[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 230 (Monday, December 1, 2003)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 67068-67086]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-29805]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 571 and 586

[Docket No. NHTSA-03-16523]
RIN 2127-AF36


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Fuel Systems Integrity

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, NHTSA is upgrading the rear impact test in 
the Federal motor vehicle safety standard on fuel system integrity. To 
simulate being struck in the rear by another vehicle, that standard 
currently specifies that the full width of the rear of the test vehicle 
be impacted with a flat, rigid barrier at speeds up to 48 km/h (30 
mph). This final rule replaces that full rear impact test procedure 
with an offset rear impact test procedure specifying that only a 
portion of the width of the rear of the test vehicle be impacted at 80 
km/h (50 mph). Under the new rear impact procedure, a lighter, 
deformable barrier is used. The barrier is very similar to the one used 
for dynamic testing in the agency's side impact protection standard, 
except that the rear impact barrier's face is mounted slightly lower to 
simulate the diving of the front end of a vehicle during pre-crash 
braking. The agency has concluded that the new, more stringent rear 
impact test procedure will save lives and prevent injuries.
    This final rule replaces the standard's lateral (side) impact test 
procedure with the procedure specified in the agency's side impact 
protection standard at an impact speed range of 53 +/- 1 km/h. The 
agency has concluded that this change will provide a more realistic 
test, increase safety, and reduce testing costs.

DATES: This final rule is effective January 30, 2004. Voluntary 
compliance is permitted on or after that date. If you wish to submit a 
petition for reconsideration of this rule, your petition must be 
received by January 15, 2004.

ADDRESSES: You may submit petitions for reconsideration [identified by 
DOT DMS Docket Number] by any of the following methods:
    [sbull] Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for 
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
    [sbull] Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    [sbull] Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590-001.
    [sbull] Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif 
Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
    [sbull] Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.

Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and docket 
number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. 
Note that all comments received will be posted without change to http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information provided. Please see 
the Privacy Act heading under Regulatory Notices. Docket: For access to 
the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to 
http://

[[Page 67069]]

dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. 
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical and other non-legal 
issues, you may call Dr. William J.J. Liu, Office of Crashworthiness 
Standards, Telephone: (202) 366-2264, Fax: (202)-366-4329.
    For legal issues, you may call Mr. Chris Calamita, Office of Chief 
Counsel Telephone: (202) 366-2992, Fax: (202)-366-3820.
    You may send mail to both of these officials at the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW., 
Washington, DC 20590.
    You may call Docket Management at (202)-366-9324. You may visit the 
Docket on the plaza level at 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC, 
from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
    A. Existing Standard
    B. Safety Problem
II. 1995 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
III. 2000 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    A. Proposed Rear Impact Test Procedure
    B. Proposed Side Impact Test Procedure
    C. Door System Integrity
    D. Lead Time
    E. Costs and Benefits
    F. Request for Comments on Additional Issues
IV. Summary of Comments
    A. Rear Impact Test Procedure Upgrade
    B. Side Impact Test Procedure Upgrade
    C. Door System Integrity
    D. Lead Time
    1. Rear Impact Test Upgrade
    2. Side Impact Test Upgrade
    E. Costs and Benefits
    F. Additional Issues
    1. Real World Data
    2. Head and Neck Injury Criteria
    3. Seat Back Failure
    4. Use of 5th Percentile Female Dummies
    5. Test Vehicle Loading Conditions
    6. Lowering the Barrier Face
    7. Pole Side Impact Test
    8. Prohibiting Fuel Leakage in Frontal Impact Crash Tests
    9. Compliance Responsibility of Second-Stage Manufacturers
    10. Fuel Siphoning
V. Final Rule
    A. Summary of the Final Rule
    B. Rear Impact Test Procedure
    C. Side Impact Test Procedure
    D. Door System Integrity
    E. Lead Time
    1. Rear Impact Test Upgrade
    2. Side Impact Test Upgrade
    F. Benefits
    G. Costs
    H. Additional Issues
    1. Real World Data
    2. Head and Neck Injury Criteria
    3. Seat Back Failure
    4. Use of 5th Percentile Female Dummies
    5. Test Vehicle Loading Conditions
    6. Lowering the Barrier Face
    7. Pole Side Impact Test
    8. Prohibiting Fuel Leakage in Frontal Impact Crash Tests
    9. Compliance Responsibility of Second-Stage Manufacturers
    10. Fuel Siphoning
VI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

I. Background

A. Existing Standard

    Standard No. 301, Fuel system integrity, sets performance 
requirements for the fuel systems of vehicles with a gross vehicle 
weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less. The standard, 
which was issued in the 1970s, limits the amount of fuel spillage from 
fuel systems of vehicles during and after being subjected to a frontal, 
rear, or side impact test.
    In the frontal impact test, the test vehicle is driven forward into 
a fixed barrier at 48 km/h (30 mph). In the rear impact test, a 1,814 
kg (4,000 pound) barrier moving at 48 km/h (30 mph) is guided into the 
full width of the rear of a stationary test vehicle. In the side impact 
test, a 1,814 kg (4,000 pound) barrier moving at 32 km/h (20 mph) is 
guided into the side of a stationary test vehicle. The standard sets 
three separate limits on fuel spillage from crash-tested vehicles: 28 
grams (1 ounce) by weight, during the time period beginning with the 
start of the impact and ending with the cessation of vehicle motion; a 
total of 142 grams (5 ounces) by weight during the 5-minute time period 
beginning with the cessation of vehicle motion; and 28 grams (1 ounce) 
by weight during any 1-minute interval in the 25-minute period 
beginning with the end of the 5-minute period.
    Similar fuel spillage limits apply to vehicles tested in accordance 
with the standard's static rollover test procedure.\1\ The rollover 
test is conducted after frontal, rear, and side impact tests.
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    \1\ Under S5.6, Fuel spillage; rollover., when a vehicle is 
rotated along its longitudinal axis to each successive increment of 
90 degrees, fuel spillage from the onset of rotational motion must 
not exceed 142 grams (5 ounces) for the first 5 minutes of testing, 
at each successive 90 degree increment. For the remaining test 
period at each increment of 90 degrees, fuel spillage during any one 
minute interval must not exceed 28 g (1 ounce).
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B. Safety Problem

    Preserving fuel system integrity in a crash is critical to 
preventing occupant exposure to fire. Although vehicle fires are 
relatively rare events (occurring in less than 1 percent of vehicles in 
towaway crashes), they tend to be severe in terms of the number of 
casualties caused. According to an analysis of data in the agency's 
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) in 2001, 3.5% percent (1,449 
fatalities) of light vehicle occupant fatalities occurred in crashes 
involving fire.\2\ Overall, the fire itself was deemed to be the most 
harmful event in the vehicle for about 24 percent (341) of these 
fatalities.
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    \2\ These fatalities included fatalities due to burns and/or 
impact injuries, but not due to asphyxiation.
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    An analysis of 1993-2001 National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) 
data indicated that each year an average of about 15,820 occupants were 
exposed to a post-crash fire in passenger cars and light vehicles 
(vans, pickup trucks, and multipurpose passenger vehicles) with a GVWR 
of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less that were towed away after the 
fire. Of those occupants, about 736 (6 percent) received moderate or 
severe burns (AIS 2 and greater). Three-quarters of those with moderate 
and more severe burns had second or third degree burns over more than 
90 percent of the body. Moreover, the agency notes that maximum-
severity (AIS 6) burns are nearly always fatal. These statistics 
underscore the importance of preserving fuel system integrity in a 
crash in order to prevent vehicle fires.

