[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 68 (Thursday, April 8, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18557-18565]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-7949]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision on Mode of Transportation and Nevada Rail 
Corridor for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 
Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, NV

AGENCY: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. 
Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: On July 23, 2002, the President signed into law (Pub. L. 107-
200) a joint resolution of the U.S. House of Representatives and the 
U.S. Senate designating the Yucca Mountain site in Nye County, Nevada, 
for development as a geologic repository for the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In the event the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) authorizes construction of the repository 
and receipt and possession of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, the Department of Energy 
(Department or DOE) would be responsible for transporting these 
materials to the Yucca Mountain Repository as part of its obligations 
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). Pursuant to the NWPA and the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), DOE issued the ``Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the 
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at 
Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada'' (DOE/EIS-0250F, February 2002) 
(Final EIS). That document analyzed the environmental impacts of the 
proposed action of constructing, operating and monitoring, and 
eventually closing a geologic repository for the disposal of 70,000 
metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, as well as of transporting spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from commercial and DOE 
sites to the Yucca Mountain site.
    In preparing the Final EIS, DOE initiated public scoping in 1995, 
and subsequently issued for public comment a Draft EIS in 1999 and a 
Supplement to the Draft EIS in 2000. During the 199-day public comment 
period on the Draft EIS, DOE held public hearings in 21

[[Page 18558]]

locations across the country, 10 of which were held throughout the 
State of Nevada. An additional hearing was convened in Las Vegas for 
members of Native American Tribes in the region. During the 56-day 
public comment period on the Supplement to the Draft EIS, DOE held 
three public hearings in Nevada. The Department received more than 
13,000 comments on the Draft EIS and the Supplement to the Draft EIS; 
about 3,600 of these comments addressed transportation related matters.
    DOE is now in the process of preparing an application to the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking authorization to construct 
the repository. In addition, in order to be in a position to transport 
waste to the repository should the NRC approve construction and waste 
receipt, DOE must proceed with certain decisions relating to the 
transportation of this material. In particular, the Department has 
decided to select the mostly rail scenario analyzed in the Final EIS as 
the transportation mode both on a national basis and in the State of 
Nevada. Under the mostly rail scenario, the Department would rely on a 
combination of rail, truck and possibly barge to transport to the 
repository site at Yucca Mountain up to 70,000 MTHM of spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste, with most of the spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste being transported by rail. This 
will ultimately require construction of a rail line in Nevada to the 
repository. In addition, the Department has decided to select the 
Caliente rail corridor \1\ in which to examine potential alignments 
within which to construct that rail line. Should the Department select 
an alignment within that corridor, it will obtain all necessary 
regulatory approvals before beginning construction.
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    \1\ A corridor is a strip of land, approximately 0.25 miles (400 
meters) wide, that encompasses one of several possible routes 
through which DOE could build a rail line. An alignment is the 
specific location of a rail line in a corridor.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the Final EIS and this Record of Decision may be 
obtained by calling or mailing a request to: Ms. Robin Sweeney, Office 
of National Transportation, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management, U.S. Department of Energy, 1551 Hillshire Drive, M/S 011, 
Las Vegas, NV 89134, Telephone 1-800-967-3477. The Final EIS, including 
the Readers Guide and Summary, is available via the Internet at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ documents/feis--a/index.htm. This Record of Decision 
is available at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov under ``What's New''. 
Questions regarding the Final EIS or this Record of Decision can be 
submitted by calling or mailing them to Ms. Robin Sweeney at the above 
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phone number or address.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information regarding the 
DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process contact: Ms. Carol 
M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-42), 
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 
20585, Telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 1-800-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Transportation-Related Decisions

    The analyses in the Final EIS provide the bases for the following 
three decisions under NEPA related to the establishment of a 
transportation program under which the Department would transport spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to a repository at Yucca 
Mountain:
    1. Outside Nevada, the selection of a national mode of 
transportation scenario (mostly rail or mostly legal-weight truck),
    2. In Nevada, the selection among transportation mode scenarios 
(mostly rail, mostly legal-weight truck, or mostly heavy-haul truck 
with an associated intermodal transfer station), and
    3. In Nevada, if the mostly rail scenario or mostly heavy-haul 
truck scenario were selected, the selection among rail corridor 
implementing alternatives, or heavy-haul truck route implementing 
alternatives with use of an associated intermodal transfer station.
    See Figure 2-5 on page 2-7 of the Final EIS for a graphical 
depiction of the different transportation scenarios and implementing 
alternatives.

