[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 215 (Monday, November 8, 2004)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 64690-64692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-24803]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
[Docket No. PRM-73-12]
Committee To Bridge the Gap, Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; notice of receipt.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing for
public comment a notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking, dated
July 23, 2004, which was filed with the Commission by Daniel Hirsch,
President, Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG). The petition was docketed
by the NRC on September 29, 2004, and has been assigned Docket No. PRM-
73-12. The petitioner requests that the NRC amend its regulations to
upgrade the ``design basis threat'' regulations ((DBT), or the
magnitude of threat that the facility's security systems must be
capable of defeating) and associated requirements for protection of
domestic reactors from nuclear terrorism to a level that encompasses,
with a sufficient margin of safety, the terrorist capabilities
evidenced by the attacks of September 11, 2001.
DATES: Submit comments by January 24, 2005. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Please include the following number PRM-73-12 in the subject line of
your comments. Comments on petitions submitted in writing or in
electronic form will be made available for public inspection. Because
your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact
information, the NRC cautions you against including any information in
your submission that you do not want to be publicly disclosed.
[[Page 64691]]
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: [email protected]. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions
about our rulemaking Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; e-mail
[email protected]. Comments can also be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking
Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. (Telephone
(301) 415-1966).
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
(301) 415-1101.
Publicly available documents related to this petition may be viewed
electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction contractor will copy
documents for a fee. Selected documents, including comments, may be
viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC rulemaking Web site at
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to [email protected].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-7163 or toll free: 800-368-5642.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The petitioner states that CBG has been active in attempting to
increase protection at nuclear facilities against the risk of nuclear
terrorism for a quarter of a century. The NRC's current DBT regulations
for nuclear power plants were issued in the 1974-1976 period (February
24, 1977; 42 FR 10836), with only one substantive modification in the
ensuring thirty years, the truck bomb rule (August 1, 1994; 59 FR
38889). The petitioner states that DBT regulations established in the
mid-seventies do not require nuclear plant security be designed to
protect against:
(a) More than one insider;
(b) More than several external attackers;
(c) Attackers capable of operating as more than one team (i.e.,
capable of employing ``effective team maneuvering tactics''); and
(d) A group or individual using weapons of greater sophistication
than hand-held automatic weapons.
The petitioner states that the original DBT regulations essentially
required the attacks to be on foot, by not requiring protection from
truck bombs, or attacks by boat or air.
The petitioner asserts that despite the facts that the original
September 11, 2001, plot considered attacking U.S. nuclear plants, that
the terrorist risk has increased since September 11, 2001, and that
U.S. authorities warn that Al Quaeda is planning even more spectacular
and deadly attacks in the U.S., nearly three years after the September
11, 2001, attacks, U.S. nuclear reactor facilities remain unprotected
against air attacks or against ground attacks involving the September
11, 2001, number of attackers. The petitioner believes something must
be done promptly to protect these facilities--and the American public.
Increased threats, however, can be countered by measures that can be
implemented for modest cost but which will provide substantial
protection against events with such potentially catastrophic
consequences.
The Petitioner's Request
NRC Security Requirements for Protection of Nuclear Power Plants From
Terrorist Attack
The petitioner requests that 10 CFR 73.1(a) be revised to encompass
attacking forces equal to those of the terrorist attack on September
11, 2001, plus a margin of safety, in numbers, teams, capabilities,
planning, willingness to die, and other characteristics. The terrorist
attack on September 11, 2001, involved 19 attackers in 4 teams. The DBT
regulations should be changed to include at least 19 attackers, plus a
margin of safety above that level.
The NRC should also take into consideration the inclusion of
multiple coordinated teams. The petitioner believes that the attackers
should be presumed to use a full range of potential weapons of which a
group such as Al Qaeda would be capable, to include shaped charges,
shoulder-fired rockets, mortars, anti-tank weapons, large quantities of
explosives, etc. The explosives, weapons, and equipment need not be
limited to hand-carried items, as stated in the current regulations (10
CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(D)). The attackers should be presumed to be ruthless,
highly motivated, willing and even intent on dying, very creative,
thorough, and capable of extended planning and preparation. The DBT
regulations should include a minimum of three insiders, in addition to
the 19 external attackers, rather than the current 1 insider as stated
at 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(B) and (ii). The insiders should be presumed to
play both a passive role (e.g., supplying information) and active
capacity (e.g., directly participating in a coordinated attack or
separate sabotage actions), a land vehicle should not be limited to a
four-wheel drive car or truck, as is now the case at 10 CFR
73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and (iii), but include the full range of trucks and
other vehicles that a group like Al Qaeda might employ for such an
attack.
