[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 28 (Friday, February 11, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7270-7274]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-2683]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-05-61-A (Auction No. 61); DA 05-194]


Auction of Automated Maritime Telecommunications Systems Licenses 
Scheduled for August 3, 2005, Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or 
Minimum Opening Bids and Other Procedures for Auction No. 61

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of ten Automated Maritime 
Telecommunications System (``AMTS'') licenses scheduled to commence on 
August 3, 2005 (Auction No. 61). This document also seeks comment on 
reserve prices or minimum opening bids and other procedures for Auction 
No. 61.

DATES: Comments are due on or before February 18, 2005, and reply 
comments are due on or before February 25, 2005.

ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail 
to the following address: [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Howard Davenport 
at (202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Roy Knowles, Debbie 
Smith or Barbara Sibert at (717) 338-2888. For service rule questions, 
contact the Mobility Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, as 
follows: Erin McGrath, Keith Harper, or JoAnn Epps at (202) 418-0620.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Public 
Notice released on February 2, 2005, Auction No. 61 Comment Public 
Notice. The complete text of the Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice, 
including attachments and any related Commission documents is available 
for public inspection and copying during regular business hours at the 
FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 61 Comment Public 
Notice and related Commission documents may also be purchased from the 
Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. 
(BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC, 
20554, telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may 
contact BCPI at its Web site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering 
documents from BCPI, please make sure you provide the appropriate FCC 
document number (for example, FCC 03-270 for the Third Report and 
Order). The Auction No. 61 Comment Public Notice and related documents 
are also available on the Internet at the Commission's Web site: http:/
/wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/61/.

I. General Information

    1. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') announces 
the auction of ten AMTS licenses. This auction is scheduled to commence 
on August 3, 2005 (Auction No. 61). AMTS is a specialized system of 
coast stations which provide integrated and interconnected marine voice 
and data communications, somewhat like a cellular phone system, for 
tugs, barges, and other vessels on waterways. Service to units on land 
is permitted, so long as marine-originating communications receive 
priority. In Auction No. 61, two 500-kilohertz blocks of paired 
spectrum in the 217/219 MHz band will be offered in each of ten AMTS 
Areas (``AMTSAs''), where available. A complete list of licenses 
available for Auction No. 61 follows.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Channel
         Market No.             Description        License No.              Frequencies (MHz)            block
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMTSA001....................  Northern         PC-AMT001-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A
                               Atlantic.
AMTSA002....................  Mid-Atlantic...  PC-AMT002-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A
AMTSA003....................  Southern         PC-AMT003-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A
                               Atlantic.
AMTSA004....................  Mississippi      PC-AMT004-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A
                               River.
AMTSA005....................  Great Lakes....  PC-AMT005-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A

[[Page 7271]]

 
AMTSA006....................  Southern         PC-AMT006-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A
                               Pacific.
AMTSA007....................  Northern         PC-AMT007-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A
                               Pacific.
AMTSA008....................  Hawaii.........  PC-AMT008-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A
AMTSA008....................  Hawaii.........  PC-AMT008-B          217.0-217.5 / 219.0-219.5         B
AMTSA009....................  Alaska.........  PC-AMT009-A          217.5-218.0 / 219.5-220.0         A
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Auction No. 61 will use the FCC's Integrated Spectrum Auction 
System (``ISAS'' or ``FCC Auction System''), an extensive redesign of 
the previous auction application and bidding systems. The redesign 
includes FCC Form 175 application enhancements such as discrete data 
elements in place of free-form exhibits and improved data accuracy 
through automated checking of FCC Form 175 applications. Enhancements 
have also been made to the FCC Form 175 application search function. 
The auction bidding system has also been updated for easier navigation, 
customizable results, and improved functionality. The Bureau will 
release subsequent public notices that outline more specific 
information on these enhancements and announce schedules for 
demonstrations.
    3. Section 309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 
requires the Commission to ``ensure that, in the scheduling of any 
competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is 
allowed * * * before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and 
comment on proposed auction procedures * * *'' Consistent with the 
provisions of Sec.  309(j)(3) and to ensure that potential bidders have 
adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific rules that 
will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission 
directed the Bureau, under its existing delegated authority, to seek 
comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start 
of each auction. The Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following 
issues relating to Auction No. 61.

