[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 250 (Thursday, December 30, 2004)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 78375-78384]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-28561]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Part 173

[Docket No. RSPA-99-6223 (HM-213B)]
RIN 2137-AD36


Hazardous Materials: Safety Requirements for External Product 
Piping on Cargo Tanks Transporting Flammable Liquids

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: RSPA is proposing to amend the Hazardous Materials Regulations 
to prohibit flammable liquids from being transported in unprotected 
product piping on existing and newly manufactured DOT specification 
cargo tank motor vehicles. If adopted as proposed, this action will 
reduce fatalities and injuries that result from accidents involving 
unprotected product piping. This proposal was developed jointly with 
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.

DATES: Comments must be received by February 28, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number 
RSPA-99-6223 (HM-213B) by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for 
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management System; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590-001.
     Hand Delivery: To the Docket Management System; Room PL-
401 on

[[Page 78376]]

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC between 9 am and 5 pm, Monday through Friday, except 
Federal Holidays.
    Instructions: You must include the agency name and docket number 
RSPA-99-6223 (HM-213B) or the Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) 
for this notice at the beginning of your comment. For detailed 
instructions on submitting comments and additional information on the 
rulemaking process, see the Public Participation section of this 
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change 
to http://dms.dot.gov including any personal information provided. 
Please see the Privacy Act section of this document.
    Docket: You may view the public docket through the Internet at 
http://dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket Management System office 
at the above address.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Michael Stevens, Office of 
Hazardous Materials Standards, Research and Special Programs 
Administration, telephone (202) 366-8553; Mr. Philip Olson, Office of 
Hazardous Materials Technology, Research and Special Programs 
Administration, telephone (202) 366-4545; or Mr. Danny Shelton, 
Hazardous Materials Division; Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, telephone (202) 366-6121, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    The Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180), at 
Sec.  173.33(e), prohibit the retention of certain liquid hazardous 
materials in the external product piping (wetlines) of a DOT 
specification cargo tank, unless the cargo tank motor vehicle (CTMV) is 
equipped with bottom damage protection devices. The current prohibition 
applies to liquid hazardous materials in Divisions 5.1 (oxidizer), 5.2 
(organic peroxide), 6.1 (toxic), and Class 8 (corrosive to skin only), 
but does not apply to flammable liquids.
    Wetlines are product piping located beneath the cargo tank on MC 
306, MC 307, DOT 406, and DOT 407 CTMVs that remain filled with product 
after loading or unloading. Wetlines on a five-compartment CTMV 
carrying gasoline typically contain 30-50 gallons of gasoline. If a 
passenger vehicle strikes the side of a CTMV, the impact likely will 
fracture unprotected wetlines. In such collisions, the passenger 
vehicle is often wedged under the CTMV. With the automobile driver and 
passenger(s) trapped in the vehicle under the CTMV, the fractured 
wetlines may release their entire contents onto the passenger vehicle. 
If ignited, fire will rapidly engulf the vehicle. When ignited, a 
gasoline spill of 50 gallons will create a fire over an area of up to 
5000 square feet, dooming those trapped in a vehicle at the site of the 
release and fire. If it is not extinguished immediately, the fire could 
result in significant loss of life or damage to property or the 
environment.
    On February 10, 2003, the Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA, we) published an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPRM; 68 FR 6689) to solicit comments and information 
regarding methods to reduce the safety risks associated with the 
retention of lading in unprotected wetlines. The ANPRM described the 
regulatory history for the current requirements in Sec.  173.33 and 
detailed our long-standing concern for the inherent safety risk 
presented by the carriage of flammable liquids in unprotected wetlines. 
In addition, the ANPRM asked commenters to address a number of issues 
to assist us in making a determination as to whether regulatory changes 
are needed, including the current state of technological development, 
practical alternatives that will protect the wetlines or eliminate the 
problem, the effectiveness of measures such as increased conspicuity or 
side guards, and current industry practices to minimize the potential 
safety problem posed by wetlines.

II. Proposal in This NPRM

    Based on comments and information received in response to the ANPRM 
(see discussion below), in this NPRM we propose to prohibit the 
carriage of flammable liquids in wetlines, unless the cargo tank motor 
vehicle conforms to the accident damage protection requirements of 
Sec.  178.337-10 or the bottom damage protection requirements of Sec.  
178.345-8(b)(1), as appropriate.
    Since product piping configurations on cargo tank motor vehicles 
transporting gasoline may contain unsafe amounts even when drained, we 
a proposing a quantity limit of one liter or less in each pipe after it 
is drained. This is a performance standard. We are not proposing a 
specific method for achieving this standard. A performance standard 
permits the industry wide latitude to develop measures to meet the 
requirement. For example, an operator may elect to install accident 
damage protection devices or it may decide to equip each CTMV with a 
system that will remove any lading remaining in unprotected wetlines 
after loading. This wetline prohibition would not apply to a material 
classed as a combustible liquid or to a flammable liquid reclassed as a 
combustible liquid. For hazardous materials other than flammable 
liquids, the existing unprotected wetline prohibition would remain in 
effect.
    Exception for Truck-Mounted DOT Specification Cargo Tank Motor 
Vehicles. In this NPRM, we propose to grant an exception from the 
piping damage protection requirements of Sec. Sec.  178.337-10 and 
178.345-8(b)(1) for truck-mounted (e.g., straight truck) DOT 
specification CTMVs. Truck-mounted CTMVs are designed and constructed 
with engine, body, and cargo tank permanently mounted to the same 
chassis. Based on the protective features afforded by their chassis and 
running gear, we believe that these cargo tank motor vehicles pose a 
significantly lower risk than most trailer and semi-trailer cargo tank 
motor vehicles. Under this proposal, components of the CTMV framework 
such as chassis rails and cross-members, suspension components, 
structural mounting members, or any other device that substantially 
protects product piping from the impact forces of another motor vehicle 
are expected to provide adequate accident damage protection. We are 
soliciting comments on whether this exception for truck-mounted cargo 
tank motor vehicles provides an acceptable level of safety, whether 
prohibiting flammable liquids in external product piping on truck-
mounted DOT specification cargo tank motor vehicles should be 
considered, or if a quantifiable design or performance standard should 
be developed for these cargo tank motor vehicles. In addition, we 
invite comments on whether a Design Certifying Engineer should be 
required to determine if the product piping on a truck-mounted CTMV is 
adequately protected as part of the design certification process that 
is required for all DOT specification CTMVs.
    Transitional period. We propose to make the changes in this NPRM 
effective two years after the effective date of a final rule and to 
permit CTMV operators five years to phase in requirements applicable to 
existing CTMVs. The two-year period provides time for planning, 
developing, and testing damage protection systems or systems designed 
to remove hazardous materials from product piping, or for redesigning 
cargo tank motor vehicles to eliminate external product piping 
altogether. Following this two-year deferral period, each newly 
manufactured cargo tank motor vehicle,

