[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 23, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8849-8851]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-3397]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414]


Duke Energy Corporation; Concerning the Application for 
Irradiation of Mixed Oxide Lead Test Assemblies at Catawba Nuclear 
Station, Units 1 and 2, Supplement No. 1 to Environmental Assessment 
and Finding of No Significant Impact

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering issuance of 
amendments to the Facility Operating Licenses to permit the use of 
mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs) in one of the two Catawba 
units and is considering the granting of exemptions from (1) the 
requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 
Section 50.44(a), 10 CFR 50.46(a)(1) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix K 
with respect to the use of M5TM fuel rod cladding; (2) 10 
CFR 50.46(a)(1) and Appendix K to part 50 with respect to the use of 
MOX fuel; and (3) certain physical security requirements of 10 CFR 
parts 11 and 73 that are usually required at fuel fabrication 
facilities for the protection of strategic quantities of special 
nuclear material. A similar request for an exemption from the 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.44(a) with respect to the use of 
M5TM fuel rod cladding is not being granted since 10 CFR 
50.44 has been changed and an exemption is no longer necessary. The 
amended licenses and exemptions would apply to Renewed Facility 
Operating License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52, issued to Duke Energy 
Corporation (Duke, the licensee), for operation of the Catawba Nuclear

[[Page 8850]]

Station (Catawba), Units 1 and 2, located in York County, South 
Carolina.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC issued an environmental 
assessment (EA) and finding of no significant impact (FONSI) on this 
matter by letter dated August 10, 2004, and also published it in the 
Federal Register on August 17, 2004 (69 FR 51112) (Reference 1). 
However, in letters dated August 31, September 20, October 29, and 
December 10, 2004, (References 2, 3, 5 and 6) the licensee stated that 
certain radiological dose consequence information provided in previous 
submittals was based on out-of-date input values for design basis 
accident doses with low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and provided 
additional information describing the updated licensing basis dose 
consequences for the analyzed accidents. Since the EA that was 
published in the Federal Register on August 17, 2004, was based, in 
part, on the outdated information, the NRC staff is issuing this 
Supplement to the EA to address the updated information. The dose 
consequence analyses that were affected by this change are (a) the 
control room doses for the loss-of-coolant accident analysis (LOCA), 
the locked rotor analysis (LRA) and the rod ejection analysis (REA), 
(b) the exclusion area boundary (EAB) doses for the LRA and REA, and 
(c) the low-population zone (LPZ) doses for the LRA, the REA and the 
LOCA. Section 5.6, ``Design Basis Accident Consequences,'' is the 
section of the EA that is affected by this change. This Supplement 
provides an update of the affected portions of Section 5.6 that 
supercedes and replaces the comparable portions of Section 5.6 of the 
EA published on August 17, 2004, to address the information provided in 
the licensee's letters dated August 31, September 20, October 29, and 
December 10, 2004, and reaffirms the NRC's conclusions for the EA and 
the FONSI.

5.6 Design-Basis Accident Consequences (DBAs)

    Duke has evaluated the radiological consequences of several 
categories of postulated DBAs involving MOX LTAs including the category 
of at-power accidents involving fuel damage to a significant portion of 
the entire core. These accidents range from the LRA that is calculated 
to damage 9.5 percent of the fuel assemblies (FAs) in the core (18 FAs) 
for Unit 1 and 5.0 percent (10 FAs) for Unit 2, the REA that is 
calculated to damage 50 percent of the core (97 FAs) for either unit, 
to the large break LOCA that is calculated to damage the full core (193 
FAs). Accordingly, considering the proportion that four MOX LTAs 
represents of the number of fuel assemblies that are calculated to be 
damaged by each DBA, the calculated EAB thyroid dose increases that are 
attributable to the use of MOX are: for the LRA, 14.1 percent for Unit 
1 and 25.4 percent for Unit 2; for the REA, 2.62 percent for each unit; 
and, for the LOCA, 1.32 percent.
    The analysis of public doses for the EAB and LPZ resulting from 
this class of accidents considered by Duke is discussed below. In 
addition, the NRC staff has evaluated the radiological consequences of 
affected DBAs on personnel in the control room.

