[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 43 (Monday, March 7, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 10901-10917]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-4314]


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 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
 ________________________________________________________________________
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
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 

  Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 43 / Monday, March 7, 2005 / Proposed 
Rules  

[[Page 10901]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

RIN 3150 AH-54


Fire Protection Program--Post-Fire Operator Manual Actions Draft 
Regulatory Guide: Issuance, Availability

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule and Issuance of Draft Regulatory Guide.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposes to amend its 
fire protection regulations for nuclear power facilities operating 
prior to January 1, 1979. The amendment would allow nuclear power plant 
licensees to use manual actions by plant operators as an alternative 
method to achieve hot shutdown conditions in the event of fires in 
certain plant areas, provided that the actions are evaluated against 
specified criteria and determined to be acceptable and that fire 
detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are provided in the 
fire area. The Commission believes that the proposed action would 
provide realistically conservative regulatory acceptance criteria for 
operator manual actions to achieve and maintain hot shutdown condition.
    The NRC is also proposing and requesting comments on a draft 
regulatory guide to support this proposed rulemaking. The NRC has 
developed the Regulatory Guide Series to describe and make available to 
the public such information as methods that are acceptable to the NRC 
staff for implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, 
techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or 
postulated accidents, and data that the staff needs in its review of 
applications for permits and licenses.
    The draft regulatory guide, entitled ``Demonstrating the 
Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to 
Fire,'' is temporarily identified by its task number, DG-1136, which 
should be mentioned in all related correspondence. This proposed 
regulatory guide offers guidance for NRC licensees and applicants to 
use in implementing the feasibility and reliability criteria that the 
staff developed for post-fire operator manual actions.

DATES: Submit comments on the proposed rule and the draft regulatory 
guide by May 23, 2005. Submit comments specific to the information 
collection aspects of this rule by April 6, 2005. Comments received 
after these dates will be considered if it is practical to do so, but 
assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received after 
these dates.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the proposed rule by any one of 
the following methods. Please include the following number RIN 3150 AH-
54 and/or DG-1136 in the subject line of your comments. Comments on the 
rulemakings or the draft regulatory guide submitted in writing or in 
electronic form will be made available for public inspection. Because 
your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact 
information, the NRC cautions you against including any information in 
your submission that you do not want publicly disclosed.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: [email protected]. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us 
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's 
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. This site provides 
the capability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web 
browser supports that function.
    Address questions about our rulemaking website to Carol Gallagher 
(301) 415-5905; e-mail [email protected]. Comments can also be submitted via 
the Federal Rulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. (Telephone (301) 
415-1966).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
(301) 415-1101.
    Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be 
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction contractor 
will copy documents for a fee. Selected documents, including comments, 
may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC rulemaking Web 
site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this 
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. Electronic copies of Draft Regulatory 
Guide DG-1136 are available in ADAMS at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under Accession ML050350359. Note, however, that 
the NRC has temporarily suspended public access to ADAMS so that the 
agency can complete security reviews of publicly available documents 
and remove potentially sensitive information. Please check the NRC's 
Web site for updates concerning the resumption of public access to 
ADAMS. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in 
accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public 
Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or 
by email to [email protected]. Electronic copies of Draft Regulatory Guide 
DG-1136 are also available through the NRC's public Web site under 
Draft Regulatory Guides in the Regulatory Guides document collection of 
the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/.
    You may submit comments on the information collections by the 
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David T. Diec, 301-415-2834, 
[email protected] or Alexander Klein, 301-415-3477, [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

[[Page 10902]]

I. Background
II. Rulemaking Initiation
III. Proposed Action
    A. Operator Manual Actions Alternative
    B. Addition of Paragraph III.P, Operator Manual Actions 
Acceptance Criteria
    C. Response to Stakeholder Comments on Operator Manual Action 
Acceptance Criteria
IV. Interim Enforcement Discretion Policy
V. Section-by-Section Analysis of Substantive Changes
VI. Plain Language
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Environmental 
Assessment
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
X. Regulatory Analysis
XI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XII. Backfit Analysis

I. Background

    Section 50.48, Fire protection, requires each operating power plant 
to have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A 
to 10 CFR part 50. Criterion 3 requires structures, systems, and 
components important to safety to be designed and located to minimize, 
consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect 
of fires and explosions. The specific fire protection requirements for 
safe shutdown capability of a plant are further discussed in paragraph 
G of Section III of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The more specific 
Sec.  50.48 and Appendix R requirements were added following a 
significant fire that occurred in 1975 at the Browns Ferry Nuclear 
Plant. The fire damaged control, instrumentation, and power cables for 
redundant trains of equipment necessary for safe shutdown.
    In response to the fire, an NRC investigation found that the 
independence of redundant equipment at Browns Ferry was negated by a 
lack of adequate separation between cables for redundant trains of 
safety equipment. The investigators subsequently recommended that a 
suitable combination of electrical isolation, physical distance, fire 
barriers, and sprinkler systems should be used to maintain the 
independence of redundant safety equipment. In response to these 
recommendations, the NRC interacted with stakeholders for several years 
to identify and implement necessary plant fire protection improvements. 
In 1980, NRC promulgated Sec.  50.48 to establish fire protection 
requirements and Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 for certain generic fire 
protection program issues, including paragraph III.G, fire protection 
of safe shutdown capability. The requirements for separation of cables 
and equipment associated with redundant hot shutdown trains were 
promulgated in paragraph III.G.2.
    Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R requires that cables and equipment 
of redundant trains of safety systems in the same fire area be 
separated by either:
    a. A 3-hour fire barrier, or
    b. A horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening 
combustibles in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic fire 
suppression system, or
    c. A 1-hour fire barrier combined with fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system.
    Appendix R applies to only those licensees who received operating 
licenses before January 1, 1979. Plants licensed after January 1, 1979, 
are not required to meet Appendix R. These plants were licensed to meet 
Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, ``Guidelines for Fire Protection 
for Nuclear Power Plants,'' that contains criteria similar to the 
Appendix R requirements. Specific licensing basis information for these 
plants is usually contained in license conditions issued at time of 
licensing.
    Because the rule was to apply to facilities which were already 
built, the NRC knew that compliance with various parts of Appendix R 
might be difficult at some facilities. Accordingly, the NRC included a 
provision which allowed licensees to submit alternative acceptable 
methods for protecting redundant equipment for NRC review and approval 
through an exemption process. During implementation of the Appendix R 
requirements, the NRC reviewed and approved a large number of 
exemptions for 60 licensees who proposed alternative acceptable methods 
of compliance in various areas, including numerous exemptions from 
paragraph III.G.2.
    In the early 1990s, generic problems arose with Thermolag \1\ fire 
barriers, which many licensees were using to comply with paragraph 
III.G.2 of Appendix R. Licensees were ultimately required to replace 
Thermolag material with other fire barriers. Several years later, fire 
protection inspectors began to notice that many licensees had not 
upgraded or replaced Thermolag fire barrier material (or had not 
otherwise provided the required separation distance between redundant 
safety trains) used to satisfy the paragraph III.G.2 criteria. Some 
licensees compensated by relying on operator manual actions \2\ which 
were not reviewed and approved by the NRC through the Sec.  50.12 
exemption process. Currently, operator manual actions are not an 
alternative specified in paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. However, such 
actions may be an acceptable means of achieving hot shutdown in the 
event of a fire under certain conditions.
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    \1\ Thermolag is a brand-name for a particular type of material 
used to construct fire barriers typically for protecting electrical 
conduits and cable trays. In the early 1990's, issues arose 
regarding the testing and qualification process used for this 
material. It was determined that barriers made of this material 
would not provide protection for the required periods of time.
    \2\ Operator manual actions are an integrated set of actions 
needed to ensure that a redundant train of systems necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions located within the same 
fire area outside the primary containment is free of fire damage.
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    In 2002, the NRC met with nuclear power plant licensees and 
informed them that the use of unapproved manual actions was not in 
compliance with paragraph III.G.2. During a meeting on June 20, 2002, 
the Nuclear Energy Institute representative stated that there was 
widespread use of operator manual actions throughout the industry based 
on the industry's understanding of past practice and existing NRC 
guidance. The industry representative also stated that licensees' use 
of unapproved manual actions had become prevalent even before the 
concerns arose with Thermolag material. Subsequent to the public 
meeting, the NRC developed criteria for inspectors to use in assessing 
the safety significance of violations resulting from licensee use of 
unapproved operator manual actions. The criteria were based on past 
practice and experience by NRC inspectors when reviewing operator 
manual actions used to comply with Appendix R, paragraph III.G.3, on 
alternate reactor shutdown capability. Licensees were familiar with 
these criteria through their interactions with the NRC staff during the 
implementation of the NRC inspection process. These criteria were 
issued in the revision to Inspection Procedure 71111.05 in March 2003. 
While unapproved operator manual actions are still violations, those 
actions that meet the interim criteria are viewed to have low or no 
safety significance.

II. Rulemaking Initiation

    Instead of continuing the current practice of requiring all 
noncompliant licensees to submit individual exemption requests for 
staff review to determine if their operator manual actions are 
acceptable, the Commission believes that amending Appendix R to 10 CFR 
part 50 would be the most orderly and efficient way to provide an 
option for licensees to utilize acceptable operator manual actions in 
lieu of the separation or barrier requirements in paragraph III.G.2. In 
this way the NRC

[[Page 10903]]

would codify conservative acceptance criteria for licensees to use in 
evaluating operator manual actions to ensure that the actions were both 
feasible and reliable. These criteria would maintain safety by ensuring 
that licensees perform thorough evaluations of the operator manual 
actions comparable to evaluations a licensee would provide to NRC for 
review and approval of an exemption request.
    The NRC staff developed a rulemaking plan (SECY-03-0100) and the 
Commission approved the staff plan on September 12, 2003. The rule 
change would revise 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2 to 
allow licensees to implement acceptable operator manual actions after 
documenting that the actions met the regulatory acceptance criteria. 
Through the established Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the NRC will 
continue to inspect licensees' methodologies for achieving and 
maintaining hot shutdown conditions in accordance with the requirements 
set forth in paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The NRC 
fire protection inspectors will verify that the licensees' operator 
manual actions met the NRC acceptance criteria and will evaluate the 
licensees' analyses, procedures and training, implementation, and 
demonstration of operator manual actions to ensure the licensees have 
adequately demonstrated the feasibility and reliability of manual 
actions.