II. Auction Structure

A. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design

    4. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction 
No. 61 in a simultaneous multiple-round auction. This methodology 
offers every license for bid at the same time with successive bidding 
rounds in which bidders may place bids on individual licenses. The 
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility

    5. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine 
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking 
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license 
area and the value of similar spectrum. The upfront payment is a 
refundable deposit made by each bidder to establish eligibility to bid 
on licenses. Upfront payments related to the specific spectrum subject 
to auction protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide 
the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments 
owed at the close of the auction. With these guidelines in mind for 
Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposes to calculate upfront payments on a 
license-by-license basis using a formula based on bandwidth and license 
area population:

$0.005 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license.

The specific proposed upfront payment for each license available in 
Auction No. 61 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 61 
Comment Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    6. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront 
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the maximum number of 
bidding units on which a bidder may place bids. This limit is a 
bidder's initial bidding eligibility. Each license is assigned a 
specific number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment on a 
bidding unit per dollar basis. Bidding units for a given license do not 
change as prices rise during the auction. A bidder's upfront payment is 
not attributed to specific licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on 
any combination of licenses as long as the total number of bidding 
units associated with those licenses does not exceed its current 
eligibility. Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction; it can 
only remain the same or decrease. Thus, in calculating its upfront 
payment amount, an applicant must determine the maximum number of 
bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold provisionally winning bids 
on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering 
that total number of bidding units. Provisionally winning bids are bids 
that would become final winning bids if the auction were to close in 
that given round. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

C. Activity Rules

    7. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific 
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of 
the auction. A bidder that does not satisfy the activity rule either 
will lose bidding eligibility in the next round or must use an activity 
rule waiver (if any remain).
    8. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into two stages, each 
characterized by a different activity requirement. The auction will 
start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes that the auction generally will 
advance from Stage One to Stage Two when the auction activity level, as 
measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new provisionally 
winning bids, is approximately twenty percent or below for three 
consecutive rounds of bidding. However, the Bureau further proposes 
that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by 
announcement during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the 
Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder activity, 
including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the 
percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there 
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in 
revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
    9. For Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposes the following activity 
requirements:
    Stage One: In each round of the first stage of the auction, a 
bidder desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility is required 
to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its 
current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity 
level will result in a reduction in the bidder's

[[Page 7272]]

bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity 
rule waiver is used). During Stage One, a bidder's reduced eligibility 
for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's 
current round activity by five-fourths (\5/4\).
    Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to be active on 90 
percent of its current bidding eligibility. During Stage Two, a 
bidder's reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the bidder's current round activity by ten-ninths (\10/9\).
    10. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that 
believe these activity rules should be modified should explain their 
reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. 
Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and 
suggested alternative activity rules.

D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

    11. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current 
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round 
being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies 
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity 
rule waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a 
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of bidding 
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from 
placing a bid in a particular round.
    12. The FCC Auction System assumes that bidders with insufficient 
activity would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if available) 
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding round where a 
bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless: (1) The 
bidder has no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder 
overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing 
eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum requirement. Note: If a bidder 
has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the required activity 
level, its eligibility will be permanently reduced, possibly 
eliminating the bidder from further bidding in the auction.
    13. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the 
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
during the bidding round by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function 
in the FCC Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is 
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the 
activity rules as described above. Once eligibility has been reduced, a 
bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
    14. A bidder may apply an activity rule waiver proactively as a 
means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder 
proactively applies an activity rule waiver (using the ``apply waiver'' 
function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in which no 
bids or withdrawals are submitted, the auction will remain open and the 
bidder's eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by 
the FCC Auction System in a round in which there are no new bids or 
withdrawals will not keep the auction open. Note: Applying a waiver is 
irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted that waiver cannot 
be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
    15. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 61 be 
provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used at the 
bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth 
above. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

    16. For Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice 
or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, 
or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding 
activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason 
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In 
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the 
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its 
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend 
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is 
solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended 
to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply 
their activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

