[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 80 (Monday, April 26, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22499-22501]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-9359]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EL04-52-000]


Reporting By Transmission Providers on Vegetation Management 
Practices Related to Designated Transmission Facilities; Order 
Requiring Reporting on Vegetation Management Practices Related to 
Designated Transmission Facilities

Issued April 19, 2004.
    Before Commissioners: Pat Wood, III, Chairman; Nora Mead Brownell, 
Joseph T. Kelliher, and Suedeen G. Kelly.
    1. In this order, pursuant to section 311 of the Federal Power Act 
(FPA),\1\ the Commission directs all entities that own, control or 
operate designated transmission facilities \2\ in the lower 48 States 
(referred to herein as ``transmission providers''), whether or not they 
are otherwise subject to the Commission's jurisdiction as a public 
utility, to report on the vegetation management practices they now use 
for those transmission lines and rights-of-ways. In order that this 
information be received before the summer peak load season, which 
typically has maximum transmission line loading and continued 
vegetation growth, this report should be submitted by June 17, 2004 to 
the Commission, the appropriate State commissions,\3\ the North 
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and the relevant 
reliability authorities.\4\ This order is driven by the findings of the 
Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force Final Blackout Report and benefits 
customers because better understanding of utility vegetation management 
practices on transmission lines will help to support improvements to 
overall grid reliability.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 825j (2000). Section 311 of the FPA authorizes the 
Commission to conduct investigations in order to secure information 
necessary or appropriate as a basis for recommending legislation. 
Section 311 makes clear that the Commission's authority in 
conducting such investigations extends to entities otherwise not 
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction ``including the generation, 
transmission, distribution and sale of electric energy by any 
agency, authority or instrumentality of the United States, or of any 
State or municipality * * *.''
    \2\ ``Designated transmission facilities'' are defined, for the 
purposes of this order only, as transmission lines with a rating of 
230 kV or higher as well as tie-line interconnection facilities 
between control areas or balancing authority areas (regardless of kV 
rating) and ``critical'' lines as designated by the regional 
reliability council. See NERC, August 14, 2003 Blackout: NERC 
Actions to Prevent and Mitigate the Impacts of Future Cascading 
Blackouts at 9 n.3 (Feb. 10, 2004).
    \3\ Some transmission providers are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of a State Commission. We request, however, that they 
serve a copy of the report on all State Commissions for States in 
which their transmission facilities are located.
    \4\ A reliability authority is the entity responsible for the 
sale and reliable operation of the interconnected transmission 
system for its defined ``reliability authority area.'' This term is 
replacing the term ``reliability coordinator'' which has the same 
meaning and is still in common use in many areas. The term 
reliability authority as used in this order refers to the corporate 
entity responsible for reliability, which may be called either the 
reliability authority or the reliability coordinator for its area.
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    2. Failure to adequately maintain vegetation within transmission 
line rights-of-way has been identified as a major cause of the August 
14, 2003 electric power blackout and as a common factor contributing to 
many previous regional outages. The vegetation management report 
required herein will provide the Commission, the States, NERC, 
reliability authorities and the Congress with valuable information 
regarding vegetation management problems that could cause line outages, 
and action taken to alleviate identified vegetation management 
problems. The Commission will also use this information in cooperation 
with the NARUC Ad-Hoc Committee on Critical Infrastructure to identify 
appropriate ways to assure effective vegetation management for electric 
transmission facilities.
    3. The Commission strongly supports legislative reform to provide a 
clear Federal framework for developing and enforcing mandatory 
reliability rules. The information collected from the reporting 
requirement herein will be reflected in a Commission report to Congress 
on the reliability of the nation's interstate bulk electric systems, 
consistent with section 311 of the FPA.\5\
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    \5\ ``The Commission shall report to Congress the results of 
investigations made under authority of this section.'' 16 U.S.C. 
825j.
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Background