III. Proposed Action

    The Commission proposes to allow the use of operator manual actions 
coincident with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system 
as an additional alternative method for compliance with paragraphs 
III.G.2(a), (b) or (c) of Appendix R.\3\ The Commission has determined 
that implementing any one of the alternatives in paragraph III.G.2 will 
provide reasonable assurance that at least one method for achieving and 
maintaining the hot shutdown condition will remain available during and 
after a postulated fire anywhere in the plant. The Commission proposes 
to add a new paragraph G.2.c-1 and a paragraph P to section III of 
Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The new paragraph G.2.c-1 would establish 
operator manual actions, in conjunction with fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system, as a fourth compliance option with 
paragraphs III.G.2(a), (b) or (c), provided that the operator manual 
actions satisfy the acceptance criteria in the new paragraph P. The new 
paragraph P would define operator manual actions and set forth the 
required acceptance criteria which must be met before a licensee could 
use operator manual actions outside the containment to comply with 
paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. Compliance with these acceptance 
criteria is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the 
feasibility and the reliability of the operator manual actions.
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    \3\ The requirements in Appendix R are applicable only to 
licensees who received operating licenses before January 1, 1979. 
Post-January 1, 1979, licensees were licensed to meet GDC-3, Sec.  
50.48(a), and Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, which contain 
criteria that are similar to the Appendix R requirements. Post-
January 1, 1979 licensees who use operator manual actions without 
NRC approval may or may not be in compliance with applicable fire 
protection requirements. Compliance depends on the specific 
licensing commitments (usually specified in license conditions for 
these licensees), the change control process, and how the change was 
justified and analyzed to demonstrate that the operator manual 
actions are feasible and reliable and thus do not adversely affect 
the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.
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A. Operator Manual Actions Alternative

    The Commission proposes to add a new paragraph c-1 to paragraph 
III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50 to codify the use of operator manual actions 
in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression 
system, as an additional alternative compliance method. Implementing 
any of the alternatives in paragraph III.G.2 will provide reasonable 
assurance that at least one method for achieving and maintaining the 
reactor in a hot shutdown condition will remain available during and 
after a postulated fire. The basis for this determination is provided 
below.
    The Commission's fire protection requirements constitute a defense-
in-depth approach to protect safe shutdown functions. The overall 
objectives of the NRC's fire protection regulations are to minimize the 
potential for fires and explosions; to rapidly detect, control, and 
extinguish fires that do occur; and to ensure that the fires will not 
prevent the accomplishment of necessary safe shutdown functions and 
will not significantly increase the risk of radioactive releases to the 
environment. The NRC has concluded if these objectives are met, there 
is reasonable assurance that a licensed facility is providing adequate 
protection of public health and safety. These objectives are met by a 
set of NRC requirements for control of combustible materials and 
ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, fire brigade 
procedures and training, and physical separation of cables and 
equipment of redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment.
    The physical separation requirements in paragraph III.G.2 of 
Appendix R are one component of the NRC's overall fire protection 
objectives. In paragraph III.G.2, the NRC specified three different 
methods for providing separation of cables and equipment of redundant 
trains of equipment located in the same fire area. These three options 
for compliance with paragraph III.G.2 offer sufficient but varying 
levels of protection. In general, the 3-hour passive fire barrier is 
judged to offer more protection than either of the other options (i.e., 
the 1-hour passive fire barrier or 20 feet of horizontal separation 
with no intervening combustibles, in combination with fire detectors 
and an automatic fire suppression system installed in the fire area). 
The NRC published a final rule in the Federal Register on November 19, 
1980 (45 FR 76602) stating that redundant trains of safe shutdown 
systems are best protected by 3-hour passive fire barriers that provide 
ample time for manual fire suppression activities to control any fire. 
The proposed operator manual action offers protection comparable to the 
latter two options, both of which require the additional layer of 
defense-in-depth protection provided by having fire detection and 
automatic suppression capability. The basis for automatic suppression 
capability in III.G.2 is found in the final rule published on November 
19, 1980 (45 FR 76602), which stated, ``The use of 1-hour barrier in 
conjunction with automatic fire suppression and detection capability * 
* * is based on the following considerations. Automatic suppression is 
required to ensure prompt, effective application of a suppressant to a 
fire that could endanger safe shutdown capability.'' The prompt, 
effective application of a suppressant to a fire also applies to 
III.G.2.b with 20 feet of horizontal separation with no intervening 
combustibles. Accordingly, the NRC proposes to allow use of operator 
manual actions only in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic 
fire suppression system.
    In issuing the current Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2, requirements 
on physical separation of safe shutdown systems, the Commission 
recognized that strict compliance with the III.G.2 criteria might be 
difficult for certain licensees at existing facilities. At that time, 
the Commission was aware that other fire protection alternatives might 
exist that could provide adequate fire protection at these facilities. 
For this reason, the Commission included an

[[Page 10904]]

exemption provision in Sec.  50.48 \4\ to allow licensees to propose 
alternative fire protection methods to the Commission for review and 
approval. Under the exemption process, the Commission has used its fire 
protection engineering experience and judgment to review and grant (or 
in some cases deny) exemptions to licensees who, because of plant 
physical limitations, sought to implement operator manual actions in 
lieu of complying with the paragraph III.G.2 separation requirements.
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    \4\ The exemption provision no longer exists in 10 CFR 50.48. It 
has been subsumed by the exemption provisions in 10 CFR 50.12, which 
apply to all sections of 10 CFR part 50.
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    The NRC recognized in the SECY-03-0100 rulemaking plan that 
``[r]eplacing a passive, rated, fire barrier * * * with human 
performance activities can increase risk. For some simple operator 
manual actions, the risk increase associated with human performance may 
be minimal. For other actions, unless the operator manual actions are 
feasible, the risk increase could be significant * * * However, if the 
operator manual actions are feasible, the overall risk increase is 
minimal.''
    On the basis of inspection experience, the NRC has concluded that 
certain manual actions can be accomplished and provide an adequate 
level of safety to satisfy the underlying purpose of the fire 
protection rule for the areas set forth in paragraph III.G.2. In 
addition, the NRC has reviewed and granted certain exemption requests 
for the use of manual actions in lieu of the separation criteria of 
paragraph III.G.2. This experience demonstrates that properly analyzed 
and implemented manual actions provide an adequate level of assurance 
that a nuclear power plant could achieve and maintain hot shutdown 
conditions.
    Due to misunderstanding of acceptable past practice and existing 
fire protection guidance that led licensees to implement unapproved 
operator manual actions, the NRC may be faced with a large number of 
operator manual action exemption requests from licensees. To provide a 
more efficient and effective process and to ensure more uniform and 
consistent regulatory treatment of these cases, the NRC is proposing to 
codify conservative, state-of-the-art acceptance criteria for licensees 
to use in evaluating operator manual actions to ensure that they are 
both feasible and reliable. The NRC believes that codifying this 
alternative in the rule will be more efficient than using the exemption 
process, and will provide for enhanced safety by allowing resources to 
be focused on safety rather than administrative compliance.
    Something that is ``feasible'' is ``capable of being accomplished 
or brought about; possible.'' Something that is ``reliable'' will 
``yield the same or compatible results in different experiments or 
statistical trials; dependably repeatable.'' To credit operator manual 
actions under paragraph III.G.2 for outside containment, the licensee 
must prove to the satisfaction of the NRC not only that the actions can 
be successfully accomplished, but also that they can be accomplished 
repeatedly by all personnel who are required to perform the actions. 
Together, proof that the operator manual actions are both feasible and 
reliable provides the level of reasonable assurance necessary for 
credited operator manual actions to be in compliance with paragraph 
III.G.2.
    If shown to be feasible and reliable, operator manual actions are 
likely to be successfully achieved, and any potential increases in risk 
to the public due to their use will be minimal. Requiring the operator 
manual actions to meet conservative acceptance criteria provides the 
NRC with reasonable assurance that such operator manual actions can be 
accomplished to safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire. 
These criteria maintain safety by ensuring that licensees perform 
thorough evaluations of the required operator manual actions and pre-
plan equipment needs. NRC fire protection inspectors will verify that 
licensees' documented operator manual actions meet the NRC acceptance 
criteria through the existing triennial inspection process. The use of 
operator manual actions does not diminish the other defense-in-depth 
objectives of the NRC fire protection program (i.e., the requirements 
that minimize the potential for fires and explosions and those which 
provide for rapid controlling and extinguishing of fires that do 
occur). To support the objective for rapidly controlling and 
extinguishing fires, the NRC is requiring fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system as part of the new operator manual 
actions option. Accordingly, the NRC has determined that the proposed 
rulemaking provides reasonable assurance that the public health and 
safety are protected, consistent with the assurance provided by 
compliance with the current three options in paragraphs III.G.2(a), (b) 
or (c).

B. Addition of Paragraph III.P, Operator Manual Actions Acceptance 
Criteria

    The proposed paragraph III.P specifies the required acceptance 
criteria which must be met before a licensee may utilize operator 
manual actions to comply with paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. A 
detailed discussion of each criterion is provided further in this 
Statement of Consideration. These criteria are as follows:

III.P Operator Manual Actions

    1. For purposes of this section, operator manual actions means the 
integrated set of actions needed to ensure that a redundant train of 
systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions 
located within the same area outside the primary containment is free of 
fire damage.
    2. A licensee relying on operator manual actions must meet all of 
the following acceptance criteria:
    (a) Analysis. The licensee shall prepare an analysis for each 
operator manual action which demonstrates its feasibility and 
reliability.
    (1) The analysis must contain a postulated fire timeline showing 
that there is sufficient time to travel to action locations and perform 
actions required to achieve and maintain the plant in a hot shutdown 
condition under the environmental conditions expected to be encountered 
without jeopardizing the health and safety of the operator performing 
the manual actions. The fire timeline shall extend from the time of 
initial fire detection until the time when the ability to achieve and 
maintain hot shutdown is reached, and shall include a time margin that 
reasonably accounts for all important variables, including (i) 
differences between the analyzed and actual conditions and (ii) human 
performance uncertainties that may be encountered.
    (2) The analysis must address the functionality of equipment or 
cables that could be adversely affected by the fire or its effects but 
still used to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.
    (3) The analysis must identify all equipment required to accomplish 
the operator manual action within the postulated timeline, including 
(but not limited to) (i) all indications necessary to identify the need 
for the operator manual actions, enable their performance, and verify 
their successful accomplishment, and (ii) any necessary communications, 
portable, and life support equipment.
    (b) Procedures and training. Plant procedures must include each 
operator manual action required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown. 
Each operator

