[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 83 (Thursday, April 29, 2004)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 23626-23639]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-9717]



[[Page 23625]]

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Part V





Department of Commerce





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Bureau of Industry and Security



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15 CFR Parts 732, 736, et al.



Revision of Export and Reexport Restrictions on Libya; Interim Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 83 / Thursday, April 29, 2004 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 23626]]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

15 CFR Parts 732, 736, 740, 742, 744, 746, 762, and 772

[Docket No. 040422128-4128-01]
RIN 0694--AD14


Revision of Export and Reexport Restrictions on Libya

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Interim rule with request for comments.

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SUMMARY: In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends 
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the 
President's April 23, 2004, decision to revise United States sanctions 
against Libya. This rule also implements the transfer to the Department 
of Commerce from the Department of Treasury of the licensing 
jurisdiction for exports to Libya of items subject to the EAR.

DATES: This rule is effective April 29, 2004. Comments must be received 
on or before June 1, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be sent to Sheila Quarterman, 
Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department 
of Commerce, P.O. Box 273, Washington, DC 20044, or to e-mail: 
[email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joan Roberts, Director, Foreign Policy 
Controls Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, 
Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 273, 
Washington, DC 20044; Telephone: (202) 482-4252, or e-mail: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On April 23, 2004, in response to Libya's continued effort to 
completely dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and missile 
programs, and adhere to its renunciation of terrorism, the President 
announced the termination of the application of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act with respect to Libya. Also, the Treasury Department 
modified sanctions imposed on U.S. firms and individuals under the 
authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to allow 
the resumption of most commercial activities, financial transactions, 
and investments. This rule sets forth the new export control policy for 
exports (and reexports) to Libya under the licensing responsibility of 
the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).

Previous Licensing Regime

    Since January 1986, in response to Libya's repeated use and support 
of terrorism against the United States, other countries, and innocent 
persons, the U.S. has maintained economic sanctions against Libya 
through the Libyan Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 550) and the 
Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Part 730 et seq.). The 
Department of the Treasury and the Department of Commerce shared 
licensing responsibility for proposed U.S. exports and reexports to 
Libya. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) had licensing jurisdiction for exports to Libya, 
including transshipments via third countries. Authorization granted by 
OFAC constituted authorization under the EAR. BIS had licensing 
jurisdiction for reexports of U.S.-origin items to Libya.

Overview: New Licensing Policy for Exports and Reexports to Libya

License Requirements for Exports and Reexports to Libya

    Under the new policy established by this Rule, BIS will require a 
license for the export or reexport of most items on the Commerce 
Control List (CCL) to Libya. This requirement applies to the export or 
reexport of all items under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Commerce that are on the multilateral export control regime lists: the 
Wassenaar Arrangement (reason for control: National Security--NS), the 
Nuclear Suppliers' Group (reason for control: Nuclear 
Nonproliferation--NP), the Australia Group (reasons for control: 
Chemical and Biological Weapons--CB) and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (reason for control: Missile Technology--MT).
    A license requirement also applies to items unilaterally controlled 
for crime control (CC) or regional stability (RS) reasons.
    In addition, a license requirement applies to most U.S.-origin 
items unilaterally controlled for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons, as set 
forth specifically in new Sec.  742.20 of the EAR.
    The license requirements described above are reflected in the 
relevant columns of the Country Chart in Supplement No. 1 to part 738 
of the EAR. BIS also will require a license for certain categories of 
items that are controlled for reasons not included on the Country 
Chart: encryption (EI), short supply (SS), Chemical Weapons (CW), 
Computers (XP), and Significant Items (SI).
    Items subject to the EAR but not specifically listed on the CCL--
referred to as EAR99 items--do not require an export or reexport 
license to Libya. This rule, however, does not relieve exporters and 
others of their responsibility to comply with obligations under the 
end-user and end-use controls maintained under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), as set forth in Part 744 of 
the EAR.

Licensing Policy

    As set forth in new Sec.  742.20 of the EAR, a general policy of 
denial will apply to applications for exports or reexports of the 
following items to Libya: items controlled for chemical and biological 
weapons proliferation reasons; military-related items controlled for 
national security reasons; items that are controlled for missile 
proliferation reasons; cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic 
items controlled for national security reasons; explosives detection 
equipment controlled under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 
2A983; ``Software'' (ECCN 2D983) specially designed or modified for the 
``development'', ``production'' or ``use'' of explosives detection 
equipment controlled by 2A983; ``Technology'' (ECCN 2E983) specially 
designed or modified for the ``development'', ``production'' or ``use'' 
of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983; commercial 
charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992; ammonium nitrate, 
including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled 
under ECCN 1C997; and technology for the production of Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 
1E355. All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and 
related spare parts and components will generally be denied, except 
that parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil 
aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft will 
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with a presumption of approval.
    Also, BIS will generally deny all applications for export and 
reexport to Libya of items controlled for AT (Column 1) reasons, and 
not described above, if such items are destined to military, police or 
intelligence end-users in Libya.
    BIS will review, on a case-by-case basis, all other applications 
for exports or reexports to Libya under the

[[Page 23627]]

applicable licensing policy described in Part 742 of the EAR.

