[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 85 (Monday, May 3, 2004)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 24496-24503]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-9948]



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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 25



Design Standards for Fuselage Doors on Transport Category Airplanes; 
Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 85 / Monday, May 3, 2004 / Rules and 
Regulations  

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2003-14193; Amdt. No. 25-114]
RIN 2120-AH34


Design Standards for Fuselage Doors on Transport Category 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends the design 
standards for fuselage doors, hatches, and exits on transport category 
airplanes. This action improves door integrity by providing design 
criteria that ensure doors remain secure under all circumstances that 
service experience has shown can happen. Adopting this amendment also 
relieves a certification burden on industry by removing regulatory 
differences between the airworthiness standards and related guidance 
material of the United States and Europe.

DATES: This amendment becomes effective June 2, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Gardlin, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport 
Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 
SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2136; fax 425-
227-1320; e-mail [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's Web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/index.cfm; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy from the Federal Aviation Administration, 
Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, 
DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Be sure to identify the 
amendment number or docket number of this rulemaking.
    You can search the electronic form of all comments in any of our 
dockets by the individual filing the comment (or signing the comment, 
if filed for an association, business, labor union, for example). You 
may review DOT's complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register 
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or 
you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question about 
this document, you may contact your local FAA official, or the person 
listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out more 
about SBREFA on the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm, 
or by e-mailing us at [email protected].

Background

    This final rule responds to notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 
No. 03-01, published in the Federal Register on January 14, 2003 (68 FR 
1932).
    In NPRM No. 03-01, the FAA proposed to revise and reorganize the 
existing rules in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 25, 
to provide:

     Clarification of the existing design 
requirements for doors.
     Definitive criteria for door design requirements 
covered in the existing rules by general text.
     Additional fail-safe requirements and detailed 
door design requirements, based on the recommendations of the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Air Transport Association 
(ATA), and on current industry practice.

    In the NPRM you will find a history of the problems and discussions 
of the safety considerations supporting our course of action. You will 
also find a discussion of the current requirements and why they do not 
adequately address the problem. We also refer to the recommendations of 
the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) that we relied on in 
developing the proposed rule. The NPRM also discusses alternatives we 
considered and the reasons for rejecting the ones we did not adopt.
    The background material in the NPRM also contains the basis and 
rationale for these requirements and, except where we have specifically 
expanded on the background elsewhere in this preamble, supports this 
final rule as if contained here. That is, any future discussions on the 
intent of the requirements may refer to the background in the NPRM as 
though it was in the final rule itself. It is therefore not necessary 
to repeat the background in this document.

Definitions

    The following definitions will aid the reader in understanding the 
final rule:
     A latch is a movable mechanical element that, 
when engaged, prevents the door from opening.
     A lock is a mechanical element that monitors the 
latch position and, when engaged, prevents the latch from becoming 
disengaged.
     Latched means the latches are fully engaged with 
their structural counterparts and held in position by the latch 
operating mechanism.
     Locked means the locks are fully engaged.
     Latching mechanism includes the latch operating 
mechanism and the latches.
     Locking mechanism includes the lock operating 
mechanism and the locks.
     Closed means the door has been placed within the 
doorframe in such a position that the latches can be operated to the 
``latched'' condition.
     Fully closed means the door is placed within the 
doorframe in the position that it will occupy when the latches are in 
the latched condition.

NTSB Safety Recommendations

    After its investigation of airplane accidents associated with 
fuselage doors opening during flight, the NTSB issued several safety 
recommendations concerning doors on transport category airplanes. In 
the NPRM, we discuss those recommendations and the FAA's response.
    After the conclusion of the harmonization activity that led to this 
final rule, the FAA received another safety recommendation, A-02-020, 
from the NTSB. The NTSB recommended the FAA, ``Require all newly 
certificated transport category airplanes [to] have a system for each 
emergency exit door to relieve pressure so that they can only be opened 
on the ground after a safe differential pressure level is attained.'' 
In the NPRM, we specifically sought comments on this recommendation. 
Although no one commented on this issue, we believe there should be 
some means to address the potential for unsafe opening of a door on the 
ground. The specific action proposed in the safety recommendation is 
not

[[Page 24497]]

necessarily the only approach to this concern. We have not yet 
determined whether a regulatory action is appropriate, or what form 
that regulatory action might take. Because the issue is important, we 
will add discussion to Advisory Circular (AC) 25.783-1, ``Fuselage 
Doors, Hatches, and Exits,'' addressing the need to consider safety of 
occupants opening exits when there is differential pressure remaining 
on the airplane. This will identify the issue and permit manufacturers 
to address it in the most effective manner for their specific design.

