[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 109 (Monday, June 7, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31815-31817]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-12741]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 2004-1]


Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has unanimously 
approved Recommendation 2004-1, for DOE to consider. Recommendation 
2004-1 deals with Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the 
recommendation are due on or before July 7, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. 
Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 694-7000.

    Dated: June 1, 2004.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

[Recommendation 2004-1]

Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations

    Dated: May 21, 2004.

Background

    In furtherance of its statutory duty to oversee the Department of 
Energy's

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(DOE) protection of workers and the public from hazards at defense 
nuclear facilities operated for DOE and the National Nuclear Safety 
Administration (NNSA), the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 
(Board) conducted eight public hearings to examine DOE's current and 
proposed methods of ensuring safety at its defense nuclear facilities.
    In these hearings, the Board also sought to benefit from the 
lessons learned as a result of investigations conducted following the 
Columbia Space Shuttle disaster and the discovery of the deep corrosion 
in the reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant. The 
Board received testimony from representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission; the Naval Reactors Program; the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board; the Deputy Secretary of Energy; the Administrator 
of NNSA; DOE's Under Secretary of Energy, Science and Environment; 
DOE's Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health; and 
selected site managers of DOE's facilities, senior contractor managers, 
and members of the public.
    The overall objective of the hearings was to gather information 
that could be helpful in assessing DOE's proposals for changing the 
methods it uses for contract management and nuclear safety oversight, 
as they have been controlled through the DOE Directives System. NNSA 
has proposed shifting responsibility for safety oversight from DOE 
Headquarters to the DOE field offices and site contractors. The key 
question the Board sought to address was: Will modifications proposed 
by DOE/NNSA to organizational structure and practices, as well as 
increased emphasis on productivity, improve or reduce safety, and 
increase or decrease the possibility of a high-consequence, low-
probability nuclear accident?
    DOE's programs for national security and environmental protection 
are complex, with potentially high consequences if not safely 
performed. Mishandling of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes 
could result in unintended nuclear criticality, dispersal of 
radioactive materials, and even nuclear detonation. DOE has a long and 
successful history of nuclear operations, during which it has 
established a structure of requirements directed to achieving nuclear 
safety. That structure is based on such methods as defense in depth, 
redundancy of protective measures, robust technical competence in 
operations and oversight, extensive research and testing, a Directives 
System embodying nuclear safety requirements, Integrated Safety 
Management, and processes to ensure safe performance.
    The United States owns the defense nuclear facilities at which its 
programs are carried out by a government agency--DOE. Each such 
facility is operated by a contractor that was selected by DOE on the 
basis of being best suited to conduct the work for DOE at that site. 
Under the original Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and continuing to date in 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the government officials in 
charge (i.e., the Secretary of Energy and other line officers) have a 
statutory responsibility to protect health and minimize danger to life 
or property. In any delegation of responsibility or authority to lower 
echelons of DOE or to contractors, the highest levels of DOE continue 
to retain safety responsibility. While this responsibility can be 
delegated, it is never ceded by the person or organization making the 
delegation. Contractors are responsible to DOE for safety of their 
operations, while DOE is itself responsible to the President, Congress, 
and the public.
    This reality was highlighted during the course of the Board's 
hearings. Many important lessons were cited in the testimony provided. 
These included the importance of a centralized and technically 
competent oversight authority, central control of technical safety 
requirements and waivers for departure from those requirements, an 
ability to operate in a decentralized mode when appropriate, a 
willingness to accept criticisms, the need for retention of technical 
expertise and capabilities at high levels of any organization in which 
technical failure could have high consequences, and an awareness that 
complacency can arise from a history of successes. DOE representatives 
testified that DOE's attention to safety has continued to improve with 
better on-site oversight and self-assessment programs, use of 
Integrated Safety Management, careful attention to safety statistics, 
and stabilization and disposal of high risk nuclear materials. However, 
cause for concern with regard to the potential increase in the 
possibility of nuclear accidents was also evident in: (1) The increased 
emphasis on productivity at the possible expense of safety, (2) the 
loss of technical competency and understanding at high levels of DOE's 
and NNSA's organizational structure, (3) the apparent absence of a 
strong safety research focus, and (4) the reduced central oversight of 
safety.
    Clearly, safety performance can benefit from attention to detail 
and lessons learned from small incidents and minor accidents. However, 
failures leading to high-consequence, low-probability accidents would 
likely have their roots in interactions between engineering failures 
and improper human actions. Because the consequences of large nuclear 
accidents would be unacceptable, the nuclear weapons complex cannot 
permit them to occur. While the potential for such accidents cannot be 
completely eliminated, their likelihood can be held to an insignificant 
level by rigorous attention to Integrated Safety Management with 
technical and operational excellence based on nuclear safety standards 
subject to rigorous oversight. In addition, nuclear safety must be 
founded on solid research, analysis, and testing to ensure an adequate 
understanding of energetic initiating mechanisms under off-normal 
conditions.
    DOE has taken some preliminary steps toward its proposed changes in 
safety practices. These actions may have contributed to some 
unfortunate consequences, such as the following:
     A glovebox fire occurred at the Rocky Flats closure site, 
where, in the interest of efficiency, a generic procedure was used 
instead of one designed to identify and control specific hazards. 
Apparently, success of the cleanup project resulted in management 
complacency. DOE site management had given the impression that safety 
was less important than progress, and contract management had not 
emphasized oversight of work control processes.
     Downsizing of safety expertise has begun in NNSA's NA-53 
organization, while field organizations such as the Albuquerque Service 
Center have not developed an equivalent technical capability in a 
timely manner. As a result, NNSA field offices are left without an 
adequate depth of understanding of such important matters as seismic 
analysis and design, training of nuclear workers, and protection 
against unintended criticality.
     DOE's Office of Environmental Safety and Health, with 
assistance from some sites and contractors, has reviewed DOE Directives 
to simplify safety requirements, with the objective of supporting 
accelerated operations that are also more efficient. This shift has led 
to proposals for downgrading some worker safety Directives to the level 
of guidance and modifying some radiation protection requirements. It 
has also led to a proposed modification of the Order on Worker Safety 
and Health to reduce requirements for protecting workers from the 
consequences of fires,