5.6.2 At-Power Accidents

    The current licensing basis analyses assume that all FAs (193) are 
affected by a LOCA. For the LRA, 9.5 percent of the Unit 1 core is 
assumed to be affected and 5.0 percent of the Unit 2 core is assumed to 
be affected; for the REA, 50 percent of the core is assumed to be 
affected. For these events, Duke assumes that the four MOX LTAs are in 
the affected fuel population displacing four LEU assemblies. Because 
the dose is directly proportional to the fuel assembly inventory and 
gap fractions, the impact on the previously analyzed accident doses is 
based on quantifying the change in fission product release due to 
replacing up to four LEU fuel assemblies with the MOX LTAs. Although 
the consequences of these accidents could be determined by updating the 
current licensing basis analyses, Duke elected to perform a comparative 
evaluation, which the NRC staff has independently verified.
    Duke selected the thyroid dose due to Iodine-131 (I-131) as the 
evaluation benchmark because the thyroid dose is typically more 
limiting than the whole body dose in that there is less margin between 
calculated thyroid doses and its associated dose criterion. Also, I-131 
is generally the most significant contributor to thyroid dose due to 
its abundance and long decay half-life. Duke has determined that the I-
131 inventory in a MOX LTA is 9 percent greater than that of an 
equivalent LEU fuel assembly.

Loss-of-Coolant Accident

    For the LOCA, the four MOX LTAs represent 2.1 percent of the 193 
assemblies in the core and the potential increase in the iodine release 
and the thyroid dose would be 1.32 percent. The resulting doses are 
90.2 rem at the EAB and 12.9 rem at the LPZ. These doses are below the 
300 rem dose reference value of 10 CFR 100.11, ``Determination of 
exclusion area, low population zone, and population center distance,'' 
and are not considered to be significant.

Locked-Rotor Accident

    For the LRA in Unit 1, the four MOX LTAs represent 22 percent of 
the 18 affected assemblies in the core. The potential increase in the 
iodine release and the thyroid dose is 14.1 percent for Unit 1. The 
resulting doses are 26.9 rem at the EAB, and 4.6 rem at the LPZ. These 
doses are below the 300 rem dose reference value of 10 CFR 100.11, and 
are not considered to be significant.
    For the LRA in Unit 2, the four MOX LTAs represent 40 percent of 
the 10 affected assemblies in the core. The potential increase in the 
iodine release and the thyroid dose is 25.4 percent for Unit 2. The 
resulting thryoid doses are 27.8 rem at the EAB, and 4.5 rem at the 
LPZ. These doses are below the 300 rem dose criterion of 10 CFR 100.11, 
and are not considered to be significant.

Rod-Ejection Accident

    For the REA in Unit 1, the four MOX LTAs represent 4.1 percent of 
the 97 assemblies in the core assumed to be involved in the postulated 
accident and the potential increase in the iodine release and the 
resulting thyroid dose would be 2.62 percent. The resulting calculated 
thyroid doses are 22.3 rem at the EAB, and 17.8 rem at the LPZ. These 
doses are below the 300 rem dose criterion of 10 CFR 100.11, and are 
not considered to be significant.
    For the REA in Unit 2, the four MOX LTAs represent 4.1 percent of 
the 97 assemblies in the core assumed to be involved in the postulated 
accident and the potential increase in the iodine release and the 
resulting thyroid dose would be 2.62 percent. Even though the 
percentage of iodine released from the fuel is the same for Units 1 and 
2 (2.62 percent), the release of radioiodine to the environment is 
greater for Unit 2 due to differences in the design of the steam 
generators, thus resulting in a higher dose than calculated for Unit 1. 
The resulting calculated thyroid doses are 31.5 rem at the EAB, and 
19.8 rem at the LPZ. These doses are below the 300 rem dose criterion 
of 10 CFR 100.11, and are not considered to be significant.

