[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 65 (Monday, April 5, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17717-17718]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-7555]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-245]
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Millstone Power Station, Unit
1; Exemption
1.0 Background
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License No. DPR-21, which authorizes the licensee to
possess the Millstone Power Station, Unit 1. The license states, in
part, that the facility is subject to all the rules, regulations, and
orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or
NRC) now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a boiling water reactor located at the
licensee's site in Waterford, Connecticut. The facility is permanently
shut down and defueled and the licensee is no longer authorized to
operate or place fuel in the reactor.
2.0 Request/Action
Section 140.11(a)(4) of 10 CFR part 140 requires a reactor with a
rated capacity of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more to maintain
primary liability insurance of $300 million \1\ and to participate in a
secondary insurance pool. All operating reactor sites carry $300
million in primary insurance coverage. All decommissioning plants
except Millstone Power Station Unit 1 have been allowed to discontinue
the secondary insurance coverage. Single unit decommissioning plants
without operating reactors on the same site have been allowed to reduce
their primary insurance coverage to $100 million. When Millstone Unit 1
receives its exemption it will still be covered by $300 million in
primary insurance because two other operating reactors exist on the
same site.
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\1\ At the time that Northeast Nuclear Energy Company requested
the exemption from secondary financial protection the requirement
for primary insurance coverage was $200 million. The regulation now
requires $300 million in primary coverage.
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By letter dated September 28, 1999, as supplemented by a letter
dated March 2, 2000, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.,
which assumed operating authority for Millstone Unit 1 in March 2001,
provided a supplementary letter dated November 6, 2003. The licensee
requested to withdraw from participation in the secondary insurance
pool.
3.0 Discussion
The NRC may grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part
140 of the regulations which, pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, are authorized
by law and are otherwise in the public interest. The underlying purpose
of Section 140.11 is to provide sufficient liability insurance to
ensure funding for claims resulting from a nuclear incident or a
precautionary evacuation.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance to cover the
costs of a nuclear accident at an operating reactor. Although the risk
of an accident at an operating reactor is very low, the consequences
can be large, in part due to the high temperature and pressure of the
reactor coolant system, as well as the inventory of radionuclides. In a
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor facility, the possibility of
accidents involving the reactor and its systems, structures and
components, is eliminated. Further reductions in risk occur because (1)
the decay heat from spent fuel decreases over time, which reduces the
amount of cooling required to prevent the spent fuel from heating up to
a temperature that could compromise the ability of the fuel cladding to
retain fission products; and (2) the relatively short-lived
radionuclides contained in the spent fuel, particularly volatile
components such as iodine and noble gases, decay away, thus reducing
the inventory of radioactive materials that are readily dispersible and
transportable in air.
Although the risk and consequences of a radiological release
decline substantially after a plant permanently defuels its reactor,
they are not completely eliminated. There are potential onsite and
offsite radiological consequences that could be associated with the
onsite storage of the spent fuel in the spent fuel pool (SFP). In
addition, a site may contain an inventory of radioactive liquids,
activated reactor components, and contaminated materials. For purposes
of modifying the amount of insurance coverage maintained by a power
reactor licensee, the potential consequences, despite very low risk,
are an appropriate consideration.
By letter dated March 2, 2000, the licensee submitted an analysis
of the heatup characteristics of the spent fuel in the absence of SFP
water inventory. The licensee concluded that air cooling of the fuel
would be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding. The
staff independently evaluated the licensee's analysis and found it to
be acceptable.
The above analyses established that air cooling was adequate in the
normal storage configuration, but events could change the configuration
of stored fuel or otherwise degrade the effectiveness of cooling. This
potential was addressed in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel
Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' which
concluded that the probability of fuel uncovery is very low, and the
probability of a random event that substantially reconfigures stored
fuel such that cooling becomes inadequate is much lower still. Even
with inadequate cooling, NUREG-1738 presented data indicating that fuel
with over 5 years' decay time would require over 24 hours of complete
adiabatic conditions (obstructed air flow) to reach temperatures
associated with rapid cladding oxidation and release of fission
products. The staff considers these conclusions applicable to Millstone
Unit 1 since its spent fuel has been decaying since November 1995. A
partial drain-down of the SFP could interfere with natural convection
heat transfer and lead to a heatup of the spent fuel. However, if this
were to occur, sufficient time is available for the licensee to take
compensatory actions (such as refilling the SFP or spraying water on
the spent fuel) thereby restoring necessary cooling. The staff judges
that the analyses in NUREG-1738 are conservative and that there will be
sufficient time for reasonable compensatory action for this small
likelihood event.