The petitioner states that the DBT regulations should include
attacks by foot or by land vehicle (e.g., vehicle bombs), as well as by
boat and by air. The DBT regulations addressing air attack should
include a fully loaded jumbo jet of maximum size in commercial service
and full fuel tanks, and more maneuverable smaller planes and
helicopters. The petitioner states that the NRC should consider
explosives potentially present in the aircraft as well as the mass of
the plane and the effect of its fuel when igniting. The DBT regulations
should protect both against direct impact of the aircraft on sensitive
facilities at the nuclear plant and against use of the aircraft or
helicopter for dropping explosives on those facilities. The petitioner
also states that the NRC should consider the coordination of an air
attack with assistance from insiders at the plant and/or external
attackers (i.e., damage to systems from the air attack coupled with
failure of backup systems due to coordinated action on the ground).
[[Page 64692]]
Mandate Security Plans, Systems, Inspections, and Force-on-Force
Exercises Protect Against the Amended DBT
The petitioner states that the security plans and physical systems
implementing those plans, inspections and force-on-force Operational
Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program exercises must be
upgraded to conform to the proposed DBT regulations. The petitioner
believes they must demonstrate high confidence to be able to repel a
September 11, 2001, level assault.
Require Prompt Construction of Shields From Air Attack at Standoff
Distances From Key Support Structures at Nuclear Plants ``Beamhenge''
The petitioner states that nuclear power plants were not designed
to withstand the attack by a fully loaded jumbo jet nor the intentional
use of airplanes for terrorist purposes.
The petitioner proposes the construction of shields composed of I-
beams with steel or other cabling and netting between them at standoff
distances around the key structures at nuclear plants. Airplanes or
jets attempting to attack sensitive structures would instead crash into
the surrounding Beamhenge shield, leaving intact the reactor, spent
fuel pool, and support facilities, thus protecting the public from
damage that could result in substantial radioactivity releases. The
Beamhenge concept may also provide some measure of protection against
such weapons as shoulder-launched rockets, causing them to detonate
before reaching their intended target.
The petitioner states that I-beams are relatively inexpensive, and
their installation can be done quickly and with modest expenditures.
The petitioner estimates that Beamhenge shields could be constructed
for a fraction of one percent of the original construction cost of the
nuclear plant. The petitioner believes that with such a low price and
relative ease of deployment, the burden is on the Commission to justify
why implementation of the Beamhenge approach should not be mandated
immediately. This petitioner requests that the shields against air
attack be required to be promptly constructed at the nation's nuclear
plants, on a time urgent basis.
Conclusion
The petitioner states that the Commission's DBT regulations
remained essentially unchanged, with one exception, for nearly thirty
years, despite dramatic increases in terrorist incidents, casualties,
and capabilities. The petitioners seek a revision of the threat basis
to include attack from the air by airplanes and jets, and attacking
forces by land, water, or air--at least equal to the nineteen
terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks in numbers,
capacity, ruthlessness, dedication, skills, planning, and willingness
to die and create large numbers of casualties. Additionally, the
petitioners propose that the security requirements in part 73 be
upgraded to provide high confidence in the ability of the security
system to protect against the proposed upgraded September 11, 2001-
equivalent DBT. In particular, the petitioners propose requiring, under
a time-urgent schedule, construction at reactor sites of shields
consisting of I-beams and cabling (Beamhenge) at stand-off distances
from buildings and other assets important to safety at reactor sites so
that airplanes or jets attempting to attack sensitive structures would
instead crash into the surrounding Beamhenge shield, leaving intact the
reactor, spent fuel pool, and support facilities, thus protecting the
public from damage that could result in substantial radioactivity
releases.
Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of November, 2004.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 04-24803 Filed 11-5-04; 8:45 am]
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