History

    In the United States, 14 CFR part 25 contains the airworthiness 
standards for type certification of transport category airplanes. 
Manufacturers of transport category airplanes must show that each 
airplane they produce of a different type design complies with the 
appropriate part 25 standards.
    In Europe, Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR)-25 contains the 
airworthiness standards for type certification of transport category 
airplanes. The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of Europe developed 
these standards, which are based on part 25, to provide a common set of 
airworthiness standards within the European aviation community. Thirty-
seven European countries accept airplanes type certificated to the JAR-
25 standards, including airplanes manufactured in the U.S. type 
certificated to JAR-25 standards for export to Europe.
    Although part 25 and JAR-25 are similar, they are not identical in 
every respect. When airplanes are type certificated to both sets of 
standards, the differences between part 25 and JAR-25 can result in 
substantial added costs to manufacturers and operators. These 
additional costs, however, often do not bring about an increase in 
safety.
    Recognizing that a common set of standards would not only benefit 
the aviation industry economically, but also preserve the necessary 
high level of safety, the FAA and the JAA began an effort in 1988 to 
``harmonize'' their respective aviation standards.
    After beginning the first steps towards harmonization, the FAA and 
JAA soon realized that traditional methods of rulemaking and 
accommodating different administrative procedures was neither 
sufficient nor adequate to make noticeable progress towards fulfilling 
the harmonization goal. The FAA identified the ARAC as an ideal vehicle 
for helping to resolve harmonization issues, and in 1992 the FAA tasked 
ARAC to undertake the entire harmonization effort.
    Despite the work that ARAC has undertaken to address harmonization, 
there remain many regulatory differences between part 25 and JAR-25. 
The current harmonization process is costly and time-consuming for 
industry, the FAA, and the JAA. Industry has expressed a strong need to 
finish the harmonization program as quickly as possible to relieve the 
drain on their resources and finally to establish one acceptable set of 
standards.
    Representatives of the FAA and JAA proposed an accelerated process 
to reach harmonization, the ``Fast Track Harmonization Program.'' The 
FAA introduced the Fast Track Harmonization Program on November 26, 
1999 (64 FR 66522). This rulemaking is a ``fast-track'' project.
    You can find further details on ARAC, its role in harmonization 
rulemaking activity, and the Fast Track Harmonization Program in the 
tasking statement (64 FR 66522, November 26, 1999) and the first NPRM 
published under this program, Fire Protection Requirements for 
Powerplant Installations on Transport Category Airplanes (65 FR 36978, 
June 12, 2000).

Related Activity

    The new European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) was established 
and formally came into being on September 28, 2003. The JAA worked with 
the European Commission (EC) to develop a plan to ensure a smooth 
transition from the JAA to the EASA. As part of the transition, the 
EASA will absorb all functions and activities of the JAA, including its 
efforts to harmonize the JAA regulations with those of the U.S. These 
JAR standards have already been incorporated into the EASA 
``Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes'' (CS-25) in 
similar, if not identical, language. The EASA CS-25 became effective 
October 17, 2003.

Related Advisory Circular

    The FAA plans to revise AC 25.783-1 to provide guidance for showing 
compliance with structural and functional safety standards for doors 
and their operating systems. When we issue the AC, we will publish a 
notice in the Federal Register.