License Exceptions

    Libya is presently listed in Country Groups D:2, D:3, D:4, E:1 and 
E:2, found in Supplement 1 to Part 740. This rule removes Libya from 
Country Group E:2. As a result, the following License Exceptions may be 
available, in whole or in part: TMP, RPL, GOV, GFT, TSU, BAG, and AVS. 
A specific transaction is eligible for a license exception only if it 
satisfies all of the terms and conditions of the relevant license 
exception and is not excluded by any of the restrictions that apply to 
all license exceptions, as set forth in the EAR (including, 
specifically, Sec.  740.2 Restrictions on all License Exceptions).

Transition for Licenses Granted by OFAC

    To facilitate a smooth transition of licensing responsibility from 
OFAC to BIS, this rule extends the validity of licenses issued by OFAC 
for exports to Libya. OFAC licenses in effect as of April 29, 2004, are 
hereby continued in accordance with their terms, except as modified by 
this Rule or by BIS, as if issued by the Department of Commerce. For 
those licenses with specified expiration dates, such dates will 
continue to apply. Licenses without specified expiration dates will be 
valid through May 1, 2005. Items licensed by OFAC and subsequently 
returned from Libya to the United States do not require further 
authorization from BIS. However, persons returning items that were 
previously exported to Libya under a specific license granted by OFAC 
to the United States are subject to a recordkeeping requirement set 
forth in Part 762 of the EAR.
    In addition, items exported or reexported to Libya under a specific 
OFAC license may not be transferred within Libya to a new end-user 
without further authorization from BIS. Reexports of items to countries 
other than the United States from Libya including those previously 
authorized under OFAC licenses must conform with the relevant 
provisions of the EAR for the country to which the items are being 
reexported. In certain circumstances, such reexports may be eligible 
for a License Exception or may not require a license. Such reexports 
will also be subject to a recordkeeping requirement.
    Although the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), as amended, 
expired on August 20, 2001, Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 
CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783) as extended by the Notice of August 7, 2003 
(68 FR 47833, August 11, 2003), continues the EAR in effect under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act. BIS amends the EAR in this 
rule under the provisions of the EAA as continued in effect under IEEPA 
and Executive Order 13222.

Rulemaking Requirements

    1. This final rule has been determined to be significant for the 
purposes of Executive Order 12866.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is 
required to respond to nor be subject to a penalty for failure to 
comply with a collection of information, subject to the requirements of 
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) (PRA), 
unless that collection of information displays a currently valid Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number. This regulation involves 
collections previously approved by the OMB under control numbers 0694-
0088, ``Multi-Purpose Application,'' which carries a burden hour 
estimate of 58 minutes to prepare and submit form BIS-748 .
    3. This rule does not contain policies with Federalism implications 
sufficient to warrant preparation of a Federalism assessment under 
Executive Order 13132.
    4. The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 
553) requiring notice of proposed rulemaking, the opportunity for 
public participation, and a delay in effective date, are inapplicable 
because this regulation involves a military or foreign affairs function 
of the United States (see 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). Further, no other law 
requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for 
public comment be given for this rule. Because a notice of proposed 
rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment are not required to be 
given for this rule by 5 U.S.C. 553, or by any other law, the 
analytical requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 
et seq., are not applicable.
    However, because of the importance of the issues raised by these 
regulations, this rule is being issued in interim form and BIS will 
consider comments in the development of the final regulations. 
Accordingly, the Department of Commerce (the Department) encourages 
interested persons who wish to comment to do so at the earliest 
possible time to permit the fullest consideration of their views.
    The period for submission of comments will close June 1, 2004. The 
Department will consider all comments received before the close of the 
comment period in developing final regulations. Comments received after 
the end of the comment period will be considered if possible, but their 
consideration cannot be assured. The Department will not accept public 
comments accompanied by a request that a part or all of the material be 
treated confidentially because of its business proprietary nature or 
for any other reason. The Department will return such comments and 
materials to the persons submitting the comments and will not consider 
them in the development of final regulations. All public comments on 
these regulations will be a matter of public record and will be 
available for public inspection and copying. In the interest of 
accuracy and completeness, the Department requires comments in written 
form.
    Oral comments must be followed by written memoranda, which will 
also be a matter of public record and will be available for public 
review and copying. Communications from agencies of the United States 
Government or foreign governments will not be available for public 
inspection.
    The public record concerning this regulation will be maintained in 
the Bureau of Industry and Security Freedom of Information Records 
Inspection Facility, Room 6881, Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. Records in this 
facility, including written public comments and memoranda summarizing 
the substance of oral communications, may be inspected and copied in 
accordance with regulations published in part 4 of Title 15 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations. Information about the inspection and copying of 
records at the facility may be obtained from the Bureau of Industry and 
Security Freedom of Information Officer, at the above address or by 
calling (202) 482-0500.

List of Subjects

15 CFR Parts 732 and 740

    Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Foreign trade, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Parts 736, 742, and 772

    Exports, Foreign trade.

