[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 158 (Tuesday, August 17, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51112-51128]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-18731]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-413 AND 50-414]


Duke Energy Corporation; Concerning the Application for 
Irradiation of Mixed Oxide Lead Test Assemblies at Catawba Nuclear 
Station, Units 1 and 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
issuance of an amendment to the Facility Operating Licenses to permit 
the use of mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs) in one of the 
two Catawba units and is considering the granting of exemptions from 
(1) the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR) Part 50.44(a), 10 CFR 50.46(a)(1) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K 
with respect to the use of M5\TM\ fuel rod cladding; (2) 10 CFR 
50.46(a)(1) and Appendix K to Part 50 with respect to the use of MOX 
fuel; and (3) certain physical security requirements of 10 CFR Parts 11 
and 73 that are usually required at fuel fabrication facilities for the 
protection of strategic quantities of special nuclear material. A 
similar request for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 
50.44(a) with respect to the use of M5\TM\ fuel rod cladding is not 
being granted since 10 CFR Part 50.44 has been changed and an exemption 
from it is no longer necessary. The amended license and exemptions 
would apply to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-
52, issued to Duke Energy Corporation (Duke, the licensee), for 
operation of the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, (Catawba) 
located in York County, South Carolina. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 
51.21, the NRC is issuing this environmental assessment (EA) and 
finding of no significant impact (FONSI).

1.0 Introduction

    The NRC staff has organized the discussion and evaluation to 
provide users with the context of the proposed action, supporting 
information that is available for tiering, the independent analyses 
performed, technical bases, and NRC conclusions. The following

[[Page 51113]]

structure was crafted to aid in its presentation:

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Background
3.0 Need for and Description of the Proposed Action
4.0 Non-Radiological Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
5.0 Radiological Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
6.0 Irreversible or Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
7.0 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts
8.0 Mitigation
9.0 Cumulative Impacts
10.0 Alternatives to the Proposed Action
11.0 Agencies and Persons Consulted
12.0 References
13.0 Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the EA that follows, the Commission concludes that 
the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality 
of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined 
not to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the proposed 
action.
    By letter dated February 27, 2003, as supplemented by letters dated 
September 15, September 23, October 1 (two letters), October 3 (two 
letters), November 3 and 4, December 10, 2003, and February 2 (two 
letters), March 1 (three letters), March 9 (two letters), March 16 (two 
letters), March 26, March 31, April 13, April 16, May 13, and June 17, 
2004, Duke submitted a license amendment request that, if granted, 
would authorize the irradiation of four mixed uranium and plutonium 
oxide MOX LTAs at either Catawba, or McGuire Nuclear Station (McGuire), 
Units 1 and 2, to support the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program 
for the disposition of fissile material. The DOE is responsible for 
implementing the national policy for disposition of fissile material. 
Duke has requested that the NRC staff's review only consider Catawba, 
as the proposed action because it no longer needed the option of 
conducting an LTA irradiation program at McGuire (Reference 6). In a 
previous, separate licensing action to support the renewal of the 
operating licenses for Catawba, Duke provided an environmental report 
(ER) (Reference 3); the ER provides useful background information about 
the site and its environs.
    The proposed action involves issuance of three exemptions (for the 
use of M5\TM\ cladding, instead of zircaloy; for fuel in the form of 
mixed uranium and plutonium oxide, rather than uranium oxide; and from 
certain physical security requirements usually required at fabrication 
facilities for the protection of strategic quantities of special 
nuclear material) and a license amendment for accompanying changes to 
the Catawba Technical Specifications (TSs) contained in Appendix A of 
each of the Catawba Nuclear Station operating licenses.
    The NRC staff has prepared this EA to comply with its National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) responsibilities to evaluate the 
environmental impacts resulting from Duke's proposed action. An EA is a 
concise public document prepared by the NRC to: (1) Briefly provide 
sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an 
EIS or a FONSI; (2) aid the Commission's compliance with NEPA when no 
EIS is necessary; and (3) facilitate preparation of an EIS when one is 
necessary.
    The NRC has completed a number of environmental reviews for 
activities that can inform this action and for activities specifically 
at the Catawba site. These reviews were published as environmental 
statements (ESs), EISs, or EAs, which were considered during the 
preparation of this assessment. In particular, in 1983, the NRC issued 
the final ES (FES) related to the operation of Catawba, NUREG-0921 
(Reference 18). In 2002, the NRC issued a site-specific supplement to 
the Generic EIS for license renewal of nuclear plants regarding 
Catawba, NUREG-1437, Supplement 9 (Reference 32) (hereafter referred to 
as Supplement 9). In 1999, the NRC issued a final addendum to the 
Generic EIS for license renewal of nuclear plants regarding the 
potential impacts of transporting spent nuclear fuel in the vicinity of 
a single high-level waste repository, NUREG-1437, Addendum 1 (Reference 
26). In 2001, the NRC issued the final EIS on the construction and 
operation of an independent spent fuel storage installation in Utah, 
NUREG-1714 (Reference 30). Finally, in 2003, the NRC issued a draft EIS 
on the construction and operation of a MOX fuel fabrication facility in 
South Carolina, NUREG-1767 (Reference 33).
    DOE has issued a number of environmental documents that provide 
useful insights to the assessment of issues involved in this proposed 
action. In fulfilling its responsibility for developing and 
implementing a framework for the disposition of fissile material, the 
DOE has issued its final programmatic EIS (PEIS) on storage and 
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials, DOE/EIS-0229 
(Reference 12). A supplemental analysis was issued by DOE in November 
2003, specifically addressing the fabrication of MOX LTAs in Europe, 
DOE/EIS-0229-SA3 (Reference 16), hereafter referred to as Supplement 
Analysis 3. The DOE has issued its final EIS on surplus plutonium 
disposition (SPD), or SPD EIS, DOE/EIS-0283 (Reference 13). A 
supplemental analysis to the SPD EIS was issued by DOE in April 2003, 
specifically addressing changes to the SPD program as it eliminated 
some of the alternatives, DOE/EIS-0283-SA1 (Reference 15), hereafter 
referred to as Supplement Analysis 1, and modified its Record of 
Decision (ROD). The ROD indicated that the disposition program would 
implement the National policy that was embodied in the September 2000 
Agreement between the Government of the United States and the 
Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Management and 
Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense 
Purposes and Related Cooperation. Finally, in 2002, DOE issued the 
final EIS on the geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste in Nevada, DOE/EIS-0250 
(Reference 14).
    This EA focuses on whether the proposed action could result in a 
significant environmental impact different from the ones considered by 
the NRC staff in earlier environmental reviews. The assessment 
considers whether changes have occurred in the human environment in the 
Catawba vicinity since the NRC staff previously considered 
environmental issues there. In a number of issue areas, the NRC 
references work that was documented in other publicly available 
environmental documents, for example, the EISs referenced above. In 
Supplement 9, the NRC staff evaluated the environmental impacts 
expected to result from continued operation and maintenance of the two 
Catawba facilities for an additional 20 years beyond the original 
license period. The Catawba plant operations for the proposed action 
would be conducted within the current license time frame; the NRC 
environmental reviews for this time frame were considered in the NRC 
FES and Supplement 9.

2.0 Background

2.1 The Plant and Its Environs

    Catawba is located on 158 ha (391 acres) in York County, South 
Carolina, approximately 29 km (18 mi) southwest of Charlotte, North 
Carolina. Rock Hill, South Carolina, the nearest city, is about 10 km 
(6 mi) south of the site. Catawba is situated on a peninsula that 
protrudes into Lake Wylie, a man-made lake created by the Wylie Dam on 
the Catawba River. The lake was initially impounded in 1904. Present 
full pond was obtained in 1924 when an increase

[[Page 51114]]

in the dam height raised the water level and increased the size of the 
lake. Duke either owns the land under the lake or the flood rights to 
that land. The lake level fluctuates in accordance with hydroelectric 
generation needs. Lake Wylie is a source of drinking water for several 
municipalities and supports extensive recreational use by fishermen, 
boaters, water skiers, and swimmers. As Lake Wylie is situated in both 
North Carolina and South Carolina, both States are involved in the 
protection, from a watershed perspective, of Lake Wylie's water 
quality. Lake Wylie exhibits thermal and oxygen dynamics similar to 
other southeastern reservoirs of comparable size, depth, flow 
conditions, and trophic status. Lake Wylie supports a good warm-water 
fishery.
    Each reactor is a pressurized light-water reactor (LWR) with four 
steam generators (SGs) producing steam that turns turbines to generate 
electricity. Duke refuels each Catawba nuclear unit on an 18-to 24-
month schedule. Catawba has approximately 1200 full-time workers and 
site contractors employed by Duke during normal plant operations. 
During refueling periods, site employment increases by as many as 500 
workers for temporary duty over a 30-to 40-day period. At the behest of 
the DOE and its fissile material disposition program, Duke has 
requested that NRC authorize it to use four MOX fuel LTAs for up to 
three refueling cycles. The four LTAs contemplated under this action 
would be used in lieu of four uranium dioxide fuel assemblies out of 
193 assemblies in the reactor core. The LTAs would not require a 
physical modification to the reactors or to any support structures, 
laydown areas or storage facilities, nor would it result in any change 
in infrastructure or in any land disturbance on the Catawba site.
    Catawba consists of two reactor buildings, two turbine buildings, 
two diesel generator buildings, six mechanical draft cooling towers, 
one shared service building, one auxiliary building, one water 
chemistry building, and one switchyard. The cooling water intake and 
discharge structures and standby nuclear service water pond are shared 
features. The reactors each have four reactor coolant loops, each of 
which contains a SG that produces steam and turns turbines to generate 
electricity. Each unit is designed to operate at core power levels up 
to 3411 megawatts (thermal) (MW[t]), with a corresponding net 
electrical output of approximately 1129 megawatts (electric) (MW[e]). 
The nuclear steam supply system for each unit and the Unit 2 SGs were 
supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The current Unit 1 SGs, 
installed in 1996, were supplied by Babcock & Wilcox International.
    The reactor containment is housed in a separate free-standing steel 
containment structure within a reinforced concrete shield building. The 
containment employs the ice condenser pressure-suppression concept, and 
is designed to withstand environmental effects and the internal 
pressure and temperature accompanying a postulated loss-of-coolant 
accident or steam-line break. Together with its engineered safety 
features, the containment structure for each unit is designed to 
adequately retain fission products that may escape from the reactor 
coolant system (RCS).
    The Catawba reactors are licensed for fuel that is slightly 
enriched uranium dioxide, up to 5 percent by weight uranium-235. The 
Catawba reactor core has several different fuel designs that will 
reside in the core with the MOX LTAs. They will include the 
Westinghouse Robust Fuel Assembly design and the Westinghouse Next 
Generation fuel design.
    Catawba uses water from Lake Wylie for cooling and service water. 
Lake Wylie is the seventh of 11 impoundments in the 410-km (255-mi) 
Catawba-Wateree Project managed by Duke and licensed by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Lake Wylie extends 45 km (28 mi) 
upstream from Wylie Dam to Mountain Island Dam. Flow through the 
Catawba-Wateree Project is managed by Duke to optimize hydroelectric 
generation, provide flood control, meet FERC minimum release 
requirements, and maintain a constant and reliable water supply for 
thermoelectric generating stations, surrounding communities, and 
industry. The average daily withdrawal from Lake Wylie for the cooling 
water and other service water systems is 386 million liters per day (L/
d) (102 million gallons per day [MGD]). Water from Lake Wylie is taken 
in through two intake structures. The low-pressure service water (LPSW) 
intake structure is located on the Beaver Dam Creek arm of Lake Wylie. 
Trash racks and traveling screens are used to remove trash and debris 
from this intake water. The intake structure is designed for a maximum 
water velocity of 0.15 m/s (0.5 ft/s) in front of the trash racks at 
the maximum design drawdown of Lake Wylie. The LPSW system supplies 
water for various functions on the secondary side of the plant. The 
nuclear service water (NSW) intake structure also is located in the 
Beaver Dam Creek arm. This intake supplies cooling water to various 
heat loads in the primary side of the plant and supplies water to the 
standby NSW pond. Catawba does not use cooling ponds for normal 
operations; however, it does have a standby NSW pond. The purpose of 
this pond is to provide an ultimate heat sink in the event of a rapid 
decline in water level in Lake Wylie. The pond is isolated from the 
plant service water during normal plant operations. The average daily 
discharge back into Lake Wylie from Catawba is 230 million L/d (60.7 
MGD). The consumptive water losses result from evaporation and drift 
from the six mechanical-draft cooling towers that provide cooling for 
the condenser circulating water system.
    The discharge structure is located on the Big Allison Creek arm of 
Lake Wylie. This structure is designed to allow warm discharge water to 
float on the surface with a minimum amount of mixing. Approximately 
1.48 million L/d (0.39 MGD) from the conventional waste water treatment 
system and from the sewage treatment system is discharged to Lake 
Wylie. Catawba obtains potable water from the city of Rock Hill, South 
Carolina. In addition, there are a total of three groundwater supply 
wells at the Catawba site. These wells supply water on a periodic basis 
to remote locations and for seasonal irrigation. The average annual 
groundwater withdrawal rate from these wells is 1.89 L/s (30 gallons 
per minute [gpm]).
    Catawba uses liquid, gaseous, and solid radioactive waste 
management systems to collect and process the liquid, gaseous, and 
solid wastes that are the by-products of operations. These systems 
process radioactive liquid, gaseous, and solid effluents before they 
are released to the environment. The waste gas and solid waste systems 
are common to both units. Portions of the liquid radioactive waste 
system are shared. The waste disposal systems for Catawba meet the 
design objectives of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I (Numerical Guide for 
Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the 
Criterion ``As Low as is Reasonably Achievable'' for Radioactive 
Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents). These 
systems control the processing, disposal, and release of radioactive 
liquid, gaseous, and solid wastes. Radioactive material in the reactor 
coolant is the source of gaseous, liquid, and solid radioactive wastes 
in LWRs. Radioactive fission products build up within the fuel as a 
consequence of the fission process. These fission products mostly are 
contained in the sealed fuel rods, but small quantities escape and 
contaminate the reactor coolant. Neutron activation

