[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 43 (Monday, March 7, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 10901-10917]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-4314]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 43 / Monday, March 7, 2005 / Proposed
Rules
[[Page 10901]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
RIN 3150 AH-54
Fire Protection Program--Post-Fire Operator Manual Actions Draft
Regulatory Guide: Issuance, Availability
AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule and Issuance of Draft Regulatory Guide.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposes to amend its
fire protection regulations for nuclear power facilities operating
prior to January 1, 1979. The amendment would allow nuclear power plant
licensees to use manual actions by plant operators as an alternative
method to achieve hot shutdown conditions in the event of fires in
certain plant areas, provided that the actions are evaluated against
specified criteria and determined to be acceptable and that fire
detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are provided in the
fire area. The Commission believes that the proposed action would
provide realistically conservative regulatory acceptance criteria for
operator manual actions to achieve and maintain hot shutdown condition.
The NRC is also proposing and requesting comments on a draft
regulatory guide to support this proposed rulemaking. The NRC has
developed the Regulatory Guide Series to describe and make available to
the public such information as methods that are acceptable to the NRC
staff for implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations,
techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or
postulated accidents, and data that the staff needs in its review of
applications for permits and licenses.
The draft regulatory guide, entitled ``Demonstrating the
Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to
Fire,'' is temporarily identified by its task number, DG-1136, which
should be mentioned in all related correspondence. This proposed
regulatory guide offers guidance for NRC licensees and applicants to
use in implementing the feasibility and reliability criteria that the
staff developed for post-fire operator manual actions.
DATES: Submit comments on the proposed rule and the draft regulatory
guide by May 23, 2005. Submit comments specific to the information
collection aspects of this rule by April 6, 2005. Comments received
after these dates will be considered if it is practical to do so, but
assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received after
these dates.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the proposed rule by any one of
the following methods. Please include the following number RIN 3150 AH-
54 and/or DG-1136 in the subject line of your comments. Comments on the
rulemakings or the draft regulatory guide submitted in writing or in
electronic form will be made available for public inspection. Because
your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact
information, the NRC cautions you against including any information in
your submission that you do not want publicly disclosed.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: [email protected]. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. This site provides
the capability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web
browser supports that function.
Address questions about our rulemaking website to Carol Gallagher
(301) 415-5905; e-mail [email protected]. Comments can also be submitted via
the Federal Rulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. (Telephone (301)
415-1966).
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
(301) 415-1101.
Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction contractor
will copy documents for a fee. Selected documents, including comments,
may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC rulemaking Web
site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image
files of NRC's public documents. Electronic copies of Draft Regulatory
Guide DG-1136 are available in ADAMS at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under Accession ML050350359. Note, however, that
the NRC has temporarily suspended public access to ADAMS so that the
agency can complete security reviews of publicly available documents
and remove potentially sensitive information. Please check the NRC's
Web site for updates concerning the resumption of public access to
ADAMS. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in
accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public
Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or
by email to [email protected]. Electronic copies of Draft Regulatory Guide
DG-1136 are also available through the NRC's public Web site under
Draft Regulatory Guides in the Regulatory Guides document collection of
the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/.
You may submit comments on the information collections by the
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David T. Diec, 301-415-2834,
[email protected] or Alexander Klein, 301-415-3477, [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
[[Page 10902]]
I. Background
II. Rulemaking Initiation
III. Proposed Action
A. Operator Manual Actions Alternative
B. Addition of Paragraph III.P, Operator Manual Actions
Acceptance Criteria
C. Response to Stakeholder Comments on Operator Manual Action
Acceptance Criteria
IV. Interim Enforcement Discretion Policy
V. Section-by-Section Analysis of Substantive Changes
VI. Plain Language
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Environmental
Assessment
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
X. Regulatory Analysis
XI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XII. Backfit Analysis
I. Background
Section 50.48, Fire protection, requires each operating power plant
to have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A
to 10 CFR part 50. Criterion 3 requires structures, systems, and
components important to safety to be designed and located to minimize,
consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect
of fires and explosions. The specific fire protection requirements for
safe shutdown capability of a plant are further discussed in paragraph
G of Section III of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The more specific
Sec. 50.48 and Appendix R requirements were added following a
significant fire that occurred in 1975 at the Browns Ferry Nuclear
Plant. The fire damaged control, instrumentation, and power cables for
redundant trains of equipment necessary for safe shutdown.
In response to the fire, an NRC investigation found that the
independence of redundant equipment at Browns Ferry was negated by a
lack of adequate separation between cables for redundant trains of
safety equipment. The investigators subsequently recommended that a
suitable combination of electrical isolation, physical distance, fire
barriers, and sprinkler systems should be used to maintain the
independence of redundant safety equipment. In response to these
recommendations, the NRC interacted with stakeholders for several years
to identify and implement necessary plant fire protection improvements.
In 1980, NRC promulgated Sec. 50.48 to establish fire protection
requirements and Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 for certain generic fire
protection program issues, including paragraph III.G, fire protection
of safe shutdown capability. The requirements for separation of cables
and equipment associated with redundant hot shutdown trains were
promulgated in paragraph III.G.2.
Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R requires that cables and equipment
of redundant trains of safety systems in the same fire area be
separated by either:
a. A 3-hour fire barrier, or
b. A horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening
combustibles in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic fire
suppression system, or
c. A 1-hour fire barrier combined with fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system.
Appendix R applies to only those licensees who received operating
licenses before January 1, 1979. Plants licensed after January 1, 1979,
are not required to meet Appendix R. These plants were licensed to meet
Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, ``Guidelines for Fire Protection
for Nuclear Power Plants,'' that contains criteria similar to the
Appendix R requirements. Specific licensing basis information for these
plants is usually contained in license conditions issued at time of
licensing.
Because the rule was to apply to facilities which were already
built, the NRC knew that compliance with various parts of Appendix R
might be difficult at some facilities. Accordingly, the NRC included a
provision which allowed licensees to submit alternative acceptable
methods for protecting redundant equipment for NRC review and approval
through an exemption process. During implementation of the Appendix R
requirements, the NRC reviewed and approved a large number of
exemptions for 60 licensees who proposed alternative acceptable methods
of compliance in various areas, including numerous exemptions from
paragraph III.G.2.
In the early 1990s, generic problems arose with Thermolag \1\ fire
barriers, which many licensees were using to comply with paragraph
III.G.2 of Appendix R. Licensees were ultimately required to replace
Thermolag material with other fire barriers. Several years later, fire
protection inspectors began to notice that many licensees had not
upgraded or replaced Thermolag fire barrier material (or had not
otherwise provided the required separation distance between redundant
safety trains) used to satisfy the paragraph III.G.2 criteria. Some
licensees compensated by relying on operator manual actions \2\ which
were not reviewed and approved by the NRC through the Sec. 50.12
exemption process. Currently, operator manual actions are not an
alternative specified in paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. However, such
actions may be an acceptable means of achieving hot shutdown in the
event of a fire under certain conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Thermolag is a brand-name for a particular type of material
used to construct fire barriers typically for protecting electrical
conduits and cable trays. In the early 1990's, issues arose
regarding the testing and qualification process used for this
material. It was determined that barriers made of this material
would not provide protection for the required periods of time.
\2\ Operator manual actions are an integrated set of actions
needed to ensure that a redundant train of systems necessary to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions located within the same
fire area outside the primary containment is free of fire damage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2002, the NRC met with nuclear power plant licensees and
informed them that the use of unapproved manual actions was not in
compliance with paragraph III.G.2. During a meeting on June 20, 2002,
the Nuclear Energy Institute representative stated that there was
widespread use of operator manual actions throughout the industry based
on the industry's understanding of past practice and existing NRC
guidance. The industry representative also stated that licensees' use
of unapproved manual actions had become prevalent even before the
concerns arose with Thermolag material. Subsequent to the public
meeting, the NRC developed criteria for inspectors to use in assessing
the safety significance of violations resulting from licensee use of
unapproved operator manual actions. The criteria were based on past
practice and experience by NRC inspectors when reviewing operator
manual actions used to comply with Appendix R, paragraph III.G.3, on
alternate reactor shutdown capability. Licensees were familiar with
these criteria through their interactions with the NRC staff during the
implementation of the NRC inspection process. These criteria were
issued in the revision to Inspection Procedure 71111.05 in March 2003.
While unapproved operator manual actions are still violations, those
actions that meet the interim criteria are viewed to have low or no
safety significance.
II. Rulemaking Initiation
Instead of continuing the current practice of requiring all
noncompliant licensees to submit individual exemption requests for
staff review to determine if their operator manual actions are
acceptable, the Commission believes that amending Appendix R to 10 CFR
part 50 would be the most orderly and efficient way to provide an
option for licensees to utilize acceptable operator manual actions in
lieu of the separation or barrier requirements in paragraph III.G.2. In
this way the NRC
[[Page 10903]]
would codify conservative acceptance criteria for licensees to use in
evaluating operator manual actions to ensure that the actions were both
feasible and reliable. These criteria would maintain safety by ensuring
that licensees perform thorough evaluations of the operator manual
actions comparable to evaluations a licensee would provide to NRC for
review and approval of an exemption request.
The NRC staff developed a rulemaking plan (SECY-03-0100) and the
Commission approved the staff plan on September 12, 2003. The rule
change would revise 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2 to
allow licensees to implement acceptable operator manual actions after
documenting that the actions met the regulatory acceptance criteria.
Through the established Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the NRC will
continue to inspect licensees' methodologies for achieving and
maintaining hot shutdown conditions in accordance with the requirements
set forth in paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The NRC
fire protection inspectors will verify that the licensees' operator
manual actions met the NRC acceptance criteria and will evaluate the
licensees' analyses, procedures and training, implementation, and
demonstration of operator manual actions to ensure the licensees have
adequately demonstrated the feasibility and reliability of manual
actions.
III. Proposed Action
The Commission proposes to allow the use of operator manual actions
coincident with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system
as an additional alternative method for compliance with paragraphs
III.G.2(a), (b) or (c) of Appendix R.\3\ The Commission has determined
that implementing any one of the alternatives in paragraph III.G.2 will
provide reasonable assurance that at least one method for achieving and
maintaining the hot shutdown condition will remain available during and
after a postulated fire anywhere in the plant. The Commission proposes
to add a new paragraph G.2.c-1 and a paragraph P to section III of
Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. The new paragraph G.2.c-1 would establish
operator manual actions, in conjunction with fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system, as a fourth compliance option with
paragraphs III.G.2(a), (b) or (c), provided that the operator manual
actions satisfy the acceptance criteria in the new paragraph P. The new
paragraph P would define operator manual actions and set forth the
required acceptance criteria which must be met before a licensee could
use operator manual actions outside the containment to comply with
paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. Compliance with these acceptance
criteria is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the
feasibility and the reliability of the operator manual actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The requirements in Appendix R are applicable only to
licensees who received operating licenses before January 1, 1979.