[[Page 10905]]

must be appropriately trained on those procedures.
    (c) Implementation. The licensee shall ensure that all systems and 
equipment needed to accomplish each operator manual action are 
available and readily accessible consistent with the analysis required 
by paragraph 2(a). The number of operating shift personnel required to 
perform the operator manual actions shall be on site at all times.
    (d) Demonstration. Periodically, the licensee shall conduct 
demonstrations using an established crew of operators to demonstrate 
that operator manual actions required to achieve and maintain the plant 
in a hot shutdown condition can be accomplished consistent with the 
analysis in paragraph 2(a) of this section. The licensee may not rely 
upon any operator manual action until it has been demonstrated to be 
consistent with the analysis. The licensee shall take prompt corrective 
action if any subsequent periodic demonstration indicates that the 
operator manual actions can no longer be accomplished consistent with 
the analysis.
    These acceptance criteria for operator manual actions are intended 
to assure the safe shutdown goals and objectives for operating reactors 
as required in 10 CFR 50.48. The primary objective for safe shutdown is 
to maintain fuel integrity (i.e., fuel design limits are not exceeded). 
For alternative or dedicated shutdown capability, the reactor coolant 
system process variables should be maintained within those predicted 
for a loss of normal ac power and fission product boundary integrity 
should not be affected.
    The applications of these acceptance criteria are as follows. 
First, the criteria are the means by which the NRC will establish 
standards that provide a reasonable level of assurance that operator 
manual actions will be satisfactorily and reliably performed to bring 
the plant to a hot shutdown condition, thus protecting public health 
and safety. Second, a standard set of acceptance criteria will permit 
both the licensees and NRC to establish consistency as to what operator 
manual actions will be allowed. Third, the criteria will provide the 
parameters which both the licensees and NRC will use to conduct 
evaluations and inspections in a thorough manner. The supporting basis 
for each criterion is discussed in detail below.
    The acceptance criteria in the proposed rule are structured to 
ensure both feasibility and reliability of the operator manual actions. 
To credit operator manual actions, the licensee must prove not only 
that the actions can be successfully accomplished (are feasible), but 
also that they can be done so repeatedly (are reliable). Central to the 
approach is the preparation of an analysis that determines what actions 
must be taken in order to reach a hot shutdown condition. This analysis 
would also identify the time available (timeline) for successful 
performance of such actions. A demonstration of the accomplished 
operator manual actions within the established timeline verifies the 
feasibility of such actions. In order to also achieve reliability of 
the actions, the Commission is proposing a criterion for a time margin 
needed to complete the actions because of potential variations in fire 
characteristics, plant conditions, and human performance that the 
demonstration cannot adequately address. This concept is further 
described in the sections below.
Timeline Analysis
    The Commission will require that a licensee perform an analysis to 
determine the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions. 
As part of the analysis, there shall be a fire timeline, which extends 
from the initial fire detection to the achievement of maintainable hot 
shutdown conditions, to define the time boundaries of the analysis for 
the fire scenario in which the operator manual actions will be 
performed. The analysis must identify all actions that must be 
completed, the equipment needed, the number of people needed, the 
communications equipment required, and the time available to perform 
the actions before unsafe plant conditions occur (i.e., before 
exceeding safe shutdown goals and objectives). The proposed rule has 
more specific requirements on each of these aspects that are discussed 
in subsequent sections of this notice. The Commission will require a 
licensee to show that a sufficient amount of extra time would be 
available for the required operator manual actions and that the process 
for determining the time available for such actions adequately 
addressed the potential variations in fire characteristics, plant 
conditions, and human performance. This concept is referred to in this 
statement as a ``time margin.''
    Proper demonstration requires that the licensee meet all operator 
manual action acceptance criteria other than Time Margin (this is 
evaluated after all other criteria, including requirements in section 
2(d), have been met) and show that at least one randomly-selected, 
established crew can successfully perform the actions within an 
acceptable time frame. For example, if there are questions about 
whether operators can reach the locations where they must perform the 
manual actions, these questions should be addressed to the extent 
practicable during the demonstration. However, successful demonstration 
does not fully determine reliability for the operator manual actions.
    Additional factors must be considered to show that the actions can 
be performed reliably under the variety of conditions that could occur 
during a fire. For example, factors that the licensee may not be able 
to recreate in the demonstrations could cause further delay under real 
fire conditions (i.e., the demonstration would likely fall short of 
actual fire situations). Furthermore, typical and expected variability 
among individuals and crews could lead to variations in operator 
performance. Finally, variations in the characteristics of the fire and 
related plant conditions could alter the time available for the 
operator actions.
    In order to ensure that a particular action could be performed 
reliably, licensees must show that a sufficient amount of extra time 
(i.e., a time margin) would be available for the action and that the 
process for determining the time available for the action adequately 
addressed the potential variations in fire characteristics and plant 
conditions. The time margin ensures that operator manual actions can be 
performed reliably: (1) Through well-thought out demonstrations that 
the actions are feasible, (2) by ensuring that there is extra time 
available for given actions with respect to the fire scenario, and (3) 
by adequately addressing all other related acceptance criteria.
    The analysis should include realistically conservative scenarios, 
and such variables as environment and human performance uncertainties 
should be considered in the time margin. For example, a licensee may 
perform a worst case demonstration that requires the operator to wear a 
self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), if there is a reasonable 
expectation that the operators will need to pass through a zone 
containing smoke in order to reach the location where the operator 
manual action is to be carried out.
    Use of a time margin is an appropriate safety factor for ensuring 
realistically reliable operator manual actions. The rule would require 
the time margin to account for all important variables, including 
differences between the analyzed and actual conditions and for human 
performance uncertainties that may be encountered.
    The factors necessitating the time margin are:

[[Page 10906]]

    1. The time margin should account for what the licensee is not 
likely to be able to recreate in the demonstration that could cause 
further delay (i.e., where the demonstration falls short).
    2. The time margin should account for the variability of fire and 
related plant conditions.
    3. The time margin should account for the variability in human 
performance among individuals and between different crews and for the 
effects of human-centered factors that could become relevant during 
fire scenarios.
    These factors are important considerations for the time margin for 
the following reasons:
    1. They address likely limitations of the demonstration.
    2. The demonstration can replicate only a subset of all possible 
fires and resulting variability in fire and plant conditions.
    3. Some degree of human performance variability is to be expected, 
some of which could further delay the times to perform the desired 
actions during real fire situations.
    In order to establish a standard to show time margin, it was 
necessary to establish a time margin (or margins) for fire-related 
operator manual actions to ensure that they would be reliably 
successful. In other words, if the licensee can meet all of the 
operator manual action acceptance criteria, which include demonstrating 
that at least one randomly-selected, established crew can successfully 
perform the actions, and show that the actions can be performed within 
an acceptable time frame that allows for adequate time margin to cover 
potential variations in plant conditions and human performance, then 
the operator manual action rule would be met. For example, as long as 
it can be shown that there is an ``X-percent'' time margin to perform 
the particular operator manual action, plant damage or an undesirable 
plant condition will still be avoided and all of the other criteria 
have been met, then there is confidence to conclude that the action 
will be performed reliably.
    The establishment of an appropriate time margin requires a 
supported technical basis. While the best technical basis for a time 
margin would be empirical data from which it could be derived, a 
database search was unable to find relevant data that could be used 
directly for or generalized to the operator manual actions of interest. 
To further develop this concept, the NRC convened an initial expert 
panel to identify a time margin for inclusion in this proposed rule 
statement for further stakeholder consideration and feedback.
    The expert panel members concluded that a time margin factor of at 
least 2 would ensure that the operator manual actions in response to 
fire are sufficiently reliable. For example, if the operator manual 
action can be shown typically to take less than 15 minutes, then at 
least 30 minutes (15x2) should be available to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown. A time margin factor of at least 2 is assumed to absorb 
delays that might be caused by the following set of factors (1) the 
need to recover from or respond to unexpected difficulties or random 
problems associated with instruments or other equipment, or 
communication devices; (2) environmental and other effects that are not 
easily replicated in a demonstration, such as radiation, smoke, toxic 
gas effects, and increased noise levels; (3) limitations of the 
demonstration to account for all possible fire locations that may lend 
the need for such operator manual actions; (4) inability to show or 
duplicate the operator manual actions because of safety considerations 
while at power; and (5) individual operator performance factors, such 
as physical size and strength, cognitive differences, time pressure, 
and emotional responses. In addition, the time margin includes adequate 
time for personnel to recover from any initial errors in conducting the 
actions. The time margin concept could alternatively consist of a range 
of multiplicative values. For example, instead of a single 
multiplicative value of 2, perhaps a range of multiplicative values 
(e.g., 2-4 times) could determine adequate time margin. This may be 
appropriate where additional factors were identified that may influence 
the timeline. These factors may be those unknown and not considered by 
the expert elicitation panel and which may result in a lower or higher 
multiplicative factor. The Commission can also foresee situations where 
a licensee may be able to define a different multiplicative value for 
different scenarios. For example, an operator manual action consisting 
of a single action by one plant operator could have a different 
multiplicative value than a scenario that involves more than one plant 
operator or where several sequential actions are necessary.
    As with the discussion of the range of multiplicative values above, 
the time margin concept may have to include a minimum additive time 
(predetermined minimum amount of time added to the demonstrated time) 
necessary for certain situations. For example, the time in the 
demonstration is shown to be short (e.g., <5 minutes for a single 
operator manual action), a single multiplicative value of 2 is applied 
resulting in an additional time of <5 minutes. There may be situations 
where the resulting <5 minutes of margin may not be adequate to address 
the factors that may cause a delay as identified above. In such 
situations it may be more appropriate to apply a minimum additive time 
(e.g., 10 minutes) to account for factors that may cause a delay with 
the operator manual action.
Request for Comment 1: (Time Margin)
    The Commission requests opinions specifically on the time margin 
aspects because of stakeholder interest in this subject and the 
Commission's desire to consider all stakeholders' input for this 
important criterion.
    Specifically, the Commission asks the following questions:
    (A) Considering the factors for time margin discussed above 
(including the conditional dependence on a worst-case demonstration 
meeting all the other acceptance criteria), should the time margin 
consist of a single multiplicative factor (e.g., 2 times), or a range 
of multiplicative factors (e.g., 2-4 times)? Please provide a technical 
basis for your proposed time frames or factors.
    (B) If a range is appropriate, what should the range be and what 
parameters or variables should be considered in determining which part 
of the range is applicable in a given situation? Please provide a basis 
for your proposed time frames or factors.
    (C) Should there be a minimum additive time (e.g., 10 minutes) for 
situations where the time in the demonstration is so short that a 
multiplicative factor would not properly account for the required time 
margin (e.g., a time in the demonstration of < 5 minutes). Please 
provide a basis for your proposed time frames or factors.
    (D) Are there other means of establishing margin (e.g., through 
consideration of conservative assumptions in the thermal hydraulic 
timeline)? Please provide a technical basis.
Environmental Factors
    Paragraph 2(a)(1) of the proposed criteria requires that the fire 
timeline include a time margin that accounts for differences between 
the analyzed and actual conditions. Adverse environmental factors are 
one area of concern that must be considered because they affect the 
operator's mental or physical performance. The environmental factors 
must be weighed with respect to the location where the operator manual 
actions will be performed, as well as the access and egress routes to 
and from this location.

