[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 1 (Monday, January 3, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 3-7]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-28668]



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  Federal Register / Vol. 70 , No. 1 / Monday, January 3, 2005 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 3]]



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

11 CFR Part 111

[Notice 2004--20]


Statement of Policy Regarding Treasurers Subject to Enforcement 
Proceedings

AGENCY: Federal Election Commission.

ACTION: Statement of policy.

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SUMMARY: The Commission is issuing a Policy Statement to clarify when, 
in the course of an enforcement proceeding (known as a Matter Under 
Review or ``MUR''), a treasurer is subject to Commission action in his 
or her official or personal capacity, or both. Under this policy, when 
the Commission investigates alleged violations of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act, as amended, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 
and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act (collectively 
``the Act'' or ``FECA'') involving a political committee, the treasurer 
will typically be subject to Commission action only in his or her 
official capacity. However, when information indicates that a treasurer 
has knowingly and willfully violated a provision of the Act or 
regulations, or has recklessly failed to fulfill duties specifically 
imposed on treasurers by the Act, or has intentionally deprived himself 
or herself of the operative facts giving rise to the violation, the 
Commission will consider the treasurer to have acted in a personal 
capacity and make findings (and pursue conciliation) accordingly. This 
Policy Statement also addresses situations in which treasurers are 
subject to Commission action in both their official and personal 
capacities, and situations where successor treasurers are named.
    The goal in adopting this policy is to clarify when a treasurer is 
subject to Commission action in a personal or official capacity, while 
at the same time preserving the Commission's ability to obtain an 
appropriate remedy that will satisfactorily resolve enforcement 
matters, or to seek relief in court, if necessary, against a live 
person. Importantly, the policy is grounded in the statutory 
obligations specifically imposed on treasurers and well-established 
legal distinctions between official and personal capacity proceedings.

DATES: December 16, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peter G. Blumberg, Attorney, 999 E 
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20463, (202) 694-1650 or (800) 424-9530.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    The Commission is modifying its current practices to specify more 
clearly when a treasurer is subject to a Commission enforcement 
proceeding in his or her ``official'' and/or ``personal'' capacity.\1\ 
Specifically, when a complaint asserts sufficient allegations to 
warrant naming a political committee as a respondent, the committee's 
current treasurer will also be named as a respondent in his or her 
official capacity. In these circumstances, reason-to-believe and 
probable cause findings against the committee will also be accompanied 
by findings against the current treasurer in his or her official 
capacity. When the complaint asserts allegations that involve a past or 
present treasurer's violation of obligations that the Act or 
regulations impose specifically on treasurers, then that treasurer may, 
in the circumstances described below, be named in his or her personal 
capacity, and findings may be made against the treasurer in that 
capacity. Thus, in some matters the current treasurer could be named in 
both official and personal capacities. Maintaining the Commission's 
ability to pursue a treasurer as a respondent in either official or 
personal capacity allows the Commission discretion to fashion an 
appropriate remedy for violations of the Act.\2\
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    \1\ The terms ``official capacity'' and ``representative 
capacity'' are generally interchangeable, as are the terms 
``personal capacity'' and ``individual capacity.'' See McCarthy v. 
Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 359 n.12 (1st Cir. 1994).
    \2\ In any scenario, the Commission will, of course, remain free 
to exercise its prosecutorial discretion not to pursue a respondent. 
For example, the Commission, in some cases, may decide not to pursue 
a predecessor treasurer who technically has personal liability where 
the committee, through its current treasurer, has agreed to pay a 
sufficient civil penalty and to cease and desist from further 
violations of the Act.
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    Notably, political committees are artificial entities that can act 
only through their agents, such as their treasurers, and often can be, 
by their very nature, ephemeral entities that may exist for all 
practical purposes for a limited period, such as during a single 
election cycle. Due to these characteristics, identifying a live person 
who is responsible for representing the committee in an enforcement 
action is particularly important. Without a live person to provide 
notice to and/or to attach liability to, the Commission may find itself 
at a significant disadvantage in protecting the public interest and in 
ensuring compliance with the laws it is responsible for enforcing. By 
virtue of their authority to disburse funds and file disclosure reports 
and to amend those reports, treasurers of committees are in the best 
position to carry out the requirements of a conciliation agreement such 
as paying a civil penalty, refunding or disgorging contributions, and 
amending reports.
    The Act designates treasurers to play a unique role in a political 
committee; indeed, a treasurer is the only office a political committee 
is required to fill. 2 U.S.C. 432(a). Without a treasurer, committees 
cannot undertake the host of activities necessary to carry out their 
mission, including receiving and disbursing funds and publicly 
disclosing their finances in periodic reports filed with the 
Commission. Id.; 2 U.S.C. 434(a)(1). Given this statutory role, 
especially the authority to receive and disburse funds (e.g., pay a 
civil penalty, refund improper contributions, disgorge ill-gotten 
funds) on behalf of the committee, designating the treasurer as the 
representative of the committee for purposes of compliance with the Act 
makes sense.
    Although the Commission may be entitled to take action as to a 
treasurer in both an official and individual capacity, in the typical 
enforcement matter the Commission expects that it will proceed against 
treasurers only in their official capacities. However, the Commission 
will consider treasurers parties to enforcement proceedings in their 
personal capacities where information indicates that the treasurer