Post-January 1, 1979, licensees were licensed to meet GDC-3, Sec.
50.48(a), and Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, which contain
criteria that are similar to the Appendix R requirements. Post-
January 1, 1979 licensees who use operator manual actions without
NRC approval may or may not be in compliance with applicable fire
protection requirements. Compliance depends on the specific
licensing commitments (usually specified in license conditions for
these licensees), the change control process, and how the change was
justified and analyzed to demonstrate that the operator manual
actions are feasible and reliable and thus do not adversely affect
the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Operator Manual Actions Alternative
The Commission proposes to add a new paragraph c-1 to paragraph
III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50 to codify the use of operator manual actions
in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression
system, as an additional alternative compliance method. Implementing
any of the alternatives in paragraph III.G.2 will provide reasonable
assurance that at least one method for achieving and maintaining the
reactor in a hot shutdown condition will remain available during and
after a postulated fire. The basis for this determination is provided
below.
The Commission's fire protection requirements constitute a defense-
in-depth approach to protect safe shutdown functions. The overall
objectives of the NRC's fire protection regulations are to minimize the
potential for fires and explosions; to rapidly detect, control, and
extinguish fires that do occur; and to ensure that the fires will not
prevent the accomplishment of necessary safe shutdown functions and
will not significantly increase the risk of radioactive releases to the
environment. The NRC has concluded if these objectives are met, there
is reasonable assurance that a licensed facility is providing adequate
protection of public health and safety. These objectives are met by a
set of NRC requirements for control of combustible materials and
ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, fire brigade
procedures and training, and physical separation of cables and
equipment of redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment.
The physical separation requirements in paragraph III.G.2 of
Appendix R are one component of the NRC's overall fire protection
objectives. In paragraph III.G.2, the NRC specified three different
methods for providing separation of cables and equipment of redundant
trains of equipment located in the same fire area. These three options
for compliance with paragraph III.G.2 offer sufficient but varying
levels of protection. In general, the 3-hour passive fire barrier is
judged to offer more protection than either of the other options (i.e.,
the 1-hour passive fire barrier or 20 feet of horizontal separation
with no intervening combustibles, in combination with fire detectors
and an automatic fire suppression system installed in the fire area).
The NRC published a final rule in the Federal Register on November 19,
1980 (45 FR 76602) stating that redundant trains of safe shutdown
systems are best protected by 3-hour passive fire barriers that provide
ample time for manual fire suppression activities to control any fire.
The proposed operator manual action offers protection comparable to the
latter two options, both of which require the additional layer of
defense-in-depth protection provided by having fire detection and
automatic suppression capability. The basis for automatic suppression
capability in III.G.2 is found in the final rule published on November
19, 1980 (45 FR 76602), which stated, ``The use of 1-hour barrier in
conjunction with automatic fire suppression and detection capability *
* * is based on the following considerations. Automatic suppression is
required to ensure prompt, effective application of a suppressant to a
fire that could endanger safe shutdown capability.'' The prompt,
effective application of a suppressant to a fire also applies to
III.G.2.b with 20 feet of horizontal separation with no intervening
combustibles. Accordingly, the NRC proposes to allow use of operator
manual actions only in conjunction with fire detectors and an automatic
fire suppression system.
In issuing the current Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2, requirements
on physical separation of safe shutdown systems, the Commission
recognized that strict compliance with the III.G.2 criteria might be
difficult for certain licensees at existing facilities. At that time,
the Commission was aware that other fire protection alternatives might
exist that could provide adequate fire protection at these facilities.
For this reason, the Commission included an
[[Page 10904]]
exemption provision in Sec. 50.48 \4\ to allow licensees to propose
alternative fire protection methods to the Commission for review and
approval. Under the exemption process, the Commission has used its fire
protection engineering experience and judgment to review and grant (or
in some cases deny) exemptions to licensees who, because of plant
physical limitations, sought to implement operator manual actions in
lieu of complying with the paragraph III.G.2 separation requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The exemption provision no longer exists in 10 CFR 50.48. It
has been subsumed by the exemption provisions in 10 CFR 50.12, which
apply to all sections of 10 CFR part 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NRC recognized in the SECY-03-0100 rulemaking plan that
``[r]eplacing a passive, rated, fire barrier * * * with human
performance activities can increase risk. For some simple operator
manual actions, the risk increase associated with human performance may
be minimal. For other actions, unless the operator manual actions are
feasible, the risk increase could be significant * * * However, if the
operator manual actions are feasible, the overall risk increase is
minimal.''
On the basis of inspection experience, the NRC has concluded that
certain manual actions can be accomplished and provide an adequate
level of safety to satisfy the underlying purpose of the fire
protection rule for the areas set forth in paragraph III.G.2. In
addition, the NRC has reviewed and granted certain exemption requests
for the use of manual actions in lieu of the separation criteria of
paragraph III.G.2. This experience demonstrates that properly analyzed
and implemented manual actions provide an adequate level of assurance
that a nuclear power plant could achieve and maintain hot shutdown
conditions.
Due to misunderstanding of acceptable past practice and existing
fire protection guidance that led licensees to implement unapproved
operator manual actions, the NRC may be faced with a large number of
operator manual action exemption requests from licensees. To provide a
more efficient and effective process and to ensure more uniform and
consistent regulatory treatment of these cases, the NRC is proposing to
codify conservative, state-of-the-art acceptance criteria for licensees
to use in evaluating operator manual actions to ensure that they are
both feasible and reliable. The NRC believes that codifying this
alternative in the rule will be more efficient than using the exemption
process, and will provide for enhanced safety by allowing resources to
be focused on safety rather than administrative compliance.
Something that is ``feasible'' is ``capable of being accomplished
or brought about; possible.'' Something that is ``reliable'' will
``yield the same or compatible results in different experiments or
statistical trials; dependably repeatable.'' To credit operator manual
actions under paragraph III.G.2 for outside containment, the licensee
must prove to the satisfaction of the NRC not only that the actions can
be successfully accomplished, but also that they can be accomplished
repeatedly by all personnel who are required to perform the actions.
Together, proof that the operator manual actions are both feasible and
reliable provides the level of reasonable assurance necessary for
credited operator manual actions to be in compliance with paragraph
III.G.2.
If shown to be feasible and reliable, operator manual actions are
likely to be successfully achieved, and any potential increases in risk
to the public due to their use will be minimal. Requiring the operator
manual actions to meet conservative acceptance criteria provides the
NRC with reasonable assurance that such operator manual actions can be
accomplished to safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire.
These criteria maintain safety by ensuring that licensees perform
thorough evaluations of the required operator manual actions and pre-
plan equipment needs. NRC fire protection inspectors will verify that
licensees' documented operator manual actions meet the NRC acceptance
criteria through the existing triennial inspection process. The use of
operator manual actions does not diminish the other defense-in-depth
objectives of the NRC fire protection program (i.e., the requirements
that minimize the potential for fires and explosions and those which
provide for rapid controlling and extinguishing of fires that do
occur). To support the objective for rapidly controlling and
extinguishing fires, the NRC is requiring fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system as part of the new operator manual
actions option. Accordingly, the NRC has determined that the proposed
rulemaking provides reasonable assurance that the public health and
safety are protected, consistent with the assurance provided by
compliance with the current three options in paragraphs III.G.2(a), (b)
or (c).
B. Addition of Paragraph III.P, Operator Manual Actions Acceptance
Criteria
The proposed paragraph III.P specifies the required acceptance
criteria which must be met before a licensee may utilize operator
manual actions to comply with paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. A
detailed discussion of each criterion is provided further in this
Statement of Consideration. These criteria are as follows:
III.P Operator Manual Actions
1. For purposes of this section, operator manual actions means the
integrated set of actions needed to ensure that a redundant train of
systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions
located within the same area outside the primary containment is free of
fire damage.
2. A licensee relying on operator manual actions must meet all of
the following acceptance criteria:
(a) Analysis. The licensee shall prepare an analysis for each
operator manual action which demonstrates its feasibility and
reliability.
(1) The analysis must contain a postulated fire timeline showing
that there is sufficient time to travel to action locations and perform
actions required to achieve and maintain the plant in a hot shutdown
condition under the environmental conditions expected to be encountered
without jeopardizing the health and safety of the operator performing
the manual actions. The fire timeline shall extend from the time of
initial fire detection until the time when the ability to achieve and
maintain hot shutdown is reached, and shall include a time margin that
reasonably accounts for all important variables, including (i)
differences between the analyzed and actual conditions and (ii) human
performance uncertainties that may be encountered.
(2) The analysis must address the functionality of equipment or
cables that could be adversely affected by the fire or its effects but
still used to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.
(3) The analysis must identify all equipment required to accomplish
the operator manual action within the postulated timeline, including
(but not limited to) (i) all indications necessary to identify the need
for the operator manual actions, enable their performance, and verify
their successful accomplishment, and (ii) any necessary communications,
portable, and life support equipment.
(b) Procedures and training. Plant procedures must include each
operator manual action required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.
Each operator
[[Page 10905]]
must be appropriately trained on those procedures.
(c) Implementation. The licensee shall ensure that all systems and
equipment needed to accomplish each operator manual action are
available and readily accessible consistent with the analysis required
by paragraph 2(a). The number of operating shift personnel required to
perform the operator manual actions shall be on site at all times.
(d) Demonstration. Periodically, the licensee shall conduct
demonstrations using an established crew of operators to demonstrate
that operator manual actions required to achieve and maintain the plant
in a hot shutdown condition can be accomplished consistent with the
analysis in paragraph 2(a) of this section. The licensee may not rely
upon any operator manual action until it has been demonstrated to be
consistent with the analysis. The licensee shall take prompt corrective
action if any subsequent periodic demonstration indicates that the
operator manual actions can no longer be accomplished consistent with
the analysis.
These acceptance criteria for operator manual actions are intended
to assure the safe shutdown goals and objectives for operating reactors
as required in 10 CFR 50.48. The primary objective for safe shutdown is
to maintain fuel integrity (i.e., fuel design limits are not exceeded).
For alternative or dedicated shutdown capability, the reactor coolant
system process variables should be maintained within those predicted
for a loss of normal ac power and fission product boundary integrity
should not be affected.
The applications of these acceptance criteria are as follows.
