[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 2 (Tuesday, January 4, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 265-284]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-15]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 35

[Docket No. RM02-1-005; Order No. 2003-B]


Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and 
Procedures

December 20, 2004.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Order on rehearing and directing compliance.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) affirms, 
with certain clarifications, the fundamental determinations in Order 
No. 2003-A.

Effective Date: January 19, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    Patrick Rooney (Technical Information), Office of Markets, Tariffs 
and Rates, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6205;
    Roland Wentworth (Technical Information), Office of Markets, 
Tariffs and Rates, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8262;
    P. Kumar Agarwal (Technical Information), Office of Markets, 
Tariffs and Rates, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8923;
    Michael G. Henry (Legal Information), Office of the General 
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8532.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Introduction and Summary
II. Background
III. Discussion
    A. Jurisdiction
    B. Pricing and Cost Recovery Provisions
    1. Transmission Credits
    2. Credits Under Change in Ownership
    3. Protecting Native Load and Other Existing Transmission 
Customers
    4. Interconnection Products and Services
    5. Generator Balancing Service Arrangements
    C. Independent Transmission Provider Obligations
    D. Issues Related to the Large Generator Interconnection 
Agreement
    1. Stand Alone Network Upgrades
    2. Permits and Licensing Requirements
    3. Tax Issues
    a. Security Requirements
    b. Elimination of the Interconnection Customer's Right to 
Contest or Appeal Taxes

[[Page 266]]

    c. Transmission Credits for Tax Payments
    4. Applicable Reliability Council Operating Requirements
    5. Power Factor Design Criteria
    6. Payment for Reactive Power
    7. Security
    8. Assignment
    9. Disclosure of Confidential Information
    E. Issues Related to the Large Generator Interconnection 
Procedures
    1. Scoping Meeting and OASIS Posting
    F. Ministerial Changes to the Pro Forma LGIP and LGIA
    G. Compliance
IV. Information Collection Statement
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
VI. Document Availability
VII. Effective Date
Appendix A--Petitioner Acronyms
Appendix B--Changes to the Pro Forma LGIP and LGIA

    Before Commissioners: Pat Wood, III, Chairman, Nora Mead Brownell, 
Joseph T. Kelliher, and Suedeen G. Kelly.

Order on Rehearing and Directing Compliance

I. Introduction and Summary

    1. In this order, we affirm, with certain clarifications, the 
fundamental determinations made in Order Nos. 2003\1\ and 2003-A.\2\ 
Adopting the pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Procedures 
(LGIP) and Large Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) will help 
prevent undue discrimination, preserve the reliability of the nation's 
transmission system, and lower prices for customers by increasing the 
number and variety of generation resources competing in wholesale 
electricity markets. At its core, the Commission's interconnection 
policy enunciated in this series of orders ensures that all Generating 
Facilities are offered Interconnection Service on comparable terms.
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    \1\ Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and 
Procedures, Order No. 2003, Final Rule, 68 FR 49845 (Aug. 19, 2003), 
FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,146 (2003.)
    \2\ Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and 
Procedures, Order No. 2003-A, Order on Rehearing, 69 FR 15932 (Mar. 
26, 2004), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,160 (2004).
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    2. This order reaffirms that an important objective of the 
Commission's pricing policy is the protection of the Transmission 
Provider's existing Transmission Customers, including native load, from 
subsidizing Network Upgrades required to interconnect merchant 
generators. This order also reaffirms the Order No. 2003-A crediting 
policy for Network Upgrades. Order No. 2003-A gave the Transmission 
Provider the option, after five years from the Commercial Operation 
Date of the Interconnection Customer's Generating Facility, of either 
fully reimbursing the Interconnection Customer for its upfront payment 
for Network Upgrades or continuing to make dollar-for-dollar credits 
against charges for Transmission Service. Order No. 2003-A provided no 
date certain for full reimbursement of the upfront payment.
    3. On rehearing, petitioners \3\ argue that a date certain is 
needed for a variety of reasons. In particular, they state that a date 
certain is needed to make the crediting policy consistent with the 
notion that the upfront payment is primarily a mechanism for financing 
Network Upgrades. This order addresses their concerns by clarifying 
that if the Transmission Provider chooses not to fully reimburse the 
Interconnection Customer after five years, it must continue to provide 
dollar-for-dollar credits to the Interconnection Customer, or develop 
an alternative schedule that is mutually agreeable and provides for the 
return of all amounts advanced for Network Upgrades not previously 
repaid. However, full reimbursement shall not extend beyond twenty (20) 
years from the Commercial Operation Date.
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    \3\ Thirteen petitioners filed requests for rehearing of Order 
No. 2003-A. See Appendix A.
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    4. This order takes effect 30 days after issuance by the 
Commission. As with the Order No. 2003 compliance process, the 
Commission will deem the open access transmission tariff (OATT) of each 
non-independent Transmission Provider to be amended to adopt the 
revisions to the pro forma LGIP and LGIA contained herein on the 
effective date of this order. Unlike the Order No. 2003 compliance 
process, however, each non-independent Transmission Provider will be 
required to amend its OATT to include the LGIP and LGIA revisions 
contained herein within 60 days after issuance of this order by the 
Commission. Also, within 60 days after issuance of this order, each 
independent Transmission Provider must submit revised tariff sheets 
incorporating its revisions to its OATT or an explanation under the 
independent entity variation standard as to why it is not proposing to 
adopt each change described in this order.

II. Background

    5. Order No. 2003 required all public utilities that own, control, 
or operate facilities used for transmitting electric energy in 
interstate commerce to have on file standard procedures and a standard 
agreement for interconnecting Generating Facilities capable of 
producing more than 20 megawatts of power (Large Generators) to their 
Transmission Systems.\4\ Order No. 2003 also required that all such 
public utilities modify their OATTs to include the pro forma LGIP and 
LGIA.
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    \4\ Provisions of the LGIP are referred to as ``sections,'' 
whereas provisions of the LGIA are referred to as ``articles.'' 
Capitalized terms used in this order have the meanings specified in 
section 1 of the pro forma LGIP and article 1 of the LGIA, as 
amended herein, or the OATT. Generating Facility means the device 
for which the Interconnection Customer has requested 
interconnection. The owner of the Generating Facility is the 
Interconnection Customer. The entity with which the Generating 
Facility is interconnecting is the Transmission Provider. A Large 
Generator is any energy resource having a capacity of more than 20 
megawatts, or the owner of such a resource.
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    6. Order No. 2003 stated that interconnection plays a crucial role 
in bringing generation into national energy markets to meet the growing 
needs of customers and to obtain for customers the benefits of 
increased competition. It noted that the then-existing interconnection 
process was fraught with delays and lack of standardization that 
discouraged merchant generators from entering the energy marketplace, 
in turn stifling the growth of competitive energy markets. It concluded 
that the delays and lack of standardization inherent in the then-
current system undermined the ability of generators to compete in the 
market and provided an unfair advantage to utilities that own both 
transmission and generation facilities. As a result, the Commission 
concluded that there was a pressing need for a single, uniformly 
applicable set of procedures and agreements to govern the process of 
interconnecting a Large Generator to a Transmission Provider's 
Transmission System.\5\
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    \5\ In another rulemaking, the Commission proposed a separate 
set of procedures and an agreement applicable to Small Generators 
(defined as any energy resource having a capacity of no larger than 
20 MW, or the owner of such a resource) that seek to interconnect 
with facilities of jurisdictional Transmission Providers that are 
already subject to an OATT. See Standardization of Small Generator 
Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 60 FR 49974 (Aug. 19, 2003), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 
32,572 (2003).
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    7. Order No. 2003-A affirmed the legal and policy conclusions on 
which Order No. 2003 was based. It held that Order No. 2003 did not 
expand the Commission's jurisdiction beyond that asserted in Order No. 
888 and upheld in court.\6\ For example, it reaffirmed that

[[Page 267]]

Order No. 2003 applies only to an interconnection with a public 
utility's Transmission System that, at the time the interconnection is 
requested, is used either to transmit electric energy in interstate 
commerce or to deliver electric energy sold at wholesale in interstate 
commerce under a Commission-filed OATT. It also reaffirmed that dual 
use facilities (those used both for wholesale and retail transactions) 
are subject to Order No. 2003 (1) if the facilities are subject to an 
OATT on file with the Commission when the Interconnection Request is 
submitted and (2) the interconnection will facilitate a wholesale sale.
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    \6\ Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery 
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 
Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 
31,036 (1996), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-A, 62 FR 12274 (Mar. 
14, 1997) FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,048 (1997), order on reh'g, Order 
No. 888-B, 81 FERC ] 61,248 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-C, 
82 FERC ] 61,046 (1998), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. 
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (TAPS 
v. FERC).
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    8. Order No. 2003-A also generally affirmed the pricing policy 
adopted in Order No. 2003 for the recovery of the costs of Network 
Upgrades associated with an interconnection.\7\ That is, the 
Commission's existing pricing policy continues to apply to a non-
independent Transmission Provider, but an independent Transmission 
Provider such as a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) or an 
Independent System Operator (ISO) has greater flexibility to propose a 
customized pricing policy to fit its circumstances. It also reaffirmed 
that all Distribution Upgrades (upgrades to the Transmission Provider's 
``distribution'' or lower voltage facilities that are subject to an 
OATT) are to be paid for by the Interconnection Customer without 
reimbursement (direct assignment).
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    \7\ Network Upgrades reside on the Transmission Provider's side 
of the Point of Interconnection with the Transmission Provider's 
Transmission System.
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    9. In addition, Order No. 2003-A clarified that, consistent with 
the Commission's transmission ratemaking policy, a non-independent 
Transmission Provider continues to have the option to charge the 
Interconnection Customer a transmission rate that is the ``higher of'' 
an average embedded cost (rolled-in) rate or an incremental cost rate 
for the Network Upgrades needed for the interconnection. It also 
explained that incremental pricing is not the same as direct 
assignment.
    10. Order No. 2003-A reiterated that, unless the Transmission 
Provider and the Interconnection Customer agree otherwise, the 
Interconnection Customer must initially fund the cost of any Network 
Upgrades used to interconnect its Generating Facility with a non-
independent Transmission Provider's Transmission System. The 
Transmission Provider must then reimburse the Interconnection Customer 
on a dollar-for-dollar basis, with interest. This reimbursement is in 
the form of credits against the rates the Interconnection Customer pays 
for the delivery component of Transmission Service. In Order No. 2003-
A, however, the Commission granted rehearing on two aspects of the 
mechanics of crediting. First, Order No. 2003-A required the 
Transmission Provider to provide credits to the Interconnection 
Customer only against transmission delivery service taken from the 
interconnecting Generating Facility, as opposed to Transmission Service 
taken elsewhere on the Transmission System. Second, it eliminated the 
requirement that transmission credits be refunded at the end of five 
years from the Commercial Operation Date of the Generating Facility and 
instead gave the Transmission Provider the option of either (1) 
reimbursing the Interconnection Customer for the remaining balance of 
the upfront payment, plus accrued interest, five years from the 
Commercial Operation Date of the Generating Facility or (2) continuing 
to provide credits until the upfront payment has been repaid, with 
accrued interest. Order No. 2003-A also eliminated the requirement that 
any Affected System Operator refund the Interconnection Customer's 
upfront payments for Network Upgrades built on the Affected System as a 
consequence of the interconnection of the Generating Facility, and 
instead required the Affected System to provide credits toward the 
Interconnection Customer's upfront payment only when Transmission 
Service is taken by the Interconnection Customer on the Affected 
System.
    11. Order No. 2003-A also clarified that neither Energy Resource 
Interconnection Service (ERIS) nor Network Resource Interconnection 
Service (NRIS) guarantees delivery service. It explained that while 
both services give the Interconnection Customer the capability to 
deliver the output of its Generating Facility into the Transmission 
System at the Point of Interconnection, neither allows the 
Interconnection Customer the right to withdraw power at any particular 
Point of Delivery. It also clarified that when an Interconnection 
Customer wants to deliver the output of its Generating Facility to a 
particular load (or set of loads), regardless of whether it has chosen 
ERIS or NRIS, it may simultaneously request Network Interconnection 
Transmission Service or Point-to-Point Transmission Service under the 
OATT. Order No. 2003-A also clarified that NRIS is not the same as or a 
substitute for Network Integration Transmission Service under the OATT.

III. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

Rehearing Requests
    12. SoCal Edison claims that in Order No. 2003-A the Commission 
rejected its argument that all interconnections of generators intending 
to sell power to ``wholesale entities,'' except interconnections of 
Qualifying Facilities that will sell all of their output to host 
utilities under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978,\8\ 
should be subject to Commission jurisdiction. In particular, SoCal 
Edison objects to the Commission's explanation that states have 
jurisdiction over an interconnection when the facility with which the 
Generating Facility is being interconnected is not subject to a 
Commission-approved OATT at the time the Interconnection Request is 
submitted, even if the Interconnection Customer intends to make a 
jurisdictional wholesale sale.\9\ This conclusion is legally erroneous 
and a significant departure from established policy and precedent.
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    \8\ 16 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. (2000).
    \9\ Order No. 2003-A at P 735.
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    13. SoCal Edison further argues that Order No. 888 states that 
wholesale transmission is within the Commission's exclusive 
jurisdiction. It cites to TAPS v. FERC, where the Supreme Court 
affirmed Order No. 888.\10\ Because interconnection is a form of 
Transmission Service, it should not matter whether an interconnection 
is with a facility that is subject to an OATT or already in use by a 
wholesale customer. Furthermore, SoCal Edison claims that it ``can cite 
to myriad orders involving its distribution system alone where [the 
Commission] accepted jurisdiction under Section 205 over the 
interconnection of generation to distribution facilities used at the 
time by no other wholesale customers but the interconnecting 
generator.''
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    \10\ See also Detroit Edison Co. v. FERC, 334 F. 3d 48, 51 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003).
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Commission Conclusion
    14. The passage in Order No. 2003-A that SoCal Edison objects to 
states as follows: ``States will retain jurisdiction over 
interconnection to dual use facilities when * * * the facility is not 
subject to a Commission-approved OATT at the time the Interconnection 
Request is made, even if the Interconnection Customer intends to make a 
jurisdictional wholesale sale.''\11\

[[Page 268]]