[[Page 78377]]

other than excepted truck-mounted tanks, would be subject to the new 
requirements. Existing cargo tank motor vehicles, other than excepted 
truck-mounted cargo tank motor vehicles, would have to be brought into 
conformance on or before the date of each cargo tank motor vehicle's 
first scheduled pressure retest after the two-year deferral period. 
Retrofits for existing CTMVs would be required to be completed no later 
than five years after the effective date of a final rule. The proposed 
seven-year transition period is needed to minimize the economic and 
operational impacts on CTMV operators and ensure realistic progress in 
implementing these safety enhancements.

Comment Summary

    We received fifteen comments in response to the ANPRM. They were 
submitted by petroleum industry representatives, carriers, cargo tank 
manufacturers, and companies that manufacture cargo tank accessories. A 
detailed discussion of the comments follows. Note that, as appropriate, 
we used specific data and information provided in the comments to 
develop the regulatory evaluation that supports this NPRM.
A. Wetlines Accidents
    The ANPRM stated that, since 1992, there have been seven fatal 
accidents, resulting in eight fatalities, where unprotected wetlines 
were damaged and gasoline released. These fatal accidents primarily 
involved collisions with passenger vehicles. Our experience indicates 
that there is a degree of under-reporting of hazardous materials 
transportation accidents of all types. In addition, prior to October 1, 
1998, certain intrastate highway carriers were not required to report 
hazardous materials releases to RSPA. Therefore, our accident database 
probably does not include all accidents involving damage to wetlines on 
cargo tank motor vehicles. The ANPRM asked commenters whether our 
accident statistics are accurate.
    One commenter, Cargo Tank Concepts (CTC), suggests that there are 
at least 21 accidents involving flammable liquids in unprotected 
wetlines that we did not include in our discussion in the ANPRM. CTC 
also provided a detailed analysis of the accidents it identified. This 
comment indicates that, as we noted in the ANPRM, our accident database 
is not inclusive of all wetlines incidents. We agree with CTC that in 
estimating the potential benefits of any proposed regulatory changes we 
should make an effort to account for all relevant accidents in order to 
accurately quantity the benefits of the proposed change. The regulatory 
evaluation developed in support of this ANPRM includes a detailed 
accident analysis.
B. Alternatives for Addressing the Safety Problem
    For purposes of assessing the costs that industry might incur to 
comply with a performance standard, such as is proposed in this NPRM, 
the ANPRM identified two systems that could be used to meet the 
performance standard: (1) A purging system; and (2) short loading 
lines. In addition, the ANPRM asked commenters to address alternative 
strategies for reducing the risks associated with carriage of flammable 
liquids in unprotected wetlines, including improved vehicle 
conspicuity, modified accident damage protection systems, and non-
regulatory alternatives.
1. Purging System
    The purging system is an onboard system that evacuates the wetlines 
by forcing the lading out of the product piping and into the cargo tank 
body. After loading is complete and the main cargo compartment valves 
are closed, the system introduces compressed air from an auxiliary tank 
into the product piping under low pressure and at a low flow rate. 
Lading in the product piping is displaced by air and flows through 
separate purging lines into the cargo tank body. This purging process 
is controlled automatically and lasts approximately six minutes. The 
system is also capable of detecting and automatically purging any 
leakage of product through the cargo tank's internal shutoff valve into 
the product piping, thereby eliminating a potential wetline condition 
during transportation. In the ANPRM we asked if such a system would 
effectively reduce the risks posed by unprotected wetlines.
    In response to our question, the American Petroleum Institute (API) 
said, ``In theory, a properly operating purging system should be very 
effective because the lines and equipment would be dry.'' Other 
commenters, however, state that such a safety system would generate 
more concerns than it averts. The Petroleum Transportation and Storage 
Association (PTSA) notes that anywhere from one half to a full gallon 
of gasoline would be left in the hoses after purging. PTSA states that 
the trapped gasoline, while reducing the risk of ignition due to 
accidental impact, could send vapors back to an otherwise empty and 
purged compartment, creating a significant risk of explosion.
    CTC suggests that the purging system has already been proven to be 
very effective. In one instance a tanker equipped with a purging system 
ran over a discarded drive shaft that was then propelled into the 
outlet piping and tore a hole in the thin schedule 10 aluminum. No 
product spilled from the piping because it had been purged. CTC reports 
another incident that occurred when a woman driving a passenger vehicle 
hit and damaged the outlet piping, trapping her vehicle beneath the 
cargo tank. Although the tanker was empty, the owner of the tanker 
stated that several gallons of gasoline would have poured onto the hood 
of her car if the lines had not been purged.
    We agree with API and CTC that a properly operating purging system 
will be effective in reducing the risks associated with unprotected 
wetlines. We disagree with PTSA. A purged wetline will not send a 
larger quantity of vapors back to an otherwise empty and purged 
compartment than would be sent by a saturated wetline. The residue 
remaining in the wetline after it has been purged will not pose a 
significant risk of explosion.
    In the ANPRM we asked if a purging system would be practicable for 
installation on new and/or existing CTMVs. Nearly all the commenters 
believe that any future wetlines requirement should apply to newly 
manufactured equipment and that it should be phased in over a period of 
years as existing equipment is taken out of service. Most commenters 
believe that retrofit is not practicable; however, NTTC indicates that 
retrofit would be practicable so long as the purging equipment can be 
installed without welding. CTC suggests that ``it is more than obvious 
that our system is practicable for installation on both new and 
existing equipment. Over the last five years more than 130 fully 
automated systems have been installed nationwide and have been on the 
road for an average of three years. More than half of these systems 
were installed as retrofits.''
    The ANPRM noted our understanding that one major oil company, 
representing less than one percent of the potentially affected cargo 
tank population, has chosen to outfit its entire fleet with a system 
that purges product from unprotected external piping. Two additional 
carriers installed the same purging system on a small portion of their 
fleets as part of a successful field evaluation and expressed interest 
in equipping their entire fleets. To verify our understanding we asked 
if any carriers were installing the systems on their