Discussion of Comments

    Eight commenters responded to the NPRM. The commenters include 
three private citizens, two foreign airworthiness authorities, an 
industry association representing the interests of several groups in 
the aviation industry, an association representing the interests of 
pilots in the U.S and Canada, and an airplane manufacturer. All 
commenters generally support the proposed rule. Comments, including 
suggested changes, are discussed below.
    Comment: An individual with cabin door design experience suggests 
that limiting the requirement to address intentional opening to 
airplanes with more than 19 passenger seats would improve safety. The 
commenter bases his position on the premise that airplanes with 19 or 
fewer passenger seats are a small percentage of the commercial fleet, 
the operator typically knows the passengers, and it is unlikely a 
person would intentionally open the exit. The commenter states that 
such a requirement could become a hazard to emergency evacuation of 
these airplanes because the rules only require a single pair of exits. 
If the means to prevent intentional opening were to fail and the exit 
could not be opened, a higher percentage of exits would become 
unavailable than for larger airplanes.
    FAA reply: While the commenter's points have some merit, the 
requirement is not related to how the airplane is operated. The intent 
of the requirement is to safeguard against an event of intentional 
opening, regardless of whether the operator knows the passengers. The 
commenter's statement therefore is not relevant that the number of 
passengers carried in commercial service on airplanes with 19 or fewer 
passenger seats is a small percentage of the total. Consideration of 
exit availability is more significant.
    In a review of airplanes of this size as part of the FAA's response 
to NTSB safety recommendation A-02-020, it does appear that many 
current designs could be affected by this requirement. On some 
airplanes, the main entry door is openable at relatively high 
differential pressures. Whether this would constitute a hazard to the 
airplane would have to be investigated. The entry door is typically the 
largest exit on the airplane. Although the loss of this exit would 
represent more than 50 percent of the evacuation capability of the 
airplane, the remaining exit would still be adequate for the number of 
people on board. The intentional opening of the exit is an immediate 
hazard to the airplane. This concern outweighs the potential decrease 
in evacuation capability that could occur if the exit were unavailable 
because of a system failure, and if there were an emergency evacuation 
at the same time. While the evacuation capability would be 
significantly reduced, it would still satisfy the regulatory 
requirements and be acceptable for the number of people on board.

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    No changes were made to the final rule.
    Comment: One commenter recommends adding the following 
requirements:

     Ability to close the doors after being opened in 
an emergency.
     Reliability tests.
     Function with minor fuselage deformation.
     Display of slide arming status on the fuselage 
exterior
    FAA reply: The commenter's recommendations relate to emergency 
evacuation, which was not the focus of the NPRM. Although the NPRM had 
some ancillary impact on evacuation requirements, it focused on the 
airworthiness of fuselage doors. The commenter's proposed requirements 
for reliability tests and door opening with minor deformation are 
effectively already part of the regulations. Section 25.809(g) requires 
provisions to minimize the probability of jamming of the emergency 
exits resulting from fuselage deformation that might occur in a minor 
crash landing. In addition, regulations governing escape slide 
performance result in extensive tests of exit system reliability. These 
recommendations are beyond the scope of the NPRM as they relate 
primarily to emergency evacuation.
    No changes were made to the final rule.
    Comment: The Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom (CAA-
UK) recommends adoption of the proposed requirements and a clarifying 
change to the intent of Sec.  25.783(a)(2). The CAA-UK states that 
since the hazardous condition identified in Sec.  25.783(a)(2) is 
unlatching, then the event to be prevented should also be unlatching.
    FAA reply: The rule, as proposed, would require that inadvertent 
opening of the door be extremely improbable, but does not specifically 
address the unlatching event. Section 25.783 has historically 
categorized the opening of a door as the safety threat and has not 
addressed intermediate steps in the sequence of that opening. This rule 
is more specific regarding the reason that a door can become a hazard. 
The purpose of paragraph (a)(2) is to prevent the hazardous condition. 
It therefore makes sense that the requirement address unlatching as 
extremely improbable, rather than simply door opening. In this case, 
the FAA assumes that if the door unlatches, it will open.
    The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) submitted the final version of 
their Notice of Proposed Amendment, NPA, 25D-301, to the docket for 
NPRM No. 03-01 and recommends the FAA adopt the language of the NPA, 
which they revised to address comments, including those of the CAA-UK. 
As our NPRM was the result of harmonization efforts with the JAA and 
Transport Canada, we consider the content of the JAA NPA important in 
maintaining harmonization.
    As the result of the CAA-UK comment and in order to maintain 
harmonization, Sec.  25.783(a)(2) is changed.
    Comment: The JAA proposes adding the following new requirement to 
the final rule to address an issue not specifically covered in NPRM No. 
03-01: ``Each door that could result in a hazard if not closed, must 
have means to prevent the latches from being moved to the latched 
position unless the door is closed.''
    FAA reply: The proposed requirements contain provisions to prevent 
the out-of-sequence actuation of certain elements of the door 
mechanism. This approach is a basic philosophy to ensure that false or 
misleading indications are not created by out-of-sequence operation. 
For example, proposed Sec.  25.783(d)(5) states: ``It must not be 
possible to position the lock in the locked position if the latch and 
the latching mechanism are not in the latched position.'' In this case, 
the JAA has adopted a new requirement to address latch movement prior 
to closing. Many current designs already incorporate such means.
    While not directly covered in the NPRM, this requirement is clearly 
in keeping with the overall approach to fuselage door safety expressed 
in the NPRM and could be seen as a logical outgrowth of the proposed 
requirements. We have determined, however, that there may be instances 
where such a provision would not be necessary, and so adopting the 
requirement for all designs would impose an unnecessary burden. For 
example, a manually-operated passenger entry door could have latches 
that, when in the latched position, would inhibit movement of the door 
to the closed position. That is, the door is obviously standing open 
and would be obvious to the person operating the door. In that case, 
the design of the door fulfills the objective of preventing door 
closure with the latches in the latched position.
    Conversely, for some designs, such a provision would clearly be 
necessary to meet the requirements of this rule as written. An example 
would be a cargo door that is operated remotely and could be positioned 
such that the operator would not be able to visually determine whether 
it was properly closed. If the latches were in the latched position, 
this would add to the potential confusion. Paragraph (e)(2), as 
adopted, requires positive means, clearly visible from the operator's 
station, to indicate that each door that could be a hazard is not 
properly closed, latched, and locked. For the remotely operated cargo 
door, satisfying the requirement would likely require a means to 
prevent the door from being closed with the latches in the latched 
position. While this rule will not maintain strict harmonization with 
the JAA, we believe the intent of the requirement as adopted by the JAA 
is still satisfied. Designs found acceptable by the FAA can also be 
found acceptable by the JAA.
    No changes were made as the result of this comment.
    The CAA-UK and one individual also had several editorial 
suggestions for clarity on the use of terms, which we accepted where 
appropriate. These suggestions are purely editorial and do not change 
the substance of the requirements.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    There are no current or new requirements for information collection 
associated with this final rule.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to this final rule.