Part I. Record of Decision for Mode of Transportation

Proposed Action and Transportation Mode Scenarios Considered in the 
Final EIS

    The Final EIS examines a Proposed Action under which DOE would ship 
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from 72 commercial 
and 5 DOE sites \2\ to the Yucca Mountain Repository. The Final EIS 
considers the potential environmental impacts of transporting spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the repository under a 
variety of modes, including legal-weight truck, rail, heavy-haul truck, 
and possibly barge. The Final EIS also considers the environmental 
impacts of two No-Action Alternatives, one under which spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste would remain at the 72 commercial 
and five DOE sites under institutional control for at least 10,000 
years, and one under which these materials would remain at the 77 sites 
in perpetuity, but under institutional control for only 100 years.
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    \2\ Fifty-four additional sites (primarily domestic research 
reactors) were expected to ship spent nuclear fuel to two DOE sites 
prior to disposal at the repository. DOE plans to consolidate these 
materials at the two DOE sites are independent of the decisions 
relating to a repository at Yucca Mountain. Shipments from these 
sites to DOE sites were analyzed in the ``Programmatic Spent Nuclear 
Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs 
Environmental Impact Statement'' (PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0202-F; April 
1995), and associated Records of Decision (June 1, 1995; 60 FR 28680 
and March 8, 1996; 61 FR 9441). The direct impacts of this 
consolidation are not included in the analysis of the alternatives 
analyzed in the Final EIS for the repository, because they would 
occur whether or not DOE proceeds with the repository at Yucca 
Mountain. Since the PEIS was published, three research reactors have 
closed. As provided for in the Record of Decision (ROD) for the 
PEIS, spent nuclear fuel from one reactor was sent to the Savannah 
River Site and fuel from another reactor was sent to the Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Fuel from 
the third reactor, which the ROD for the PEIS anticipated would be 
consolidated at INEEL, was sent on an interim basis to the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) site in Lakewood, Colorado (which 
also was one of the fifty-four sites analyzed in the PEIS). It is 
still ultimately expected to be consolidated at INEEL as provided in 
the ROD for the PEIS, whence it will be shipped to the repository. 
The fuel that went to USGS is within the amounts analyzed by the 
PEIS as going from USGS to INEEL. Moreover, since the change in 
interim storage plans does not affect the shipment of fuel to Yucca 
Mountain, it does not affect the transportation analysis in the 
Final EIS for the repository.
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    At the outset, we note that over the past 30 years, more than 2,700 
shipments of spent nuclear fuel have been completed, none of which has 
resulted in an identified injury caused by the release of radioactive 
material. That basic fact provides important context for our 
decisionmaking today.
    The Final EIS examines various national transportation scenarios 
and Nevada transportation implementing alternatives to reflect the 
range of potential environmental impacts that could occur. Two national 
transportation scenarios, referred to as the ``mostly legal-weight 
truck'' scenario and the ``mostly rail'' scenario, and three Nevada 
scenarios, referred to as the legal-weight truck scenario, the rail 
scenario, and the heavy-haul truck scenario, were evaluated. The three 
broad scenarios discussed below represent the combinations of the 
scenarios and implementing alternatives as analyzed in the Final EIS.

[[Page 18559]]

Mostly Rail to the Yucca Mountain Repository--Preferred Mode of 
Transportation

    Under the preferred mode of transportation as analyzed in the Final 
EIS (the mostly rail scenario), DOE would ship most of the spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from the 77 sites to the 
Yucca Mountain Repository by rail. DOE would construct a rail line in 
one of five rail corridors considered in the Final EIS to connect the 
repository at Yucca Mountain to an existing main rail line in Nevada.
    Under the mostly rail scenario analyzed in the Final EIS, 
radioactive materials from certain commercial nuclear sites that do not 
have the capability to load rail-shipping casks would be shipped by 
legal-weight truck to the repository. For other commercial sites that 
have the capability to load rail shipping casks, but do not have rail 
access, materials would be shipped either by heavy-haul truck or 
possibly barge to a nearby railhead outside Nevada for shipment by rail 
to the repository at Yucca Mountain.
    Under the mostly rail alternative, about 9,000 to 10,000 train 
shipments (assuming one cask per train \3\) of spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste would travel on the nation's rail network 
over the anticipated 24-year period (DOE's current plan calls for three 
casks per train shipment, about 3,000 to 3,300 total shipments). In 
addition, there would be about 1,000 legal-weight truck shipments from 
commercial sites that do not have the capability to load rail-shipping 
casks to the repository at Yucca Mountain.
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    \3\ The final EIS stated that DOE anticipated as many as 5 casks 
per train. However, DOE conservatively estimated 1 cask per train 
for analytical purposes to ensure that it considered routine and 
accident transportation risks that could result from a larger number 
of train shipments (9,000 to 10,000).
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Mostly Rail to Nevada With Transfer to Heavy-Haul Truck for Shipment to 
the Repository

    Under this scenario as analyzed in the Final EIS, DOE would ship 
most spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from the 77 
sites to Nevada by rail. Rail shipments would terminate in Nevada at an 
intermodal transfer station where shipping casks would be transferred 
from rail cars to heavy-haul trucks for shipment to the Yucca Mountain 
Repository. DOE would construct an intermodal transfer station at one 
of three locations analyzed in the Final EIS. One of the five heavy-
haul routes analyzed in the Final EIS would be upgraded to improve 
transportation operations, reduce traffic congestion, and enable year-
round shipments to the repository.
    Under this scenario, radioactive materials from certain commercial 
nuclear sites that do not have the capability to load rail-shipping 
casks would be shipped by legal-weight truck directly to the 
repository.
    Under this alternative, about 9,000 to 10,000 train shipments 
(assuming one cask per train) of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste would travel on the nation's rail network to Nevada 
over the 24-year period. There also would be about 9,000 to 10,000 
heavy-haul truck shipments in Nevada from the intermodal transfer 
station to the repository. In addition, there would be about 1,000 
legal-weight truck shipments from commercial sites that do not have the 
capability to load rail-shipping casks to the repository at Yucca 
Mountain.

Mostly Legal-Weight Truck to the Yucca Mountain Repository

    Under the mostly legal-weight truck scenario, as analyzed in the 
Final EIS, DOE would ship most spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste from the 77 sites to the repository by legal-weight 
truck. About 53,000 legal-weight trucks carrying these materials would 
travel primarily on the nation's interstate highway system during the 
24-year period. About 300 shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel would 
travel from the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
to Nevada by rail, where the rail casks would be transferred to heavy-
haul trucks for shipment to the repository.