[[Page 4]]

knowingly and willfully violated an obligation that the Act or 
regulations specifically impose on treasurers or where the treasurer 
recklessly failed to fulfill the duties imposed by law, or where the 
treasurer has intentionally deprived himself or herself of the 
operative facts giving rise to the violation. In these circumstances, 
the Commission may decide to find reason to believe the treasurer has 
violated the Act in his or her personal capacity, as well as finding 
reason to believe the committee violated the Act.
    This statement of policy is intended to provide clearer notice to 
respondents and the public as to the nature of the Commission's 
enforcement actions, improve the perception of fairness throughout the 
regulated community, and merge the Commission's treasurer designation 
into conceptually familiar legal principles for the federal 
judiciary.\3\ The statement first surveys the law on the official/
personal capacity distinction; next, addresses when the Commission will 
proceed as to treasurers in their official or personal capacity or 
both; and finally, resolves the reoccurring issues of successor 
treasurers and substitution.
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    \3\ As discussed infra Part II., the phrases ``official 
capacity'' and ``personal capacity'' are legal terms of art that 
permeate such field as sovereign immunity, bankruptcy, corporations, 
and federal procedure. Their usage instantaneously identifies for 
the judiciary when the Commission is pursuing treasurers by virtue 
of their position, rather than by product of their actions.
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    The Commission's Proposed Statement of Policy Regarding Naming of 
Treasurers in Enforcement Matters was published in the January 28, 
2004, Federal Register. 69 FR 4092 (January 28, 2004). One comment was 
received. The commenter stated that the Commission's effort to clarify 
its treasurer naming policy is welcome, but he made several 
recommendations for how the Commission could assist treasurers to 
better understand their potential personal liability, such as requiring 
separate notices in instances where a treasurer was named in his or her 
individual and official capacities, and by enacting the policy's 
proposals through a rulemaking, rather than a policy statement. The 
commenter's suggestions were considered, but in order to allow the 
Commission to retain flexibility in processing its cases, and because 
the policy statement combined with existing laws and Commission 
regulations provide sufficient notice to treasurers of their 
responsibilities, the suggested changes were not implemented.

II. The Official/Personal Capacity Distinction

    In the seminal case of Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), the 
United States Supreme Court discussed the distinction between official 
capacity and personal capacity suits. The Court determined that a suit 
against an officer in her official capacity ``generally represent[s] 
only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an 
officer is an agent.'' Id. at 165. In other words, an official capacity 
proceeding ``is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit 
against the official's office.'' Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, ``an official-capacity suit is, in 
all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the 
entity.'' Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Therefore, in an official capacity 
suit, the plaintiff seeks a remedy from the entity, not the particular 
officer personally.
    A ``personal-capacity action is * * * against the individual 
defendant, rather than * * * the entity that employs him.'' Id. at 
167'68. Since a ``[p]ersonal-capacity suit[] seek[s] to impose personal 
liability upon'' a particular individual, the individual is the true 
party in interest. Id. Liability lies with the particular officer 
personally, not with the officer's position. See id. at 166 n.11 
(``Should the official die pending final resolution of a personal-
capacity action, the plaintiff would have to pursue his action against 
the decedent's estate.''); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 
(1991) (``officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as 
individuals'').
    The ``distinction between claims aimed at a defendant in his 
individual as opposed to representative capacity can be found across 
the law.'' McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 360 (citing numerous Supreme Court, 
lower court, and state cases referencing differences between individual 
and official capacity claims in multiple fields of law).\4\ The 
official capacity/individual capacity distinction also carries societal 
significance. As the McCarthy court explained:
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    \4\ See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165 (42 U.S.C. 1983); Stafford v. 
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 544 (1980) (venue determination); Ex Parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment); Northeast Fed. 
Credit Union v. Neves, 837 F.2d 531, 534 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(jurisdictional purposes); Pelkoffer v. Deer, 144 B.R. 282, 285-86 
(W.D. Pa. 1992) (bankruptcy); Estabrook v. Wetmore, 529 A.2d 956, 
958 (N.H. 1987) (applying doctrine that acts of a corporate employee 
performed in his corporate capacity generally do not form the basis 
for personal jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity).