[[Page 51115]]

of the primary coolant system also is responsible for coolant 
contamination.
    Nonfuel solid waste results from treating and separating 
radionuclides from gases and liquids and from removing contaminated 
material from various reactor areas. Solid wastes also consist of 
reactor components, equipment, and tools removed from service, as well 
as contaminated protective clothing, paper, rags, and other trash 
generated from plant design modifications and operations and routine 
maintenance activities. Solid waste may be shipped to a waste processor 
for volume reduction before disposal at a licensed burial site 
(Reference 3). Spent resins and filters are stored or packaged for 
shipment to a licensed offsite processing or disposal facility.
    Routine maintenance performed on plant systems and components is 
necessary for safe and reliable operation. Maintenance activities 
conducted at Catawba include inspection, testing, and surveillance to 
maintain the current licensing basis of the plant and to ensure 
compliance with environmental and safety requirements. Certain 
activities can be performed while the reactor is operating, but others 
require that the plant be shut down. Long-term outages are scheduled 
for refueling and for certain types of repairs or maintenance, such as 
replacement of a major component. Fuel rods that have exhausted a 
certain percentage of their fuel and are removed from the reactor core 
for disposal are called spent fuel. Duke refuels each of the Catawba 
units every 18 to 24 months (Reference 3). Each outage is typically 
scheduled to last approximately 30 to 40 days, and the outage schedules 
are staggered so that both units are not shut down at the same time. 
Typically, one-third of the core is replaced at each refueling.
    Catawba has five 230-kV transmission lines leaving the site from 
the switch yard (References 3 and 18). The five lines are contained 
within rights-of-way ranging from 35 to 46 m (115 to 150 ft) in width 
and from 1 to 40 km (0.7 to 24.4 mi) in length covering a total of 75.7 
km (42.4 mi) and approximately 295 ha (730 ac) (References 3 and 18). 
The rights-of-way extend out from Catawba to the north, south, and 
west. The lines and rights-of-way were constructed or rebuilt between 
1973 and 1983. Duke owns less than 10 percent of the rights-of-way and 
has easements for the remaining 90 percent. Vegetation in the rights-
of-way is managed through a combination of mechanical and herbicide 
treatments (Reference 3). Initial treatments include mowing and/or 
treatment with Arsenal (imazapyr) and Accord (glyphosate). Spot 
treatments then are applied once every 3 years using Arsenal, Accord, 
Garlon4A, and Krenite. Herbicide treatments in wetlands are limited to 
Arsenal and Accord, which are approved for use in wetlands. In 
addition, Duke cooperates with the South Carolina Department of Natural 
Resources regarding protection of rare species and partners with The 
Wildlife Federation on vegetation management in some portions of the 
rights-of-way.

2.2 Supporting DOE Analyses

    DOE has issued a number of environmental documents that provide 
useful insights to the assessment of issues involved in this proposed 
action. In fulfilling its responsibility for developing and 
implementing a framework for the disposition of fissile material, DOE 
has issued its final PEIS on storage and disposition of weapons-usable 
fissile materials, DOE/EIS-0229 (Reference 12). A supplemental analysis 
to the PEIS was issued by DOE in November 2003, specifically addressing 
the fabrication of MOX LTAs in Europe, DOE/EIS-0229-SA3 (Reference 16), 
hereafter referred to as Supplement Analysis 3. The DOE has issued its 
final EIS on SPD, or SPD EIS, DOE/EIS-0283 (Reference 13). A 
supplemental analysis to the SPD EIS was issued by DOE in April 2003, 
specifically addressing changes to the SPD program as it eliminated 
some of the alternatives, Supplement Analysis 1. Finally, in 2002, DOE 
issued the final EIS on the geologic repository for the disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in Nevada, DOE/EIS-
0250 (Reference 14).
    As background, in the following, the NRC staff summarizes the DOE 
analyses regarding transportation risk of the LTAs to Catawba. The 
transportation and associated impacts of the MOX LTAs to Catawba are 
not related to the proposed action; the complete analysis is included 
in Supplement Analysis 3. The LTAs would be shipped by truck from one 
of three marine military ports near the Atlantic Ocean: Charleston 
Naval Weapons Station (South Carolina), Yorktown Naval Weapons Station 
(Virginia) or Naval Station Norfolk (Virginia). The ultimate selection 
of the porting facility will be made by DOE and would influence the 
transportation risk because transportation routing and distance, the 
accident statistics for the states through which the route passes, and 
the population distribution along transportation corridors would be 
different, depending on which port is selected. The LTAs would be 
shipped from the selected marine port by truck.
    If the proposed action is approved, then, once the LTAs are 
inserted into the reactor and are irradiated, the DOE proposes to take 
possession of a small portion of the irradiated fuel and to conduct 
post-irradiation examination and testing at one of its National 
laboratories. The irradiated LTAs that remain at Catawba are expected 
to be managed in a manner similar to other spent fuel and are expected 
to be shipped to a high-level waste repository for ultimate 
disposition; because LTAs will be used in lieu of other fuel 
assemblies, the total number of spent fuel rods that have to be managed 
by Duke at Catawba would be reduced by the small number that will 
return to the DOE under this campaign. As part of this action to assess 
the impacts of transporting the spent fuel rods to a high-level waste 
repository, the NRC staff will assume that DOE will not remove any of 
the spent fuel rods from the LTAs, but will ship complete fuel 
assemblies to a permanent geologic repository.

3.0 Need for and Description of Proposed Action

    Duke proposes three exemptions (for the use of M5TM 
cladding instead of zircaloy; for fuel in the form of mixed uranium and 
plutonium oxide, rather than uranium oxide; and from physical security 
requirements usually required at fabrication facilities for the 
protection of strategic quantities of special nuclear material) and a 
license amendment to the TSs in Appendix A of the Catawba operating 
licenses. The need for these changes is that they will permit the 
insertion of four LTAs containing mixed uranium dioxide 
(UO2) and plutonium dioxide (PuO2), also referred 
to as MOX, fuel into one of the Catawba reactor cores and thus support 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program for the disposition of 
fissile material. It is important to note that the action is not 
``batch,'' or routine widescale use of MOX fuel at Catawba or any other 
reactor. The irradiation of four MOX LTAs is part of DOE's program for 
fissile material disposition.
    The physical design and material composition of each LTA is 
identical (within manufacturing tolerances); the physical design is 
based on the Framatome Advanced Mark BW design. The fuel assembly upper 
and lower nozzles are 304L stainless steel. The lower nozzle has a 
debris filter which is A-286 steel alloy. The grid straps located 
axially along the fuel assembly are either Inconel 718 or 
M5TM zirconium alloy. The hold down springs

[[Page 51116]]

on the fuel assembly top nozzle are Inconel 718. The fuel rod cladding 
is M5TM zirconium alloy as well as the rod upper and lower 
end caps. The fuel rod is filled with helium gas and contains a plenum 
spring manufactured from either 302 or 304 stainless steel.
    With the exception of the M5TM cladding, the materials 
used in the fuel assembly structural components are typical of those 
currently or previously in use at Catawba. The M5TM alloy is 
a proprietary zirconium based alloy, composed primarily of zirconium 
and niobium, that has demonstrated superior corrosion resistance and 
reduced irradiation growth relative to both standard and low tin 
zircaloy. Although Catawba has not previously used the M5TM 
alloy, the alloy has been used in at least four other pressurized-water 
reactors (PWRs).
    The fuel pellet contains a mixture of UO2 and 
PuO2, thus, the term MOX. The fuel is manufactured through a 
sintering process like that used for the current fuel which consists of 
only UO2. The current fuel is referred to as low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) fuel. The fuel proposed in this application is referred 
to as MOX fuel and has only been used in a limited number of 
applications in PWRs in the U.S. However, reactors located in Europe 
have more than 35 years of experience with MOX fuel. As of 1998, three 
European fabrication plants have produced more than 435,000 MOX fuel 
rods, which have been used in 35 different PWRs. The plutonium for use 
in the Catawba fuel will be obtained from highly-enriched material 
blended down to a fissile content useful for reactor operations. By 
contrast, the European MOX fuel is recycled from commercial operating 
reactor fuel. The source of the fuel feedstock determines its grade; 
Catawba fuel has been referred to as ``weapons grade'' and the European 
fuel as ``reactor grade.'' The Catawba fuel will be chemically polished 
to meet specifications for reactor operations and, therefore, ``grade'' 
does not have a bearing on the presence of impurities.
    During manufacturing, the composition of the LEU fuel is 
approximately 3 percent to 5 percent of the U-235 isotope with the 
balance of the uranium almost completely consisting of the U-238 
isotope. During reactor operations a substantial portion of the uranium 
in LEU fuel is converted into plutonium. The conversion of uranium to 
plutonium in LWR fuel, whether LEU or MOX, is a function of burnup. An 
LEU fuel assembly begins its life with an inventory of U-238 and U-235 
and ends its life with an inventory that includes Pu isotopes, the 
remaining U-235 and U-238, and other fission products. A MOX fuel 
assembly begins its life with an inventory of uranium and Pu isotopes; 
it ends its life with the remaining uranium and Pu isotopes and other 
fission products. At a burnup of 50 MWd/MT (megawatt-days/metric ton), 
a fuel assembly fabricated with MOX is estimated to contain 
approximately 13 kg of plutonium, whereas an LEU assembly with the same 
burnup would contain approximately 6 kg of plutonium. Therefore, even 
with just the current LEU fuel in Catawba, and in all operating LWRs of 
this design, plutonium already exists in substantial quantities.
    No other primary or secondary plant structures, systems or 
components are affected by this application. None of the plant 
structures, systems or components, including waste systems, will be 
modified and none of these systems will be operated in a different 
manner or with different operating limits because of the proposed 
action. The proposed use of the MOX assemblies does not represent the 
introduction of any new sources of compounds, materials or elements 
beyond the new clad alloy or the MOX fuel. In addition, Duke is not 
requesting any changes to the TSs on coolant system specific activity 
or the radioactive effluent controls program nor is it planning any 
changes to the detailed radioactive effluent controls in the selected 
licensee commitments in Chapter 16 of the updated final safety 
evaluation report (UFSAR).