[[Page 10907]]

Operators' performance may be impeded by their inability to reach the 
required location and by the difficulty of performing the action in the 
conditions existing at the required location. The environment along the 
egress route after completion of the operator manual action must also 
be considered to ensure personnel health and safety throughout. These 
environmental factors are considered in the analysis via preparation 
and planning thereby ensuring there is sufficient time to travel to the 
location(s) and perform the action(s) required to achieve and maintain 
the plant in a hot shutdown condition.
Equipment Performance
    Paragraph 2(a)(2) of the criteria requires the analysis to address 
the functionality of equipment or cables that could be adversely 
affected by the fire but still used to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown. For example, operators may rely upon valves to achieve and 
maintain hot shutdown conditions. If the functionality of the valves is 
adversely affected by the fire then it may degrade or prevent the 
performance of the required operator manual actions. As identified in 
Information Notice 92-18 for motor-operated valves, bypassing thermal 
overload protection devices (discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.106, 
``Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated 
Valves'' Rev. 1, ML 003740323) could jeopardize completion of the 
safety function or cause degradation of other safety systems due to 
sustained abnormal circuit currents that can arise from fire-induced 
``hot shorts.'' Even if these overload protection devices are not 
bypassed, hot shorts can cause loss of power to motor-operated valves 
by tripping the devices. If an operator manual action requires the 
manual manipulation of a depowered motor-operated valve, such fire-
induced damage could make the manipulation physically impossible. 
Therefore, if equipment to be used during operator manual actions could 
be affected by fire, the licensee must determine that the functionality 
of that equipment will not be adversely affected.
    Plant systems, structures and components (SSCs) are used to achieve 
and maintain hot shutdown conditions. SSCs often require active 
intervention, through either automatic or manual means, to perform 
their required function. The analysis of the fire timeline must 
identify all such SSCs needed to achieve maintainable hot shutdown 
conditions from the time of initial fire detection, particularly those 
that require operator manual actions to perform their hot shutdown 
function and explain how active equipment will be operated. Diagnostic 
indications relevant to the SSCs' safety function may be critical to 
specific operator manual actions and interaction with this equipment. 
Diagnostic indications are the alerting, information, control, and 
feedback capability provided through instrumentation. They also provide 
sufficient information that determines if and when these interfaces 
must be effected. These indications would typically be needed to: (1) 
Enable the operators to determine which manual actions are appropriate 
for the fire scenario; (2) direct the personnel as to the proper 
performance of the operator manual actions; and (3) provide the 
necessary feedback to the operators verifying that the manual actions 
have had their expected results. Diagnostic indications are considered 
in the analysis via identification of the SSCs necessary to accomplish 
the operator manual action and evaluation of their availability under 
the fire and environmental conditions expected. Guidance on identifying 
needed indication is provided as in paragraph c.2 of the draft 
regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for Demonstrating the Feasibility 
and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire.''
Communications Equipment
    Paragraph 2(a)(3)(ii) of the proposed criteria requires the 
analysis to identify all communications equipment necessary to 
accomplish the operator manual actions. Communications equipment may be 
needed to provide feedback between operators in the main control room 
and personnel out in the plant to ensure that any activities requiring 
coordination between them are clearly understood and correctly 
accomplished. The unpredictability of fires can force staff to deviate 
from planned activities, hence the need to consider constant and 
effective communications. Communications may be needed in the 
performance of sequential operator manual actions (where one action 
must be completed before another can be started) and provide 
verification that procedural steps have been accomplished, especially 
those that must be conducted at remote locations. Communications must 
be considered in the analysis by identifying the necessary 
communications equipment and ensuring their availability to the plant 
operators for the time needed to achieve and maintain hot shutdown. For 
example, if portable radios are to be used for communications then the 
analysis should list the equipment and confirm that the equipment can 
be used in the plant areas (i.e., capable of receiving and transmitting 
in the necessary plant areas) and are available for the time required 
(e.g., battery power life has been considered for the time period 
necessary). Such communications should be identified and addressed as 
per paragraph c.2 of the draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for 
Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual 
Actions in Response to Fire.''
Portable Equipment
    Paragraph 2(a)(3)(ii) of the proposed criteria requires the 
analysis to identify all portable equipment necessary to accomplish the 
operator manual actions. Portable equipment, especially tools such as 
keys to open locked areas, ladders to reach high locations, torque 
devices to turn valve handwheels, and electrical breaker rackout tools, 
can be essential to access and manipulate SSCs to successfully 
accomplish required operator manual actions. Similarly, life support 
equipment, such as self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA), may 
need to be worn to permit access to and egress from the locations where 
the operator manual actions must be performed since the routes could be 
negatively affected by fire effects, such as smoke, that propagate 
beyond the fire-involved area. Portable equipment must be considered in 
the analysis by identifying necessary equipment and ensuring their 
availability to the plant operators during the time needed to achieve 
and maintain hot shutdown. For example, if SCBA is necessary then the 
analysis should list the equipment and confirm that the equipment can 
be used in the plant areas (i.e., access and egress to tight areas are 
not impeded by the use of SCBA) and are available for the time required 
(e.g., portable bottle air supply provides sufficient time to perform 
the action). Such equipment should be identified and addressed as per 
paragraph c.2 of the draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for 
Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual 
Actions in Response to Fire.''
Procedures and Training
    Paragraph 2(b) of the proposed criteria requires that all manual 
actions be included in plant procedures, and that each operator 
receives training on these manual actions. The role of written plant 
procedures in the successful performance of operator manual actions is 
three-fold: (1) Assist the operators in correctly diagnosing the type 
of plant event that the fire may trigger, usually

[[Page 10908]]

in conjunction with indications, thereby permitting them to select the 
appropriate operator manual actions (or prescribe actions to be taken 
should a fire occur in a given fire area); (2) direct the operators to 
the appropriate preventive and mitigative manual actions to place and 
maintain the plant in a stable hot shutdown condition; and (3) minimize 
the potential confusion that can arise from fire-induced conflicting 
signals, including spurious actuations, thereby minimizing the 
likelihood of personnel error during the required operator manual 
actions. Written procedures should contain the steps to be performed, 
how the operator manual actions are performed and the tools and 
equipment needed to successfully perform the actions.
    Training on these procedures serves three supporting functions: (1) 
Establishes familiarity with the procedures, equipment, and potential 
(simulated) conditions in an actual event; (2) provides the level of 
knowledge and understanding necessary for the personnel performing the 
operator manual actions to be well-prepared to handle departures from 
the expected sequence of events; and (3) provides the personnel with 
the opportunity to practice their response without exposure to adverse 
conditions, thereby enhancing confidence that they can reliably perform 
their duties in an actual event. Determining that operators are 
appropriately trained on procedures entails establishing, implementing, 
and maintaining a training program that incorporates the instructional 
requirements necessary to provide qualified operators to perform the 
manual actions. Licensees are already required to establish training 
programs for licensed operator and nuclear plant personnel under 10 CFR 
55.59 and 50.120, respectively. The procedures and training provided to 
operators and nuclear plant personnel will ensure that the supporting 
functions and roles discussed above can be met. Such procedures and 
training should be identified and addressed as in paragraph c.2 of the 
draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for Demonstrating the 
Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to 
Fire.'' The Commission expects plant procedures to be available at or 
near the locations where the operator manual actions are to occur so 
that they are easily accessible to the operators.
Implementation and Staffing
    Paragraph 2(c) of the proposed criteria requires that equipment and 
personnel necessary for feasible and reliable operator manual actions 
must be readily available and accessible. The equipment is available 
when its functionality is not adversely affected by the fire or its 
effects. Accessible means that the personnel should be able to find and 
reach the locations of the components and be able to manipulate the 
components. Accessibility and availability of equipment must be 
considered in the analysis by identifying necessary equipment, ensuring 
operators are knowledgeable of equipment locations, determining that 
accessibility of such equipment, and that the equipment will not be 
adversely affected by a fire or its effects. For example, operators may 
rely upon valves to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. If 
the functionality of the valves is adversely affected by the fire or if 
the valves are not accessible for manipulation then the functionality 
of such valves may be degraded, thereby preventing the performance of 
the required operator manual actions.
    The intent of the staffing requirement is to ensure that qualified 
personnel will be on site at all times such that hot shutdown 
conditions can be achieved and maintained in the event of a fire. An 
individual expected to perform the operator manual actions must not 
have collateral duties, such as fire fighting or security, during the 
evolution of the fire scenario. This individual should be exclusively 
available for the performance of required operator manual actions. 
Therefore, operating shift staffing levels should include enough 
personnel on watch for the performance of any operator manual actions 
that could arise as a result of a fire. The fire brigade would not be 
expected to perform actions other than those associated with fire 
fighting. Otherwise, the potential for interfering with either their 
fire fighting activities or the operator manual actions could exist, 
such that successful performance of one or the other, or both, could be 
impaired. For example, during a fire, an individual who is part of the 
five-person fire brigade could not perform the required operator manual 
actions because that individual is expected to participate in the fire 
fighting efforts.
Demonstration
    The concepts of feasibility and reliability were examined under 
Criterion 2(a) of section III.P in connection with the fire timeline 
and time margin. Demonstration and time margin development complement 
each other. Paragraph 2(d) of the proposed criteria requires 
demonstration in order to establish the feasibility of operator manual 
actions. The demonstration criterion provides reasonable assurance that 
the operator manual actions can be performed in the analyzed time 
period for a range of conceivable fire situations.
    The use of such demonstrations is supported, for instance, by 
NUREG-1764, ``Guidance for the Review of Changes to Human Actions'' and 
NUREG-0711 ``Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model,'' cited in 
NUREG-0800, Section 18.0 Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety 
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. NUREG-1764 states that ``* * 
* [a] walk-through of the human actions under realistic conditions 
should be performed * * * The scenario used should include any 
complicating factors that are expected to affect the crews['] ability 
to perform the human actions * * *'' NUREG-0711 states that ``* * * an 
integrated system design (i.e., hardware, software, and personnel 
elements) is evaluated using performance-based tests * * * Plant 
personnel should perform operational events using a simulator or other 
suitable representation of the system to determine its adequacy to 
support safety operations * * *''
    There are several important elements to the demonstration 
criterion. First, licensees may take credit for operator manual actions 
only after a successful demonstration. To continue taking credit for 
operator manual actions, licensees must complete demonstrations such 
that all operating crews successfully perform the coordinated sets of 
operator manual actions taken as a result of a fire in a specific fire 
area. Periodic demonstrations, at a frequency consistent with that 
established by the licensee in compliance with 10 CFR 50.120, provide 
valuable training and experience for licensee personnel and also serve 
to verify that plant configuration and conditions (access, egress, 
etc.) have not changed over time such that the operator manual actions 
can no longer be accomplished in accordance with the analysis performed 
pursuant to paragraph III.P.2(a). Should a licensee be unable to 
successfully complete a subsequent demonstration, the Commission 
expects prompt corrective action to retrain the operators, or to modify 
the operator manual actions, or modify the plant conditions so that the 
demonstration yields successful results.
    Second, the demonstration verifies an action can be completed 
within the analyzed fire timeline. This can be done utilizing an 
established crew of operators to show in the demonstration that 
operator manual actions can be accomplished to achieve and maintain

[[Page 10909]]

hot shutdown for the entire fire scenario. This serves as a benchmark 
for the development of a time margin, which is an application of the 
reliability concept. Another means of establishing time margin is 
through consideration of conservative assumptions in the thermal-
hydraulic timeline (e.g., end-state).
    Third, the demonstration must be completed by an established crew. 
An established crew is a group of operators that normally work as a 
team during any one shift. Conducting the demonstration with an 
established crew instead of a crew assembled just for the demonstration 
will provide a more valid basis for the fire timeline determination, as 
well as provide the established crew with the training necessary to 
work as a team.
    Fourth, operator manual actions may not be credited until those 
actions have been shown in the demonstrations to be feasible by 
satisfying all the acceptance criteria. The demonstration should ensure 
that all relevant aspects of the criteria are met and that important 
characteristics of those criteria are included in the demonstration to 
the extent possible. For example, environmental conditions must be 
considered and should be simulated where possible. This may include, 
but is not limited to, such considerations as expected lighting levels, 
protective clothing, and noise levels. This is important because it 
validates the demonstration by conducting it under conditions that are 
as realistic as possible.
    Fifth, prompt corrective actions are required if any demonstration 
determines that the operator manual action may not be accomplished 
consistent with the analysis. Prompt corrective actions should be 
implemented at the first available opportunity consistent with the 
guidelines of Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1, Information to 
Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of 
Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions.
    As with training, the demonstration provides the crew with 
practical experience. All elements of the fire scenario, including the 
use of equipment and procedures, adequacy of staffing levels, and 
response to indications, should be integrated into the demonstration to 
develop this benchmark. In this way, any complexities, such as the 
number of required operator manual actions and their dependence upon 
one another, are evaluated and identified for appropriate consideration 
in the development of the time margin. Failure of an initial 
demonstration to show that the operator manual actions can be 
accomplished consistent with the analysis indicates that the manual 
actions are not feasible. In such cases, the licensee could modify the 
actions (e.g., different access/egress routes, redeployment of critical 
equipment by placing it at the location where the operator manual 
actions will be performed vs. carrying it to that location), retrain 
the crew, such that a new demonstration satisfies the analysis, or the 
licensee could conclude that operator manual actions are not feasible 
and opt to comply with paragraph III.G.2.