    The ubiquity of the [official capacity/individual capacity] 
distinction is a reflection of the reality that individuals in our 
complex society frequently act on behalf of other parties--a reality 
that often makes it unfair to credit or blame the actor, 
individually, for such acts. At the same time, the law strikes a 
wise balance by refusing automatically to saddle a principal with 
total responsibility for a representative's conduct, come what may, 
and by declining mechanically to limit an injured party's recourse 
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to the principal alone, regardless of the circumstances.

    Id.

III. Treasurers in Their Official Capacity

    Clearly indicating that the current treasurer is a party to an 
enforcement proceeding in his or her official capacity will improve the 
Commission's enforcement of the law in a number of ways. Most 
importantly, it clarifies that findings by the Commission (whether 
``Reason To Believe'' or ``Probable Cause To Believe'') or the signing 
of a conciliation agreement only concerns the treasurer in his or her 
capacity as representative of the committee, not personally. The 
practice also ensures that a named individual who signs the 
conciliation agreement on behalf of the committee (or obtains legal 
representation on behalf of the committee) is the one empowered by law 
to disburse committee funds to pay a civil penalty, disgorge funds, 
make refunds, and carry out other monetary remedies that the committee 
agrees to through the conciliation agreement.\5\ Also, naming a 
treasurer (in his or her official capacity), as opposed to naming 
simply the office of treasurer or just the committee, not only provides 
the Commission with an individual in every instance to serve with 
notices throughout the proceeding, but also results in more 
accountability on behalf of the committee--that is, a particular person 
who will ensure that a committee is responsive to Commission 
findings.\6\ Finally, specifying whether a treasurer is a party to an 
enforcement proceeding in his or her official or personal capacity is 
consistent with use of these terms as pleading conventions in court 
actions. A probable cause finding against a treasurer in his or her 
official capacity makes clear to a district court in enforcement 
litigation that the Commission is seeking relief against the committee, 
and would only entitle the

[[Page 5]]

Commission to obtain a civil penalty from the committee. See Graham, 
473 U.S. at 165.
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    \5\ In the absence of a treasurer, ``the financial machinery of 
the campaign grinds to a halt * * *'' FEC v. Toledano, 317 F.3d 939, 
947 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied; see 2 U.S.C. 432(a) (``No 
expenditure shall be made * * * without the authorization of the 
treasurer or his or her designated agent.''); 11 CFR 102.7(a) 
(designation of assistant treasurer).
    \6\ Such accountability may be especially helpful in matters 
involving committees that tend to be ephemeral--existing for only a 
short time before permanently disbanding operations.
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IV. Treasurers in Their Personal Capacities