First, the criteria are the means by which the NRC will establish
standards that provide a reasonable level of assurance that operator
manual actions will be satisfactorily and reliably performed to bring
the plant to a hot shutdown condition, thus protecting public health
and safety. Second, a standard set of acceptance criteria will permit
both the licensees and NRC to establish consistency as to what operator
manual actions will be allowed. Third, the criteria will provide the
parameters which both the licensees and NRC will use to conduct
evaluations and inspections in a thorough manner. The supporting basis
for each criterion is discussed in detail below.
The acceptance criteria in the proposed rule are structured to
ensure both feasibility and reliability of the operator manual actions.
To credit operator manual actions, the licensee must prove not only
that the actions can be successfully accomplished (are feasible), but
also that they can be done so repeatedly (are reliable). Central to the
approach is the preparation of an analysis that determines what actions
must be taken in order to reach a hot shutdown condition. This analysis
would also identify the time available (timeline) for successful
performance of such actions. A demonstration of the accomplished
operator manual actions within the established timeline verifies the
feasibility of such actions. In order to also achieve reliability of
the actions, the Commission is proposing a criterion for a time margin
needed to complete the actions because of potential variations in fire
characteristics, plant conditions, and human performance that the
demonstration cannot adequately address. This concept is further
described in the sections below.
Timeline Analysis
The Commission will require that a licensee perform an analysis to
determine the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions.
As part of the analysis, there shall be a fire timeline, which extends
from the initial fire detection to the achievement of maintainable hot
shutdown conditions, to define the time boundaries of the analysis for
the fire scenario in which the operator manual actions will be
performed. The analysis must identify all actions that must be
completed, the equipment needed, the number of people needed, the
communications equipment required, and the time available to perform
the actions before unsafe plant conditions occur (i.e., before
exceeding safe shutdown goals and objectives). The proposed rule has
more specific requirements on each of these aspects that are discussed
in subsequent sections of this notice. The Commission will require a
licensee to show that a sufficient amount of extra time would be
available for the required operator manual actions and that the process
for determining the time available for such actions adequately
addressed the potential variations in fire characteristics, plant
conditions, and human performance. This concept is referred to in this
statement as a ``time margin.''
Proper demonstration requires that the licensee meet all operator
manual action acceptance criteria other than Time Margin (this is
evaluated after all other criteria, including requirements in section
2(d), have been met) and show that at least one randomly-selected,
established crew can successfully perform the actions within an
acceptable time frame. For example, if there are questions about
whether operators can reach the locations where they must perform the
manual actions, these questions should be addressed to the extent
practicable during the demonstration. However, successful demonstration
does not fully determine reliability for the operator manual actions.
Additional factors must be considered to show that the actions can
be performed reliably under the variety of conditions that could occur
during a fire. For example, factors that the licensee may not be able
to recreate in the demonstrations could cause further delay under real
fire conditions (i.e., the demonstration would likely fall short of
actual fire situations). Furthermore, typical and expected variability
among individuals and crews could lead to variations in operator
performance. Finally, variations in the characteristics of the fire and
related plant conditions could alter the time available for the
operator actions.
In order to ensure that a particular action could be performed
reliably, licensees must show that a sufficient amount of extra time
(i.e., a time margin) would be available for the action and that the
process for determining the time available for the action adequately
addressed the potential variations in fire characteristics and plant
conditions. The time margin ensures that operator manual actions can be
performed reliably: (1) Through well-thought out demonstrations that
the actions are feasible, (2) by ensuring that there is extra time
available for given actions with respect to the fire scenario, and (3)
by adequately addressing all other related acceptance criteria.
The analysis should include realistically conservative scenarios,
and such variables as environment and human performance uncertainties
should be considered in the time margin. For example, a licensee may
perform a worst case demonstration that requires the operator to wear a
self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), if there is a reasonable
expectation that the operators will need to pass through a zone
containing smoke in order to reach the location where the operator
manual action is to be carried out.
Use of a time margin is an appropriate safety factor for ensuring
realistically reliable operator manual actions. The rule would require
the time margin to account for all important variables, including
differences between the analyzed and actual conditions and for human
performance uncertainties that may be encountered.
The factors necessitating the time margin are:
[[Page 10906]]
1. The time margin should account for what the licensee is not
likely to be able to recreate in the demonstration that could cause
further delay (i.e., where the demonstration falls short).
2. The time margin should account for the variability of fire and
related plant conditions.
3. The time margin should account for the variability in human
performance among individuals and between different crews and for the
effects of human-centered factors that could become relevant during
fire scenarios.
These factors are important considerations for the time margin for
the following reasons:
1. They address likely limitations of the demonstration.
2. The demonstration can replicate only a subset of all possible
fires and resulting variability in fire and plant conditions.
3. Some degree of human performance variability is to be expected,
some of which could further delay the times to perform the desired
actions during real fire situations.
In order to establish a standard to show time margin, it was
necessary to establish a time margin (or margins) for fire-related
operator manual actions to ensure that they would be reliably
successful. In other words, if the licensee can meet all of the
operator manual action acceptance criteria, which include demonstrating
that at least one randomly-selected, established crew can successfully
perform the actions, and show that the actions can be performed within
an acceptable time frame that allows for adequate time margin to cover
potential variations in plant conditions and human performance, then
the operator manual action rule would be met. For example, as long as
it can be shown that there is an ``X-percent'' time margin to perform
the particular operator manual action, plant damage or an undesirable
plant condition will still be avoided and all of the other criteria
have been met, then there is confidence to conclude that the action
will be performed reliably.
The establishment of an appropriate time margin requires a
supported technical basis. While the best technical basis for a time
margin would be empirical data from which it could be derived, a
database search was unable to find relevant data that could be used
directly for or generalized to the operator manual actions of interest.
To further develop this concept, the NRC convened an initial expert
panel to identify a time margin for inclusion in this proposed rule
statement for further stakeholder consideration and feedback.
The expert panel members concluded that a time margin factor of at
least 2 would ensure that the operator manual actions in response to
fire are sufficiently reliable. For example, if the operator manual
action can be shown typically to take less than 15 minutes, then at
least 30 minutes (15x2) should be available to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown. A time margin factor of at least 2 is assumed to absorb
delays that might be caused by the following set of factors (1) the
need to recover from or respond to unexpected difficulties or random
problems associated with instruments or other equipment, or
communication devices; (2) environmental and other effects that are not
easily replicated in a demonstration, such as radiation, smoke, toxic
gas effects, and increased noise levels; (3) limitations of the
demonstration to account for all possible fire locations that may lend
the need for such operator manual actions; (4) inability to show or
duplicate the operator manual actions because of safety considerations
while at power; and (5) individual operator performance factors, such
as physical size and strength, cognitive differences, time pressure,
and emotional responses. In addition, the time margin includes adequate
time for personnel to recover from any initial errors in conducting the
actions. The time margin concept could alternatively consist of a range
of multiplicative values. For example, instead of a single
multiplicative value of 2, perhaps a range of multiplicative values
(e.g., 2-4 times) could determine adequate time margin. This may be
appropriate where additional factors were identified that may influence
the timeline. These factors may be those unknown and not considered by
the expert elicitation panel and which may result in a lower or higher
multiplicative factor. The Commission can also foresee situations where
a licensee may be able to define a different multiplicative value for
different scenarios. For example, an operator manual action consisting
of a single action by one plant operator could have a different
multiplicative value than a scenario that involves more than one plant
operator or where several sequential actions are necessary.
As with the discussion of the range of multiplicative values above,
the time margin concept may have to include a minimum additive time
(predetermined minimum amount of time added to the demonstrated time)
necessary for certain situations. For example, the time in the
demonstration is shown to be short (e.g., <5 minutes for a single
operator manual action), a single multiplicative value of 2 is applied
resulting in an additional time of <5 minutes. There may be situations
where the resulting <5 minutes of margin may not be adequate to address
the factors that may cause a delay as identified above. In such
situations it may be more appropriate to apply a minimum additive time
(e.g., 10 minutes) to account for factors that may cause a delay with
the operator manual action.
Request for Comment 1: (Time Margin)
The Commission requests opinions specifically on the time margin
aspects because of stakeholder interest in this subject and the
Commission's desire to consider all stakeholders' input for this
important criterion.
Specifically, the Commission asks the following questions:
(A) Considering the factors for time margin discussed above
(including the conditional dependence on a worst-case demonstration
meeting all the other acceptance criteria), should the time margin
consist of a single multiplicative factor (e.g., 2 times), or a range
of multiplicative factors (e.g., 2-4 times)? Please provide a technical
basis for your proposed time frames or factors.
(B) If a range is appropriate, what should the range be and what
parameters or variables should be considered in determining which part
of the range is applicable in a given situation? Please provide a basis
for your proposed time frames or factors.
(C) Should there be a minimum additive time (e.g., 10 minutes) for
situations where the time in the demonstration is so short that a
multiplicative factor would not properly account for the required time
margin (e.g., a time in the demonstration of < 5 minutes). Please
provide a basis for your proposed time frames or factors.
(D) Are there other means of establishing margin (e.g., through
consideration of conservative assumptions in the thermal hydraulic
timeline)? Please provide a technical basis.
Environmental Factors
Paragraph 2(a)(1) of the proposed criteria requires that the fire
timeline include a time margin that accounts for differences between
the analyzed and actual conditions. Adverse environmental factors are
one area of concern that must be considered because they affect the
operator's mental or physical performance. The environmental factors
must be weighed with respect to the location where the operator manual
actions will be performed, as well as the access and egress routes to
and from this location.
[[Page 10907]]
Operators' performance may be impeded by their inability to reach the
required location and by the difficulty of performing the action in the
conditions existing at the required location. The environment along the
egress route after completion of the operator manual action must also
be considered to ensure personnel health and safety throughout. These
environmental factors are considered in the analysis via preparation
and planning thereby ensuring there is sufficient time to travel to the
location(s) and perform the action(s) required to achieve and maintain
the plant in a hot shutdown condition.
Equipment Performance
Paragraph 2(a)(2) of the criteria requires the analysis to address
the functionality of equipment or cables that could be adversely
affected by the fire but still used to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown. For example, operators may rely upon valves to achieve and
maintain hot shutdown conditions. If the functionality of the valves is
adversely affected by the fire then it may degrade or prevent the
performance of the required operator manual actions. As identified in
Information Notice 92-18 for motor-operated valves, bypassing thermal
overload protection devices (discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.106,
``Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated
Valves'' Rev. 1, ML 003740323) could jeopardize completion of the
safety function or cause degradation of other safety systems due to
sustained abnormal circuit currents that can arise from fire-induced
``hot shorts.'' Even if these overload protection devices are not
bypassed, hot shorts can cause loss of power to motor-operated valves
by tripping the devices. If an operator manual action requires the
manual manipulation of a depowered motor-operated valve, such fire-
induced damage could make the manipulation physically impossible.