C. Response to Stakeholder Comments on Operator Manual Action 
Acceptance Criteria

    As part of the development of this proposed rule, the NRC 
considered stakeholder comments that provided additional insights. A 
number of stakeholder comments were made in response to the draft 
acceptance criteria intended for use in the interim enforcement 
discretion policy published for comment (68 FR 66501 and 69730) and in 
a subsequent public meeting on June 23, 2004. The comments on these 
criteria involved the demonstration using the same personnel/crews who 
are required to perform the manual actions during the fire; the 
application of plant procedures; the application of a fire detection 
and suppression system; and the application of operator manual actions 
criteria in all provisions of paragraph III.G.
Demonstration Criterion
    A number of public comments indicated that the requirement for the 
demonstration to use ``the same personnel/crews who will be required to 
perform the actions during the fire'' is unnecessarily restrictive. The 
Commission agrees that requiring all crews to demonstrate performance 
under all conditions is unnecessarily restrictive. The intent is to 
provide reasonable assurance that whatever crew is on duty at the time 
of a fire can reliably perform the required actions, allowing for 
variabilities and uncertainties. The Commission considers it sufficient 
that an established crew (i.e., one that typically works as a team) 
shows the ability to perform the required operator manual actions 
through documented demonstration. This demonstration should show that 
the crew can successfully perform all operator manual actions required 
by the entire fire scenario within the analyzed fire timeline. The 
demonstration should be part of the periodic operator training. To 
reasonably assure that the remaining crews (i.e., the ones that receive 
training but do not perform the demonstration during a particular 
training cycle) can reliably perform the actions, the ``time margin'' 
addressed in the analysis criterion is used to offset the variability 
among crews. In this way, the demonstration by the established crew 
with an appropriate margin, will reasonably assure that any of the 
crews could likewise perform the required actions. Another means of 
determining margin is through consideration of conservative assumptions 
in the thermal-hydraulic timeline (e.g., end-state).
Procedural Guidance vs. Guidance
    A number of public comments suggested that the phrase ``procedural 
guidance'' be replaced by ``guidance'' (e.g., pre-fire plan). The 
Commission considers this term insufficient to provide feasible and 
reliable operator manual actions. In fact, the Commission has 
strengthened the wording from the original ``procedural guidance'' to 
``plant procedures'' to reflect the need for formal written steps. 
Typically, plant operators should be capable of performing noncomplex 
manual actions without detailed instructions. However, there are fire 
scenarios which could conceivably be atypical such that what would 
``normally'' be non-complex could prove to be difficult in an actual 
situation. The reading of procedures from the control room to direct 
remote activities could be impeded by communication difficulties or 
other control room activities. In addition, operators who perform 
actions outside the control room may require immediate feedback from 
the control room, and vice versa, to determine if certain actions have 
produced the intended results. The Commission expects plant procedures 
to be available at or near the locations where the operator manual 
actions are to occur so that they are easily accessible to the 
operators.
Need for Detection and Suppression Where Fire Occurs
    There appeared to be some confusion on the part of a few commenters 
regarding where fire detection and automatic suppression would be 
required in conjunction with the addition of the option for operator 
manual actions in complying with paragraph III.G.2. Some thought they 
would be required in the areas where the operator manual actions would 
occur. The proposed requirement for fire detectors and an automatic 
fire suppression system applies only to the area where the fire occurs, 
not to the

[[Page 10910]]

area(s) where the operator manual actions will take place.\5\
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    \5\ Only in the presumably rare case where the operator manual 
actions would also occur in the same fire area as the fire itself 
would fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system have 
to be installed ``in the area where the operator manual actions are 
taken'' for these operator manual actions to receive credit. This is 
envisioned only if a very large fire area experiences a very 
localized fire such that the fire effects do not preclude access to, 
egress from, and operator manual actions in, a distant location 
within the very large area.
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    A few commenters questioned whether the requirement for fire 
detection and automatic suppression installed in the area where the 
fire occurs should accompany the proposed compliance option for 
operator manual actions, and why this could not be left to the 
discretion of the licensees and review by the NRC, depending on the 
specific conditions to be encountered in that fire area. As discussed 
in the staff's proposed Appendix R, dated May 29, 1980, protective 
features shall be provided for fire areas that contain cables or 
equipment of redundant systems important to achieving and maintaining 
safe shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one means of achieving 
said conditions survives postulated fires. The protective features may 
consist of a combination of automatic and manual fire suppression 
capability, fire propagation retardants, physical separation, partial 
fire barriers, or alternative shutdown capability independent of the 
room. The proposed operator manual action option in conjunction with 
fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system is consistent 
with the requirement of protective features and maintains a similar 
defense-in-depth concept as with a 1-hr passive fire barrier or a 20-ft 
separation with no intervening combustibles.
    The paragraph III.G.2 compliance option of a 3-hr passive fire 
barrier requires no fire detection or automatic suppression to be 
installed in the area where the fire occurs. To consider the option for 
operator manual actions as providing reasonable assurance at a level 
comparable to this option, one must be convinced that the 
implementation of operator manual actions by itself provides a 
sufficient level of defense-in-depth without the additional level of 
protection provided by fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression 
system. The reason that the 3-hr barrier was ``exempted'' from the 
additional need for fire detection and automatic suppression was the 
prevalent acknowledgment that a fire at a nuclear power plant lasting 
longer than three hours, without intervention, is highly unlikely, if 
not incredible. Therefore, unlike a 1-hr barrier or a 20-ft separation 
without intervening combustibles, this compliance option was considered 
to be sufficient without the additional level of defense-in-depth 
provided by the fire detection and automatic suppression. Experience in 
both the nuclear and non-nuclear industry clearly indicates that human 
reliability is not at a level approaching that provided by a 3-hr 
barrier as the sole level of defense-in-depth. Therefore, without 
substantial additional justification such as can be provided by using 
the risk-informed, performance-based option in the Fire Protection 
Regulation at 10 CFR 50.48(c), it is not reasonable to consider the 
implementation of operator manual actions without fire detection and 
automatic suppression as a sufficient compliance option to paragraph 
III.G.2.
    A few commenters indicated that requiring fire detection and 
automatic suppression in conjunction with operator manual actions if 
creditable under III.G.2 ``does not enhance the ability of the operator 
to perform a manual action in another area of the plant that is 
unaffected by the fire * * * [Furthermore], this new ``requirement'' is 
also more severe than Appendix R, Section III.G.3 because III.G.3 only 
requires a ``fixed'' suppression system, either manual or automatic, 
but does not require an ``automatic'' suppression system * * * ''
    With regard to the first claim, requiring fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system in the fire area under consideration 
would enhance the ability of the operator to achieve and maintain safe 
shutdown from an unaffected area. The activation of detection and 
automatic suppression as indicated in the staff's statements of 
consideration for Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 (as amended on December 
1, 1980; 45 FR 79409) would ensure prompt and effective application of 
suppressant to a fire that could endanger safe shutdown capability. As 
a result, the time it takes a fire to adversely affect the licensee's 
ability to achieve and maintain a safe reactor shutdown may be 
extended, thereby enhancing the licensee's ability to perform feasible 
and reliable operator manual actions.
    While a proposed requirement of automatic suppression for operator 
manual actions under paragraph III.G.2 may appear to be more severe 
than that of fixed suppression under paragraph III.G.3, the Commission 
believes that this difference is minor in practicality. Part 50, 
Paragraph 48(a)(1), Fire Protection, of 10 CFR states that ``each 
operating nuclear power plant must have a fire protection plan that 
satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part.'' Appendix A, 
Criterion 3, Fire Protection, states that ``Fire detection and fighting 
systems of appropriate capacity and capability shall be provided and 
designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, 
systems, and components important to safety.'' If a non-water, fixed 
suppression system (i.e., a gaseous suppression system) is used to 
comply with III.G.3, the governing standards from the NFPA essentially 
dictate that the system be automatic, unless an exception is 
granted.\6\ If a fixed water system is used to comply with III.G.3, it 
can be non-automatic (i.e., manually activated). However, the 
requirement that it be ``fixed'' means that its infrastructure is 
essentially the same as an automatic system, such that the practical 
difference between automatic and fixed suppression in areas III.G.2 and 
III.G.3 is minimal.
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    \6\ NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems, 
Section 1-8.1.1, requires use of ``automatic detection and automatic 
actuation,'' with the exception that ``manual-only actuation can be 
used if acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction [the NRC] 
where automatic release could result in an increased risk.'' NFPA 
12A, Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems, Section 2-
3.1.1, similarly states that ``automatic detection and automatic 
actuation shall be used,'' with a similar exception that ``manual-
only actuation shall be permitted to be used if acceptable to the 
authority having jurisdiction [again, the NRC].'' NFPA 2001, 
Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, Section 2-3.1.1, 
parallels NFPA 12A exactly.
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    Finally, in both paragraphs III.G.2 and III.G.3, the requirement 
for fire detection and suppression (automatic or fixed) provides a 
degree of ``defense-in-depth'' to the passive fire protection features 
already in place (except in the case of the 3-hr fire barrier, where 
this is deemed sufficient without detection or suppression). Defense-
in-depth is a recognized cornerstone in NRC policy to protect the 
public health and safety. Therefore, maintaining defense-in-depth is 
recognized as providing safety benefit in and of itself.
    When the NRC proposed the original ``Fire Protection Program for 
Nuclear Power Plants Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,'' on May 29, 
1980 (45 FR 36082), it specified that ``the following minimum fire 
protective features shall be provided: (a) An early warning detection 
system; (b) manual fire suppression capability; and (c) fixed fire 
suppression systems and alternative shutdown capability as shown on 
Table 1.'' In Table 1, the need for fixed fire suppression systems, 
automatic or manual, was based on four factors: (1) Does the fire/water 
disable normal shutdown capability; (2) is shutdown

[[Page 10911]]

available from the control room; (3) is shutdown required from an 
alternate panel (if not available in the control room); and (4) is the 
access for manual fire fighting ``good'' or ``poor.'' A fixed fire 
suppression system was required whenever shutdown had to be performed 
at an alternate panel, except if (a) the only in-situ combustible was 
cable insulation; (b) measures were provided to retard propagation; and 
(c) separation between redundant systems was at least 10 feet 
horizontal and vertical of clean air space. These requirements were 
enhanced when they subsequently became paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of section 
III.G in the final rule. It should be noted that even during the 
original rulemaking for Appendix R, the need for at least fixed fire 
suppression was recognized when shutdown operations would consist of 
ex-control room operator manual actions (which include those performed 
at an alternate panel).
    In developing Appendix R, section III.G, the NRC originally 
considered fire detection and automatic suppression, if not as the 
primary level of defense-in-depth, at least as an equal level of 
defense-in-depth in conjunction with fire-retardant coatings, and 
subsequently their successors, fire barriers and/or physical 
separation, as stated in the ``Statements of Consideration, 10 CFR part 
50, Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Power Plants,'' 
(November 19, 1980, 45 FR 76602).