[[Page 78378]]

tanks and, if so, we asked for the costs associated with installation 
and maintenance.
    Most commenters know of only one carrier, Sun Oil Co. (Sunoco), 
currently operating a purging system on its cargo tanks. Sunoco worked 
with CTC to develop a purging system that is reliable and easy to 
understand and operate. According to CTC, Sunoco's experience 
demonstrates that vapor does not escape from a purged wetline, enter an 
empty compartment, and create a more volatile atmosphere than if the 
wetline contained a greater quantity of the flammable liquid. Further, 
Sunoco has indicated to CTC that it is confident that the outcome of an 
accident will be less serious because gasoline will have been purged 
from the product piping. According to CTC, British Petroleum (BP)/
AMOCO/ARCO, Getty, and Motiva/Shell have each installed a CTC purging 
system on one of its units. Carriers that have installed the CTC 
purging system indicate that they are satisfied with the purging 
system, but they are postponing further purchases pending the issuance 
of a RSPA regulation. The regulatory evaluation includes a more 
complete discussion of the costs involved with installation of a 
purging system on both new and existing CTMVs.
2. Short Loading Lines
    The installation of short, or independent, loading lines involves 
adding a set of short lines for loading that are independent of the 
unloading lines. These short-loading lines, placed on the lower part of 
the cargo tank, are accessible and are not exposed to damage in case of 
rollover. Each short four-inch inside diameter pipe extends from the 
cargo tank wall and contains approximately one gallon of hazardous 
material rather than the 30 to 50 gallons contained in a typical 
product piping system. In the ANPRM we voiced our concern regarding the 
effectiveness of such a design and whether it might adversely impact 
the structural integrity of the cargo tank. We were interested in 
obtaining the industry's thoughts on the practicality of installing 
independent loading lines on new and/or existing tanks. We also asked 
if any carriers are currently installing the systems on their tanks 
and, if so, we asked for the costs associated with installation and 
maintenance.
    The commenters state that short and recessed loading lines are not 
practicable options for installation on new or existing cargo tanks. 
They state that recessed loading lines will be more difficult for 
drivers and terminal workers to access, increasing accidents and OSHA 
claims. Also, commenters suggest that such a requirement would require 
loading rack modifications, cause increased splashing and concern for 
static ignition, and require a longer flow period. Commenters agree 
that the installation of short or recessed loading lines may be 
unrealistic because substantial modifications to existing loading racks 
may be necessary or loading times may increase. API suggests that such 
a substantial change to the loading rack would cost $1 million per 
loading lane. Commenters also assert that if the product flow were 
reversed at the rack and the lines were purged, there would be problems 
with the fuel tax accounting system, fuel blends due to mixing at the 
rack, and the mixing of flammable liquids in slop tanks. All of the 
commenters agree that draining the product at the rack is neither a 
feasible nor cost-effective option.
    We agree with the commenters. Our analysis of short or recessed 
loading lines indicates that the system would not be a cost-effective 
means of mitigating the risks associated with unprotected wetlines. Due 
to the high cost of facility modification and the potential for greater 
risks to workers, the public, and the environment, implementation of an 
independent loading line requirement is not feasible at this time.
3. Accident Damage Protection
    In the ANPRM, we stated that we are aware of at least one cargo 
tank operator that has installed under-ride protection on its cargo 
tank motor vehicles. Although this protection may not meet the bottom 
damage protection requirements in Sec.  178.345-8(b), we invited 
comments on whether this may or may not substantially reduce the risks 
posed by unprotected product piping. We also asked if there were cost-
effective designs that would provide a level of protection that would 
sufficiently reduce the risks associated with unprotected wetlines.
    Commenters agree that there are designs for accident damage 
protection that would protect the wetlines from rupture during a 
collision, but both API and the Society of Independent Gasoline 
Marketers of America (SIGMA) suggest that the same structure could 
puncture the shell of the tank due to the impact of a collision. Also, 
the weight of accident damage protection rigid enough to protect the 
wetlines in a side impact situation would be approximately 1,100 to 
1,200 pounds, which would significantly reduce the amount of product 
hauled per trip. API states that accident damage protection would cost 
between $3,000 and $5,000 for ``light duty,'' which would most likely 
be insufficient in a side impact, or $11,000 and $12,000 for ``heavy 
duty,'' which would be adequate protection. Commenters suggest that 
accident damage protection capable of protecting the wetlines in a side 
impact situation is not cost-effective at this time.
    We agree with the commenters. Adequate accident damage protection 
is available, but we realize that there are some valid concerns 
regarding rigid tubing puncturing the tank shell during an accident 
situation and the costs involved with installation of systems that 
would be effective in reducing accidents involving unprotected 
wetlines.
4. Conspicuity
    In the ANPRM, we suggested that perhaps marking or other systems 
that increase vehicle conspicuity could be effective in reducing 
collisions between cargo tank motor vehicles and automobiles. All 
commenters agree that improved conspicuity or lighting requirements 
would not reduce the risk of wetlines incidents. The current 
conspicuity requirements make cargo tanks highly visible. Commenters 
further suggest that the accidents that resulted in wetlines incidents 
were not a result of impaired visibility.
    We agree with the commenters that the conspicuity requirements 
currently in place are sufficient and we have decided not to propose 
any changes to the conspicuity features already required on cargo tank 
motor vehicles.
5. Non-Regulatory Alternatives
    In the ANPRM, we asked if an awareness campaign might be a 
successful means of reducing the risk associated with unprotected 
wetlines. Most commenters do not see this as a reasonable approach for 
reducing the number of wetlines accidents. Indeed, the Petroleum 
Marketers Association of America (PMAA) suggests that a public 
awareness campaign ``might cause unnecessary alarm among the public 
over a risk that we see as so minimal.'' On the other hand CTC states 
that ``the public has every right to be alerted to the fact that cargo 
tank outlet piping, designed to fail if impacted in an accident, is 
being used to transport up to 50 gallons of gasoline located underneath 
a cargo tank that carries thousands of gallons of flammable liquids.'' 
Further, CTC indicated that the frequency and accuracy of wetlines 
incidents being reported would increase as the public becomes more 
aware of the situation.