Environmentally Preferable Transportation Mode Alternative

    In making this determination, DOE considered human health and 
environmental impacts that could occur from shipping spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level radioactive waste from the 77 sites to the repository at 
Yucca Mountain. DOE also considered the human health and environmental 
impacts that could occur from the construction of a rail line and from 
any upgrades to existing highways (the heavy-haul truck routes) in 
Nevada.
    The Final EIS indicates that some potential non-radiological 
fatalities could occur as a result of traffic accidents during the 
transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste 
to the repository at Yucca Mountain. The Final EIS indicates that the 
highest number of potential traffic fatalities (about five) could occur 
under the mostly legal-weight truck scenario, whereas the mostly rail 
scenario could result in about three potential traffic fatalities 
during the 24-year period of shipping spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste to the repository at Yucca Mountain.
    The Final EIS also considers the potential health effects that 
could result from radiation exposure to workers during shipping and 
from cask loading and unloading, and to the general population along 
the transportation routes to the repository. Under the mostly legal-
weight truck scenario, the Final EIS indicates that about 12 worker and 
three general public latent cancer fatalities could occur from routine 
(incident-free) exposures during the 24-year period of shipping spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the repository. Under 
the mostly rail scenario, about three worker and one general public 
latent cancer fatalities could occur during the 24-year period. The 
radiation dose to any one individual would be extremely small.
    DOE also estimated the potential health effects to the general 
public that could result from a severe transportation accident during 
shipments to the repository (referred to in the Final EIS as a maximum 
reasonably foreseeable accident). The probability that this accident 
could occur is extremely unlikely--about three chances in 10 million 
per year. If such an accident were to occur in an urban population 
setting, less than one latent cancer fatality could be expected under 
the mostly legal-weight truck scenario, whereas about five latent 
cancer fatalities could be expected under the mostly rail scenario, 
primarily because of the greater amounts of radioactive materials that 
could be released from a rail cask in such an accident.
    In Nevada, construction of a rail line, regardless of the rail 
corridor selected, would involve the disturbance of land (and 
associated impacts, although low, to natural resources such as 
biological and cultural resources) in amounts greater than those 
associated with any heavy-haul truck alternative. For example, 
construction of a rail line in the shortest rail corridor (Valley 
Modified) would result in the disturbance of about 1,240 acres; rail 
line construction in the longest corridor (Carlin) would disturb about 
4,900 acres. Construction of an intermodal transfer station and the 
upgrade of the longest heavy-haul route would result in the disturbance 
of about 1,000 acres. Furthermore, the construction of any rail line 
would involve various land use conflicts that, for the most part, would 
not occur with the limited construction required to improve any of the 
heavy-haul truck routes. No land disturbances

[[Page 18560]]

would occur under the legal-weight truck alternative.
    The Department also evaluated the risk of sabotage, including 
terrorism. For reasons the NRC has carefully explained, this analysis 
is most likely not required by NEPA.\4\ It is not possible to predict 
whether such acts would occur and, if they did, the nature of such 
acts. Moreover, such analysis does not advance the public participation 
purpose of NEPA, since there are serious limits on what information can 
responsibly be disseminated on these issues without risking disclosure 
of information that might be used in planning or carrying out such an 
act.\5\ Nevertheless, the Final EIS includes the consequences of a 
potentially successful attempt on a cask during shipment via rail or 
legal-weight truck. In both instances, a successful attack would result 
in the release of contaminants into the environment. The consequences 
estimated for a rail shipment would be less than those estimated for a 
legal-weight truck shipment, mostly because the thicker shield wall of 
the heavier rail cask would tend to mitigate the effects of the 
sabotage event when compared to the lighter, legal-weight truck 
transportation cask.
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    \4\ See Duke Cogema Stone & Webster, 56 N.R.C. 335 (2002); 
Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002); Duke Energy 
Corp., 56 N.R.C. 358 (2002); Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 56 
N.R.C. 367 (2002); Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 57 N.R.C. 1 
(2003); and Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003), 
appeal docketed, No. 03-74628 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2003).
    \5\ See materials cited in footnote 4
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    None of the three transportation scenarios analyzed in the Final 
EIS is clearly environmentally preferable. Each would result in some 
impact to the environment, and public health and safety, although all 
impacts would be small. For example, transporting by either rail or 
heavy-haul truck in Nevada would result in some land disturbance, 
although the impacts would be greater for rail because more land would 
be disturbed during the construction of a rail line than during the 
upgrading of existing highways to accommodate heavy-haul trucks. 
Radiation exposure to workers and the public from either routine rail 
or truck shipments to the repository at Yucca Mountain would be very 
small, and the differences among the different modes of transportation 
also would be very small. Similarly, accident risks under each 
alternative would be very small, and associated differences among 
alternatives also very small. The Department does not consider the 
differences among modes to be sufficiently distinct to make any of them 
clearly environmentally preferable.
    Although the potential impacts of any of the transportation 
alternatives would be small, they would be greater than the 
transportation-related impacts of the No-Action Alternatives. Overall 
however, as analyzed in the Final EIS, the impacts of proceeding with 
construction and operation of a repository at Yucca Mountain, including 
transportation, would cause relatively small public health impacts 
through the period 10,000 years after repository closure and would 
cause fewer public health impacts than the No-Action Alternative. For 
the No-Action Alternative with institutional controls for 10,000 years, 
the potential long-term environmental impacts also would be small, but 
significantly greater than the proposed action because the potential 
for nonradiological fatalities to workers under this alternative is 
significantly greater. Additional information may be found on pages S-
82 through S-88 and Chapters 2 and 7 of the Final EIS. The cost of this 
No-Action Alternative is also significantly greater than that of the 
proposed action ($42.7 billion to $57.3 billion (in 2001 dollars) for 
the proposed action versus $167 billion to $184 billion for the first 
300 years of institutional control and $519 million to $572 million per 
year thereafter). Additionally, the public health and safety impacts of 
the No-Action Alternative without effective institutional control are 
significantly greater than the proposed action. Likewise, in the long 
run, securing these materials by consolidating them and disposing of 
them in a secure, remote location, better protects against terrorist 
attack than leaving them at 72 commercial and 5 DOE sites in 35 states 
within 75 miles of more than 161 million Americans.\6\ Moreover, for 
the reasons expressed by the Secretary and the President in their site 
recommendations and by the Congress in passing the joint resolution, it 
is in the national interest to move forward with this project.
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    \6\ As explained in footnote 2, some additional materials are 
currently stored at 50 additional sites (54 at the time of site 
recommendation), consisting primarily of research reactors, in four 
additional states, but DOE plans to consolidate these materials at 
two DOE sites for reasons unrelated to its repository plans.
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    In any event, in the Yucca Mountain Development Act, Pub. L. 107-
200, Congress directed DOE to proceed with the development of a license 
application for a repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste. DOE believes that this statute and the 
NWPA make it incumbent on DOE to proceed with appropriate 
transportation planning so the Department will be in a position to 
fulfill its responsibility under the NWPA to begin disposal of this 
material promptly, should the NRC grant the necessary authorizations 
for it to do so.