4.0 Non-Radiological Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    The NRC staff has completed a number of environmental reviews for 
activities specifically at the Catawba site. These reviews were 
published as ESs, EISs, or EAs. These reviews were considered during 
the completion of this assessment and provide a current baseline of 
non-radiological and radiological environmental analyses that serve as 
a platform to consider whether, and if so, how the human environment 
can be affected by the proposed action. In particular, in 1983, the NRC 
issued the final EIS related to the operation of Catawba, NUREG-0921 
(Reference 18). In 2002, the NRC issued the final supplement to the 
Generic EIS for license renewal of nuclear plants, regarding Catawba, 
NUREG-1437, Supplement 9. In this assessment, the NRC staff has focused 
its attention on whether the proposed irradiation of four MOX LTAs has 
the potential to change how an environmental resource may be affected 
and whether the environmental impacts of the proposed action are 
bounded by the environmental impacts previously evaluated in the final 
EIS and Supplement 9.

4.1 Surface and Groundwater Use

    Catawba uses water from Lake Wylie, an impoundment on the Catawba 
River for the source of main condenser cooling and service water at 
Catawba. There are three groundwater supply wells on the Catawba site 
that are used on a periodic basis to supply remote locations and for 
seasonal irrigation. The proposed action is not expected to change the 
manner in which the facility is operated nor does it increase surface 
or groundwater usage from that previously considered by the NRC staff 
in the final EIS (Reference 18) and Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC 
staff concludes that the environmental impacts of the proposed use of 
MOX LTAs are bounded by the environmental impacts previously evaluated 
in the final EIS and Supplement 9.

4.2 Water Quality

    Pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1977 (the 
Clean Water Act), the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (SCDHEC) regulates the impacts of non-
radiological effluents discharged from Catawba via a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Adherence by the licensee 
to the provisions of the permit maintains water quality standards in 
Lake Wylie and in the vicinity that could potentially be affected by 
operation of Catawba. The current NPDES wastewater permit for Catawba, 
issued on April 30, 2001, expires on June 30, 2005.
    The proposed action is not expected to change the types, 
characteristics, or quantities of non-radiological effluents discharged 
to the environment. There will be no change in the use or discharge of 
biocides or other chemicals at Catawba as a result of the proposed 
action. As discussed above, this application is for the use of four MOX 
fuel LTAs to be irradiated in the reactor core. Aside from the LTAs 
isolated in the reactor core, the proposed action will not introduce 
any materials or chemicals into the plant that could affect the 
characteristics or types of non-radiological effluents. In addition, 
the method of operation of non-radiological waste systems will not be 
affected by the proposed change. There are no known mechanisms 
associated with a change in fuel isotopic content that would alter the 
non-radiological effluent quantity. None of the parameters

[[Page 51117]]

regulated under the Clean Water Act will be changed by the proposed 
action. The proposed action is not expected to change the manner in 
which the facility is operated nor does it alter water quality from 
that previously considered by the NRC staff in the final EIS (Reference 
18) and Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the 
environmental impacts of the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded by 
the environmental impacts previously evaluated in the final EIS and 
Supplement 9.

4.3 Thermal Effluents

    The proposed action will not change the licensed power level for 
Catawba. There will be no increase in the amount of heat that is 
produced by the facility and subsequently discharged via cooling tower 
blowdown to Lake Wylie. Therefore, there will be no change to the 
discharge temperature and no increase in the impact of thermal 
effluents on aquatic biota. The proposed action is not expected to 
change the manner in which the facility is operated nor does it alter 
thermal effluents that may affect aquatic biota from that previously 
considered by the NRC staff in the final EIS (Reference 18) and 
Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the environmental 
impacts of the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded by the 
environmental impacts previously evaluated in the final EIS and 
Supplement 9.

4.4 Impingement and Entrainment

    The proposed action does not involve an increase in the licensed 
thermal power level for Catawba that would require additional cooling. 
Because there will be no increase in the volume of water drawn into the 
plant, there will be no incremental impact on aquatic biota associated 
with the withdrawal of cooling water from Lake Wylie. The proposed 
action is not expected to change the manner in which the facility is 
operated nor does it alter impingement of adult or juvenile fish or on 
the entrainment of fish eggs and larvae from that previously considered 
by the NRC staff in the final EIS (Reference 18) and Supplement 9. 
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the environmental impacts of 
the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded by the environmental impacts 
previously evaluated in the final EIS and Supplement 9.

4.5 Air Quality

    Transmission lines have been associated with the production of 
minute amounts of ozone and oxides of nitrogen as a result of corona 
discharges from the breakdown of air near high-voltage conductors. 
Through the years, line designs have been developed that greatly reduce 
corona effects. The transmission lines associated with the Catawba 
facility meet the 1997 version of National Electric Safety Code and 
corona effects are minimal on those lines.
    SCDHEC has issued a Clean Air Act air emissions and operating 
permit to Catawba for the release of controlled amounts of effluents to 
the atmosphere resulting from operation of the emergency diesel 
generators (EDGs) and other equipment on the site. The Charlotte, North 
Carolina, metropolitan area has not been identified as a non-attainment 
or maintenance area, therefore, no assessment of the vehicle exhaust 
emissions anticipated at the time of peak workforce is required by the 
Clean Air Act. The proposed use of the MOX LTAs will not result in an 
increase in station electrical output or a change in the operation of 
the station EDGs or other equipment.
    The proposed action is not expected to change the manner in which 
the facility is operated nor does it alter air quality, either as a 
result of release of increased amounts of effluents to the atmosphere 
or as a result of corona associated with the transmission lines for 
Catawba, from that previously considered by the NRC staff in the final 
EIS (Reference 18) and Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes 
that the environmental impacts of the proposed use of MOX LTAs are 
bounded by the environmental impacts previously evaluated in the final 
EIS and Supplement 9.

4.6 Noise

    The proposed action will not result in any increase in ambient 
noise level either on-site or beyond the site boundary. When noise 
levels are below the levels that result in hearing loss, impacts have 
been judged primarily in terms of adverse public reactions to the 
noise. As noted in the Generic EIS for License Renewal, NUREG-1437 
(Reference 24), no nuclear plants have offsite noise levels sufficient 
to cause hearing loss. Generally, power plant sites do not result in 
offsite levels more than 10 dB(A) above background. Noise level 
increases more than 10 dB(A) would be expected to lead to interference 
with outdoor speech communication, particularly in rural areas or low-
population areas, such as Catawba, where the background noise level is 
in the range of 45-55 dB(A). Generally, noise surveys around major 
sources of noise such as large highways and airports have found that, 
when the background noise level increases beyond 60-65 dB(A), noise 
complaints increase significantly. Noise levels below 60-65 dB(A) are 
generally considered to be of small significance. The principal sources 
of noise at Catawba are the result of operation of mechanical draft 
cooling towers, transformers, and loudspeakers. These noise sources are 
not perceived by large numbers of people offsite. In addition, these 
sources of noise are sufficiently distant from critical receptors 
outside the plant boundaries that the noise is attenuated to nearly 
ambient levels and is scarcely noticeable.
    The proposed action is not expected to change the manner in which 
the facility is operated nor does it alter ambient noise level onsite 
or beyond the site boundary at Catawba from that previously considered 
by the NRC staff in the final EIS (Reference 18) and Supplement 9. 
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the environmental impacts of 
the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded by the environmental impacts 
previously evaluated in the final EIS and Supplement 9.

4.7 Thermophilic Organisms

    Thermophilic organisms are known to inhabit cooling tower basins 
and natural bodies of water in the southern latitudes of the U.S., 
including water bodies in the vicinity of Catawba. Waste heat from 
power plant facilities could stimulate the growth of these organisms, 
some of which are known to be potentially harmful to man.
    The use of MOX LTAs will not change the licensed power level at 
Catawba. There will be no increase in the amount of heat that is 
produced by the facility and subsequently discharged via cooling tower 
blowdown to Lake Wylie that would change the discharge temperature or 
that would increase the impact of thermal discharges on thermophilic 
organisms. The proposed action is not expected to change the manner in 
which the facility is operated nor would it alter the abundance of 
pathogenic thermophilic microbiological organisms due to heated 
discharges from Catawba from that previously considered by the NRC 
staff in the final EIS (Reference 18) and Supplement 9. Therefore, the 
NRC staff concludes that the environmental impacts of the proposed use 
of MOX LTAs are bounded by the environmental impacts previously 
evaluated in the final EIS and Supplement 9.

4.8 Aquatic Ecology

    Recently, in Supplement 9, the NRC staff evaluated and disclosed 
the impacts resulting from the current mode of operation and that are 
expected to

[[Page 51118]]

occur during the extended term of the renewed operating licenses at 
Catawba. The NRC staff has considered the potential impacts of the 
proposed action on water use and quality, impingement and entrainment, 
thermal effluents, and thermophilic organisms. The proposed action is 
not expected to change the manner in which the facility is operated nor 
does it alter any resource components associated with aquatic ecology 
at Catawba from that previously considered by the NRC staff in the 
final EIS (Reference 18) and Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff 
concludes that the environmental impacts of the proposed use of MOX 
LTAs are bounded by the environmental impacts previously evaluated in 
the final EIS and Supplement 9.

4.9 Terrestrial Ecology

    Recently, in Supplement 9, the NRC staff evaluated and disclosed 
the impacts resulting from the current mode of operation and that are 
expected to occur during the extended term of the renewed operating 
licenses at Catawba. The NRC staff has considered the potential impacts 
of the proposed action on cooling tower operation, transmission line 
operation and maintenance, and on-site or off-site land use. The 
proposed action is not expected to change the manner in which the 
facility is operated nor does it alter any resource components 
associated with terrestrial ecology at Catawba from that previously 
considered by the NRC staff in the final EIS (Reference 18) and 
Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the environmental 
impacts of the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded by the 
environmental impacts previously evaluated in the final EIS and 
Supplement 9.

4.10 Threatened or Endangered Species

    On the basis if its conclusions of no impact on aquatic or 
terrestrial resources as discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that 
the proposed use of four MOX fuel LTAs at Catawba will have no effect 
on any Federally-listed threatened or endangered species or their 
designated critical habitat.

4.11 Socioeconomic Impacts

    The licensee plans to implement additional security measures to 
support activities associated with the proposed action, from the time 
the material (MOX) arrives on site until it is irradiated. Duke has not 
identified the need to hire additional staff to support the proposed 
action. Catawba already has over 1200 full-time workers employed by 
Duke and site contractors during normal plant operations. During 
refueling periods, site employment increases by as many as 500 workers 
for temporary duty over a 30-to 40-day period. Even if a limited number 
of additional security personnel were hired to implement the proposed 
action, it will not significantly increase the number of licensee staff 
or contractors employed at the facility; therefore, there would be no 
noticeable impact on housing or transportation that might result from 
an increase in workforce. Likewise, there will be no need for 
additional public services, such as for public safety, public 
utilities, social services, or education. Finally, no impacts are 
expected on tourism and recreation or taxes as a result of the proposed 
action. The proposed action is not expected to change the manner in 
which the facility is operated nor does it alter any resource 
components associated with socioeconomics in the Catawba vicinity from 
that previously considered by the NRC staff in the final EIS (Reference 
18) and Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the 
environmental impacts of the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded by 
the environmental impacts previously evaluated in the final EIS and 
Supplement 9.

4.12 Offsite Land Use

    The land occupied by Catawba is in unincorporated York County. York 
County and its municipalities currently have land use plans and zoning 
requirements that govern development activities within the county. Duke 
has not identified the need to hire additional staff to support the 
proposed action. Catawba already has over 1200 full-time workers 
employed by Duke and site contractors during normal plant operations. 
During refueling periods, site employment increases by as many as 500 
workers for temporary duty over a 30- to 40-day period. Even if a 
limited number of additional personnel were hired to implement the 
proposed action, it will not significantly increase the number of 
licensee staff or contractors employed at the facility. The proposed 
action will not have any impact on the local infrastructure, such as 
transportation or housing in the Catawba vicinity that might result 
from an increased workforce. Because there will not be any need to 
augment the local infrastructure, the proposed change will not be 
accompanied by any land-disturbing activities offsite. The proposed 
action is not expected to change the manner in which the facility is 
operated nor does it alter any resource components associated with land 
use in the Catawba vicinity from that previously considered by the NRC 
staff in the final EIS (Reference 18) and Supplement 9. Therefore, the 
NRC staff concludes that the environmental impacts of the proposed use 
of MOX LTAs are bounded by the environmental impacts previously 
evaluated in the final EIS and Supplement 9.