Therefore, if equipment to be used during operator manual actions could
be affected by fire, the licensee must determine that the functionality
of that equipment will not be adversely affected.
Plant systems, structures and components (SSCs) are used to achieve
and maintain hot shutdown conditions. SSCs often require active
intervention, through either automatic or manual means, to perform
their required function. The analysis of the fire timeline must
identify all such SSCs needed to achieve maintainable hot shutdown
conditions from the time of initial fire detection, particularly those
that require operator manual actions to perform their hot shutdown
function and explain how active equipment will be operated. Diagnostic
indications relevant to the SSCs' safety function may be critical to
specific operator manual actions and interaction with this equipment.
Diagnostic indications are the alerting, information, control, and
feedback capability provided through instrumentation. They also provide
sufficient information that determines if and when these interfaces
must be effected. These indications would typically be needed to: (1)
Enable the operators to determine which manual actions are appropriate
for the fire scenario; (2) direct the personnel as to the proper
performance of the operator manual actions; and (3) provide the
necessary feedback to the operators verifying that the manual actions
have had their expected results. Diagnostic indications are considered
in the analysis via identification of the SSCs necessary to accomplish
the operator manual action and evaluation of their availability under
the fire and environmental conditions expected. Guidance on identifying
needed indication is provided as in paragraph c.2 of the draft
regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for Demonstrating the Feasibility
and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire.''
Communications Equipment
Paragraph 2(a)(3)(ii) of the proposed criteria requires the
analysis to identify all communications equipment necessary to
accomplish the operator manual actions. Communications equipment may be
needed to provide feedback between operators in the main control room
and personnel out in the plant to ensure that any activities requiring
coordination between them are clearly understood and correctly
accomplished. The unpredictability of fires can force staff to deviate
from planned activities, hence the need to consider constant and
effective communications. Communications may be needed in the
performance of sequential operator manual actions (where one action
must be completed before another can be started) and provide
verification that procedural steps have been accomplished, especially
those that must be conducted at remote locations. Communications must
be considered in the analysis by identifying the necessary
communications equipment and ensuring their availability to the plant
operators for the time needed to achieve and maintain hot shutdown. For
example, if portable radios are to be used for communications then the
analysis should list the equipment and confirm that the equipment can
be used in the plant areas (i.e., capable of receiving and transmitting
in the necessary plant areas) and are available for the time required
(e.g., battery power life has been considered for the time period
necessary). Such communications should be identified and addressed as
per paragraph c.2 of the draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for
Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual
Actions in Response to Fire.''
Portable Equipment
Paragraph 2(a)(3)(ii) of the proposed criteria requires the
analysis to identify all portable equipment necessary to accomplish the
operator manual actions. Portable equipment, especially tools such as
keys to open locked areas, ladders to reach high locations, torque
devices to turn valve handwheels, and electrical breaker rackout tools,
can be essential to access and manipulate SSCs to successfully
accomplish required operator manual actions. Similarly, life support
equipment, such as self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA), may
need to be worn to permit access to and egress from the locations where
the operator manual actions must be performed since the routes could be
negatively affected by fire effects, such as smoke, that propagate
beyond the fire-involved area. Portable equipment must be considered in
the analysis by identifying necessary equipment and ensuring their
availability to the plant operators during the time needed to achieve
and maintain hot shutdown. For example, if SCBA is necessary then the
analysis should list the equipment and confirm that the equipment can
be used in the plant areas (i.e., access and egress to tight areas are
not impeded by the use of SCBA) and are available for the time required
(e.g., portable bottle air supply provides sufficient time to perform
the action). Such equipment should be identified and addressed as per
paragraph c.2 of the draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for
Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual
Actions in Response to Fire.''
Procedures and Training
Paragraph 2(b) of the proposed criteria requires that all manual
actions be included in plant procedures, and that each operator
receives training on these manual actions. The role of written plant
procedures in the successful performance of operator manual actions is
three-fold: (1) Assist the operators in correctly diagnosing the type
of plant event that the fire may trigger, usually
[[Page 10908]]
in conjunction with indications, thereby permitting them to select the
appropriate operator manual actions (or prescribe actions to be taken
should a fire occur in a given fire area); (2) direct the operators to
the appropriate preventive and mitigative manual actions to place and
maintain the plant in a stable hot shutdown condition; and (3) minimize
the potential confusion that can arise from fire-induced conflicting
signals, including spurious actuations, thereby minimizing the
likelihood of personnel error during the required operator manual
actions. Written procedures should contain the steps to be performed,
how the operator manual actions are performed and the tools and
equipment needed to successfully perform the actions.
Training on these procedures serves three supporting functions: (1)
Establishes familiarity with the procedures, equipment, and potential
(simulated) conditions in an actual event; (2) provides the level of
knowledge and understanding necessary for the personnel performing the
operator manual actions to be well-prepared to handle departures from
the expected sequence of events; and (3) provides the personnel with
the opportunity to practice their response without exposure to adverse
conditions, thereby enhancing confidence that they can reliably perform
their duties in an actual event. Determining that operators are
appropriately trained on procedures entails establishing, implementing,
and maintaining a training program that incorporates the instructional
requirements necessary to provide qualified operators to perform the
manual actions. Licensees are already required to establish training
programs for licensed operator and nuclear plant personnel under 10 CFR
55.59 and 50.120, respectively. The procedures and training provided to
operators and nuclear plant personnel will ensure that the supporting
functions and roles discussed above can be met. Such procedures and
training should be identified and addressed as in paragraph c.2 of the
draft regulatory guide DG-1136, ``Guidance for Demonstrating the
Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to
Fire.'' The Commission expects plant procedures to be available at or
near the locations where the operator manual actions are to occur so
that they are easily accessible to the operators.
Implementation and Staffing
Paragraph 2(c) of the proposed criteria requires that equipment and
personnel necessary for feasible and reliable operator manual actions
must be readily available and accessible. The equipment is available
when its functionality is not adversely affected by the fire or its
effects. Accessible means that the personnel should be able to find and
reach the locations of the components and be able to manipulate the
components. Accessibility and availability of equipment must be
considered in the analysis by identifying necessary equipment, ensuring
operators are knowledgeable of equipment locations, determining that
accessibility of such equipment, and that the equipment will not be
adversely affected by a fire or its effects. For example, operators may
rely upon valves to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. If
the functionality of the valves is adversely affected by the fire or if
the valves are not accessible for manipulation then the functionality
of such valves may be degraded, thereby preventing the performance of
the required operator manual actions.
The intent of the staffing requirement is to ensure that qualified
personnel will be on site at all times such that hot shutdown
conditions can be achieved and maintained in the event of a fire. An
individual expected to perform the operator manual actions must not
have collateral duties, such as fire fighting or security, during the
evolution of the fire scenario. This individual should be exclusively
available for the performance of required operator manual actions.
Therefore, operating shift staffing levels should include enough
personnel on watch for the performance of any operator manual actions
that could arise as a result of a fire. The fire brigade would not be
expected to perform actions other than those associated with fire
fighting. Otherwise, the potential for interfering with either their
fire fighting activities or the operator manual actions could exist,
such that successful performance of one or the other, or both, could be
impaired. For example, during a fire, an individual who is part of the
five-person fire brigade could not perform the required operator manual
actions because that individual is expected to participate in the fire
fighting efforts.
Demonstration
The concepts of feasibility and reliability were examined under
Criterion 2(a) of section III.P in connection with the fire timeline
and time margin. Demonstration and time margin development complement
each other. Paragraph 2(d) of the proposed criteria requires
demonstration in order to establish the feasibility of operator manual
actions. The demonstration criterion provides reasonable assurance that
the operator manual actions can be performed in the analyzed time
period for a range of conceivable fire situations.
The use of such demonstrations is supported, for instance, by
NUREG-1764, ``Guidance for the Review of Changes to Human Actions'' and
NUREG-0711 ``Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model,'' cited in
NUREG-0800, Section 18.0 Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. NUREG-1764 states that ``* *
* [a] walk-through of the human actions under realistic conditions
should be performed * * * The scenario used should include any
complicating factors that are expected to affect the crews['] ability
to perform the human actions * * *'' NUREG-0711 states that ``* * * an
integrated system design (i.e., hardware, software, and personnel
elements) is evaluated using performance-based tests * * * Plant
personnel should perform operational events using a simulator or other
suitable representation of the system to determine its adequacy to
support safety operations * * *''
There are several important elements to the demonstration
criterion. First, licensees may take credit for operator manual actions
only after a successful demonstration. To continue taking credit for
operator manual actions, licensees must complete demonstrations such
that all operating crews successfully perform the coordinated sets of
operator manual actions taken as a result of a fire in a specific fire
area. Periodic demonstrations, at a frequency consistent with that
established by the licensee in compliance with 10 CFR 50.120, provide
valuable training and experience for licensee personnel and also serve
to verify that plant configuration and conditions (access, egress,
etc.) have not changed over time such that the operator manual actions
can no longer be accomplished in accordance with the analysis performed
pursuant to paragraph III.P.2(a). Should a licensee be unable to
successfully complete a subsequent demonstration, the Commission
expects prompt corrective action to retrain the operators, or to modify
the operator manual actions, or modify the plant conditions so that the
demonstration yields successful results.
Second, the demonstration verifies an action can be completed
within the analyzed fire timeline. This can be done utilizing an
established crew of operators to show in the demonstration that
operator manual actions can be accomplished to achieve and maintain
[[Page 10909]]
hot shutdown for the entire fire scenario. This serves as a benchmark
for the development of a time margin, which is an application of the
reliability concept. Another means of establishing time margin is
through consideration of conservative assumptions in the thermal-
hydraulic timeline (e.g., end-state).
Third, the demonstration must be completed by an established crew.
An established crew is a group of operators that normally work as a
team during any one shift. Conducting the demonstration with an
established crew instead of a crew assembled just for the demonstration
will provide a more valid basis for the fire timeline determination, as
well as provide the established crew with the training necessary to
work as a team.
Fourth, operator manual actions may not be credited until those
actions have been shown in the demonstrations to be feasible by
satisfying all the acceptance criteria. The demonstration should ensure
that all relevant aspects of the criteria are met and that important
characteristics of those criteria are included in the demonstration to
the extent possible. For example, environmental conditions must be
considered and should be simulated where possible. This may include,
but is not limited to, such considerations as expected lighting levels,
protective clothing, and noise levels. This is important because it
validates the demonstration by conducting it under conditions that are
as realistic as possible.