    ``* * * [T]he NRC staff has indicated to the Commission that 
there are requirements * * * in which the protection afforded by 
Appendix R over and above that previously accepted, may be 
desirable. The Commission has decided that these requirements should 
be retroactively applied to all facilities * * * to take fully into 
account the increased knowledge and experience developed on fire 
protection matters over the last several years. The first of these 
[requirements] * * * is related to fire protection features for 
ensuring that systems and associated circuits used to achieve and 
maintain a safe shutdown are free from fire damage. Appendix A to 
BTP CMEB 9.5-1 permits a combination of fire-retardant coatings and 
fire detection and suppression systems without specifying a physical 
separation distance to protect redundant systems, and such 
arrangements were accepted in some early fire protection reviews. As 
a result of some separate effects tests, the staff changed its 
position on this configuration, and subsequent plans have been 
required to provide additional protection in the form of fire 
barriers or substantial physical separation for safe shutdown 
systems. No credit for such coatings as fire barriers is allowed by 
Section III.G of Appendix R.''

    The NRC originally characterized fire-retardant coatings, and 
subsequently their successors, fire barriers and/or physical 
separation, as ``additional,'' implying that detection and suppression 
were intended to be primary. The requirement that detection and 
suppression (automatic) be included with Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2, 
operator manual actions is not only consistent with the corresponding 
options currently there, but also is consistent with NRC's original 
intent in developing Appendix R, section III.G.
    The risk-informed, performance-based option in 10 CFR 50.48(c) is 
available to those licensees who wish to demonstrate that operator 
manual actions in particular situations provide a reasonable assurance 
that the public health and safety can be maintained without fire 
detection or automatic suppression. Although the exemption process is 
available for cases that can be justified under Sec.  50.12, the 
Commission considers the use of the option proposed by this rulemaking 
or the risk-informed, performance-based option currently provided in 10 
CFR 50.48(c) more desirable in order to minimize the need for future 
exemption requests for addressing operator manual actions.
Request for Comment 2
    After considering the technical implications and historical 
background of the proposed criteria as discussed above, the Commission 
has tentatively decided that the proposed operator manual actions 
rulemaking should require fire detectors and an automatic fire 
suppression system in the fire area to permit operator manual actions 
as a compliance option under paragraph III.G.2, provided the acceptance 
criteria delineated in a new paragraph III.P are satisfied. The basis 
for the requirement is discussed above. However, because of the 
stakeholder interest in this subject, the Commission is asking for 
specific feedback and opinions from stakeholders on requiring an 
automatic versus fixed fire suppression system in the fire area.
    The Commission asks the following specific question:
    Under the proposed option of using operator manual actions under 
III.G.2.c-1, when redundant trains are located in the same fire area, 
should the requirement for a suppression system in the fire area be 
automatic or fixed? An automatic suppression system is required in 
III.G.2(b) and (c). However, a fixed system is specified in III.G.3. 
Provide the rationale for why requiring fixed or automatic suppression 
would provide the appropriate level of protection in the proposed 
paragraph III.G.2(C-1).
Application of Operator Manual Actions Acceptance Criteria to 
Paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3
    The proposed operator manual actions rulemaking would modify 
requirements in paragraph III.G.2 to permit operator manual actions as 
a compliance option under this paragraph, provided the acceptance 
criteria delineated in a new paragraph III.P are satisfied. The 
proposed rule language would not apply to paragraphs III.G.1 or 
III.G.3, although the term ``operator manual actions'' may be construed 
as applicable to the same types of actions taken under these 
paragraphs. This issue has been raised by stakeholders during 
discussions conducted thus far, and therefore, the Commission is 
providing background information about this subject and a specific 
request for comment.
    Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, section III.G.1 requires fire protection 
features capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of systems 
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either 
the control room or emergency control station(s) \7\ is free of fire 
damage. The NRC considers redundant trains located in completely 
separate fire areas to comply with III.G.1. Paragraph III.G.1 also 
allows a licensee to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from 
either the control room or emergency control station(s).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189 Fire Protection for Operating 
Reactors defines an ``emergency control station'' as a ``location 
outside the MCR where actions are taken by operations personnel to 
manipulate plant systems and controls to achieve safe shutdown of 
the reactor.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain 
hot shutdown conditions are located in the same fire area, paragraph 
III.G.2. requires one of three means to ensure that one of the trains 
is free of fire damage. Through this rulemaking, the Commission is 
proposing to add a fourth means.
    Where the protection of systems required to function properly for 
hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of paragraph III.G.2, or 
where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown may be 
subject to damage as a result of fire suppression activities or the 
inadvertent actuation of fire suppression systems, paragraph III.G.3 
requires that an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be 
provided and must be independent of cables, systems or components in 
the area, room, or zone under consideration. In addition, paragraph 
III.G.3 further requires that

[[Page 10912]]

fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system must be installed in 
the area, room, or zone under consideration. Specific criteria for 
implementing this capability are contained in Appendix R, paragraph 
III.L, ``alternative and dedicated shutdown capability,'' including 
such features as the performance goals for specific functions (e.g., 
maintaining RCS process variables within those predicted for a loss of 
normal AC power, with makeup function capable of maintaining the 
reactor coolant level above the top of the core for BWRs and within 
level of pressurizer indication for PWRs), and to achieve cold shutdown 
within 72 hours.
    Feedback from the stakeholders on the Federal Register Notice (68 
FR 66501; November 26, 2003) made clear that some stakeholders believe 
that acceptance criteria for operator manual actions should be expanded 
to other provisions of paragraph III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. 
For example, one commenter stated that ``[R]ather than changing 
Appendix R, Section III.G.2, we recommend that the NRC issue generic 
industry guidance clarifying that manual actions are permissible to 
satisfy all subsections of Appendix R, Section III.G, and that manually 
operating equipment locally satisfies the ``emergency control 
stations'' provision of Appendix R, Section III.G.1. This approach 
maintains maximum consistency with existing NRC guidance and avoids the 
creation of a separate set of standards that are only applicable to 
``III.G.2'' manual actions. Otherwise, establishing criteria 
specifically applicable to Appendix R, Section III.G.2, will lead to 
new disputes when manual actions previously credited to satisfy 
Sections III.G.1 and III.G.3 are reviewed during the inspection 
process.''
    Another commenter stated that ``This [sic--These] proposed interim 
acceptance criteria should state NRC's current expectations for 
feasibility of all manual actions. This maintains the maximum 
consistency with existing NRC guidance, and avoids the creation of a 
separate set of standards only applicable to ``III.G.2'' manual 
actions. Establishing criteria specifically applicable to ``III.G.2 
manual actions'' will lead to unnecessary confusion about whether an 
action is a ``III.G.1.a action'' or a ``III.G.2 action''.
    In addition to the written public comments, the NRC received 
comments during a June 23, 2004, Category 3 public meeting in 
Rockville, Maryland discussing application of operator manual actions 
criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3. During this meeting the 
industry stated that it will conduct a survey of licensees shortly 
following issuance of the proposed rule to determine their position and 
consensus on the application of operator manual action criteria to 10 
CFR part 50, Appendix R, paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3.
    There were two issues identified by stakeholders relative to 
operator manual actions. The first was specific operator manual actions 
within individual paragraphs III.G.1, III.G.2, and III.G.3. The second 
was the applicability of the proposed operator manual actions 
acceptance criteria to all provisions of paragraph III.G.
    Operator manual actions, as currently outlined in the proposed 
rule, would be used as an additional option to satisfy paragraph 
III.G.2 requirements. However, based on stakeholder comments, the NRC 
is asking for feedback from stakeholders on the advantages and 
disadvantages of also applying operator manual action acceptance 
criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3.
    The NRC believes that there are technical and backfit 
considerations associated with expanding the applicability of operator 
manual action acceptance criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3.
    A III.G.3--compliant Fire Area contains redundant trains of 
shutdown equipment or cables and one train has not been ensured to 
remain free of fire damage (per III.G.2 criteria), or redundant trains 
are vulnerable to damage as a result of fire suppression activities or 
the inadvertent actuation of fire suppression systems. As noted, 
paragraph III.L contains specific provisions concerning this alternate 
or dedicated shutdown capability. For instance, it contains criteria 
such as III.L.3 ``Procedures shall be in effect * * *,'' and III.L.4 
``The number of operating shift personnel * * * required to operate 
such equipment shall be on site at all times.'' However, they are not 
as comprehensive as the proposed acceptance criteria in paragraph 
III.P. The NRC believes that if it applied the proposed acceptance 
criteria in paragraph III.P to paragraph III.G.3, it may be necessary 
to modify paragraph III.L.
    In addition, the NRC believes that operator manual actions 
previously approved for paragraph III.G.3 would need to be revisited in 
order to ensure that they satisfy the acceptance criteria as proposed 
for paragraph III.G.2.
    Applying the same new acceptance criteria to all fire protection 
manual actions in paragraph III.G may require a generic backfit 
analysis since the current rule allows the use of manual actions at 
emergency control stations in III.G.1 with no codified acceptance 
criteria and in III.G.3 with less specific acceptance criteria. Section 
50.109(a)(3) provides the standard for a backfit analysis that must 
show ``a substantial increase in the overall protection * * * and that 
the direct and indirect costs of implementation * * * are justified in 
view of this increased protection.'' The extent of licensees' usage of 
manual actions is highly plant specific and the associated costs and 
benefits of backfitting are therefore difficult to quantify. 
Furthermore, applying the acceptance criteria to all paragraph III.G 
manual actions could invalidate the use of some existing manual 
actions. The subsequent hardware/fire barrier/program modifications 
that would then be needed could be very expensive. Thus, value-impact 
analyses in many cases would probably show that backfitting is not 
cost-beneficial.
    Alternatively, if a generic analysis cannot justify the backfit 
under 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3), the NRC may be able to justify the 
backfitting as necessary for ``adequate protection'' under 10 CFR 
50.109(a)(4)(ii). Recent inspection experience has not shown major 
issues with respect to the use of operator manual actions, thus, not 
providing significant support to justify that the backfit is needed for 
adequate protection. Further, NRC inspections of potentially risk-
significant (``greater than green'') findings on such manual actions 
are already handled by the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) corrective 
action program or are evaluated as plant-specific backfits, as 
applicable.
    Regardless of the applicable section under 10 CFR 50.109, a backfit 
may ultimately enhance safety, as a result of a consistent set of 
rules. However, backfitting the operator manual actions' acceptance 
criteria to all plants may cause plants with existing operator manual 
actions previously approved under a different set of criteria to 
resubmit exemption requests for staff review and approval.
    Applying new acceptance criteria on a forward-fit basis for 
operator manual actions under III.G.3 might be a means of addressing 
this backfit concern. Under this approach, application of the new 
acceptance criteria to III.G.3 would apply to operator manual actions 
that resulted from future licensing basis changes after the effective 
date of the new rule. The new acceptance criteria would thus apply to 
all III.G.2 operator manual actions, but to only a small percentage of 
the manual actions credited under III.G.3. This approach,