    The Act places certain legal obligations on committee treasurers, 
the violation of which makes them personally liable.\7\ See, e.g., 2 
U.S.C. 432(c) (keep an account of various committee records), 432(d) 
(preserve records for three years), 434(a)(1) (file and sign reports of 
receipts and disbursements). The Commission's regulations further 
require treasurers to examine and investigate contributions for 
evidence of illegality. See 11 CFR 103.3. Due to their ``pivotal 
role,'' treasurers may be held personally liable for failing to fulfill 
their responsibilities under the Act and the Commission's regulations. 
See Toledano, 317 F.3d at 947 (``The Act requires every political 
committee to have a treasurer, 2 U.S.C. 432(a), and holds him 
personally responsible for the committee's recordkeeping and reporting 
duties, id. 432(c)-(d), 434(a). * * * Federal law makes the treasurer 
responsible for detecting [facial contribution] illegalities, 11 CFR 
103.3(b), and holds him personally liable if he fails to fulfill his 
responsibilities, see 2 U.S.C. 437g(d) . * * *''); see also FEC v. John 
A. Dramesi for Cong. Comm., 640 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding 
treasurer responsible for failing to ``make * * * best efforts to 
determine the legality of'' an excessive contribution); FEC v. Gus 
Savage for Cong. '82 Comm., 606 F. Supp. 541, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1985) 
(``It is the treasurer, and not the candidate, who becomes the named 
defendant in federal court, and subjected to the imposition of 
penalties ranging from substantial fines to imprisonment.''); 104.14(d) 
(``Each treasurer of a political committee, and any other person 
required to file any report or statement under these regulations and 
under the Act shall be personally responsible for the timely and 
complete filing of the report or statement and for the accuracy of any 
information or statement contained in it.'').
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    \7\ If a past or present treasurer violates a prohibition that 
applies generally to individuals, the treasurer may be named as a 
respondent in his or her personal capacity, and findings may be made 
against the treasurer in that capacity. In this way, a treasurer 
would be treated no differently than any other individual who 
violates a provision of the Act. The Act and the Commission's 
regulations apply to any ``person,'' which includes individuals. 
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. 432(b) (forward contributions to the committee's 
treasurer), 441e (receipt of contributions from foreign nationals), 
and 441f (making and knowingly accepting contributions in the name 
of another).
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    Thus, a treasurer may be named as a respondent in a Matter Under 
Review in his or her personal capacity, and findings may be made 
against a treasurer in the same capacity, when the MUR involves the 
treasurer's violation of a legal obligation that the statute or 
regulations impose specifically on committee treasurers or when a 
reasonable inference from the alleged violation is that the treasurer 
knew, or should have known, about the facts constituting a 
violation.\8\ In practice, however, the Commission intends to consider 
a treasurer the subject of an enforcement proceeding in his or her 
personal capacity only when available information (or inferences fairly 
derived therefrom) indicates that the treasurer had knowledge that his 
or her conduct violated a duty imposed by law, or where the treasurer 
recklessly failed to fulfill his or her duties under the act and 
regulations, or intentionally deprived himself or herself of facts 
giving rise to the violations. If, at any time in the proceeding, the 
Commission is persuaded that the treasurer did not act with the 
requisite state of mind, subsequent findings against the treasurer will 
only be made in his or her official capacity.\9\
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    \8\ Indeed, if FECA were construed to impose liability on 
treasurers only in their official capacities, it would effectively 
mean that only committees are liable for violations under the 
statute--which would have been easy enough for Congress to 
accomplish by writing the Act to impose reporting, recordkeeping, 
and other duties on ``committees'' rather than ``treasurers.'' In 
fact, in some instances, the Act and the Commission's regulations 
specifically impose obligations on committees and committee officers 
and candidates. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. 441a(f) (receipt of excessive 
contributions), 11 CFR 104.7(b) (best efforts).
    \9\ Conversely, when a reason-to-believe finding is made against 
a treasurer in his or her official capacity only, but the potential 
violations at issue involve obligations specifically imposed by the 
Act or regulations on treasurers, the notice of the finding will be 
accompanied by a letter advising that the Commission could later 
decide to pursue the treasurer in a personal capacity if information 
shows that the treasurer knowingly and willfully violated the Act, 
or recklessly failed to fulfill the duties imposed by law, or 
intentionally deprived himself or herself of the operative facts 
giving rise to the violation.
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    Should the Commission file suit in district court following a 
finding of probable cause against a treasurer in his or her personal 
capacity, judicial relief, including an injunction and payment of a 
civil penalty, could be obtained against the treasurer personally. 
Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-168. Likewise, when the Commission obtains 
relief from a treasurer personally, the obligation will follow the 
individual. Thus, when a treasurer in his or her personal capacity 
agrees to pay a civil penalty through a conciliation agreement, or is 
ordered to pay a civil penalty by a district court, a personal 
obligation exists to pay the civil penalty. (A separate civil penalty 
would likely be assessed against the committee itself.) Likewise, a 
cease and desist provision (negotiated through conciliation) or an 
injunction (imposed by a district court) against a treasurer in his or 
her personal capacity will still apply to that treasurer in the event 
he or she subsequently becomes treasurer with another committee. Cf. 
Sec'y Exch. Comm'n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1311 n.11 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(``The significance of naming an officer * * * personally is that 
`otherwise he is bound only as long as he remains an officer * * *, 
whereas if he is named [personally] he is personally enjoined without 
limit of time.' '') (quoting 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 4113 
(1969, supp. to 2d ed.)).