This statement was in error. We grant rehearing to clarify that this 
statement was based on the false premise that a dual use facility may 
not be subject to an OATT at the time the Interconnection Request is 
made. In fact, a facility may be considered dual use only if it serves 
both state- and Commission-jurisdictional functions at the time the 
Interconnection Request is submitted. As a result, a dual use facility 
must be subject to an OATT. And if an Interconnection Customer seeks to 
interconnect with a dual use facility to make a wholesale sale, that 
interconnection will be subject to Order No. 2003. This is consistent 
with Order No. 2003 and other statements in Order No. 2003-A, where the 
Commission stated that an interconnection with dual use 
``distribution'' facilities \12\ that already serve a Commission-
jurisdictional transmission function (and are subject to an OATT) for 
the purpose of facilitating a jurisdictional wholesale sale of 
electricity is subject to Order No. 2003.\13\ In conclusion, Order No. 
2003-A incorrectly suggested that a state regulatory agency would have 
jurisdiction over an interconnection with a dual use facility when the 
Interconnection Customer intends to make a jurisdictional wholesale 
sale. Because this is the only statement on which SoCal Edison's 
request for rehearing is based, there is no need to address its other 
arguments.
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    \11\ Order No. 2003-A at P 735.
    \12\ As explained in Order No. 2003 at P 803, the term 
``distribution'' is usually used to refer to lower voltage lines 
that are not networked and that carry power in one direction. The 
term ``local distribution'' is a legal term, and under Section 
201(b)(1) of the FPA, the Commission lacks jurisdiction over ``local 
distribution'' facilities. The court in Detroit Edison Co. v. FERC, 
334 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Detroit Edison), used the terms 
``distribution'' and ``local distribution'' interchangeably. The 
court recognized that certain ``distribution'' and ``local 
distribution'' interchangeably. The court recognized that certain 
``distribution'' facilities serve a dual use function (i.e., they 
are used for both wholesale and retail sales) and that there could 
be Commission-jurisdictional uses of ``local distribution'' 
facilities; in such cse, the court viewed the Commission's 
jurisdiction as extending only tot he use of the facilities for 
purposes of the wholesale transaction. Detroit Edison, 334 F.3d at 
51. Consistent with Detroit Edison, the Final Rule applies to a dual 
use facility only if the facility is already part of a Commission-
filed OATT and the interconnection is for the purpose of making a 
jurisdictional sale of electric energy for resale in interstate 
commerce.
    We note that some facilities labeled by a utility as 
``distribution'' may actually carry out a transmission rather than a 
local distribution function and thus would be subject to Commission 
jurisdiction for accommodating wholesale as well as unbundled retail 
transactions. In this circumstance, we do not view the label as 
controlling.
    \13\ Order No. 2003 at P 804; Order No. 2003-A at P 730, 736.
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B. Pricing and Cost Recovery Provisions

1. Transmission Credits
    15. In Order No. 2003-A, the Commission noted that requiring the 
Transmission Provider to provide the Interconnection Customer with 
credits against transmission service unrelated to the Generating 
Facility, and to fully reimburse the Interconnection Customer after 
only five years, tends to shift risk from the entity in control of the 
investment (i.e., the Interconnection Customer) to native load and 
other Transmission Customers. The Commission stated that this shifting 
of risk may result in inefficient siting decisions, and may require 
native load or other Transmission Customers to bear the cost of the 
Network Upgrades when the Interconnection Customer takes little 
additional transmission service with the new Generating Facility as the 
source, or where the Interconnection Customer elects to retire the 
Generating Facility early. Therefore, to place an appropriate level of 
risk on the Interconnection Customer, the Commission in Order No. 2003-
A revised the Final Rule policy (1) to make credits available only for 
transmission service that has the Generating Facility as the source of 
the power transmitted, and (2) to eliminate the guarantee of full 
reimbursement of the upfront payment in five years.
Rehearing Requests
    16. Several petitioners object to the revisions made in Order No. 
2003-A.\14\ Specifically, they argue that the Commission (1) should not 
have limited the applicability of credits to transmission service that 
has the Generating Facility as the source, (2) should not have given 
the Transmission Provider the option to fully reimburse the 
Interconnection Customer's upfront payment, plus interest, after five 
years, or to continue to provide credits to the Interconnection 
Customer until the total of all credits equals the Interconnection 
Customer's initial payment for the Network Upgrades plus interest, and 
(3) should not have excused an Affected System from having to provide 
credits except when transmission service is taken on the Affected 
System and has the Generating Facility as the source.
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    \14\ See, e.g., Calpine, EPSA, Integen, PSEG, and Reliant.
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    17. Calpine states that in Order No. 2003-A, the Commission has 
destroyed the balance and fairness of the Order No. 2003 policies.\15\ 
It argues that the Commission is now obligating the Interconnection 
Customer to finance Network Upgrades under terms that virtually 
guarantee that the Interconnection Customer will not be made whole for 
its upfront funding.
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    \15\ Calpine also states that, as a member of EPSA, it endorses 
and supports EPSA's request for rehearing of Order No. 2003-A.
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    18. Reliant, PSEG, and Intergen state that, contrary to the 
Commission's stated rationale, the revised crediting rules will not 
cause the Interconnection Customer to make more efficient siting 
decisions, and they are not needed to protect native load or other 
Transmission Customers from bearing the costs of Network Upgrades if 
the Generating Facility is retired early. Intergen objects to the new 
policies for a number of reasons. First, Network Upgrade costs cannot 
influence siting decisions because the costs are typically unknown when 
siting decisions are made. Second, the Interconnection Customer must 
take multiple factors into consideration when making siting decisions. 
For example, the Interconnection Customer must consider the ability to 
access particular markets, fuel and water supply access, air quality 
issues, tax issues, and zoning issues, among other things. Third, 
because a Generating Facility is a multi-hundred million dollar 
investment, the Interconnection Customer has tremendous risk exposure, 
and adding a few million dollars in Network Upgrade costs will not 
shift the risk of commercial infeasibility or poor siting decisions to 
others. Fourth, oversight by state regulatory authorities is an 
important constraint on where the Interconnection Customer chooses to 
site its facility. Fifth, the amount of Network Upgrades needed is 
directly tied to the condition in which the Transmission Provider keeps 
its Transmission System. If the Transmission Provider has been properly 
upgrading and expanding its facilities, then fewer Network Upgrades are 
likely to be needed. Also, Reliant claims that continuing to require 
that the Interconnection Customer fund the Network Upgrade costs 
upfront mitigates any lack of incentive that the Interconnection 
Customer may otherwise have to make efficient siting decisions.
    19. With regard to the need to protect native load and other 
transmission customers, Intergen states that an Interconnection 
Customer has strong incentives to maximize its use of the Transmission 
System, since it makes money only when it sells the output of its 
Generating Facility. Even under a worst case scenario, in which all 
Network Upgrade costs are assigned to existing customers, they would 
not suffer a significant rate increase. Intergen argues that concerns 
about

[[Page 269]]

native load customers being harmed by early retirements are overblown 
and do not recognize the significant benefits of increased competition 
in the generation market.
    20. PSEG states that, by allowing the full reimbursement of upfront 
payments to be delayed beyond the five-year period, the Commission is 
discouraging development of RTOs. What will happen, for example, to an 
Interconnection Customer's transmission credits when the non-
independent Transmission Provider to which it is interconnected joins 
an RTO? PSEG argues that permitting generators to ``cash out'' their 
credits on a date certain would alleviate these complexities and 
engender a smoother transition to an RTO system in which the 
interconnecting generator receives well-defined property rights rather 
than credits. Also, Intergen states that allowing the time for 
repayment to be extended indefinitely is inconsistent with the 
Commission's underlying ``financing'' policy for Network Upgrades and 
forces the Interconnection Customer to bear the full costs of a below-
market interest rate.
    21. Calpine points out that there are also Transmission Systems 
where the Interconnection Customer does not directly pay for 
transmission service. As a result, the Interconnection Customer does 
not receive a bill for transmission services to which credits can be 
applied. This is the situation, for example, in the California ISO, 
where load pays for transmission service. However, under Order No. 
2003-A, the dollar-for-dollar offset against transmission service 
payments is the only way explicitly provided to receive transmission 
credits, and this might allow someone to argue that credits need not be 
paid in areas such as California. Under the Order No. 2003 language in 
article 11.4.1 of the pro forma LGIA, this argument could not have been 
made because that provision required that all upfront payments for 
Network Upgrades had to be refunded within five years, and the Parties 
had to agree on a mechanism to do so. Because Order No. 2003-A dropped 
the mandatory five-year repayment provision, there is no explicit 
provision as to how an Interconnection Customer that does not pay 
directly for transmission service is to receive its credits. Therefore, 
Calpine proposes adding the following sentence to article 11.4.1 of the 
LGIA:

    In the event there is not a direct payment to Transmission 
Provider or Affected System Operator for transmission service to 
deliver power from the Large Generating Facility against which a 
repayment credit may be used, Transmission Provider, Affected System 
Operator and Interconnection Customer shall agree on a repayment 
schedule that would be comparable to one where transmission service 
was directly paid for, or such other mutually agreeable schedule.

    22. Reliant and others state that the Commission departed from the 
balanced approach of Order No. 2003 by deciding that transmission 
credits must be given by the Transmission Provider only for 
transmission service that has the Generating Facility as the source of 
the power transmitted. Reliant argues that certain Generating 
Facilities, such as peakers, require transmission service on a very 
limited schedule and, as a result, owners of such facilities may find 
it difficult to recover the sums advanced to the Transmission Provider 
under Order No. 2003-A. Reliant claims that the new policy creates a 
barrier to entry for exactly the type of facility needed during tight 
supply conditions.
    23. Reliant and Intergen argue that the Commission's new policy on 
credits effectively takes away a fundamental right that Order No. 888 
provided to the Transmission Customer. That is, the use of credits for 
any service taken on a Transmission Provider's system must be equated 
to the right of a Transmission Customer to change its Point of Receipt 
or Point of Delivery under Point-to-Point Transmission Service. If the 
Transmission Provider can provide service from the new points, it 
grants the service with no additional charge to the Transmission 
Customer. Petitioners argue that, similarly, the Transmission Customer 
should be allowed to use its credits at alternate points of receipt or 
delivery without paying an additional charge to the Transmission 
Provider.
    24. Intergen states that Order No. 2003 mitigated adverse cost 
impacts by giving the Interconnection Customer flexibility in 
determining how best to use the credits it received for the costs of 
Network Upgrades. The ability to transfer credits to other entities for 
which the Generating Facility is not the source of the power 
transmitted may be crucial for an Interconnection Customer that must 
meet its debt obligations, but has limited ability to acquire 
transmission service or sell its output. Also, because the interest 
accruing on the credits does not fully compensate the Interconnection 
Customer for its upfront payment, an Interconnection Customer has a 
strong incentive to transfer the credits to another entity that can use 
the credits immediately.
    25. TAPS states that a problem would arise if a Transmission 
Provider were to seek to restrict credits to a Network Customer by 
basing the credits on the energy output, rather than the capacity, of a 
Generating Facility used as a Network Resource. TAPS asks the 
Commission to revise or clarify Order No. 2003-A to provide that a 
Network Customer that designates an interconnecting Generating Facility 
as a Network Resource will receive credits based on the full capacity 
of the Network Resource (or the amount reserved by the Network Customer 
if it is less), not just the energy delivered from the resource.
    26. EPSA states that if the Commission retains the policy of 
limiting credits to transmission service that has the Generating 
Facility as the source, there are several issues that must be 
clarified. First, the Commission should clarify that credits will be 
applied to the total reservation payment for any service obtained to 
support the delivery of the generator, whether or not energy is 
scheduled in any particular hour of the reservation period and whether 
or not the power customers take advantage of the options to use 
alternative receipt or delivery points provided under the pro forma 
OATT to all point-to-point customers. Second, the Commission should 
clarify that credits will be applied to network services whenever a 
Network Customer designates the Generating Facility as a Network 
Resource or substitute resource, regardless of whether the Generating 
Facility produces energy during each hour of the designation. Finally, 
EPSA asks the Commission to clarify that credits must be provided by 
the Transmission Provider when it designates the Generating Facility as 
a Network Resource or substitute resource for meeting its native load 
requirements, whether or not the Transmission Provider actually enters 
into a service agreement under the OATT.
    27. TAPS states that changes described in P 675 of Order No. 2003-A 
suggest that only credits equal to the OATT's embedded cost rates must 
be provided, even if the Transmission Provider charges an incremental 
transmission rate.\16\ The Rule should be revised or clarified to 
address this discrepancy. A Transmission Provider that seeks 
transmission charges based on the incremental cost of Network Upgrades 
should be required to provide the Interconnection Customer that paid 
for those upgrades upfront with credits

[[Page 270]]