II. 1995 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    On April 12, 1995, NHTSA published an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPRM) announcing the agency's plans to consider upgrading 
Standard No. 301.\3\ The agency explained that it was considering using 
a three-phase approach to upgrade the requirements of the standard. 
Phase 1 would focus on requirements for component performance (e.g., 
fuel tanks, fuel pumps, and electrical systems); Phase 2 would address 
system performance (e.g., shutting down fuel supply and potential 
ignition sources in the event of a breach in the fuel system); and 
Phase 3 would address issues related to environmental and aging effects 
(e.g., the potential relationship of vehicle aging to fire occurrence). 
The

[[Page 67070]]

agency sought comment on this approach as well as several other issues.
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    \3\ 60 FR 18566. Previously, the agency published a Request for 
Comments notice stating that NHTSA was ``considering initiating 
rulemaking to upgrade the protection currently provided by'' 
Standard No. 301. 57 FR 59041, December 14, 1992; Docket No. 92-66, 
Notice 1. The notice also requested answers to specific questions 
related to test impact speeds, impact barriers, effect of vehicle 
aging on the likelihood of fire, contribution of occupant entrapment 
to the likelihood of fire-related injuries, etc.
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    NHTSA received comments from component and vehicle manufacturers, 
industry associations, consumer advocacy organizations, and other 
organizations. After reviewing these comments and further analysis, the 
agency made the following decisions.
    First, after examining the effectiveness of fuel pump shut-off 
devices in reducing post-crash vehicle fires, the agency decided not to 
pursue rulemaking with respect to fuel system component performance. 
The agency's review of NASS data did not reveal a significant 
difference in the rate or severity of post-crash fire occurrence in 
vehicles with and vehicles without fuel pump shut-off devices. Research 
conducted under the General Motors (GM) C/K settlement agreement \4\ 
confirmed this finding during crash testing with and without fuel pump 
shut-off devices. During crash testing, there was no difference in the 
rate of fuel leakage or severity of post-crash fire occurrence between 
vehicles equipped with shut-off switches (Ford) and those without (GM, 
Chrysler and Honda).
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    \4\ On December 2, 1994, the Secretary of Transportation 
announced a settlement of an investigation by NHTSA of an alleged 
safety defect in certain GM pickup trucks with fuel tanks mounted 
outside the frame rails. Under that settlement, GM contributed over 
$51.3 million for a variety of safety initiatives. Among other 
things, the settlement funded research on ways to reduce the 
occurrence and effects of post-crash fires. All relevant results of 
this research are being placed in dockets NHTSA-98-3585, NHTSA-98-
3588, Docket No. 96-GMRSCH-GR, and Docket No. 95-20-GR.
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    Second, the agency decided not to pursue rulemaking related to 
environmental and aging effects. The agency agreed with vehicle 
manufacturer comments that further studies were needed to define the 
problems associated with environmental and aging effects and determine 
whether rulemaking would be appropriate to address them. The agency 
stated that it might revisit this issue upon further study. As part of 
the GM settlement, GM contracted with Southwest Research Institute to 
conduct research on the environmental factors and aging effects on fuel 
system components. This report showed some effects of corrosion on 
metal components and some effects of hot arid conditions on rubber 
components, and little effect on plastic components. The findings were 
inconclusive, but did not indicate serious problems affecting fuel 
system crash performance. No further agency action is planned at this 
time.\5\
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    \5\ http://dms.dot.gov/search/document.cfm?doucmentid=183754&docketid=3588 Docket Number NHTSA-1988-3588-177 (Miller, 
Michael et al. ``First, Second and Third Progress Reports and Final 
Report--Inspection of Aging Vehicles and Testing Components'')
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    Third, the agency decided to investigate the feasibility and 
practicability of upgrading Standard No. 301's rear and side impact 
requirements. The agency reviewed real world crash data to determine 
what types of rear impact crashes resulted in ``moderate,'' ``severe,'' 
and ``very severe'' fires.\6\ Next, the agency analyzed the data to 
determine whether it was the fire or the impact of the crash that 
caused the fatalities and injuries in the fire-related crashes. NHTSA 
then examined the data to determine the characteristics of rear crashes 
that were causing fire-related fatalities and injuries and developed a 
new crash test procedure to simulate the most frequent crash scenario 
that leads to fire and fire-related fatalities and injuries in rear 
impact crashes. The agency then performed seventeen crash tests using 
the new crash test procedure.\7\
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    \6\ A ``moderate'' fire is defined as fire damage to between 25 
and 50 percent of the vehicle surface; a ``severe'' fire is fire 
damage to between 50 and 75 percent of the vehicle surface; and a 
``very severe'' fire is fire damage to more than 75 percent of the 
vehicle surface.
    \7\ The rear impact tests used a 1,368 kg (3,015 pound) moving 
deformable barrier (MDB) with the barrier lowered by 50 mm (2 
inches) to simulate pre-crash braking. The MDB impacted the test 
vehicle at 80 km/h (50 mph) parallel to the longitudinal centerline 
of the test vehicle with a 70 percent overlap on the side of the 
vehicle where the fuel filler neck was located. However, the new 
rear impact test allows the MDB to strike the rear with the overlap 
on either side of the vehicle for all possible worst case scenarios, 
including dual fuel tank designs with filler necks on both sides and 
filler neck in the center of the rear.
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III. 2000 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

A. Proposed Rear Impact Test Procedure

    After reviewing the comments on the 1995 ANPRM and analyzing the 
real world crash data and data from the seventeen crash tests with the 
new crash test procedure, the agency published a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) on November 13, 2000.\8\ In the NPRM, the agency 
tentatively concluded that the proposed rear impact test procedure 
would reduce fire-related fatalities and injuries from rear impact 
crashes. Thus, the agency proposed to replace Standard No. 301's 
current rear impact test procedure with one that would specify 
impacting the rear of the test vehicle at 80 +/- 1 km/h (50 mph) with a 
1,368 kg (3,015 pound) moving deformable barrier (MDB) at a 70 percent 
overlap with the test vehicle. That barrier is very similar to that 
used under Standard No. 214, Side impact protection, in dynamic side 
impact testing except that the face of the MDB used in rear impact 
testing under Standard No. 301 would be 50 mm (2 inches) lower than the 
face of the Standard No. 214 barrier to simulate pre-crash braking.\9\
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    \8\ 65 FR 67693, Docket No. NHTSA-2000-8248.
    \9\ Standard No. 214, Side Impact Protection, specifies that the 
bottom of the face of the barrier is 11 inches above the ground and 
the bottom of the bumper is 13 inches above the ground. See Figure 
2.
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    The agency noted that the proposed test procedure would simulate a 
type of rear vehicle-to-vehicle collision that can result in post-crash 
fire in an otherwise survivable crash: a high speed offset rear strike 
to the vehicle that results in fuel leakage from a breach in the fuel 
system and, potentially, a rapidly spreading fire that results in 
fatalities and injuries. The agency also noted that NASS estimates show 
that the majority of fatal and nonfatal occupant burn injuries in rear 
impact crashes occurred in crashes in the 34 to 48 km/h (21 to 30 mph) 
delta-v range. The agency stated that the elements of the proposed 
offset rear impact test procedure were accordingly chosen to simulate 
vehicle-to-vehicle crashes with a delta-v range of 32 to 48 km/h (20 to 
30 mph).
    The agency tentatively concluded that the proposed offset rear 
impact test procedure was practicable. The agency stated:

    Crash test results indicate that large, medium, and small 
vehicles could be designed to meet the standard under the proposed 
upgraded rear impact procedure. In those tests, some small as well 
as large existing light-duty vehicles already meet the proposed 
upgrade. Several larger light-duty vehicles, including passenger 
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and light trucks, all passed 
the proposed upgrade. In addition, several small vehicles, the Mazda 
Miata, Chevrolet Metro, Nissan Sentra, and Honda Civic, passed the 
proposed upgrade. While we are aware that some existing smaller 
vehicles leaked fuel when tested under the proposed upgraded test 
procedure (e.g., the 1996 Suzuki Sidekick, Dodge Neon, and Geo 
Prizm, and the 1998 Chevrolet Cavalier, VW Jetta, and Ford Escort), 
we believe that relatively minor, inexpensive design changes would 
correct the vast majority of the failures.\10\ For example, the fuel 
lines in the Dodge Neon could be rerouted, and the area on top of 
the tank around the fuel sender unit plastic sealing plate could be 
reinforced on the VW Jetta.\11\
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    \10\ The Ford Mustang test series demonstrated the technical 
feasibility of redesigning a 1993 Ford Mustang so that it would pass 
the proposed upgrade test procedure (the 1996 Ford Mustang test). It 
demonstrated that structural and component design are critical, 
regardless of the fuel tank location, for passing the upgrade.
    \11\ 65 FR at 67701.

    NHTSA did not propose to require manufacturers to place each 
vehicle's

[[Page 67071]]

fuel tank forward of the rear axle, as suggested by Advocates for 
Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) in its comment on the ANPRM, 
because the agency believed such a requirement would be unnecessary and 
too design restrictive. The agency noted that the fuel tank of the 1996 
Ford Mustang, which passed the proposed upgraded test procedure, is 
located behind the rear axle. The agency stated that this test 
demonstrated that structural and component designs are more critical 
factors than fuel tank location in maintaining fuel system integrity.
    NHTSA also did not propose to use a heavier barrier (e.g., a 4,000-
pound barrier) to simulate impacts by light trucks and sport utility 
vehicles, again as suggested by Advocates, because in an 80 km/h (50 
mph) rear impact offset crash test, a 3,015-pound barrier effectively 
reproduces the damage profile seen in real world crashes that most 
often lead to fires. The agency stated that if a heavier barrier were 
used, the proposed rear impact crash test would no longer reproduce 
that profile. The agency also noted that it had conducted its research 
crash tests with a 3,015-pound barrier, and that further research and 
development would have to be conducted before a heavier barrier could 
be proposed for use in any test procedure.

B. Proposed Side Impact Test Procedure

    NHTSA proposed to replace the current lateral (side) impact crash 
test in Standard No. 301 with the side impact crash test currently 
specified in Standard No. 214. The Standard No. 214 side impact crash 
test specifies that a stationary vehicle be struck on either side by a 
1,368 kg (3,015 pound) MDB moving at a speed of 54 km/h.\12\
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    \12\ Currently, Standard No. 214 specifies an impact speed of 54 
km/h. In the NPRM, the agency proposed to change that specification 
in Standard No. 214 to 53 +/- 1 km/h and adopt it for Standard No. 
301. The agency noted that the new specification was very close to 
the speed (52.9 +/- 0.8 km/h) at which NHTSA's Office of Vehicle 
Safety Compliance was conducting Standard No. 214 tests. As 
explained later, we are adopting this proposal. In addition, we are 
also adopting the proposal to delete several paragraphs of outdated 
requirements in Standard No. 214 that related solely to vehicles 
manufactured in the mid-1990s.
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    The agency reasoned that test analyses show that the Standard No. 
214 side impact crash test exposes a tested vehicle to higher crush 
energy and crash forces, and to greater changes in velocity, than the 
existing Standard No. 301 side test. Test data also show the Standard 
No. 214 test exposes the fuel system components to greater forces.
    Moreover, the agency reasoned that replacing the Standard No. 301 
side test with the Standard No. 214 side impact test would reduce 
certification testing costs for manufacturers because they would only 
have to conduct one type of side impact test instead of two. The agency 
also noted that commenters on the ANPRM supported this change, stating 
that the change would be beneficial from both a safety and a cost 
perspective.

C. Door System Integrity

    In the NPRM, the agency also stated that it was considering adding 
a post-crash door openability test requirement to Standard No. 206.\13\ 
NHTSA noted that NASS data indicate that potential escape from a post-
crash vehicle fire was made more difficult for occupants with moderate 
or more serious burns because, among other reasons, they were sitting 
next to a door that was jammed shut by crash forces. The agency also 
noted that real-world crash reports indicate that there were instances 
in which fire suddenly started several minutes after the vehicle was 
impacted. Thus, the agency concluded that it is critical that occupants 
be able to exit the vehicle quickly and easily after a crash that could 
lead to a fire. The agency requested comment on whether such a 
requirement was necessary and, if so, what type of requirements would 
be appropriate, objective, and repeatable.
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    \13\ Standard No. 206 specifies requirements for door locks and 
door retention components.
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D. Lead Time

    NHTSA proposed a lead time of three years for the proposed upgraded 
rear impact test and one year for the change to the Standard No. 214 
side impact test. The agency stated that a three-year lead time 
appeared to be necessary for the proposed upgraded rear impact test 
because: (1) All of a manufacturer's makes and models would have to be 
tested under the upgraded test to determine compliance; and (2) for 
those vehicles that did not comply, countermeasures would have to be 
incorporated into designs and then implemented in engineering and 
manufacturing. The agency stated that only one year of lead time was 
needed for the new side impact test because few, if any, design changes 
would be necessary.
    NHTSA stated that between the date the final rule was issued and 
the date it took effect, manufacturers would be allowed the option of 
certifying vehicles under the existing Standard No. 301 tests or under 
the new tests. However, manufacturers would have to irrevocably select 
a test when they certified the vehicle.

E. Costs and Benefits

    The agency prepared a Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation (PRE) 
describing the costs and benefits of the proposed upgraded test 
procedures.\14\ NHTSA estimated that the average cost for vehicles that 
need to be modified to comply with Standard No. 301's requirements 
under the proposed test procedures would be $5 per vehicle. The agency 
also estimated that 46 percent of the vehicle fleet would have to be so 
modified.\15\ Since approximately 15.2 million vehicles are sold in the 
United States each year, the agency estimated that the total cost of 
the proposed rule would be $35 million each year.
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    \14\ A copy of the PRE was placed in the docket. See Docket No. 
NHTSA-2000-8248, entry 2.
    \15\ A NHTSA-sponsored cost study indicated that none of the 
proposed remedies for the noncompliant vehicles will require major 
structural redesign that will change the vehicle's structural 
stiffness (NHTSA Docket No. NHTSA-008248-4, Nov. 16, 2000).
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    NHTSA estimated that the proposed rule would save from 8 to 21 
lives annually, once all vehicles on the road meet Standard No. 301's 
requirements under the proposed upgraded test procedures.