    4. On August 14, 2003, an electric power blackout occurred over 
large portions of the Northeast and Midwest United States and Ontario, 
Canada. The blackout lasted up to two days in some areas of the United 
States and longer in some areas of Canada. It affected an area with 
over 50 million people and 61,800 megawatts of electric load. In the 
wake of the blackout, a joint U.S.-Canada Task Force (Task Force) 
undertook a study of the causes of that blackout and possible solutions 
to avoid future such blackouts. In November 2003, the Task Force issued 
an interim report, describing its investigation and findings and 
identifying the causes of the blackout.\6\ The Task Force's final 
report, issued on April 5, 2004, verifies and expands the findings of 
the interim report.
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    \6\ U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Interi Report: 
Causes of the August 14th Blackout in the United States and Canada 
(Nov. 2003) (Interim Blackout Report). The Interim Blackout Report 
is fully replaced by the Final Report.
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    5. The Task Force identified FirstEnergy Corporation's 
(FirstEnergy) failure to adequately trim trees and manage vegetation in 
its transmission rights-of-way as one of the four primary causes of the 
August 14, 2003 blackout.\7\ The blackout investigation explained that, 
during the hour before the cascading blackout occurred, three 
FirstEnergy 345 kV transmission lines failed as a result of contact 
between the lines and overgrown vegetation that encroached into the 
required clearance height for the lines.\8\ It stated that ``because 
the trees were so tall * * * each of these [three] lines faulted under 
system conditions well within specified operating parameters.'' \9\
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    \7\ U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Blackout 
Report (April 2004), at 20. The other primary causes identified by 
the Task Force were inadequate system understanding by FirstEnergy 
and the East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement (ECAR), 
a NERC Regional Reliability Council, and inadequate situational 
awareness by FirstEnergy, and failure of the interconnected grid's 
reliability organizations to provide effective diagnostic support. 
Id. at 17-20.
    \8\ Id. at 57-67.
    \9\ Id. at 58.
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    6. The Interim Blackout Report also compared the August 2003 
blackout with seven previous major outages and concluded that conductor 
contact with trees was a common factor among the outages.\10\ The Task 
Force emphasized that vegetation management is critical and that many 
outages can be mitigated or prevented by managing the vegetation before 
it becomes a problem.\11\ It also noted that investigation reports from 
previous major outages recommended

[[Page 22500]]

paying special attention to the condition of vegetation on rights-of-
way and the need for preventative maintenance in this area.
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    \10\ Id. at 107. The Interim Blackout Report concluded that 
conductor contact with trees ``was an initiating trigger in several 
of the outages and a contributing factor in the severity of several 
more * * *. In some of the disturbances, tree contact accounted for 
the loss of more than one circuit, contributing multiple 
contingencies to the weakening of the system.'' Id.
    \11\ Id. at 59.
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    7. In an October 15, 2003 letter to the chief executive officers of 
all entities operating control areas or serving as NERC reliability 
coordinators, NERC listed six categories of ``near term'' actions, 
including vegetation management, that would promote reliable operations 
of the bulk power system.\12\ The letter requested that they report to 
their respective regional councils and to NERC within 60 days that they 
had completed a review of the listed reliability practices and the 
status of any necessary corrective actions. With regard to vegetation 
management, NERC asked that the control area operators and reliability 
councils report on their efforts to ``ensure high voltage transmission 
line rights-of-way are free of vegetation and other obstructions that 
could contact an energized conductor within the normal and emergency 
ratings of each line.'' \13\
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    \12\ A copy of the letter is available on the NERC Web site at: 
http://www.nerc.com/filez/blackout.html. While a list of entities 
that voluntarily responded is also available on the NERC Web site, 
the actual responses are not posted on NERC's Web site.
    \13\ October 15, 2003, NERC letter at 3.
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    8. NERC posted on its Web site an abbreviated summary of its 
vegetation management findings. The summary states:

Some entities did not specifically address the issue of vegetation 
management. Of those that did, almost all indicated they have an 
active comprehensive vegetation program in place with rights-of-way 
patrolled at least annually. One entity indicated it did not yet 
comply with the heat-sensing portion of the Regional Reliability 
Council's operating procedure but is taking action to do so in 2004. 
Some entities patrol by air, some by ground, and some by both. To 
some extent, the amount of transmission an entity is responsible for 
determines the type of patrol used. Routine tree trimming is 
conducted on cycles that range from every three to six years. Local 
vegetation type and geographic region of the country has an impact 
on deciding the frequency of the trimming cycle. Typical problems 
and concerns noted are as follows:
     One entity owns transmission lines located on 
lands under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service or Bureau of 
Land Management. The need for special use permits can impede the 
ability to remove vegetation from rights-of-way for these circuits.
     One entity cited state and federal 
restrictions, such as those related to environmental or endangered 
species regulations, which create concerns because they are not 
allowed to clear rights-of-way appropriately to ensure 
reliability.''

    9. In March 2004, the Commission made available to the public a 
128-page vegetation management report (Final Vegetation Report), 
prepared to support the blackout investigation.\14\ The report details 
problems with vegetation management relating to the August 2003 
blackout, and the impact of vegetation management on electric 
reliability. The report concludes that the August 2003 blackout likely 
would not have occurred had the rights-of-way been maintained for three 
345 kV transmission lines that tripped due to tree-line contacts.\15\ 
It also concludes that utilities responsible for the right-of-way 
maintenance had in place vegetation management programs that were in 
line with current industry norms. Further, it concludes that current 
industry ``standards'' are inadequate and must be improved. The Final 
Vegetation Report recommends specific practices that would reduce the 
likelihood of tree and power line conflicts and provides 
recommendations for the oversight and enforcement of utility vegetation 
management activities.
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    \14\ CN Utility Consulting, Utility Vegetation Management Final 
Report, (March 2004) (Final Vegetation Report). The Final Vegetation 
Report is available on the Internet at http://www.ferc.gov/cust-protect/moi/blackout.asp.
    \15\ Id., at 26-27.
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    10. On April 5, 2004, the Joint Task Force issued its Final 
Blackout Report. That report verifies the findings of the interim 
report, including the role of inadequate tree-trimming as an immediate 
cause of the 345 kV line outages in the Cleveland-Akron area that 
ultimately precipitated the blackout.

Discussion

    11. The Interim and Final Blackout Reports and the Final Vegetation 
Report all indicate that inadequate maintenance of vegetation on 
transmission line rights-of-way was a major cause of the August 14, 
2003 blackout. Further, the Task Force's analysis of seven other major 
outages identified tree contacts as an initiating or contributing 
factor to such outages.
    12. It is clear from these reports that a higher standard of 
performance of vegetation management is critical to minimizing the risk 
of regional power outages and ensuring the uninterrupted flow of 
electricity in the nation's interconnected bulk electric systems. As 
noted above, NERC requested that control area operators and reliability 
authorities report their efforts to ensure that high voltage 
transmission line rights-of-way are free of vegetation and other 
obstructions that could cause a line outage. The information provided 
in response to NERC's inquiry is useful but incomplete. Further inquiry 
is necessary to understand the state of the industry's vegetation 
management programs and to better support industry efforts to improve, 
and sustain improvement of, industry vegetation management programs and 
protect the public interest.\16\ In addition, a more comprehensive view 
of the vegetation management practices in the United States will allow 
the Commission to provide a more complete report to Congress. 
Accordingly, pursuant to section 311 of the FPA,\17\ the Commission is 
requiring that all transmission providers (whether or not they are 
otherwise subject to the Commission's jurisdiction as public utilities) 
that own, control or operate designated transmission facilities in the 
lower 48 States submit a report containing the following 
information:\18\
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    \16\ See Final Blackout Report at 59.
    \17\ See note 1, infra.
    \18\ OMB Control Number 1902-0207; expiration date October 31, 
2004.