Transportation-Related Comments on the Final EIS

    DOE distributed about 6,200 copies of the Final EIS and has 
received written comments on the Final EIS from the White Pine County 
Nuclear Waste Project Office, White Pine County Board of County 
Commissioners, Board of County Commissioners Lincoln County, Board of 
Mineral County Commissioners, and a member of the public. Although 
comments were received on a variety of issues, the following summation 
addresses only those few comments related to the transportation of 
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to a Yucca Mountain 
repository.
    Commenters stated that DOE should develop specific transportation-
related mitigation measures, and encouraged DOE to do so in a 
cooperative manner. Commenters also stated that additional, more 
detailed and community-specific transportation analyses are needed for 
purposes of mitigation planning, as well as to support DOE in its 
transportation decisionmaking, such as the decision on the mode of 
transportation. Commenters also encouraged DOE to develop plans for 
transportation, such as route selection for shipments of spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste, and emergency planning and 
response. Commenters also requested clarification of the roles of the 
NRC and DOE's transportation services contractors, and whether counties 
are eligible for technical assistance and funding under Section 180(c) 
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA).
    As discussed below in Use of All Practicable Means to Avoid or 
Minimize Harm (Parts I and II), DOE has already adopted measures to 
avoid or minimize environmental harm that could result from the 
transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 
Additional potential mitigation measures associated with the 
construction of a rail line will be identified during preparation of an 
environmental impact statement that considers alternative alignments 
within the Caliente corridor for construction of the rail line (see 
PART II of this ROD). DOE also will consult with states, Native 
American tribes, local governments, utilities, the transportation 
industry and other interested parties in a cooperative

[[Page 18561]]

manner to refine the transportation system as it is developed. 
Furthermore, DOE must comply with the transportation-related provisions 
of the NWPA. Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste will 
be shipped to Yucca Mountain in casks that have been certified by the 
NRC (Section 180(a)). Prior to these shipments, DOE will comply with 
the regulations of the NRC regarding advanced notification of state and 
local governments (Section 180(b)).

Transportation Mode Decision

    Under the NWPA, the Department is responsible for planning that 
will allow for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste in the event the NRC authorizes receipt and 
possession of these materials at Yucca Mountain. Accordingly, as the 
next step in fulfilling that responsibility, the Department is issuing 
this Record of Decision to select a transportation mode. The Department 
has decided to select the preferred mode of transportation analyzed in 
the Final EIS, the mostly rail scenario, both on a national basis and 
in the State of Nevada. Under this decision, the Department would rely 
on a combination of rail, truck and possibly barge to transport to the 
repository up to 70,000 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste. Most of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste would be transported by rail. The Department would 
use truck transport where necessary, depending on certain factors such 
as the timing of the completion of the rail line proposed to be 
constructed in Nevada. This could include building an intermodal 
capability at a rail line in Nevada to take legal-weight truck casks 
from rail cars and transport them the rest of the way to the repository 
via highway, should the rail system be unavailable at the time of the 
opening of the repository \7\. In addition, since some commercial 
utilities are not able to accommodate rail casks, they would ship by 
legal-weight truck to the repository. Additionally, the Department 
would use heavy-haul truck and possibly barge as needed to ship spent 
nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear sites to nearby railheads outside 
Nevada for shipment to the repository.
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    \7\ In March 2004, DOE issued a Supplement Analysis and 
determined, in accordance with 10 CFR 1021.314, that this rail/
legal-weight truck scenario would not constitute a substantial 
change to the proposal previously analyzed in the Final EIS or 
significant new circumstances or information relevant to 
environmental concerns, as discussed in 40 CFR 1502.9(c)(1).
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Basis for Transportation Mode Decision

