[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 155 (Thursday, August 12, 2004)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 49819-49822]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-18485]



[[Page 49819]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 573 and 577

[Docket No. NHTSA 2001-11107; Notice 3]
RIN 2127-AJ05


Motor Vehicle Safety; Reimbursement Prior to Recall

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Response to a petition for reconsideration.

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SUMMARY: This document denies a petition for reconsideration of a final 
rule issued by NHTSA with respect to the reimbursement of costs 
incurred by owners of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment to 
remedy of safety-related defects or noncompliances with a Federal motor 
vehicle safety standard (FMVSS). That final rule implemented section 
6(b) of the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and 
Documentation (TREAD) Act. Under the rule, in their programs to remedy 
defects or noncompliances, motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment 
manufacturers are required to include a plan for reimbursing owners for 
the cost of a remedy incurred within specified times before and shortly 
after the manufacturer's notification of the defect or noncompliance.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, contact George 
Person, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA (phone: 202-366-5210). 
For legal issues, contact Andrew DiMarsico, Office of Chief Counsel, 
NHTSA (phone: 202-366-5263).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Section 6(b) of the TREAD Act amended 49 U.S.C. 30120(d) to require 
a manufacturer's remedy program to include a plan for reimbursing an 
owner or purchaser who incurred the cost of the remedy within a 
reasonable time in advance of the manufacturer's notification under 49 
U.S.C. 30118 (b) or (c). Section 6(b) further authorized the Secretary 
to prescribe regulations establishing what constitutes a reasonable 
time and other reasonable conditions for the reimbursement plan. See 49 
U.S.C. 30120(d).
    On October 17, 2002, NHTSA published a final rule implementing the 
reimbursement provision of the TREAD Act. 67 FR 64049. The final rule 
required manufacturers' programs for remedying safety defects and 
noncompliances in motor vehicles and equipment to include reimbursement 
plans that, at a minimum, cover certain expenditures incurred to remedy 
the defect or noncompliance before the implementation of the recall. 
See 49 CFR 573.13 and 577.11 (2003). The reader is referred to that 
notice, and the prior Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 66 FR 64078 
(December 11, 2001), for further information.
    The rule requires manufacturers to provide reimbursement, at a 
minimum, to consumers who obtain a pre-notification remedy within a 
specified time period. The beginning of the minimum reimbursement 
period is determined by first considering the underlying categorical 
basis for the recall. For recalls based upon a safety-related defect, 
the start of the minimum reimbursement period is the date NHTSA's 
Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opens an investigation known as 
an engineering analysis (EA) or one year prior to the date the 
manufacturer submits its notice of a defect to NHTSA pursuant to 49 
U.S.C. 30118(b) or (c) and 49 CFR Part 573, whichever is earlier. For 
recalls based upon a noncompliance with a FMVSS, the start of the 
minimum reimbursement period is the date of the observation of a test 
failure by either the manufacturer or NHTSA.
    The end of the minimum reimbursement period is determined by the 
nature of the product being recalled. For motor vehicles, the end date 
is ten days after the date the manufacturer mailed the last of its 
notices to owners pursuant to 49 CFR 577.5. For replacement equipment, 
the end date is ten days after the date the manufacturer mailed the 
last of its notices pursuant to 49 CFR 577.5 or 30 days after the 
conclusion of the manufacturer's initial efforts to provide public 
notice of the existence of the defect or noncompliance pursuant to 49 
CFR 577.7, whichever is later. Manufacturers may (and generally do) 
provide reimbursement for a longer period than required under the rule.
    The agency based the regulatory delineation of ``reasonable time'' 
on the language and legislative history of section 6(b) of the TREAD 
Act. We also considered the free remedy provision of the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 
(Safety Act). Under the Safety Act, manufacturers of motor vehicles and 
equipment that are recalled must provide a remedy without charge unless 
the vehicle or replacement equipment was bought by a first purchaser 
more than 10 calendar years (5 years for a tire) before notice of a 
defect or noncompliance with a FMVSS under 49 U.S.C. 30118. See 49 
U.S.C. 30120(g)(1). As explained in the preamble to the final rule, in 
the TREAD Act reimbursement provision, Congress required a 
reimbursement period covering persons who incurred the cost of the 
remedy within a ``reasonable time in advance'' of the manufacturer's 
notification under section 30118.\1\ We therefore concluded that the 
period for reimbursement should be limited by this language. 67 FR at 
64051. We also noted that Congress was well aware of statutory periods 
for free remedies (49 U.S.C. 30120(g)(1)), since it had extended those 
periods in section 4 of the TREAD Act, and the fact that it did not 
reference it in the reimbursement provision of the Act cannot be viewed 
as inadvertent. See 67 FR at 64052. Thus, we reasoned that not all pre-
notification remedies within the free remedy period were to be eligible 
for reimbursement.
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    \1\ In addition to the differences in the time periods of the 
free remedy provision and the reimbursement provision, the 
provisions run from different dates. The free remedy runs from the 
date of the first purchase; the reimbursement period begins at a 
reasonable time in advance of the manufacturer's notification under 
49 U.S.C. Sec.  30118(b) or (c).
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    In deciding what time period constituted a ``reasonable time in 
advance'' of a manufacturer's notification of a defect or 
noncompliance, we relied upon the statutory concerns underlying the 
remedy of noncompliances with FMVSSs and safety-related defects, and 
where applicable, the agency's investigative process. See 67 FR at 
64051-53 and 66 FR at 64078-79 (December 11, 2001) (NPRM). As noted in 
the NPRM, we believe that the minimum period for reimbursement need not 
begin before consumers would be expected to have a substantial concern 
that the problem in question would need to be addressed by a safety 
recall. See 66 FR at 64079. As explained above, in our view, for 
noncompliances this would be when NHTSA or the manufacturer observes a 
test failure; for safety defects, it would be when ODI opens an EA or 
one year before the manufacturer submits its Part 573 notice, whichever 
is earlier. See 67 FR 64079. Before these dates, in our view, there 
would be no reason for a consumer to anticipate a safety recall would 
be forthcoming. While an owner of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment may need to address a problem in his or her vehicle or 
equipment prior to these dates, and thus incur the cost of a remedy, 
the overall level of concern over the matter will not have reached a 
level such that a recall