Fifth, prompt corrective actions are required if any demonstration
determines that the operator manual action may not be accomplished
consistent with the analysis. Prompt corrective actions should be
implemented at the first available opportunity consistent with the
guidelines of Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1, Information to
Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of
Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions.
As with training, the demonstration provides the crew with
practical experience. All elements of the fire scenario, including the
use of equipment and procedures, adequacy of staffing levels, and
response to indications, should be integrated into the demonstration to
develop this benchmark. In this way, any complexities, such as the
number of required operator manual actions and their dependence upon
one another, are evaluated and identified for appropriate consideration
in the development of the time margin. Failure of an initial
demonstration to show that the operator manual actions can be
accomplished consistent with the analysis indicates that the manual
actions are not feasible. In such cases, the licensee could modify the
actions (e.g., different access/egress routes, redeployment of critical
equipment by placing it at the location where the operator manual
actions will be performed vs. carrying it to that location), retrain
the crew, such that a new demonstration satisfies the analysis, or the
licensee could conclude that operator manual actions are not feasible
and opt to comply with paragraph III.G.2.
C. Response to Stakeholder Comments on Operator Manual Action
Acceptance Criteria
As part of the development of this proposed rule, the NRC
considered stakeholder comments that provided additional insights. A
number of stakeholder comments were made in response to the draft
acceptance criteria intended for use in the interim enforcement
discretion policy published for comment (68 FR 66501 and 69730) and in
a subsequent public meeting on June 23, 2004. The comments on these
criteria involved the demonstration using the same personnel/crews who
are required to perform the manual actions during the fire; the
application of plant procedures; the application of a fire detection
and suppression system; and the application of operator manual actions
criteria in all provisions of paragraph III.G.
Demonstration Criterion
A number of public comments indicated that the requirement for the
demonstration to use ``the same personnel/crews who will be required to
perform the actions during the fire'' is unnecessarily restrictive. The
Commission agrees that requiring all crews to demonstrate performance
under all conditions is unnecessarily restrictive. The intent is to
provide reasonable assurance that whatever crew is on duty at the time
of a fire can reliably perform the required actions, allowing for
variabilities and uncertainties. The Commission considers it sufficient
that an established crew (i.e., one that typically works as a team)
shows the ability to perform the required operator manual actions
through documented demonstration. This demonstration should show that
the crew can successfully perform all operator manual actions required
by the entire fire scenario within the analyzed fire timeline. The
demonstration should be part of the periodic operator training. To
reasonably assure that the remaining crews (i.e., the ones that receive
training but do not perform the demonstration during a particular
training cycle) can reliably perform the actions, the ``time margin''
addressed in the analysis criterion is used to offset the variability
among crews. In this way, the demonstration by the established crew
with an appropriate margin, will reasonably assure that any of the
crews could likewise perform the required actions. Another means of
determining margin is through consideration of conservative assumptions
in the thermal-hydraulic timeline (e.g., end-state).
Procedural Guidance vs. Guidance
A number of public comments suggested that the phrase ``procedural
guidance'' be replaced by ``guidance'' (e.g., pre-fire plan). The
Commission considers this term insufficient to provide feasible and
reliable operator manual actions. In fact, the Commission has
strengthened the wording from the original ``procedural guidance'' to
``plant procedures'' to reflect the need for formal written steps.
Typically, plant operators should be capable of performing noncomplex
manual actions without detailed instructions. However, there are fire
scenarios which could conceivably be atypical such that what would
``normally'' be non-complex could prove to be difficult in an actual
situation. The reading of procedures from the control room to direct
remote activities could be impeded by communication difficulties or
other control room activities. In addition, operators who perform
actions outside the control room may require immediate feedback from
the control room, and vice versa, to determine if certain actions have
produced the intended results. The Commission expects plant procedures
to be available at or near the locations where the operator manual
actions are to occur so that they are easily accessible to the
operators.
Need for Detection and Suppression Where Fire Occurs
There appeared to be some confusion on the part of a few commenters
regarding where fire detection and automatic suppression would be
required in conjunction with the addition of the option for operator
manual actions in complying with paragraph III.G.2. Some thought they
would be required in the areas where the operator manual actions would
occur. The proposed requirement for fire detectors and an automatic
fire suppression system applies only to the area where the fire occurs,
not to the
[[Page 10910]]
area(s) where the operator manual actions will take place.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Only in the presumably rare case where the operator manual
actions would also occur in the same fire area as the fire itself
would fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system have
to be installed ``in the area where the operator manual actions are
taken'' for these operator manual actions to receive credit. This is
envisioned only if a very large fire area experiences a very
localized fire such that the fire effects do not preclude access to,
egress from, and operator manual actions in, a distant location
within the very large area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few commenters questioned whether the requirement for fire
detection and automatic suppression installed in the area where the
fire occurs should accompany the proposed compliance option for
operator manual actions, and why this could not be left to the
discretion of the licensees and review by the NRC, depending on the
specific conditions to be encountered in that fire area. As discussed
in the staff's proposed Appendix R, dated May 29, 1980, protective
features shall be provided for fire areas that contain cables or
equipment of redundant systems important to achieving and maintaining
safe shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one means of achieving
said conditions survives postulated fires. The protective features may
consist of a combination of automatic and manual fire suppression
capability, fire propagation retardants, physical separation, partial
fire barriers, or alternative shutdown capability independent of the
room. The proposed operator manual action option in conjunction with
fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system is consistent
with the requirement of protective features and maintains a similar
defense-in-depth concept as with a 1-hr passive fire barrier or a 20-ft
separation with no intervening combustibles.
The paragraph III.G.2 compliance option of a 3-hr passive fire
barrier requires no fire detection or automatic suppression to be
installed in the area where the fire occurs. To consider the option for
operator manual actions as providing reasonable assurance at a level
comparable to this option, one must be convinced that the
implementation of operator manual actions by itself provides a
sufficient level of defense-in-depth without the additional level of
protection provided by fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression
system. The reason that the 3-hr barrier was ``exempted'' from the
additional need for fire detection and automatic suppression was the
prevalent acknowledgment that a fire at a nuclear power plant lasting
longer than three hours, without intervention, is highly unlikely, if
not incredible. Therefore, unlike a 1-hr barrier or a 20-ft separation
without intervening combustibles, this compliance option was considered
to be sufficient without the additional level of defense-in-depth
provided by the fire detection and automatic suppression. Experience in
both the nuclear and non-nuclear industry clearly indicates that human
reliability is not at a level approaching that provided by a 3-hr
barrier as the sole level of defense-in-depth. Therefore, without
substantial additional justification such as can be provided by using
the risk-informed, performance-based option in the Fire Protection
Regulation at 10 CFR 50.48(c), it is not reasonable to consider the
implementation of operator manual actions without fire detection and
automatic suppression as a sufficient compliance option to paragraph
III.G.2.
A few commenters indicated that requiring fire detection and
automatic suppression in conjunction with operator manual actions if
creditable under III.G.2 ``does not enhance the ability of the operator
to perform a manual action in another area of the plant that is
unaffected by the fire * * * [Furthermore], this new ``requirement'' is
also more severe than Appendix R, Section III.G.3 because III.G.3 only
requires a ``fixed'' suppression system, either manual or automatic,
but does not require an ``automatic'' suppression system * * * ''
With regard to the first claim, requiring fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system in the fire area under consideration
would enhance the ability of the operator to achieve and maintain safe
shutdown from an unaffected area. The activation of detection and
automatic suppression as indicated in the staff's statements of
consideration for Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 (as amended on December
1, 1980; 45 FR 79409) would ensure prompt and effective application of
suppressant to a fire that could endanger safe shutdown capability. As
a result, the time it takes a fire to adversely affect the licensee's
ability to achieve and maintain a safe reactor shutdown may be
extended, thereby enhancing the licensee's ability to perform feasible
and reliable operator manual actions.
While a proposed requirement of automatic suppression for operator
manual actions under paragraph III.G.2 may appear to be more severe
than that of fixed suppression under paragraph III.G.3, the Commission
believes that this difference is minor in practicality. Part 50,
Paragraph 48(a)(1), Fire Protection, of 10 CFR states that ``each
operating nuclear power plant must have a fire protection plan that
satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part.'' Appendix A,
Criterion 3, Fire Protection, states that ``Fire detection and fighting
systems of appropriate capacity and capability shall be provided and
designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures,
systems, and components important to safety.'' If a non-water, fixed
suppression system (i.e., a gaseous suppression system) is used to
comply with III.G.3, the governing standards from the NFPA essentially
dictate that the system be automatic, unless an exception is
granted.\6\ If a fixed water system is used to comply with III.G.3, it
can be non-automatic (i.e., manually activated). However, the
requirement that it be ``fixed'' means that its infrastructure is
essentially the same as an automatic system, such that the practical
difference between automatic and fixed suppression in areas III.G.2 and
III.G.3 is minimal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems,
Section 1-8.1.1, requires use of ``automatic detection and automatic
actuation,'' with the exception that ``manual-only actuation can be
used if acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction [the NRC]
where automatic release could result in an increased risk.'' NFPA
12A, Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems, Section 2-
3.1.1, similarly states that ``automatic detection and automatic
actuation shall be used,'' with a similar exception that ``manual-
only actuation shall be permitted to be used if acceptable to the
authority having jurisdiction [again, the NRC].'' NFPA 2001,
Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, Section 2-3.1.1,
parallels NFPA 12A exactly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in both paragraphs III.G.2 and III.G.3, the requirement
for fire detection and suppression (automatic or fixed) provides a
degree of ``defense-in-depth'' to the passive fire protection features
already in place (except in the case of the 3-hr fire barrier, where
this is deemed sufficient without detection or suppression). Defense-
in-depth is a recognized cornerstone in NRC policy to protect the
public health and safety. Therefore, maintaining defense-in-depth is
recognized as providing safety benefit in and of itself.
When the NRC proposed the original ``Fire Protection Program for
Nuclear Power Plants Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,'' on May 29,
1980 (45 FR 36082), it specified that ``the following minimum fire
protective features shall be provided: (a) An early warning detection
system; (b) manual fire suppression capability; and (c) fixed fire
suppression systems and alternative shutdown capability as shown on
Table 1.'' In Table 1, the need for fixed fire suppression systems,
automatic or manual, was based on four factors: (1) Does the fire/water
disable normal shutdown capability; (2) is shutdown
[[Page 10911]]
available from the control room; (3) is shutdown required from an
alternate panel (if not available in the control room); and (4) is the
access for manual fire fighting ``good'' or ``poor.'' A fixed fire
suppression system was required whenever shutdown had to be performed
at an alternate panel, except if (a) the only in-situ combustible was
cable insulation; (b) measures were provided to retard propagation; and
(c) separation between redundant systems was at least 10 feet
horizontal and vertical of clean air space. These requirements were
enhanced when they subsequently became paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of section
III.G in the final rule. It should be noted that even during the
original rulemaking for Appendix R, the need for at least fixed fire
suppression was recognized when shutdown operations would consist of
ex-control room operator manual actions (which include those performed
at an alternate panel).
