[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 30 (Tuesday, February 15, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7787-7790]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-2860]


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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

[Social Security Ruling, SSR 05-1c.]


The Social Security Act, Sections 223(d)(2)(A) and 1614(a)(3)(B), 
as Amended (42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B)--Disability 
Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income--Whether Past 
Relevant Work Must Exist in Significant Numbers in the National Economy

AGENCY: Social Security Administration (SSA).

[[Page 7788]]


ACTION: Notice of Social Security Ruling.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with 20 CFR 402.35(b)(1), the Commissioner of 
Social Security gives notice of Social Security Ruling (SSR) 05-1c. 
This ruling is based on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social 
Security v. Pauline Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003). That 
decision affirmed as reasonable SSA's interpretation of sections 
223(d)(2)(A) and 1614(a)(3)(B) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B)) that an individual who remains 
physically and mentally able to do his or her past relevant work will 
be found not disabled, without the need for SSA to investigate whether 
that previous work exists in the national economy.

DATES: Effective Date: February 15, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Becky Morris, Social Insurance 
Specialist, Social Security Administration, 6401 Security Boulevard, 
Baltimore, MD 21235-6401, (410) 966-7829 or TTY (800) 966-5609.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1) and (a)(2) do 
not require us to publish this Social Security Ruling, we are doing so 
in accordance with 20 CFR 402.35(b)(1).
    Social Security Rulings make available to the public precedential 
decisions relating to the Federal old-age, survivors, disability, 
supplemental security income, and black lung benefits programs. Social 
Security Rulings may be based on case decisions made at all 
administrative levels of adjudication, Federal court decisions, 
Commissioner's decisions, opinions of the Office of the General 
Counsel, and policy interpretations of the law and regulations.
    Although Social Security Rulings do not have the same force and 
effect as the statute or regulations, they are binding on all 
components of the Social Security Administration, in accordance with 20 
CFR 402.35(b)(1), and are to be relied upon as precedents in 
adjudicating cases.
    If this Social Security Ruling is later superseded, modified, or 
rescinded, we will publish a notice in the Federal Register to that 
effect.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Programs 96.001 Social 
Security--Disability Insurance and 96.006 Supplemental Security 
Income.)

    Dated: February 9, 2005.
Jo Anne B. Barnhart,
Commissioner of Social Security.

    This Ruling concerns the Social Security Administration's (SSA) 
interpretation of sections 223(d)(2)(A) and 1614(a)(3)(B) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382(a)(3)(B)) that a claimant 
who remains physically and mentally able to perform his or her past 
relevant work will be found not disabled (see 20 CFR 404.1520 and 
416.920), regardless of whether that previous work exists in the 
national economy.
    In June 1996, the claimant applied for Social Security disability 
insurance benefits and for Supplemental Security Income, alleging 
disability due to heart disease and cervical and lumbar radiculopathy. 
She had worked as an elevator operator for 6 years until her job was 
eliminated in August 1995. The SSA denied her claim at the initial and 
reconsideration levels of adjudication and she requested a hearing 
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that she was 
not under a disability because her impairments did not prevent her from 
performing her past work as an elevator operator. The ALJ rejected the 
claimant's argument that she was not able to do her past work because 
it no longer existed in significant numbers in the national economy. 
The SSA's Appeals Council denied the claimant's request for review. The 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed 
the ALJ's findings, concluding that whether the old job exists is 
irrelevant under SSA's regulations. The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the statute unambiguously 
provides that the ability to perform prior work disqualifies a claimant 
from benefits only if the work is ``substantial gainful work which 
exists in the national economy.''
    The Supreme Court of the United States (the Court) held that 42 
U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B) do not require a different 
interpretation and that, because SSA's regulations (20 CFR 404.1520, 
404.1560(b), 416.920, and 416.960(b)) are a reasonable interpretation 
of the text of the Act, they must be deferred to and given effect.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 20 (2003)

Opinion of the Court

Supreme Court of the United States

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No. 02-763

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Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, Petitioner v. 
Pauline Thomas

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit

[November 12, 2003]

    Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
    Under the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) is authorized to pay disability insurance benefits and 
Supplemental Security Income to persons who have a ``disability.'' A 
person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, 
``only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such 
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 
economy.'' 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The issue we must 
decide is whether the SSA may determine that a claimant is not disabled 
because she remains physically and mentally able to do her previous 
work, without investigating whether that previous work exists in 
significant numbers in the national economy.
    Pauline Thomas worked as an elevator operator for six years until 
her job was eliminated in August 1995. In June 1996, at age 53, Thomas 
applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II and 
Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security 
Act. See 49 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq. (Title II); as 
added, 86 Stat. 1465, and as amended, section 1381 et seq. (Title XVI). 
She claimed that she suffered from, and was disabled by, heart disease 
and cervical and lumbar radiculopathy.
    After the SSA denied Thomas's application initially and on 
reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Thomas had ``hypertension, cardiac 
arrhythmia, [and] cervical and lumbar strain/sprain.'' Decision of ALJ 
5, Record 15. He concluded, however, that Thomas was not under a 
``disability'' because her ``impairments do not prevent [her] from 
performing her past relevant work as an elevator operator.'' Id., at 6, 
Record 16. He rejected Thomas's

[[Page 7789]]

argument that she is unable to do her previous work because that work 
no longer exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The 
SSA's Appeals Council denied Thomas's request for review.
    Thomas then challenged the ALJ's ruling in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, renewing her argument 
that she is unable to do her previous work due to its scarcity. The 
District Court affirmed the ALJ, concluding that whether Thomas's old 
job exists is irrelevant under the SSA's regulations. Thomas v. Apfel, 
Civ. No. 99-2234 (Aug. 17, 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded. Over the dissent of 
three of its members, it held that the statute unambiguously provides 
that the ability to perform prior work disqualifies from benefits only 
if it is ``substantial gainful work which exists in the national 
economy.'' 294 F. 3d 568, 572 (2002). That holding conflicts with the 
decisions of four other Courts of Appeals. See Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 
882 F. 2d 1453, 1457 (CA9 1989); Garcia v. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, 46 F. 3d 552, 558 (CA6 1995); Pass v. Chater, 65 F. 3d 
1200, 1206-1207 (CA4 1995); Rater v. Chater, 73 F. 3d 796, 799 (CA8 
1996). We granted the SSA's petition for certiorari. 537 U.S. 1187 
(2003).
    As relevant to the present case, Title II of the Act defines 
``disability'' as the ``inability to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months.'' 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1)(A). That definition is qualified, 
however, as follows:

    ``An individual shall be determined to be under a disability 
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such 
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but 
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage 
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 
national economy * * *'' section 423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