F. Request for Comments on Additional Issues

    In the NPRM, the agency also requested comments on several issues. 
The questions are repeated below.
    1. Are there any real-world data, other than the data that the 
agency has already analyzed for this proposed upgrade, that may better 
describe the relationship between the risk of occupant injury due to 
fire and crash severity?
    2. Vehicle manufacturers. How many of your vehicle models would 
need some redesign to comply with the proposed offset rear impact and 
side impact test procedures? Describe the type and extent of design 
changes. What costs would be associated with those redesigns? Would you 
have any significant problems completing necessary redesigns within the 
three-year lead time? If so, please identify those problems and 
indicate how much lead time you would need.
    3. What impact would the proposed changes have on vehicle safety?
    4. Are the proposals sufficient and appropriate for the different 
sizes and types of vehicles?
    5. In the various crash tests that were performed during the 
research for this rulemaking, the values of head and neck injury 
criteria measured by the responses of the two front Hybrid III 
anthropomorphic test devices were

[[Page 67072]]

much higher than acceptable thresholds. Direct contact of the head of 
the dummy with the interior of the vehicle compartment, which occurred 
when the front seat rotated backward excessively due to the rear 
impact, contributed to these high values. These high values raise 
concerns about head and neck protection of the occupants. The rear 
impact testing also raised concerns about the seat back strength, as 
most seat backs collapsed in those tests. What do the high HIC values 
and neck loadings registered by the test dummies in those tests 
indicate about the real world potential for trauma injury to vehicle 
occupants in rear impacts? Could future vehicles be designed to provide 
both the improved fuel system integrity necessary to meet the more 
stringent requirements proposed in this NPRM and, at the same time, 
provide improved occupant protection in such impacts?
    6. How do seat back failures influence the injury potential in rear 
impacts? Please provide data and other information that would aid the 
agency in determining the need for improving seat back strength and the 
appropriate requirements for doing so.
    7. Should the agency require vehicles to retain fuel system 
integrity in tests with 5th percentile female dummies, as well as with 
50th percentile male dummies, as is currently required?
    8. NHTSA is proposing to eliminate the second sentence in S7.1.6(b) 
from Standard No. 301. That sentence reads: ``If the weight on any 
axle, when the vehicle is loaded to unloaded vehicle weight plus dummy 
weight, exceeds the axle's proportional share of the test weight, the 
remaining weight shall be placed so that the weight on that axle 
remains the same.'' Given the specifications in S7.1.6(a) concerning 
the placement of rated cargo and luggage capacity weight in the luggage 
area and the placement of dummies, is the second sentence in S7.1.6(b) 
needed for conducting Standard No. 301 compliance tests?
    9. For the rear offset MDB test conditions, the agency is proposing 
that the barrier be the same as the one shown in Figure 2 of Standard 
No. 214 and specified in 49 CFR Part 587, with one exception. The 
exception is that the face of the barrier would be positioned in the 
rear impact test so that it is 50 mm (2 inches) lower than the barrier 
face height specified in the current Figure 2 of Standard No. 214.\16\
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    \16\ The question also noted that positioning the barrier face 
in that manner might make it necessary to slightly change the center 
of gravity and moment of inertia specifications. NHTSA's subsequent 
analysis indicated that there will be no measurable effect on the 
center of gravity and the moment of inertia of the MDB by lowering 
the face of the barrier two inches (NHTSA Docket No. NHTSA-008248-3, 
November 16, 2000).
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    10. With respect to side impact crashes that result in fire, this 
proposal to upgrade Standard No. 301 addresses vehicle-to-vehicle 
crashes. There are approximately two to eight times as many side 
collision fires (depending on vehicle type) when the object struck is 
another vehicle compared to a narrow object such as a pole. However, 
the side collision fire rate for cars, light trucks, and vans is 
highest when a narrow object is struck. Would it therefore be 
reasonable to consider a pole side impact test as part of a subsequent 
upgrading of Standard No. 301?
    11. Should the agency amend Standard No. 301 to prohibit fuel 
leakage in any crash test under Standard No. 208?

IV. Summary of Comments

    NHTSA received comments to the NPRM from seven vehicle 
manufacturers (Subaru, DaimlerChrysler, Porsche, Volkswagen, Ford, 
Honda, and General Motors), two vehicle manufacturer associations 
(Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers \17\ and National Truck Equipment 
Association), three engineering firms (American Automotive Design, 
Dynamic Safety, and Syson-Hille and Associates), a test laboratory 
(Transportation Research Center), the Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety, and a consumer advocate group, Advocates for Highway and Auto 
Safety. Their comments are summarized below by issue.
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    \17\ The members of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 
are: BMW Group, DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Ford Motor Company, General 
Motors, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Nissan, Porsche, Toyota, 
Volkswagen, and Volvo.
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A. Rear Impact Test Procedure Upgrade

    None of the commenters opposed the proposed rear impact test 
procedure upgrade.
    The Alliance suggested that significant vehicle redesign will 
likely be required to meet the high speed rear crash requirements. 
Volkswagen (VW) stated that the rear end structure of small cars will 
need to be made stiffer, which could result in increased acceleration 
imposed on occupants in more common lower speed rear crashes. Honda 
commented that increased vehicle body and fuel tank deformation would 
occur, even on vehicles that pass the fuel leak requirements.
    DaimlerChrysler (DC) stated its belief ``that the proposal is 
likely to require significant changes to vehicle structure and design, 
which are yet to be fully defined and realized.'' DC argued that the 
proposed upgrade is a ``major rulemaking effort which will present many 
challenges to the industry that may not yet be fully identified.''
    DC also expressed concerns with using a MDB at the proposed impact 
speed (80 km/h). DC stated that in impacts between a MDB and a vehicle 
at 80 km/h, DC has observed complete crushing of the barrier face and 
ensuing contact with the rigid cart backer plate and contact between 
the cart uprights and the impacted vehicle. DC recommended that NHTSA 
reevaluate the proposed test procedure upgrade to determine if the 
anticipated benefits could be achieved with a lower impact speed (such 
as 56-64 km/h), or provide design changes to the MDB and cart system.
    GM and Ford observed bottoming of the barrier face to the backing 
plate and contact between the barrier uprights and the vehicle in some 
rear impact crash tests. GM also stated that the barrier face can 
underride the struck vehicle and, upon rebound, the upright that 
contacted the vehicle can become ``caught'' on vehicle structure (e.g., 
bumper, frame cross member, etc.), with undetermined effects on the 
struck vehicle. GM and Ford suggested that some changes to the MDB 
might be necessary. Ford recommended that the agency investigate 
``rounding the corners of the deformable portion of the barrier and 
increasing its depth.'' Ford stated that its testing indicated that the 
right angle corners of the barrier face can ``hang up on trim,'' 
potentially affecting test repeatability.
    Honda commented that it had conducted rear impact crash tests in 
accordance with the proposed test procedure. Honda noted that the MDB 
sometimes over-rode the rear of the test vehicle, and that in these 
instances, the rear frame structure of the vehicle could not absorb 
crash energy sufficiently to meet the fuel leaking requirements of 
Standard No. 301. Honda also noted, ``Even in instances when the rear 
frame functioned somewhat to absorb energy, the increased speed and the 
off-set impact caused extensive deformation of the fuel tank.'' Honda 
stated that a vehicle in compliance with the proposed upgrade would 
have to absorb twice as much energy as a vehicle in compliance with 
Standard No. 301 as currently written. Honda argued that under the 
proposed upgrade, significant changes would have to be made to each of 
its vehicle models.
    VW noted that the proposed rear impact would be to either side of 
the vehicle. VW recommended that this be