[[Page 10913]]

however, may increase the regulatory complexity and burden associated 
with fire protection inspections and further complicate the fire 
protection licensing basis of each facility.
    Applying the new acceptance criteria to all operator manual actions 
in III.G.2 and III.G.3, would make fire protection implementation and 
inspections more consistent, reliable and predictable. However, the NRC 
also notes that the existing requirements vary among plants for several 
reasons; for example, post-1979 plants were not specifically licensed 
to Appendix R, and thus these provisions would not apply to them absent 
other regulatory action, which would tend to offset the possible 
consistency gain.
Request for Comment 3
    After considering a number of technical and regulatory 
implications, the Commission has tentatively decided to limit the 
applicability of this proposed rule on operator manual actions to 
paragraph III.G.2. However, because of the stakeholder interest in this 
subject, the Commission is also asking for specific feedback and 
opinions from stakeholders on applying operator manual actions 
acceptance criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3. Depending on the 
comments received, the Commission may extend application of the 
criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3.
    The Commission asks the following specific question:
    Should the operator manual action acceptance criteria developed for 
III.G.2 also be applied to operator manual actions for III.G.1 and 
III.G.3? Are there advantages or disadvantages not noted by the 
Commission that should be considered? Please provide a discussion 
outlining the basis for your response taking into account the 
considerations outlined in the supplementary information section of 
this document.

IV. Interim Enforcement Discretion Policy

    In SECY-03-0100, ``Rulemaking Plan on Post-Fire Operator Manual 
Actions,'' dated June 17, 2003, the NRC staff recommended development 
of an interim enforcement policy relying on preliminary acceptance 
criteria for manual actions. The staff proposed this strategy based on 
a belief that interim acceptance criteria could be developed that would 
be consistent with the manual actions acceptance criteria in the final 
rule. The Commission had previously approved a similar enforcement 
discretion policy related to a fitness-for-duty proposed rulemaking. In 
an SRM dated September 12, 2003, the Commission approved the staff's 
recommendation.
    In March 1998, the NRC issued EGM 98-02, ``Enforcement Guidance 
Memorandum--Disposition of Violations of Appendix R, Sections III.G and 
III.L Regarding Circuit Failures,'' that provides enforcement guidance 
for issues related to fire-induced circuit failures, which encompasses 
the vast majority of manual actions as compensatory measures to satisfy 
the regulatory requirements. This EGM was developed based on an 
apparent widespread misunderstanding of the requirements on the part of 
licensees and remains in effect until December 31, 2005. The EGM 
provides guidance for disposition of noncompliances involving fire-
induced circuit failures, which could prevent operation or cause 
maloperation of equipment needed to achieve and maintain post-fire safe 
shutdown. Among the enforcement conditions, discretion will be given 
for cases where licensees do not dispute that a violation of regulatory 
requirements has occurred with respect to a nonconformance and that 
licensees take prompt compensatory actions and also take corrective 
action within a reasonable time. The expectations of this EGM have been 
incorporated into the current NRC Enforcement Manual. In addition, the 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued a revised Inspection 
Procedure (IP) 71111.05 in March 2003 incorporating interim operator 
manual actions acceptance criteria. The inspection procedure provides 
guidance to assess and ensure that plant specific operator manual 
actions meet the interim acceptance criteria and that corrective 
actions taken by the plants will achieve and maintain safe shutdown 
condition.
    On November 26, 2003 (68 FR 66501), the NRC staff published a 
Federal Register notice soliciting public comments on specific 
acceptance criteria for operator manual actions to be considered for 
use in developing an interim enforcement discretion policy for post-
fire operator manual actions. In addition, as part of the proposed rule 
development, the staff has had numerous interactions with industry and 
public stakeholders to discuss rule requirements and the more developed 
operator manual actions acceptance criteria. Based on these meetings 
and comments in response to the November 26, 2003, Federal Register 
notice, the Commission believes that the proposed rule's acceptance 
criteria and detection and suppression requirements are still evolving, 
such that the new interim enforcement guidance developed in conjunction 
with the proposed rule may not be consistent with the requirements 
specified in the final rule.
    The current applications of EGM 98-02 and IP 71111.05 are effective 
to ensure and maintain the overall plant safety by licensees through 
the use of adequate and appropriate compensatory measures in the form 
of operator manual actions implemented under the licensee's Fire 
Protection Program. Manual actions that fail to meet the criteria in 
the inspection procedure are not considered to be feasible or to be 
adequate compensatory measures. Such manual actions will result in the 
non-compliance being entered into the enforcement process. The new 
interim enforcement policy for the post-fire operator manual actions 
would utilize a disputed set of acceptance criteria and trigger 
additional reviews (by licensees and inspectors) of past findings, with 
the prospect of a third review being necessary upon issuance of the 
final rule. Issuing such an enforcement discretion policy at this time 
could also have the unintended consequence of preempting the rulemaking 
process without a clear safety benefit.
    Based on the above, the Commission believes that the continued use 
of the current enforcement discretion policy of EGM 98-02 and the 
guidance in IP 71111.05 is sufficient in the interim and that a 
revision of the existing policy or development of additional policy to 
include specific operator manual actions acceptance criteria is not 
warranted.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis of Substantive Changes

    Part 50, Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2. Add an ``or'' at the end of 
the paragraph c. The change is necessary for the introduction of a new 
option that recognizes operator manual actions as an alternative method 
to satisfy the requirements set forth in paragraph III.G.2.
    Part 50, Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2. Add paragraph c-1, 
``Operator actions that satisfy the acceptance criteria in paragraph 
III.P. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression 
system shall be installed in the fire area.'' This paragraph would 
codify use of operator manual actions in conjunction with fire 
detectors and an automatic suppression system installed in the fire 
area as an additional alternative compliance method. The licensees 
implementing this voluntary alternative or any of the existing 
alternatives currently set forth in this paragraph would provide 
reasonable assurance that at least one method for achieving and 
maintaining hot shutdown condition would remain

[[Page 10914]]

available during and after a postulated fire anywhere in the plant. 
This paragraph numbering was chosen to preserve the numbering of 
subsequent requirements within paragraph III.G.2.
    Part 50, Appendix R. Add paragraph III.P [Acceptance Criteria for 
Operator Manual Actions]. The new paragraph P would define operator 
manual actions and set forth the required acceptance criteria which 
must be met before a licensee may use operator manual actions to comply 
with paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R.
    Proposed paragraph III.P.1 [Definition]. Paragraph III.P.1 adds a 
definition for operator manual actions.
    Proposed paragraph III.P.2. Paragraph III.P.2 sets forth the 
requirements and acceptance criteria for relying on operator manual 
actions.
    Proposed paragraph III.P.2.a requires that an analysis be performed 
for operator manual actions and that the feasibility and reliability of 
these actions be demonstrated. The analysis must also address the fire 
timeline and identify all manual actions that must be completed; the 
equipment needed; the number of operators needed; the communication 
equipment needed; and the time available, including time margin, for 
the operators to perform the actions before unsafe plant conditions 
occur.
    Proposed paragraph III.P.2.b contains requirements for plant 
procedures that must include each operator manual action required to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown. It also includes operator training 
requirements for those procedures.
    Proposed paragraph III.P.2.c contains requirements that systems and 
equipment needed to accomplish operator manual actions are available 
and equipment is readily accessible consistent with the analysis 
required by subparagraph III.P.2(a). It also includes a requirement 
that the number of operating shift personnel required to perform the 
operator manual actions must be on site at all times.
    Proposed paragraph III.P.2.d contains requirements for periodic 
demonstrations of the operator manual actions and corrective actions.

VI. Plain Language

    A June 1, 1988, presidential memorandum entitled ``Plain Language 
in Government Writing'' directed that the Government's writing be in 
plain language. This memorandum was published on June 10, 1998 (63 FRN 
31883). In compliance with this directive, editorial changes have been 
made in the proposed revision to improve the organization and 
readability of the existing language of the paragraph being revised. 
These types of changes are not discussed further in this document. The 
NRC requests comments on the proposed rule specifically with respect to 
the clarity and readability of the language used. Comments should be 
sent to the address listed under the ADDRESSES heading of the preamble.

VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Advancement and Transfer Act of 1995, Pub. 
L. 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that 
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, 
unless the use of such standards is inconsistent with applicable law or 
otherwise impractical. The NRC is aware of the guidance on operator 
manual actions contained in ANSI/ANS Standard 58.8 (1994), ``Time 
Response Design Criteria for Safety-Related Operator Actions.'' This 
standard contains criteria that establish time requirements for use in 
the design of safety-related systems for nuclear power plants. The 
objective of the criteria is to determine whether sufficient time 
exists for operators to perform the required operator manual actions to 
operate safety-related systems or whether automatic actuation is 
required. The scope of the standard is ``limited to safety-related 
operator actions associated with design basis events (DBEs) that result 
in a reactor trip and is required to be analyzed in safety analysis 
reports (SARs).'' The NRC considers this industry consensus standard 
relevant to the proposed rulemaking, but not acceptable as a 
replacement for it. Operator manual actions performed for the purpose 
of fire protection are beyond the intended application of this 
standard. However, the principles and methods contained in the standard 
may be adaptable to the proposed rulemaking and have been considered as 
part of the NRC's effort to develop generic operator manual actions 
acceptance criteria.
    The NRC is further aware of draft guidance for review of license 
amendment requests that contain risk-important human actions. The NRC 
staff issued NUREG-1764, ``Guidance for the Review of Changes to Human 
Actions,'' as a draft report for public comment with the comment period 
closing on March 31, 2003. This NUREG proposes a risk-informed 
methodology for the review of the human performance aspects of 
licensees' proposed changes to plant systems and operations in license 
amendment requests. In addition to using risk insights to help the 
staff determine the level of regulatory review expended on licensees' 
submittals relying on human actions, the NUREG provides deterministic 
review criteria for evaluating the acceptability of human actions 
proposed by licensees.
    The NRC notes that a separate rulemaking for 10 CFR 50.48(c), 
``National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805,'' has 
recently been completed which permits nuclear power plant licensees to 
develop a risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program 
consistent with voluntary consensus standard NFPA 805, ``Performance-
Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric 
Generating Plants.'' Appendix B of NFPA 805 specifies a method for 
assessing the feasibility of operator manual actions. The NRC believes 
that licensees who choose to implement the NFPA 805 approach could 
alternatively, with appropriate analysis and documentation, use it to 
justify the acceptability of certain operator manual actions in their 
fire protection programs.
    In preparing the proposed rule, the NRC considered the 
applicability of the risk-informed approach and the deterministic 
review criteria presented in NUREG-1764 and Appendix B of NFPA 805 to 
help refine the regulatory requirements and the implementation 
guidance. The NRC is not aware of any other consensus standard that 
could be adopted to provide guidance or criteria for the use of 
operator manual actions, but will consider using an alternative 
standard if one is identified during the rulemaking process.

VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Environmental 
Assessment

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 
subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a 
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment. Therefore, an environmental impact statement is not 
required. The basis for this determination is as follows:
    This action would establish regulations that allow nuclear power 
plant licensees to use manual actions by plant operators as an 
alternative method to achieve hot shutdown conditions in the event of 
fires in certain plant areas, provided that the actions are evaluated 
against specified criteria and determined to be feasible and reliable, 
and that fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are 
provided in the fire area. This proposed action also provides 
conservative and thorough regulatory acceptance criteria for

[[Page 10915]]

operator manual actions taken under Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions.
    The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability 
or consequences of an accident. No changes are being made in the types 
or quantities of radiological effluents that may be released off site, 
and there is no significant increase in public radiation exposure since 
there is no change to facility operations that could create a new or 
affect a previously analyzed accident. The staff believes there will be 
no net change in occupational radiation exposure. Any potential 
increase in exposure to personnel performing or demonstrating operator 
manual actions will likely be offset by a reduction of occupational 
radiation exposure since fewer personnel will be required to install or 
maintain fire barriers in or near radiologically controlled areas.
    With regard to nonradiological impacts, no changes are being made 
to nonradiological plant effluents and there are no changes in 
activities that could adversely affect the environment. Therefore, 
there are no significant non-radiological impacts associated with the 
proposed action.
    The primary alternative to this action is the no-action 
alternative. The no-action alternative would result in licensees 
proposing to use the risk-informed, performance-based alternative 
provided in 10 CFR 50.48(c) or submitting exemptions to authorize the 
use of acceptable operator manual actions. The NRC's approval of these 
actions would have the same environmental impacts as the proposed 
action.
    The determination of this environmental assessment is that this 
action will have no significant offsite impact on the public. Comments 
on any aspect of the environmental assessment may be submitted to the 
NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.
    The NRC has sent a copy of this proposed rule to all State Liaison 
Officers and requested their comments on the environmental assessment.

IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This proposed rule contains new or amended information collection 
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq). This rule has been submitted to the Office of 
Management and Budget for review and approval of the information 
collection requirements.
    Type of submission, new or revision: Revision.
    The title of the information collection: 10 CFR Part 50, ``Fire 
Protection Program--Post Fire Operator Manual Actions'' (Proposed 
Rule).
    The form number if applicable: Not applicable.
    How often the collection is required: As needed.
    Who will be required or asked to report: Licensees for nuclear 
power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, who wish to 
implement fire protection manual actions.
    An estimate of the number of annual responses: 8.
    The estimated number of annual respondents: 8.
    An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to 
complete the requirement or request: A reduction of 745 hours annually 
(-2,880 hours reporting plus 2,135 hours recordkeeping,) or a reduction 
of 93 hours per respondent.
    Abstract: The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations pertaining 
to fire protection under 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Paragraph III.G.2, 
to allow the voluntary use of manual actions by operators of nuclear 
power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, to achieve 
hot shutdown conditions in the event of fires in certain plant areas, 
provided the actions are evaluated against specific criteria that have 
been determined to be acceptable by the NRC.
    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on 
the potential impact of the information collections contained in this 
proposed rule and on the following issues:
    1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the 
information will have practical utility?
    2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?
    3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of 
the information to be collected?
    4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized, 
including the use of automated collection techniques?
    A copy of the OMB clearance package may be viewed free of charge at 
the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 
Pike, Room O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The OMB clearance package and 
rule are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 days after the 
signature date of this notice and are also available at the rule forum 
site, http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
    Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information 
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the 
above issues, by April 6, 2005, to the Records and FOIA/Privacy 
Services Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to 
[email protected] and to the Desk Officer, John A. Asalone, Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011), Office 
of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance 
of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date. 
You may also e-mail comments to [email protected] or 
comment by telephone at (202) 395-4650.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a request for information or an information collection 
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid 
OMB control number.

X. Regulatory Analysis

    The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this 
proposed regulation. The analysis examined the costs and benefits of 
Commission alternatives for updating the existing rule to accommodate 
technological advances.
    The analysis examined two baselines. The Main baseline reflects the 
effects of the rule as of the date of publication, that is, full 
compliance with all existing regulations. The Industry Practices 
baseline reflects a more ``real world'' assessment of compliance.
    The regulatory alternatives examined under each baseline were No 
Action, under which no regulatory changes would be undertaken; 
Regulatory Guidance, under which Section 50.48 and Appendix R would not 
be modified but regulatory guidance would be updated; and the Proposed 
Alternative, under which the proposal outlined above would be 
implemented.
    The regulatory analysis showed that the proposed alternative was 
the most cost beneficial of the three alternatives. The benefit is the 
greatest under the Industry Practices baseline because fourteen 
reactors would take immediate advantage of the proposed rule with 
corresponding savings to industry.
    Option 3, the Proposed Alternative, was determined to be the most 
preferable based on best professional

[[Page 10916]]

judgment and quantitative analysis because it (1) improves 
effectiveness and efficiency of the NRC regulatory process by assuring 
adequate and uniform operator manual actions; (2) eliminates the need 
for some licensees to request exemptions from Paragraph III.G.2 or make 
equipment modifications; and (3) reduces NRC costs by reducing the 
number of exemption requests to be reviewed. Under Option 3, public 
health and safety would be maintained at the current level.
    The results of the analysis are summarized in the following table.

                                  Net Present Value of Regulatory Alternatives
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     Option 2        Option 3
                           Baseline                                Option 1  no     regulatory       proposed
                                                                      action         guidance       alternative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Main............................................................  ..............       ($42,240)     $13,992,793
Industry Practices..............................................  ..............        (42,240)      16,839,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory 
analysis. The regulatory analysis may be viewed and downloaded via the 
NRC rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Single copies of 
the analysis are also available from David T. Diec, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, (301) 415-2834, e-mail [email protected] or Alexander 
Klein, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, (301) 415-3477, e-mail 
[email protected]. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the 
NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.

XI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 
605(b), the Commission certifies that this proposed rule, if adopted, 
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. This proposed rule would affect only licensees 
authorized to operate nuclear power reactors. These licensees do not 
fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth 
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Size Standards established by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10 CFR 2.810).

XII. Backfit Analysis

    Section 50.109 (a)(1) defines backfitting as ``the modification of 
or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility 
* * * any of which may result from a new or amended provision in the 
Commission rules or the imposition of a regulatory staff position 
interpreting the Commission rules that is either new or different from 
a previously applicable staff position.'' The requirements in Appendix 
R are only applicable to licensees who received operating licenses 
before January 1, 1979. To resolve an existing regulatory compliance 
issue for these licensees under paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R, the 
proposed rule represents a voluntary alternative to the current 
requirements. The proposed rule would allow the use of operator manual 
actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown during a fire in an 
area where redundant shutdown trains are located as an additional 
method beyond the three alternatives presently provided. Licensees who 
currently have approved operator manual actions will not be required to 
perform any additional actions (such as analysis or documentation). 
Licensees who employ operator manual actions but have not received NRC 
approval are in violation of paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. There is 
no backfitting as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1) because licensees may 
choose to continue to meet paragraph III.G.2 through other provisions.
    Post-January 1, 1979 licensees who use operator manual actions 
without NRC approval may or may not be in compliance with applicable 
fire protection requirements (GDC-3, Sec.  50.48(a), applicable license 
conditions, or current fire protection programs). Compliance for plants 
licensed after January 1, 1979, depends on the specific licensing 
commitments, the change control process, and how the change was 
justified and analyzed to demonstrate that the operator manual actions 
are feasible and reliable and do not adversely affect the ability to 
achieve or maintain safe shutdown. This rule is not applicable to these 
licensees as they are not required to meet Appendix R.
    Based on the above discussion, the NRC has concluded that the 
proposed rule would not constitute a backfit as defined in 10 CFR 
50.109(a)(1).

List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 50

    Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire 
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Backfitting, 
Reporting and record keeping requirements.

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble and under the authority 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to 
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR part 50.

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 
FACILITIES

    1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 
Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 
83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 
2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); 
sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
    Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5841).
    Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 
853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
    Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec. 
108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).
    Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec. 
185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235).
    Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued under sec. 
102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
    Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 
1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844).
    Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-
415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239).
    Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 
U.S.C. 2152).
    Sections 50.80--50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, 
as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234).
    Appendix F also issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 
2237).

    2. In Appendix R to Part 50, Section III.G.2.c. is revised and a 
new Section III.G.2.c-1 and Section III.P. are added to read as 
follows:

[[Page 10917]]

Appendix R to Part 50--Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power 
Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979

* * * * *

III. Specific Requirements

* * * * *
    G. * * *
    2. * * *
    c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety 
circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour 
rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire 
suppression system shall be installed in the fire areas; or
    c-1. Operator manual actions that satisfy the acceptance 
criteria in paragraph III.P. In addition, fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire 
area.
* * * * *
    P. 1. For purposes of this section, operator manual actions 
means the integrated set of actions needed to ensure that a 
redundant train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown conditions located within the same area outside the primary 
containment is free of fire damage.
    2. A licensee relying on operator manual actions must meet all 
of the following requirements:
    (a) Analysis. The licensee shall prepare an analysis for each 
operator manual action which demonstrates its feasibility and 
reliability.
    (1) The analysis must contain a postulated fire timeline showing 
that there is sufficient time to travel to action locations and 
perform actions required to achieve and maintain the plant in a hot 
shutdown condition under the environmental conditions expected to be 
encountered without jeopardizing the health and safety of the 
operator performing the manual action. The fire timeline shall 
extend from the time of initial fire detection until the time when 
the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown is reached, and 
shall include a time margin that reasonably accounts for all 
important variables, including (i) differences between the analyzed 
and actual conditions, and (ii) human performance uncertainties that 
may be encountered.
    (2) The analysis must address the functionality of equipment or 
cables that could be adversely affected by the fire or its effects 
but still used to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.
    (3) The analysis must identify all equipment required to 
accomplish the operator manual actions within the postulated 
timeline, including (but not limited to) (i) all indications 
necessary to identify the need for the operator manual actions, 
enable their performance and verify their successful accomplishment, 
and (ii) any necessary communications, portable, and life support 
equipment.
    (b) Procedures and training. Plant procedures must include each 
operator manual action required to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown. Each operator must be appropriately trained on those 
procedures.
    (c) Implementation. The licensee shall ensure that all systems 
and equipment needed to accomplish each operator manual action are 
available and readily accessible consistent with the analysis 
required by paragraph 2(a). The number of operating shift personnel 
required to perform the operator manual actions shall be on site at 
all times.
    (d) Demonstration. Periodically, the licensee shall conduct 
demonstrations using an established crew of operators to demonstrate 
that operator manual actions required to achieve and maintain the 
plant in a hot shutdown condition can be accomplished consistent 
with the analysis in paragraph 2(a) of this section.
    The licensee may not rely upon any operator manual action until 
it has been demonstrated to be consistent with the analysis. The 
licensee shall take prompt corrective action if any subsequent 
periodic demonstration indicates that the operator manual actions 
can no longer be accomplished consistent with the analysis.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of February, 2005.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 05-4314 Filed 3-4-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P