

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

Regulatory Analysis

A regulatory analysis has not been prepared for this rulemaking. This final rule makes an administrative change in the method of calculating the NRC's application fee for criminal history checks requested by licensees. The amendment is required to ensure that the NRC recovers the full cost of the criminal history program from licensees using the service. Because this rule implements the Section 149 requirement that the cost of the criminal history check be paid by the licensee or applicant, a regulatory analysis is unnecessary.

Backfit Analysis

The NRC has determined that the backfit rule does not apply to this final rule and a backfit analysis is not required because this amendment does not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR Chapter I.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73

Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous materials transportation, Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

■ For the reasons set forth in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR part 73.

PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

■ 1. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204,

88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

■ 2. In § 73.57, paragraph (d)(3) is revised to read as follows:

§ 73.57 Requirements for criminal history checks of individuals granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information by power reactor licensees.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(3) (i) Fees for the processing of fingerprint checks are due upon application. Licensees shall submit payment with the application for the processing of fingerprints through corporate check, certified check, cashier's check, money order, or electronic payment, made payable to "U.S. NRC." (For guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at (301) 415-7404). Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable.

(ii) The application fee is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC on behalf of a nuclear power plant licensee, and an administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC. The NRC processing fee covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of licensee fingerprint submissions. The Commission publishes the amount of the fingerprint check application fee on the NRC public Web site. (To find the current fee amount, go to the Electronic Submittals page at <http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/eie.html> and select the link for the Criminal History Program.) The Commission will directly notify licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.

* * * * *

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of September, 2004.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Martin J. Virgilio,

Acting Executive Director for Operations.

[FR Doc. 04-21766 Filed 9-30-04; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 23

[Docket No. CE212, Special Condition 23-151-SC]

Special Conditions; ARINC, Inc.; Raytheon Models 200, 300, and B300; Protection of Systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued to ARINC, Inc.; 1632 S. Murray Boulevard; Colorado Springs, CO 80916 for a Supplemental Type Certificate for the Raytheon Model King Air 200, 300 and B300 airplanes. These airplanes will have novel and unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisaged in the applicable airworthiness standards. The novel and unusual design features include the installation of a Digital Air Data Computer on the copilot side. The Digital Air Data Computer will be either an IS&S ADDU (Air Data Display Unit) or a Thommen AD32 Air Data Display for which the applicable regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate airworthiness standards for the protection of these systems from the effects of high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to the airworthiness standards applicable to these airplanes.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is September 20, 2004. Comments must be received on or before November 1, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Regional Counsel, ACE-7, Attention: Rules Docket Clerk, Docket No. CE212, Room 506, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. All comments must be marked: Docket No. CE212. Comments may be inspected in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wes Ryan, Aerospace Engineer, Standards Office (ACE-110), Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329-4127.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the approval and thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The FAA, therefore, finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon issuance.

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to submit such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered by the Administrator. The special conditions may be changed in light of the comments received. All comments received will be available in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons, both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. CE212." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Background

On February 9, 2004, ARINC, Inc.; 1632 S. Murray Boulevard, Colorado Springs, CO 80916, made application to the FAA for a new Supplemental Type Certificate for the Raytheon Model 200, 300, and B300 airplanes. The Raytheon Models of concern are approved under TC No. A24CE. The proposed modification incorporates a novel or unusual design feature, a digital air data computer, which may be vulnerable to HIRF external to the airplane.

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of 14 CFR part 21, § 21.101, ARINC, Inc. must show that the Raytheon Model 200, 300, and B300 aircraft meet the following provisions, or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the change to the Raytheon Model 200, 300, and B300: For those areas modified

or impacted by the installation of the IS&S ADDU (Air Data Display Unit) or a Thommen AD32 Air Data Display system, the following paragraphs as amended by Amendments 23-1 through 23-54 must be complied with: §§23.305, 23.307, 23.365, 23.603, 23.609, 23.611, 23.613, 23.625, 23.627, 23.771, 23.773, 23.777, 23.1301, 23.1303, 23.1309, 23.1311, 23.1321, 23.1322, 23.1325, 23.1331, 23.1335, 23.1351, 23.1357, 23.1359, 23.1361, 23.1365, 23.1367, 23.1381, 23.1431, 23.1529, 23.1541, 23.1543, 23.1581 and the special conditions adopted by this rulemaking action. For systems that are not modified or impacted by the installation, the original certification basis listed on TC No. A24CE are still applicable.