In developing Appendix R, section III.G, the NRC originally
considered fire detection and automatic suppression, if not as the
primary level of defense-in-depth, at least as an equal level of
defense-in-depth in conjunction with fire-retardant coatings, and
subsequently their successors, fire barriers and/or physical
separation, as stated in the ``Statements of Consideration, 10 CFR part
50, Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Power Plants,''
(November 19, 1980, 45 FR 76602).
``* * * [T]he NRC staff has indicated to the Commission that
there are requirements * * * in which the protection afforded by
Appendix R over and above that previously accepted, may be
desirable. The Commission has decided that these requirements should
be retroactively applied to all facilities * * * to take fully into
account the increased knowledge and experience developed on fire
protection matters over the last several years. The first of these
[requirements] * * * is related to fire protection features for
ensuring that systems and associated circuits used to achieve and
maintain a safe shutdown are free from fire damage. Appendix A to
BTP CMEB 9.5-1 permits a combination of fire-retardant coatings and
fire detection and suppression systems without specifying a physical
separation distance to protect redundant systems, and such
arrangements were accepted in some early fire protection reviews. As
a result of some separate effects tests, the staff changed its
position on this configuration, and subsequent plans have been
required to provide additional protection in the form of fire
barriers or substantial physical separation for safe shutdown
systems. No credit for such coatings as fire barriers is allowed by
Section III.G of Appendix R.''
The NRC originally characterized fire-retardant coatings, and
subsequently their successors, fire barriers and/or physical
separation, as ``additional,'' implying that detection and suppression
were intended to be primary. The requirement that detection and
suppression (automatic) be included with Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2,
operator manual actions is not only consistent with the corresponding
options currently there, but also is consistent with NRC's original
intent in developing Appendix R, section III.G.
The risk-informed, performance-based option in 10 CFR 50.48(c) is
available to those licensees who wish to demonstrate that operator
manual actions in particular situations provide a reasonable assurance
that the public health and safety can be maintained without fire
detection or automatic suppression. Although the exemption process is
available for cases that can be justified under Sec. 50.12, the
Commission considers the use of the option proposed by this rulemaking
or the risk-informed, performance-based option currently provided in 10
CFR 50.48(c) more desirable in order to minimize the need for future
exemption requests for addressing operator manual actions.
Request for Comment 2
After considering the technical implications and historical
background of the proposed criteria as discussed above, the Commission
has tentatively decided that the proposed operator manual actions
rulemaking should require fire detectors and an automatic fire
suppression system in the fire area to permit operator manual actions
as a compliance option under paragraph III.G.2, provided the acceptance
criteria delineated in a new paragraph III.P are satisfied. The basis
for the requirement is discussed above. However, because of the
stakeholder interest in this subject, the Commission is asking for
specific feedback and opinions from stakeholders on requiring an
automatic versus fixed fire suppression system in the fire area.
The Commission asks the following specific question:
Under the proposed option of using operator manual actions under
III.G.2.c-1, when redundant trains are located in the same fire area,
should the requirement for a suppression system in the fire area be
automatic or fixed? An automatic suppression system is required in
III.G.2(b) and (c). However, a fixed system is specified in III.G.3.
Provide the rationale for why requiring fixed or automatic suppression
would provide the appropriate level of protection in the proposed
paragraph III.G.2(C-1).
Application of Operator Manual Actions Acceptance Criteria to
Paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3
The proposed operator manual actions rulemaking would modify
requirements in paragraph III.G.2 to permit operator manual actions as
a compliance option under this paragraph, provided the acceptance
criteria delineated in a new paragraph III.P are satisfied. The
proposed rule language would not apply to paragraphs III.G.1 or
III.G.3, although the term ``operator manual actions'' may be construed
as applicable to the same types of actions taken under these
paragraphs. This issue has been raised by stakeholders during
discussions conducted thus far, and therefore, the Commission is
providing background information about this subject and a specific
request for comment.
Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, section III.G.1 requires fire protection
features capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of systems
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either
the control room or emergency control station(s) \7\ is free of fire
damage. The NRC considers redundant trains located in completely
separate fire areas to comply with III.G.1. Paragraph III.G.1 also
allows a licensee to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from
either the control room or emergency control station(s).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189 Fire Protection for Operating
Reactors defines an ``emergency control station'' as a ``location
outside the MCR where actions are taken by operations personnel to
manipulate plant systems and controls to achieve safe shutdown of
the reactor.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain
hot shutdown conditions are located in the same fire area, paragraph
III.G.2. requires one of three means to ensure that one of the trains
is free of fire damage. Through this rulemaking, the Commission is
proposing to add a fourth means.
Where the protection of systems required to function properly for
hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of paragraph III.G.2, or
where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown may be
subject to damage as a result of fire suppression activities or the
inadvertent actuation of fire suppression systems, paragraph III.G.3
requires that an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be
provided and must be independent of cables, systems or components in
the area, room, or zone under consideration. In addition, paragraph
III.G.3 further requires that
[[Page 10912]]
fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system must be installed in
the area, room, or zone under consideration. Specific criteria for
implementing this capability are contained in Appendix R, paragraph
III.L, ``alternative and dedicated shutdown capability,'' including
such features as the performance goals for specific functions (e.g.,
maintaining RCS process variables within those predicted for a loss of
normal AC power, with makeup function capable of maintaining the
reactor coolant level above the top of the core for BWRs and within
level of pressurizer indication for PWRs), and to achieve cold shutdown
within 72 hours.
Feedback from the stakeholders on the Federal Register Notice (68
FR 66501; November 26, 2003) made clear that some stakeholders believe
that acceptance criteria for operator manual actions should be expanded
to other provisions of paragraph III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50.
For example, one commenter stated that ``[R]ather than changing
Appendix R, Section III.G.2, we recommend that the NRC issue generic
industry guidance clarifying that manual actions are permissible to
satisfy all subsections of Appendix R, Section III.G, and that manually
operating equipment locally satisfies the ``emergency control
stations'' provision of Appendix R, Section III.G.1. This approach
maintains maximum consistency with existing NRC guidance and avoids the
creation of a separate set of standards that are only applicable to
``III.G.2'' manual actions. Otherwise, establishing criteria
specifically applicable to Appendix R, Section III.G.2, will lead to
new disputes when manual actions previously credited to satisfy
Sections III.G.1 and III.G.3 are reviewed during the inspection
process.''
Another commenter stated that ``This [sic--These] proposed interim
acceptance criteria should state NRC's current expectations for
feasibility of all manual actions. This maintains the maximum
consistency with existing NRC guidance, and avoids the creation of a
separate set of standards only applicable to ``III.G.2'' manual
actions. Establishing criteria specifically applicable to ``III.G.2
manual actions'' will lead to unnecessary confusion about whether an
action is a ``III.G.1.a action'' or a ``III.G.2 action''.
In addition to the written public comments, the NRC received
comments during a June 23, 2004, Category 3 public meeting in
Rockville, Maryland discussing application of operator manual actions
criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3. During this meeting the
industry stated that it will conduct a survey of licensees shortly
following issuance of the proposed rule to determine their position and
consensus on the application of operator manual action criteria to 10
CFR part 50, Appendix R, paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3.
There were two issues identified by stakeholders relative to
operator manual actions. The first was specific operator manual actions
within individual paragraphs III.G.1, III.G.2, and III.G.3. The second
was the applicability of the proposed operator manual actions
acceptance criteria to all provisions of paragraph III.G.
Operator manual actions, as currently outlined in the proposed
rule, would be used as an additional option to satisfy paragraph
III.G.2 requirements. However, based on stakeholder comments, the NRC
is asking for feedback from stakeholders on the advantages and
disadvantages of also applying operator manual action acceptance
criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3.
The NRC believes that there are technical and backfit
considerations associated with expanding the applicability of operator
manual action acceptance criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3.
A III.G.3--compliant Fire Area contains redundant trains of
shutdown equipment or cables and one train has not been ensured to
remain free of fire damage (per III.G.2 criteria), or redundant trains
are vulnerable to damage as a result of fire suppression activities or
the inadvertent actuation of fire suppression systems. As noted,
paragraph III.L contains specific provisions concerning this alternate
or dedicated shutdown capability. For instance, it contains criteria
such as III.L.3 ``Procedures shall be in effect * * *,'' and III.L.4
``The number of operating shift personnel * * * required to operate
such equipment shall be on site at all times.'' However, they are not
as comprehensive as the proposed acceptance criteria in paragraph
III.P. The NRC believes that if it applied the proposed acceptance
criteria in paragraph III.P to paragraph III.G.3, it may be necessary
to modify paragraph III.L.
In addition, the NRC believes that operator manual actions
previously approved for paragraph III.G.3 would need to be revisited in
order to ensure that they satisfy the acceptance criteria as proposed
for paragraph III.G.2.
Applying the same new acceptance criteria to all fire protection
manual actions in paragraph III.G may require a generic backfit
analysis since the current rule allows the use of manual actions at
emergency control stations in III.G.1 with no codified acceptance
criteria and in III.G.3 with less specific acceptance criteria. Section
50.109(a)(3) provides the standard for a backfit analysis that must
show ``a substantial increase in the overall protection * * * and that
the direct and indirect costs of implementation * * * are justified in
view of this increased protection.'' The extent of licensees' usage of
manual actions is highly plant specific and the associated costs and
benefits of backfitting are therefore difficult to quantify.
Furthermore, applying the acceptance criteria to all paragraph III.G
manual actions could invalidate the use of some existing manual
actions. The subsequent hardware/fire barrier/program modifications
that would then be needed could be very expensive. Thus, value-impact
analyses in many cases would probably show that backfitting is not
cost-beneficial.
Alternatively, if a generic analysis cannot justify the backfit
under 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3), the NRC may be able to justify the
backfitting as necessary for ``adequate protection'' under 10 CFR
50.109(a)(4)(ii). Recent inspection experience has not shown major
issues with respect to the use of operator manual actions, thus, not
providing significant support to justify that the backfit is needed for
adequate protection. Further, NRC inspections of potentially risk-
significant (``greater than green'') findings on such manual actions
are already handled by the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) corrective
action program or are evaluated as plant-specific backfits, as
applicable.