[[Page 67073]]

changed so that the impact is on the side of the vehicle where the fuel 
filler pipe or filler neck is located. VW argued that impacting the 
side of the vehicle where the fuel filler pipe or filler neck is 
located would represent the worst case condition and establish a more 
objective requirement for enforcement purposes.
    VW also commented that in order to assure compliance with the 
higher speed rear impact test, the vehicle rear end structure would 
have to be made stiffer, particularly in smaller cars. VW stated that 
this would tend to increase the potential for whiplash type injuries in 
lower speed crashes. VW recommended that NHTSA address this issue 
before issuing a final rule.
    Ford commented that it has conducted voluntary, in-house 80 km/h 
vehicle-to-vehicle rear impact crash tests to evaluate fuel system 
integrity since the mid-1980s. Ford supported the agency's proposed 
test upgrade, stating, ``Ford believes this test can provide a robust 
evaluation of a fuel system's integrity.''
    Syson-Hille commented that other vehicle manufacturers, such as GM, 
began conducting 80 km/h vehicle-to-vehicle rear impact crash tests in 
the 1980s, and that Mercedes-Benz marketing materials note that its 
vehicles have been designed to provide fuel system integrity in offset 
rear impact crashes since the early 1980s.
    The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), Advocates for 
Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates), and American Automotive Design 
(AAD), urged NHTSA to require the use of a 4,000-pound rigid barrier, 
instead of the 3,015-pound MDB. IIHS and Advocates urged this based on 
their view that the Standard No. 214 barrier does not reflect the 
characteristics of pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles (SUV) and 
thus may not reproduce the patterns or extent of deformation seen when 
those types of vehicles strike cars in the side or rear.

B. Side Impact Test Procedure Upgrade

    None of the commenters opposed the proposed side impact test 
procedure upgrade.
    DC recommended that, as in the proposed rear impact test procedure, 
the agency specify that the MDB be lowered 50 mm (2 inches) in the 
proposed side impact test procedure. DC stated that data indicate that 
pre-impact braking occurs in 54 percent of side impacts.

C. Door System Integrity

    Vehicle manufacturers generally opposed adding a post-crash test 
door operability requirement to Standard No. 206. The Alliance and GM 
agreed with and supported the logic regarding a post-crash test door 
operability requirement. However, the Alliance and GM stated that 
Standard No. 206 addresses component level performance, while a post-
crash test door operability requirement would address vehicle level 
performance. The Alliance stated that adding such a requirement to 
Standard No. 206 would necessitate the addition of vehicle crash test 
requirements to the standard as well. The Alliance also stated,

    Prior to proposing such requirements in future rulemakings, 
NHTSA would need to develop and define an objective set of 
meaningful and measurable requirements pertaining to the 
applicability of doors (front rear, sliding, etc.), number of doors 
(per row, per vehicle, etc.), and methodology by which operability 
would be assessed (without the use of tools is an insufficient 
measure, as NHTSA has concluded in past rulemaking efforts).

    GM stated that such a requirement would be more appropriate if it 
were added to crash tests that are already required for other safety 
standards, such as Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection, 
Standard No. 214, Side impact protection, or Standard No. 301. GM noted 
that it currently performs door operability evaluations following most 
barrier tests.\18\ GM argued that NHTSA should develop meaningful, 
appropriate, objective, and repeatable requirements for post-crash test 
door operability after further research and through separate 
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ GM stated, ``These evaluations start by first actuating the 
door latch. Assuming the door unlatches a nominal force of 
approximately 100 pounds is applied to open the door using a hook-
type dial gage. A measurement of how far the door could be opened is 
made and recorded.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DC argued that NHTSA has not provided sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the need for adding a post-crash test door operability 
requirement to Standard No. 206. DC recommended that NHTSA conduct 
research to determine such a requirement's real world benefits, 
feasibility, and effects on vehicle design, cost, and weight. DC 
suggested that if NHTSA persists in such a rulemaking, the agency 
require only one operable door per vehicle.
    Advocates supported adding a post-crash test door operability 
requirement to Standard No. 206. Advocates stated:

    Advocates believes that ensuring that doors can be opened after 
crashes is not a safety problem involving only fire-related 
collisions. It is a major safety issue long overdue for agency 
regulatory attention. Many thousands of crashes every year result in 
vehicle deformation preventing door opening. In these crashes, 
numerous people are seriously injured whose lives could be saved or 
the severity of their injuries substantially reduced if rescue 
squads could quickly reach them without recourse either to the use 
of Jaws of Life or to being forced to extricate a seriously injured 
person through a window or windshield, a common practice.

    Syson-Hille also supported a post-crash test door operability 
requirement. Syson-Hille recommended that the agency require at least 
one door on two-door vehicles and three doors on four-door vehicles to 
be operable after a crash test.

D. Lead Time

1. Rear Impact Test Upgrade
    The vehicle manufacturers all supported the three-year lead time 
proposed in the NPRM for the rear impact test upgrade, but recommended 
that the agency add a phase-in after that period. The Alliance 
recommended a four-year phase-in with an implementation schedule of 25 
percent compliance the first year, 40 percent the second year, 70 
percent the third year, and 100 percent the fourth year. The Alliance 
also recommended that the agency grant carry forward credits for early 
compliance.
    The Alliance argued that a phase-in is necessary because the 
Alliance considered this to be a ``major rulemaking, particularly in 
response to the substantially increased impact energy of the high speed 
rear offset impact testing proposed.'' The Alliance stated:

    Significant vehicle redesign and retooling for production will 
likely be required in a number of vehicles. The small number of 
tests conducted by the NHTSA, often with a sample size of one 
vehicle, simply is inadequate to identify whether vehicle changes 
are required or for any manufacturer to assure compliance for all 
its vehicles.

    DC supported the Alliance's recommended phase-in schedule. DC 
argued that such a phase-in would ``allow the efficient phasing out of 
older models designed to the current requirements with replacements 
that are thoroughly designed, constructed and tested to meet the more 
stringent requirements without very costly and disruptive mid cycle 
manufacturing changes.''
    Subaru recommended a three-year full phase-in, with complete 
compliance after the third year. Honda suggested a four-year phase-in 
with an implementation schedule of 10 percent, 30 percent, 70 percent, 
and 100 percent. Porsche supported the Alliance's recommended lead time 
but requested that the agency provide small volume manufacturers the 
option of coming into compliance at the 100 percent level in

[[Page 67074]]

the third year of the phase-in with no requirements in the first two 
years.
    IIHS stated that the proposed three-year lead time for the rear 
impact test upgrade should be sufficient.
2. Side Impact Test Upgrade
    Vehicle manufacturers supported the one-year lead time proposed in 
the NPRM for the side impact test upgrade, but recommended that the 
agency add a phase-in after this lead time. The Alliance and Ford 
recommended a four-year phase-in with an implementation schedule of 25 
percent compliance the first year, 40 percent the second year, 70 
percent the third year, and 100 percent the fourth year. The Alliance 
also recommended that the agency grant carry forward credits for early 
compliance.
    IIHS stated that the one-year lead time proposed by the agency in 
the NPRM should be sufficient.