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Polices and Procedures

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 
economic effect of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531-2533) prohibits agencies from 
setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade 
Act also requires the consideration of international standards and, 
where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. standards. And 
fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform

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Act of 1995 requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the 
costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, 
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation).
    The FAA has determined that this final rule has minimal costs, and 
that it is neither ``a significant regulatory action'' as defined in 
Executive Order 12866, nor ``significant'' as defined in DOT's 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. Further, this rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, 
will reduce barriers to international trade, and will not impose an 
Unfunded Mandate on State, local, or tribal governments, or on the 
private sector.
    The DOT Order 2100.5 prescribes policies and procedures for 
simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. If it is 
determined that the expected impact is so minimal that the rule does 
not warrant a full evaluation, a statement to that effect and the basis 
for it is included in the regulation. Accordingly, the FAA has 
determined the expected impact of this rule is so minimal the rule does 
not warrant a full evaluation. We provide the basis for this 
determination as follows.
    Currently, airplane manufacturers must satisfy both part 25 and the 
European standards to certificate transport category aircraft in both 
the United States and Europe. Meeting two sets of certification 
requirements raises the cost of developing a new transport category 
airplane often with no increase in safety. In the interest of fostering 
international trade, lowering the cost of aircraft development, and 
making the certification process more efficient, the FAA, European 
Authorities, Transport Canada, and aircraft manufacturers have been 
working to create, to the maximum possible extent, a single set of 
certification requirements accepted in the United States, Europe, and 
Canada. As explained in detail previously, these efforts are referred 
to as ``harmonization.''
    This final rule amends the current fuselage door standard contained 
in 14 CFR part 25 with a new improved door standard. This new standard 
will set forth, as a regulatory requirement, some of the existing 
technical guidance criteria that have been determined to be necessary 
for safety but which, up to this point, have not been included in the 
regulations. In addition, this rule addresses recommendations from the 
NTSB and the ATA task force on doors.
    With the one exception noted, this rule harmonizes the FAA and 
European requirements for fuselage doors. The rule will relieve a 
certification burden on industry by eliminating regulatory differences 
between the airworthiness standards and related guidance material of 
the United States and Europe.