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would be anticipated. Thus, under the rule, reasonable concerns would 
not dictate delaying the replacement or the repair of a problematic 
part on the basis of an expectation that with a delay a free remedy 
would be available under a recall, as was the case with the Firestone 
tires that preceded the enactment of the TREAD Act. There, as reported 
to NHTSA, some owners delayed replacing Firestone tires, which were 
under investigation and determined to be defective shortly thereafter, 
because they would have to pay for the replacements, but would not have 
to do so if there was a recall.
    Public Citizen (PC) and the Center for Auto Safety (CAS) 
(collectively ``PC/CAS'') jointly filed a timely petition for 
reconsideration of the rule.

II. Discussion

    PC/CAS's petition contends that the mandatory reimbursement period 
established by the final rule is too limited. PC/CAS take issue with 
both the beginning date and the end date of the required reimbursement 
period.

A. Beginning Date of the Reimbursement Period

    PC/CAS object to the beginning date of the reimbursement period on 
various grounds. They first argue that NHTSA's regulation is 
inconsistent with the purpose of a reimbursement amendment offered by 
Congressman Bill Luther during the deliberations on the TREAD Act. More 
broadly, throughout their petition, they claim that the agency's 
determination of what constitutes a ``reasonable time'' is inconsistent 
with the overall purposes of the TREAD Act. They also assert that the 
rule fails to provide a ``uniform'' remedy and that NHTSA therefore 
should have adopted one of two ``bright-line'' rules. They also contend 
that the rule does not advance several of their policy choices.
    Our responses follow.
1. The Luther Amendment
    PC/CAS assert that the period for reimbursement in the rule is 
inconsistent with the purpose of a proposed amendment offered by 
Congressman Bill Luther to the bill that ultimately became the TREAD 
Act. PC/CAS argue that Congressman Luther's amendment was intended to 
encourage consumers to act on safety defects as soon as they are 
evident, rather than wait for a formal recall, and that a reimbursement 
period that falls short of the period for a free remedy under section 
30120(g)(1) \2\ is inconsistent with the amendment. PC/CAS's reliance 
on the Luther amendment is misplaced because they fail to recognize 
that Congressman Luther's amendment was modified before the bill was 
enacted.
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    \2\ Section 30120(g)(1) states: The requirement that a remedy be 
provided without charge does not apply if the motor vehicle or 
replacement equipment was bought by the first purchaser more than 10 
calendar years, or the tire, including an original equipment tire, 
was bought by the first purchaser more than 5 calendar years, before 
notice is given under section 30118(c) of this title or an order is 
issued under section 30118(b) of this title, whichever is earlier.
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    The initial bills introduced in both the House of Representatives 
(H.R. 5164) and the Senate (S. 3059) in the wake of the Firestone tire 
investigation did not include any reimbursement language. Mr. Luther's 
amendment, offered during the mark-up of the bill in the House 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection on 
September 21, 2000, would have required:

a manufacturer to fully reimburse the owner of a motor vehicle which 
replaces equipment on a motor vehicle before a recall is ordered 
under subsection (a) or (b) because such equipment is defective or 
not in compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard.

This proposed amendment did not refer to any time limitation for the 
period for reimbursement.
    However, the full Committee did not adopt Mr. Luther's 
reimbursement language. On October 6, 2000, during the mark-up 
conducted by the full Committee on Commerce, its Chairman, Congressman 
Billy Tauzin, offered an amendment to Mr. Luther's reimbursement 
provision. Among other changes, Chairman Tauzin's amendment, which was 
ultimately enacted as section 6(b) of the TREAD Act, added a time 
limitation to the period for reimbursement:

    A manufacturer's remedy program shall include a plan for 
reimbursing an owner or purchaser who incurred the cost of the 
remedy within a reasonable time in advance of the manufacturer's 
notification under subsection (b) or (c) of section 30118. The 
Secretary may prescribe regulations establishing what constitutes a 
reasonable time for purposes of the preceding sentence and other 
reasonable conditions for the reimbursement plan.

    The Commerce Committee reported H.R. 5164, as amended, to the House 
of Representatives. See H.R. Report No. 106-954, p. 11 (2000). The 
summary section of the report stated, ``[F]urther, the legislation 
addresses * * * reimbursement for parts replaced immediately prior to a 
recall.'' Id. at p. 6 (emphasis supplied).
    No further amendments to the reimbursement provision were offered 
in the House. The full House of Representatives passed H.R. 5164 as 
reported out of Committee. See 146 Cong. Rec. H9624-32 (2000). The 
Senate passed H.R. 5164 on October 11, 2000. See 146 Cong. Rec. S10272 
(2000).\3\
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    \3\ The reimbursement provision was inadvertently left out of 
H.R. 5164 as reported. On October 12, 2000, the House of 
Representatives passed H. Con. Res. 428 to add it. See 146 Cong. 
Rec. H9852 (2000). The Senate passed H. Con. Res. 428 on October 17, 
2000. See 146 Cong. Rec. S10632 (2000).
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2. The Purposes of the TREAD Act
    PC/CAS next argue that the time periods established in the 
reimbursement rule are inconsistent with the purposes of the TREAD Act. 
PC/CAS broadly advance various purposes of the TREAD Act such as: to 
``incentivize'' recalls and ``disincentivize'' stonewalls; discourage 
foot dragging by manufacturers by making it less financially 
advantageous to delay announcement of a recall; to influence customer 
behavior; to encourage the timely replacement of defective parts and 
remedy a defect before an official acknowledgement; to expand 
consumers' rights; to provide meaningful recourse to consumers affected 
by a recall; and not limit reimbursement in a manner contrary to good 
public policy. PC/CAS broadly assert that the agency's reimbursement 
rule fails to further these purposes of the TREAD Act.
    PC/CAS's broad assertions of various and sundry purposes of the 
TREAD Act lack support or citation. Even if one could read some 
provisions of the TREAD Act as being consistent with some or all of 
these asserted ``purposes,'' it would not support PC/CAS's arguments. 
Section 6(b) cannot fairly be viewed as an omnibus provision that 
authorized NHTSA to adopt rules to advance general policies. We must be 
guided by the language of the statutory provision. Thus, for example, 
while we agree with PC/CAS that an apparent congressional purpose of 
Section 6(b) was to expand consumer rights by creating an obligation on 
manufacturers to provide reimbursement to purchasers for some pre-
recall expenditures that was not previously required under the Safety 
Act, that would not resolve the scope of the rule. The critical 
question is the extent of the rights, which requires consideration of 
the statutory term ``a reasonable time in advance of notification.'' 
That is just what NHTSA did.
3. Uniform Statutory Remedy
    PC/CAS further argue that the reimbursement rule does not provide a 
``uniform statutory remedy'' because the

