[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 124 (Tuesday, June 29, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 38950-38952]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-14726]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

[Docket No. RSPA-03-17375; Notice 2]


Pipeline Safety: Grant of Waiver; GulfTerra Field Services LLC

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA); U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice; grant of waiver.

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SUMMARY: GulfTerra Field Services LLC (GTFS), requested a waiver of 
compliance with the regulatory requirements at 49 CFR 
192.619(a)(2)(ii), 192.503, and 192.505 for certain offshore pipeline 
segments of the deepwater Phoenix Gas Gathering System (Phoenix). GTFS 
is requesting a waiver from the post-construction hydrotesting 
requirement for selected segments of the Phoenix system.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

[[Page 38951]]

Background

    GTFS, a wholly owned subsidiary of GulfTerra Energy Partners L.P., 
has entered into a gas gathering agreement with Kerr McGee Oil & Gas 
Corporation and the Devon Louisiana Corporation to design, build, own, 
and operate the Phoenix Gas Gathering System (Phoenix). GTFS will 
transport production fuel from the Red Hawk Spar, a deepwater fuel 
production facility in the Gulf of Mexico, to the Pioneer Platform, an 
existing pipeline facility located approximately 76 miles downstream.
    GTFS requested a waiver of compliance with the requirements at 49 
CFR 192.619(a)(2)(ii), 192.503, and 192.505 based on its contention 
that it is unnecessary to hydrostatically test this pipeline. GTFS 
asserts that a hydrostatic test will not demonstrate the strength and 
integrity of the pipeline because the pipeline is designed of heavy 
wall pipe and it will not experience the wall stress intended to be 
produced by a hydrotest. The heavy wall pipe is being used to prevent 
the collapse of the pipeline in the face of the huge external pressures 
exerted on it at a water depth of 5,300 feet. GTFS proposes to perform 
alternative risk control activities instead of the pressure test 
regulations.
    After reviewing the waiver request, RSPA/OPS published a notice 
inviting interested persons to comment on whether a waiver should be 
granted (Notice 1) (69 FR 16338; March 29, 2004). RSPA/OPS stated that 
it was considering if a hydrotest of this pipeline was necessary and if 
the alternative risk control activities proposed by GTFS will yield an 
equivalent or greater degree of safety.