[[Page 78379]]

    We agree that the public should understand the risks involved with 
the transportation of flammable liquids and be sure to utilize safe 
driving techniques, but an awareness campaign would not solve the 
safety problem associated with the retention of flammable liquids in 
unprotected wetlines. We agree with CTC that an awareness campaign 
could help to expand data collected on wetlines incidents, but making 
the public aware of this situation does not eliminate the inherent 
safety problem.
    In the ANPRM, we asked for comments on additional safety practices 
that the industry is currently utilizing to minimize the safety risk 
associated with the retention of flammable liquids in unprotected 
wetlines. Commenters suggest that the driver training they provide 
constitutes an adequate safety practice and sufficiently mitigates the 
risks associated with unprotected wetlines. They state that motor 
carriers train cargo tank motor vehicle drivers on the dangers 
associated with flammable liquids in wetlines and some even provide 
defensive driver training. Commenters did not provide any definitive 
costs associated with the wetlines training the industry provides. The 
Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America (SIGMA), states 
that ``in the past, SIGMA members have estimated their per-employee 
hazmat training costs at approximately $4,000 per employee.'' Other 
commenters indicate that significant resources were dedicated to safety 
training.
    We agree that providing drivers with defensive driver training is 
beneficial to both the driver and the public, but the wetlines 
accidents that have occurred indicate that this type of training does 
not adequately alleviate the safety risk associated with the retention 
of flammable liquids in unprotected wetlines. We are encouraged that 
carriers realize the dangers associated with unprotected wetlines and 
are searching for a safety solution. We do not agree that training 
alone is an adequate solution; we note, however, that training is 
essential to the success of any proposed safety practice.
    In the ANPRM we asked if an industry or an industry/government 
research initiative to explore new methods to address the wetlines 
safety problem would be of value. Commenters disagree as to the value 
of such research. SIGMA states that ``a research initiative would be 
valuable if potential methods of enhancing safety of wetlines were 
identified.'' On the other hand, PMAA's view is that ``the risk is so 
low, we do not believe further research is warranted.''
    We continue to believe that the risks associated with unprotected 
wetlines are significant. At this time, we do not believe that an 
industry/government research initiative is necessary to identify 
potential solutions to the safety problem because, in our view, a 
purging system reduces the risks associated with unprotected wetlines 
in a cost-effective manner. We will keep abreast of technological 
advances that affect the safe transportation of hazardous materials 
and, as necessary, conduct or participate in research projects that 
might provide information about new technologies or innovative ideas 
that could increase hazmat safety.
6. Other
    In the ANPRM, we suggested that there might be other cost-effective 
solutions that could significantly reduce or eliminate the current 
level of risk. We asked commenters to identify other possible 
approaches to reducing or eliminating the risks posed by the 
transportation of flammable liquids in unprotected wetlines. We asked 
them to provide information on the costs, effectiveness, phase of 
development, or any other concepts, either facility- or vehicle-
related, that might reduce the risks posed by unprotected wetlines.
    Two commenters indicated that there is a new technology that could 
reduce the safety risks associated with wetlines. These commenters are 
marketing two versions of a double-poppeted emergency valve that allows 
the external link to rotate if the valve is sheared during an accident 
situation, thereby closing the valve and trapping the product in the 
wetline. The commenters suggest that the installation of this valve 
requires no modification to the existing cargo tank, except for 
installation of the valve, and that it is easily retrofitted onto the 
cargo tank in place of the current emergency valve.
    While we agree that a double-poppeted emergency valve could be of 
some value in reducing the potential consequences of an accident 
involving unprotected wetlines, we note that the valve's external link 
operates only in the event that the valve is sheared from the piping; 
this limitation means that for accidents that do not shear the valve 
from the piping, the valve's utility in mitigating the consequences of 
the accident is limited. In our view, a regulatory solution must 
comprehensively address the underlying safety risks associated with the 
retention of flammable liquids in unprotected wetlines.
C. Costs Associated With Regulations
    In the ANPRM, we stated that we are aware of two systems that may 
be used to meet the performance standard proposed in this NPRM--a 
manual onboard purging system and short or recessed loading lines. We 
estimated that the manual onboard purging system could be installed on 
a newly constructed CTMV for around $2,120 (welded) or $2,256 (non-
welded) (2002 dollars). A short loading line system can be installed 
for $1,540 per cargo tank motor vehicle (2002 dollars). Equipment and 
installation costs are the same for the retrofit of existing CTMVs; 
however, additional costs in the form of lost profit or risks to 
technicians installing new equipment may be incurred when systems are 
installed on existing CTMVs. We invited comments on the accuracy of the 
data that we used in the ANPRM. Specifically, we asked for information 
on the costs for the purging system and short and recessed loading 
lines.
    Several commenters provided figures for the costs associated with 
retrofitting tanks with purging systems and short loading lines. The 
American Petroleum Institute (API) and the Petroleum Transportation & 
Storage Association (PTSA) both indicate that the hardware and 
installation costs of retrofitting a cargo tank with a wetline purging 
system could total as much as $5,000 per tank. These commenters suggest 
that adding in the costs associated with cleaning and purging the tank 
and the losses due to the time out of service for the retrofit suggests 
that the actual cost of the retrofit could be well over $5,000 dollars 
per tank. PTSA estimates the cost for installing short loading lines on 
a CTMV to be approximately $2,000 per tank.
    Another commenter, CTC, states that it sells both automatic and 
manual purging systems. CTC indicates that a semi-manual system, a 
system that does not include optical sensors, solenoids and LEDs, would 
be consistent with the costs used in the ANPRM, that is $2,100 to 
$2,300. CTC further states that, depending on the options chosen, 
prices range from $3,000 to $4,000 for a fully automatic wetlines 
purging system; on average, according to CTC, the cost for a fully 
automated system, either new or retrofit, averages $3,800.
    We agree with PTSA that the cost of retrofitting a tank with short 
lines would be approximately $2,000. However, in our view both PTSA and 
API are overestimating the cost of retrofitting a tank with a wetlines 
purging system. CTC has manufactured and installed over 130 wetline 
purging