applied against the full amount of the incremental transmission 
charges, until the Interconnection Customer's upfront payment, plus 
interest, has been completely reimbursed.
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    \16\ Paragraph 675 stated that credits are to be applied in full 
to reservation charges set forth in OATT schedule 7--Long-Term Firm 
and Short-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, schedule 
8--Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, and to the basic 
transmission charges based on Attachment H-Annual Transmission 
Revenue Requirement for Network Integration Transmission Service.
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    28. PSEG states that under Order No. 2003-A, a non-independent 
Transmission Provider may have an incentive to ``tack on'' unnecessary 
Network Upgrade requirements (for which ultimate compensation to the 
generator has now been made considerably less certain) or not to build 
Network Upgrades that would allow transmission service to be taken from 
the Generating Facility (for which credits would have to be given). 
PSEG claims that this will discourage the construction of new 
generation and create incentives for preferential treatment of 
affiliated generation.
    29. Intergen states that unlike merchant units, the Transmission 
Provider's generating facilities never had to pay the upfront costs of 
their Network Upgrades. Thus, Transmission Provider facilities never 
had to assume any of the risks associated with Network Upgrades that 
the merchant generators do. To mitigate these competitive 
disadvantages, Intergen asserts that the Commission should allow the 
Interconnection Customer to receive credits for service sourcing at 
points other than the Generating Facility.
    30. PSEG argues that Network Upgrades benefit the entire 
Transmission System, and this common benefit is what distinguishes 
Network Upgrades from sole use facilities. The Interconnection 
Customer's financing of investment in the network of a non-independent 
Affected System benefits all Network Customers and all network 
transactions. It is unduly discriminatory to limit the Interconnection 
Customer's recovery of the funds it advances for Network Upgrades on an 
Affected System simply because the Interconnection Customer is unable 
to make direct use of them.
    31. EPSA urges the Commission to reverse its decision to modify the 
crediting policy with respect to Network Upgrades funded by an 
Interconnection Customer on an Affected System. A Generating Facility 
will be less likely to use transmission service on an Affected System 
than on the Transmission System to which it is interconnected, and this 
will unreasonably delay repayment. This is especially true in the West, 
where network facilities affected by an interconnection are often 
jointly owned by a number of Transmission Providers. These Transmission 
Providers are often far removed from the Transmission Provider to which 
the Generation Facility is interconnected. According to EPSA, an 
Interconnection Customer is unlikely to take transmission service on 
the Transmission System of a Transmission Provider that jointly owns 
these affected facilities. Therefore, the Interconnection Customer will 
have little ability to use the credits to which it is entitled.
Commission Conclusion
    32. In Order No. 2003-A, the Commission revised the rules governing 
transmission credits to place the Interconnection Customer at greater 
risk for the cost of Network Upgrades occasioned by the Interconnection 
Request. The Commission was concerned that to do otherwise would not 
lead to efficient siting decisions and would not adequately protect 
native load and other Transmission Customers from having to bear 
Network Upgrade costs if the Generating Facility were to retire early. 
In their arguments opposing the modifications, Intergen and others 
state that the cost of Network Upgrades is typically small compared to 
the cost of the Generating Facility and that the Interconnection 
Customer will often embark on a project even though Network Upgrade 
costs are unknown. This suggests that placing the risk for the cost of 
Network Upgrades on the Interconnection Customer does not place a 
significant burden on the Interconnection Customer and thus is 
completely appropriate. Also, Intergen states that the Interconnection 
Customer has a strong incentive to maximize its use of the Transmission 
System because it only makes money if it is selling output from its 
Generating Facility. The crediting policy, however, reinforces that 
incentive by linking transmission credits directly to the output of the 
Generating Facility.
    33. We strongly encourage policies that promote efficient 
investment decisions and protect native load and other Transmission 
Customers from having to bear the burden of the Interconnection 
Customer's Network Upgrade costs. Given these concerns, we continue to 
find that the Order No. 2003-A crediting policy provides a reasonable 
balance between the objectives of promoting competition and 
infrastructure development, protecting the interests of Interconnection 
Customers, and protecting native load and other Transmission Customers.
    34. Intergen states that extending the reimbursement timeframe 
indefinitely is inconsistent with the Commission's determination that 
the upfront payment is merely a mechanism for financing the cost of the 
Network Upgrades. In addition, PSEG states that the indefinite 
timeframe will make the transition to RTO development more complex, and 
Calpine claims that an uncertain timeframe for reimbursement will 
create problems in areas such as California where the Interconnection 
Customer does not receive directly a bill for transmission service to 
which credits can be applied.
    35. These petitioners make valid points. To address the 
Interconnection Customer's need for a date certain for reimbursement of 
its upfront payment, we are specifying what the Transmission Provider 
must do if it elects not to return to the Interconnection Customer any 
portion of its upfront payment that remains due at the end of five 
years. Specifically, in order to provide a definite end date for 
reimbursement that is not to be exceeded, we are revising pro forma 
LGIA article 11.4.1 to state that full reimbursement shall not extend 
beyond twenty (20) years from the Commercial Operation Date. The 
portion of this article that describes the Transmission Provider's 
second repayment option now reads as follows:

    (2) declare in writing that Transmission Provider or Affected 
System Operator will continue to provide payments to Interconnection 
Customer on a dollar-for-dollar basis for the non-usage sensitive 
portion of transmission charges, or develop an alternative schedule 
that is mutually agreeable and provides for the return of all 
amounts advanced for Network Upgrades not previously repaid; 
however, full reimbursement shall not extend beyond twenty (20) 
years from the Commercial Operation Date.

    36. All other crediting rules remain the same. This change 
addresses Intergen's concern that Order No. 2003-A's removal of a date 
certain for the repayment of Network Upgrade costs was inconsistent 
with the notion that the upfront payment is, in essence, a loan to the 
Transmission Provider designed to facilitate construction of the 
Network Upgrades. The change also addresses PSEG's concern that the 
lack of a date certain might create an obstacle to the development of 
an RTO, which may require the Interconnection Customer's upfront 
payment to be converted into financial transmission rights. Finally, 
the change addresses Calpine's concern that, in the absence of a date 
certain for repayment of Network Upgrade costs, a Transmission Provider 
could conclude that credits need not be repaid in areas where the 
Interconnection Customer does not pay directly for transmission 
service. We further clarify that the Interconnection Customer is 
entitled to full reimbursement for its upfront payment and the period 
for reimbursement may

[[Page 271]]

not be longer than the period that would be required if the 
Interconnection Customer paid for transmission service directly and 
received credits on a dollar-for-dollar basis, or 20 years, whichever 
is less. In short, the imposition of a 20-year date certain does not 
mean that the Commission is switching from reimbursing through credits 
to reimbursing over 20 years. Rather, if credits have not fully 
reimbursed the upfront payment within 20 years, there will be a balloon 
payment at the end of year 20.
    37. Reliant argues that the owner of a Generating Facility, such as 
a peaker, that requires transmission service on a limited schedule may 
find it difficult or impossible to recover its upfront payment under 
the Commission's rules as revised by Order No. 2003-A. We disagree. Any 
Interconnection Customer whose Generating Facility is used as intended, 
whether or not it is a peaker, normally will be required to take Firm 
Point-to-Point Transmission Service or Network Integration Transmission 
Service and therefore will have ample opportunity to use its 
transmission credits to obtain reimbursement of its upfront payment. 
Furthermore, reimbursement of any upfront payment must occur no later 
than 20 years after the Commercial Operation Date.
    38. Reliant and Intergen argue that limiting credits to 
transmission service taken with the Generating Facility as the source 
takes away the Transmission Customer's fundamental right under Order 
No. 888 to change its Point of Receipt or Point of Delivery under 
Point-to-Point Transmission Service without additional charge if the 
Transmission Provider is able to grant the service at the alternate 
points. Also, Intergen argues that the ability to transfer credits may 
be crucial for an Interconnection Customer that must meet debt 
obligations but is constrained in its ability to acquire transmission 
service. The new policy does not revoke any rights provided by Order 
No. 888. If the Interconnection Customer or other Transmission Customer 
is taking firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under the OATT with 
the Generating Facility as the source of the power transmitted, the 
customer continues to have all of the rights given under the OATT to 
change temporarily Points of Receipt or Delivery, if capacity is 
available, and is entitled to continue to receive credits toward the 
cost of the transmission service while doing so.
    39. TAPS and EPSA ask the Commission to revise or clarify Order No. 
2003-A to provide that a Network Customer that designates a Generating 
Facility as a Network Resource will receive credits based on the full 
capacity of the Network Resource (or the amount reserved by the Network 
Customer if it is less), not just the energy delivered from the 
resource. We clarify that when a Generating Facility is designated as a 
Network Resource or a substitute resource, the Interconnection Customer 
is entitled to credits for the full amount of the reserved capacity of 
the Generating Facility regardless of the amount of energy that is 
scheduled for delivery in any particular hour. Also, TAPS states that 
changes to the Final Rule described in P 675 of Order No. 2003-A 
suggest that only credits equal to the Tariff's embedded cost rates 
would be provided, even if the Transmission Provider chooses to charge 
an incremental cost rate. We clarify that, if the Transmission Provider 
chooses to charge an incremental cost rate, the Interconnection 
Customer is entitled to receive credits, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, 
at the incremental rate.
    40. PSEG states that the new rules may provide a non-independent 
Transmission Provider with an incentive to ``tack on'' unnecessary 
Network Upgrades or omit necessary Network Upgrades. Also, Intergen 
claims that, unlike a merchant developer, the Transmission Provider 
never had to assume for its Generating Facilities any of the risks 
associated with Network Upgrades, and this places the merchant 
developer at a competitive disadvantage. We disagree. The Commission's 
crediting policy assigns risk and cost responsibility in a reasonable 
manner and applies to Interconnection Requests by entities affiliated 
with the Transmission Provider and to Interconnection Requests by 
unaffiliated merchant generators. We reiterate that the Transmission 
Provider has an obligation to apply our interconnection policy in a 
non-discriminatory manner to all new Interconnection Requests, whether 
the Generating Facility is owned by the Transmission Provider, its 
Affiliate, or a merchant developer.
    41. EPSA and PSEG are concerned that the Interconnection Customer 
may be unable to recoup upfront payments for Network Upgrades that are 
constructed on an Affected System. We note that taking transmission 
service on an Affected System is entirely at the option of the 
Interconnection Customer. Whether or not the Interconnection Customer 
exercises its option, the Network Upgrades on the Affected System 
benefit the Interconnection Customer by making the minimum transmission 
additions necessary for it to interconnect safely and reliably, as well 
as by facilitating access to customers and markets that are outside the 
Transmission Provider's electric system. Furthermore, if the 
Interconnection Customer were to be reimbursed by the Affected System 
Operator for the cost of the Network Upgrades without ever taking 
service on the Affected System, other Transmission Customers on the 
Affected System would have to bear the cost instead. This would create 
a disincentive for the Affected System to construct the Network 
Upgrades necessary for the Interconnection Customer to interconnect, a 
problem that would be particularly difficult to address if the Affected 
System were not a public utility.
    42. In addition, EPSA states that when an Affected System is 
jointly owned, an Interconnection Customer is unlikely to take 
transmission service on the Transmission System of a Transmission 
Provider that is far removed from the Affected System on which Network 
Upgrades had to be constructed. We clarify that the Affected System 
Operator must provide the Interconnection Customer with credits for 
transmission service taken on the Affected System until the 
Interconnection Customer's entire upfront payment has been reimbursed. 
In the case of an Affected System that is jointly owned, it is the 
responsibility of the Affected System Operator to provide the credits 
and to seek reimbursement for any amounts that it believes it is owed 
by the other owners. We note that this problem is not unique to an 
Affected System. If a Transmission Provider provides transmission 
service on a Transmission System that is jointly owned, that 
Transmission Provider must follow a similar procedure.
2. Credits Under Change in Ownership
Rehearing Requests
    43. Cinergy requests clarification of LGIA article 11.4.1, which 
states that if the Generating Facility fails to achieve commercial 
operation, but it or another Generating Facility is later constructed 
and uses the Network Upgrades, the Transmission Provider and the 
Affected System Operator shall at that time reimburse the 
Interconnection Customer for the amounts advanced for Network Upgrades. 
Specifically, where a Generating Facility fails to achieve commercial 
operation, Cinergy argues that it would be difficult for a Transmission 
Provider to determine who would be entitled to any eventual credit for 
the costs of Network Upgrades. This is significant because, given the 
uncertain state of the energy

[[Page 272]]

industry, the original entity constructing the Generating Facility 
could have been either purchased in whole or in part by another 
company, bankrupt, or simply no longer be in existence. Cinergy argues 
that the obligation to keep track of who should receive such 
reimbursement, if any, should not lie with the Transmission Provider 
but rather with the Interconnection Customer or its successors.
    44. In addition, Cinergy states that article 11.4.1 is not clear as 
to whether interest accrues on the upfront payment made by an 
Interconnection Customer whose Generating Facility fails to achieve 
commercial operation. Cinergy argues that interest should not accrue 
during what could possibly be an extended period of time where the 
upgrades remain idle, unused by either another Generating Facility or 
the Transmission Provider. Cinergy asks the Commission to clarify 
article 11.4.1 accordingly.
Commission Conclusion
    45. We agree with Cinergy that, when a Generating Facility does not 
achieve commercial operation, the responsibility for keeping track of 
the entity that is entitled to receive any transmission credits that 
may be due should lie with the Interconnection Customer, or with any 
successor entity that may later construct a Generating Facility that 
makes use of the Network Upgrades. Therefore, we are adding the 
following sentence to the final paragraph of LGIA article 11.4.1: 
``Before any such reimbursement can occur, the Interconnection 
Customer, or the entity that ultimately constructs the Generating 
Facility, if different, is responsible for identifying the entity to 
which reimbursement must be made.''
    46. With regard to the accrual of interest on upfront payments in 
cases where the Generating Facility fails to achieve commercial 
operation, we clarify that interest continues to accrue provided the 
interconnection agreement remains in effect. Interest does not accrue 
after an interconnection agreement has been terminated by either Party 
or during any period in which no interconnection agreement is in 
effect.
3. Protecting Native Load and Other Existing Transmission Customers
Rehearing Requests
    47. SWTransco and Southern Company argue that the Commission's 
interconnection pricing policy, in certain circumstances, would not 
protect native load and other customers from bearing the cost of 
Network Upgrades required for interconnection.\17\ Moreover, these 
petitioners argue that a policy of allowing the Transmission Provider 
to charge the higher of an incremental rate or an embedded cost rate 
does not always protect other customers from subsidizing the 
Interconnection Customer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Southern Company states that its request for rehearing does 
not specifically address all of the requirements and issues in Order 
No. 2003-A that it addressed in its Request for Rehearing filed in 
response to Order No. 2003. Therefore, instead of restating all of 
the arguments made in the request for rehearing, Southern Company 
incorporates them by reference. Because the FPA requires that 
applications for rehearing ``set forth specifically the ground or 
grounds upon which such application is based, ``set forth 
specifically the ground or grounds upon which such application is 
based, ``16 U.S.C. Sec.  8251 (2000), Southern Company's arguments 
from its request for rehearing of Order No. 2003 have been 
considered in this order only to the extent the arguments were 
specifically presented in its request for rehearing of Order No. 
2003-A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    48. SWTransco states that to leave the other Transmission Customers 
no worse off in certain situations, it is necessary to charge the 
Interconnection Customer not only the Network Upgrade costs, but also 
the share of the rolled-in costs attributable to any Generating 
Facility that is displaced by the new Generating Facility. Also, 
Southern Company states that charging the Interconnection Customer only 
an incremental rate would not cover the Generating Facility's use of 
the rest of the Transmission System.
    49. Southern Company states that to truly prevent subsidies, the 
Commission must either (1) allow the direct assignment of 
Interconnection Facilities and NRIS facilities (because they do not 
provide a system benefit) and require the generator (or its customer) 
to pay the embedded transmission rate for delivery service or (2) allow 
all Transmission Providers to implement participant funding. Southern 
Company agrees that any disputes regarding participant funding 
determinations may need to be resolved by an independent entity, but 
asserts that, in the absence of an RTO or other independent entity, the 
Commission is well equipped (and, indeed, charged under sections 205 
and 206 of the Federal Power Act) to resolve such disputes.
    50. Southern Company states that the subsidization issue is 
generally not a concern if the Generating Facility is designated a 
Network Resource of the Transmission Provider, or of its Network 
Customers, contemporaneously with the execution of its interconnection 
agreement. Southern Company argues that the subsidization issue arises 
mainly when a merchant generator has no long-term reservations for 
transmission delivery service from its plant contemporaneously with the 
execution of the interconnection agreement, or when the Interconnection 
Customer and the Transmission Customer are different entities.
    51. On a related matter, some petitioners ask for guidance 
regarding the implementation of incremental pricing in the context of 
generator interconnections. For example, NRECA seeks answers to the 
following questions. Over what period of time should the incremental 
costs be presumed to be amortized? If the Interconnection Customer has 
only a short-term contract for the output of the Generating Facility, 
should the costs be amortized over that short period? If the 
Interconnection Customer has only a short-term contract for the output 
of the Generating Facility, but the Transmission Customer that requests 
delivery of the Generating Facility's power is taking service under a 
long-term transmission contract, should the cost of the Network 
Upgrades be amortized over the length of the transmission contract? 
Should the cost of Network Upgrades be amortized over their useful 
life?
    52. SWTransco claims that the interconnection procedures and 
agreement in Order No. 2003-A do not appear to contain mechanics 
sufficient to allow the pricing concept to be implemented. Southern 
Company argues that the Transmission Provider will not be able to 
calculate an incremental rate with any certainty because it often has 
no reasonable idea regarding the amount of the delivery service that 
might ultimately be taken from the facility (or which entities will 
actually be requesting any such delivery service) or the duration of 
any such service. This is because, in Southern Company's experience, 
merchant generators normally do not seek interconnection and 
transmission delivery services at the same time. At a minimum, the 
Commission must clarify how the incremental pricing calculation could 
be performed for a merchant generator that does not make a request for 
transmission delivery service at the time of the execution of the 
interconnection agreement or when the Interconnection Customer and the 
Transmission Customer are separate entities.
    53. TAPS states that it is unclear from Order No. 2003-A whether or 
how the Commission intends that incremental pricing would be applied to 
network Transmission Customers, given the load ratio share pricing 
required by the OATT.