Regardless of the applicable section under 10 CFR 50.109, a backfit
may ultimately enhance safety, as a result of a consistent set of
rules. However, backfitting the operator manual actions' acceptance
criteria to all plants may cause plants with existing operator manual
actions previously approved under a different set of criteria to
resubmit exemption requests for staff review and approval.
Applying new acceptance criteria on a forward-fit basis for
operator manual actions under III.G.3 might be a means of addressing
this backfit concern. Under this approach, application of the new
acceptance criteria to III.G.3 would apply to operator manual actions
that resulted from future licensing basis changes after the effective
date of the new rule. The new acceptance criteria would thus apply to
all III.G.2 operator manual actions, but to only a small percentage of
the manual actions credited under III.G.3. This approach,
[[Page 10913]]
however, may increase the regulatory complexity and burden associated
with fire protection inspections and further complicate the fire
protection licensing basis of each facility.
Applying the new acceptance criteria to all operator manual actions
in III.G.2 and III.G.3, would make fire protection implementation and
inspections more consistent, reliable and predictable. However, the NRC
also notes that the existing requirements vary among plants for several
reasons; for example, post-1979 plants were not specifically licensed
to Appendix R, and thus these provisions would not apply to them absent
other regulatory action, which would tend to offset the possible
consistency gain.
Request for Comment 3
After considering a number of technical and regulatory
implications, the Commission has tentatively decided to limit the
applicability of this proposed rule on operator manual actions to
paragraph III.G.2. However, because of the stakeholder interest in this
subject, the Commission is also asking for specific feedback and
opinions from stakeholders on applying operator manual actions
acceptance criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3. Depending on the
comments received, the Commission may extend application of the
criteria to paragraphs III.G.1 and III.G.3.
The Commission asks the following specific question:
Should the operator manual action acceptance criteria developed for
III.G.2 also be applied to operator manual actions for III.G.1 and
III.G.3? Are there advantages or disadvantages not noted by the
Commission that should be considered? Please provide a discussion
outlining the basis for your response taking into account the
considerations outlined in the supplementary information section of
this document.
IV. Interim Enforcement Discretion Policy
In SECY-03-0100, ``Rulemaking Plan on Post-Fire Operator Manual
Actions,'' dated June 17, 2003, the NRC staff recommended development
of an interim enforcement policy relying on preliminary acceptance
criteria for manual actions. The staff proposed this strategy based on
a belief that interim acceptance criteria could be developed that would
be consistent with the manual actions acceptance criteria in the final
rule. The Commission had previously approved a similar enforcement
discretion policy related to a fitness-for-duty proposed rulemaking. In
an SRM dated September 12, 2003, the Commission approved the staff's
recommendation.
In March 1998, the NRC issued EGM 98-02, ``Enforcement Guidance
Memorandum--Disposition of Violations of Appendix R, Sections III.G and
III.L Regarding Circuit Failures,'' that provides enforcement guidance
for issues related to fire-induced circuit failures, which encompasses
the vast majority of manual actions as compensatory measures to satisfy
the regulatory requirements. This EGM was developed based on an
apparent widespread misunderstanding of the requirements on the part of
licensees and remains in effect until December 31, 2005. The EGM
provides guidance for disposition of noncompliances involving fire-
induced circuit failures, which could prevent operation or cause
maloperation of equipment needed to achieve and maintain post-fire safe
shutdown. Among the enforcement conditions, discretion will be given
for cases where licensees do not dispute that a violation of regulatory
requirements has occurred with respect to a nonconformance and that
licensees take prompt compensatory actions and also take corrective
action within a reasonable time. The expectations of this EGM have been
incorporated into the current NRC Enforcement Manual. In addition, the
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued a revised Inspection
Procedure (IP) 71111.05 in March 2003 incorporating interim operator
manual actions acceptance criteria. The inspection procedure provides
guidance to assess and ensure that plant specific operator manual
actions meet the interim acceptance criteria and that corrective
actions taken by the plants will achieve and maintain safe shutdown
condition.
On November 26, 2003 (68 FR 66501), the NRC staff published a
Federal Register notice soliciting public comments on specific
acceptance criteria for operator manual actions to be considered for
use in developing an interim enforcement discretion policy for post-
fire operator manual actions. In addition, as part of the proposed rule
development, the staff has had numerous interactions with industry and
public stakeholders to discuss rule requirements and the more developed
operator manual actions acceptance criteria. Based on these meetings
and comments in response to the November 26, 2003, Federal Register
notice, the Commission believes that the proposed rule's acceptance
criteria and detection and suppression requirements are still evolving,
such that the new interim enforcement guidance developed in conjunction
with the proposed rule may not be consistent with the requirements
specified in the final rule.
The current applications of EGM 98-02 and IP 71111.05 are effective
to ensure and maintain the overall plant safety by licensees through
the use of adequate and appropriate compensatory measures in the form
of operator manual actions implemented under the licensee's Fire
Protection Program. Manual actions that fail to meet the criteria in
the inspection procedure are not considered to be feasible or to be
adequate compensatory measures. Such manual actions will result in the
non-compliance being entered into the enforcement process. The new
interim enforcement policy for the post-fire operator manual actions
would utilize a disputed set of acceptance criteria and trigger
additional reviews (by licensees and inspectors) of past findings, with
the prospect of a third review being necessary upon issuance of the
final rule. Issuing such an enforcement discretion policy at this time
could also have the unintended consequence of preempting the rulemaking
process without a clear safety benefit.
Based on the above, the Commission believes that the continued use
of the current enforcement discretion policy of EGM 98-02 and the
guidance in IP 71111.05 is sufficient in the interim and that a
revision of the existing policy or development of additional policy to
include specific operator manual actions acceptance criteria is not
warranted.
V. Section-by-Section Analysis of Substantive Changes
Part 50, Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2. Add an ``or'' at the end of
the paragraph c. The change is necessary for the introduction of a new
option that recognizes operator manual actions as an alternative method
to satisfy the requirements set forth in paragraph III.G.2.
Part 50, Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2. Add paragraph c-1,
``Operator actions that satisfy the acceptance criteria in paragraph
III.P. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression
system shall be installed in the fire area.'' This paragraph would
codify use of operator manual actions in conjunction with fire
detectors and an automatic suppression system installed in the fire
area as an additional alternative compliance method. The licensees
implementing this voluntary alternative or any of the existing
alternatives currently set forth in this paragraph would provide
reasonable assurance that at least one method for achieving and
maintaining hot shutdown condition would remain
[[Page 10914]]
available during and after a postulated fire anywhere in the plant.
This paragraph numbering was chosen to preserve the numbering of
subsequent requirements within paragraph III.G.2.
Part 50, Appendix R. Add paragraph III.P [Acceptance Criteria for
Operator Manual Actions]. The new paragraph P would define operator
manual actions and set forth the required acceptance criteria which
must be met before a licensee may use operator manual actions to comply
with paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R.
Proposed paragraph III.P.1 [Definition]. Paragraph III.P.1 adds a
definition for operator manual actions.
Proposed paragraph III.P.2. Paragraph III.P.2 sets forth the
requirements and acceptance criteria for relying on operator manual
actions.
Proposed paragraph III.P.2.a requires that an analysis be performed
for operator manual actions and that the feasibility and reliability of
these actions be demonstrated. The analysis must also address the fire
timeline and identify all manual actions that must be completed; the
equipment needed; the number of operators needed; the communication
equipment needed; and the time available, including time margin, for
the operators to perform the actions before unsafe plant conditions
occur.
Proposed paragraph III.P.2.b contains requirements for plant
procedures that must include each operator manual action required to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown. It also includes operator training
requirements for those procedures.
Proposed paragraph III.P.2.c contains requirements that systems and
equipment needed to accomplish operator manual actions are available
and equipment is readily accessible consistent with the analysis
required by subparagraph III.P.2(a). It also includes a requirement
that the number of operating shift personnel required to perform the
operator manual actions must be on site at all times.
Proposed paragraph III.P.2.d contains requirements for periodic
demonstrations of the operator manual actions and corrective actions.
VI. Plain Language
A June 1, 1988, presidential memorandum entitled ``Plain Language
in Government Writing'' directed that the Government's writing be in
plain language. This memorandum was published on June 10, 1998 (63 FRN
31883). In compliance with this directive, editorial changes have been
made in the proposed revision to improve the organization and
readability of the existing language of the paragraph being revised.
These types of changes are not discussed further in this document. The
NRC requests comments on the proposed rule specifically with respect to
the clarity and readability of the language used. Comments should be
sent to the address listed under the ADDRESSES heading of the preamble.
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Advancement and Transfer Act of 1995, Pub.
L. 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies,
unless the use of such standards is inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical. The NRC is aware of the guidance on operator
manual actions contained in ANSI/ANS Standard 58.8 (1994), ``Time
Response Design Criteria for Safety-Related Operator Actions.'' This
standard contains criteria that establish time requirements for use in
the design of safety-related systems for nuclear power plants. The
objective of the criteria is to determine whether sufficient time
exists for operators to perform the required operator manual actions to
operate safety-related systems or whether automatic actuation is
required. The scope of the standard is ``limited to safety-related
operator actions associated with design basis events (DBEs) that result
in a reactor trip and is required to be analyzed in safety analysis
reports (SARs).'' The NRC considers this industry consensus standard
relevant to the proposed rulemaking, but not acceptable as a
replacement for it. Operator manual actions performed for the purpose
of fire protection are beyond the intended application of this
standard. However, the principles and methods contained in the standard
may be adaptable to the proposed rulemaking and have been considered as
part of the NRC's effort to develop generic operator manual actions
acceptance criteria.
The NRC is further aware of draft guidance for review of license
amendment requests that contain risk-important human actions. The NRC
staff issued NUREG-1764, ``Guidance for the Review of Changes to Human
Actions,'' as a draft report for public comment with the comment period
closing on March 31, 2003. This NUREG proposes a risk-informed
methodology for the review of the human performance aspects of
licensees' proposed changes to plant systems and operations in license
amendment requests. In addition to using risk insights to help the
staff determine the level of regulatory review expended on licensees'
submittals relying on human actions, the NUREG provides deterministic
review criteria for evaluating the acceptability of human actions
proposed by licensees.
The NRC notes that a separate rulemaking for 10 CFR 50.48(c),
``National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805,'' has
recently been completed which permits nuclear power plant licensees to
develop a risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program
consistent with voluntary consensus standard NFPA 805, ``Performance-
Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric
Generating Plants.'' Appendix B of NFPA 805 specifies a method for
assessing the feasibility of operator manual actions. The NRC believes
that licensees who choose to implement the NFPA 805 approach could
alternatively, with appropriate analysis and documentation, use it to
justify the acceptability of certain operator manual actions in their
fire protection programs.