15 CFR Part 744

    Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Part 746

    Embargoes, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

[[Page 23628]]

15 CFR Part 762

    Administrative practice and procedure, Business and industry, 
Confidential business information, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements.

0
Accordingly, parts 732, 736, 740, 742, 744, 746, 762, and 772 of the 
Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-799) are amended as 
follows:

PART 732--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 732 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 
FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 
47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.


Sec.  732.1  [Amended]

0
2. Section 732.1 is amended:
0
a. By revising the phrase ``Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya.'' in the next 
to last sentence of paragraph (d)(2) to read ``Cuba, Iran, and Iraq.''; 
and
0
b. By revising the phrase ``embargoed countries (e.g., Cuba, Iran, 
Iraq, and Libya),'' in (d)(3) to read ``countries subject to a 
comprehensive embargo (e.g., Cuba, Iran, and Iraq),''.


Sec.  732.2  [Amended]

0
3. Section 732.2 is amended by revising the phrase ``Your export or 
reexport destination for the direct product is Cuba, Libya,'' in 
paragraph (f)(1)(i) to read ``Your export or reexport destination for 
the direct product is Cuba''.

0
4. Section 732.3 is amended:
0
a. By revising the phrase ``Your export or reexport destination for the 
direct product is Cuba, Libya,'' in paragraph (f)(1)(i) to read ``Your 
export or reexport destination for the direct product is Cuba'';
0
b. By revising the phrase ``If your destination for any item is Cuba, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya or Rwanda'' in paragraph (i) to read ``If your 
destination for any item is Cuba, Iran, Iraq or Rwanda''; and
0
c. By revising paragraph (d)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  732.3  Steps regarding the ten general prohibitions.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (4) Destinations subject to embargo provisions. The Country Chart 
does not apply to Cuba, Iran, and Iraq; and for those countries you 
should review the embargo provisions at part 746 of the EAR and may 
skip this step concerning the Country Chart. For Rwanda, the Country 
Chart provides for certain license requirements, and part 746 of the 
EAR provides additional requirements.

PART 736--[AMENDED]

0
5. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 736 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 13020, 61 
FR 54079, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp. p. 219; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 
1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 
783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 
328; Notice of October 29, 2003, 68 FR 62209, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 
347.

Sec.  736.2  [Amended]

0
6. Section 736.2 is amended by revising the phrase ``General 
Prohibition Three to Cuba, Libya,'' in paragraph (b)(3)(i) to read 
``General Prohibition Three to Cuba''.

PART 738--[AMENDED]

0
7. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 738 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
10 U.S.C. 7420; 10 U.S.C. 7430(e); 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 
287c; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6004; 30 U.S.C. 185(s), 
185(u); 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 42 U.S.C. 6212; 43 U.S.C. 1354; 46 U.S.C. 
app. 466c; 50 U.S.C. app. 5; Sec. 901-911, Pub. L. 106-387; Sec. 
221, Pub. L. 107-56; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 
228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of 
August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.


0
8. Supplement No. 1 to part 738 is amended by revising the entry for 
``Libya'' to read as follows:

                                                                      Supplement No. 1 to Part 738--Commerce Country Chart
                                                                                      [Reason for control]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Chemical & biological         Nuclear          National        Missile       Regional       Firearms         Crime control         Anti-terrorism
                                                     weapons           nonproliferation      security         tech         stability     convention --------------------------------------------
                 Countries                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              CB 1     CB 2     CB 3     NP 1     NP 2     NS 1     NS 2      MT 1       RS 1     RS 2      FC 1       CC 1     CC 2     CC 3     AT 1     AT 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Libya.....................................       X        X        X        X                 X        X           X        X        X                    X                 X        X
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

PART 740--[AMENDED]

0
9. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 740 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
Sec. 901-911, Pub. L. 106-387; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 
Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; 
Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.


Sec.  740.2  [Amended]

0
10. Section 740.2 is amended by revising the phrase ``The export or 
reexport is to an embargoed destination (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and 
Libya),'' in paragraph (a)(6) to read ``The export or reexport is to an 
embargoed destination (Cuba, Iran, and Iraq),'';


Sec.  740.9  [Amended]

0
11. Section 740.9 is amended:
0
a. By revising the sentence ``No foreign-origin items may be returned 
to Cuba or Libya.'' in paragraph (b)(3) to read ``No foreign-origin 
items may be returned to Cuba.'';
0
b. By revising the phrase ``A destination in Cuba or Libya;'' in 
paragraph (b)(4)(i) to read ``A destination in Cuba;''; and
0
c. By revising the phrase ``except Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan'' 
in paragraph (c)(2) to read ``except Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan''.


Sec.  740.15  [Amended]

0
12. Section 740.15 is amended by revising the phrase ``to a country 
included in Country Group D:1, Cuba, or Libya,'' in paragraph (b)(2) to 
read ``to a country included in Country Group D:1, Cuba,''.