[[Page 273]]

Commission Conclusion
    54. Order No. 2003-A clarified that the Commission was not 
abandoning any of the fundamental principles that have long guided its 
transmission pricing policy. The Commission's interconnection pricing 
policy continues to allow the Transmission Provider to charge the 
Interconnection Customer a transmission rate that is the higher of the 
incremental cost rate for Network Upgrades required to interconnect the 
Generating Facility or an embedded cost rate for the entire 
Transmission System (including the cost of the Network Upgrades). Order 
No. 2003-A emphasized that this ``higher of'' policy ensures that other 
Transmission Customers, including the Transmission Provider's native 
load, will not subsidize Network Upgrades required to interconnect 
merchant generation.
    55. On rehearing, petitioners raise concerns regarding the 
implementation of this policy and whether other customers are protected 
from having to bear the costs of Network Upgrades under all 
circumstances. Petitioners argue that they can devise certain 
hypothetical cases in which the Transmission Provider must either 
impose some new transmission costs on existing customers or violate the 
Commission's prohibition against ``and'' pricing.
    56. In response to these petitioners, we first reaffirm that an 
important objective of our interconnection pricing policy continues to 
be the protection of existing Transmission Customers, including the 
Transmission Provider's native load, from adverse rate implications 
associated with Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades 
required to interconnect a new Generating Facility. Despite the 
unsupported hypothetical generalizations of some petitioners, we have 
not been presented with any evidence that native load and other 
Transmission Customers cannot be held harmless under our existing 
pricing policy. If a Transmission Provider (or an existing Transmission 
Customer) believes that, for an actual interconnection, it faces 
circumstances where native load and other customers are not held 
harmless, it should make that demonstration in an actual transmission 
rate filing. The Transmission Provider must explain the facts of the 
case and the assumptions on which its calculation is based and provide 
evidentiary support. While we cannot envision any circumstances where 
our existing pricing policy will not fully protect native load and 
other Transmission Customers, we are willing to consider alternative 
pricing proposals under the facts of a specific case. We emphasize that 
the Transmission Provider bears the full burden of showing that any 
such proposal is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential, and is appropriate under the circumstances.
    57. Similarly, with regard to the calculation of incremental rates, 
we are not prescribing generic rules at this time. Rather, we invite 
the Transmission Provider, in the context of an actual interconnection 
agreement or transmission rate filing, to propose a calculation method 
that assigns appropriate cost responsibility to the Interconnection 
Customer and is consistent with applicable Commission policy and 
precedent.
4. Interconnection Products and Services
Rehearing Requests
    58. Some petitioners seek clarification of the provisions of Order 
No. 2003-A governing NRIS and ERIS.
    59. NRECA requests that the Commission clarify that, consistent 
with the OATT (1) only Interconnection Customers that are load serving 
entities may request Network Integration Transmission Service under a 
Transmission Provider's OATT, and (2) only Network Customers can 
designate Network Resources.
    60. TAPS asserts that, as clarified in Order No. 2003-A, the unique 
feature of NRIS has nothing to do with being a ``Network Resource,'' 
which is defined by the OATT as a resource designated by a Network 
Customer under Network Integration Transmission Service. Rather, NRIS 
provides assurance that even absent any transmission service, ``the 
Generating Facility, as well as other generating facilities in the same 
electrical area, can be operated at peak load,'' and that the output of 
the Generating Facility will not be ``bottled up'' under such 
conditions. The name ``Network Resource Interconnection Service,'' 
therefore, is misleading. TAPS recommends an alternative name, such as 
``Enhanced Interconnection Service,'' that more accurately describes 
this Interconnection Service.
    61. Also, TAPS states that the references to ``other Network 
Resources'' in LGIA articles 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2 and LGIP section 3 are 
particularly confusing, because as noted above, ``Network Resource'' is 
defined as a resource designated under Network Integration Transmission 
Service. In other words, the references to ``other'' Network Resources 
assume something that has not necessarily happened in the case of 
resources taking NRIS.
    62. TAPS states that article 4.1.2.2 suggests that generators 
taking NRIS are different from generators taking ERIS with respect to 
their ability to be designated as Network Resources. Specifically, the 
introductory sentences of article 4.1.1.2, especially if read in 
conjunction with LGIA article 4.1.2.2, suggest that NRIS is the 
preferred route to obtaining a Network Resource designation under the 
OATT. Although the preamble of Order No. 2003-A otherwise makes clear 
that a resource with ERIS may be designated as a Network Resource, it 
confusingly states elsewhere that ``Network Resource Interconnection 
Service makes it possible for the Generating Facility to be designated 
as a Network Resource.''
    63. Similarly, TAPS states that LGIA article 4.1.1.1 and LGIP 
section 3.2.2.1 continue to describe ERIS as providing ``as available'' 
access, without restricting application of that limit, i.e., without 
adding language such as ``unless combined with Network Integration 
Transmission Service or Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service,'' 
which would be consistent with the preamble of Order No. 2003-A. TAPS 
is concerned that LGIP section 3 lacks any reference to the ability of 
an ERIS customer to obtain anything other than ``as available'' 
transmission service. The Commission should modify LGIP section 3 and 
LGIA articles 4.1.1.1, 4.1.1.2, and 4.1.2.2 to eliminate any confusion.
    64. EPSA states that the Commission has introduced some uncertainty 
as to the additional studies or additional upgrades that might be 
associated with NRIS. It asks the Commission to clarify that any 
references to such studies or upgrades apply only to optional upgrades 
to reduce congestion or to customer-specific delivery issues, not to 
upgrades related to the designation of a NRIS generator as a Network 
Resource. If the Commission does not clarify that the Interconnection 
Customer's responsibility to pay for additional studies and upgrades is 
to be limited to the circumstances described above, EPSA requests 
rehearing on this issue. EPSA also urges the Commission to require 
Transmission Providers to include in their compliance filings the 
protocols and procedures they will use to determine when additional 
studies or upgrades are needed.
    65. Intergen asserts that the studies associated with NRIS and with 
Network Integration Transmission Service are essentially identical. 
Thus, a NRIS customer and a Network Integration Transmission Service 
customer should

[[Page 274]]

build the same Network Upgrades. However, Intergen interprets the 
clarification in Order No. 2003-A to mean that the NRIS customer will 
not receive any delivery assurances despite the fact that it is 
fronting the costs of the Network Upgrades needed to permit Network 
Integration Transmission Service. The Commission's statement that the 
Interconnection Customer's Generating Facility may have to be restudied 
and pay for additional upgrades once it is designated as a Network 
Resource, according to Intergen, eviscerates the value of NRIS.
    66. In addition, Intergen states that, if the Network Integration 
Transmission Service studies reveal that the Interconnection Customer 
cannot acquire Network Integration Transmission Service without 
significant upgrades, and the Interconnection Customer cannot use its 
credits for service sourcing elsewhere on the Transmission Provider's 
Transmission System, the credits could be ``locked'' into a facility 
that cannot move its power. Intergen asks for further clarification or 
rehearing of this aspect of Order No. 2003-A. Intergen also asks the 
Commission to clarify that, because NRIS uses studies similar to those 
used to determine whether Network Integration Transmission Service is 
available, and because the Interconnection Customer is paying for the 
upgrades associated with those studies, an NRIS generator does not need 
to be restudied and does not need to construct additional Network 
Upgrades when designated as a Network Resource.
    67. NRECA states that NERC and others had stressed in earlier 
comments to the Commission that the requirement in LGIP section 3.2.2.2 
that the Transmission Provider study the Transmission System ``at peak 
load, under a variety of severely stressed conditions * * *.'' was 
insufficient to ensure the reliability of the Transmission System. 
Order No. 2003-A failed to address NERC's concern over the wording of 
section 3.2.2.2 of the LGIP. NRECA argues that, although the Commission 
indicates that it will allow a Transmission Provider to petition for 
changes to the study criteria subject to the ``consistent with or 
superior to'' standard, such an ad hoc approach to this important 
reliability issue is insufficient. It notes that Order No. 2003-A 
indicated that a threshold requirement for obtaining the Commission's 
permission to deviate from the pro forma LGIP will be whether there is 
an accepted regional practice addressing this issue. However, NRECA 
claims that in many regions there is no such established practice. 
Consequently, a Transmission Provider in such regions would be barred 
from making the necessary changes to the NRIS study criteria.
Commission Conclusion
    68. Most of the questions and concerns raised by petitioners 
concerning interconnection products and services were fully addressed 
in Order No. 2003-A, and we will not repeat those conclusions here. We 
remind petitioners that, to gain a full understanding of Order No. 
2003-A's treatment of NRIS and ERIS, the preamble, LGIP and LGIA must 
be read together. To include all of the relevant preamble discussion in 
the LGIP and LGIA would make those documents unwieldy.
    69. In response to TAPS's concerns about the descriptions of NRIS 
and ERIS and the relationship between NRIS, ERIS and Network 
Integration Transmission Service, we note that the Commission addressed 
these matters in detail at P 530-537 of Order No. 2003-A. Also, we 
disagree with TAPS's assertion that the name ``Network Resource 
Interconnection Service'' is misleading. The name is suitable given 
that the principal purpose of the service is to allow the Generating 
Facility to qualify for designation as a Network Resource by a Network 
Customer. However, we agree that the use of the word ``other'' as a 
modifier of ``Network Resources'' in LGIP sections 1 and 3.2.2.1 and 
LGIA articles 1 and 4.1.2.2 is confusing. Therefore, we are eliminating 
it from those sections and articles. In response to NRECA, we clarify 
that we are not changing the requirement of Order No. 888 that only a 
load serving entity can become a Network Customer and only a Network 
Customer can designate a Generating Facility as a Network Resource.
    70. In response to EPSA's and Intergen's concerns that an 
Interconnection Customer taking NRIS may be required to pay for 
additional studies and additional upgrades to have the Generating 
Facility designated as a Network Resource, we note that the Commission 
addressed this matter at P 544-545 of Order No. 2003-A; no further 
response is needed.
    71. NRECA argues that the study criteria for NRIS are insufficient, 
and is concerned that the Commission will not allow a Transmission 
Provider to adopt different criteria if there is no established 
practice addressing this issue in the Transmission Provider's region. 
Our experience with the Order No. 2003 and Order No. 2003-A compliance 
filings leads us to agree with NRECA that the orders' requirements 
regarding the Transmission Provider's use of alternative NRIS study 
criteria are unnecessarily burdensome. In their compliance filings, a 
number of Transmission Providers proposed to modify the NRIS study 
criteria to allow them to study the Transmission System under non-peak 
load conditions. Some of these Transmission Providers supported their 
requests with references to criteria documented in their reliability 
region's planning standards, while others explained that the use of 
their proposed criteria is a generally accepted regional practice. The 
Commission generally accepted these proposals subject to certain 
conditions.\18\ Based on our experience with these compliance filings, 
we now conclude that it is no longer necessary to require the 
Transmission Provider that wishes to include non-peak load criteria in 
its NRIS study process to demonstrate that the use of such study 
criteria is consistent with or superior to the requirements of pro 
forma LGIP section 3.2.2.2. Rather, we will allow the non-independent 
Transmission Provider to adopt study criteria that consider non-peak 
load conditions if the Transmission Provider, upon request by the 
Interconnection Customer, agrees to provide the Interconnection 
Customer with a written justification for doing so. We emphasize, 
however, that the Transmission Provider must provide comparable 
service; that is, it must study non-peak conditions for the 
interconnection of its own and its affiliates' Generating Facilities on 
the same basis that it studies non-peak conditions for the non-
affiliated Interconnection Customer. To implement this change, we are 
inserting the following sentences after the first sentence of LGIP 
section 3.2.2.2:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See, e.g., Southern Company Services, Inc., 107 FERC ] 
61,317, order on reh'g and compliance, 109 FERC ] 61,014 (2004); 
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 108 FERC ] 61,018 (2004); Florida 
Power & Light Co., 108 FERC ] 61,239 (2004).

    The Transmission Provider may also study the Transmission System 
under non-peak load conditions. However, upon request by the 
Interconnection Customer, the Transmission Provider must explain in 
writing to the Interconnection Customer why the study of non-peak 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
load conditions is required for reliability purposes.

    This should simplify the compliance process and satisfy NRECA's 
concerns.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See also infra Part III.D.4 (explaining that a non-
independent Transmission Provider on compliance may propose 
additional operating requirements that are not codified or 
referencedinit Applicable Reliability council's standards.)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 275]]

5. Generator Balancing Service Arrangements
    72. In Order No. 2003-A, the Commission deleted article 4.3 from 
the pro forma LGIA, thereby eliminating any reference in the LGIA to 
the Interconnection Customer's obligation to make generator balancing 
service arrangements before submitting a schedule for delivery service 
that identifies the Interconnection Customer's Generating Facility as 
the Point of Receipt for the scheduled delivery.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Order No. 2003-A at P 663-667.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rehearing Requests
    73. NRECA and Southern Company argue that Order No. 2003-A is at 
odds with Order No. 888-A, which anticipated that generator balancing 
service arrangements would be included in the interconnection 
agreement.
Commission Conclusion
    74. We disagree with NRECA and Southern Company. While it is true 
that Order No. 888-A indicated that the Commission expected the 
interconnection agreement to include a provision for generator 
balancing service arrangements, it also included the following:

    This agreement will be tailored to the parties' specific 
standards and circumstances, and, although such arrangements must 
not be unduly preferential or discriminatory (e.g., must be 
comparable for all wholesale sellers, including the transmission 
provider's own wholesale sales), we prefer not to set these 
standards generically.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Order No. 888-A at 30,230.