Comments on Proposed Waiver

    Comments were received from Carl Langer (a private citizen) and the 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service (MMS). 
Each substantive comment is addressed below:
    1. Both commenters noted that a hydrotest is a means of ensuring 
that the finished pipeline meets all quality requirements.
    RSPA/OPS agrees that a hydrotest is one of several quality control 
checks that are generally used to ensure quality construction of a 
pipeline. For the Phoenix pipeline, however, GTFS has demonstrated that 
a hydrotest, as required by 49 CFR part 195, will not produce stresses 
in the pipe wall sufficient to demonstrate the integrity of the pipe 
because the Phoenix pipeline uses heavy wall pipe. Furthermore, RSPA/
OPS sees no added value in performing a hydrotest on this pipeline. 
GulfTerra has committed to perform several additional quality control 
measures on this pipeline throughout its construction to ensure its 
integrity. These additional risk control measures are listed at the end 
of this document.
    2. Mr. Langer thought it prudent to require a hydrotest as a means 
of applying pressure on pipeline project managers to eliminate as many 
human errors as possible.
    Although no one can disagree that humans make mistakes, the purpose 
of a hydrotest has never been to apply additional pressure on pipeline 
project managers. To the contrary, the purpose of a hydrotest is to 
impose wall stresses that are sufficient to expose defects in the 
pipeline.
    3. Both commenters mentioned that a hydrotest can be useful in 
detecting small pipeline leaks due to minor defects and not necessarily 
major pipeline failures.
    The intent of the hydrotest regulation is to produce stresses in 
the pipe wall that are sufficient to expose defects in the pipe prior 
its operation. Because this pipeline is built using heavier wall pipe 
and is under huge compressive stresses from more than a mile of water, 
a hydrotest as required by the gas pipeline safety regulations will not 
produce wall stresses high enough to detect leaks.
    4. Mr. Langer commented on the consequences of a leaking 
hydrocarbon pipeline and how negative public opinion could result in a 
suspension of operations for an offshore oil producing facility in the 
event of a major crude oil pipeline break. He stated that it is better 
to verify that the pipeline is free of leaks during construction--
before hydrocarbons are introduced into the pipeline. He also suggested 
that a sizing pig be used in addition to a hydrotest.
    The Phoenix system is a natural gas pipeline, not a hazardous 
liquid pipeline. Because of the different characteristics of gas and 
hazardous liquids, the impact of gas pipeline incidents on an offshore 
pipeline facility is expected to be significantly less than a similar 
accident involving a hazardous liquid pipeline. Moreover, because this 
is an offshore natural gas pipeline facility, there would be no 
immediate safety hazard to the general public. RSPA/OPS expects--and 
the federal pipeline safety regulations require--GTFS to take actions 
that are necessary to ensure the safe operation of its system. In 
addition, RSPA/OPS has the enforcement authority to impose restrictions 
or discontinue the use of the Phoenix pipeline in the event the 
facility becomes a danger to persons or the environment. Finally, the 
suggestion that a sizing pig be used in addition to a hydrotest is 
beyond the scope of this waiver.
    5. Mr. Langer commented that the elimination of the hydrotest would 
introduce the possibility of shoddy materials and shoddy workmanship.
    The Federal pipeline safety regulations set forth minimum standards 
for materials and constructions. In addition, GTFS has committed to 
perform several other quality control checks on this pipeline 
throughout its construction to ensure the integrity of the pipeline. 
GTFS is expected to comply with the federal pipeline safety regulations 
and the conditions of this waiver.
    A waiver of the hydrotest requirement for the Phoenix system does 
not relieve GTFS of its responsibility to ensure that quality control 
procedures are adhered to during the construction of this pipeline.
    6. Mr. Langer commented that there may come a time when it is cost 
prohibitive to dewater gas transmission pipelines after a hydrotest has 
been performed. However, he does not believe this to be the case with 
the Phoenix pipeline because this line is at a depth of only 5,300 
feet.
    In evaluating this waiver request, RSPA/OPS evaluated whether the 
proposed waiver would provide an equal or greater level of safety to 
that currently provided by the regulations. RSPA/OPS believes that 
because the Phoenix system is constructed of heavy wall pipe and 
located offshore at a depth of 5,300 feet, a hydrotest of this pipeline 
does not provide any meaningful information because the stresses 
produced from the tests are not sufficient to demonstrate the integrity 
of the pipe.
    7. MMS commented that research should be performed by industry 
experts to determine what viable hydrotest alternatives exist and how 
can they be implemented.
    GTFS relied on the research and expertise of Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV), a respected international and independent foundation involved in 
safeguarding life, property, and the environment at sea, and designed 
this pipeline to meet DNV's Offshore Standard for Submarine Pipeline 
Systems (DNV-OS-F101, Jan. 2003). DNV publishes Offshore Service 
Specifications, Offshore Standards, and Recommended Practices for 
ships, offshore units and installations. It also provides 
classification, certification, and other verification and consulting 
services for general use by the offshore industry. For additional 
information on

[[Page 38952]]

DNV's research and expertise dealing with offshore pipeline facilities, 
they are located on the Web and can be reached at http://exchange.dnv.com.

Grant of Waiver

    For the reasons explained above and in Notice 1, and in light of 
the equivalent level of safety provided by the alternative risk control 
activities, RSPA/OPS finds that the request for waiver is consistent 
with pipeline safety. Therefore, GTFS's request for waiver of 
compliance with 49 CFR 192.619(a)(2)(ii), 192.503, and 192.505 is 
granted subject to GTFS compliance with the following conditions:
    1. Utilize thick wall, high strength, and high quality DSAW pipe;
    2. Perform a pipe mill hydrotest on each pipe joint equivalent to 
95% specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) to detect defects in the 
seam weld and prevent the deployment of defective pipe joints;
    3. Perform extensive inspection and quality control during the line 
pipe manufacture, transport, fabrication, and installation to prevent 
pipe damage;
    4. Utilize Automated Ultrasonic Inspection (AUT) for inspection of 
offshore welds to improve defect detection in the girth weld and to 
improve the weld quality during the pipeline and steel catenary riser 
fabrication;
    5. Subject all buckle arrestors to complete radiographic and 
magnetic particle inspection, including radiographic inspection of all 
buckle arrestor to line pipe welds;
    6. Perform complete radiographic inspection and hydrotesting of all 
welds connecting subsea valves and assemblies to the pipeline;
    7. Perform a leak test of the pipeline's subsea tie-in flange that 
connects to the VR 397 riser flange; and
    8. Perform factory acceptance hydrotests of all subsea ``wye'', 
tee, ball valve, and check valve assemblies.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on June 24, 2004.
William H. Gute,
Acting Deputy Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 04-14726 Filed 6-28-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P