Supplement No. 1 to Part 740 [Amended]

0
13. Supplement No. 1 to part 740 is amended:
0
a. By removing Libya from Country Group E:2; and
0
b. By revising footnote 1(a) to Country Group E to read ``A 
comprehensive embargo against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan; and''.

[[Page 23629]]

PART 742--[AMENDED]

0
14. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 742 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 
Sec. 901-911, Pub. L. 106-387; Sec. 221, Pub. L. 107-56; E.O. 12058, 
43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 
CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., 
p. 950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 
13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of November 9, 
2001, 66 FR 56965, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 917; Notice of August 7, 
2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.


0
15. Section 742.1 is amended:
0
a. By revising the heading ``Exports and reexports involving Cuba, 
Libya, Iraq, Iran, and the Bosnian Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia-
Herzegovina'' of paragraph (c) to read ``Exports and reexports 
involving Cuba, Iran, and Iraq'';
0
b. By revising the parenthetical phrase ``(Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Iran and 
the Bosnian Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina).'' in 
paragraph (c) to read ``(Cuba, Iran, and Iraq).'';
0
c. By revising paragraph (d) to read as set forth below; and
0
d. By revising the phrase ``certain exports to and for the use of 
certain foreign vessels or aircraft; and certain exports to all 
countries for Libya aircraft.'' in paragraph (e) to read ``and certain 
exports to and for the use of certain foreign vessels and aircraft.''


Sec.  742.1  Introduction

* * * * *
    (d) Anti-terrorism Controls on Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, Sudan and Syria. Commerce maintains anti-terrorism controls on 
Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan under section 6(a) of 
the Export Administration Act. Items controlled under section 6(a) to 
Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea and Libya are described in Sec. Sec.  
742.8, 742.9, 742.10, 742.19 and 742.20, respectively, and in 
Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Commerce also maintains controls under 
section 6(j) of the EAA to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan 
and Syria. Items controlled to these countries under EAA section 6(j) 
are also described in Supplement 2 to part 742. The Secretaries of 
Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the 
Congress 30 days before issuing a license for an item controlled under 
section 6(j) to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan or Syria. 
As noted in paragraph (c) of this section, if you are exporting or 
reexporting to Cuba, Iran, or Iraq you should review part 746 of the 
EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.
* * * * *

0
16. Part 742 is amended by adding a new Sec.  742.20 to read as 
follows:


Sec.  742.20  Anti-terrorism: Libya.

    (a) License requirements. (1) If AT Column 1 of the Country Chart 
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the 
appropriate ECCN, BIS requires a license for export and reexport to 
Libya for anti-terrorism purposes.
    (2) The Secretary of State has designated Libya as a country whose 
government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism.
    (3) In support of U.S. foreign policy against terrorism, BIS 
maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and 
reexport to Libya of items described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742.
    (i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of 
Supplement No. 2 to part 742, if destined to military, police, 
intelligence or other end-users in Libya, are controlled under section 
6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA).
    (ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement 
No. 2 to part 742 destined to other end-users in Libya, as well as 
items to all end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through 
(c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of 
Supplement No. 2 to part 742, are controlled to Libya under section 
6(a) of the EAA.
    (b) Licensing policy. (1) Applications for export and reexport to 
all end-users in Libya of the following items will generally be denied:
    (i) Items controlled for chemical and biological weapons 
proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain 
CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of 
the ``License Requirements'' section of an ECCN on the CCL.
    (ii) Military-related items controlled for national security 
reasons to any destination. These are items that contain NS Column 1 or 
RS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the ``License Requirements'' 
section in an ECCN on the CCL and are controlled by equipment or 
material entries ending in the number ``18.''
    (iii) Items controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any 
destination. These are items that have an MT Column 1 in the Country 
Chart column of the ``License Requirements'' section of an ECCN on the 
CCL.
    (iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, 
and related spare parts and components, except that parts and 
components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe 
operation of commercial passenger aircraft will be reviewed on a case-
by-case basis, with a presumption of approval. These are items 
controlled to any destination for national security and missile 
technology reasons and items controlled to Libya for anti-terrorism 
purposes. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, MT Column 1, 
or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the ``License 
Requirements'' section of an ECCN on the CCL. Note that, consistent 
with the general rule that applies to computing U.S. parts and 
components content incorporated into foreign made products, all 
aircraft-related items that require a license to Libya will be 
controlled U.S. content, except for ECCNs 6A998, 7A994, and 9A991.d, 
for purposes of such licensing requirements.
    (v) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and crypto-logic items 
controlled to any destination for national security reasons. Such items 
contain an AT Column 1 and an NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country 
Chart column of the ``License Requirements'' section of an ECCN on the 
CCL.
    (vi) Explosives detection equipment controlled under ECCN 2A983.
    (vii) ``Software'' (ECCN 2D983) specially designed or modified for 
the ``development'', ``production'' or ``use'' of explosives detection 
equipment controlled by 2A983.
    (viii) ``Technology'' (ECCN 2E983) specially designed or modified 
for the ``development'', ``production'' or ``use'' of explosives 
detection equipment controlled by 2A983.
    (ix) Commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992.
    (x) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing 
ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997.
    (xi) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355.
    (2) Applications for export and reexport to Libya of all other 
items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described by 
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if the 
export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military 
end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), 
of this

[[Page 23630]]

section, applications for Libya will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis if:
    (i) The U.S. content of foreign-produced commodities is 20% or less 
by value; or
    (ii) The commodities are medical items.

