[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 55 (Wednesday, March 23, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14746-14747]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-5646]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration


Collaborative Decisionmaking Simulation

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Summary of the simulation of a capacity-reducing event using 
Chicago O'Hare International Airport as a model.

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SUMMARY: This summarizes the simulation of a capacity-reducing event 
run by the FAA on July 13-14, 2004. This simulation was conducted by 
the agency in accordance with Section 423 of Public Law 108-176, 
codified at section 40129 of title 49 of the United States Code.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James W. Whitlow, Deputy Chief 
Counsel, Policy and Adjudication, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-
3773.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    In accordance with Section 423 of Public Law 108-176, the FAA 
sought to establish a collaborative decision making pilot program that 
would facilitate certain communications among participating carriers at 
a designated airport over their flight schedules if the airport 
experience or is expected to experience reduced capacity because of a 
capacity-reducing event. On March 23, 2004 (69 FR 13616), the FAA 
published a notice in the Federal Register requesting comments on the 
FAA's proposed actions to implement a program. In that notice, the FAA 
announced it was preparing a computer simulation of a capacity-reducing 
event using Chicago O'Hare International Airport as a model. The stated 
purpose of the simulation was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
different delay-avoidance strategies that may be employed by the FAA 
and its customers in handling a capacity-reducing event.
    The FAA scheduled the simulation for July 13-14, 2003, and issued a 
letter of invitation to the major airlines operating at O'Hare Airport, 
and to all major industry groups. The simulation was built around an 
actual capacity-reducing event that occurred at O'Hare Airport on March 
17, 2004, when a ground delay program was implemented at the airport 
for 11 hours because of a snowstorm. The simulation was designed to 
allow carriers to review their data for that date, and compare it to 
the results achieved during the simulation.
    This document summarizes the simulation that was conducted on July 
13-14, 2004.

Summary

    Participants in the simulation included seven airlines, two trade 
groups, and FAA and DOT personnel. The seven airlines represented 96% 
of the flights into O'Hare Airport. The participants first reviewed the 
March 17th operation at O'Hare Airport before proceeding to the 
simulation. In the first simulation scenario, the airlines had entered 
their date 12 hours in advance, without sharing their information with 
any other carriers.
    Based on the data entered in the software, the carriers were able 
to accommodate 93% of their passengers on their own airline. A factor 
impacting this result was the airlines' lack of access during the 
simulation to the passenger and planning resources available at their 
Operation Centers. This skewed the number of non-accommodated 
passengers, because the Operation Centers have resources available to 
accommodate their passengers, including busing and the use of larger 
aircraft.
    The next simulation reduced the airport arrival rate below the 
actual rate incurred on March 17, 2004 in order to explore the concept 
of inter-airline communication. Again the airlines affirmed their 
ability to accommodate passengers through mechanisms available today, 
using their existing online and interline flight interruption 
procedures.

Conclusions

    The simulation did identify modifications to the ground delay 
program software that would enhance operations, such as earlier 
notification

[[Page 14747]]

of a ground delay program and warnings when a city-pair was left 
without service. The participants indicated, however, that these 
enhancements could be acted upon without further action by the FAA 
under Section 423.
    Participants expressed concern about anti-trust legal issues, the 
costs that would be incurred to implement a formal CRE program similar 
to the simulation, and the lack of quantifiable benefits. The 
unreliability of forecasted weather was considered a detriment to 
changing airlines' schedules early, thereby inconveniencing passengers 
and disrupting the airlines' schedule. It was recommended by the 
participants that no additional action was necessary or should be taken 
by the FAA to implement a collaborative decision making program under 
this legislation. Accordingly, the FAA intends to take no further 
action on this matter at this time.

    Issued in Washington, DC on March 17, 2005.
Andrew B. Steinberg,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 05-5646 Filed 3-22-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M