[[Page 78380]]

systems. Given CTC's experience, we believe that its estimate of the 
costs of installing a purging system is more accurate than the 
estimates provided by PTSA and API. Therefore, in the regulatory 
evaluation, we use the CTC cost estimates in our analysis of the costs 
associated with the performance standard proposed in this NPRM.
    In the ANPRM we asked commenters if reductions in the costs 
associated with purging systems would stem from economies of scale. 
Most commenters indicate that economies of scale would not be 
applicable because there are not a sufficient number of tanks affected 
to provide the benefits associated with economies of scale. CTC states 
that over the past five years it has sold 130 systems nationwide. This 
does not indicate a market that could benefit from economies of scale. 
However, CTC suggests that if demand for its purging system were to 
reach 1,000 units per year, then the cost of the system would be 
substantially reduced. Because of the conflicting information provided 
by commenters, we do not include potential economies of scale in the 
analysis of system costs in the regulatory evaluation. However, we 
invite commenters to provide data and information concerning cost 
reductions that would be achieved as a result of economies of scale.
D. Cargo Tank Population
    Based on information in the U.S. Census Bureau's 1997 Vehicle 
Inventory and Use Survey, we estimated in the ANPRM that the population 
of vehicles that would be affected by any regulatory action to address 
the safety risks associated with the retention of flammable liquids in 
unprotected wetlines is approximately 63,000. Commenters to the ANPRM 
indicate that there are actually between 10,000 and 50,000 vehicles 
that will be affected. For example, PTSA states that there are ``more 
than 50,000 cargo tank vehicles in flammable [liquid] service 
nationwide'' that ``deliver approximately 42,000 shipments per day.'' 
The National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. (NTTC) states, ``respondents to 
NTTC's membership survey reported a total fleet of 10,648 cargo tank 
motor vehicles designed, primarily, for the transportation of petroleum 
products (i.e., Specifications MC 306, DOT 406 and older 
equivalents).''
    A May 2003 editorial entitled Fuel haulers find the key, published 
in Modern Bulk Transporter, reports an industry estimate of the number 
of petroleum trailers in service to be 15,000 units. The article 
states: ``A surprising result of the research was the finding that the 
number of petroleum trailers in service today may be less than half of 
what was estimated 10 years ago. The new estimate suggests a total 
petroleum fleet of around 15,000 units, down significantly from the 
48,000-unit figure that has been quoted since the mid 1990s.'' The 
article indicates that this decline can be attributed in large part to 
24-hour loading and delivery operations. Based on the information in 
this article, increases in productivity achieved by the industry over 
the past decade, and the inconclusive nature of the comments provided 
by the industry in response to the ANPRM, we believe that 15,000 
vehicles is a reasonably accurate estimate for the population of CTMVs 
that would be affected by regulatory action to address the wetlines 
safety issue. A more detailed analysis of the population of vehicles 
that will be affected by this proposal can be found in the regulatory 
evaluation.
E. Cargo Tank Useful Life
    The ANPRM stated our understanding that the useful life of a cargo 
tank is at least 20 years and may extend to 30 years. The American 
Petroleum Institute (API) suggests that the useful life of a cargo tank 
is between five and twelve years, after which time the tanks must be 
upgraded or replaced. Other commenters, notably NTTC and PMAA, agree 
that the average useful life for a cargo tank in flammable liquid 
service is about 20 years and that 25-year-old cargo tanks are not 
uncommon. For the regulatory evaluation, we used a 20-year useful life 
estimate to evaluate the costs to the industry of the performance 
standard proposed in this NPRM.
F. Maximum Weight Limits
    The ANPRM asked commenters to estimate the percentage of CTMVs in 
flammable liquid service that are operated at maximum weight limits. 
Several commenters indicate that virtually all CTMVs are loaded to the 
maximum weight limit permitted by state or Federal regulations, 
whichever is greater. Commenters also suggest that for every six pounds 
added to the tare weight of a cargo tank, one gallon of gasoline is 
displaced from each load. We agree that the added weight of a system 
designed to reduce or eliminate lading from wetlines would have a 
negative impact on the amount of product that can be transported and 
that this cost must be addressed as part of any proposed regulatory 
changes. In addition, the additional risk to the general public that 
results from more frequent deliveries to compensate for any added 
weight must be addressed. The regulatory evaluation includes a more 
complete analysis of this issue in the discussion of costs that may be 
incurred by the industry to comply with the proposals in this NPRM.
G. Average Distance Traveled
    In the ANPRM, we asked for an estimate of the average distance 
traveled by a typical CTMV during a delivery route. Most commenters 
indicate that the average round trip falls somewhere between 40 and 60 
miles. However, some commenters suggest that the average distance per 
trip varies greatly depending on the areas within which deliveries are 
made. For example, some commenters note that tankers operating in rural 
areas travel significantly higher round-trip distances than tankers 
operating in urban areas. These commenters estimate a range of from 25 
miles for an urban round-trip to 100 miles for a round-trip completed 
in a rural area.
    Based on comments received to the ANPRM, in the regulatory 
evaluation, we estimate that the average round trip should fall 
somewhere between 40 and 60 miles. While commenters are correct that an 
urban route is, on average, significantly shorter than a rural route, 
because the demand for flammable liquids, especially gasoline, is 
higher in urban areas, suppliers will make far more urban delivery 
trips than rural delivery trips. A weighted average takes account of 
the larger number of short round-trips and results in an average 
distance per trip of between 40 and 60 miles.
H. Additional Benefits
    In the ANPRM we asked if additional benefits, either measurable or 
otherwise, would result from the implementation of requirements 
established to reduce the safety risks associated with unprotected 
wetlines. Only one commenter addressed this question. CTC suggests that 
one of the additional benefits of an automatic wetlines purging system 
is that the system provides a continual means to detect leaking or 
malfunctioning emergency valves. Under the bottom loading system the 
outlet piping is filled with the flammable liquid that is in the cargo 
tank. CTC states ``[a] recent installation of a purging system for a 
major oil company revealed that all five emergency valves were stuck 
open, despite their procedures for periodic inspections. A wetlines 
incident in this case would have caused the loss of the entire contents 
of the affected compartments.''
    As we noted in the ANPRM, we are aware that the automatic purging 
system is also capable of detecting and purging