[[Page 49821]]

reimbursement period is based upon the timing of the remedy rather than 
the nature of the remedy. PC/CAS contend that this can cause similarly 
situated consumers to be treated differently.
    PC/CAS do not point to any language in Section 6(b) of the TREAD 
Act that supports its assertion that the reimbursement period should be 
based on the nature of the remedy or that all persons who remedied a 
defect or noncompliance prior to the manufacturer's notification must 
have the same right to reimbursement. By its terms, the TREAD Act's 
reimbursement provision is oriented toward the timing of the remedy; it 
expressly refers to reimbursement of a purchaser who ``incurred the 
cost of the remedy within a reasonable time in advance of the 
manufacturer's notification.'' Accordingly, in circumstances where one 
vehicle was repaired before the beginning of the reimbursement period 
and another vehicle was repaired during the reimbursement period, the 
fact that the rule does not require the owner of the first vehicle to 
be reimbursed is entirely consistent with the statute and its 
legislative history.
    We note that even under PC/CAS view that the reimbursement period 
should be based on the time for a free remedy under section 
30120(g)(1), there may be differences in eligibility for reimbursement. 
For example, in cases where a defective part is used for several model 
years, under PC/CAS's preferred ``bright-line'' approach, owners of 
vehicles under 10 years old would be eligible for reimbursement, while 
owners of vehicles with the same defective part that are more than 10 
years old would not be eligible for reimbursement.
4. Manufacturers' Reduction of Their Liability
    One of PC/CAS's central themes is that by basing the time frame for 
the duty to reimburse on the opening of an Engineering Analysis in a 
defect investigation, the longer a manufacturer can ward off an EA, the 
lower its liability. PC/CAS thus claim that the reimbursement rule 
creates an incentive for manufacturers to delay a recall and stonewall 
the agency.
    As discussed above, Section 6(b) was not framed in terms of 
incentives for timely recalls. Moreover, we do not agree that the 
reimbursement rule would encourage a manufacturer to delay a recall. 
There are several factors that encourage the timely determination and 
notification of safety-related defects and noncompliances that far 
outweigh any possible cost savings that might be achieved through 
limiting the number of owners possibly entitled to reimbursement.
    The Safety Act requires manufacturers to notify NHTSA and owners of 
vehicles and equipment when the manufacturer learns that the vehicle or 
equipment contains a defect and decides in good faith that the defect 
is related to motor vehicle safety, or decides in good faith that the 
vehicle or equipment does not comply with an applicable FMVSS. See 49 
U.S.C. 30118(c)(1) and (2). Such notification must be given within a 
reasonable time after the manufacturer first decides that a safety-
related defect or noncompliance exists under section 30118(c). See 49 
U.S.C. 30119(c)(2). A manufacturer cannot evade its statutory 
obligations ``by the expedient of declining * * * to reach its own 
conclusion as to the relationship between a defect in its vehicles and 
* * * safety.'' United States v. General Motors Corp., 574 F. Supp. 
1047, 1050 (D.D.C. 1983). Thus, a manufacturer incurs its duties to 
notify and remedy whether it actually determined, or it should have 
determined, that its vehicles are defective and the defect is safety-
related. The failure to perform these duties in a timely manner is a 
violation of the Safety Act that can subject the manufacturer to 
substantial civil penalties. See 49 U.S.C. 30165.\4\
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    \4\ Section 5(a) of the TREAD Act significantly increased the 