    Note to paragraph (b) of this section: Applicants who wish any 
of the factors described in paragraph (b) of this section to be 
considered in reviewing their license applications must submit 
adequate documentation demonstrating the value of the U.S. content 
or the specifications and medical use of the equipment.

    (4) License applications for items reviewed under 6(a) controls 
will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of 6(j) controls 
to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport 
could make a significant contribution to the military potential of 
Libya, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance 
Libya's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the 
Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days 
prior to issuance of a license.

0
17. Supplement No. 2 to part 742 is revised to read as follows:

SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 TO PART 742--ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS: IRAN, LIBYA, 
NORTH KOREA, SYRIA AND SUDAN CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED 
POLICIES

    Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts 
entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be 
eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable 
licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract 
sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this 
Supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity 
dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign 
policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the 
purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you 
believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your 
transaction, you should include all relevant information with your 
license application. BIS will determine any applicable contract 
sanctity date at the time an application with relevant supporting 
documents is submitted.


    (a) Terrorist-supporting countries. The Secretary of State has 
designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as 
countries whose governments have repeatedly provided support for 
acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act (EAA).
    (b) Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j) and 6(a). Whenever 
the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport to any 
of these countries could make a significant contribution to the 
military potential of such country, including its military logistics 
capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support 
acts of international terrorism, the item is subject to mandatory 
control under EAA section 6(j) and the Secretaries of Commerce and 
State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 
30 days before a license for such an item may be issued.
    (1) On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State determined that 
the export to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria 
of items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this 
Supplement, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other 
sensitive end-users, are controlled under EAA section 6(j). 
Therefore, the 30-day advance Congressional notification requirement 
applies to the export or reexport of these items to sensitive end-
users in any of these countries.
    (2) License applications for items controlled to designated 
terrorist-supporting countries under EAA section 6(a) will also be 
reviewed to determine whether the Congressional notification 
requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.
    (3) Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under section 
6(a) to Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are:
    (i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) to non-
sensitive end-users, and
    (ii) The following items to all end-users: for Iran, items in 
paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(44) of this Supplement; for North 
Korea, items in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(45) of this Supplement; 
for Sudan, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(14), and (c)(16) 
through (c)(44) of this Supplement; for Libya and Syria, items in 
paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) 
through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of this Supplement.
    (c) The license requirements and licensing policies for items 
controlled for anti-terrorism reasons to Iran, Syria, Sudan, North 
Korea, and Libya are generally described in Sec. Sec.  742.8, 742.9, 
742.10, 742.19, and 742.20 of this part, respectively. This 
Supplement provides guidance on licensing policies for Iran, Libya, 
North Korea, Syria, and Sudan and related contract sanctity dates 
that may be available for transactions benefitting from pre-existing 
contracts involving Iran, Syria, and Sudan. Exporters are advised 
that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
administers a comprehensive trade and investment embargo against 
Iran (See Executive Orders 12957, 12959 and 13059 of March 15, 1995, 
May 6, 1995 and August 19, 1997, respectively.) Exporters are 
further advised that exports and reexports to Iran of items that are 
listed on the CCL as requiring a license for national security or 
foreign policy reasons are subject to a policy of denial under the 
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992 (50 U.S.C. 
1701 note (1994)). Transactions involving Iran and benefitting from 
a contract that pre-dates October 23, 1992 may be considered under 
the applicable licensing policy in effect prior to that date.
    (1) All items subject to national security controls.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
items valued at $7 million or more: January 23, 1984.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
all other national security controlled items: September 28, 1984.
    (C) Contract sanctity date for non-military end-users or end-
uses: August 28, 1991, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs 
(c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or military end-
uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through 
(c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available 
for items valued at $7 million or more to military end-users or end-
uses. The contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-
users: December 16, 1986.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or military 
end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through 
(c)(42) of this Supplement. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 
1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items 
first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA 
section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of such equipment will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or military end-
uses in Libya will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through 
(c)(42) of this Supplement.
    (2) All items subject to chemical and biological weapons 
proliferation controls. Applications for all end-users in Iran, 
Libya, North Korea, Syria, or Sudan of these items will generally be 
denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for contract sanctity dates 
for Iran and Syria. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 
1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items 
first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA 
section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993), or 
unless an earlier date for any item is listed in Supplement 1 to 
part 742.
    (3) All items subject to missile proliferation controls (MTCR). 
Applications for all end-users in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, 
or Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity provisions for 
Iran and Syria are not available. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: 
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies 
(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons 
under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 
1993).
    (4) All items subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls 
(NRL).
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied. No contract sanctity date is available.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or end-uses to 
Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-
users or end-uses will be considered on a