[[Page 78381]]

any leakage of product through the cargo tank's internal shutoff valve 
into the product piping, thereby eliminating a potentially serious 
safety condition during transportation. We agree with CTC that this 
should be included as an additional benefit of the automatic purging 
system.
I. Low-Frequency/High-Consequence Events
    In the ANPRM, we asked if a cost-benefit analysis developed to 
support a regulatory change should include a reduction in risks 
associated with low-frequency, high-consequence events. Commenters 
suggest that any cost-benefit analysis should include all relevant 
events, regardless of their frequency or magnitude. CTC gives the 
following example: ``Much attention has been given lately to 
regulations that might reduce the risk of gasoline cargo tanks being 
hijacked by terrorists, but a cargo tank does not need to be hijacked, 
nor does it need to be rigged with explosives to create a 
catastrophe.'' CTC suggests that if terrorists decide to cause 
intentional accidents involving wetlines, then low-frequency, high-
consequence events could rapidly become common and more than a threat 
to public safety. CTC argues that the benefits for addressing this 
vulnerability would be substantial.
    We agree with the commenters that all relevant events should be 
included in a cost-benefit analysis. We also agree with CTC's comments 
regarding security concerns associated with the transportation of 
hazardous materials, specifically a cargo tank filled with gasoline. 
However, the intention of this rulemaking is to identify a cost-
effective solution to the safety risks associated with the 
transportation of flammable liquids in unprotected product piping. We 
are addressing the security risks associated with hazardous materials 
transportation in several other rulemaking projects. Although CTC's 
points are valid, we do not agree that attaching security concerns to 
our search for a cost-effective solution to the wetlines issue would be 
appropriate.

III. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This proposed rule is a significant regulatory action under section 
3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, was reviewed by the 
Office of Management and Budget. The proposed rule is also a 
significant rule under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the 
Department of Transportation (44 FR 11034). A regulatory evaluation is 
available for review in the docket. This regulatory evaluation makes a 
number of key assumptions, as follows: (1) The estimated number of 
CTMVs affected by our proposal is 15,000 units; (2) the lowest-cost 
solution identified in our proposal is 100% effective in eliminating 
the risk posed by wetlines; (3) for retrofit of existing CTMVs, 
equipment downtime would be limited to time already accounted for 
during DOT-mandated qualification testing; (4) affected parties will 
select the lowest-cost alternative available (the non-welded purging 
system); and (5) the benefits identified in our regulatory evaluation 
are from actual wetlines-related incidents.
    Number of CTMVs. In our regulatory evaluation we estimate the 
number of affected CTMVs to be 15,000. We arrived at this conclusion 
using several different methodologies. For example, the daily 
consumption of gasoline in the United States is 7,900,000 barrels or 
332,000,000 gallons. Shipment of this amount, together with the 
subsequent daily reshipment of gasoline from bulk storage to 
intermediate or jobber storage, results in 43,824 (88%) bulk shipments 
in 8,000 gallon CTMVs and 23,904 (12%) bulk shipments in 2,000 gallon 
CTMVs. Based on an average of five trips per day per CTMV and 12% of 
CTMVs out of service at any time, the total number of CTMVs required to 
transport the gasoline is 9,817 8,000-gallon cargo tanks and 5,737 
2,000-gallon cargo tanks, or, a total of 15,554 CTMVs. This figure is 
consistent with industry estimates on the number of CTMVs currently in 
petroleum service (15,000). This proposed rule would except truck-
mounted cargo tanks, which are typically in the 2,000-3,500 gallon 
range, from the wetlines prohibition; this exception would apply to a 
total of 5,737 CTMVs. Our regulatory evaluation assumes that 15,000 
CTMVs will be affected under this NPRM. This total includes about 5,183 
CTMVs that transport flammable liquids other than petroleum products 
that may be subject to the requirements of this NPRM. We invite 
comments to provide us with additional data concerning the number of 
CTMVs that may be affected by the provisions of this NPRM.
    Effectiveness of technology solutions. The intent of this proposed 
rule is to eliminate the risks posed by unprotected product piping 
containing flammable liquids during transportation. To evaluate the 
benefits and costs of the proposal to prohibit the carriage of 
flammable liquids in wetlines, we identified several technologies that 
would permit operators of CTMVs to meet the proposed performance 
standard. The system used for our regulatory analysis is the lowest-
cost system currently available--a purging system that can be installed 
on a CTMV without welding. A purging system evacuates the loading/
unloading lines by forcing the flammable liquid out of the product 
lines and into the cargo tank body. After loading is complete and the 
main cargo compartment valves are closed, the system introduces 
compressed air from an auxiliary tank through an air filter and 
regulator into the lines. We agree with most commenters to the ANPRM 
that the purging-system technology that currently exists will eliminate 
the risks posed by wetlines and, therefore, would be 100% effective 
whether installed in newly manufactured CTMVs or retrofitted on 
existing CTMVs. We welcome additional comments on whether a purging 
system would be 100% effective in eliminating the risk posed by 
wetlines.
    Costs associated with system installation. We believe that systems 
designed to purge loading lines on CTMVs will be installed at the point 
of manufacture on newly constructed CTMVs and, therefore, no additional 
costs would be incurred. For existing CTMVs, we propose to permit 
retrofits over a five-year period, thereby permitting systems designed 
to purge loading lines to be installed at the time of a CTMV's required 
5-year pressure test. This policy would allow maximum flexibility to 
CTMV owners and operators when scheduling installation time and is 
consistent with previous rulemakings requiring the retrofit of existing 
CTMVs. In our regulatory evaluation we assume that labor man-hour costs 
are the only additional costs incurred when retrofitting existing 
CTMVs. Other down-time costs, such as loss of profit, are not taken 
into account based on our assumption that the CTMV will already be out 
of service at the time of installation. We welcome comments on whether 
the down-time costs we quote are either realistic or accurate and if 
there would be any extenuating circumstances of which we are not aware.
    Selection of low-cost alternative. Both ``welded'' and ``non-
welded'' systems are equally effective in meeting the performance 
standard proposed in the NPRM. An automated purging system must be 
installed by welding; a manual purging system may be installed with or 
without welding. For new construction, some companies may elect to 
install a ``welded'' purging system over a ``non-welded'' system, not 
withstanding the lower per-unit cost of the ``non-welded''