E. Costs and Benefits

    Honda commented that the agency's cost estimates were insufficient. 
Honda stated, ``The cost of managing all the accompanying issues is at 
least 10 times greater than NHTSA's cost estimation.'' Honda claimed 
that to meet the proposed rear impact test upgrade, ``It will be 
necessary to change the thickness of the vehicle's rear structure, 
which requires the modification of existing dies and manufacturing of 
new dies and parts.''
    VW questioned the safety benefits of the proposed test upgrades. VW 
stated:

    The accident data base of the Medical University of Hanover in 
Germany indicates that in the universe of crashes with at least one 
injured occupant, only 0.58 percent resulted in after-crash fire and 
only 0.4 percent of the injuries in the data base were fire related. 
In the same sample of crashes, the whiplash injuries were reported 
in 11 percent of the cases. Although the vehicle fleet population in 
Germany is different from that in the U.S., Volkswagen submits that 
the statistics support the very low incidence of post-crash fires 
and fire related injuries.

F. Additional Issues

1. Real World Data
    The agency asked in the NPRM whether there were any real-world 
data, other than the data that NHTSA had already analyzed, that may 
better describe the relationship between the risk of occupant injury 
due to fire and crash severity.
    The Alliance, GM, DC, and Ford stated that there were no such data. 
The Alliance and GM commented that both the FARS and NASS files might 
need to be modified to more accurately define any remaining fire risk.
2. Head and Neck Injury Criteria
    In the NPRM, the agency noted that in the various crash tests that 
were performed during the research for this rulemaking, the values of 
head and neck injury criteria measured by the two front seat dummies 
were much higher than acceptable thresholds. The agency asked what 
these high injury values indicate about the real world potential for 
trauma injury to vehicle occupants in rear impacts.
    The Alliance stated that its members would need access to more 
details of NHTSA's test program in order to respond to this 
question.\19\ However, the Alliance argued that the issue of occupant 
protection in rear impacts is outside the scope of this rulemaking. The 
Alliance recommended that the agency address this issue in the ongoing 
Standard No. 202, Head restraints, rulemaking or in a possible future 
upgrade of Standard No. 207, Seating systems. The Alliance also 
commented that more research is needed to provide an appropriate level 
of seating system performance dealing with the proposed rear impact 
test upgrade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ The agency notes that it docketed a detailed list of all 
the rear impact crash test results discussed in the NPRM and other 
related dockets. See Docket No. NHTSA-99-5825-1, June 8, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Syson-Hille commented that both GM and Mercedes-Benz have been 
using 50 mph vehicle-to-vehicle rear impact tests, with occupant 
survival space criteria, since the 1980s. Advocates suggested that the 
agency consider upgrading requirements for the entire seating system 
(seat, seat back, and head restraint) to provide improved occupant 
protection in the proposed Standard No. 301 rear impact test upgrade.
3. Seat Back Failure
    In the NPRM, the agency asked how seat back failures influence 
injury potential in rear impacts. The agency also asked for data that 
would aid it in determining the need for improving seat back strength 
and the appropriate requirements for doing so.
    The Alliance stated that without a definition of ``seat back 
failure'' it could not answer the question. However, the Alliance 
defined the optimal seat back strength as the balance between strength 
and flexibility to address both severe and minor impacts.
    DC and Ford supported the Alliance's comments. DC commented that 
the issue of seat back strength is outside the scope of this 
rulemaking, and should be addressed in a possible future upgrade of 
Standard No. 207. Ford stated that seat back strength should be 
designed to enhance occupant safety in real-world crashes.
    GM agreed with an upgrade of Standard No. 207 seat back strength 
requirements in the future. However, GM stated that this should be done 
in a separate rulemaking.
    VW commented that a single optimal level of seat back strength is 
extremely difficult to define because of the range in impact severity 
(a function of impact speed and the impacting vehicle structure in 
real-world crash situations).
    Advocates stated:

    Advocates thinks it would be difficult for the agency to justify 
instituting the proposed rear impact fuel integrity test without 
reforming Standard No. 207 to prevent seat back collapse while also 
ensuring much better head restraint protection against whiplash 
injuries. It is obvious that it is unacceptable to propose a new 
crash test in which the majority of seatbacks in the test vehicles 
collapse or occupants suffer severe whiplash injuries in seats which 
maintain their upright positions. * * * Advocates is concerned that, 
in the short term, manufacturers may simply increase seat back 
strength, especially rigidity, to prevent seat backs from collapsing 
in the new No. 301 rear impact test.
4. Use of 5th Percentile Female Dummies
    In the NPRM, the agency asked whether it should require vehicles to 
meet the requirements of Standard No. 301 in tests with 5th percentile 
female dummies as well as with the currently-required 50th percentile 
male dummies.
    The Alliance, DC, GM, VW, and Ford opposed requiring the use of 5th 
percentile female dummies in Standard No. 301 rear impact tests. The 
Alliance stated that different dummy sizes would only change the total 
impact weight of the tested vehicles and would have little or no effect 
on the performance of the fuel system. However, GM supported the 
voluntary use of instrumented test dummies for research to understand 
better the mechanics and magnitude of the potential for injury for 
various dummy sizes in different crash situations.
    Advocates supported requiring the use of 5th percentile female 
dummies in the proposed rear impact test procedure. Advocates stated 
this would help prevent occupant injury due to ramp up of the seat 
back. In addition, Advocates suggested that the agency require use of 
the 95th percentile male dummy in Standard No. 301 rear impact tests to 
help prevent occupant injury due to seat back failure.
5. Test Vehicle Loading Conditions
    In the NPRM, the agency proposed to eliminate the second sentence 
of

[[Page 67075]]

S7.1.6(b) of Standard No. 301. That sentence reads:

    If the weight on any axle, when the vehicle is loaded to 
unloaded vehicle weight plus dummy weight, exceeds the axle's 
proportional share of the test weight, the remaining weight shall be 
placed so that the weight on that axle remains the same.

    The Alliance, Ford, and VW opposed the elimination of that 
sentence. The Alliance stated:

    The 136 kg load specified for impact testing by FMVSS [Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard] 301 is relatively small for many 
trucks. Even with this load directly over the rear axle, the test 
axle loads will generally not be in the same proportions as the 
specified GAWRs [gross axle weight ratings] for a full-sized truck. 
The second sentence allows the manufacturer to conduct the test when 
the conditions specified in the first sentence cannot be met.

    VW recommended that the agency incorporate the load distribution 
provisions of S7.1.6(b), which apply to multipurpose passenger 
vehicles, trucks, and buses, in S7.1.6(a), which applies to passenger 
cars. VW also suggested that the text of S7.1.6(a) and (b) be clarified 
to state that the weight placement and attachment must be out of the 
vehicle crush zone and done in a manner that does not interfere with 
vehicle crash deformation.
    GM recommended that the agency revise the test vehicle loading 
conditions to read as follows:

    Passenger cars. A passenger car is loaded to its unloaded 
vehicle weight plus the weight of the necessary anthropomorphic test 
devices, plus its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight, secured 
in the luggage area.
    Multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses. A 
multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, or bus is loaded to its 
unloaded vehicle weight plus the weight of the necessary 
anthropomorphic test devices, plus 136 kilograms or its rated cargo 
and luggage capacity weight, whichever is less, secured in the load 
carrying area and distributed as nearly as possible in proportion to 
its gross axle weight ratings. For the purposes of this standard, 
unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-
performing accessories.