    75. The policies as set forth in Order No. 888-A remain unchanged. 
Thus, we are not including a provision for generator balancing service 
arrangements in the pro forma LGIA. However, we recognize that some 
Transmission Providers may prefer to include such a provision in the 
interconnection agreement that it enters into with the Interconnection 
Customer, rather than in a separate agreement. Therefore, we are 
permitting the Transmission Provider to include a provision for 
generator balancing service arrangements in individual interconnection 
agreements. Such provisions should be tailored to the Parties' specific 
standards and circumstances, and are subject to Commission approval.

C. Independent Transmission Provider Obligations

    76. Order No. 2003-A provided that if a non-independent 
Transmission Owner's transmission facilities are under the operational 
control of an RTO or ISO, the RTO's or ISO's Commission-approved 
standards and procedures govern all interconnections with those 
facilities. It also provided that a non-independent Transmission Owner 
that belongs to an RTO or ISO but has operational control over some of 
its Transmission System must have its own set of interconnection 
agreements and procedures separate from the RTO's or ISO's that govern 
interconnections with the portions of its Transmission System over 
which it retains operational control.
Rehearing Requests
    77. NYISO asks the Commission to not apply the pro forma LGIP and 
LGIA to certain facilities under New York Transmission Owners' (NYTO) 
control for the period between January 20, 2004, which was the date 
that non-independent Transmission Providers were required to adopt the 
pro forma LGIP and LGIA, and Commission action on NYISO's compliance 
filing, which occurred August 6, 2004.
    78. TAPS states that Order No. 2003-A suggested that a non-
independent Transmission Owner that is a member of an RTO or ISO could 
have its own tariff for interconnections with transmission facilities 
over which it retains operational control.\22\ According to TAPS, the 
Commission should make clear that where the Interconnection Service is 
necessary to effectuate service under the OATT of an RTO that has 
operational control of transmission facilities owned by a non-
independent Transmission Owner, that Transmission Owner may not layer 
on a separate set of interconnection procedures and agreements for 
facilities over which it maintains operational control. TAPS contends 
that such layering is inconsistent with Order No. 2003-A and Commission 
precedent, which provide that the RTO or ISO must offer ``one-stop 
shopping'' for interconnection.\23\ At a minimum, TAPS continues, the 
Commission should subject any non-independent Transmission Owner within 
an RTO to a heavy burden to demonstrate why an Interconnection Customer 
should be unable to obtain through the RTO or ISO the necessary 
interconnection with the Transmission Owner's facilities that are not 
subject to the RTO's operational control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Order No. 2003-A at P 53.
    \23\ Id. at P 785; see also Delmarva Power & Light Company, 106 
FERC ] 61,290 (2004) (addressing load-side interconnections).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Conclusion
    79. NYISO's concerns have been mooted by the Commission's orders in 
response to compliance filings submitted by the New York utilities.\24\ 
Accordingly, there is no need to address them here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ New York Independent System Operator, Inc., 108 FERC ] 
61,159 (2004), reh'g--pending (NYISO); ISO New England, 109 FERC ] 
61,147 (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    80. In response to TAPS, we clarify that a Transmission Owner that 
belongs to an RTO or ISO cannot require a separate set of 
interconnection procedures or agreement for interconnection with 
facilities within the RTO's or ISO's operational control; i.e., a 
transmission facility cannot be governed by two separate sets of 
interconnection procedures and agreements . If the Transmission Owner 
retains operational control of some jurisdictional facilities, and 
those facilities are not subject to the interconnection procedures 
under the OATT of the RTO or ISO,\25\ then the Transmission Owner must 
have a separate set of interconnection procedures and agreement 
applicable to these facilities. An Interconnection Customer seeking to 
interconnect with the facilities within the Transmission Owner's 
operational control will be subject only to the Transmission Owner's 
interconnection agreement and procedures. We acknowledge that this may 
create inconsistent interconnection procedures and agreements within a 
region controlled by an RTO or ISO, or result in confusion as to which 
interconnections procedures and agreement applies to the facilities to 
which the Interconnection Customer wishes to interconnect. To address 
this issue, we are allowing a Transmission Owner that retains control 
over some jurisdictional facilities to subject these facilities to an 
RTO- or ISO-controlled interconnection process. In such instance, the 
Transmission Owner must agree to transfer to the RTO or ISO control 
over the significant aspects of the interconnection process under the 
Transmission Owner's OATT interconnection process, including the 
performance of all Interconnection Studies and cost determinations 
applicable to Network Upgrades.\26\ Even

[[Page 276]]

under this modified approach, there should be only one applicable 
interconnection agreement and one set of procedures for each 
Interconnection Request for a Commission-jurisdictional 
interconnection.

D. Issues Related to the Large Generator Interconnection Agreement

1. Stand Alone Network Upgrades
    81. LGIA article 5.2 in Order No. 2003 provided, among other 
things, that the Interconnection Customer assumes responsibility for 
the design, procurement, and construction of Stand Alone Network 
Upgrades, the Interconnection Customer shall transfer control of such 
upgrades to the Transmission Provider. Order No. 2003-A revised LGIA 
article 5.2 to provide that ``[u]nless Parties otherwise agree, 
Interconnection Customer shall transfer ownership of Transmission 
Provider's Interconnection Facilities and Stand Alone Network Upgrades 
to Transmission Provider.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ For example, the RTO or ISO conducts all studies, 
determines costs, identifies necessary Network Upgrades, and 
controls all aspects of the interconnection process.
    \26\ See New England Power Pool, 109 FERC ] 61,155 at P 27, 74 
(2004); see also NYISO at P 123-124. In NYISO, the Commission 
conditionally waived the requirement that the Transmission Owners 
adopt the pro forma LGIP and LGIA for transmission facilities over 
which Transmission Owners retained operational control. Waiver was 
granted due in part to the commitment by the Transmission Owners to 
relinquish operational control over the relevant facilities to the 
RTO or ISO upon Commission issuance of the NYISO order.
    \27\ Order No. 2003-A, LGIA article 5.2(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rehearing Request
    82. NRECA seeks clarification that if a transmission-owning 
Interconnection Customer is a load serving entity that has the right to 
own or operate the Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities 
or Stand Alone Network Upgrades under existing state or other law or 
under pre-existing contracts, Order No. 2003-A does not supersede such 
pre-existing contractual or legal/regulatory rights in a way that would 
bar such a load serving entity from retaining ownership.
    83. TAPS makes similar arguments. It argues that while it may be 
reasonable for the Transmission Provider to operate and control the 
Interconnection Facilities and Stand Alone Network Upgrades constructed 
by the Interconnection Customer, compelling the Interconnection 
Customer to give up ownership contributes to monopolization of 
transmission ownership. Allowing Interconnection Customers that are 
load serving entities to retain ownership does not mean that operation 
and control of the Transmission System will be fragmented or that 
reliability will be compromised; indeed, some TAPS members already own 
transmission facilities. TAPS further notes that while Order No. 2003-A 
states that allowing the Interconnection Customer to retain ownership 
is ``inconsistent with existing Commission precedent,'' \28\ it does 
not cite to the precedent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Order No. 2003 at P 230.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    84. TAPS further argues that where an Interconnection Customer has 
constructed Interconnection Facilities and Stand Alone Network 
Upgrades, the customer should have the option of owning the facilities 
and receiving a lease payment or other credit recognizing the 
contribution that the facilities make to the Transmission System (e.g., 
as a credit for customer-owned facilities consistent with section 30.9 
of the pro forma OATT). Allowing transmission dependent utilities to 
retain ownership takes advantage of these utilities' solid credit, 
reduces regulatory conflicts, and facilitates siting through joint 
planning and ownership of the Transmission System.
Commission Conclusion
    85. Under ordinary circumstances, the Transmission Provider assumes 
the risk and responsibility for reliably operating its Transmission 
System. Giving the Interconnection Customer the option of owning 
Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities or Stand Alone 
Network Upgrades without the Transmission Provider's consent raises 
reliability and liability issues arising from the operation of these 
types of facilities by an entity not responsible for the rest of the 
Transmission System.\29\ While TAPS highlights some of the benefits 
that might result from giving the Interconnection Customer the 
unilateral option of owning the Transmission Provider's Interconnection 
Facilities or Stand Alone Network Upgrades, on balance, the risks 
outweigh the benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See, e.g., Virginia Electric & Power Co., 94 FERC ] 61,164 
at 61,589 (2001) (explaining that it is appropriate for the 
Transmission Provider to construct and own Transmission System 
facilities, but stopping short of requiring ownership by the 
Transmission Provider), order on remand on other grounds sub nom. 
American Electric Power Service Corp., 99 FERC ] 61,177 (2002), 
order on clarification, 100 FERC ] 61,150 (2002); Cambridge Electric 
Light Co., 96 FERC ] 61,205 at 61,874 (2001) (refusing to require 
generator ownership of certain Interconnection Facilities because of 
questions of reliability and liability).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    86. In response to NRECA, Order No. 2003-A did not supersede pre-
existing contractual or legal rights that would bar a load serving 
entity from retaining ownership of any Transmission Provider's 
Interconnection Facilities or Stand Alone Network Upgrades it 
constructs. Such pre-existing agreements are grandfathered and are not 
subject to Order No. 2003.
2. Permits and Licensing Requirements
    87. Order No. 2003 required the Transmission Provider to provide 
the Interconnection Customer with permitting assistance for the 
Generating Facility.\30\ Order No. 2003-A did not change this 
provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ LGIA article 5.14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rehearing Request
    88. Cinergy notes that Order No. 2003-A rejected its request for 
rehearing which argued that the Commission should restrict this 
requirement to the permitting of the Transmission Provider or 
Transmission Owner's Interconnection Facilities or Network 
Upgrades.\31\ Cinergy requests clarification that, consistent with LGIA 
article 5.13, which addresses efforts by the Transmission Provider on 
behalf of the Interconnection Customer regarding lands of other 
property owners, the costs for any permitting assistance provided per 
the provisions of LGIA article 5.14 shall be the responsibility of the 
Interconnection Customer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Order No. 2003-A at P 303.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Conclusion
    89. Although Cinergy's argument is untimely and should have been 
presented in response to Order No. 2003, we will address the argument 
to provide clarification. Cinergy points to article 5.13, where the 
Commission requires the Interconnection Customer to pay for the 
Transmission Provider's efforts to obtain access to the lands of other 
property owners; however, the assistance provided under article 5.14 is 
different. This is because article 5.13 requires the Transmission 
Provider to participate, on the Interconnection Customer's behalf, in a 
process that may include lengthy and contentious proceedings and 
eminent domain proceedings.\32\ Article 5.14, on the other hand, 
requires that the Parties merely assist and cooperate in good faith in 
their efforts to secure the necessary permits. Such assistance is 
reciprocal and imposes costs to be borne by each Party. The Commission 
considers these costs a cost of doing business and is not requiring 
compensation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Order No. 2003 at P 251; Order No. 2003-A at P 300.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    90. Article 5.14 contains language suggesting that the Parties 
should amend their interconnection agreement to ``specify the 
allocation of the responsibilities'' to obtain permits, licenses, and 
authorizations. Because article 14.1 already contains language 
addressing the Parties' rights and responsibilities, we are amending 
article 5.14 to eliminate the suggestion that Parties should amend 
their interconnection agreement to allocate these responsibilities.

[[Page 277]]

3. Tax Issues
a. Security Requirements
    91. Order No. 2003 allowed the Transmission Provider to require the 
Interconnection Customer to provide security, but not after the former 
receives a private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) determining that the payments from the Interconnection Customer 
to the Transmission Provider are not taxable as income to the 
Transmission Provider. Order No. 2003-A revised the policy and allowed 
the Transmission Provider to require security even if it secures such a 
ruling.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Order No. 2003-A at P 343-344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rehearing Requests
    92. Southern Company argues that the security requirement, which 
should reflect the cost consequences of any current tax liability as of 
January 1 of each year, is impractical and may leave the Transmission 
Provider with inadequate security. The IRS determines income based on 
the fair market value, which will be based on all facts at the time the 
``subsequent taxable event'' takes place.\34\ Southern Company argues 
that it will be impractical to quantify a security amount that will 
approximate the fluctuating current tax liabilities as of January 1 of 
each year because the amount of recognizable income cannot be estimated 
when the interconnection agreement is signed. The new policy could 
leave the Transmission Provider at risk if the ``cost consequences'' 
are underestimated. Therefore, the Commission should restore the 
original Order No. 2003 language that allowed the Transmission Provider 
to require security based on estimated, maximum tax liability. 
Alternatively, additional clarification is needed on the correct 
methodology for calculating the security that the Transmission Provider 
may demand from the Interconnection Customer to determine the ``current 
income tax liability as of January 1 of each year.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ A ``subsequent taxable event'' is an occurrence that makes 
taxable payments a Transmission Provider had concluded were not 
taxable; it creates a current tax liability for the Transmission 
Provider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    93. Southern Company also argues that the pro forma OATT and its 
own OATT require that appropriate security be provided and 
maintained.\35\ It argues that the phrase ``and maintain'' should be 
added to LGIA article 5.17.3 to clarify that security not only must be 
provided, but also maintained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Citing pro forma OATT section 11, Southern Company OATT 
section 11(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    94. EPSA argues that the Commission should not extend the 
Transmission Provider's right to require security beyond the point in 
time when a favorable private letter ruling from the IRS is obtained. 
Receipt of such a letter ruling significantly reduces the already small 
risk of tax liability, and thus, the need for security. As an example 
of the costs associated with the policy, EPSA explains that requiring 
the Interconnection Customer to post a $3 million credit (assuming a 30 
percent tax gross-up \36\ rate on a $10 million interconnection) would 
have an ongoing cost of $20,000 to $60,000 per year to secure the risk. 
The Commission should restore the Order No. 2003 policy. This would be 
consistent with the rulings in Order No. 2003-A that the security 
should track the cost consequences of current tax liability over time 
and that the security should be eliminated if the Transmission Provider 
collects an indemnification payment from the Interconnection Customer 
to cover the taxes payable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ A tax gross-up for income taxes is a dollar amount 
calculated to determine the Interconnection Customer's payment 
needed to indemnify the Transmission Provider for any current tax 
liability associated with payments the Interconnection Customer 
makes for the Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities and 
Network Upgrades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Conclusion

