

entitled "Composition Of And Method For Making High Performance Resins For Infusion And Transfer Molding Processes," which are assigned to the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Written objections to the prospective grant of a license should be sent to NASA Langley Research Center. NASA has not yet made a determination to grant the requested license and may deny the requested license even if no objections are submitted within the comment period.

DATES: Responses to this notice must be received by April 29, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robin W. Edwards, Patent Attorney, Mail Stop 212, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681-2199, telephone (757) 864-3230; fax (757) 864-9190.

Dated: April 8, 2004.

Keith T. Sefton,

Chief of Staff, Office of the General Counsel.

[FR Doc. 04-8391 Filed 4-13-04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-P

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

Public Hearing

ACTION: Notice of public hearing.

SUMMARY: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States will hold its tenth public hearing on April 13-14, 2004 in Washington, DC. The two-day hearing will examine the performance of law enforcement and the intelligence communities prior to September 11 and evaluate post-9/11 reforms in these areas. The hearing will be open to the public and members of the media. Seating will be provided on a first-come, first-served basis, and doors will open at 8 a.m. Members of the media must register by the close of business on April 9, 2004, by visiting the Commission's Web site, <http://www.9-11commission.gov>. Members of the media, particularly photographers and radio and television broadcasters, also must contact the appropriate Senate Press Gallery for accreditation.

DATES: April 13-14, 2004, 9 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Press availability to follow.

LOCATION: Hart Senate Office Building, Room 216, Washington, DC, 20510

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Al Felzenberg or Jonathan Stull at (202) 401-1627, (202) 494-3538 (cellular), or jestull@9-11commission.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Please refer to Public Law 107-306 (November 27, 2002), title VI (Legislation creating the Commission), and the Commission's Web site: <http://www.9-11commission.gov>.

Dated: April 9, 2004.

Philip Zelikow,

Executive Director.

[FR Doc. 04-8523 Filed 4-12-04; 10:52 am]

BILLING CODE 8800-01-M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Tennessee Valley Authority

[Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328]

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 issued to Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) for operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in Hamilton County, Tennessee.

The proposed amendments would allow both trains of control room air-conditioning system (CRACS) to be inoperable for up to 7 days provided control room temperatures are verified every 4 hours to be less than or equal to 90 degrees Fahrenheit. If this temperature limit cannot be maintained or if both CRACS trains are inoperable for more than 7 days, requirements of Technical Specification Section (TS) 3.0.3 will be required.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)

involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed change will allow the use of alternate cooling methods in the event both trains of the CRACS are inoperable. The CRACS is used to maintain an acceptable environment for control room equipment and personnel during normal and emergency conditions. This system does not have the potential to create a design basis accident as it only provides control room cooling and does not directly mitigate postulated accidents. Temporary cooling devices will be designed in accordance with appropriate design controls, sized to ensure adequate cooling capability, and located such that safety-related features would not be prevented from performing their safety function. Since the CRACS does not contribute to the initiators of postulated accidents, the probability of an accident is not significantly increased by the proposed change.

The CRACS does ensure a suitable environment for safety-related equipment and personnel during an accident. The temperature limit placed on the proposed action ensures that the control room temperature will remain at acceptable levels to support plant evolutions in response to postulated accidents. Safety functions that are necessary to maintain acceptable offsite dose limits will not be degraded by the proposed change. Alternate cooling methods that will maintain the control room well within the equipment temperature limits will ensure these safety functions. With the control room cooling requirements satisfied, the offsite dose impact is not affected. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed change will continue to ensure that the control room temperatures will not exceed operability limits for equipment or personnel. The temperature control functions for the control room are not postulated to create an accident and since the proposed change continues to maintain acceptable temperatures, there are no new accident initiators created. The alternate cooling methods to be used will utilize appropriate design, sizing, and location considerations. Implementation of temporary cooling methods will be designed such that safety-related features would not be prevented from performing their safety function and in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. Plant will comply with applicable TS requirements. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.