5.6.3 Control Room Dose

    Control room dose is the only occupational dose that has been 
previously considered for DBA conditions. The at-power accident with 
the most severe consequences for the control room personnel is the 
LOCA; the control room doses from postulated locked-rotor or rod-
ejection accidents are bounded by the calculated control

[[Page 8851]]

room dose from the LOCA. Duke determined that the resulting control 
room thyroid dose after a postulated LOCA considering the use of four 
MOX fuel LTAs would be 13 rem. This is below the NRC staff's 30 rem 
acceptance criterion and is not considered to be significant.

5.6.4 Conclusion

    The DBA with the greatest consequences at the EAB (a LOCA) would 
result in a calculated offsite dose of 90.2 rem to the thyroid. The DBA 
with the greatest consequences at the LPZ (a REA) would result in 
calculated offsite doses of 17.8 and 19.8 rem to the thyroid for Units 
1 and 2, respectively. These doses remain below the 300 rem reference 
value to the thyroid specified in 10 CFR 100.11 for offsite releases. 
The calculated change in dose consequences at the EAB and at the LPZ 
that could be attributable to the use of the four MOX fuel LTAs is not 
significant.
    The DBA with the greatest consequences to the control room 
personnel, a LOCA, would result in a calculated dose of 13 rem to the 
thyroid. This dose remains below the 30 rem acceptance criterion. The 
calculated change in dose consequences for control room personnel that 
could be attributable to the use of the four MOX fuel LTAs is not 
significant.
    The NRC staff concludes that the environmental impact resulting 
from incremental increases in EAB, LPZ, and control room dose following 
postulated DBAs that could occur as a result of the irradiation of four 
MOX LTAs does not represent a significant environmental impact.

11.0 Agencies and Persons Consulted

    Related to the publication of the EA in August 2004, (Reference 1), 
on July 30, 2004, the NRC staff consulted with the South Carolina State 
official, Mr. Mike Gandy of the Department of Health and Environmental 
Controls, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. 
The State official had no comments. Related to the issuance of this 
Supplement to the EA, on February 8, 2005, the NRC staff consulted with 
the South Carolina State official, Mr. Mike Gandy, of the Department of 
Health and Environmental Controls, regarding the environmental impact 
of the proposed action. The State official had no comment.

12.0 References

    1. NRC letter to Duke, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2--
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact Related 
to the Use of Mixed Oxide Lead Test Assemblies (TAC Nos. MB7863, 
MMB7864, MC0824, MC0825), dated August 10, 2004 (ADAMS ML042230368). 
Also published in the Federal Register on August 17, 2004, 69 FR 51112.
    2. Duke letter to NRC, Dose Inputs, August 31, 2004 (ADAMS 
ML042660144).
    3. Duke letter to NRC, Revised Dose Evaluations, September 20, 2004 
(ADAMS ML042890343).
    4. NRC Letter to Duke, Requesting Additional Information, October 
7, 2004 (ADAMS ML042860050).
    5. Duke letter to NRC, Response to Request for Additional 
Information on Revised Dose Evaluations, October 29, 2004 (ADAMS 
ML043150030).
    6. Duke letter to NRC, Additional Information on Revised Dose 
Evaluations, December 10, 2004 (ADAMS ML043560170).

13.0 Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the EA and Supplement No. 1 to the EA, the NRC 
reaffirms its conclusion that the proposed action will not have a 
significant effect on the quality of the human environment. 
Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to prepare an environmental 
impact statement for the proposed action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated February 27, 2003, and subsequent letters dated 
September 15, September 23, October 1 (two letters), October 3 (two 
letters), November 3 and 4, December 10, 2003, and February 2 (two 
letters), March 1 (three letters), March 9 (two letters), March 16 (two 
letters), March 26, March 31, April 13, April 16, May 13, June 17, 
August 31, September 20, October 4, October 29, and December 10, 2004. 
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 
O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to 
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-
800-397-4209 or (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February, 2005.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Edwin M. Hackett,
Project Director, Project Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-3397 Filed 2-22-05; 8:45 am]
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