Discussion

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards because of novel or unusual design features of an airplane, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of §21.16.

Special conditions, as appropriate, as defined in §11.19, are issued in accordance with §11.38 after public notice and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with §21.101.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the models for which they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model already included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of §21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

ARINC, Inc. plans to incorporate certain novel and unusual design features into an airplane for which the airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for protection from the effects of HIRF. These features include the addition of a digital Air Data computer, which may be susceptible to the HIRF environment, that were not envisaged by the existing regulations for this type of airplane.

Protection of Systems From High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

Recent advances in technology have given rise to the application in aircraft designs of advanced electrical and electronic systems that perform functions required for continued safe flight and landing. Due to the use of sensitive solid-state advanced components in analog and digital

electronics circuits, these advanced systems are readily responsive to the transient effects of induced electrical current and voltage caused by the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade electronic systems performance by damaging components or upsetting system functions.

Furthermore, the HIRF environment has undergone a transformation that was not foreseen when the current requirements were developed. Higher energy levels are radiated from transmitters that are used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of transmitters has increased significantly. There is also uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling to cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined.

The combined effect of the technological advances in airplane design and the changing environment has resulted in an increased level of vulnerability of electrical and electronic systems required for the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. Effective measures against the effects of exposure to HIRF must be provided by the design and installation of these systems. The accepted maximum energy levels in which civilian airplane system installations must be capable of operating safely are based on surveys and analysis of existing radio frequency emitters. These special conditions require that the airplane be evaluated under these energy levels for the protection of the electronic system and its associated wiring harness. These external threat levels, which are lower than previous required values, are believed to represent the worst case to which an airplane would be exposed in the operating environment.

These special conditions require qualification of systems that perform critical functions, as installed in aircraft, to the defined HIRF environment in paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed value using laboratory tests, in paragraph 2, as follows:

(1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment defined below:

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
10 kHz–100 kHz ...	50	50
100 kHz–500 kHz	50	50
500 kHz–2 MHz	50	50

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
2 MHz–30 MHz	100	100
30 MHz–70 MHz ...	50	50
70 MHz–100 MHz	50	50
100 MHz–200 MHz	100	100
200 MHz–400 MHz	100	100
400 MHz–700 MHz	700	50
700 MHz–1 GHz ...	700	100
1 GHz–2 GHz	2000	200
2 GHz–4 GHz	3000	200
4 GHz–6 GHz	3000	200
6 GHz–8 GHz	1000	200
8 GHz–12 GHz	3000	300
12 GHz–18 GHz ...	2000	200
18 GHz–40 GHz ...	600	200

The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square (rms) values.

or,

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter, electrical field strength, from 10 kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for signal attenuation due to installation.

A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant, for approval by the FAA, to identify either electrical or electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term "critical" means those functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models, similarity with existing systems, or any combination of these. Service experience alone is not acceptable since normal flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be exposed to the fields concurrently.

Applicability: As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to Raytheon Model 200, 300, and B300

airplanes. Should ARINC, Inc. apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on the models listed. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.

Citation

■ The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19.

The Special Conditions

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Raytheon Model 200, 300, and B300 airplanes modified by ARINC, Inc. to add a digital Air Data computer.

1. Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems From High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high

intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the airplane.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies: *Critical Functions:* Functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on September 20, 2004.

David R. Showers,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 04–22019 Filed 9–30–04; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2004–19170; Directorate Identifier 2004–NE–18–AD; Amendment 39–13809; AD 2004–20–04]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6B–36A and PT6B–36B Turboshaft Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC) PT6B–36A and PT6B–36B turboshaft engines with compressor rear hubs, part number (P/N) 3018111 installed. This AD requires reviewing, and correcting if necessary the critical part record for compressor rear hubs, P/N 3018111. This AD also requires removing compressor rear hubs from service that exceed the published part life limit, before further flight. This AD results from the discovery of a compressor rear hub, P/N 3018111, that exceeded the published life limit. This occurred because the operator used an incorrect life limit calculation contained in a PWC Service Bulletin. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the compressor rear hub and damage to the airplane.

DATES: Effective October 18, 2004. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of October 18, 2004.

We must receive any comments on this AD by November 30, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this AD.