    As we explain below, the Department has concluded that it should 
use mostly rail nationwide and in Nevada based, in large part, on the 
analyses of the Final EIS. The Department also considered the 
preferences for rail transportation expressed by the State of Nevada 
and other factors described below.
    The analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate that the potential 
radiation doses to workers and the general public from rail, truck or 
barge transportation would be very small, and that the differences in 
resulting potential impacts from such exposures among the different 
modes of transportation also would be very small. Nevertheless, using 
mostly rail tends to minimize the potential environmental impacts that 
could occur. The decision to rely primarily on the nation's rail system 
to ship these materials would result in fewer shipments than would 
occur if legal-weight trucks were the primary mode of transportation. 
This in turn would result in fewer trucks on public highways. The lower 
number of rail shipments as compared to truck shipments is estimated to 
result in fewer potential traffic fatalities and, under routine 
conditions, slightly fewer latent cancer fatalities to workers and the 
general public relative to mostly legal-weight truck shipments.
    In reaching its decision, DOE also considered the number of 
commercial nuclear sites having, or expected to have, the capability to 
handle rail casks, the distances to suitable railheads near the 
commercial nuclear sites, and historical experience using rail to ship 
spent nuclear fuel and other large reactor-related components. The 
Department found that the preponderance of commercial sites have the 
capability and experience to ship to nearby railheads.
    The Department also considered preferences expressed by the State 
of Nevada in its comments on the Draft EIS. In these comments, the 
state indicated that DOE should plan its transportation system to 
maximize the use of rail.
    The Department also considered irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources and cumulative impacts in making its decision. 
There would be an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of 
resources, such as land, electric power, fossil fuels and construction 
materials, associated with the construction of a rail line in Nevada, 
although this commitment of resources would not significantly diminish 
these resources, either nationwide or in Nevada. DOE also recognizes 
that for all alternatives involving transportation of spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste, there could be cumulative 
impacts from past, present and reasonably foreseeable future activities 
involving transportation of other radioactive materials. Based on the 
analyses in the Final EIS, DOE does not expect that any cumulative 
impacts would be significant over the duration of shipping spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the repository.
    Based on these various considerations, DOE concludes that shipping 
by mostly rail, both nationally and in the State of Nevada, would be 
preferable to shipping by mostly truck or using heavy-haul trucks in 
Nevada.

Use of All Practicable Means To Avoid or Minimize Harm--Transportation 
Mode

    The shipment of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste is highly 
regulated and subject to the utmost scrutiny. DOE carefully follows the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC transportation rules now and 
will follow or exceed any others that may be established in the future 
whether by the Congress or by DOT or NRC. DOE also will consult with 
states, Native American tribes, local governments, utilities, the 
transportation industry and other interested parties in a cooperative 
manner to refine the transportation system as it is developed.
    Measures DOE will implement to avoid or minimize harm include the 
following \8\: prior to the shipment of spent nuclear fuel, the shipper 
or carrier must select routes and prepare a written plan listing origin 
and destination of the shipment, scheduled route, all planned stops, 
estimated time of departure and arrival, and emergency telephone 
numbers; advance notice must be provided to State and local governments 
prior to shipping irradiated reactor fuel through their states; anyone 
involved in the preparation or transport of radioactive materials will 
be required to have proper training; carriers must be provided with 
shipping papers containing emergency information, including contacts 
and telephone numbers, readily available during transport for 
inspection by appropriate officials; clearly identifiable markings, 
labels, and placards of hazardous contents must be provided; and all 
spent nuclear fuel and high-level

[[Page 18562]]

radioactive waste shipments would be in the most rugged casks (Type B, 
which range from small containers of sealed radioactive sources to 
heavily shielded steel casks that sometimes weigh as much as 150 tons).
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    \8\ Application of these measures to national security 
activities may, in some respects, be subject to section 7 of the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. section 10106.
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    The NRC has promulgated rules (10 CFR 73.37) and interim 
compensatory measures (March 4, 2002; 67 FR 9792) specifically aimed at 
protecting the public from harm that could result from sabotage of 
spent nuclear fuel casks. These security rules are designed to minimize 
the possibility of sabotage and facilitate recovery of spent nuclear 
fuel shipments that could come under the control of unauthorized 
persons. The use of armed escorts for all shipments; safeguarding the 
detailed shipping schedule information, monitoring of shipments through 
satellite tracking and a communication center with 24-hour staffing; 
and coordinating logistics with state and local law enforcement 
agencies all contribute to shipment security. Additionally, the cask 
safety features that provide containment, shielding, and thermal 
protection provide protection against sabotage. The Department and 
other agencies continue to examine the protections built into their 
physical security and safeguards systems for transportation shipments.
    DOE is now developing its transportation security plan and its 
design basis threat for transportation. The transportation security 
plan will be developed in cooperation with other Federal agencies, 
including the NRC, DOT, and the Department of Homeland Security. The 
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is exploring the use of 
armed Federal agents as escorts for all shipments and other operational 
techniques employed by the National Nuclear Security Administration's 
Office of Secure Transportation as well as the design of special 
security cars for rail transport, to further mitigate the potential 
threat of a terrorist act. In addition to its domestic efforts, the 
Department is a member of the International Working Group on Sabotage 
for Transport and Storage Casks, which is investigating the 
consequences of a potential act of sabotage and is exploring 
opportunities to enhance the physical protection of casks. As a result 
of the above efforts, DOE will modify its methods and systems as 
appropriate between now and the time shipments start.
    In compliance with section 180(c) of the NWPA, DOE will provide 
technical assistance and funds to states for training public safety 
officials of appropriate units of local government and Native American 
tribes through whose jurisdictions the Department plans to ship spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The training of public 
safety officials will cover procedures required for safe routine 
transportation of these materials and for dealing with emergency 
response situations.
    Pursuant to the NWPA, spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste will be transported in casks certified by the NRC. The NRC 
regulates and certifies the design, manufacture, testing and use of 
these casks. Additionally, the NWPA requires that DOE comply with NRC 
regulations regarding advance notification of State and local 
governments prior to transportation of spent nuclear fuel or high-level 
radioactive waste.
    At this stage in the decision-making, the Department believes it 
has incorporated all practicable mitigation measures. The Department 
will continue to identify and evaluate potential mitigation measures as 
the transportation system develops and as a result of the lessons 
learned from the shipping of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste.