4.13 Cultural Resources and Historic Properties

    The proposed action will not result in any changes in off-site land 
use or in any land-disturbing activities. There will be no physical 
changes to the existing facility or disturbances to undeveloped 
portions of the site. The NRC staff concludes that the use of MOX lead 
test assemblies at Catawba will not have environmental impacts on 
cultural resources and historic properties. The proposed action is not 
expected to change the manner in which the facility is operated nor 
does it alter any resource components associated with cultural 
resources and historic properties in the Catawba vicinity from that 
previously considered by the NRC staff in the final EIS (Reference 18) 
and Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the 
environmental impacts of the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded by 
the environmental impacts previously evaluated in the final EIS and 
Supplement 9.

4.14 Aesthetics

    As noted above, the proposed action will not require any physical 
changes to the existing facility or be accompanied by any land-
disturbing activities, either off-site or on-site. Also, the proposed 
change will not result in any changes in land use plans or zoning 
requirements in unincorporated York County or its municipalities. The 
proposed action is not expected to change the manner in which the 
facility is operated nor does it alter any resource components 
associated with aesthetics or viewsheds in the Catawba vicinity from 
that previously considered by the NRC staff in the final EIS (Reference 
18) and Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the 
environmental impacts of the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded by 
the environmental impacts previously evaluated in the final EIS and 
Supplement 9.

4.15 Summary

    In summary, the proposed irradiation of four MOX LTAs at Catawba 
would not result in a significant change in non-radiological impacts in 
the areas of surface or groundwater use, chemical or thermal 
discharges, intake effects, air quality, noise, thermophilic organisms, 
aquatic or terrestrial ecology, threatened

[[Page 51119]]

or endangered species, socioeconomics, off-site land use, cultural 
resources or historic properties, aesthetics, or environmental justice. 
No other non-radiological impacts were identified or would be expected. 
Therefore, based on the above discussions, the NRC staff concludes that 
there are no significant non-radiological environmental impacts 
associated with the proposed action.

5.0 Radiological Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

5.1 Gaseous Effluents

    The licensee has evaluated the potential impacts that could result 
from the proposed use of MOX LTAs on the type or amount of gaseous 
radioactive effluents that could be released from the Catawba facility. 
This evaluation includes a consideration of fuel cladding performance 
and fuel integrity considerations and is based on the similarity of MOX 
fuel to the present LEU fuel, both from a fuel design and a fission 
product inventory perspective. The analysis takes into account the 
replacement of four out of 193 fuel assemblies with the assemblies 
containing MOX fuel; this action considers the four MOX LTAs.
    As fuel is irradiated, both activation and fission products are 
created. The activation products that are created are a function of 
impurities and the chemistry of the reactor coolant and the neutron 
flux that the materials encounter. Thermal neutron flux is 
significantly lower in MOX fuel than in LEU fuel, which would tend to 
lower activation products. However, for four lead assemblies, this is 
expected to be an insignificant effect.
    The outer surfaces of the fuel assemblies which are exposed to the 
RCS are the same materials which have been used at Catawba for many 
years. The exception is the introduction of the M5TM alloy. 
This material is a zirconium-based alloy and is more corrosion 
resistant than currently-used zirconium-based alloys. Therefore, the 
fuel assembly surfaces exposed to reactor coolant should not interact 
to produce any different quantity or type of radioactive material in 
the RCS.
    The performance of M5TM cladding is expected to meet or 
exceed that of the current zircaloy cladding. Therefore, there is not 
expected to be any increase in the quantity of failed fuel rods. In the 
event of failed fuel rods, the MOX fuel could release fission products 
from the gap into the RCS. However, the chemical volume and control 
system and radioactive waste systems are designed to cope with fuel rod 
failures. The same fission products present from the failure of a LEU 
fuel rod would be present for the failure of a MOX fuel rod. Only 
slight differences in curie content of respective isotopes would be 
expected in the event of a cladding failure.
    Fission product inventories and fuel gap inventories are of the 
same order of magnitude in both MOX fuel and LEU fuels. In particular, 
the amount of iodine and noble gas that would be released into the 
reactor coolant in the event of a leaking fuel rod would be similar. 
Additionally, any liquid or gaseous effluents would be processed by the 
plant liquid waste and waste gas systems prior to release to the 
environment. These waste treatment systems would limit radioactive 
discharges to the environment as a result of hold-up for decay, 
filtering, and demineralization. The plant treatment systems are 
capable of treating these radioactive effluents because the types of 
radioactive material in MOX and LEU fuel are the same and the curie 
content of MOX fuel is of the same order of magnitude as LEU fuel. 
Thus, the licensee is expected to maintain the same level of 
radioactive control and to remain within the same regulatory limits 
with the MOX fuel as for the LEU fuel.
    Therefore, based on the materials and performance capabilities of 
the fuel and plant systems, there is no basis to expect any change in 
gaseous effluent characteristics typical of normal plant operations. In 
addition, Duke has not requested any changes to the TSs limits on RCS 
specific activity or to the radioactive effluent controls program and 
is not planning any changes to the selected licensee commitments of 
Chapter 16 of the UFSAR. These requirements and commitments place 
limits on various isotopes and specify requirements for monitoring and 
surveillance, thereby limiting the release of gaseous radioactive 
effluents from the Catawba facility.
    The NRC staff concludes that there will be no anticipated changes 
in the type or amount of gaseous radiological effluents resulting from 
the use of MOX fuel lead assemblies compared to the current LEU fuel. 
The licensee will continue to maintain its radioactive gaseous 
effluents within license conditions and regulatory limits. Therefore, 
there will be no additional environmental impacts as a result of 
gaseous radioactive effluents from the proposed action.

5.2 Liquid Effluents

    Duke has evaluated the potential impacts that could result from the 
proposed use of MOX lead assemblies on the type or amount of liquid 
radioactive effluents that could be released from the Catawba facility. 
This evaluation includes a consideration of fuel cladding performance 
and fuel integrity considerations and is based on the similarity of MOX 
fuel to the present LEU fuel, both from a fuel design and a fission 
product inventory perspective. The analysis takes into account the 
replacement of four out of 193 fuel assemblies with fuel assemblies 
containing MOX fuel.
    As fuel is irradiated, both activation and fission products are 
created. The activation products that are created are a function of 
impurities and the chemistry of the reactor coolant and the neutron 
flux that the materials encounter. Impurities in the reactor coolant 
and reactor coolant water chemistry are independent of the fuel type, 
whether MOX or LEU. Thermal neutron flux is significantly lower in MOX 
fuel than in LEU fuel, which would tend to lower activation products. 
However, for four lead assemblies, this is expected to be an 
insignificant effect.
    There are no expected changes to liquid radioactive effluents as a 
result of the proposed action. As discussed above, with the exception 
of the M5TM alloy cladding on the MOX fuel rods in the LTAs, 
the outer surfaces of the fuel assemblies which are exposed to the RCS 
and several other components are very similar to the materials that 
have been used at Catawba for many years. The M5TM alloy 
material is a zirconium-based alloy and is more corrosion resistant 
than currently used zirconium-based alloys. Therefore, the fuel 
assembly surfaces exposed to reactor coolant should not interact to 
produce any different quantity or type of radioactive material in the 
RCS.
    The cladding performance of M5TM is expected to meet or 
exceed that of the current zircaloy cladding, therefore, there is not 
expected to be any increase in the quantity of failed fuel rods. In the 
event of failed fuel rods the MOX fuel could release fission products 
from the gap into the RCS. However, the chemical volume and control 
system and radioactive waste systems are designed to cope with fuel rod 
failures. The same fission products present from the failure of a LEU 
fuel rod would be present for the failure of a MOX fuel rod. Only 
slight differences in curie content of respective isotopes are 
expected.
    Therefore, based on the materials and performance capabilities of 
the fuel and plant systems there is no basis to expect any change in 
liquid effluent characteristics typical of normal plant

[[Page 51120]]

operations. In addition, Duke is not requesting any changes to the TSs 
on RCS specific reactivity or the radioactive effluent controls 
program, nor is it planning any changes to the detailed radioactive 
effluent controls in the selected licensee commitments section of 
Chapter 16 of the UFSAR. These requirements and commitments place 
limits on the concentration of radioactive material released in liquid 
effluents and specify requirements for monitoring and surveillance, 
thereby limiting the release of liquid radioactive effluents from the 
Catawba facility. Therefore, there will be no additional environmental 
impacts as a result of liquid radioactive effluents from the proposed 
action.

5.3 Waste Management and Solid Radioactive Waste

    The introduction of the four LTAs should have minimal impact on 
solid waste. As discussed above, there is no change to radioactive 
liquid effluents and no need for liquid effluent cleanup that would 
generate additional solid radioactive waste in the form of resins or 
evaporator bottoms. There would be no expected impact on primary system 
filters or resins associated with normal plant operations.
    The quantity of waste associated with a pool side post-irradiation 
examination program which will be conducted for the MOX fuel assemblies 
is minimal and consistent with other post-irradiation examinations 
performed during refueling outages. This waste would be small volumes 
of low-level waste such as disposable portions of anti-contamination 
clothing.
    The proposed action would not result in an increase in authorized 
power level, therefore, there will be no increase in the amount of 
water required to remove heat from the reactor. This means that there 
will be no need for additional water treatment in the secondary system 
that could lead to an increase in the amount of spent resins and 
evaporator bottoms.
    The proposed action would not increase the number of fuel rods 
irradiated in the reactor. Four assemblies containing MOX fuel will 
replace four LEU assemblies in the reactor core. No additional fuel 
assemblies will be irradiated. Therefore, this will not result in an 
increase in the volume of solid radioactive waste from fittings, 
endcaps, and springs for fuel assemblies.
    The spent fuel storage racks will not be changed; therefore there 
will be no change in the volume of irradiated/contaminated material 
that will need to be disposed of in an off-site burial facility.
    Therefore, based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes 
that the proposed action will have no impact on waste management and 
solid radioactive waste.

5.4 Occupational Dose

    The licensee estimates that there will be slight increases in the 
radiation exposure of its workforce during the handling of MOX fuel 
during receipt and handling operations. The increase in dose is due to 
a higher dose rate from a fresh MOX fuel assembly as compared to a 
fresh LEU fuel assembly. The total neutron and gamma dose rate at 10 
centimeters from the face of a fresh MOX fuel assembly averages about 6 
mrem/hour, falling off to about 1.8 mrem/hour at 100 centimeters 
(Reference 5). This is a relatively low radiation field; however, it is 
larger than that associated with a LEU fuel assembly, which has 
virtually no radiation field at these distances.
    The initial fuel receipt, handling, and inspection activities for 
the fresh MOX fuel LTAs could result in a conservatively estimated 
total occupational dose in the range of 0.020 to 0.042 person-rem 
(Reference 5). However, the licensee will use the application of the As 
Low As Reasonably Achievable principles to try to effect lower doses 
than are estimated. Radiation doses of this magnitude are well within 
regulatory occupational exposure limits and do not represent an impact 
to worker health. There are no other expected changes in normal 
occupational operating doses as a result of the proposed action.
    Not included among the workforce on the Catawba site are the 
workers who will conduct hot-cell examinations of the irradiated MOX 
fuel after it has been taken from the Catawba reactor core and shipped 
to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). In order to assess the impact 
of the proposed action on the workers at ORNL, the NRC staff has 
referenced DOE's SPD EIS to provide an assessment of the occupational 
doses resulting from post-irradiation examinations following 
irradiation of the LTAs. DOE has estimated the radiological 
consequences for the hot-cell examination of fuel assemblies at ORNL. 
There are an estimated 10 workers associated with the hot-cell 
examination work, each estimated to accumulate approximately .177 
person-rem (Reference 9). The hot-cell post-irradiation examinations at 
ORNL will be conducted in accordance with DOE radiation protection 
programs and procedures Occupational doses in the range of 0.020 to 
0.042 total person-rem as a result of poolside examination and 0.177 
person-rem for each of the 10 workers performing hot-cell examinations 
at ORNL would be far below the regulatory limit for individual workers 
of 5 rem/year. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that there will be no 
significant increase in occupational dose as a result of the proposed 
use of MOX LTAs at Catawba.