[[Page 23631]]

case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) 
through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is 
available.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or end-uses in 
Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for export and reexport 
to non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-
by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) 
through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is 
available.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or end-uses to 
Libya will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-
users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless 
otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this 
Supplement.
    (5) All military-related items, i.e., applications for export 
and reexport of items controlled by CCL entries ending with the 
number ``18''.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
Supplement.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria will 
generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will 
generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 
1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items 
first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA 
section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya will 
generally be denied.
    (6) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, 
and related spare parts and components.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. 
empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at $3 million or more: 
January 23, 1984.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for other helicopters and aircraft 
and gas turbine engines therefor: September 28, 1984.
    (C) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and 
components controlled by 9A991.d: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria will 
generally be denied.
    (A) There is no contract sanctity for helicopters exceeding 
10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at $3 million 
or more; except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value, have a 
contract sanctity date of December 16, 1986, if destined for a 
regularly scheduled airline with assurance against military use.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters with 10,000 lbs. 
empty weight or less: April 28, 1986.
    (C) Contract sanctity date for other aircraft and gas turbine 
engines therefor: December 16, 1986.
    (D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and 
components controlled by ECCN 9A991.d: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will 
generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya will 
generally be denied.
    (7) Heavy duty, on-highway tractors.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 
28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 
19, 1996.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (8) Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity 9t (10 tons) 
or more.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 
28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 
19, 1996.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (9) Large diesel engines (greater than 400 horsepower) and parts 
to power tank transporters.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 
19, 1996.
    (iii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (10) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was 
subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see 
paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other cryptographic, 
cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment for all end-users: October 
22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. A license is required for all national security-
controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment 
to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria will 
generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for cryptographic, 
cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of any such 
equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for 
Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date 
applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy 
reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of 
December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of any such equipment will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. A license is required for all national security-
controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment 
to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Libya will 
generally be denied.
    (11) Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject 
to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction 
finding, and radar equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied.

[[Page 23632]]

Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for exports of navigation, direction 
finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security 
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this 
Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction 
finding, and radar equipment: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a 
prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled 
to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a 
contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (12) Electronic test equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally 
be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
electronic test equipment that was subject to national security 
controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test 
equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for electronic test equipment that 
was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test 
equipment: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in 
North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications 
for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-
nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (13) Mobile communications equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
mobile communications equipment that was subject to national 
security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of 
this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all end-users of all other mobile 
communications equipment: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for mobile communications equipment 
that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: 
see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other mobile 
communications equipment: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a 
prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled 
to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a 
contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (14) Acoustic underwater detection equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national 
security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of 
this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other acoustic underwater 
detection equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. A license is required for acoustic underwater 
detection equipment that was subject to national security controls 
on August 28, 1991, to all end-users. Applications for military end-
users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was 
subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses to Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment of these items 
will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or 
for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (15) Portable electric power generator.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 
22, 1987.
    (ii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a 
case-by-case basis.
    (16) Vessels and boats, including inflatable boats.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on 
October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other vessels and boats for 
all end-users: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. A license is required for national security-
controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or 
for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Contract sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

[[Page 23633]]

Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date 
of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-
by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. A license is required for national security-
controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or 
for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (17) Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless 
of horsepower).
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security 
controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for outboard engines of 45 HP or more 
for all end-users: September 28, 1984.
    (C) Contract sanctity date for all other marine and submarine 
engines for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. A license is required for all marine and submarine 
engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. 
Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in 
Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for 
marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security 
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this 
Supplement.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-
by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. A license is required for all marine and submarine 
engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. 
Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in 
Libya of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (18) Underwater photographic equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national 
security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of 
this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic 
equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for underwater photographic equipment 
that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: 
see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic 
equipment: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of such equipment will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (19) Submersible systems.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such systems 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
submersible systems that were subject to national security controls 
on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems for 
all end-users: October 22, 1987.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such systems will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for submersible systems that were 
subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems: 
August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such systems will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of such equipment will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such systems will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (20) Scuba gear and related equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied. No contract sanctity is 
available for such items to Iran.
    (ii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users and end-uses in 
Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-
military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 
19, 1996.
    (iii) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of such equipment will generally be denied.
    (21) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 
22, 1987.
    (ii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
    (iii) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of such equipment will generally be denied.
    (22) Computer numerically controlled machine tools.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject 
to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other computer numerically 
controlled machine tools for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for computer numerically controlled 
machine tools that were subject to national security controls on 
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other computer 
numerically controlled machine tools: August 28, 1991.

