and 
foreign airlines and smaller travel agencies. This notice of proposed 
rulemaking sets forth the reasons for our rule proposal and its 
objectives and legal basis.
    Our proposed termination of the existing rules would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small business 
entities. The rules impose obligations only on airlines that own, 
control, or operate a system, and none of the airlines that now own, or 
have owned, a system has been a small entity. The rules may indirectly 
affect smaller airlines and travel agencies, which are small entities, 
because they may affect how code-share services are displayed in the 
systems used by travel agents. Eliminating the rules should have no 
significant impact on smaller airlines or travel agencies.
    First, the rules currently govern only Amadeus, the system with the 
smallest market share in the United States, because the other three 
systems have no airline owners. Secondly, the rules prohibit a system 
from discriminating against code-share services offered by airlines. 
The Board adopted the rules because one of the airline-owned systems 
was then planning to stop displaying flights operated by any airline if 
they were sold under another airline's code, a change that would 
undermine the marketing efforts of a major competitor of the system's 
airline owner. 49 FR 9435. It seems unlikely that any system would 
adopt a similar policy on the display of code-share services, because 
all major U.S. and European airlines have code-share operations. 
Furthermore, travel agencies have a substantial degree of bargaining 
leverage with the systems, as shown by the record in our last 
reexamination of the comprehensive rules, 69 FR 981-983, which should 
cause the systems to offer displays that meet the needs of travel 
agents. Airlines are obtaining more bargaining power with the systems, 
which should also keep systems from offering displays that would 
significantly interfere with airline marketing programs. Because code-
sharing is now a widespread practice, a system's refusal to display 
services operated under code-share arrangements would probably 
undermine that system's ability to obtain travel agency customers, and 
it would displease its major airline customers. Finally, the Internet 
has provided new sources of airline information for travel agents to 
use, so travel agents no longer rely so greatly on the systems for 
airline information. Furthermore, as discussed, there no longer appears 
to be any rationale for maintaining these rules.
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires us to publish an initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis that considers such matters as the 
impact of a proposed rule on small entities if the rule would have ``a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.'' 5 U.S.C. 605(b). For the reasons stated above, I certify 
that the elimination of our rule on the treatment of code-share 
operations which is proposed by this notice would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
No initial regulatory flexibility analysis is therefore required for 
this action.
    Our proposed rule contains no direct reporting, record-keeping, or 
other compliance requirements that would affect small entities. There 
are no other federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or conflict with 
our proposed rules.
    Interested persons may address our tentative conclusions under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act in their comments submitted in response to 
this notice of proposed rulemaking.
Assistance for Small Entities
    Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996, Public Law 104-121, we want to assist small 
entities in understanding the proposed rule so that they can better 
evaluate its effects on them and participate in the rulemaking. If the 
proposed rule would affect your small business, organization, or 
governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its 
provisions or options for compliance, please consult Thomas Ray at 
(202) 366-4731.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    The proposed rule contains no collection-of-information 
requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub. L. 96-511, 44 
U.S.C. Chapter 35. See 57 FR at 43834.

Federalism Implications

    Our proposal would have no substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive 
Order 13132, dated August 4, 1999, we have determined that it does not 
present sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultations 
with State and local governments.

Taking of Private Property

    This proposed rule would not effect a taking of private property or 
otherwise have taking implications under Executive Order 12630, 
Government Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected 
Property Rights.

Civil Justice Reform

    This proposed rule meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 
3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize 
litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.

Protection of Children

    We have analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13045, 
Protection of Children from Environmental Heath Risks and Safety Risks. 
This rule does not concern an environmental risk to health or risk to 
safety that may disproportionately affect children.

Consultation and Coordination With Tribal Governments.

    This proposed rule will not have tribal implications, will not 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on Indian tribal 
governments, and will not preempt tribal law. Therefore, it is exempt 
from the consultation requirements of Executive Order 13175. If tribal 
implications are identified during the comment period, we will 
undertake appropriate consultations with the affected Indian tribal 
officials.

[[Page 16995]]

Energy Effects

    We have analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use. We have determined that this is not classified as 
a ``significant energy action'' under that order because it is a 
``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866 and it 
would not have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy.

Environment

    The proposed rule would have no significant impact on the 
environment.

PART 256--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

    1. Accordingly the Department proposes to remove 14 CFR art 256 and 
reserve art 256.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 27, 2005.
Norman Y. Mineta,
Secretary of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 05-6650 Filed 4-1-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P