5.5 Dose to the Public

    Dose to the public will not be changed by the use of four lead 
assemblies at Catawba during normal operations. As discussed above, 
there is no basis to contemplate an increased source of liquid, gaseous 
or solid radiological effluents that could contribute to increased 
public exposure during normal operations. The SPD EIS states that no 
change would be expected in the radiation dose to the general public 
from normal operations associated with disposition of MOX fuel at the 
proposed reactors (Reference 13). In addition, DOE has performed an 
analysis that demonstrates no incremental change in doses for 16 years 
of reactor operation.
    For members of the public, the licensee estimates that there will 
be no detectable increase in public dose during normal operations with 
the MOX fuel assemblies (Reference 5). Use of the lead assemblies in 
the reactor core will not change the characteristics of plant effluents 
or water use. During normal plant operation, the type of fuel material 
will have no effect on the chemistry parameters or radioactivity in the 
plant water systems. The fuel material is sealed inside fuel rods that 
are seal-welded and leaktight. Therefore, there would be no direct 
impact on plant radioactive effluents and the associated radiation 
exposure.

5.6 Design-Basis Accident Consequences

    The models used by Duke to assess design-basis accident (DBA) 
consequences reflect conservative assumptions to ensure that there is 
an adequate safety margin. In particular, the NRC staff notes that Duke 
assumed that plutonium concentration of the pins in the LTAs was 5 
percent. The nominal LTA fuel design calls for 176 fuel pins with a 
plutonium concentration of 4.94 percent; 76 pins at 3.35 percent, and 
12 pins at 2.40 percent. The nominal average plutonium concentration is 
4.37 percent. Conservatively basing the calculation on 5 percent 
plutonium concentration provides margin to compensate for differences 
(e.g., manufacturing tolerances and power

[[Page 51121]]

history differences) between the nominal design and the actual fuel as 
loaded in the core.
    The differences in the initial fuel isotopics between MOX and LEU 
fuel are potentially significant to accident radiological consequences 
because the distribution of fission products created depends on the 
particular fissile material. If the fissile material is different, it 
follows that the distribution of fission products may be different. For 
example, one atom of I-131 is created in 2.86 percent of all U-235 
fissions, whereas one atom of I-131 is created in 3.86 percent of all 
Pu-239 fissions. This shift in fission product distribution was 
assessed for its influence on postulated radiological consequences of 
DBAs.
    Duke's application provided an accident source term for irradiated 
MOX fuel. The NRC staff compared that source term to data prepared by 
Sandia National Laboratory and performed independent calculations of 
core inventory using the ORIGEN-S code (as described in NUREG/CR-0200 
(Reference 28). The NRC staff has determined that source term 
assumptions used by Duke in its analyses of the accident consequences 
of the use of the MOX LTAs are adequate and conservative for assessing 
the consequences of DBAs.
    To address the impact of MOX fuel on gap fractions, Duke assumed an 
increase of 50 percent over that provided in Regulatory Guide 1.183 
(Reference 23), for LEU fuel for each of the MOX LTAs. Duke provided 
information to support this assumption with comparative data from 
European MOX facilities. The NRC staff obtained the assistance of 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to confirm the adequacy of Duke's 
assumed increase in the gap fractions. Based upon its review, the NRC 
staff determined that the gap fraction increase assumed by Duke in its 
analyses is acceptable.
    Duke has evaluated the radiological consequences of postulated DBAs 
involving MOX LTAs. Duke has categorized various DBAs on the basis of 
how many fuel assemblies would be affected by that event. Duke 
identified two major categories:
     Fuel-handling accidents (FHA) involving damage to a few 
fuel assemblies. These include fresh and irradiated FHAs (involving the 
drop of a single fuel assembly) and the weir gate drop (WGD) accident 
(causing damage to seven fuel assemblies). A small number of assemblies 
are involved such that if the four MOX LTAs were in the damaged 
population, they would comprise all or a significant portion of the 
damaged population. As such, these events are limiting with regard to 
the potential increase in dose that would result if they occurred while 
the MOX LTAs were in the core. [The loss of coolant accident (LOCA) 
discussed below is limiting with regard to the magnitude of the dose.]
     At-power accidents involving fuel damage to a significant 
portion of the entire core. These accidents range from the locked rotor 
accident with 11 percent core damage (21 assemblies damaged), to the 
rod ejection accident with 50 percent core damage (97 fuel assemblies 
damaged), to the large break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) with full 
core damage (all 193 fuel assemblies damaged). In this case, the 
relative effect of damaging all four MOX LTA is reduced as the fuel 
damage population increases. For example, in a DBA LOCA, all 193 fuel 
assemblies are postulated to be damaged and the four MOX LTAs 
constitute just 2 percent of all the fuel assemblies in the core.
    The NRC staff considered the following additional category to 
further assess potential DBA consequences:
     Accident source term assumptions derived from RCS 
radionuclide concentrations, such as SG tube rupture, main steam line 
break, instrument line break, waste gas decay tank rupture, and liquid 
storage tank rupture (LST). Estimates of the radionuclide releases 
resulting from these events are based on pre-established administrative 
controls that are monitored by periodic surveillance requirements, for 
example: RCS and secondary plant-specific activity LCO, or offsite dose 
calculation manual effluent controls. Increases in specific activities 
due to MOX, if any, would be limited by these administrative controls. 
Because the analyses were based upon the numerical values of these 
controls, there is no impact on the previously analyzed DBAs in this 
category and no further discussion of these events is warranted.
    The analysis of public doses for the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) 
and Low-Population Zone (LPZ) resulting from the two classes of 
accidents considered by Duke are discussed below. In addition, the NRC 
staff has evaluated the radiological consequences of affected DBAs on 
the operators in the control room.
5.6.1 Fuel-Handling Accidents
    Duke has performed analyses of the dose consequences of FHAs, 
including: the drop of a single fresh fuel assembly; the drop of a 
single irradiated MOX fuel assembly during refueling; and a weir drop 
accident, which leads to damage of seven irradiated fuel assemblies 
including the four MOX fuel assemblies.

Fresh MOX LTA Drop

    This accident analysis is not currently part of the Catawba 
licensing basis. Duke performed this analysis to assess the 
radiological consequences of a drop of a fresh MOX LTA prior to it 
being placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Duke stated that plutonium 
isotopes have a much higher specific activity than uranium isotopes 
and, if inhaled, could present a more severe radiological hazard. 
Although the configuration of the MOX pellets and LTA fuel rods 
provides protection against inhalation hazards, some plutonium could 
become airborne if the MOX LTA is damaged.
    Duke performed an analysis to estimate the radiological 
consequences from a fresh MOX fuel drop accident. The approach for this 
analysis was consistent with the assumptions and methodologies that 
were used in the calculations supporting the MOX Fuel Fabrication 
Facility (MFFF) construction authorization request. The MOX MFFF 
application and review did not address the MOX fuel drop accident and 
although the guidance of NUREG/CR-6410 has not been used previously for 
DBA analyses for power reactors, the NRC staff concludes that the 
overall methodology used in the MFFF review is appropriate for the 
present application.
    The dose estimated by the licensee for the postulated drop of a 
single fresh MOX fuel assembly was 0.3 rem total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE) at the EAB, which is a small fraction of the 10 CFR 
50.67 dose criterion (i.e., 25 rem TEDE at the EAB) and is, therefore, 
found to be acceptable. The NRC staff has evaluated the analysis 
provided by the licensee and concludes that the methodology and 
calculations have been applied in a conservative manner. Therefore, the 
NRC staff concludes that there will be no significant adverse 
environmental impact as a result of a fresh MOX fuel drop accident.

Irradiated MOX LTA Drop

    Duke has calculated that the radiological consequences resulting 
from a FHA involving the drop of a single irradiated MOX fuel assembly 
would be 2.3 rem TEDE at the EAB, 0.34 rem TEDE at the edge of the LPZ, 
and 2.1 rem TEDE in the control room--increases of about 64 percent 
over the previous analysis for LEU fuel.
    The NRC staff performed confirmatory analyses of the spent FHA 
using the MOX LTA source term that it generated using the SCALE SAS2H 
computer code (as described in NUREG/CR-0200, (Reference 28)). For the 
irradiated FHA, the source term reflected the decay of

[[Page 51122]]

the radionuclides for a 72-hour period after shutdown of the reactor 
prior to moving fuel and, conservatively, was increased (multiplied) by 
a radial peaking factor of 1.65. The results of the NRC staff's 
analyses confirmed the results obtained by Duke. The doses estimated by 
the licensee for the postulated spent FHA are a small fraction of the 
10 CFR 50.67 dose criterion and are, therefore, acceptable and will not 
result in a significant adverse environmental impact.

Weir Gate Drop

    Duke has calculated the radiological consequences resulting from a 
FHA involving the drop of a weir gate, which is assumed to damage 7 
fuel assemblies, including all four MOX fuel assemblies. The calculated 
doses would be 3.5 rem TEDE at the EAB, 0.5 rem TEDE at the edge of the 
LPZ, and 3.3 rem TEDE in the control room. These dose estimates 
represent increases of about 58 percent over the previous analysis for 
LEU fuel, but are still well below the 10 CFR 50.67 dose criterion.
    The NRC staff performed confirmatory analyses of the weir gate drop 
accident using the MOX LTA source term that it generated using the 
SCALE SAS2H computer code. For this accident, the source term for the 
four MOX assemblies and the three LEU assemblies reflected the decay of 
the radionuclides for 19.5 days after shutdown of the reactor prior to 
moving fuel and, conservatively, was increased (multiplied) by a radial 
peaking factor of 1.65 (Reference 36). The results of the NRC staff's 
analyses confirmed the results obtained by Duke. The doses estimated by 
the licensee for the postulated accident were below the 5 rem TEDE 
criterion specified in 10 CFR 50.67 and are, therefore, acceptable and 
will not have a significant adverse environmental impact.
5.6.2 At-Power Accidents
    The current licensing basis analyses assume that all fuel 
assemblies (193) are affected by a LOCA. For the locked-rotor accident, 
11 percent of the core (21 assemblies) is assumed to be affected; for 
the rod-ejection accident, 50 percent of the core (97 assemblies) is 
assumed to be affected. For these events, Duke assumes that the four 
MOX LTAs are in the affected fuel population displacing four LEU 
assemblies. Because the dose is directly proportional to the fuel 
assembly inventory and gap fractions, the impact on the previously 
analyzed accident doses is based on quantifying the change in fission 
product release due to replacing up to four LEU fuel assemblies with 
the MOX LTAs. Although the consequences of these accidents could be 
determined by updating the current licensing basis analyses, Duke 
elected to perform a comparative evaluation, which the NRC staff has 
independently verified.
    Duke selected the thyroid dose due to I-131 as the evaluation 
benchmark because the thyroid dose is typically more limiting than the 
whole body dose in that there is less margin between calculated thyroid 
doses and its associated dose criterion. Also, I-131 is generally the 
most significant contributor to thyroid dose due to its abundance and 
long decay half-life. Duke has determined that the I-131 inventory in a 
MOX LTA is 9 percent greater than that of an equivalent LEU fuel 
assembly.

Loss-of-Coolant Accident

    For the LOCA, the four MOX LTAs represent 2.1 percent of the 193 
assemblies in the core and the potential increase in the iodine release 
and the thyroid dose would be 1.32 percent. The previously-calculated 
thyroid dose would increase to 90.2 rem at the EAB and to 25.3 rem at 
the LPZ, which is well below the 300 rem dose criterion of 10 CFR 
100.11.