In preparing the proposed rule, the NRC considered the
applicability of the risk-informed approach and the deterministic
review criteria presented in NUREG-1764 and Appendix B of NFPA 805 to
help refine the regulatory requirements and the implementation
guidance. The NRC is not aware of any other consensus standard that
could be adopted to provide guidance or criteria for the use of
operator manual actions, but will consider using an alternative
standard if one is identified during the rulemaking process.
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Environmental
Assessment
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment. Therefore, an environmental impact statement is not
required. The basis for this determination is as follows:
This action would establish regulations that allow nuclear power
plant licensees to use manual actions by plant operators as an
alternative method to achieve hot shutdown conditions in the event of
fires in certain plant areas, provided that the actions are evaluated
against specified criteria and determined to be feasible and reliable,
and that fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are
provided in the fire area. This proposed action also provides
conservative and thorough regulatory acceptance criteria for
[[Page 10915]]
operator manual actions taken under Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions.
The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability
or consequences of an accident. No changes are being made in the types
or quantities of radiological effluents that may be released off site,
and there is no significant increase in public radiation exposure since
there is no change to facility operations that could create a new or
affect a previously analyzed accident. The staff believes there will be
no net change in occupational radiation exposure. Any potential
increase in exposure to personnel performing or demonstrating operator
manual actions will likely be offset by a reduction of occupational
radiation exposure since fewer personnel will be required to install or
maintain fire barriers in or near radiologically controlled areas.
With regard to nonradiological impacts, no changes are being made
to nonradiological plant effluents and there are no changes in
activities that could adversely affect the environment. Therefore,
there are no significant non-radiological impacts associated with the
proposed action.
The primary alternative to this action is the no-action
alternative. The no-action alternative would result in licensees
proposing to use the risk-informed, performance-based alternative
provided in 10 CFR 50.48(c) or submitting exemptions to authorize the
use of acceptable operator manual actions. The NRC's approval of these
actions would have the same environmental impacts as the proposed
action.
The determination of this environmental assessment is that this
action will have no significant offsite impact on the public. Comments
on any aspect of the environmental assessment may be submitted to the
NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.
The NRC has sent a copy of this proposed rule to all State Liaison
Officers and requested their comments on the environmental assessment.
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This proposed rule contains new or amended information collection
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq). This rule has been submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget for review and approval of the information
collection requirements.
Type of submission, new or revision: Revision.
The title of the information collection: 10 CFR Part 50, ``Fire
Protection Program--Post Fire Operator Manual Actions'' (Proposed
Rule).
The form number if applicable: Not applicable.
How often the collection is required: As needed.
Who will be required or asked to report: Licensees for nuclear
power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, who wish to
implement fire protection manual actions.
An estimate of the number of annual responses: 8.
The estimated number of annual respondents: 8.
An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to
complete the requirement or request: A reduction of 745 hours annually
(-2,880 hours reporting plus 2,135 hours recordkeeping,) or a reduction
of 93 hours per respondent.
Abstract: The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations pertaining
to fire protection under 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Paragraph III.G.2,
to allow the voluntary use of manual actions by operators of nuclear
power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, to achieve
hot shutdown conditions in the event of fires in certain plant areas,
provided the actions are evaluated against specific criteria that have
been determined to be acceptable by the NRC.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on
the potential impact of the information collections contained in this
proposed rule and on the following issues:
1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the
information will have practical utility?
2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?
3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized,
including the use of automated collection techniques?
A copy of the OMB clearance package may be viewed free of charge at
the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Room O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The OMB clearance package and
rule are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 days after the
signature date of this notice and are also available at the rule forum
site, http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the
above issues, by April 6, 2005, to the Records and FOIA/Privacy
Services Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to
[email protected] and to the Desk Officer, John A. Asalone, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011), Office
of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance
of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date.
You may also e-mail comments to [email protected] or
comment by telephone at (202) 395-4650.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
X. Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this
proposed regulation. The analysis examined the costs and benefits of
Commission alternatives for updating the existing rule to accommodate
technological advances.
The analysis examined two baselines. The Main baseline reflects the
effects of the rule as of the date of publication, that is, full
compliance with all existing regulations. The Industry Practices
baseline reflects a more ``real world'' assessment of compliance.
The regulatory alternatives examined under each baseline were No
Action, under which no regulatory changes would be undertaken;
Regulatory Guidance, under which Section 50.48 and Appendix R would not
be modified but regulatory guidance would be updated; and the Proposed
Alternative, under which the proposal outlined above would be
implemented.
The regulatory analysis showed that the proposed alternative was
the most cost beneficial of the three alternatives. The benefit is the
greatest under the Industry Practices baseline because fourteen
reactors would take immediate advantage of the proposed rule with
corresponding savings to industry.
Option 3, the Proposed Alternative, was determined to be the most
preferable based on best professional
[[Page 10916]]
judgment and quantitative analysis because it (1) improves
effectiveness and efficiency of the NRC regulatory process by assuring
adequate and uniform operator manual actions; (2) eliminates the need
for some licensees to request exemptions from Paragraph III.G.2 or make
equipment modifications; and (3) reduces NRC costs by reducing the
number of exemption requests to be reviewed. Under Option 3, public
health and safety would be maintained at the current level.
The results of the analysis are summarized in the following table.
Net Present Value of Regulatory Alternatives
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 2 Option 3
Baseline Option 1 no regulatory proposed
action guidance alternative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Main............................................................ .............. ($42,240) $13,992,793
Industry Practices.............................................. .............. (42,240) 16,839,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory
analysis. The regulatory analysis may be viewed and downloaded via the
NRC rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Single copies of
the analysis are also available from David T. Diec, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, (301) 415-2834, e-mail [email protected] or Alexander
Klein, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, (301) 415-3477, e-mail
[email protected]. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the
NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.
XI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C.
605(b), the Commission certifies that this proposed rule, if adopted,
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. This proposed rule would affect only licensees
authorized to operate nuclear power reactors. These licensees do not
fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Size Standards established by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10 CFR 2.810).
XII. Backfit Analysis
Section 50.109 (a)(1) defines backfitting as ``the modification of
or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility
* * * any of which may result from a new or amended provision in the
Commission rules or the imposition of a regulatory staff position
interpreting the Commission rules that is either new or different from
a previously applicable staff position.'' The requirements in Appendix
R are only applicable to licensees who received operating licenses
before January 1, 1979. To resolve an existing regulatory compliance
issue for these licensees under paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R, the
proposed rule represents a voluntary alternative to the current
requirements. The proposed rule would allow the use of operator manual
actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown during a fire in an
area where redundant shutdown trains are located as an additional
method beyond the three alternatives presently provided. Licensees who
currently have approved operator manual actions will not be required to
perform any additional actions (such as analysis or documentation).
Licensees who employ operator manual actions but have not received NRC
approval are in violation of paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R. There is
no backfitting as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1) because licensees may
choose to continue to meet paragraph III.G.2 through other provisions.
Post-January 1, 1979 licensees who use operator manual actions
without NRC approval may or may not be in compliance with applicable
fire protection requirements (GDC-3, Sec. 50.48(a), applicable license
conditions, or current fire protection programs). Compliance for plants
licensed after January 1, 1979, depends on the specific licensing
commitments, the change control process, and how the change was
justified and analyzed to demonstrate that the operator manual actions
are feasible and reliable and do not adversely affect the ability to
achieve or maintain safe shutdown. This rule is not applicable to these
licensees as they are not required to meet Appendix R.
Based on the above discussion, the NRC has concluded that the
proposed rule would not constitute a backfit as defined in 10 CFR
50.109(a)(1).
List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 50
Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Backfitting,
Reporting and record keeping requirements.
For the reasons set forth in the preamble and under the authority
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR part 50.
PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68
Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234,
83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201,
2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);
sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5841).
Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat.
853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec.
108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).
Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec.
185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235).
Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued under sec.
102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat.
1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844).
Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-
415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239).
Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42
U.S.C. 2152).
Sections 50.80--50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234).
Appendix F also issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C.
2237).
2. In Appendix R to Part 50, Section III.G.2.c. is revised and a
new Section III.G.2.c-1 and Section III.P. are added to read as
follows:
[[Page 10917]]
Appendix R to Part 50--Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power
Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979
* * * * *
III. Specific Requirements
* * * * *
G. * * *
2. * * *
c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety
circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour
rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire
suppression system shall be installed in the fire areas; or
c-1. Operator manual actions that satisfy the acceptance
criteria in paragraph III.P. In addition, fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire
area.
* * * * *
P. 1. For purposes of this section, operator manual actions
means the integrated set of actions needed to ensure that a
redundant train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown conditions located within the same area outside the primary
containment is free of fire damage.
2. A licensee relying on operator manual actions must meet all
of the following requirements:
(a) Analysis. The licensee shall prepare an analysis for each
operator manual action which demonstrates its feasibility and
reliability.
(1) The analysis must contain a postulated fire timeline showing
that there is sufficient time to travel to action locations and
perform actions required to achieve and maintain the plant in a hot
shutdown condition under the environmental conditions expected to be
encountered without jeopardizing the health and safety of the
operator performing the manual action. The fire timeline shall
extend from the time of initial fire detection until the time when
the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown is reached, and
shall include a time margin that reasonably accounts for all
important variables, including (i) differences between the analyzed
and actual conditions, and (ii) human performance uncertainties that
may be encountered.
(2) The analysis must address the functionality of equipment or
cables that could be adversely affected by the fire or its effects
but still used to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.
(3) The analysis must identify all equipment required to
accomplish the operator manual actions within the postulated
timeline, including (but not limited to) (i) all indications
necessary to identify the need for the operator manual actions,
enable their performance and verify their successful accomplishment,
and (ii) any necessary communications, portable, and life support
equipment.
(b) Procedures and training. Plant procedures must include each
operator manual action required to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown. Each operator must be appropriately trained on those
procedures.
(c) Implementation. The licensee shall ensure that all systems
and equipment needed to accomplish each operator manual action are
available and readily accessible consistent with the analysis
required by paragraph 2(a). The number of operating shift personnel
required to perform the operator manual actions shall be on site at
all times.
(d) Demonstration. Periodically, the licensee shall conduct
demonstrations using an established crew of operators to demonstrate
that operator manual actions required to achieve and maintain the
plant in a hot shutdown condition can be accomplished consistent
with the analysis in paragraph 2(a) of this section.
The licensee may not rely upon any operator manual action until
it has been demonstrated to be consistent with the analysis. The
licensee shall take prompt corrective action if any subsequent
periodic demonstration indicates that the operator manual actions
can no longer be accomplished consistent with the analysis.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of February, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 05-4314 Filed 3-4-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P