    GM also recommended that the agency replace the language in S8.1.1 
of Standard No. 208, S6.1 of Standard No. 212, S7.7 of Standard No. 
219, S7.1.6 of Standard No. 301, S7.1.6 of Standard No. 303, and S7.2.3 
of Standard No. 305 with the same language as that quoted above.\20\ GM 
stated that these changes would facilitate common understanding, 
eliminate any ambiguity that might be due to any differences in the 
language of these standards, parallel the wording of the test 
procedure, and agree with the agency's intent for the loading 
conditions to be consistent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ GM recommended that the following sentence be included in 
the language for Standard Nos. 208, 212, and 219: ``Vehicles are 
tested to a maximum unloaded vehicle weight of 2,495 kilograms.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Lowering the Barrier Face
    In the NPRM, the agency proposed that the MDB that would be used in 
the proposed rear impact test procedure upgrade be the same as the one 
shown in Figure 2 of Standard No. 214, except that the barrier face 
would be 50 mm (2 inches) lower. The agency requested comments on this 
proposed change.
    DC, GM, and Ford supported the proposed lowering of the barrier 
face for rear impact testing. The Alliance and VW, however, questioned 
NHTSA's proposal to lower the barrier face for the rear impact testing. 
VW commented that the statistics used by NHTSA to justify the proposed 
change had not been verified. VW also stated,

    The speed distribution of rear end crashes in which pre-impact 
braking might occur has not been fully addressed and it is possible 
that pre-impact braking of either the target vehicle or the 
impacting vehicle or both is not as common as NHTSA assumes in the 
high speed rear impact crashes that the very severe upgraded rear 
crash test is intended to address.
7. Pole Side Impact Test
    In the NPRM, the agency noted that the side collision fire rate for 
passenger cars, light trucks, and vans is highest when a narrow object 
is struck. Thus, the agency asked whether it would be reasonable to 
consider a pole side impact test as part of a subsequent upgrading of 
Standard No. 301.
    The Alliance, DC, GM, Ford, and Porsche opposed a pole side impact 
test. The Alliance stated that NHTSA would need to provide a full 
assessment of the safety basis if the agency undertook such a 
rulemaking. The Alliance also stated that the agency would need to 
propose a detailed test procedure, including pole contact locations, 
closing velocities, pole sizes, and modes of testing.
    DC commented that any potential benefits of a pole side impact test 
``would be far outweighed by the added counter measures that such 
testing would require.'' DC stated:

    We believe that the benefits to real world safety and the scope 
and magnitude, and impact on motor vehicle design of such 
requirements would need to be verified through detailed studies, 
testing, and be evaluated by the agency prior to consideration of 
such potentially invasive regulation with apparent major impact on 
motor vehicles. We believe that such studies would not demonstrate 
an appreciable benefit in overall real world occupant safety.
    Advocates supported adding a pole side impact test to Standard No. 
301. Advocates stated,

    Such a test would provide concurrent safety information on both 
upper and lower interior occupant protection (because of severe side 
structure deformation and localized intrusion), door integrity both 
during and after the crash, and of fuel system integrity.
8. Prohibiting Fuel Leakage in Frontal Impact Crash Tests
    In the NPRM, the agency asked whether it should amend Standard No. 
301 to prohibit fuel leakage in any crash test performed under Standard 
No. 208.
    The Alliance and GM supported a future revision limiting fuel 
system leakage in any Standard No. 208 crash test to current Standard 
No. 301 requirements, if a meaningful safety benefit could be 
determined.
    DC and Ford opposed a fuel leakage requirement in Standard No. 208 
crash tests.
    Advocates commented that the rates of fuel release and quantities 
currently permitted by Standard No. 301 are not consonant with fire 
prevention and occupant safety following a crash. Advocates recommended 
that the agency should show the real-world consequences of the rates 
and amounts of fuel spillage permitted by Standard No. 301, and, if the 
amounts are judged to be too lenient, revise them to minimize the 
chances of a post-crash fire.
    IIHS and Dynamic Safety recommended that the agency adopt frontal 
offset crash test requirements in Standard No. 301. IIHS stated, 
``Frontal offset deformable barrier crash tests create deformation 
patterns commonly found in severe real-world crashes. The offset 
loading challenges the vehicle's ability to retain its structural 
integrity.''
9. Compliance Responsibility of Second-Stage Manufacturers
    In the NPRM, the agency noted that there are a large number of 
second-stage manufacturers that could be affected by the proposed rule. 
Second-stage manufacturers buy a chassis from a first-stage 
manufacturer and finish it to the consumer's specifications. The 
manufacturers that put a work-related body on a pickup truck chassis 
(such as a small tow truck) often perform manufacturing operations 
affecting the fuel system, both in the structure around the fuel tank 
and where the fuel filler neck attaches to the body. Other second-stage 
manufacturers use a van chassis or an incomplete vehicle for 
ambulances, small mobile homes, small school buses, etc.

[[Page 67076]]

    Typically, the first-stage manufacturer provides the second-stage 
manufacturer with a body builder's guide that tells the second-stage 
manufacturer what additions or other modifications it can make and 
still either pass along the original equipment manufacturer's 
certification for compliance with Standard No. 301 (for chassis cabs) 
or otherwise be confident that the vehicle will comply (for other types 
of incomplete vehicles). To the extent that a second-stage manufacturer 
deviates from the guide, it would have to certify compliance on its 
own.
    In the NPRM, the agency tentatively concluded that few final stage 
manufacturers would deviate from the body builder's guide.
    The National Truck Equipment Association (NTEA) \21\ disagreed with 
this tentative conclusion. The NTEA commented:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The NTEA represents second-stage manufacturers, most of 
whom are small businesses.

    It is not inconceivable that a major upgrade of the standard 
could force a chassis manufacturer to forbid the completion of 
certain chassis with certain body types or equipment in order to 
reduce their liability to an acceptable level. In any event, it will 
be impossible for the chassis manufacturers to test or even envision 
all types of multi-stage vehicles and will likely allow no 
modifications of any sort while leaving as much liability with the 
final stage manufacturer as possible, even when no fuel system 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
modifications are made by the final stage manufacturer.

    The NTEA stated that the proposed upgrade of Standard No. 301 could 
require second-stage manufacturers to conduct compliance testing, and 
that since most second-stage manufacturers are small businesses, such 
testing would be an unreasonable burden.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ The NTEA submitted several conformity statements from 
first-stage manufacturers as evidence that the certification 
responsibilities of second-stage manufacturers would change as a 
result of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Fuel Siphoning
    Dynamic Safety, IIHS, and Advocates all raised the issue of fuel 
siphoning after a fuel line is breached. Dynamic Safety stated:

    Any fuel system integrity standard upgrade should address the 
issue of fuel line siphoning. The standard should require that 
vehicles not siphon fuel if a fuel line is breached.

    Dynamic Safety commented that anti-siphon devices are readily 
available. Dynamic Safety stated that Ford and DC have been using fuel 
return line one-way check valves (known as ``duckbill valves'') on many 
of their vehicles since the 1980s, and that GM has installed ``siphon 
break'' holes in some of its passenger car fuel return lines since the 
late 1980s.
    IIHS stated, ``The Institute strongly supports implementation of 
requirements designed to stop the flow of fuel after a collision.'' 
Advocates strongly supported research into and consideration of fuel 
system flow interdiction through the use of various technologies, such 
as electric current shut-off devices that stop fuel pump delivery after 
a crash and manual or electrical inertia switches and check valves to 
block fuel delivery.