Costs and Benefits of the Final Rule

    In the NPRM, the FAA identified only one section, 25.783(b), where 
manufacturers would incur a measurable cost. For the other changes, the 
FAA has not made quantitative cost estimates but has provided 
qualitative cost estimates. There were no comments to the docket 
contesting these estimates.
    1. Paragraph 25.783(a) is descriptive and has no expected cost.
    2. Paragraph 25.783(b) relates to opening by persons. The 
requirement is new to have design precautions taken to minimize the 
possibility for a person to open a door intentionally during flight, 
but is expected to be accommodated in existing design practices for all 
but one United States manufacturer. (Requirements regarding inadvertent 
opening are not new.) One manufacturer expects to incur an estimated 
cost of $0.75 million, which will include the requirements for the 
prevention of intentional opening of the doors.
    3. Paragraph 25.783(c) covers means to prevent pressurization. The 
requirement to consider single failures in the pressurization-inhibit 
system is new, but is believed to be industry practice. Thus, the cost, 
if any, is expected to be very little for a new design. The provision 
to permit certain doors to forego this system is actually cost 
relieving and could result in a minor cost reduction in some cases.
    4. Paragraph 25.783(d) covers latching and locking. Most of these 
changes incorporate recommendations currently contained in an advisory 
circular. The vast majority of airplanes already comply, and basic 
design practice is to comply with these requirements. Therefore, these 
requirements, while new, have minimal cost impact. The requirement for 
each latch to have a lock that monitors the latch position formalizes 
existing practice. The requirement to eliminate forces in the latching 
mechanism that could load the locks is new and may not be complied with 
in all cases currently. The FAA believes that these costs are minimal.
    5. Paragraph 25.783(e) covers warning, caution, and advisory 
indications. The reliability of the door indication system will be 
required to be higher for all doors. This is expected to have only a 
small cost impact, as will the requirement for an aural warning for 
certain doors, and the requirement to provide an indication to the door 
operator.
    6. Paragraph 25.783(f) contains the visual inspection provision 
requirement. The requirement for direct visual inspection is extended 
to more door types, and may add costs in some cases.
    7. Paragraph 25.783(g) deals with certain maintenance doors, 
removable emergency exits, and access panels. This provision may reduce 
costs in some cases as indicated in the AC.
    8. Paragraph 25.783(h) covers doors that are not a hazard and is 
intended to provide relief for certain doors, so it could reduce costs.
    9. Paragraphs 25.783(i), 25.783(j), 25.809(b), 25.809(c), and 
25.809(f) move text to other sections, improve clarity, and have no 
impact on cost. These changes, as summarized in the NPRM, are repeated 
here for the reader's understanding of the changes.

     The changes to Sec.  25.783(i) are removed from 
existing Sec.  25.783 and added in Sec.  25.810 (``Emergency egress 
assist means and escape routes'') as a new paragraph (e).
     The changes to Sec.  25.783(j) move the special 
requirement for lavatory doors from the current paragraph (j) to the 
new Sec.  25.820 (``Lavatory doors'').
     Section 25.809(b) (``Emergency exit 
arrangement'') is revised by adding a new paragraph (b)(3) to require 
that each emergency exit must be capable of being opened, when there is 
no fuselage deformation, ``even though persons may be crowded against 
the door on the inside of the airplane.'' This specific requirement is 
currently a part of Sec.  25.783(b), but is more appropriate as part of 
the emergency exit arrangement requirements of Sec.  25.809.
     The changes to Sec.  25.809(c) include the 
requirement that the means of opening emergency exits also must be 
marked so it can be readily located and operated, even in darkness. 
This requirement is currently located in Sec.  25.783(b), but is more 
appropriate as part of the emergency exit arrangement requirements of 
Sec.  25.809.
     Section 25.809(f) is revised to require that the 
external door be located where persons using it will not be endangered 
by the propellers when appropriate operating procedures are used. This 
requirement currently is found in Sec.  25.783(d), but is more 
applicable to the emergency exit arrangement requirements of Sec.  
25.809.

    10. Paragraph 25.807 corrects an unintended deletion.

[[Page 24500]]

Summary of Costs and Benefits

    This final rule is expected to--

     Maintain or provide an increase in the level of 
safety;
     Have only a relatively small effect on costs 
when compared to current industry practice; and
     Provide some cost savings to manufacturers by 
avoiding duplicative testing and reporting that could result from the 
existence of differing requirements under the current standards.