    95. Order No. 2003-A concluded that it was unreasonable to allow 
the Transmission Provider to require security for the maximum amount of 
potential tax liability.\37\ Providing some security helps to address 
the risk that the Interconnection Customer will not be able to fulfill 
its full indemnification obligations should the interconnection credits 
be deemed taxable at some future time. Because the potential tax 
liability will change over time, it is reasonable that the required 
level of security also change over time. As Southern notes, there may 
be a situation where the amount of the payment for Interconnection 
Facilities deemed taxable can be based on the fair value of the 
property transferred under IRS policy or procedure. If so, the 
Interconnection Customer can be asked to pay the Transmission Provider 
only the present value of the cost consequences of the current tax 
liability based on that fair value, which also can change over time. 
The possibility that the potential tax payment may be based on the fair 
value of the property instead of some other measure does not justify 
allowing a security requirement to be imposed in excess of the cost 
consequences of the potential current tax liability determined as of 
January 1 of each year. Southern's request for rehearing on this point 
is denied. We, therefore, reiterate that it is excessive to require 
that an Interconnection Customer maintain security equal to the maximum 
theoretical tax liability calculated at the outset of the agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Order No. 2003-A at P 343.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    96. Although Southern Company's argument is untimely and should 
have been presented in response to Order No. 2003, we will address the 
argument to provide clarification. Article 5.17.3 allows the 
Transmission Provider to require the Interconnection Customer to 
provide security for Interconnection Facilities ``in an amount equal to 
the cost consequences of any current tax liability under'' article 
5.17. We believe it is unnecessary to specify that such security be 
``maintained'' because this requirement is implicit in the provision's 
reference to ``current tax liability.''
    97. Order No. 2003-A explained that the security for tax liability 
in LGIA article 5.17.3 protects the Transmission Provider against the 
possibility that the IRS will change its policy or that there will be a 
subsequent taxable event.\38\ A private letter ruling from the IRS does 
not address these risks. While the ruling may show that the IRS does 
not currently consider these payments taxable, the risk remains that 
the IRS may change its policy or there will be a subsequent taxable 
event. Thus, we reject EPSA's request for rehearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Id. at P 344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Elimination of the Interconnection Customer's Right To Contest or 
Appeal Taxes
    98. Order No. 2003 gave the Interconnection Customer the right to 
appeal, protest, seek abatement of, or otherwise protest a Government 
Authority's determination that payments made to the Transmission 
Provider are income subject to taxation. Order No. 2003-A gave to the 
Transmission Provider in LGIA articles 5.17.7 and 5.17.9 the sole 
discretion to protest such a determination.
Rehearing Requests
    99. EPSA argues that the Commission should not have eliminated the 
Interconnection Customer's right to contest or appeal taxes for which 
the Interconnection Customer is ultimately liable. A Transmission 
Provider with multiple controversial tax matters might be able to trade 
off a concession on one matter for relief on another. In such a case, 
the Transmission Provider would have a fiduciary responsibility to its 
shareholders to concede to the IRS a tax issue for which it is fully 
indemnified.

[[Page 278]]

Also, the Interconnection Customer's obligation to pay for any tax 
controversies pursued on its behalf should ensure that it will not 
force the Transmission Provider to undertake frivolous contests and 
appeals.
    100. Southern Company notes that although the Commission agreed 
that the Interconnection Customer's settlement obligation in LGIA 
article 5.17.7 should be subject to a tax gross-up to fully compensate 
the Transmission Provider for income taxes, it did not amend the 
article to confirm this intention.
Commission Conclusion
    101. Order No. 2003-A allowed the Transmission Provider to 
determine whether and how to contest a Governmental Authority's tax 
determination.\39\ This is reasonable because otherwise the 
Interconnection Customer could force the Transmission Provider to 
pursue a claim that the Transmission Provider does not believe is 
valid. Allowing the Interconnection Customer to participate in the 
appeal process,\40\ however, should help to counteract the Transmission 
Provider's ability to negotiate with the IRS in a manner detrimental to 
the Interconnection Customer's interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Id. at P 372.
    \40\ LGIA article 5.17.7 requires the Transmission Provider to 
keep the Interconnection Customer informed of the contest's 
progress, to consider in good faith the Interconnection Customer's 
suggestions about conducting the contest, and to reasonably permit 
the Interconnection Customer or its representative to attend contest 
proceedings. The Transmission Provider may also agree to settle only 
after obtaining either the Interconnection Customer's consent or 
written advice from a nationally recognized tax counsel who is 
reasonably acceptable to the Interconnection Customer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    102. We are amending LGIA article 5.17.7 in response to Southern 
Company's comment.
c. Transmission Credits for Tax Payments
    103. Order No. 2003 provided that, if the Transmission Provider 
requires the Interconnection Customer to pay a tax gross-up, it will 
refund all tax gross-up amounts as transmission credits. Order No. 
2003-A amended article 11.4.1 to clarify that the Transmission Provider 
need refund only the tax gross-up amounts associated with Network 
Upgrades.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Order No. 2003-A at P 351.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rehearing Request
    104. Southern Company repeats the argument it made in response to 
Order No. 2003 that requiring the Transmission Provider to provide 
transmission credits for tax gross-up or other related tax payments in 
connection with Network Upgrades forces retail customers to subsidize 
the Interconnection Customer.
Commission Conclusion
    105. Order No. 2003-A excepted from the total dollars refundable as 
transmission credits any amount related to the tax gross-up for 
Interconnection Facilities.\42\ Order No. 2003-A distinguished tax 
payments related to Network Upgrades from tax payments related to 
Interconnection Facilities.\43\ Because the tax payments related to 
Interconnection Facilities are not ultimately recoverable in 
transmission rates, the Interconnection Customer must reimburse the 
Transmission Provider for these payments to make the Transmission 
Provider whole. For this reason, pro forma LGIA article 11.4.1 excludes 
from the refundable total any costs related to tax payments for 
Interconnection Facilities. And because all costs associated with 
Network Upgrades are recoverable through transmission rates, including 
the cost of funding any related current tax liability, the Transmission 
Provider should refund to the Interconnection Customer as transmission 
credits those tax gross-up or other related tax payments initially 
funded by the Interconnection Customer.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ LGIA article 11.4.1.
    \43\ Order No. 2003-A at P 338-341.
    \44\ See id. at P. 341.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Applicable Reliability Council Operating Requirements
    106. LGIA article 9.1 requires the Interconnection Customer and the 
Transmission Provider to comply with the Applicable Reliability Council 
operating requirements. The Transmission Provider may impose 
supplemental interconnection requirements not specifically required by 
the Applicable Reliability Council, particularly those related to 
system protection and safety, if the Applicable Reliability Council 
requirements specifically allow such requirements. The Transmission 
Provider must also impose such requirements on itself and all other 
Interconnection Customers, including its Affiliates.
Rehearing Request
    107. NRECA complains that the Transmission Provider's inability to 
impose supplemental interconnection requirements if they are not 
referenced in the Applicable Reliability Council documents creates 
significant risks to the safety and reliability of the Transmission 
Provider's Transmission System.
Commission Conclusion
    108. We deny NRECA's request for rehearing. Order No. 2003-A stated 
that most operational requirements are already contained in or 
referenced in the Applicable Reliability Council's standards. Where 
such operational requirements are not specifically contained in or 
referenced in those standards, we strongly encourage the Transmission 
Provider to seek to have such requirements codified. As provided in 
Order No. 2003-A, the Transmission Provider is free to propose 
variations, provided that it can demonstrate that they are consistent 
with or superior to the pro forma LGIP.
5. Power Factor Design Criteria
    109. LGIA article 9.6.1 requires the Interconnection Customer to 
design the Generating Facility to maintain a power factor at the Point 
of Interconnection within the range of 0.95 leading to 0.95 lagging, 
unless the Transmission Provider establishes different requirements 
that apply to all generators in its Control Area on a comparable basis. 
This provision does not apply to wind generators.
Rehearing Request
    110. SoCal Edison argues that wind generators should not be 
exempted from the power factor requirement. Such an exemption may lead 
to uncontrolled voltage problems. It also contends that one commenter 
misled the Commission when it asserted that wind generators are unable 
to meet the power factor requirement; wind generating facilities have 
been able to meet this requirement for many years.
Commission Conclusion
    111. Order No. 2003-A adopted Appendix G of the LGIA (Requirements 
of Generators Relying on Newer Technologies) as a placeholder for 
future interconnection requirements specific to wind and other 
alternative technologies.\45\ The Commission included Appendix G in the 
LGIA because (1) a particular LGIA or LGIP requirement might not be 
suitable for those technologies and (2) those technologies might call 
for a slightly different approach to interconnection. This includes the 
power factor design criteria requirement in LGIA article 9.6.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Order No. 2003-A at fn 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    112. On September 24, 2004, Commission staff held a conference to 
discuss the technical requirements for

[[Page 279]]

the interconnection of wind generators and other alternative 
technologies, the needs of transmission operators for voltage support 
from large wind farms, and the need for creating specific requirements 
in Appendix G to accommodate their interconnection.\46\ Among other 
things, the conferees spoke about whether the power factor design 
criteria in Order No. 2003-A are reasonable for these technologies. The 
Commission is still evaluating the transcript of the conference and 
comments filed afterwards. Until the Commission decides how to proceed 
based upon the record in that proceeding, it will continue to exempt 
wind generators from the power factor design criteria in LGIA article 
9.6.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Interconnection for Wind Energy and Other Alternative 
Technologies, Docket No. PL04-15-000; Standardization of Small 
Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Docket No. 
RM02-12-000; and Standardizing Generator Interconnection Agreements 
and Procedures, Docket Nos. RM02-1-001, RM002-1-005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Payment for Reactive Power
    113. LGIA article 9.6.3 requires the Transmission Provider to pay 
the Interconnection Customer for reactive power the Interconnection 
Customer provides or absorbs when the Transmission Provider asks the 
Interconnection Customer to operate its Generating Facility outside a 
specified power factor range, provided that if it pays its own or 
affiliated generators for reactive power service within the specified 
range, it must also pay the Interconnection Customer. Payments are to 
be under the Interconnection Customer's rate on file with the 
Commission, unless service is under a Commission-approved RTO or ISO 
tariff. Order 2003-A clarified that there is nothing in LGIA article 
9.6.3 that requires the Interconnection Customer to run its Generating 
Facility solely to provide reactive power to the Transmission Provider 
simply because it has an interconnection agreement with the 
Transmission Provider.
Rehearing Requests
    114. The Commission stated in Order No. 2003-A that there is 
nothing in LGIA article 9.6.3 that requires the Interconnection 
Customer to run its Generating Facility solely to provide reactive 
power to the Transmission Provider simply because it has an 
interconnection agreement with the Transmission Provider. AEP notes 
that in Order No. 2003, the Commission agreed with Calpine ``* * * that 
if the Transmission Provider pays its own or its affiliated generators 
for reactive power within the established range it must also pay the 
Interconnection Customer.'' These two statements are inconsistent, 
claims AEP. The Transmission Provider is required to offer ``Reactive 
Power and Voltage Control from Generation Resources Service'' (Schedule 
2 Service) under Order No. 888. The Transmission Provider thus has a 
responsibility to keep its own generators on line and be able to 
provide reactive power to allow delivery service on demand anywhere on 
its electric system. AEP notes that the Transmission Provider is 
generally paid for providing this service to retail customers through a 
bundled rate. The cost of providing this service to wholesale customers 
is recovered through transmission rates--not through a payment to the 
Transmission Provider's generators, as Calpine had suggested. In 
contrast, the Interconnection Customer has no such obligation. AEP asks 
the Commission to clarify that a Transmission Provider that is required 
to provide Schedule 2 Service, and that charges for it accordingly, is 
not ``paying its own generators'' for reactive power within the 
established range and thus triggering a responsibility to pay the 
Interconnection Customer in the same manner.
    115. AEP also seeks clarification that Order No. 2003-A does not 
prejudge the manner in which the Interconnection Customer should be 
paid for providing reactive power service.
    116. Calpine, EPSA, and PSEG argue that the Interconnection 
Customer's right to be paid for providing reactive power should not 
hinge on whether the Transmission Provider pays its own or its 
Affiliate's generators. They contend that their generators provide 
reactive power service that is similar to Schedule 2 Service and, 
therefore, they should receive comparable compensation. They argue that 
they should be paid for reactive power provided, whether within or 
outside of the established power factor range. They also argue that the 
Interconnection Customer incurs an opportunity cost when its Generating 
Facility must provide reactive power when it reduces real power output. 
Finally, they state that some regions have mechanisms to compensate for 
providing reactive power \47\ and seek clarification that LGIA article 
9.6.3 will not disturb those arrangements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ E.g., PJM, NYISO, and ISO New England.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    117. Reliant states that Order No. 2003-A was an improvement over 
Order No. 2003. However, it contends that the Commission should 
reinstate the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR) language, 
which provided that an Interconnection Customer could file a tariff 
with the Commission to secure compensation for reactive power service. 
Reliant states that the ANOPR language is balanced and negotiated.
Commission Conclusion
    118. We disagree with AEP's assertion that there is a contradiction 
in the Commission's clarifications in Order No. 2003-A. The intent of 
the first clarification was to ensure that the Transmission Provider 
could not demand that the Interconnection Customer operate its 
Generating Facility solely to provide reactive power. The 
Interconnection Customer, however, may be required by the Transmission 
Provider to provide reactive power from time to time when its 
Generating Facility is in operation.
    119. As to the second clarification, we further clarify that while 
the Transmission Provider is not ``paying'' its own or affiliated 
generators directly for providing reactive power within the specified 
range, the owner of the generator is nonetheless being compensated for 
that service when the Transmission Provider includes reactive power 
related costs in its transmission revenue requirement. Therefore, the 
``trigger'' to compensate the Interconnection Customer for providing 
this service is not eliminated, as AEP argues. We require that an 
Interconnection Customer be treated comparably with the Transmission 
Provider and its Affiliates. Accordingly, we are requiring the 
Transmission Provider to pay the Interconnection Customer for providing 
reactive power within the specified range if the Transmission Provider 
so pays its own generators or those of its Affiliates.
    120. We also clarify that Order No. 2003-A does not prejudge how 
the Interconnection Customer is to be compensated for providing 
reactive power. LGIP article 9.6.3, as revised in Order No. 2003-A, 
states that such payments are to be provided under a filed rate 
schedule unless service is provided under a Commission-approved RTO or 
ISO tariff.
    121. We also clarify that there is nothing in LGIA article 9.6.3 
that disturbs any present arrangements for reactive power compensation.
    122. In response to Reliant, we decline to substitute the 
referenced ANOPR language because the ANOPR language was, at best, 
vague.
7. Security
    123. LGIA article 11.5 requires the Interconnection Customer, among 
other