    ``[W]ork which exists in the national economy'' is defined to mean 
``work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where 
such individual lives or in several regions of the country.'' Ibid. 
Title XVI of the Act, which governs Supplemental Security Income 
benefits for disabled indigent persons, employs the same definition of 
``disability'' used in Title II, including a qualification that is 
verbatim the same as section 423(d)(2)(A). See 42 U.S.C. 
1382c(a)(3)(B). For simplicity's sake, we will refer only to the Title 
II provisions, but our analysis applies equally to Title XVI.
    Section 423(d)(2)(A) establishes two requirements for disability. 
First, an individual's physical or mental impairment must render him 
``unable to do his previous work.'' Second, the impairment must also 
preclude him from ``engag[ing] in any other kind of substantial gainful 
work.'' The parties agree that the latter requirement is qualified by 
the clause that immediately follows it--which exists in the national 
economy.'' The issue in this case is whether that clause also qualifies 
``previous work.''
    The SSA has answered this question in the negative. Acting pursuant 
to its statutory rulemaking authority, 42 U.S.C. 405(a) (Title II), 
1383(d)(1) (Title XVI), the agency has promulgated regulations 
establishing a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine 
disability. See 20 CFR 404.1520 (2003) (governing claims for disability 
insurance benefits); Sec.  416.920 (parallel regulation governing 
claims for Supplemental Security Income). If at any step a finding of 
disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the 
claim further. At the first step, the agency will find non-disability 
unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a ``substantial 
gainful activity.'' Sec. Sec.  404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, 
the SSA will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he has 
a ``severe impairment,'' defined as ``any impairment or combination of 
impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or 
mental ability to do basic work activities.'' Sec. Sec.  404.1520(c), 
416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment 
which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of 
impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the 
claimant qualifies. Sec. Sec.  404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the 
claimant's impairment is not on the list, the inquiry proceeds to step 
four, at which the SSA assesses whether the claimant can do his 
previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is determined not to 
be disabled.\1\ If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth, 
and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called ``vocational 
factors'' (the claimant's age, education, and past work experience), 
and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other 
jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 
Sec. Sec.  404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(c).\2\
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    \1\ The four-step instructions to the claimant read as follows: 
``If we cannot make a decision based on your current work activity 
or on medical facts alone, and you have a severe impairment(s), we 
then review your residual functional capacity and the physical and 
mental demands of the work you have done in the past. If you can 
still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not 
disabled.'' 20 CFR 404.1520(e), 416.920(e)(2003).
    \2\ In regulations that became effective on September 25, 2003, 
the SSA amended certain aspects of the five-step process in ways not 
material to this opinion. The provisions referred to as subsections 
(e) and (f) in this opinion are now subsections (f) and (g).
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    As the above description shows, step four can result in a 
determination of no disability without inquiry into whether the 
claimant's previous work exists in the national economy; the 
regulations explicitly reserve inquiry into the national economy for 
step five. Thus, the SSA has made it perfectly clear that it does not 
interpret the clause ``which exists in the national economy'' in Sec.  
423(d)(2)(A) as applying to ``previous work.'' \3\ The issue presented 
is whether this agency interpretation must be accorded deference.
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    \3\ This interpretation was embodied in the regulations that 
first established the five-step process in 1978, see 43 FR 55349 
(codified, as amended, at 20 CFR 404.1520 and 416.920 (1982)). Even 
before enactment of Sec.  423(d)(2)(A) in 1967, the SSA disallowed 
disability benefits when the inability to work was caused by 
``technological changes in the industry in which [the claimant] has 
worked.'' 20 CFR 404.1502(b) (1961).
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    As we held in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), when a statute speaks clearly 
to the issue at hand we ``must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress,'' but when the statute ``is silent or 
ambiguous'' we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency 
charged with its implementation. The Third Circuit held that, by 
referring first to ``previous work'' and then to ``any other kind of 
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,'' 42 
U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added), the statute unambiguously 
indicates that the former is a species of the latter. ``When,'' it 
said, ``a sentence sets out one or more specific items followed by `any 
other' and a description, the specific items must fall within the 
description.'' 294 F. 3d, at 572. We disagree. For the reasons 
discussed below the interpretation adopted by SSA is at least a 
reasonable construction of the text and must therefore be given effect.
    The Third Circuit's reading disregards--indeed, is precisely 
contrary to--the grammatical ``rule of the last antecedent,'' according 
to which a limiting clause or phrase (here, the relative clause ``which 
exists in the national economy'') should ordinarily

[[Page 7790]]