This rule will codify existing guidance, standard industry practice, 
and industry recommendations for the design standards for fuselage 
doors. The FAA believes the cost savings from a single certification 
requirement exceed the minimal additional compliance cost. The FAA 
therefore considers the final rule will be cost-beneficial. This 
conclusion is reinforced by industry's support for the proposal and the 
absence of comments to the docket regarding the economic analyses.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, 50 U.S.C. 601-612, as 
amended, establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that 
agencies shall endeavor, consistent with the objective of the rule and 
of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and informational 
requirements to the scale of the business, organizations, and 
governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation.'' To achieve that 
principle, the RFA requires agencies to solicit and consider flexible 
regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for their actions. 
The Act covers a wide range of small entities, including businesses and 
governments.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a final rule 
will have a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. If the determination is that the final rule will, the Agency 
must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    If, however, an agency determines that the rule is not expected to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the 
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not 
required. The certification must include a statement providing the 
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    As stated in the initial regulatory flexibility determination, the 
FAA certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities for two reasons:
    First, the rule is expected to provide relief from some regulatory 
costs. The final rule will require that manufacturers of transport 
category aircraft meet a single certification requirement, rather than 
different standards for the United States and Europe. Manufacturers of 
the affected airplanes are believed to already meet, or expect to meet 
most standards that will be required by this final rule.
    Second, all affected U.S. transport-aircraft category manufacturers 
exceed the Small Business Administration small-entity criterion of 
1,500 employees for aircraft manufacturers, as published by the Small 
Business Administration in 13 CFR part 121, Small Business Size 
Regulations; Size Standards (65 FR 53533, September 5, 2000). The 
current U.S. part 25 airplane manufacturers include: Boeing, Cessna 
Aircraft, Gulfstream Aerospace, Learjet (owned by Bombardier), Lockheed 
Martin, McDonnell Douglas (a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Boeing 
Company), Raytheon Aircraft, and Sabreliner Corporation. All of these 
manufacturers have more than 1,500 employees and therefore do not 
qualify as small entities.
    The FAA certified in the NPRM that the proposal would not have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. There 
were no comments to the docket contesting this FAA certification. 
Consequently, as the rule is expected to provide cost relief, there are 
no small entities affected, and the comments received did not dispute 
the initial economic analysis, the FAA certifies that this final rule 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.

Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that 
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not 
considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and 
has determined that it will reduce trade barriers by narrowing the 
differences between U.S. standards and European international 
standards.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended, 
among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal 
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act 
requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing 
the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule 
that may result in the expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted 
annually for inflation) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector. Such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.''
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. The requirements 
of Title II of the Act therefore do not apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government, and therefore does not have federalism implications.

Plain English

    Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993) requires each 
agency to write regulations that are simple and easy to understand. We 
invite your comments on how to make these regulations easier to 
understand, including answers to questions such as the following:

     Are the requirements clearly stated?
     Do the regulations contain unnecessary technical 
language or jargon that interferes with their clarity?
     Would the regulations be easier to understand if 
they were divided into more (but shorter) sections?
     Is the description in the preamble helpful in 
understanding the final rule?
    Please send your comments to the address specified in the FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner 
affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to 
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, 
and to establish such regulatory distinctions. In the NPRM, we 
requested comments on

[[Page 24501]]

whether the proposed rule should apply differently to intrastate 
operations in Alaska. We did not receive any comments, and we have 
determined, based on the administrative record of this rulemaking, that 
there is no need to make any regulatory distinctions applicable to 
intrastate aviation in Alaska.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental impact statement. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, 
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this final rule qualifies for a categorical 
exclusion.

Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use.

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it is not 
a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order because it is 
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, 
and it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the 
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Recording and recordkeeping 
requirements.

The Amendment

0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration 
amends part 25 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, and 44704.

0
2. Section 25.783 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  25.783  Fuselage doors.