potential amount of such civil penalties from $1,000 to $5,000 per 
violation and increased the maximum civil penalty for a related 
series of violations from $925,000 to $15,000,000.
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    The TREAD Act also reduced the likelihood that NHTSA will be 
unaware of a potential safety problem. Prior to the TREAD Act, in 
deciding whether to open a defect investigation, NHTSA relied heavily 
on owner complaints to obtain information about potential problems. The 
TREAD Act significantly expanded the nature and amount of information 
NHTSA receives authorizing the agency to require manufacturers to 
submit a wide variety of information related to potential defects. See 
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of the TREAD Act, 49 U.S.C. 30166(l) and (m). 
NHTSA implemented these provisions by requiring manufacturers submit 
Early Warning Reporting (EWR) information, reports on foreign recalls, 
and various advisories and bulletins. See 49 CFR Part 579. This 
information will reduce a manufacturer's ability to delay or avoid a 
recall in the hope that the agency will not become aware of a real-
world safety problem.\5\
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    \5\ For example, EWR information recently helped lead to the 
early identification of a safety problem in, and the recall of, 
certain tires manufactured by Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. See Danny 
Hakim, Another Recall Involving Ford, Firestone Tires and SUVs, N.Y. 
Times, February 27, 2004, at C1. In the same article, Joan 
Claybrook, President of Public Citizen, one of the petitioners here, 
said the action showed that the new system worked. Id. at C5.
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    PC/CAS cite a handful of specific instances where manufacturers 
have delayed conducting recalls, such as Ford's recall of model year 
(MY) 1988-93 vehicles with defective ignition switches and Chrysler's 
recall of MY 1993-95 Chrysler LH vehicles to address fuel rail leaks. 
These examples do not make their case. To begin, in view of the small 
numbers, they are not representative. Vehicle manufacturers undertake 
hundreds of recalls per year. In 2003, vehicle manufacturers conducted 
529 vehicle recalls; the average number of recalls per year for the 
last five years is 471. In 2003, approximately 75 percent (or 401) were 
undertaken by manufacturers in the absence of investigations by NHTSA.
    Second, PC/CAS have not demonstrated that a desire on the part of 
manufacturers to limit reimbursing owners was a factor, much less a 
significant factor, in delaying the cited recalls. Ordinarily, a recall 
is triggered if only a small fraction of vehicles exhibit a defect. 
See, United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (Wheels) (holding that a wheel is defective if there were a 
significant number of failures and noting that the term ``significant'' 
indicates that there must be a non-de minimus number of failures. 518 
F.2d at 438 fn. 84.) The significant cost in a recall campaign is the 
cost of remedying the vehicles that have been recalled. In comparison, 
the cost of reimbursing owners of the small fraction of vehicles that 
have been repaired before the recall is not particularly significant. 
Thus, while it is possible that a manufacturer would improperly delay a 
recall, it is highly unlikely that such a decision would be driven by 
anticipated reimbursement costs. In addition, once they decide to 
conduct a recall, many manufacturers provide broad reimbursement, in 
part as a matter of customer relations. In fact, in both the Ford 
ignition switch and Chrysler fuel rail recalls, Ford and Chrysler 
offered reimbursement to all consumers who had remedied the problems 
prior to the announcement of the recall, regardless of the length of 
time involved.\6\ The fact