[[Page 280]]

things, to provide a form of security ``reasonably acceptable to 
Transmission Provider'' and ``consistent with the Uniform Commercial 
Code.'' The security shall be ``in an amount sufficient to cover the 
costs for constructing, procuring and installing the applicable portion 
of Transmission Provider's Interconnection Facilities, Network 
Upgrades, or Distribution Upgrades and shall be reduced on a dollar-
for-dollar basis for payments made to Transmission Provider for these 
purposes.''
Rehearing Request
    124. Southern Company argues that LGIA article 11.5 should include 
an obligation to maintain security. Requiring the amount of security to 
be automatically and immediately reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis 
for payments made to the Transmission Provider under the 
interconnection agreement is arbitrary and discriminatory, as it 
ignores the risk this imposes on the Transmission Provider under 
bankruptcy law. Specifically, section 547 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
provides that a Debtor in Possession or a Bankruptcy Trustee may avoid 
preferential transfers made by the bankrupt entity on or within 90 days 
before the filing of the relevant bankruptcy petition. If payments to 
the Transmission Provider could be deemed ``preferential,'' the 
Transmission Provider needs the protection given by the security 
required under article 11.5 to be maintained and not reduced until such 
payment is not subject to being avoided, set aside, or returned under 
section 547. Language to this effect should be added to article 11.5; 
otherwise the Transmission Provider would have no reasonable prospect 
of being repaid for any payments required to be returned or set aside 
under bankruptcy law, and the Transmission Provider would also incur 
legal expenses associated with the defense of such claims.
Commission Conclusion
    125. We reject Southern Company's requests for rehearing. Although 
Southern Company's argument regarding the maintenance of security is 
untimely and should have been raised in response to Order No. 2003, we 
will address the argument here to provide clarification. The change 
Southern Company proposes is unnecessary. Article 11.5 already requires 
the security provided by the Interconnection Customer to be 
``sufficient to cover'' the relevant costs and that a letter of credit 
or surety bond specify ``a reasonable expiration date.'' \48\ 
Therefore, Southern Company's concern that an Interconnection Customer 
would not be required to maintain the security is misplaced, as the 
article requires that ``sufficient'' security be maintained for a 
``reasonable'' period of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See LGIA article 11.5, 11.5.2, and 11.5.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    126. Southern Company's arguments regarding bankruptcy were 
presented and rejected in Order No. 2003-A,\49\ and Southern Company 
offers no new arguments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Order No. 2003-A at P 428, 431.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Assignment
    127. LGIA article 19.1 provides that the written consent of the 
non-assigning party is ordinarily required to assign the 
interconnection agreement. However, the Interconnection Customer may 
assign the agreement, without the consent of the Transmission Provider, 
for collateral security purposes to aid in financing the Generating 
Facility (i.e., collateral assignment).
Rehearing Request
    128. Southern Company argues that several revisions to LGIA article 
19.1 are needed to conform to the Uniform Commercial Code and to the 
OATT. It seeks clarification that a party is not relieved of its 
obligations if another party assigns the agreement. It adds that the 
Interconnection Customer only has the right to assign the 
interconnection agreement to another eligible customer. Southern 
Company proposes that the Commission revise article 19.1 to subject the 
collateral assignment of the agreement to the prior written consent of 
the Transmission Provider if the collateral assignee is not an eligible 
customer. Such consent is a suitable way for the Transmission Provider 
to (1) obtain the collateral assignee's agreement and (2) transfer the 
interconnection agreement in a foreclosure sale only to an eligible 
customer.
    129. Southern Company also argues that the Commission should revise 
LGIA article 19.1 to address risks associated with adverse claims and 
multiple assignments of the Interconnection Customer's rights. It 
states that the exercise of assignment rights by an assignee should be 
made subject to the Transmission Provider not having received a 
contrary court order or notice of an unresolved contrary claim. 
Otherwise, the Transmission Provider could be in violation of a court 
order or have to resolve which claimant is legally entitled to exercise 
assignment rights. Southern Company further claims that this 
requirement is superior to the pro forma LGIA in that it helps assure 
that the proper assignee receives the benefits of the LGIA and that a 
Transmission Provider does not incorrectly recognize an improper or 
subordinate assignee as being entitled to the Interconnection 
Customer's rights under the LGIA.
    130. Southern Company also proposes that the Transmission Provider 
have the right to require the collateral assignee or its purchaser in 
foreclosure to assume the interconnection agreement and also cure any 
existing defaults before receiving the benefits of an assignee. It 
states that if a defaulting Interconnection Customer had not assigned 
its rights, the Transmission Provider would be free to require the 
Interconnection Customer to either cure its defaults or terminate the 
agreement. This ``perform'' or ``get out of the queue'' policy benefits 
competing Interconnection Customers and potential competitors. The 
Transmission Provider should not have to provide service to a 
collateral assignee or purchaser in foreclosure if uncured defaults 
exist or amounts are owed in arrears after the application of any 
security provided to the Transmission Provider by the assignor. 
Southern Company argues that to rule otherwise could result in 
discrimination against the Transmission Provider and other 
Interconnection Customers in the queue or desiring to join the queue if 
the Transmission Provider continues to provide service, despite not 
being made whole.
Commission Conclusion
    131. LGIA article 19.1 already states that an assignment does not 
relieve a Party of its obligations under the interconnection agreement. 
As to Southern Company's concern about the assignee being an eligible 
customer, article 19.1 already requires that the assignee have the 
``legal authority and operational ability to satisfy the obligations of 
the assigning Party.'' This ensures that the assignee is able to meet 
the obligations under the agreement. And if the assignee is unable to 
meet the obligations, article 19.1 requires the assignor to fulfill the 
obligations under the agreement. We are not requiring that the assignee 
be an ``Eligible Customer'' under Southern Company's OATT because 
Southern Company has not explained why this designation should be 
required of an assignee of an interconnection agreement. In response to 
Southern Company's arguments regarding collateral assignment and the 
assignment of debts, the Commission rejected these arguments in Order 
No.

[[Page 281]]

2003-A,\50\ and Southern Company has offered no new information or 
arguments that prompt us to change that conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Id. at P 475, 476.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. Disclosure of Confidential Information
    132. LGIA article 22.1.10 provides that a Party must provide any 
information requested by the Commission or its staff, including 
Confidential Information. Order No. 2003-A modified article 22 to 
require a Party to provide requested information to a state regulator 
conducting a confidential investigation, even if the Party otherwise 
would be required to maintain this information in confidence.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Id. at P 486.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rehearing Request
    133. EPSA notes that Order No. 2003-A revised LGIA articles 22.1.10 
and 22.1.11, deleting the requirement that a Party be notified when 
another Party receives a request from a state regulator for 
Confidential Information.\52\ EPSA states that it has no objection to 
state regulators receiving Confidential Information to which they are 
entitled, but argues that fundamental fairness and due process should 
preclude the secret release of Confidential Information. The issue of 
providing state regulators with access to Confidential Information is 
under discussion in other forums and, EPSA concludes, any policy 
developed in this proceeding should be consistent with how the issue is 
addressed elsewhere. As an example of one forum, EPSA notes that the 
PJM Electricity Markets Committee (EMC) held several stakeholder 
meetings to develop the principles under which state regulators should 
be given access to Confidential Information. The principles developed 
by the EMC with the input of the state commissions, and which the PJM 
Members Committee approved, address a wide range of issues and require 
notice of the request to the Party that provided the Confidential 
Information. The Commission should reverse the conclusion reached in 
Order No. 2003-A and, consistent with the PJM approach, return to its 
Order No. 2003 policy of requiring notice to a Party before another 
Party releases Confidential Information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Conclusion
    134. We deny EPSA's rehearing request, but provide clarification. 
In Order No. 2003-A, the Commission explained that it was deleting the 
requirement that a Party be notified when another Party receives a 
request for Confidential Information from a state regulator because a 
state regulator should have the same rights to Confidential Information 
as this Commission. We clarify here that the state regulator has the 
right to request Confidential Information from one Party (without 
notification to the other Party) only when the state commission has the 
legal authority to do so. The pro forma LGIA should not be interpreted 
as granting states access to Confidential Information where the state 
lacks authority under state law. Nor should the pro forma LGIA be 
interpreted as barring or limiting a state's access to information, or 
the procedures through which a state may request such information, 
where such access is permitted under state law. We are modifying 
article 22.1.10 to clarify this point. As for EPSA's argument regarding 
PJM, under the ``independent entity variation'' standard, an RTO like 
PJM has greater flexibility to propose variations from the pro forma 
LGIP and LGIA, including variations to those provisions applicable to 
the release of Confidential Information to states. As a result, the RTO 
or ISO may propose to treat Confidential Information differently from 
the approach taken in Order No. 2003, to better suit regional needs.

E. Issues Related to the Large Generator Interconnection Procedures

1. Scoping Meeting and OASIS Posting
    135. LGIP section 3.3.4 requires the Transmission Provider and the 
Interconnection Customer to hold a Scoping Meeting within 30 Calendar 
Days from receipt of the Interconnection Request to discuss the 
proposed interconnection. If the Transmission Provider intends to hold 
a Scoping Meeting with an Affiliate, it is required to announce the 
meeting on its OASIS site, transcribe the Scoping Meeting, and make 
copies of the transcript available to the public upon request. LGIP 
section 3.4 requires the Transmission Provider to post on its OASIS a 
list of all Interconnection Requests. It must post information such as 
the location of the interconnection and the Generating Facility's 
projected In-Service Date. The list is not to disclose the identity of 
the Interconnection Customer until the latter executes an 
interconnection agreement.
Rehearing Request
    136. Southern Company claims that the requirement in LGIP section 
3.4 to not disclose the identity of the Interconnection Customer on 
OASIS conflicts with the requirement to give notice of a meeting with 
an Affiliate. The requirement to disclose the identity of the Affiliate 
is discriminatory because it does not apply to other competitors. This 
puts the Affiliate at a competitive disadvantage. Southern Company also 
claims that the requirement to notice Scoping Meetings with the 
Affiliate conflicts with LGIP section 3.4, which requires that the 
identity of the Interconnection Customer not be disclosed until the 
Interconnection Customer has executed an interconnection agreement. It 
asks that the notice and transcript requirements be eliminated or that 
the Commission require all Scoping Meetings to be noticed and 
transcribed.
Commission Conclusion
    137. We deny Southern Company's request for rehearing. An 
affiliated Interconnection Customer and one that is not an Affiliate of 
the Transmission Provider are not similarly situated. That is, of 
course, one of the reasons the Commission created the Code of Conduct 
\53\ and Standards of Conduct \54\ for affiliated Interconnection 
Customers. Order No. 2003-A balanced the need to treat affiliated and 
nonaffiliated Interconnection Customers alike with the need to adhere 
to the Code of Conduct and Standards of Conduct requirements. Finally, 
we agree with Southern Company that there is a conflict between 
sections 3.3.4 and 3.4 of the pro forma LGIP, and are revising the 
latter to show that the restriction of section 3.4 (not to disclose the 
identity of the Interconnection Customer) does not apply to an 
affiliated Interconnection Customer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ The Code of Conduct is imposed on a case-by-case basis when 
the Commission grants market-based rate authorization. Generally, 
the Code of Conduct contains a provision that all market information 
shared between the publicly utility (i.e., Transmission Provider) 
and the Affiliate is to be disclosed simultaneously to the public. 
See, e.g., Northeast Utilities Service Company, 87 FERC ] 61,063 at 
61,276 (1999).
    \54\ Standards of Conduct for Transmission Providers, Order No. 
2004, 68 FR 69134 (Dec. 11, 2003), FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations 
Preambles ] 31,155 (2003), order on reh'g, Order No. 2004-A, 69 FR 
23562 (Apr. 29, 2004), III FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,161 (2004), 107 
FERC ] 61,032 (2004), order on reh'g, Order No. 2004-B, 69 FR 48371 
(Aug. 10, 2004), III FERC Stats & Regs. ] 31,166 (2004), 108 FERC ] 
61,118 (2004).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 282]]

F. Ministerial Changes to the Pro Forma LGIP and LGIA

    138. Since Order No. 2003-A was issued, we have identified certain 
sections of the LGIP and articles of the LGIA that require 
modification. Because of the ministerial nature of these changes, no 
further discussion is needed. The changes are included in Appendix B, 
which also reports changes to the pro forma LGIP and LGIA that reflect 
conclusions in this order.

G. Compliance

    139. This order takes effect 30 days after issuance by the 
Commission. As with the Order No. 2003 compliance process, the 
Commission will deem the OATT of each non-independent Transmission 
Provider to be amended to adopt the revisions to the pro forma LGIP and 
LGIA contained herein on the effective date of this order. The Order 
No. 2003 compliance process also required each non-independent 
Transmission Provider to make a ministerial filing to include its pro 
forma LGIP and LGIA in its next filing with the Commission. But because 
it has taken longer than anticipated for all non-independent 
Transmission Providers to make the necessary changes to their OATTs, 
here we adopt different compliance procedure. We are requiring all 
public utilities that own, control, or operate interstate transmission 
facilities to adopt the revisions to the pro forma LGIP and pro forma 
LGIA that appear in this order within 60 days after the issuance of 
this order by the Commission. A non-independent Transmission Provider 
that already has amended its OATT to add the pro forma LGIP and pro 
forma LGIA should submit revised tariff sheets incorporating the 
changes contained in this order. A non-independent Transmission 
Provider that has not yet made the ministerial filing to reflect the 
fact that its OATT now follows Order No. 2003, or that has not yet 
filed the revisions to the pro forma LGIP or LGIA that appeared in 
Order No. 2003-A, must take the necessary steps to ensure that its OATT 
contains the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA including the revisions 
in this order within 60 days after issuance of this order by the 
Commission. Within the same time frame, each RTO or ISO also must 
submit either revised tariff sheets incorporating changes contained in 
this order, or an explanation under the independent entity variation 
standard as to why it is not adopting each change.
    140. Also, in Order No. 2003 the Commission required that for any 
non-conforming LGIAs submitted for approval, the Transmission Provider 
``should clearly indicate where the agreement does not conform to its 
standard Interconnection Agreement, preferably through red-lining and 
strikeout.'' \55\ We clarify here that each Transmission Provider 
submitting a non-conforming agreement for Commission approval must 
explain its justification for each nonconforming provision and provide 
a redline document comparing the nonconforming agreement to the 
effective pro forma LGIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Order No. 2003 at P 915.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Information Collection Statement