The NUREG-1738 study did not evaluate the risk from malevolent
acts. With regard to physical protection, the Millstone Unit 1 SFP is
located within the overall Millstone site protected area (PA) which
also contains operating Millstone Units 2 and 3. The licensee maintains
a protective strategy for Units 2 and 3 that is in compliance with the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 and interim compensatory measures issued
by Order on February 25, 2002. By
[[Page 17718]]
virtue of its location in the overall Millstone site PA (including
Units 2 and 3), the Unit 1 SFP is accorded the substantial protection
provided by the licensee's compliance with the Unit 2 and 3
requirements.
Based on insights from NUREG-1738 and other SFP analyses, the
probability of a zirconium fire involving the Millstone Power Station,
Unit 1 spent fuel is expected to be very low and well within the
Commission's safety goals. The staff considers that the significant age
of the spent fuel (over eight years), improved security measures at the
site and the location of two operating reactors at the same site
significantly reduce the risk of a spent fuel accident/incident at the
Millstone Power Station Unit 1. For this reason, an accident/incident
involving the spent fuel resulting in a large offsite release or the
need to evacuate a large portion of the local population has a very low
likelihood. Additionally, the fuel at Millstone Power Station, Unit 1
has decayed in excess of eight years, substantially reducing the
potential offsite consequences of fuel damage. The potential
consequences continue to decrease as time passes.
A licensee's liability for offsite costs may be significant due to
lawsuits alleging damages from offsite releases. An appropriate level
of financial liability coverage is needed to account for potential
judgments and settlements and to protect the Federal government from
indemnity claims. The staff believes that the Commission's requirement
to maintain the $300 million in primary offsite financial protection at
the Millstone site is sufficient for this purpose.
In a letter from the Executive Director for Operations to the
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) dated
September 17, 2001, post-shutdown insurance requirements for
decommissioning nuclear power plants were addressed. The staff and the
ACRS agreed that onsite and offsite insurance coverage can be
substantially reduced shortly after a facility permanently shuts down.
The ACRS also accepted the staff's assessment that the primary
insurance level be reduced to $100 million (the Millstone site
maintains a primary insurance level of $300 million because of the two
operating units) and that decommissioning licensees be released from
participation in the secondary insurance pool.
The staff has completed its review of the licensee's request to
withdraw from participation in the secondary insurance pool. On the
basis of its review, the staff finds that the risk from random events
associated with the spent fuel stored in the Millstone Power Station,
Unit 1 SFP is very low and well within the Commission's safety goals.
Additionally, the staff believes that the security measures already
implemented for the Millstone site (collectively for Millstone Units 1,
2 and 3) including supplemental requirements issued by Order on
February 25, 2002, provide reasonable assurance of protection against
radiological sabotage and adequate protection of public health and
safety and the common defense and security. Therefore, the licensee's
proposed protection limits (i.e., $300 million in primary insurance
coverage) will provide sufficient insurance to recover from limiting
hypothetical events, if they occur, and the underlying purpose of the
regulation will not be adversely affected by the reduction in insurance
coverage.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, an exemption to withdraw from the secondary insurance pool for
offsite liability insurance is authorized by law and is otherwise in
the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Dominion
Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., an exemption as described above from the
secondary insurance requirements of 10 CFR part 140.11(a)(4) for the
Millstone Power Station, Unit 1.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that this
exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the
human environment (65 FR 42038).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of March 2004.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Eric J. Leeds,
Deputy Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 04-7555 Filed 4-2-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P