be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately 
follows (here, ``any other kind of substantial gainful work''). See 2A 
N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction Sec.  47.33, p. 369 
(6th rev. ed. 2000) (``Referential and qualifying words and phrases, 
where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last 
antecedent''). While this rule is not an absolute and can assuredly be 
overcome by other indicia of meaning, we have said that construing a 
statute in accord with the rule is ``quite sensible as a matter of 
grammar.'' Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993). 
In FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959), this Court 
employed the rule to interpret a statute strikingly similar in 
structure to section 423(d)(2)(A)--a provision of the Fur Products 
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 69, which defined `` `invoice' as `a written 
account, memorandum, list, or catalog * * * transported or delivered to 
a purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or agent, or any 
other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or 
furs.' '' 359 U.S., at 386 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 69(f)) (emphasis added). 
Like the Third Circuit here, the Court of Appeals in Mandel Brothers 
had interpreted the phrase `` `any other' '' as rendering the relative 
clause (`` `who is engaged in dealing commercially' '') applicable to 
all the specifically listed categories. 359 U.S., at 389. This Court 
unanimously reversed, concluding that the ``limiting clause is to be 
applied only to the last antecedent.'' Id., at 389, and n. 4 (citing 2 
J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction Sec.  4921 (3d ed. 1943)).
    An example will illustrate the error of the Third Circuit's 
perception that the specifically enumerated ``previous work'' ``must'' 
be treated the same as the more general reference to ``any other kind 
of substantial gainful work.'' 294 F. 3d, at 572. Consider, for 
example, the case of parents who, before leaving their teenage son 
alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, ``You will be punished if 
you throw a party or engage in any other activity that damages the 
house.'' If the son nevertheless throws a party and is caught, he 
should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the house was 
not damaged. The parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any other 
activity that damages the house. As far as appears from what they said, 
their reasons for prohibiting the home-alone party may have had nothing 
to do with damage to the house--for instance, the risk that underage 
drinking or sexual activity would occur. And even if their only concern 
was to prevent damage, it does not follow from the fact that the same 
interest underlay both the specific and the general prohibition that 
proof of impairment of that interest is required for both. The parents, 
foreseeing that assessment of whether an activity had in fact 
``damaged'' the house could be disputed by their son, might have wished 
to preclude all argument by specifying and categorically prohibiting 
the one activity--hosting a party--that was most likely to cause damage 
and most likely to occur.
    The Third Circuit suggested that interpreting the statute as does 
the SSA would lead to ``absurd results.'' Ibid. See also Kolman v. 
Sullivan, 925 F. 2d 212, 213 (CA7 1991) (the fact that a claimant could 
perform a past job that no longer exists would not be ``a rational 
ground for denying benefits''. The court could conceive of ``no 
plausible reason why Congress might have wanted to deny benefits to an 
otherwise qualified person simply because that person, although unable 
to perform any job that actually exists in the national economy, could 
perform a previous job that no longer exists.'' 294 F. 3d, at 572-573. 
But on the very next page the Third Circuit conceived of just such a 
plausible reason, namely, that ``in the vast majority of cases, a 
claimant who is found to have the capacity to perform her past work 
also will have the capacity to perform other types of work.'' Id., at 
574, n. 5. The conclusion which follows is that Congress could have 
determined that an analysis of a claimant's physical and mental 
capacity to do his previous work would ``in the vast majority of 
cases'' serve as an effective and efficient administrative proxy for 
the claimant's ability to do some work that does exist in the national 
economy. Such a proxy is useful because the step-five inquiry into 
whether the claimant's cumulative impairments preclude him from finding 
``other'' work is very difficult, requiring consideration of ``each of 
th[e] [vocational] factors and * * * an individual assessment of each 
claimant's abilities and limitations,'' Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 
458, 460-461, n. 1 (1983) (citing 20 CFR Sec. Sec.  404.1545-1404.1565 
(1982)). There is good reason to use a workable proxy that avoids the 
more expansive and individualized step-five analysis. As we have 
observed, ``[t]he Social Security hearing system is `probably the 
largest adjudicative agency in the western world.' * * * The need for 
efficiency is self-evident.'' 461 U.S., at 461, n. 2 (citation 
omitted).
    The Third Circuit rejected this proxy rationale because it would 
produce results that ``may not always be true, and * * * may not be 
true in this case.'' 294 F. 3d, at 576. That logic would invalidate a 
vast number of the procedures employed by the administrative state. To 
generalize is to be imprecise. Virtually every legal (or other) rule 
has imperfect applications in particular circumstances. Cf. Bowen v. 
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) (O.CONNOR, J., concurring) (``To be 
sure the Secretary faces an administrative task of staggering 
proportions in applying the disability benefits provisions of the 
Social Security Act. Perfection in processing millions of such claims 
annually is impossible''). It is true that, under the SSA's 
interpretation, a worker with severely limited capacity who has managed 
to find easy work in a declining industry could be penalized for his 
troubles if the job later disappears. It is also true, however, that 
under the Third Circuit's interpretation, impaired workers in declining 
or marginal industries who cannot do ``other'' work could simply refuse 
to return to their jobs--even though the jobs remain open and 
available--and nonetheless draw disability benefits. The proper Chevron 
inquiry is not whether the agency construction can give rise to 
undesirable results in some instances (as here both constructions can), 
but rather whether, in light of the alternatives, the agency 
construction is reasonable. In the present case, the SSA's 
authoritative interpretation certainly satisfies that test.
    We have considered respondent's other arguments and find them to be 
without merit.
* * * * *
    We need not decide today whether Section 423(d)(2)(A) compels the 
interpretation given it by the SSA. It suffices to conclude, as we do, 
that Sec.  423(d)(2)(A) does not unambiguously require a different 
interpretation, and that the SSA's regulation is an entirely reasonable 
interpretation of the text. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed.
    It is so ordered.
    Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[FR Doc. 05-2860 Filed 2-14-05; 8:45 am]
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