V. Treasurers in Both Capacities

    There will likely be cases in which the treasurer is subject to 
Commission action in both his or her official and personal capacity, as 
explained in supra sections III. and IV. In such cases, the Commission 
will clearly designate that the findings are being made against the 
treasurer in both capacities. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 541 
F.2d 710, 711 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying a similar standard in an action 
involving the Federal Trade Commission when finding that ``[t]he 
propriety of including a person both as an individual and as a 
corporate officer in a cease and desist order has consistently been 
upheld in instances where the person included was instrumental in 
formulating, directing and controlling the acts and practices of the 
corporation'') (citing Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Standard Ed. Soc'y, 302 
U.S. 112 (1937); Standard Distrib. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 211 F.2d 7 (2d 
Cir. 1954); Benrus Watch Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 352 F.2d 313 (8th 
Cir. 1965)).
    For example, if a complaint alleges a violation such as 
coordination or receipt of contributions in the name of another, the 
Commission intends initially to name the treasurer as a respondent only 
in his or her official capacity. Notably, in these cases the reporting 
violation stems from the same operative facts as the principal 
violation. Only if the Commission learns later that the treasurer had 
knowledge of the operative facts--for example, the treasurer knew that 
an in-kind contribution stemming from coordination went unreported--or 
acted recklessly, or intentionally deprived himself or herself of the 
relevant facts, might the Commission make findings

[[Page 6]]

against the treasurer in his or her personal capacity.
    In cases where the treasurer is subject to Commission action in 
both official and personal capacities, the respondents could be named 
as ``John Doe for Congress and Joe Smith, in his official capacity as 
treasurer and in his personal capacity.'' Alternatively, the 
respondents could be named as ``John Doe for Congress and Joe Smith, in 
his official capacity as treasurer'' and ``Joe Smith, in his personal 
capacity.'' Regardless of the form of the notification, where a 
treasurer has been named in both his or her official and personal 
capacities, any resulting conciliation agreement would be signed by the 
treasurer on behalf of both the committee and the treasurer in his or 
her personal capacity.