    (a) Describe in detail the vegetation management practices and 
standards that the transmission provider uses for control of 
vegetation near designated transmission facilities, and indicate the 
source of any standard utilized (state law or regulation, historical 
practice, etc.). Describe the clearance assumptions or definition 
used for the appropriate distance between the vegetation and the 
facilities. Indicate how the vegetation management practices treat 
vegetation that encroaches or might reasonably be expected to 
encroach due to growth prior to the next inspection into the line 
clearance zone from below, beside, and above the facilities.
    (b) ``Designated transmission facilities'' are defined, for the 
purposes of this report only, as lines with a rating of 230 kV or 
higher as well as tie-line interconnection facilities between 
control areas or balancing authority areas (regardless of kV rating) 
and ``critical'' lines as designated by the regional reliability 
council.\19\ List the facilities under transmission provider control 
that meet this definition.
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    \19\ If the reporting utility's regional reliability council has 
already designated specific lines below 230 kV as ``critical,'' it 
is those lines which should be included in this report. If the 
regional reliability council has not already designated such lines, 
then there is no need for the reporting utility to identify 
additional ``critical'' lines below 230 kV nor to request such 
designation by its regional reliability council for the purpose of 
this report.
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    (c) For each facility identified pursuant to item b), indicate 
how often the transmission provider inspects that facility for 
vegetation management purposes. Indicate when the most recent survey 
of that facility was performed, what kind of survey was used (e.g., 
helicopter overflight or foot patrol), and indicate what the 
findings of that survey showed. If the survey led to further action, 
indicate what action was taken and the date(s) it was performed.

[[Page 22501]]

    (d) For the facilities identified pursuant to b), indicate 
whether identified remediation has been completed as of June 14, 
2004.
    (e) Describe any factors that the respondent believes prevents 
or unduly delays the performance of adequate vegetation management.

    13. The Commission expects that the responses to parts (b) and (c) 
above should come in two parts. Each transmission provider should 
submit a general response that contains clear information responding to 
each question. The transmission providers must also provide a detailed 
response that addresses the specifics of each part. This detailed 
response may be filed under the protection of Critical Energy 
Infrastructure Information.\20\
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    \20\ 18 CFR 388.113(c)(1) (2000).
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    14. Transmission Providers should submit the report by June 17, 
2004 to the Commission, the appropriate State commissions, NERC and the 
relevant reliability authorities.\21\ In circumstances where multiple 
entities own, control or operate the same transmission facilities, only 
a single report need be submitted (but the report should identify which 
entities and lines are being handled through consolidated reporting).
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    \21\ Utilities in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
(WECC) should also submit the results to WECC.
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    15. Consistent with the Commission's regulations that apply to any 
filings made with the Commission, contained in 18 CFR 385.2005,\22\ the 
report should be verified by a corporate officer.
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    \22\ 18 CFR 385.2005 requires the signer of a filing to verify 
that: the signer has read the filing signed and knows its contents; 
the contents are true as stated, to the best knowledge and belief of 
the signer; and the signer possess full power and authority to sign 
the filing.
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Document Availability

    16.In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's 
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington DC 20426.
    17. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is 
available using the eLibrary link. The full text of this document is 
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, 
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type 
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in 
the docket number field.
    18. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's Web 
site during normal business hours at [email protected] or by 
calling (866) 208-3676 or for TTY, contact (202) 502-8659.
    The Commission orders:
    (A) All entities that own, control or operate designated 
transmission facilities, as defined herein, in the lower 48 States, 
whether or not they are otherwise subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction as public utilities, are directed to submit to the 
Commission, the appropriate State commissions, the North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and the relevant reliability 
coordinators and reliability authorities, by June 17, 2004, a report on 
vegetation management practices related to such transmission lines, as 
discussed in the body of this order.
    (B) The Secretary shall promptly publish a copy of this order in 
the Federal Register.

    By the Commission.
Magalie R. Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 04-9359 Filed 4-23-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P