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explosions, and discharges from high-pressure systems.
    Proposed modifications to DOE and NNSA's organizational structure, 
manpower, contract management, oversight policies and practices, and 
safety directives could have unintended consequences. These include 
reduction of defense in depth, potentially inconsistent safety-related 
decisions caused by decentralization of safety authority, emphasis on 
performance as opposed to safety, and reduction of technical capability 
at key points in the organizational structure. DOE and NNSA line 
managers could be left with inadequate awareness of safety issues.
    As a result of testimony it has received, the Board is not 
convinced of the benefit of the changes to DOE's and NNSA's 
organizational structure and practices as they have been described. The 
Board cautions that if any such changes are made, they must be done 
formally and deliberatively, with due attention given to unintended 
safety consequences that could reduce the present high level of nuclear 
safety. DOE should take full advantage of lessons learned from safety 
problems discovered by National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and it should learn from the success 
of the good organizational and safety practices championed by the Naval 
Reactors Program. The Board needs to be sure that any fundamental 
reorganization does not degrade nuclear safety, and that the likelihood 
of a serious accident, facility failure, construction problem, or 
nuclear incident will not be increased as a result of well-intentioned 
changes.
    As a result of testimony received at the public hearings and the 
potential effects on safety at defense nuclear facilities outlined 
above, the Board recommends:
    1. That delegation of authority for nuclear safety matters to field 
offices and contractors be contingent upon the development and 
application of criteria and implementing mechanisms to ensure that:
    a. Oversight responsibility includes the capability for examining, 
assessing, and auditing by all levels of the DOE organization,
    b. The technical capability and appropriate experience for 
effective safety oversight is in place, and
    c. Corrective action plans consistent with recommendations 
resulting from internal DOE and NNSA reviews of the Columbia accident 
and the Davis-Besse incident are issued.
    2. That to ensure that any features of the proposed changes will 
not increase the likelihood of a low-probability, high-consequence 
nuclear accident, DOE and NNSA take steps to:
    a. Empower a central and technically competent authority 
responsible for operational and nuclear safety goals, expectations, 
requirements, standards, directives, and waivers;
    b. Ensure the continued integration and support of research, 
analysis, and testing in nuclear safety technologies; and
    c. Require that the principles of Integrated Safety Management 
serve as the foundation of the implementing mechanisms at the sites.
    3. That direct and unbroken line of roles and responsibilities for 
the safety of nuclear operations--from the Secretary of Energy and the 
NNSA Administrator to field offices and sites--be insured according to 
appropriate Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities documents and 
Quality Assurance Implementation Plans.
    4. That prior to final delegation of authority and responsibility 
for defense nuclear safety matters to the field offices and 
contractors, DOE and NNSA Program Secretarial Officers provide a report 
to the Secretary of Energy describing the results of actions taken in 
conformance with the above recommendations.

John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 04-12741 Filed 6-4-04; 8:45 am]
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