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that Ford and Chrysler provided reimbursement without any time 
limitation (and provided it before the statutory requirement to do so) 
further demonstrates that a desire to reduce the cost of potential 
reimbursements is not a factor that would cause manufacturers to 
improperly delay defect or noncompliance determinations.
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    \6\ Ford's notification letters to owners advising of a defect 
in the ignition switch provided that Ford would provide a refund if 
the owner obtained the remedy before the date of the owner 
notification letter. Chrysler also offered reimbursement to owners 
who remedied the fuel rail leaks prior to recall. See Carson v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. W2001-03088, 2003 WL 1618076 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. March 19, 2003).
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5. Other Concerns
    PC/CAS contend that as a result of its tying ``reasonable time'' to 
the agency's investigative processes, the reimbursement rule is 
unnecessarily complex and consumers will be unaware of the reference 
point for the reimbursement period. As we stated in the preamble to the 
final rule, we find it unnecessary for consumers to know how 
``reasonable time'' is determined or have an intimate knowledge of 
NHTSA's investigative process. See 67 FR at 64052. Under the rule, 
manufacturers must provide the specific dates for the period of 
reimbursement in their reimbursement plans and provide appropriate 
notice to consumers. See 49 CFR 577.11(d)(3).
    PC/CAS raise a narrow issue involving the start of the 
reimbursement period when the recall was based on a noncompliance with 
a FMVSS. They assert that tying reimbursement to the `` `date of the 
[manufacturer's] initial test failure or the initial observation of a 
possible noncompliance' confers upon manufacturers virtually 
unrestricted leeway to define a reimbursement period, latitude that 
would likely be advantageous to manufacturers at the expense of 
consumers.''
    As explained in the preamble to the NPRM, the observation of a 
possible noncompliance through testing or observation is a critical 
point in the initiation of a recall because, while not determinative of 
a noncompliance, it is the triggering event for OVSC or a manufacturer 
to conduct an investigation into the potential noncompliance. See 66 FR 
at 64078-64079; see also 67 FR at 64051-64052. Thus, we based the start 
of the reimbursement period for recalls related to noncompliances with 
a FMVSS on the date of the observation of an apparent failure. Before 
that time, consumers will have no reason to believe that a 
noncompliance exists, and will be unlikely to seek a remedy based on a 
concern about safety.
    We also disagree that this provision will allow manufacturers to 
manipulate the reimbursement period. The date of the initial 
observation of a possible noncompliance is identified by the 
manufacturer in its Part 573 report to the agency (see 49 CFR 
573.6(c)(7)) and is objectively determinable.
    PC/CAS also argue that the agency could have adopted one of two 
bright-line rules to determine ``reasonable time'' in the rulemaking. 
PC/CAS first suggest a bright line derived from consumer law, i.e., one 
based on the discovery rule. According to PC/CAS, the applicable period 
of time to seek recovery would run from the date the consumer discovers 
the defect recall remedy, which is the date of the receipt of the 
manufacturer's recall notice, and would continue until barred by a 
state law statute of limitations.
    PC/CAS's petition itself reveals a basic flaw in its discovery rule 
approach, which renders it irrelevant. It states that it is based on 
consumer law; it does not purport to be based on Section 6(b) of the 
TREAD Act. The discovery rule approach is not in accord with the Act, 
because it does not provide for reimbursement of an owner or purchaser 
who incurred the cost of the remedy within a reasonable time in advance 
of the manufacturer's notification. It provides for reimbursement of 
costs incurred within an unlimited time before a manufacturer's 
notification. Also, this approach, which depends on state laws, which 
may differ or may not exist, does not produce a bright line.
    The second, and better approach according to PC/CAS, is to adopt 
the 10-year/5-year time frame for a free repair provided by section 
30120(g)(1) as the reasonable time frame for reimbursement. As 
discussed above, this is neither required by, nor consistent with, 
Section 6(b).
End Date for Reimbursement
    PC/CAS also seek reconsideration of the end dates for the 
reimbursement period established in the final rule. This is apparently 
based on a misunderstanding of the rule.
    The end date for the reimbursement period is the last date on which 
a consumer may incur costs that are eligible for reimbursement. We 
established such a date because Section 6(b) is designed to assure 
coverage of the reimbursement of remedy costs that are incurred in 
advance of the manufacturer's notification. Once a consumer receives a 
recall notice, any subsequent remedial action should be in accordance 
with the terms of the recall.\7\
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    \7\ Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30120, the manufacturer initially 
determines the type of remedy available to the consumer after 
notification of a noncompliance or safety defect.
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    PC/CAS seem to believe that the end date in the rule limits the 
period during which consumers may submit a claim for reimbursement for 
the costs of a pre-notification remedy. In fact, manufacturers are not 
allowed to establish a cut-off date for the submission of reimbursement 
claims. While in the NPRM we originally proposed to allow manufacturers 
to establish a cut-off date (see 66 FR at 64083), for reasons explained 
in the preamble to the final rule, we decided not to do so (see 67 FR 
at 64059).
    Therefore, based upon the above, we are denying PC/CAS's petition 
for reconsideration of the reimbursement rule.

III. Rulemaking Analyses

    NHTSA set forth its rulemaking analyses in the preamble to the 
final rule. This supplements those statements. Under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995, and OMB's regulation at 5 CFR 1320.5(b)(2), on 
June 9, 2004, NHTSA received approval from OMB for an amendment to a 
previously-approved information collection requirement (OMB control 
number 2127-0004) that includes the reimbursement rule.

    Issued on: August 9, 2004.
Jeffrey W. Runge,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 04-18485 Filed 8-11-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P