Part II. Record of Decision for Nevada Rail Corridor

Background

    As noted above, the mostly rail scenario assumes that DOE will 
ultimately construct a rail line in Nevada to ship spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level radioactive waste to the repository. To implement that 
scenario, DOE therefore needs to select among alternative rail 
corridors within which to study possible alignments in which it will 
pursue construction of a rail line that would connect the repository at 
Yucca Mountain to an existing main rail line in Nevada in the event the 
NRC authorizes construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain. In the 
Final EIS, DOE analyzed five potential rail corridors--Caliente, 
Carlin, Caliente-Chalk Mountain, Jean and Valley Modified--for this 
potential rail line. Additional descriptive information, including 
variations associated with each corridor, may be found in section 
2.1.3.3 and Appendix J, section J.3.1.2, of the Final EIS. The Final 
EIS did not specify a corridor preference, but in December 2003, DOE 
announced its preference for the Caliente corridor (Notice of Preferred 
Nevada Rail Corridor; 68 FR 74951; December 29, 2003.

Proposed Action and Nevada Rail Corridors Considered in the Final EIS

A. Caliente Rail Corridor--Preferred Alternative
    The Caliente corridor originates at an existing siding to the 
mainline railroad near Caliente, Nevada. The corridor extends in a 
westerly direction to the northwest corner of the Nevada Test and 
Training Range (previously known as Nellis Air Force Range), before 
turning south-southeast to the repository at Yucca Mountain. The 
corridor ranges between 318 miles (512 kilometers) and 344 miles (553 
kilometers), depending on the variations to the corridor considered in 
the Final EIS. Construction of a rail line within the Caliente corridor 
would take about 46 months. The total life-cycle cost for construction 
and operation of the rail line is estimated to be $880 million (2001 
dollars).
B. Carlin Rail Corridor
    The Carlin corridor originates at the mainline railroad near 
Beowawe in north central Nevada. The Carlin and Caliente corridors 
converge near the northwest boundary of the Nevada Test and Training 
Range. Past this point, they are identical. The Carlin corridor ranges 
between 319 miles (513 kilometers) and 338 miles (544 kilometers) long, 
depending on the variations to the corridor. Construction of a rail 
line within the Carlin corridor would take about 46 months. The total 
life-cycle cost for construction and operation of the rail line is 
estimated to be $821 million (2001 dollars).
C. Caliente-Chalk Mountain Rail Corridor
    The Caliente-Chalk Mountain corridor is identical to the Caliente 
corridor until it approaches the northern boundary of the Nevada Test 
and Training Range. At that point the Caliente-Chalk Mountain corridor 
turns south through the Nevada Test and Training Range and the Nevada 
Test Site to the Yucca Mountain site. Depending on the variations, the 
corridor is between 214 miles (344 kilometers) and 242 miles (382 
kilometers) long from the tie-in at the mainline near Caliente to the 
Yucca Mountain site. Construction of a rail line within the Caliente-
Chalk Mountain corridor would take about 43 months. The total life-
cycle cost for construction and operation of the rail line is estimated 
to be $622 million (2001 dollars). The Department designated the 
Caliente-Chalk Mountain alternative as non-preferred in the Final EIS 
due to national security concerns raised by the U.S. Air Force.

[[Page 18563]]

D. Jean Rail Corridor
    The Jean corridor originates at the existing mainline railroad near 
Jean, Nevada. The corridor ranges between 112 miles (181 kilometers) 
and 127 miles (204 kilometers) long from the tie-in with the mainline 
to the Yucca Mountain site. Construction of a rail line within the Jean 
corridor would take about 43 months. The total life-cycle cost for 
construction and operation of the rail line is estimated to be $462 
million (2001 dollars).
E. Valley Modified Rail Corridor
    The Valley Modified corridor originates at an existing rail siding 
off the mainline railroad northeast of Las Vegas. Depending on the 
variations, the corridor is between 98 miles (157 kilometers) and 101 
miles (163 kilometers) long from the tie-in with the mainline to the 
Yucca Mountain site. Construction of a rail line within the Valley 
Modified corridor would take about 40 months. The total life-cycle cost 
for construction and operation of the rail line is estimated to be $283 
million (2001 dollars).