[[Page 78382]]

system, based on convenience (installation at the point of manufacture) 
and the opportunity to install an automated purging system rather than 
a manual purging system if they so choose. Although unlikely (costs and 
risk are higher), some companies may elect to retrofit a ``welded'' 
purging system over a ``non-welded'' purging system for the opportunity 
to install an automated rather than a manual purging system. In our 
regulatory analysis we assume that CTMV owners/operators will choose to 
install the lowest-cost alternative (the non-welded purging system) 
that satisfies the performance standard proposed in the NPRM for newly 
constructed and existing CTMVs due to its ease of installation, lower 
cost, and the elimination of risk posed to welders. We have included a 
sensitivity analysis in our regulatory evaluation that compares 
benefits and costs for different scenarios, including two tables 
highlighting a ``welded'' manual purging system installed on both newly 
constructed and existing CTMVs. We welcome comments on whether CTMV 
owners/operators would select the ``welded'' or ``non-welded'' option.
    Benefits of proposed rule. We identified 190 reported incidents 
involving wetlines during the 12-year period from January 1, 1990, 
through December 31, 2001, which is a rate of about 16 incidents per 
year. Incidents reported by carriers to RSPA, under Sec. Sec.  171.15 
and 171.16 of the HMR, are a direct result of the hazardous material 
involved. Therefore, all quantified reported and non-reported costs to 
society to avoid a wetlines incident accrued in our regulatory 
evaluation are the direct result of the release of flammable liquids in 
unprotected product piping during an accident.
    In our benefit-cost analysis we determined that achieving 
compliance with the proposed rule under the lowest cost system of which 
we are aware, the non-welded purging system, and within an acceptable 
time frame, would cost industry $39.9 million in present value 
(discounted 7%) over a period of 20 years, the estimated maximum useful 
life of a CTMV. The corresponding present-value benefits are $45.3 
million, for a benefit-cost ratio of 1.14:1 when discounted by 7%. The 
benefits include lives saved, injuries prevented, and property damage 
avoided. In addition, the proposal to prohibit the transportation of 
flammable liquids in unprotected product lines reduces losses by the 
private sector (in terms of time and productivity), by government (in 
terms of allocation of scarce resources, including emergency 
responders, their support vehicles, and equipment), and by the general 
public (in terms of time and inconvenience).
    Associated Damages Caused by Wetlines That Are Not Reported to 
RSPA. The damages caused by wetlines incidents are greater than what is 
reported on Incident Reports submitted to RSPA. Associated damages 
caused by wetlines incidents include the costs of traffic delays, 
additional vehicle operating expenses, commercial losses beyond those 
that may be included in evacuation costs, environmental damage, and 
emergency services beyond those that may be included in 
decontamination/cleanup costs. These associated damages are not 
reported to RSPA; however, they are part of the true costs of the 
wetlines incidents that are reported. Associated damages are difficult 
to estimate; however, high profile incidents, such as the Yonkers, New 
York, incident, provide insight into some of these associated damages. 
At best, we can provide a range of values for these associated damages 
that are informed by empirical and other evidence.
    Because of the difficulty in estimating associated benefits, some 
of the estimates for the benefits discussed in this section may be 
over- or understated. For example, the estimate derived for traffic 
delays is extrapolated from information about delays associated with 
several wetlines incidents, including the incident in Yonkers that 
destroyed an overpass section of the New York State Thruway and 
incidents in Huntsville, Alabama; Mesa, Arizona; and Chatham, Ohio, 
that resulted in lengthy highway closures. For purposes of this 
analysis, we assume that these delays are directly attributable to the 
release of the hazardous materials as a result of the accidents in 
question. However, it is also true that traffic delays result from 
accidents that are not related to hazardous materials or where a 
hazardous material is not released from its packaging during an 
accident. We did not try to identify the incremental costs of traffic 
delays resulting from the hazardous materials spill over and above the 
costs for delays that may have resulted had the hazardous material not 
been released. For this reason, these costs may be overstated. It is 
reasonable to assume that most, if not all, of the costs related to 
traffic delays resulting from wetlines accidents are directly 
attributable to the release of hazardous materials. Such delays would 
not have been as severe if a hazardous material were not involved or 
had not been released. In the Yonkers incident, for example, the 
overpass section would not have been destroyed had the hazardous 
material not been released and ignited. In addition, for traffic 
delays, our extrapolation is based on information concerning 15 of the 
190 wetlines-related incidents reported to RSPA. If the full cost of 
traffic delays were calculated for the remaining 175 wetlines-related 
incidents, the corresponding associated benefits would be much higher. 
However, even if only 61% of the cost to society to avoid traffic 
delays estimated here, when discounted by 7%, are directly attributable 
to wetlines incidents or, if only 40% of the costs to society to avoid 
traffic delays estimated here, when discounted by 3%, are directly 
attributable to wetlines incidents, the measures proposed in the NPRM 
will result in benefits exceeding costs. We invite comments on whether 
all associated benefits should be considered in a regulatory analysis 
or if a range of benefits is more appropriate.
    When product piping is damaged, the potential for fire is great and 
the consequences of such accidents may be substantial. We believe, 
therefore, that transportation of flammable liquids in unprotected 
product piping poses an unacceptable risk and continuing to permit this 
practice is not in the public interest.