Locked-Rotor Accident

    For the locked-rotor accident, the four MOX LTAs represent 19 
percent of the 21 assemblies in the core assumed to be involved in the 
postulated accident and the potential increase in the iodine release 
and the resulting thyroid dose would be 12 percent. The previously-
calculated thyroid dose would increase to 4.1 rem at the EAB and to 1.3 
rem at the LPZ, which is well below the 300 rem dose criterion of 10 
CFR 100.11.

Rod-Ejection Accident

    For the rod-ejection accident, the four MOX LTAs represent 4.1 
percent of the 97 assemblies in the core assumed to be involved in the 
postulated accident and the potential increase in the iodine release 
and the resulting thyroid dose would be 2.63 percent. The previously-
calculated thyroid dose would increase to 1.03 rem at the EAB and to 
0.1 rem at the LPZ, which is well below the 300 rem dose criterion of 
10 CFR 100.11.
5.6.3 Control Room Dose
    Control room dose is the only occupational dose that has been 
previously considered for DBA conditions. The at-power accident with 
the most severe consequences for the control room operators is the 
LOCA; the control room doses from postulated locked-rotor or rod-
ejection accidents are bounded by the calculated control room dose from 
the LOCA. Duke determined that the control room thyroid dose after a 
postulated LOCA that could be attributable to the irradiation of four 
MOX fuel LTAs would increase by 1.32 percent to 5.37rem. This is below 
the dose criterion set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 
19, and is not considered significant.
    Duke determined that the radiological consequences to workers in 
the control room following a postulated WGD accident would result in a 
calculated dose to control room operators of 3.3 rem TEDE. While this 
is an increase of 58 percent over the dose previously analyzed for LEU 
fuel, it remains below the 5 rem TEDE criterion specified in 10 CFR 
50.67. The change in calculated doses to control room operators 
attributable to the use of the four MOX fuel LTAs does not represent a 
significant environmental impact.
5.6.4 Conclusion
     The most-limiting DBA (a LOCA) would result in a calculated off-
site dose at the EAB of 90.2 rem to the thyroid and 25.3 rem to the 
thyroid at the edge of the LPZ. These doses represent increases of less 
than 1.32 percent of the dose previously calculated for LEU fuel and 
remain well below the limit of 300 rem thyroid specified in 10 CFR 
100.11 for off-site releases. The calculated change in dose 
consequences at the EAB and at the LPZ that could be attributable to 
the use of the four MOX fuel LTAs is not significant.
    The NRC staff concludes that the environmental impact resulting 
from incremental increases in EAB, LPZ, and control room dose following 
postulated DBAs that could occur as a result of the irradiation of four 
MOX LTAs does not represent a significant environmental impact.

5.7 Fuel Cycle Impacts

     The source of fissionable material is outside of the fuel cycle 
(coming, as it does, from the pits of dismantled nuclear warheads that 
are excess to the strategic stockpile). Therefore, the proposed 
irradiation of four MOX LTAs at Catawba would preclude use of four LEU 
assemblies. This would have only negligible impact on the fuel cycle.

5.8 Transportation of Fresh Fuel

     The transportation of the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies is the 
responsibility of the DOE and has been addressed by the DOE in 
Supplement Analysis 3, regarding the fabrication of MOX fuel LTAs in 
Europe and their return to the U.S. In Section 5.2 of Supplement 
Analysis 3, the truck

[[Page 51123]]

transportation risks from U.S. ports to Catawba, the methodology used, 
and the summary results are described.
    DOE indicates that LTAs will be one shipment using Safe Secure 
Trailer/SafeGuards Transports (SST/SGTs); DOE stated that the shipment 
would be made in SST/SGTs because unirradiated MOX fuel in large enough 
quantities is subject to security concerns similar to those associated 
with weapons-grade plutonium (Reference 13). The SST/SGT is a specially 
designed component of an 18-wheel tractor-trailer vehicle that has 
robust safety and security enhancements.
    The risks and consequences associated with exposures to 
transportation workers and persons residing near or sharing 
transportation links with shipments of radioactive material packages 
during routine transport operations or as a result of accidents were 
assessed by DOE using the RADTRAN 5 computer code (Reference 29); see, 
Chapter 5 of Supplement Analysis 3 (Reference 16). For incident-free 
transportation risk, DOE used the RADTRAN 5 code to calculate the dose 
and corresponding risk based on the external dose rate from the 
shipping vehicle, the transportation route and population density along 
the route. For accident transportation risk, DOE used the State-
specific accident rates between the marine ports and Catawba, and a 
conditional accident frequency-severity relationship that considered 
the route conditions. DOE used the accident rate for SST/SGT transport 
and the accident severity category classifications of NRC's NUREG-0170 
(Reference 17). DOE also calculated the non-radiological accident 
risks.
    The radiological risk of transporting the four fresh MOX LTAs is an 
estimate of the number of latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) and is small 
for both the public and the driver. Table 2 (Page 17 of Supplement 
Analysis 3) indicates that for incident-free transportation of the 
fresh MOX LTAs, the radiological risk to the crew which corresponds to 
shipping from the Naval Station Norfolk port in Virginia, is a maximum 
of 4.0 x 10-6 LCFs. DOE indicates that the maximum 
radiological risk to the public for incident-free transportation is 3.2 
x 10-6 LCFs, associated with shipping from Naval Station 
Norfolk or Yorktown Naval Weapons Station. For accidents, in Table 2 
DOE provides an estimate of the radiological risk in terms of LCFs. 
Non-radiological risks are stated as expected number of accident 
fatalities from non-radiological factors. The accident risk analysis 
does not distinguish between the crew and the public. For postulated 
accidents, the radiological risk is calculated to be a maximum of 2.1 x 
10-7 LCFs, which corresponds to transporting the MOX LTAs to 
Catawba from either the Naval Station Norfolk port or the Yorktown 
Naval Weapons Station port. The maximum non-radiological risk is 
calculated to be 1.7 x 10-4 which also corresponds to 
shipping from Naval Station Norfolk or Yorktown Naval Weapons Station. 
For both normal and accident conditions, no fatalities associated with 
incident free or accidents during transportation are expected.

5.9 Transportation of Spent Fuel

     Radiological risks during routine transportation would result from 
the potential exposure of people to low levels of external radiation 
near a loaded shipment, either stationary or in transit. Any irradiated 
MOX fuel rods that are not shipped offsite for post irradiation 
examination will be stored on-site until they are shipped to a 
permanent high-level waste repository. A shipping container must have a 
certificate of compliance (COC) issued by the NRC. As specified in 10 
CFR Part 71 Subpart D, the applicant for a COC must submit a Safety 
Analysis Report (SAR) which the NRC staff then reviews against a number 
of standards. After review, the NRC staff issues a safety evaluation 
report (SER) describing the basis of approval.
    The only disposal site currently under consideration in the U.S. is 
the proposed geologic repository in Nevada (Reference 14). For purposes 
of complying with NEPA requirements, it is assumed that spent MOX LTAs 
would eventually be shipped to the proposed repository in Nevada. 
However, the DOE's application for a license to operate the repository 
has not yet been submitted to the NRC. There is no assurance that the 
DOE's application, if submitted, would be approved, but it is 
reasonable to use the Nevada repository as a surrogate for this 
assessment.
    On a per-kilometer-traveled basis, the NRC reported that the 
routine radiological and vehicle-related transportation risks for spent 
MOX fuel would be similar to those estimated for fresh MOX fuel, 
plutonium metal, or transuranic radioactive waste (Reference 33). The 
transportation risks of LEU spent nuclear fuel and spent MOX fuel 
transport, in particular, were estimated in the DOE final EIS 
concerning disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in 
Nevada (Reference 14). DOE reported that under the mostly legal-weight 
truck scenario, approximately 53,000 truck shipments were estimated to 
result in approximately 12 LCFs to workers, 3 LCFs to the public, and 5 
traffic fatalities.
    The NRC has assessed the transportation impacts of a campaign of 
batch MOX fuel use in conjunction with an application for the 
construction and operation of a MOX fuel fabrication facility 
(Reference 33); the NRC's impact evaluation from that assessment is 
used to put the spent MOX LTA transportation risks into proper context. 
It should be noted that the NRC has not received an application 
requesting widescale or batch use of recycled plutonium for use in MOX 
fuel for any commercial reactor, and the NRC has not made any 
determination regarding any proposal for such use. In NUREG-1767 
(Reference 33), the NRC estimated the transportation risks of the spent 
MOX fuel based on average shipment risks calculated from the DOE 
results (Reference 14); the estimates show that no fatalities would be 
expected. Shipment of all of the spent MOX fuel generated under a batch 
use scenario would result in approximately 598 shipments (Reference 
33). Further, assuming three assemblies per cask, the campaign might be 
expected to result in approximately 0.1 worker LCFs, 0.03 public LCFs, 
and 0.05 transportation fatalities. Under this proposed action, only 
four MOX LTAs are contemplated. Even if the number of shipments were 
minimized to ship the highest concentration of MOX spent fuel, i.e., 
all four assemblies in two casks, and, using the results of the 
aforementioned assessment, the MOX LTAs might be expected to result in 
a small fraction (i.e., 2 / 598) of the quantified risk estimates, 
above, and not discernible from earlier NRC analyses involving solely 
LEU spent fuel.
    DOE proposes to take possession of a small portion of the 
irradiated fuel (i.e., spent fuel) from Catawba and to conduct post-
irradiation examination and testing at one of its national 
laboratories. DOE described these activities in the SPD EIS (Reference 
13). The transportation risks for this limited amount of spent MOX fuel 
that would be shipped to ORNL in Tennessee from Catawba is considered 
to be bounded by the risk estimates from the spent MOX LTAs. Apart from 
the smaller quantities involved for the post-irradiation examination 
and testing, the total number of kilometers traveled from Catawba to 
ORNL is less than that from Catawba to any contemplated repository.
    In light of the above, no significant impacts would be expected 
from the shipment of either the spent MOX LTAs to a repository or the 
shipment of a

[[Page 51124]]

small portion of the spent MOX LTAs to ORNL. Furthermore, the estimated 
risks are only a very small fraction of the radiological annual 
transport risks estimated in NUREG-0170, the NRC's Final EIS on the 
transportation of radioactive material (Reference 17). The NRC has 
determined that the impact from normal transportation and accidents is 
small.