Environmentally Preferable Rail Corridor Alternative

    DOE considered human health and environmental impacts that could 
occur from the construction of a rail line, as well as from shipping 
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in Nevada.
    Construction of a rail line, regardless of the rail corridor 
selected, would involve the disturbance of land and associated impacts, 
although low, to natural resources such as biological and cultural 
resources. For example, construction of a rail line in the Valley 
Modified corridor (shortest) would result in the disturbance of about 
1,240 acres; rail line construction in the Carlin corridor (longest) 
would disturb about 4,900 acres.
    Construction of any rail line in Nevada also would conflict with 
existing land uses. Depending on the variations considered, privately-
owned lands occur on less than one percent of the lands analyzed under 
the Caliente (ranges from 222 to 618 acres), Caliente-Chalk Mountain 
(ranges from 198 to 272 acres) and Valley Modified (ranges from 0 to 44 
acres) corridors, but up to about five and seven percent of the lands 
analyzed under the Jean (ranges from 32 to 865 acres) and Carlin 
(ranges from 1,804 to 3,756 acres) corridors, respectively. The 
Caliente and Carlin corridors cross Timbisha-Shoshone trust lands, and 
a relatively short distance on the Nevada Test and Training Range, 
although variations are available that would avoid these lands. The 
Caliente corridor crosses two wilderness study areas, and the Valley 
Modified corridor passes through the Desert National Wildlife Range, 
although variations may be available to avoid these lands. The 
Caliente-Chalk Mountain corridor crosses land dedicated to testing and 
training activities of the U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense on 
the Nevada Test and Training Range; no variations are available that 
would avoid the Range under this corridor alternative.
    Under any rail corridor alternative, water would be used for 
compaction of the rail bed and dust suppression, and by workers during 
construction. Water consumption would vary, primarily because of the 
length of the corridor, ranging from 320 acre-feet for the Valley 
Modified corridor to 710 acre-feet for the Caliente corridor.
    During the 24-year shipping period, assuming standard nationwide 
rail routing practices, the incident-free (routine) collective dose to 
members of the public from the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste by rail would result in less than one 
latent cancer fatality regardless of which corridor is selected. The 
difference in impacts among the corridors is minimal. Similarly, less 
than one latent cancer fatality would occur in the exposed worker 
population, and that is not affected by the Nevada corridor selection.
    DOE also estimated the potential health effects to the general 
public that could result from a severe transportation accident during 
shipments to the repository (referred to in the Final EIS as a maximum 
reasonably foreseeable accident). If such an accident were to occur in 
a rural population setting, the collective radiological dose to members 
of the public would result in less than one latent cancer fatality. The 
probability that this accident could occur is extremely unlikely--about 
2 chances in 1 million per year.
    The environmental impacts identified in the Final EIS do not 
provide a clear basis for discriminating among alternative rail 
corridors in Nevada. Each of these alternatives would result in some 
impact to the environment and public health and safety. Construction of 
a rail line within any rail corridor would involve certain land use 
conflicts, and land disturbance with attendant impacts (although small, 
the impacts tend to increase with increasing corridor length). 
Radiation exposure to workers and the public in Nevada would be small, 
and the differences among the rail corridor alternatives also would be 
very small.
    For these reasons, DOE does not consider the differences among the 
corridor alternatives to be sufficient to make any of them clearly 
environmentally preferable.
    Finally, although the potential impacts of any of the five 
potential rail corridors would be small, they would be greater than the 
potential transportation-related impacts of the No-Action Alternatives. 
Nevertheless, as explained above, the impacts of proceeding with 
construction and operation of a repository at Yucca Mountain, including 
transportation, are relatively small and less than either of the No-
Action Alternative scenarios. Part I (of this ROD) provides further 
comparison of the proposed action and the No-Action Alternative 
scenarios. In any event, given DOE's responsibilities under the Yucca 
Mountain Development Act and the NWPA, DOE believes it is obligated to 
proceed with appropriate transportation planning, including, given its 
selection of the mostly rail scenario in Nevada, the selection of a 
corridor in which to study possible alignments for the Nevada rail 
line, in preference to either No-Action Alternative scenario.

Comments on Preferred Rail Corridor

    DOE noticed its preference for the Caliente corridor in the Federal 
Register (December 29, 2003; 68 FR 74951). The Carlin corridor was 
identified as a secondary preference. The Department has received 
comments on the preference announcement. Concerns expressed in these 
comments included the need for a comprehensive programmatic EIS 
covering all aspects of nuclear waste transportation to Yucca Mountain, 
avoidance of all major population centers with transportation routes, 
and provision of documentation supporting the preference decision. 
Other comments addressed the need for adequate opportunities for public 
participation and comment on the corridor preference announcement, 
including a request for cooperating agency status for any future rail 
alignment EIS. Selection of a corridor preference prior to having a 
mode of transportation decision was raised as a concern. In addition, 
there was confusion regarding the designation of the Carlin corridor as 
a secondary preference and its relationship to the upcoming rail 
alignment EIS process. Furthermore, commenters indicated that a rail 
line in the Caliente corridor would have significant negative impacts 
on cultural, socioeconomic, and wildlife resources, as well as a 
massive modern