B. Executive Order 13132

    This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 
(``Federalism''). This proposed rule would preempt State, local and 
Indian tribe requirements, but does not propose any regulation that has 
direct effects on the States, the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, the 
consultation and funding requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not 
apply.
    The Federal hazardous material transportation law, 49 U.S.C. 5101-
5127, contains an express preemption provision (49 U.S.C. 5125(b)) that 
preempts State, local, and Indian tribe requirements on certain 
subjects. These subjects are:
    (1) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous 
material;
    (2) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and 
placarding of hazardous material;
    (3) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents 
related to hazardous material and requirements related to the number, 
contents, and placement of those documents;
    (4) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the

[[Page 78383]]

unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material; or
    (5) the design, manufacturing, fabricating, marking, maintenance, 
reconditioning, repairing, or testing of a packaging or container 
represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in 
transporting hazardous material.
    This proposed rule covers item 5 and would preempt any State, 
local, or Indian tribe requirements not meeting the ``substantively the 
same'' standard.
    Federal hazardous materials transportation law provides at 49 
U.S.C. Sec.  5125(b)(2) that, if the Secretary of Transportation issues 
a regulation concerning any of the covered subjects, the Secretary must 
determine and publish in the Federal Register the effective date of 
Federal preemption. The effective date may not be earlier than the 90th 
day following the date of issuance of the final rule and not later than 
two years after the date of issuance. We propose that the effective 
date of Federal preemption will be 90 days from publication of a final 
rule in the Federal Register.

C. Executive Order 13175

    This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13175 
(``Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''). 
Because this proposed rule does not have tribal implications, does not 
impose substantial direct compliance costs, and is not required by 
statute, the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 
13175 do not apply.

D. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT 
Procedures and Policies

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an 
agency to review regulations to assess their impact on small entities 
unless the agency determines a rule is not expected to have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
Based on the assessment in the regulatory evaluation, we believe that 
this NPRM may have a significant impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. However, many small businesses will not be affected by 
the proposals in this NPRM because they tend to own single-unit (i.e. 
``straight'') trucks, which are excepted from the proposals.
    The detailed small business analysis is available for review in the 
docket. We invite commenters to address the impact that the proposals 
in this NPRM may have on small entities.
    This proposed rule has been developed in accordance with Executive 
Order 13272 (``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency 
Rulemaking'') and DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance 
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act to ensure that potential impacts of 
draft rules on small entities are properly considered. DOT has notified 
the Small Business Administration's Chief Counsel for Advocacy (SBA) of 
this draft proposed rule.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This proposed rule imposes no new information collection 
requirements.

F. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory 
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The 
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in 
April and October of each year. The RIN number contained in the heading 
of this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the 
Unified Agenda.

G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    This proposed rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of 
$100 million or more to either State, local, or tribal governments, in 
the aggregate, or to the private sector, and is the least burdensome 
alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule.

H. Environmental Assessment

    The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended 
(42 U.S.C. 4321-4347), requires Federal agencies to consider the 
consequences of major federal actions and prepare a detailed statement 
on actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment. There are no significant environmental impacts associated 
with this proposed rule. An initial environmental assessment is 
available in the docket.

I. Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit 
http://dms.dot.gov.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 173

    Hazardous materials transportation, packaging and containers, 
Radioactive materials, Uranium.
    In consideration of the foregoing, we propose to amend 49 CFR Part 
173 as follows:

PART 173--SHIPPERS--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND 
PACKAGINGS

    1. The authority citation for part 173 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127, 44701; 49 CFR 1.45, 1.53.

    2. In Sec.  173.33, paragraph (e) is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  173.33  Hazardous materials in cargo tank motor vehicles.

* * * * *
    (e) Retention of hazardous materials in external product piping 
during transportation.
    (1) No person may offer or transport a liquid hazardous material in 
Division 5.1 (oxidizer), Division 5.2 (organic peroxide), Division 6.1 
(toxic), or Class 8 (corrosive which is corrosive to skin only) in the 
external product piping of a DOT specification cargo tank motor vehicle 
unless the vehicle is equipped with bottom damage protection devices 
conforming to the appropriate requirements of Sec.  178.337-10 or Sec.  
178.345-8(b)(1) of this subchapter, or the accident damage protection 
requirements of the specification under which the cargo tank motor 
vehicle was manufactured. This requirement does not apply to a residue 
that remains after the external product piping is drained to the 
maximum extent practicable.
    (2) No person may offer or transport a Class 3 (flammable liquid) 
material in the external product piping of a DOT specification cargo 
tank motor vehicle on or after [date two years after the effective date 
of the final rule], unless the cargo tank motor vehicle is protected 
with bottom damage protection devices conforming to the requirements of 
Sec.  178.337-10 or Sec.  178.345-8(b)(1) of this subchapter, as 
appropriate. The requirements of this paragraph (e)(2) do not apply 
to--
    (i) A cargo tank motor vehicle that is marked or certified to a DOT 
specification before [date two years after the effective date of the 
final rule], until the date of the first required periodic pressure 
test occurring after [date two years after the effective date of the 
final rule];
    (ii) A cargo tank motor vehicle designed and constructed with 
engine, body, and cargo tank permanently mounted on the same chassis 
with

[[Page 78384]]

product piping protected from impact by another motor vehicle by the 
structural components of the cargo tank motor vehicle, such as damage 
protection guards, framing members, or wheel assemblies.
    (iii) A combustible liquid.
    (iv) Flammable liquid residue, not to exceed one liter (0.26 
gallons) per line, that may remain in piping after it is drained.
    (3) A sacrificial device in accordance with Sec.  178.345-8(b)(2) 
of this subchapter may not be used to satisfy the bottom damage 
protection requirements of this paragraph (e) if hazardous material is 
retained in product piping during transportation.
* * * * *

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 23, 2004 under authority 
delegated in 49 CFR Part 106.
Robert A. McGuire,
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety.
[FR Doc. 04-28561 Filed 12-29-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P