5.10 Severe Accidents

    Environmental issues associated with postulated severe accidents 
are discussed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Catawba, 
NUREG-0921 (Reference 18), the Generic Environmental Impact Statement 
for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants (GEIS), NUREG-1437, Volumes 1 and 
2 (Reference 24) and in Supplement 9 to NUREG-37, the site-specific 
supplement. Severe nuclear accidents are those accidents that are more 
severe than DBAs because they could result in substantial damage to the 
reactor core, whether or not there are serious off-site consequences. 
In the environmental reviews identified above, the NRC staff assessed 
the impacts of severe accidents, using the results of existing analyses 
and site-specific information to conservatively predict the 
environmental impacts of severe accidents for Catawba.
    Severe accidents initiated by external phenomena such as tornadoes, 
floods, earthquakes, and fires have not traditionally been discussed in 
quantitative terms in FESs and were not specifically considered for the 
Catawba site in the GEIS (Reference 24). However, in the GEIS, the NRC 
staff did evaluate existing impact assessments performed by NRC and by 
the industry at 44 nuclear plants in the U.S. and concluded that the 
risk from beyond design-basis earthquakes at existing nuclear power 
plants, including Catawba, was small. [The NRC's standard for 
significance was established using the Council on Environmental 
Quality's terminology for ``significantly'' (40 CFR 1508.27, which 
requires consideration of both ``context'' and ``intensity''). 
``Small'' in this context means ``environmental effects are not 
detectable or are so minor that they will neither destabilize nor 
noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource.''] The NRC 
staff did conclude in the GEIS that the risks from other external 
events were adequately addressed by a generic consideration of 
internally initiated severe accidents.
    As part of its ongoing licensing reviews, the NRC staff also 
reviewed Revision 2b of the Catawba Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
(Reference 4), which is a full scope Level 3 PRA. In this case, the 
Catawba PRA included the analysis of internal as well as external 
events. The internal events analysis was an updated version of the 
Individual Plant Examination (IPE) model (Reference 1), and the 
external events analysis was based on the Individual Plant Examination 
for External Events (IPEEE) model (Reference 2). The calculated total 
core damage frequency (CDF) for internal and external events in 
Revision 2b of the Catawba PRA is 5.8 x 10-5 per year. 
Internal event initiators represent about 80 percent of the total CDF 
and were composed of transients (24 percent of total CDF), loss of 
coolant accidents (29 percent of total CDF), internal flood (24 percent 
of total CDF), and reactor pressure vessel rupture (2 percent of total 
CDF). Remaining contributors together accounted for less than 3 percent 
of total CDF. External event initiators represented about 20 percent of 
the total CDF and are composed of seismic initiators (15 percent of 
total CDF), tornado initiators (4 percent of total CDF), and fire 
initiators (2 percent of the total CDF). Duke estimated the dose to the 
population within 80 km (50 mi) of the Catawba site from all initiators 
(internal and external) to be 0.314 person-sieverts (Sv) (31.4 person-
rem) per year (Reference 3); internal events account for approximately 
0.21 person-Sv (21 person-rem). Early and late containment failures 
accounted for the majority of the population dose.
    In its most recent review of severe accidents for the purpose of 
determining whether mitigation alternatives were warranted, the NRC 
staff considered the following major elements:
     The Level 1 and 2 risk models that form the basis for the 
September 1992 IPE submittal (Reference 1);
     The major modifications to the IPE models that have been 
incorporated in Revision 2b of the PRA (Reference 4);
     The external events models that form the basis for the 
June 1994 IPEEE submittal (Reference 2); and
     The analyses performed to translate fission product 
release frequencies from the Level 2 PRA model into offsite consequence 
measures (Reference 3).
    The NRC staff's review of the Catawba IPE was described in an NRC 
safety evaluation dated June 7, 1994 (Reference 22). In that review, 
the NRC staff evaluated the methodology, models, data, and assumptions 
used to estimate the CDF and characterize containment performance and 
fission product releases. The NRC staff concluded that Duke's analysis 
met the intent of Generic Letter (GL) 88-20 (Reference 19) and NUREG-
1560 (Reference 25), which means the IPE was of adequate quality to be 
used to look for design or operational vulnerabilities. The NRC staff's 
review primarily focused on the licensee's ability to examine Catawba 
for severe accident vulnerabilities and not specifically on the 
detailed findings or quantification estimates. Overall, the NRC staff 
concluded that the Catawba IPE was of adequate quality to be used as a 
tool in searching for areas with high potential for risk reduction and 
to assess such risk reductions, especially when the risk models are 
used in conjunction with insights, such as those from risk importance, 
sensitivity, and uncertainty analyses.
    The NRC staff's review of the Catawba IPEEE was described in a SER 
dated April 12, 1999 (Reference 27). Duke did not identify any 
fundamental weaknesses or vulnerabilities to severe accident risk with 
regard to the external events. In the SER, the NRC staff concluded that 
the IPEEE met the intent of Supplement 4 to GL 88-20 (Reference 21), 
and that the licensee's IPEEE process was capable of identifying the 
most likely severe accidents and severe accident vulnerabilities.
    The NRC staff reviewed the process used by Duke to extend the 
containment performance (Level 2) portion of the IPE to the off-site 
consequence (Level 3) assessment. This included consideration of the 
source terms used to characterize fission product releases for each 
containment release category and the major input assumptions used in 
the off-site consequence analyses. The NRC staff reviewed Duke's source 
term estimates for the major release categories and found these 
predictions to be in reasonable agreement with estimates of NUREG-1150 
(Reference 20) for the closest corresponding release scenarios. In 
Supplement 9, the NRC staff concluded that the assignment of source 
terms was acceptable. The differences in the source terms for a severe 
accident involving substantial damage to the core solely with LEU fuel 
assemblies or substituting four LEU assemblies with MOX LTAs are 
indistinguishable, given the uncertainty, and would result in no 
appreciable change in the risk estimates.
    The plant-specific evaluation included the Catawba reactor core 
radionuclide inventory, emergency response evacuation modeling based on 
Catawba evacuation time estimate studies, release category source terms 
from the Catawba PRA, Revision 2b, analysis (same as the source terms 
used in the IPE), site-specific meteorological data for a 
representative year, and projected population distribution within

[[Page 51125]]

a 80 km (50 mi) radius (Reference 4). The NRC staff confirmed that Duke 
used appropriate values for the consequence analysis and reported the 
results of its risk evaluation for Catawba in Supplement 9. The NRC 
staff concluded that the methodology used by Duke to estimate the CDF 
and offsite consequences for Catawba was adequate.
    In the license renewal GEIS (Reference 24), the NRC staff concluded 
that the probability-weighted consequences from atmospheric releases 
associated with severe accidents was judged to be of small significance 
for all plants, including Catawba. The NRC staff concluded that, for 
both the drinking water and aquatic food pathways, the probability-
weighted consequences from fallout due to severe accidents is of small 
significance for all plants, including Catawba. The NRC staff concluded 
that the probability-weighted consequences from groundwater releases 
associated with severe accidents was judged to be of small significance 
for all plants, including Catawba.
    Nothing about the proposed action would significantly change either 
the probability or consequences of severe accidents. The small 
percentage of non-LEU fuel assemblies that could be involved in a 
severe accident would not result in an appreciable change in the risk 
estimates. The proposed action is not expected to change the manner in 
which the facility is operated nor does it alter Catawba's risk profile 
for severe accidents analyzed in the GEIS for license renewal 
(Reference 24) and, more recently, its assessment of mitigation 
alternatives in Supplement 9. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that 
the environmental impacts of the proposed use of MOX LTAs are bounded 
by the environmental impacts previously evaluated in the GEIS and 
Supplement 9.

5.11 Decommissioning

    Once a nuclear power generating facility permanently ceases 
commercial operation, the licensee is required to begin 
decommissioning. Decommissioning is the process of removing a facility 
or site safely from service and reducing residual radioactivity to a 
level that permits either the release of the property for unrestricted 
use and termination of the license or release of the property under 
restricted conditions and termination of the license. In November 2002, 
the NRC staff issued Final Supplement 1 to NUREG-0586, entitled 
``Generic EIS on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities,'' (Reference 
31) regarding the decommissioning of power reactors. Supplement 1 to 
the GEIS for decommissioning comprehensively evaluated all 
environmental impacts related to the radiological decommissioning of 
nuclear power facilities. By rule, if a licensee anticipates the need 
to perform activities that have not been previously considered or 
activities with impacts greater than those considered in the 
decommissioning GEIS, then it must obtain NRC approval with a license 
amendment request. At this time, Duke has not identified and the NRC 
staff is unaware of any activities that are dissimilar from those 
assessed in NUREG-0586 that might occur as a result of the LTA 
campaign. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that the impacts 
associated with the decommissioning of a facility that would irradiate 
four MOX LTAs would be bounded by the impacts predicted by Supplement 1 
to NUREG-0586 (Reference 31).
    Decommissioning impacts are primarily related to the activities 
associated with the decontamination and dismantlement of the 
structures, systems, and components of the facility. The use of the MOX 
fuel LTAs will not change the scope or impact of those activities. 
During decommissioning, the primary system is typically decontaminated 
using a chemical flush. Contamination in the primary system is removed 
by the chemical flush and deposited in ion exchange resins that are 
permanently disposed in licensed burial facilities. Decommissioning of 
the facility would not result in the generation of any significant 
increase in liquid or solid radioactive waste. No increases in offsite 
or occupational exposure would be expected. No significant quantities 
of contaminated or activated additional structural material would be 
generated during decommissioning because of the use of the lead 
assemblies.
    Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the decommissioning of the 
facility after use of the lead assemblies would not result in impacts 
that are significantly different from a facility undergoing 
decommissioning that did not use the lead assemblies. Furthermore, the 
impacts of decommissioning the Catawba facility after the irradiation 
of four MOX fuel LTAs are bounded by the impacts evaluated in NUREG-
0586, Supplement 1 (Reference 31).

5.12 Summary

    The proposed irradiation of four MOX fuel LTAs at Catawba would not 
significantly increase the probability or consequences of accidents, 
would not introduce any new radiological release pathways, would not 
result in a significant increase in occupational or public radiation 
exposure, and would not result in significant additional fuel cycle 
environmental impacts. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there 
are no significant environmental radiological impacts associated with 
the proposed action.

6.0 Irreversible or Irretrievable Commitment of Resources

    The NRC staff has considered the commitment of resources related to 
operation of Catawba. These resources include materials and equipment 
required for plant maintenance and operation, the nuclear fuel used by 
the reactors, and ultimately, permanent offsite storage space for the 
spent fuel assemblies. As described in Supplement 9, the most 
significant resource commitments related to operation of the Catawba 
facility are the fuel and the permanent storage space. The resource 
commitments to be considered in this assessment are associated with the 
proposed irradiation of four MOX fuel LTAs in the reactor core of one 
of the Catawba facilities. Aside from the plutonium in the MOX fuel 
(20.2 kg Pu per assembly), all of the materials that are to be used 
would be used if the action were not to proceed.

7.0 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts

    The NRC staff has considered whether the proposed action would 
cause significant unavoidable adverse impacts and concludes that the 
proposed irradiation of four MOX fuel LTAs will have no environmental 
non-radiological impacts and only minor radiological impacts. 
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that there will be no significant 
adverse impacts as a result of the proposed action.

8.0 Mitigation

    The NRC staff has evaluated the impacts that would accrue from the 
proposed action. The NRC staff has concluded that there will be no 
environmental non-radiological impacts and only minor radiological 
impacts. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that mitigation is not 
warranted or necessary to minimize the impacts of this action.

9.0 Cumulative Impacts

    The NRC staff considered potential cumulative impacts during its 
evaluation of the proposed action. For the purposes of this analysis, 
past actions were those related to the resources at the site at the 
time of the plant licensing and construction;

[[Page 51126]]

present actions are those related to the resources at the site at the 
time of current operations of the power plant; and future actions are 
considered to be those that are reasonably foreseeable through the end 
of plant operation. The impacts of the proposed action are combined 
with other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions at 
Catawba regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person 
undertakes such other actions. These combined impacts are defined as 
``cumulative'' in 40 CFR 1508.7 and include individually minor, but 
collectively significant, actions taking place over a period of time. 
The NRC staff concludes that the proposed action would add only minute, 
incremental effects to those already accruing from current operation at 
Catawba using LEU fuel.

10.0 Alternatives to the Proposed Action

    The NRC staff has evaluated a number of reasonable alternatives to 
the proposed action, including the no-action alternative. Two of the 
alternatives involve use of the reactors at two other Duke facilities, 
McGuire and Oconee Nuclear Station. A fourth alternative involves a 
different scheme than is currently proposed for transporting all of the 
rods from the irradiated MOX fuel LTAs offsite for post-irradiation 
examination (PIE) at ORNL.

10.1 No-Action Alternative

    The NRC staff has considered the no-action alternative. If the four 
MOX fuel LTAs are not irradiated in one of the Catawba reactors, four 
LEU fuel assemblies with comparable performance characteristics will be 
used. The impacts resulting from the proposed action and the no-action 
alternative are similar.

10.2 Use of the McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 as an 
Alternative

    MOX fuel lead assembly irradiation at a McGuire unit is a 
technically feasible alternative to using MOX LTA fuel at Catawba. 
McGuire and Catawba share the same fuel assembly design, and the RCS 
operating parameters are similar among all four units. All of the 
reactors are base loaded, with approximately 18 month intervals between 
refueling. All four reactors have the same rated thermal power--3411 
MW(t) nominal. In addition, transportation modes and means of delivery 
to the two plants are the same.
    Due to these and other similarities, there is a de minimis 
difference in the environmental impacts of MOX fuel lead assembly use 
at McGuire as compared to MOX fuel lead assembly use at Catawba. The ER 
on MOX fuel lead assembly use submitted to the NRC in support of the 
license amendment request (Reference 5), is applicable to both plants. 
Duke's responses to NRC requests for additional information (Reference 
7 and Reference 9) related to environmental consequences would be 
technically applicable to irradiation of the MOX LTAs at McGuire as 
well as at Catawba.
    In a letter dated September 23, 2003, Duke amended its license 
amendment request to apply to Catawba only (Reference 6). This action 
was based on refueling schedule considerations and the desire to 
minimize the resource requirements associated with MOX fuel lead 
assembly licensing. While use of MOX fuel lead assemblies at McGuire 
remains technically feasible, these refueling schedule and resource 
considerations make Catawba preferable for use of the MOX fuel lead 
assemblies in the late spring of 2005. That date, in turn, is driven by 
lead assembly fabrication and transportation (Reference 10).