[[Page 18564]]

sculpture project. Others raised the potential for impacts to ranchers 
living in proximity to the proposed Caliente corridor, including 
questions regarding the design and operation of a rail line and the 
nature of measures that could mitigate resulting adverse impacts. 
Finally, several commenters thanked DOE for announcing its corridor 
preference, recognizing the challenges and opportunities and associated 
need to coordinate closely as DOE proceeds with transportation 
planning.
    Comments calling for DOE to prepare a programmatic transportation 
EIS and the need to avoid all major Nevada population centers with 
transportation routes were addressed in the response to comments in the 
Final EIS. DOE believes a programmatic EIS to be unnecessary as its 
Final EIS provides the environmental impact information necessary to 
make certain broad transportation-related decisions (as described above 
in Transportation-Related Decisions).
    With regard to avoiding population centers, the analyses of the 
Final EIS illustrate that potential public health and safety impacts 
would be so low for individuals who lived and worked along any route 
that individual impacts would not be discernible, even if the 
corresponding doses could be measured.
    Although some commenters stated that DOE's intent in identifying 
the Carlin corridor as a secondary preference was unclear, the decision 
to select the Caliente corridor also represents DOE's intent to no 
longer consider the Carlin corridor for development of a rail line. 
This decision and the basis for not selecting the Carlin corridor are 
discussed below in Rail Corridor Decision and Basis for Rail Corridor 
Decision.
    The remaining concerns and issues regarding potential environmental 
impacts associated with the development of a rail line, potential 
mitigation measures, and opportunities for public involvement and 
project participation will be addressed during the future preparation 
of a rail alignment EIS. As part of developing this documentation, DOE 
will identify and adopt measures to avoid or minimize environmental 
harm that could result from the construction and operation of a rail 
line within the Caliente corridor.

Rail Corridor Decision

    In Part I of this Record of Decision, the Department selected, both 
on a national basis and in the State of Nevada, the mostly rail 
scenario. That decision is premised on the assumption that DOE will 
ultimately construct a rail line to connect the repository site to an 
existing rail line in the State of Nevada. To that end, the Department 
has decided to select the preferred rail corridor alternative, the 
Caliente corridor, in which to evaluate alignments for a rail line.

Basis for Rail Corridor Decision

    The Department decided to evaluate alignments within the Caliente 
corridor for possible construction of a rail line based, in large part, 
on the analyses of the Final EIS. The Department, however, also 
considered other factors discussed below, such as potential for 
construction delay, direct and indirect costs of each alternative, and 
comments received from the public.
    The Department considered irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources and cumulative impacts in making its decision. 
There would be an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of 
resources, such as electric power, fossil fuels, construction 
materials, and water associated with the construction of a rail line in 
Nevada, although this commitment of resources would not significantly 
diminish the resources in question in Nevada. DOE recognizes that for 
all rail corridors there could be cumulative impacts from past, present 
and reasonably foreseeable future activities.
    The Department considered potential land use conflicts and their 
potential to affect adversely construction of a rail line, as analyzed 
in the Final EIS in making this decision. If the Department were to 
select the Valley Modified rail corridor there may be conflicts with 
the Desert National Wildlife Range and local community plans for 
development in the greater Las Vegas metropolitan area. If the 
Department were to select the Caliente-Chalk Mountain corridor there 
would be conflicts with U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense 
testing and training activities directly related to national security 
interests on the Nevada Test and Training Range. If the Department were 
to select the Jean corridor it may require crossing relatively greater 
amounts of private land, and would pose greater potential land use 
conflicts because of its proximity to the greater Las Vegas 
metropolitan area. If the Department were to select the Carlin corridor 
it would also require crossing relatively greater amounts of private 
land. Moreover, little infrastructure, such as roads and electric 
power, is available over long segments, which would tend to make 
logistics during construction as well as emergency response 
capabilities more challenging. Overall, the Caliente rail corridor 
appears to have the fewest land use or other conflicts that could lead 
to substantial delays in acquiring the necessary land and rights-of-
way, or in beginning construction.
    DOE also considered concerns expressed by the public in Nevada. In 
these comments, the public stated that DOE should avoid rail corridors 
in the Las Vegas Valley.
    The Department also considered the direct costs of constructing and 
operating a rail line, and the indirect costs resulting from potential 
delays in the availability of the rail line. The Jean and Valley 
Modified corridors are the shortest and have the lowest estimated 
construction costs. The Carlin and Caliente corridors are the longest 
and on the basis of construction cost alone would be more expensive to 
develop. However, delays in the construction of the rail line because 
of land use or other conflicts and the resulting inability to accept 
large amounts of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste 
transported by a railroad to the repository in a timely manner could 
add to both the liability costs for delayed acceptance of commercial 
spent nuclear fuel and the costs of continued storage of DOE wastes.
    Based on all of the above, DOE concludes that the Caliente corridor 
is preferable to the other corridors it evaluated as a potential 
corridor in which to construct a rail line. Therefore, DOE has decided 
to select the Caliente corridor as the one within which to evaluate 
possible alignments for the rail line connecting the repository to an 
existing main rail line in Nevada.

Use of All Practicable Means To Avoid or Minimize Harm--Rail Corridor

    In the Final EIS, DOE identified transportation-related measures 
that would be implemented, and other measures that would require 
further consideration and refinement before adoption to avoid or 
minimize environmental harm. As described in Part I, this decision 
adopts all practicable measures to avoid or minimize adverse 
environmental impact that could result from the transportation of spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive wastes to a repository at Yucca 
Mountain appropriate at this stage of decision-making. Construction of 
a rail line will be consistent with applicable Federal, state and 
Native American tribal requirements. In addition to these measures, 
other potential mitigation measures associated with the construction of 
a rail line will be identified and evaluated during preparation of 
future NEPA documentation.


[[Page 18565]]


    Issued in Washington, DC April 2, 2004.
Margaret S. Y. Chu,
Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
[FR Doc. 04-7949 Filed 4-7-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P