III. Bidding Procedures

A. Round Structure

    17. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 61 over the Internet. 
Telephonic bidding will also be available. The toll free telephone 
number through which telephonic bidding may be accessed will be 
provided to bidders.
    18. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public 
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the 
auction. The simultaneous multiple-round format will consist of 
sequential bidding rounds, each followed by the release of round 
results. Details regarding the location and format of round results 
will be included in the same public notice.
    19. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, 
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

    20. Section 309(j) of the Communications Act calls upon the 
Commission to prescribe methods for establishing a reasonable reserve 
price or a minimum opening bid amount when FCC licenses are subject to 
auction, unless the Commission determines that a reserve price or 
minimum opening bid amount is not in the public interest. Consistent 
with this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to seek 
comment on the use of a minimum opening bid amount and/or reserve price 
prior to the start of each auction.
    21. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below 
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can 
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid amount, on 
the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the 
auction below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to 
accelerate the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often 
has the discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the 
auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid amount and the 
reserve price to be the same amount.
    22. In light of Section 309(j)'s requirements, the Bureau proposes 
to establish minimum opening bid amounts for Auction No. 61. The Bureau 
believes a minimum opening bid amount, which has been used in other 
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.
    23. Specifically, for Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposes to 
calculate

[[Page 7273]]

minimum opening bid amounts on a license-by-license basis using a 
formula based on bandwidth and license area population:
$0.005 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license.

The specific minimum opening bid amount for each license available in 
Auction No. 61 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 61 
Comment Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    24. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts 
will result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not 
reasonable amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they 
should explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an 
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims 
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening 
bid amount levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bid 
amounts, the Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the 
amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the 
availability of technology to provide service, the size of the 
geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum 
bands and any other relevant factors that could reasonably have an 
impact on valuation of the AMTS spectrum. The Bureau also seeks comment 
on whether, consistent with Section 309(j), the public interest would 
be served by having no minimum opening bid amount or reserve price.

C. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid Increments

    25. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a 
given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Auction System 
interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for each license.
    26. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be equal 
to its minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally 
winning bid for the license. After there is a provisionally winning bid 
for a license, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that license will 
be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning bid plus an 
additional amount. The minimum acceptable bid amount will be calculated 
by multiplying the provisionally winning bid amount times one plus the 
minimum acceptable bid percentage--e.g., if the minimum acceptable bid 
percentage is 5 percent, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal 
(provisionally winning bid amount) * (1.05), rounded. The Bureau will 
round the result using our standard rounding procedures.
    27. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each license consist of the 
minimum acceptable bid amount and additional amounts calculated using 
the minimum acceptable bid amount and the bid increment percentage. The 
Bureau will round the results using our standard rounding procedures. 
The first additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times one plus the bid increment percentage, 
rounded--e.g., if the bid increment percentage is 5 percent, the 
calculation is (minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 + 0.05), rounded, 
or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05, rounded; the second 
additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid 
amount times one plus two times the bid increment percentage, rounded, 
or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.10, rounded; the third 
additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid 
amount times one plus three times the bid increment percentage, 
rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.15, rounded; etc. Note 
that the bid increment percentage need not be the same as the minimum 
acceptable bid percentage.
    28. In the case of a license for which the provisionally winning 
bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal 
the second highest bid received for the license.
    29. For Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposes to use a minimum 
acceptable bid percentage of five percent. This means that the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for a license will be approximately five percent 
greater than the provisionally winning bid amount for the license. The 
Bureau proposes to use a bid increment percentage of five percent.
    30. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, the minimum acceptable bid percentage, and the 
bid increment percentage if it determines that circumstances so 
dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the FCC Auction 
System during the auction. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.