VI. Successor Treasurers/Substitution

    An issue closely related to the official/personal capacity 
distinction is whether a successor treasurer may be substituted for a 
predecessor treasurer in a matter under review. Often the specific 
individual who was the treasurer at the time of a violation is no 
longer the treasurer during the enforcement process. Whether the 
successor treasurer or the predecessor treasurer should be named as the 
respondent depends on whether the Commission is pursuing the treasurer 
in his or her official capacity, personal capacity, or both.
    Currently, when OGC discovers that a committee has changed 
treasurers after the date of the activity on which the finding was 
based, OGC typically notes the change of treasurer, the date of the 
change, the former treasurer's name, and indicates whether an amendment 
was made to the Statement of Organization in OGC's next report to the 
Commission. If a treasurer change is made after a finding of reason to 
believe, then OGC typically includes the new treasurer and notes the 
change in its next report on the matter. If a treasurer change is made 
after a finding of probable cause to believe, OGC sends the new 
treasurer a supplemental probable cause brief (incorporating the prior 
probable cause brief), which states that the Commission found probable 
cause to believe against the committee and the treasurer's predecessor 
and will recommend probable cause against the new treasurer. After 
receiving a response or waiting until the expiration of the response 
period, OGC typically returns to the Commission with a recommendation 
as to the new treasurer.
    When the Commission pursues a current treasurer in his or her 
official capacity, successor treasurers will be substituted for the 
predecessor treasurer. In such cases, the Commission is pursuing the 
official position (and, therefore, the entity), not the individual 
holding the position. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Because an official 
capacity action is an action against the treasurer's position, the 
Commission may summarily substitute a new treasurer in his or her 
official capacity at any stage prior to a finding of probable cause to 
believe.\10\
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    \10\ Pursuant to the final policy, the Commission is not legally 
obligated to undertake the requirements of 2 U.S.C. 437g(a)(3) when 
a successor treasurer begins his or her position; although not 
legally required to do so, the Commission would intend to inform a 
new treasurer of the pending action and make copies of the briefs 
available to the successor treasurer.
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    When a predecessor treasurer may be personally liable, the 
Commission could pursue the predecessor treasurer individually, and not 
substitute the successor treasurer for the predecessor treasurer 
individually. See fn. 7; Graham, 473 U.S. at 167-68. There would be no 
legal basis for imputing personal liability from a predecessor 
treasurer's misconduct to a successor treasurer who did not personally 
engage in the misconduct.
    If the Commission were to pursue a treasurer both officially and 
personally and this treasurer is later replaced, the Commission could 
pursue the predecessor treasurer for any violations for which he or she 
is personally liable, and substitute the successor treasurer for 
official capacity violations. Absent some independent basis of 
liability, the Commission does not intend to pursue intermediate 
treasurers.\11\ See Cal. Democratic Party v. FEC, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 
1037 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (dismissing individual capacity claims against a 
former treasurer because ``there is no allegation that [the treasurer] 
violated any personal obligation'' and dismissing official capacity 
claims against him ``since [he] is no longer treasurer * * * and thus, 
is not the appropriate person against whom an official capacity suit 
can be maintained. * * *'').\12\
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    \11\ For example, while Treasurer A is the treasurer for Joe 
Smith for Congress, a violation occurs that subjects A to official 
liability and potentially to individual liability. Treasurer A would 
be named in his official capacity and notified in a reason-to-
believe notification of the potential for personal liability. After 
the enforcement action has begun, Treasurer A resigns and Treasurer 
B takes over. The Commission would pursue Treasurer B in her 
official capacity, and if the circumstances warranted, Treasurer A 
in his individual capacity. If Treasurer B resigns and is succeeded 
by Treasurer C prior to the conclusion of the enforcement matter, 
the Commission would then continue to pursue Treasurer A in his 
individual capacity and pursue Treasurer C in her official capacity. 
Treasurer B would no longer be named in her official capacity.
    \12\ A deeper examination of the court file indicates that--
despite the California Democratic Party court's assertion to the 
contrary--the Commission never actually pled that the treasurer in 
this case was personally liable. Rather, the complaint references 
the treasurer ``as treasurer'' and the Commission's response to the 
treasurer's motion to dismiss indicates that the Commission was 
pursuing the treasurer ``in his official capacity.'' Compl., 
paragraphs 8, 58-59, Prayer paragraphs 1-5; Resp. to Def. Mot. to 
Dismiss, p. 21. However, the court's statement in California 
Democratic Party underscores the need for the Commission to 
delineate more clearly the capacity in which it pursues treasurers.
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VII. Conclusion

    Effective as of the date this Policy Statement is published in the 
Federal Register, and as more fully explained above, the Commission 
will consider treasurers of political committees subject to enforcement 
proceedings as follows:
    1. In enforcement proceedings where a political committee is a 
respondent, the committee's current treasurer will be subject to 
Commission action ``in (his or her) official capacity as treasurer.''
    2. In enforcement proceedings where information indicates that a 
treasurer (past or present) of a political committee (a) knowingly and 
willfully violated the Act or regulations, (b) recklessly failed to 
fulfill the duties imposed by a provision of the Act or regulations 
that applies specifically to treasurers, or (c) intentionally deprived 
himself or herself of the operative facts giving rise to a violation, 
the treasurer may be subject to Commission action ``in (his or her) 
personal capacity.''
    3. In enforcement proceedings where information indicates that a 
treasurer of a political committee is subject to findings in both an 
official and personal capacity (i.e., information indicates that the 
committee's current treasurer violated the Act or regulations with the 
requisite state of mind described in 2 above), the current 
treasurer may be subject to Commission action in both an official and 
personal capacity.
    4. When the Commission makes findings as to a treasurer in his or 
her official capacity, successor treasurers will be substituted as if 
the findings had been made as to the successor.
    5. In enforcement proceedings involving provisions of the Act or 
regulations that apply generally to individuals (e.g., prohibitions 
against the making of an excessive contribution), the treasurer will be 
subject to Commission action in his or her personal capacity the same 
as any other individuals.


[[Page 7]]


    Dated: December 23, 2004.
Bradley A. Smith,
Chairman, Federal Election Commission.
[FR Doc. 04-28668 Filed 12-30-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6715-01-P