    (a) General. This section applies to fuselage doors, which includes 
all doors, hatches, openable windows, access panels, covers, etc., on 
the exterior of the fuselage that do not require the use of tools to 
open or close. This also applies to each door or hatch through a 
pressure bulkhead, including any bulkhead that is specifically designed 
to function as a secondary bulkhead under the prescribed failure 
conditions of part 25. These doors must meet the requirements of this 
section, taking into account both pressurized and unpressurized flight, 
and must be designed as follows:
    (1) Each door must have means to safeguard against opening in 
flight as a result of mechanical failure, or failure of any single 
structural element.
    (2) Each door that could be a hazard if it unlatches must be 
designed so that unlatching during pressurized and unpressurized flight 
from the fully closed, latched, and locked condition is extremely 
improbable. This must be shown by safety analysis.
    (3) Each element of each door operating system must be designed or, 
where impracticable, distinctively and permanently marked, to minimize 
the probability of incorrect assembly and adjustment that could result 
in a malfunction.
    (4) All sources of power that could initiate unlocking or 
unlatching of any door must be automatically isolated from the latching 
and locking systems prior to flight and it must not be possible to 
restore power to the door during flight.
    (5) Each removable bolt, screw, nut, pin, or other removable 
fastener must meet the locking requirements of Sec.  25.607.
    (6) Certain doors, as specified by Sec.  25.807(h), must also meet 
the applicable requirements of Sec. Sec.  25.809 through 25.812 for 
emergency exits.
    (b) Opening by persons. There must be a means to safeguard each 
door against opening during flight due to inadvertent action by 
persons. In addition, design precautions must be taken to minimize the 
possibility for a person to open a door intentionally during flight. If 
these precautions include the use of auxiliary devices, those devices 
and their controlling systems must be designed so that--
    (1) No single failure will prevent more than one exit from being 
opened; and
    (2) Failures that would prevent opening of the exit after landing 
are improbable.
    (c) Pressurization prevention means. There must be a provision to 
prevent pressurization of the airplane to an unsafe level if any door 
subject to pressurization is not fully closed, latched, and locked.
    (1) The provision must be designed to function after any single 
failure, or after any combination of failures not shown to be extremely 
improbable.
    (2) Doors that meet the conditions described in paragraph (h) of 
this section are not required to have a dedicated pressurization 
prevention means if, from every possible position of the door, it will 
remain open to the extent that it prevents pressurization or safely 
close and latch as pressurization takes place. This must also be shown 
with any single failure and malfunction, except that--
    (i) With failures or malfunctions in the latching mechanism, it 
need not latch after closing; and
    (ii) With jamming as a result of mechanical failure or blocking 
debris, the door need not close and latch if it can be shown that the 
pressurization loads on the jammed door or mechanism would not result 
in an unsafe condition.
    (d) Latching and locking. The latching and locking mechanisms must 
be designed as follows:
    (1) There must be a provision to latch each door.
    (2) The latches and their operating mechanism must be designed so 
that, under all airplane flight and ground loading conditions, with the 
door latched, there is no force or torque tending to unlatch the 
latches. In addition, the latching system must include a means to 
secure the latches in the latched position. This means must be 
independent of the locking system.
    (3) Each door subject to pressurization, and for which the initial 
opening movement is not inward, must--
    (i) Have an individual lock for each latch;
    (ii) Have the lock located as close as practicable to the latch; 
and
    (iii) Be designed so that, during pressurized flight, no single 
failure in the locking system would prevent the locks from restraining 
the latches necessary to secure the door.
    (4) Each door for which the initial opening movement is inward, and 
unlatching of the door could result in a hazard, must have a locking 
means to prevent the latches from becoming disengaged. The locking 
means must ensure sufficient latching to prevent opening of the door 
even with a single failure of the latching mechanism.
    (5) It must not be possible to position the lock in the locked 
position if the latch and the latching mechanism are not in the latched 
position.
    (6) It must not be possible to unlatch the latches with the locks 
in the locked position. Locks must be designed to withstand the limit 
loads resulting from--

    (i) The maximum operator effort when the latches are operated 
manually;
    (ii) The powered latch actuators, if installed; and
    (iii) The relative motion between the latch and the structural 
counterpart.


[[Page 24502]]