D. Provisionally Winning Bids

    31. At the end of a bidding round, a provisionally winning bid 
amount for each license will be determined based on the highest bid 
amount received for the license. In the event of identical high bid 
amounts being submitted on a license in a given round (i.e., tied 
bids), the Bureau proposes to use a random number generator to select a 
single provisionally winning bid from among the tied bids. If the 
auction were to end with no higher bids being placed for that license, 
the winning bidder would be the one that placed the selected 
provisionally winning bid. However, the remaining bidders, as well as 
the provisionally winning bidder, can submit higher bids in subsequent 
rounds. If any bids are received on the license in a subsequent round, 
the provisionally winning bid again will be determined by the highest 
bid amount received for the license.
    32. A provisionally winning bid will remain the provisionally 
winning bid until there is a higher bid on the same license at the 
close of a subsequent round, unless the provisionally winning bid is 
withdrawn. Bidders are reminded that provisionally winning bids confer 
credit for activity.

E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

    33. For Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposes the following bid 
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding 
round, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that 
round. By removing selected bids in the FCC Auction System, a bidder 
may effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal 
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
    34. A bidder may withdraw its provisionally winning bids using the 
``withdraw bids'' function in the FCC Auction System. A bidder that 
withdraws its provisionally winning bid(s) is subject to the bid 
withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission rules. The Bureau seeks 
comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.
    35. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, the Commission explained 
that allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of 
licenses and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information 
becomes available during the course of an auction. The Commission 
noted, however, that, in some instances, bidders may seek to withdraw 
bids for improper reasons. The Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in 
managing the auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent any 
bidding abuses. The Commission stated that the Bureau should 
assertively exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number of 
rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from 
bidding on a particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is 
abusing

[[Page 7274]]

the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures.
    36. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each 
bidder in Auction No. 61 to withdrawing provisionally winning bids in 
no more than one round during the course of the auction. To permit a 
bidder to withdraw bids in more than one round may encourage insincere 
bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The 
round in which withdrawals may be used will be at the bidder's 
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the 
Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of provisionally 
winning bids that may be withdrawn in the round in which withdrawals 
are used. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment 
provisions specified in the Commission's rules. The Bureau seeks 
comment on this proposal.

F. Stopping Rule

    37. The Bureau has discretion ``to establish stopping rules before 
or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction 
within a reasonable time.'' For Auction No. 61, the Bureau proposes to 
employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping 
rule means that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding 
closes simultaneously on all licenses.
    38. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the 
first round in which no bidder submits any new bids, applies a 
proactive waiver, or places any withdrawals. Thus, unless circumstances 
dictate otherwise, bidding will remain open on all licenses until 
bidding stops on every license.
    39. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to 
exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 61:
    i. Use a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The 
modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after 
the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, places a 
withdrawal or submits any new bids on any license for which it is not 
the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding 
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the 
provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction open under this 
modified stopping rule. The Bureau further seeks comment on whether 
this modified stopping rule should be used at any time or only in stage 
two of the auction.
    ii. Keep the auction open even if no bidder submits any new bids, 
applies a waiver or places any withdrawals. In this event, the effect 
will be the same as if a bidder had applied a waiver. The activity 
rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder with insufficient 
activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a remaining 
activity rule waiver.
    iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes 
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final 
round(s) and the auction will close.
    40. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain 
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very 
slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely 
that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time. 
Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to 
increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number 
of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum 
bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still 
a high level of bidding activity. The Bureau seeks comment on these 
proposals.

IV. Conclusion

    41. Comments are due on or before February 18, 2005, and reply 
comments are due on or before February 25, 2005. Because of the 
disruption of regular mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the 
Bureau requires that all comments and reply comments be filed 
electronically. Comments and reply comments and copies of material 
filed with the Commission pertaining to Auction No. 61, must be sent by 
electronic mail to the following address: [email protected]. The 
electronic mail containing the comments or reply comments must include 
a subject or caption referring to Auction No. 61 Comments and the name 
of the commenting party. The Bureau requests that parties format any 
attachments to electronic mail as Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or 
Microsoft[reg] Word documents. Copies of comments and reply comments 
will be available for public inspection during regular business hours 
in the FCC Reference Information Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, 
SW., Washington, DC 20554, and will also be posted on the Web page for 
Auction No. 61 at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/61/.
    42. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte 
rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that 
memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the 
substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects 
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and 
arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to 
oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose 
proceedings are set forth in Sec.  1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.

Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 05-2683 Filed 2-10-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P