    141. Order No. 2003-B contains information collection requirements 
for which the Commission obtained approval from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).\56\ Given that this order makes only minor 
changes to Order Nos. 2003 and 2003-A, OMB approval for this order is 
not necessary. However, the Commission will send a copy of this order 
to OMB for informational purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ The OMB Control Number for this collection of information 
is 1902-0096.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    142. The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) \57\ requires rulemakings 
to contain either (1) a description and analysis of the effect that the 
proposed or Final Rule will have on small entities or (2) a 
certification that the rule will not have a significant economic effect 
on a substantial number of small entities. In Order Nos. 2003 and 2003-
A, the Commission certified that the Final Rule would not have a 
significant economic effect on a substantial number of small 
entities.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612
    \58\ Order No. 2003 at P 924; Order No. 2003-A at P 792.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rehearing Request
    143. NRECA repeats the argument made previously that the Commission 
has underestimated the number of utilities affected by Order No. 2003. 
It asks the Commission to clarify that a cooperative with an existing 
Order No. 888 waiver will not lose that waiver as soon as it receives 
an Interconnection Request. It also requests clarification that if an 
Interconnection Customer seeks Interconnection Service from a small 
utility that believes that it would be overly burdened by the 
requirements of Order Nos. 2003 and 2003-A, the small utility may seek 
waiver of those requirements from the Commission.
Commission Conclusion
    144. The Commission stated in Order No. 2003 that it is sympathetic 
to the needs of small entities.\59\ However, NRECA raises no new 
arguments that it did not raise in its rehearing request to Order No. 
2003. We therefore reject its assertion that the Commission's RFA 
analysis was unrealistic.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See Order No. 2003 at P 830.
    \60\ See, e.g., Order No. 2003-A at P 789 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    145. As to its request for clarification, NRECA is correct that an 
entity may at any time request waiver of the Commission's regulations. 
However, as the Commission stated in Order No. 2003, waivers must be 
made on a case-by-case basis.\61\ Absent the granting of such a waiver 
request, however, NRECA is correct that a request for jurisdictional 
service (including Interconnection Service) would mean that a utility 
with a conditional waiver of Order No. 888 would lose that waiver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Order No. 2003 at P 830-831.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Document Availability

    146. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in 
the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to obtain this document from the Public Reference Room 
during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern Time) at 888 
First Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC The full text of this 
document is also available electronically from the Commission's 
eLibrary system (formerly called FERRIS) in PDF and Microsoft Word 
format for viewing, printing, and downloading. eLibrary may be accessed 
through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov ). To access 
this document in eLibrary, type ``RM02-1-'' in the docket number field 
and specify a date range that includes this document's issuance date.
    147. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's 
Web site during normal business hours from our Help line at 202-502-
8222 or the Public Reference Room at 202-502-8371 Press 0, TTY 202-502-
8659. E-Mail the Public Reference Room at [email protected]

VII. Effective Date

    148. Changes to Order Nos. 2003 and 2003-A made in this order on 
rehearing will become effective on January 19, 2005.

Regulatory Text

List of Subjects 18 CFR Part 35

    Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.


[[Page 283]]


    By the Commission. Commissioner Brownell dissenting in part with 
a separate statement attached.
Linda Mitry,
Deputy Secretary.

    The Appendices will not be published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.

Appendix A

Petitioner Acronyms

    AEP--American Electric Power Service Corp.
    Calpine--Calpine Corporation
    Cinergy--Cinergy Services, Inc.
    EPSA--Electric Power Supply Association
    Intergen--Intergen Services, Inc. and Tenaska, Inc.
    NRECA--National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
    NYISO--New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and the New 
York Transmission Owners
    PSEG--PSEG Companies and GWF Energy LLC
    Reliant--Reliant Resources, Inc.
    SoCal Edison--Southern California Edison Company
    Southern Company--Southern Company Services, Inc.
    SWTransco--Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc.
    TAPS--Transmission Access Policy Study Group

Appendix B

                 Changes To The Pro Forma LGIP and LGIA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1--Definition of ``Force        Change ``caused'' to ``cause''.
 Majeure''.
Section 1--Definition of Network        Change ``in the same manner as
 Resource Interconnection Service.       all other Network Resources''
                                         to ``in the same manner as
                                         Network Resources''.
Section 3.2.2.1.......................  Remove two instances of ``all
                                         other'' in this section:
                                         ``Transmission Provider must
                                         conduct the necessary studies
                                         and construct the Network
                                         Upgrades needed to integrate
                                         the Large Generating Facility
                                         (1) in a manner comparable to
                                         that in which Transmission
                                         Provider integrates its
                                         generating facilities to serve
                                         native load customers; or (2)
                                         in an ISO or RTO with market
                                         based congestion management, in
                                         the same manner as Network
                                         Resources. Network Resource
                                         Interconnection Service allows
                                         Interconnection Customer 's
                                         Large Generating Facility to be
                                         designated as a Network
                                         Resource, up to the Large
                                         Generating Facility's full
                                         output, on the same basis as
                                         existing Network Resources
                                         interconnected to Transmission
                                         Provider's Transmission System,
                                         and to be studied as a Network
                                         Resource on the assumption that
                                         such a designation will
                                         occur.''
Section 3.2.2.2.......................  At the end of this section, add
                                         the following text: ``The
                                         Transmission Provider may also
                                         study the Transmission System
                                         under non-peak load conditions.
                                         However, upon request by the
                                         Interconnection Customer, the
                                         Transmission Provider must
                                         explain in writing to the
                                         Interconnection Customer why
                                         the study of non-peak load
                                         conditions is required for
                                         reliability purposes.''
Section 3.4...........................  In the third sentence, change
                                         ``The list will not * * *'' to
                                         ``Except in the case of an
                                         Affiliate, the list will not *
                                         * *''
Section 5.2...........................  In the second sentence, change
                                         text to read: ``* * * to the
                                         Interconnection Customer, as
                                         appropriate.''
Section 7.2...........................  In the third paragraph, second
                                         sentence, change text to read:
                                         ``For the purpose of this
                                         section 7.2, * * *
Section 7.6...........................  Change the first sentence to
                                         read: ``If Re-Study of the
                                         Interconnection System Impact
                                         Study is required due to a
                                         higher queued project dropping
                                         out of the queue, or a
                                         modification of a higher queued
                                         project subject to Section 4.4,
                                         or re-designation of the Point
                                         of Interconnection pursuant to
                                         section 7.2 Transmission
                                         Provider shall notify
                                         Interconnection Customer in
                                         writing.''
Section 9.............................  In the second paragraph, second
                                         sentence, change ``party'' to
                                         ``Party.''
Section 11.1..........................  In the second sentence, change
                                         ``'' Interconnection Customer
                                         shall tender a draft LGIA,
                                         together with draft appendices
                                         completed to the extent
                                         practicable'' to ``''
                                         Transmission Provider shall
                                         tender a draft LGIA, together
                                         with draft appendices.''
Section 11.2..........................  In the third sentence, change
                                         ``* * * tender of the LGIA
                                         pursuant to section 11.1 * *
                                         *'' to ``* * * tender of the
                                         draft LGIA pursuant to section
                                         11.1 * * *''
                                        In the fifth sentence, change
                                         ``* * * section 13.5 within
                                         sixty days of tender of
                                         completed draft of the LGIA
                                         appendices'' to ``* * * section
                                         13.5 within sixty (60) Calendar
                                         Days of tender of draft LGIA.''
Section 13.4..........................  In the second paragraph, change
                                         the reference to ``OATT'' to
                                         ``Tariff.''
Section 13.6.2........................  In the first sentence, change
                                         the text to read: ``* * *
                                         within thirty (30) Calendar
                                         Days of receipt. * * *'' In the
                                         second sentence, change
                                         ``OATT'' to ``Tariff.''
---------------------------------------
            Large Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 1--Definition of ``Force        Change ``caused'' to ``cause''.
 Majeure''.
Article 1--Definition of Network        Change ``in the same manner as
 Resource Interconnection Service.       all other Network Resources''
                                         to ``in the same manner as
                                         Network Resources''.
Recitals..............................  Change the last word from
                                         ``(OATT)'' to ``(Tariff).''
Article 4.1.2.2.......................  Remove ``other'' from the
                                         following sentence in the first
                                         paragraph: ``Although Network
                                         Resource Interconnection
                                         Service does not convey a
                                         reservation of transmission
                                         service, any Network Customer
                                         under the Tariff can utilize
                                         its network service under the
                                         Tariff to obtain delivery of
                                         energy from the interconnected
                                         Interconnection Customer's
                                         Large Generating Facility in
                                         the same manner as it accesses
                                         Network Resources.''
                                        Remove ``all other'' from the
                                         following sentence in the
                                         second paragraph: ``In the
                                         event of transmission
                                         constraints on Transmission
                                         Provider's Transmission System,
                                         Interconnection Customer's
                                         Large Generating Facility shall
                                         be subject to the applicable
                                         congestion management
                                         procedures in Transmission
                                         Provider's Transmission System
                                         in the same manner as Network
                                         Resources.''

[[Page 284]]

 
Article 5.14..........................  Delete the first two sentences
                                         of this article and replace
                                         them with the following
                                         sentence: ``Transmission
                                         Provider or Transmission Owner
                                         and Interconnection Customer
                                         shall cooperate with each other
                                         in good faith in obtaining all
                                         permits, licenses, and
                                         authorizations that are
                                         necessary to accomplish the
                                         interconnection in compliance
                                         with Applicable Laws and
                                         Regulations.''
Article 5.17.7........................  In the second paragraph, before
                                         the last sentence, add this new
                                         sentence: ``The settlement
                                         amount shall be calculated on a
                                         fully grossed-up basis to cover
                                         any related cost consequences
                                         of the current tax liability.''
Article 5.17.8(ii)....................  Add the word ``interest'' to the
                                         beginning of this subsection,
                                         revising it to read: ``(ii)
                                         interest on any amount paid * *
                                         *
                                        Reference to 18 CFR
                                         35.19a(a)(2)(ii) should be
                                         changed to 18 CFR
                                         35.19a(a)(2)(iii).
Article 11.4.1........................  In the second paragraph of this
                                         article, replace ``(2) declare
                                         in writing that Transmission
                                         Provider or Affected System
                                         Operator will continue to
                                         provide payments to
                                         Interconnection Customer
                                         pursuant to this subparagraph
                                         until all amounts advanced for
                                         Network Upgrades have been
                                         repaid.'' with ``(2) declare in
                                         writing that Transmission
                                         Provider or Affected System
                                         Operator will continue to
                                         provide payments to
                                         Interconnection Customer on a
                                         dollar-for-dollar basis for the
                                         non-usage sensitive portion of
                                         transmission charges, or
                                         develop an alternative schedule
                                         that is mutually agreeable and
                                         provides for the return of all
                                         amounts advanced for Network
                                         Upgrades not previously repaid;
                                         however, full reimbursement
                                         shall not extend beyond twenty
                                         (20) years from the Commercial
                                         Operation Date.''
                                        Add the following sentence to
                                         the last paragraph of this
                                         article: ``Before any such
                                         reimbursement can occur, the
                                         Interconnection Customer, or
                                         the entity that ultimately
                                         constructs the Generating
                                         Facility, if different, is
                                         responsible for identifying the
                                         entity to which reimbursement
                                         must be made.''
                                        Reference to 18 CFR
                                         35.19a(a)(2)(ii) should be
                                         changed to 18 CFR
                                         35.19a(a)(2)(iii).
Article 18.1..........................  Capitalize each reference to
                                         ``Indemnifying Party.''
Article 18.3.5........................  Revise the second sentence to
                                         read ``* * * thirty (30)
                                         Calendar Days advance written
                                         notice * * *''
Article 18.3.6........................  In the first sentence, change
                                         ``polices'' to ``policies.''
Article 19.1..........................  In the second sentence, change
                                         ``party's'' to ``Party's.''
Article 22.1.10.......................  Revise the last sentence to
                                         read: ``Requests from a state
                                         regulatory body conducting a
                                         confidential investigation
                                         shall be treated in a similar
                                         manner if consistent with the
                                         applicable state rules and
                                         regulations.''
Article 28.1.2........................  In the first sentence, change
                                         ``party'' to ``Party.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nora Mead BROWNELL, Commissioner dissenting in part:
    On rehearing of Order No. 2003, the Commission made three 
critical revisions to the procedures by which Interconnection 
Customers obtain cost recovery for their up-front funding of Network 
Upgrades. Specifically, the Commission eliminated the following key 
protections afforded to Interconnection Customers: (1) The ability 
to apply credits to transmission service taken from sources other 
than the specific interconnecting generating facility; (2) the 
ability to obtain full reimbursement within five years; and (3) the 
ability to obtain reimbursement for upgrades made to adjacent 
transmission systems (so-called ``Affected Systems'') on which the 
Interconnection Customer does not take transmission service. I am 
now convinced that the Commission erred in making these revisions, 
and that today's order, by making the minor modification of 
requiring full reimbursement after twenty years, does not go far 
enough to correct that error.
    In Order No. 2003-A, the Commission's primary justification for 
modifying the cost recovery provisions was that the changes were 
necessary to ensure that Interconnection Customers make efficient 
decisions on where to site their generating facilities. Rehearing 
petitioners make a convincing argument that there is no reason to 
believe that these modifications will have any appreciable effect on 
siting decisions, which are driven by state and local siting 
regulations and fuel accessibility needs. Instead of attempting to 
rebut this argument or develop a substitute rationale, the majority 
simply treats petitioners' argument as an admission that Network 
Upgrade costs are small and, therefore, concludes that 
Interconnection Customers have no basis to complain about bearing 
those costs. However, the relative size of Network Upgrade costs 
compared to other siting costs is irrelevant to whether it is fair 
to put Interconnection Customers at substantial risk of never 
obtaining full reimbursement for upgrades that benefit all 
customers.
    The Commission has been quite explicit that up-front payment of 
Network Upgrades costs by an Interconnection Customer is simply a 
``financing mechanism that is designed to facilitate the efficient 
construction of Network Upgrades,'' and is ``not a rate for 
interconnection or transmission service.'' \1\ As the Commission 
explained in Order No. 2003-A, ``the Transmission Provider's right 
to charge for transmission service at the higher of an embedded cost 
rate, or an incremental rate designed to recover the cost of the 
Network Upgrades, provides the Transmission Provider with a cost 
recovery mechanism that ensures that native load and other 
transmission customers will not subsidize service to the 
Interconnection Customer.'' \2\ The primary purpose of having the 
Interconnection Customer finance the Network Upgrades was to 
alleviate any delay that might result if the Transmission Provider 
were forced to secure funding.\3\
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    \1\ Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and 
Procedures, Order No. 2003-A, Order on Rehearing, 69 FR 15932 (Mar. 
26, 2004), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,160 at P 612 (2004).
    \2\ Id. at P 613.
    \3\ See, e.g., id.
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    The issue, then, is whether we have exposed the Interconnection 
Customer to undue risk in its role as financier of Network Upgrades 
that benefit the system as a whole. I believe that we have. 
Therefore, I would grant rehearing and return to the cost recovery 
policies we announced in Order No. 2003.

Nora Mead Brownell

[FR Doc. 05-15 Filed 1-3-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P