    (7) Each door for which unlatching would not result in a hazard is 
not required to have a locking mechanism meeting the requirements of 
paragraphs (d)(3) through (d)(6) of this section.
    (e) Warning, caution, and advisory indications. Doors must be 
provided with the following indications:
    (1) There must be a positive means to indicate at each door 
operator's station that all required operations to close, latch, and 
lock the door(s) have been completed.
    (2) There must be a positive means clearly visible from each 
operator station for any door that could be a hazard if unlatched to 
indicate if the door is not fully closed, latched, and locked.
    (3) There must be a visual means on the flight deck to signal the 
pilots if any door is not fully closed, latched, and locked. The means 
must be designed such that any failure or combination of failures that 
would result in an erroneous closed, latched, and locked indication is 
improbable for--
    (i) Each door that is subject to pressurization and for which the 
initial opening movement is not inward; or
    (ii) Each door that could be a hazard if unlatched.
    (4) There must be an aural warning to the pilots prior to or during 
the initial portion of takeoff roll if any door is not fully closed, 
latched, and locked, and its opening would prevent a safe takeoff and 
return to landing.
    (f) Visual inspection provision. Each door for which unlatching of 
the door could be a hazard must have a provision for direct visual 
inspection to determine, without ambiguity, if the door is fully 
closed, latched, and locked. The provision must be permanent and 
discernible under operational lighting conditions, or by means of a 
flashlight or equivalent light source.
    (g) Certain maintenance doors, removable emergency exits, and 
access panels. Some doors not normally opened except for maintenance 
purposes or emergency evacuation and some access panels need not comply 
with certain paragraphs of this section as follows:
    (1) Access panels that are not subject to cabin pressurization and 
would not be a hazard if open during flight need not comply with 
paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section, but must have a means to 
prevent inadvertent opening during flight.
    (2) Inward-opening removable emergency exits that are not normally 
removed, except for maintenance purposes or emergency evacuation, and 
flight deck-openable windows need not comply with paragraphs (c) and 
(f) of this section.
    (3) Maintenance doors that meet the conditions of paragraph (h) of 
this section, and for which a placard is provided limiting use to 
maintenance access, need not comply with paragraphs (c) and (f) of this 
section.
    (h) Doors that are not a hazard. For the purposes of this section, 
a door is considered not to be a hazard in the unlatched condition 
during flight, provided it can be shown to meet all of the following 
conditions:
    (1) Doors in pressurized compartments would remain in the fully 
closed position if not restrained by the latches when subject to a 
pressure greater than \1/2\ psi. Opening by persons, either 
inadvertently or intentionally, need not be considered in making this 
determination.
    (2) The door would remain inside the airplane or remain attached to 
the airplane if it opens either in pressurized or unpressurized 
portions of the flight. This determination must include the 
consideration of inadvertent and intentional opening by persons during 
either pressurized or unpressurized portions of the flight.
    (3) The disengagement of the latches during flight would not allow 
depressurization of the cabin to an unsafe level. This safety 
assessment must include the physiological effects on the occupants.
    (4) The open door during flight would not create aerodynamic 
interference that could preclude safe flight and landing.
    (5) The airplane would meet the structural design requirements with 
the door open. This assessment must include the aeroelastic stability 
requirements of Sec.  25.629, as well as the strength requirements of 
subpart C of this part.
    (6) The unlatching or opening of the door must not preclude safe 
flight and landing as a result of interaction with other systems or 
structures.

0
3. Amend Sec.  25.807 by revising paragraph (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.807  Emergency exits.

* * * * *
    (h) Other exits. The following exits also must meet the applicable 
emergency exit requirements of Sec. Sec.  25.809 through 25.812, and 
must be readily accessible:
    (1) Each emergency exit in the passenger compartment in excess of 
the minimum number of required emergency exits.
    (2) Any other floor-level door or exit that is accessible from the 
passenger compartment and is as large or larger than a Type II exit, 
but less than 46 inches wide.
    (3) Any other ventral or tail cone passenger exit.
* * * * *

0
4. Amend Sec.  25.809 by adding a new paragraph (b)(3), and by revising 
paragraphs (c) and (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.809  Emergency exit arrangement.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Even though persons may be crowded against the door on the 
inside of the airplane.
    (c) The means of opening emergency exits must be simple and 
obvious; may not require exceptional effort; and must be arranged and 
marked so that it can be readily located and operated, even in 
darkness. Internal exit-opening means involving sequence operations 
(such as operation of two handles or latches, or the release of safety 
catches) may be used for flightcrew emergency exits if it can be 
reasonably established that these means are simple and obvious to 
crewmembers trained in their use.
* * * * *
    (f) Each door must be located where persons using them will not be 
endangered by the propellers when appropriate operating procedures are 
used.
* * * * *

0
5. Amend Sec.  25.810 by adding a new paragraph (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.810  Emergency egress assist means and escape routes.

* * * * *
    (e) If an integral stair is installed in a passenger entry door 
that is qualified as a passenger emergency exit, the stair must be 
designed so that, under the following conditions, the effectiveness of 
passenger emergency egress will not be impaired:
    (1) The door, integral stair, and operating mechanism have been 
subjected to the inertia forces specified in Sec.  25.561(b)(3), acting 
separately relative to the surrounding structure.
    (2) The airplane is in the normal ground attitude and in each of 
the attitudes corresponding to collapse of one or more legs of the 
landing gear.
* * * * *

0
6. Add a new Sec.  25.820 to read as follows:


Sec.  25.820  Lavatory doors.

    All lavatory doors must be designed to preclude anyone from 
becoming trapped inside the lavatory. If a locking mechanism is 
installed, it must be capable of being unlocked from the outside 
without the aid of special tools.


[[Page 24503]]


    Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 20, 2004.
Ali Bahrami,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 04-9948 Filed 4-30-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P