[[Page 23634]]

    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of such equipment will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (23) Vibration test equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of vibration test equipment that was subject to national security 
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test 
equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for vibration test equipment that was 
subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other vibration 
test equipment: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (24) Digital computers with a CTP of 6 or above, assemblies, 
related equipment, equipment for development or production of 
magnetic and optical storage equipment, and materials for 
fabrication of head/disk assemblies.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity dates for military end-users and end-uses 
of items that were subject to national security controls on August 
28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-
users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity dates for items that were subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other items: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea.
    (A) Computers with a CTP above 2000 MTOPS: Applications for all 
end-users will generally be denied.
    (B) Computers with a CTP at or below 2000 MTOPS: Applications 
for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-
users or nuclear end-uses, will generally be denied. Applications 
for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-
nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, will be considered on a 
case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (25) Telecommunications equipment.
    (i) A license is required for the following telecommunications 
equipment:
    (A) Radio relay systems or equipment operating at a frequency 
equal to or greater than 19.7 GHz or ``spectral efficiency'' greater 
than 3 bit/s/Hz;
    (B) Fiber optic systems or equipment operating at a wavelength 
greater than 1000 nm;
    (C) ``Telecommunications transmission systems'' or equipment 
with a ``digital transfer rate'' at the highest multiplex level 
exceeding 45 Mb/s.
    (ii) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national 
security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of 
this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test 
equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for exports of telecommunications 
equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 
28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other 
telecommunications equipment: August 28, 1991.
    (iv) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (v) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (vi) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (26) Microprocessors.
    (i) Operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz.
    (A) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (1) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of microprocessors that were subject to national security controls 
on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (2) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for 
all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (B) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (1) Contract sanctity date for microprocessors that were subject 
to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (2) Contract sanctity date for all other microprocessors: August 
28, 1991.
    (C) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (D) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of

[[Page 23635]]

these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military 
end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-
by-case basis.
    (ii) With a CTP of 550 MTOPS or above.
    (A) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of these items will generally be denied.
    (B) [RESERVED]
    (27) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For Iran, Syria, 
Sudan, North Korea, or Libya a license is required for all such 
equipment described in ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for 
all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 
28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of such equipment will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (28) Software specially designed for the computer-aided design 
and manufacture of integrated circuits.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
software will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of such software that was subject to national security controls on 
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all 
end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such software: August 
28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such software will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (29) Packet switches. Equipment described in ECCN 5A991.c.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
equipment will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
in Iran of packet switches that were subject to national security 
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other packet switches for 
all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for packet switches that were subject 
to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other packet switches: August 
28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (30) Specially designed software for air traffic control 
applications that uses any digital signal processing techniques for 
automatic target tracking or that has a facility for electronic 
tracking.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
software will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of such software that was subject to national security controls on 
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all 
end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such 
software: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such software will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (31) Gravity meters having static accuracy of less (better) than 
100 microgal, or gravity meters of the quartz element (worden) type.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on 
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such gravity meters 
for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

[[Page 23636]]

    (A) Contract sanctity date for gravity meters that were subject 
to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such gravity 
meters: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (32) Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower (better) than 1.0 nt 
rms per square root Hertz.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of such magnetometers that were subject to national security 
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this 
Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such magnetometers for 
all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for such magnetometers that were 
subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such magnetometers: 
August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (33) Fluorocarbon compounds described in ECCN 1C006.d for 
cooling fluids for radar.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such 
compounds will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national 
security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of 
this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such fluorocarbon 
compounds for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such compounds will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for such fluorocarbon compounds that 
were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such fluorocarbon 
compounds: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such compounds will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such compounds will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (34) High strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) 
described in ECCN 1C210.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such fibers 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in 
ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 
28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other high strength organic 
and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 for all end-
users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of such fibers will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for high strength organic and 
inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject 
to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other high strength organic 
and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210: August 28, 
1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of such fibers will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in 
North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications 
for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-
nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya.Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of such fibers will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (35) Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and 2B993 for cutting 
gears up to 1.25 meters in diameter.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of such machines that were subject to national security controls on 
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such machines for all 
end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for machines that were subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other machines: August 28, 
1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of

[[Page 23637]]

these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military 
end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-
by-case basis.
    (36) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses 
of aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other aircraft skin and spar 
milling machines to all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft skin and spar milling 
machines that were subject to national security controls on August 
28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other aircraft skin and spar 
milling machines: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of such equipment will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (37) Manual dimensional inspection machines described in ECCN 
2B996.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national 
security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of 
this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other manual dimensional 
inspection machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for such manual dimensional 
inspection machines that were subject to national security controls 
on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such manual dimensional 
inspection machines: August 28, 1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in 
North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications 
for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-
nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (38) Robots capable of employing feedback information in real 
time processing to generate or modify programs.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of 
such robots that were subject to national security controls on 
August 28, 1991: see paragraphs (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 
1991.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by case basis.
    (A) Contract sanctity date for such robots that were subject to 
national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
    (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 
1991.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract 
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract 
sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for 
foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract 
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in 
North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications 
for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-
nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Libya will be considered on a case-by case basis.
    (39) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983.
    (i) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, 
controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.
    (A) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
    (B) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 
1996.
    (C) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 
1996.
    (D) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of these items will generally be denied.
    (E) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (ii) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, not 
controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.
    (A) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by 
non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
    (B) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 
2003.
    (C) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports 
by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
    (D) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: 
March 21, 2003.
    (E) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (40) ``Software'' described in ECCN 2D983 specially designed or 
modified for the ``development'', ``production'' or ``use'' of 
explosives detection equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by 
non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 
2003.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports 
by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: 
March 21, 2003.
    (v) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (41) ``Technology'' described in ECCN 2E983 specially designed 
or modified for the ``development'', ``production'' or ``use'' of 
explosives detection equipment.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by 
non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 
2003.