10.3 Use of Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 as an Alternative

    MOX fuel lead assembly irradiation at Oconee is not considered to 
be a technically feasible alternative to using MOX fuel lead assemblies 
at a Catawba unit. As described in Duke's license amendment request, 
the reason for the lead assembly program is to demonstrate the 
acceptable performance of MOX fuel derived from weapons grade plutonium 
in reactors. McGuire and Catawba are very similar in design to European 
reactors that have amassed decades of experience using reactor grade 
MOX fuel. Further, McGuire and Catawba are the facilities that have 
been proposed to and accepted by the DOE for the larger-scale 
irradiation of the MOX fuel. It should be noted that the NRC has not 
received an application for wide scale routine, or batch, use of MOX 
fuel in any reactor and the NRC has not made any determination 
regarding any proposal for wide scale routine, or batch, use.
    McGuire and Catawba share the same fuel assembly design. By 
contrast, Oconee has a different fuel assembly design and a different 
RCS design than the McGuire and Catawba plants. Oconee fuel assemblies 
have a 15x15 lattice; McGuire and Catawba use 17x17 fuel. The fuel rod 
pitch is 0.568 inches at Oconee, versus 0.496 inches at McGuire and 
Catawba. Oconee has 177 fuel assemblies in each core; McGuire and 
Catawba have 193 fuel assemblies in each core. Oconee uses a fixed 
incore detector system with rhodium detectors to measure neutron flux; 
McGuire and Catawba use a movable incore detector system with fission 
chambers. Oconee is a Babcock and Wilcox-designed reactor; McGuire and 
Catawba are four-loop Westinghouse plants. The core thermal power level 
is 2568 MW(t) at Oconee, vs. 3411 MW(t) at McGuire and Catawba. RCS 
average temperature is 579 [deg]F at Oconee, vs. 586 [deg]F at McGuire 
and Catawba.
    Duke considers that a lead assembly program with the prototypical 
fuel design under prototypical conditions is required prior to 
contemplating use of significant quantities of MOX fuel at McGuire or 
Catawba. The differences between McGuire/Catawba and Oconee, while not 
extreme, are great enough such that MOX fuel lead assembly use at 
Oconee would not be considered prototypical (Reference 10). For those 
same reasons, Duke considers it likely that NRC would not consider a 
MOX fuel lead assembly program at Oconee to be sufficient for NRC to 
authorize Duke to use significant quantities of MOX fuel at McGuire or 
Catawba. Therefore, Oconee is not a practical alternative for a MOX 
fuel lead assembly program.
    Duke has stated that it knows of no technical reason that MOX fuel 
could not be used safely at Oconee (Reference 10). However, in the 
context of the ongoing U.S. program to dispose of surplus plutonium 
using MOX fuel, McGuire and Catawba are the only reactors selected for 
the program and the only technically feasible alternatives under Duke's 
control for a MOX fuel lead assembly program.

10.4 Offsite Storage of All MOX LTA Fuel Rods

    As part of the MOX Fuel Project lead assembly program, a small 
number of irradiated MOX fuel rods will, at the direction of DOE, be 
transported to ORNL for post-irradiation examination (PIE). The fuel 
rods would be destructively examined at ORNL and eventually disposed of 
as waste. The remainder of the MOX fuel rods (approximately 1000 rods) 
would remain in the SFP at Catawba until they are accepted by DOE 
pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, presumably to a permanent 
geologic repository.
    Transportation of irradiated MOX fuel to an interim offsite 
location is beyond the scope of the Duke lead assembly license 
amendment application (Reference 10). Duke's application is 
specifically limited to the receipt and storage of MOX fuel as well as 
incore irradiation of the MOX fuel. The environmental impacts of 
irradiated

[[Page 51127]]

MOX fuel transportation and disposal have been addressed in other EISs. 
There are no specific plans in place to transport offsite all of the 
MOX fuel rods from the MOX fuel lead assemblies in conjunction with the 
offsite shipment of a limited number of rods to ORNL for PIE.
    Nevertheless, the NRC staff requested that Duke consider an 
alternative involving a variation of the proposed DOE transportation of 
the irradiated MOX fuel rods in the LTAs (Reference 35). Duke could 
ship all of the MOX fuel assemblies to ORNL for storage even though 
there are no facilities for such storage at ORNL (Reference 10). 
Nevertheless, in this hypothetical case, following interim storage, 
ORNL could ship the four MOX fuel assemblies to another storage 
location. The difference in these approaches is minor from an 
environmental perspective. The alternative approach would eliminate the 
need for the direct shipment of four fuel assemblies from Catawba to 
Yucca Mountain, should Yucca Mountain eventually be licensed, however, 
offsetting this benefit is the shipment from Catawba to ORNL and from 
ORNL to Yucca Mountain and additional handling. Duke has stated that it 
expects that the difference between the alternatives would be 
negligible (Reference 10).
    It should be noted that it is necessary to cool spent fuel 
assemblies in the SFP prior to shipping them offsite. Therefore, the 
alternative of shipping all of the fuel offsite would by necessity 
involve some period of onsite storage at Catawba. There is no 
conceivable alternative (other than no-action) that involves no spent 
MOX fuel assembly storage at Catawba (Reference 10).
    If DOE were to transport all of the rods in the four MOX LTAs 
offsite, no irradiated MOX fuel would need to be stored on the Catawba 
site. The NRC staff concludes that the environmental impacts from this 
alternative would be similar to those for the proposed action.

11.0 Agencies and Persons Consulted

    On July 30, 2004, the NRC staff consulted with the South Carolina 
State official, Mr. Mike Gandy of the Department of Health and 
Environmental Controls, regarding the environmental impact of the 
proposed action. The State official had no comments.

12.0 References

    1. Duke letter to NRC, Catawba Individual Plant Examination 
(IPE) Submittal, September 10, 1992.
    2. Duke letter to NRC, Individual Plant Examination of External 
Events (IPEEE) Submittal, Catawba Nuclear Station, June 21, 1994.
    3. Duke letter to NRC, Applicant's Environmental Report--
Operating License Renewal Stage Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 
2, June 12, 2001, ADAMS ML011660138.
    4. Duke, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Revision 2b, Catawba 
Nuclear Station, April 18, 2001.
    5. Duke letter to NRC, Proposed Amendments to the Facility 
Operating License and Technical Specifications to Allow Insertion of 
Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Lead Assemblies and Request for Exemption 
from Certain Regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, February 27, 2003, ADAMS 
ML030760734.
    6. Duke letter to NRC, Catawba and McGuire, Mixed Oxide Fuel 
Lead Assembly License Amendment Request, September 23, 2003, ADAMS 
ML032750033.
    7. Duke letter to NRC, Catawba, Response to Request for 
Additional Information Regarding the Use of Mixed Oxide Lead Fuel 
Assemblies, November 3, 2003, ADAMS ML033210369.
    8. Duke letter to NRC, Response to Request for Additional 
Information dated November 30, 2003, Regarding the Use of Mixed 
Oxide Lead Fuel Assemblies, December 10, 2003, ADAMS ML033510563.
    9. Duke letter to NRC, Catawba, Response to Request for 
Additional Information, Mixed Oxide Fuel Assemblies (Environmental, 
Radiological, and Materials), February 2, 2004, ADAMS ML040510064.
    10. Duke letter to NRC, Catawba, Response to Request for 
Additional Information Mixed Oxide Fuel Lead Assemblies 
(Environmental), March 1, 2004, ADAMS ML040710492.
    11. Duke letter to NRC, Catawba, Amended Information Regarding 
Radiological Consequences for MOX Fuel Lead Assemblies, March 16, 
2004, ADAMS ML040840483.
    12. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), DOE/EIS-0229, Storage and 
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement, December 1996.
    13. DOE/EIS-0283, Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental 
Impact Statement, 1 through 5, November 1999.
    14. DOE/EIS-0250, Final Environmental Impact Statement for a 
Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-
Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, 
February 2002.
    15. DOE/EIS-0283-SA1, Supplemental Analysis and Amended Record 
of Decision--Changes Needed to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Program, April 2003.
    16. DOE/EIS-0229-SA3, Supplemental Analysis--Fabrication of 
Mixed Oxide Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe, November 2003.
    17. NRC NUREG-0170, Final Environmental Impact Statement on the 
Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Means, 
December 1977.
    18. NRC NUREG-0921, Final Environmental Impact Statement Related 
to the Operation of Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, January 
1983.
    19. NRC Generic Letter 88-20, Individual Plant Examination for 
Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, November 23, 1988.
    20. NRC NUREG-1150, Severe Accident Risks--An Assessment for 
Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, December 1990.
    21. NRC Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20, Individual Plant 
Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident 
Vulnerabilities,'' June 28, 1991.
    22. NRC Letter to Duke, Safety Evaluation of Catawba Nuclear 
Station, Units 1 and 2, Individual Plant Examination (IPE) 
Submittal, June 7, 1994.
    23. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.183, ``Alternative Radiological 
Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power 
Reactors.''
    24. NRC NUREG-1437, Volumes 1 and 2, Generic Environmental 
Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, May 1996.
    25. NRC NUREG-1560, Individual Plant Examination Program: 
Perspectives on Reactor Safety and Plant Performance, December 1997.
    26. NRC NUREG-1437, Vol. 1, Addendum 1, Final Report--Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement--License Renewal of Nuclear Plants--
Main Report--Section 6.3--Transportation Table 9.1, Summary of 
Findings on NEPA issues for license renewal of nuclear power plants, 
August 1999.
    27. NRC Letter Duke, Catawba--Review of Individual Plant 
Examination of External Events (IPEEE), April 12, 1999.
    28. NRC NUREG/CR-0200, Revision 6, Volume 1, SAS2H: A Coupled 
One-Dimensional Depletion and Shielding Analysis Module, March 2000.
    29. Sandia National Laboratories, SAND 2000-1256, RADTRAN 5 
Technical Manual, May 2000.
    30. NRC NUREG-1714, Vol. 1, Final Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Construction and Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installation on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of 
Goshute Indians and the Related Transportation Facility in Toole 
County, Utah, December 2001.
    31. NRC NUREG-0586, Generic Environmental Impact Statement on 
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, November 2002.
    32. NRC NUREG-1437, Supplement 9 (Catawba) to the Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear 
Plants, December 2002.
    33. NRC NUREG-1767, Draft Report for Comment--Environmental 
Impact Statement on the Construction and Operation of a Mixed Oxide 
Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site, South 
Carolina, February 2003.
    34. NRC Letter to Duke, Catawba--Request for Additional 
information Regarding Mixed Oxide Lead Fuel Assemblies, December 16, 
2003, ADAMS ML033500408.
    35. NRC Letter to Duke, Catawba--Request for Additional 
Information Regarding Mixed Oxide Lead Fuel Assemblies, February 20, 
2004, ADAMS ML040490683.
    36. NRC Letter to Duke, transmitting safety evaluation for 
proposed amendments to the operating license, April 5, 2004, ADAMS 
ML040970046.

[[Page 51128]]

13.0 Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the EA, the NRC concludes that the proposed action 
will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human 
environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to prepare an EIS 
for the proposed action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated February 27, 2003, as supplemented by letters 
dated September 15, September 23, October 1 (two letters), October 3 
(two letters), November 3 and 4, December 10, 2003, and February 2 (two 
letters), March 1 (three letters), March 9 (two letters), March 16 (two 
letters), March 26, March 31, April 13, April 16, May 13, and June 17, 
2004. Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public 
File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible electronically 
from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents 
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by 
telephone at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
[email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of August 2004.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Edwin M. Hackett,
Project Director, Project Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 04-18731 Filed 8-16-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P