[[Page 23638]]

    (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports 
by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: 
March 21, 2003.
    (v) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (42) Production technology controlled under ECCN 1C355 on the 
CCL.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be 
denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military 
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (v) Libya. Applications for military end-users or for military 
end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. 
Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses 
in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (43) Commercial Charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992 
on the CCL.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of these items will generally be denied.
    (v) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (44) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing 
ammonium nitrate, under ECCN 1C997 on the CCL.
    (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items 
will generally be denied.
    (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these 
items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 
2001.
    (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (iv) North Korea. Applications for all end-users in North Korea 
of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: 
June 15, 2001.
    (v) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these 
items will generally be denied.
    (45) Specific processing equipment, materials and software 
controlled under ECCNs 0A999, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1C999, 1D999, 
2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999 on the CCL.
    (i) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for 
military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in 
North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications 
for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-
nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.
    (ii) [Reserved]


PART 744--[AMENDED]

0
18. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 744 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; Sec. 901-911, Pub. L. 106-
387; Sec. 221, Pub. L. 107-56; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 
Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; 
E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 12947, 60 
FR 5079, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 356; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 
1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13099, 63 FR 45167, 3 CFR, 1998 Comp., 
p.208; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; E.O. 
13224, 66 FR 49079, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 786; Notice of November 9, 
2001, 66 FR 56965, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 917; Notice of August 7, 
2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.


Sec.  744.8  [Removed and reserved]

0
19. Part 744 is amended by removing and reserving Sec.  744.8.

PART 746--[AMENDED]

0
20. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 746 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
22 U.S.C. 287c; 22 U.S.C. 6004; Sec. 901-911, Pub. L. 106-387; Sec. 
221, Pub. L. 107-56; E.O. 12854, 58 FR 36587, 3 CFR 1993 Comp., p. 
614; E.O. 12918, 59 FR 28205, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 899; E.O. 13222, 
3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 
CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.


Sec.  746.1  [Amended]

0
21. Section 746.1 is amended:
0
a. By revising the phrase ``currently Cuba, Libya, Iran, and Iraq.'' in 
paragraph (a) to read ``currently Cuba, Iran, and Iraq.''; and
0
b. By revising the header ``Cuba and Libya.'' for paragraph (a)(1) to 
read ``Cuba.''; and
0
c. By revising the phrase ``require a license to Cuba or Libya.'' in 
paragraph (a)(1) to read ``require a license to Cuba.''


Sec.  746.4  [Removed and reserved]

0
22. Part 746 is amended by removing and reserving Sec.  746.4.

PART 762--[AMENDED]

0
23. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 762 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 
7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.


0
24. Section 762.2 is amended by adding new paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  762.2  Records to be retained.

* * * * *
    (c) Special recordkeeping requirement.
    (1) Libya. Persons in receipt of a specific license granted by the 
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
for the export to Libya of any item subject to the EAR must maintain a 
record of those items transferred to Libya pursuant to such specific 
license and record when the items are consumed or destroyed in the 
normal course of their use in Libya, reexported to a third country not 
requiring further authorization from BIS, or returned to the United 
States. This requirement applies only to items subject to a license 
requirement under the EAR for export to Libya as of April 29, 2004. 
These records must include the following information:
    (i) Date of export or reexport and related details (including means 
of transport);
    (ii) Description of items (including ECCN) and value of items in 
U.S. Dollars;
    (iii) Description of proposed end-use and locations in Libya where 
items are intended to be used;
    (iv) Parties other than specific OFAC licensee who may be given 
temporary access to the items; and
    (v) Date of consumption or destruction, if the items are consumed 
or destroyed in the normal course of their use in Libya, or the date of 
reexport to a third country not requiring further authorization from 
BIS, or return to the United States.
    (2) [Reserved]

PART 772--[AMENDED]

0
25. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 772 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 
E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 
7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.


Sec.  772.1  [Amended]

0
26. Section 772.1 is amended:
0
a. By revising the phrase ``export license applications to Iran, Sudan 
and Libya'' in Note 3 following the definition of Agricultural 
commodities to read ``export license applications to Iran and Sudan'';
0
b. By revising the phrase ``for export to Iran, Libya and Sudan'' in 
the paragraph entitled Medical devices to read ``for export to Iran and 
Sudan''; and

[[Page 23639]]

0
c. By revising the phrase ``for export to Iran, Libya and Sudan'' in 
the paragraph entitled Medicines to read ``for export to Iran and 
Sudan''.

    Dated: April 23, 2004.
Peter Lichtenbaum,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 04-9717 Filed 4-27-04; 1:21 pm]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P