V. Final Rule

A. Summary of the Final Rule

    The amendments in this final rule are essentially the same as those 
proposed in the NPRM, but with compliance requirements for the rear 
impact upgrade to be phased-in. Instead of providing that all vehicles 
must comply at the end of a several year period, as proposed in the 
NPRM, the agency is providing that compliance with the rear impact 
upgrade will be phased-in over an additional three-year period, without 
credits for early compliance. The lead time for the side impact upgrade 
is the same as proposed.
    As proposed in the NPRM, the final rule establishes a rear impact 
test procedure that specifies striking the rear of the test vehicle at 
80 +/- 1 km/h (50 mph) with a 1,368 kilogram (3,015 pound) MDB at a 70 
percent overlap with the test vehicle. The MDB is located 50 
millimeters (2 inches) lower than the face of the Standard No. 214 
barrier to simulate pre-crash braking. This replaces the 48 km/h rear 
moving barrier crash test previously required under S6.2 of Standard 
No. 301.
    Also as proposed, the final rule eliminates Standard No. 301's side 
crash test and replaces it with the side impact crash test currently 
specified in Standard No. 214. S6.3 of Standard No. 301 had required a 
vehicle's side to be impacted by a barrier moving at 48 km/h. This 
final rule incorporates into S6.3 the side impact crash test in 
Standard No. 214, which is also amended by the final rule to specify 
that a stationary vehicle be struck on either side by a 1,368 kg (3,015 
pound) MDB moving at a speed of 53 +/- 1km/h.
    NHTSA notes that while it has conducted research to explore the 
desirability of revising the Standard No. 214 barrier, additional 
research would have to be conducted before the agency could decide 
whether proposing a revision might be worthwhile. Thus, even if a 
revision were ultimately adopted, it could not be implemented until 
well beyond the implementation of this upgrade to Standard No. 301.
    Instead of providing that all vehicles comply at the end of a 
several year period, as proposed in the NPRM, the agency is providing 
that compliance with the rear impact upgrade will be phased in by 
increasing percentages of production over an additional three-year 
period, without credits for early compliance or compliance above the 
required percentages.
    At least 40 percent of vehicles manufactured on or after September 
1, 2006, but before September 1, 2007, must comply with the new rear 
impact requirements. At least 70 percent of the vehicles manufactured 
on or after September 1, 2007, but before September 1, 2008, will have 
to comply, and starting September 1, 2008, all vehicles manufactured 
will have to comply with the upgraded rear impact requirements. The 
final rule amends 49 CFR Part 586, establishing reporting and record 
keeping requirements concerning the phase-in. However, vehicles 
manufactured in two or more stages will not be required to meet the 
rear impact upgrade requirements until September 1, 2008, when all 
vehicles must be certified as complying.
    All vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2004, must 
comply with the upgraded side impact requirements.

B. Rear Impact Test Procedure

    After reviewing real-world fire-related crash data, various vehicle 
offset crash tests, and the comments, NHTSA is adopting the rear impact 
test procedure as proposed. The final rule replaces Standard No. 301's 
current rear impact test procedure with one that specifies striking the 
rear of the test vehicle at 80 +/- 1 km/h (50 mph) with a 1,368 
kilogram (3,015 pound) MDB at a 70 percent overlap with either side of 
the test vehicle. The MDB face is located 50 millimeters (2 inches) 
lower than the face of the Standard No. 214 barrier to simulate pre-
crash braking.
    The agency is not adopting DC's recommended impact speed of 56-64 
km/h for the reasons stated in the NPRM. Namely, the agency believes 
that the upgraded test procedure will simulate a type of rear vehicle-
to-vehicle collision that can result in post-crash fire in an otherwise 
survivable crash: a high speed offset rear strike to the vehicle that 
results in fuel leakage from a breach in the fuel system and, 
potentially, a rapidly spreading fire that results in fatalities and 
injuries. As NHTSA noted in the NPRM, NASS estimates show that the 
majority of fatal and nonfatal occupant burn injuries in rear impact 
crashes were in the 34 to 48

[[Page 67077]]

km/h (21 to 30 mph) delta-v range. The agency believes that the offset 
rear impact test procedure specified in this final rule will simulate 
vehicle-to-vehicle crashes with a delta-v range of 32 to 48 km/h (20 to 
30 mph).
    The agency is also not adopting the recommendations of DC, GM, and 
Ford to specify design changes to the MDB and cart system. DC, GM, and 
Ford commented that, in their rear impact testing under the proposed 
test procedure, the MDB honeycomb appeared to bottom out. NHTSA, in the 
rear impact testing that it conducted in support of this rulemaking, 
took detailed post-crash test honeycomb crush measurements. None of the 
measurements indicated complete bottoming out of the honeycomb, and 
only a few of the measurements indicated about 85 percent compression.
    Honeycomb, by design, is limited to approximately 85 percent 
compression, at which point it begins to stiffen considerably until it 
becomes infinitely stiff at 90-95 percent compression. During the 85-90 
percent compression phase, it is similar to vehicle structures that 
become progressively stiffer as the crush in a crash increases. The 
measurements that were at 85 percent compression were observed near the 
edges of the MDB face, and since the total area was miniscule compared 
to the overall block of honeycomb, there will be little or no effect on 
the total or local forces exerted. Therefore, the energy absorbing 
honeycomb element has fully served its function of spreading the loads 
to the soft and hard structures of the vehicle and dissipating its 
share of the crash energy by the time that nearly full compression 
occurs. Accordingly, the agency believes that bottoming out of the 
honeycomb is not a concern.
    DC, GM, and Ford also commented that, in their rear impact testing, 
the uprights supporting the cart face inadvertently contacted the 
struck vehicle. None of the commenters provided details on specific 
tests. However, the agency observed such contact in several of its rear 
impact tests. The NHTSA tests were conducted with the Standard No. 214 
barrier, which has uprights that extend approximately 100 mm (4 inches) 
above the backing plate. The agency conducted film analysis of its 
tests and found there was no contact between the uprights and any 
significant vehicle structural components. The only vehicle components 
that contacted the uprights were trunks or tailgates that were already 
deformed. These contacts came late in the crash event and did not 
influence the outcomes.
    The agency also notes that GM conducted several rear impact crash 
tests with a non-Standard No. 214 barrier. The cart used by GM had 
uprights extending approximately 600 mm (24 inches) above the backing 
plate, or 20 inches taller than the uprights on the barrier used by 
NHTSA. Despite this significant difference, there was no difference in 
the GM and NHTSA test results. Accordingly, the agency believes that 
contact between the cart uprights and the struck vehicle is not a 
concern.
    GM noted that in some of its tests the barrier face underrode the 
struck vehicle and, upon rebound, the upright that contacted the 
vehicle became ``caught'' on vehicle structure (e.g., bumper, frame 
cross member, etc.), with undetermined effects on the struck vehicle. 
Ford stated that, in some of its tests, right angle corners of the 
barrier face hung up on vehicle trim, potentially affecting test 
repeatability.
    NHTSA did not observe either of these phenomena in any of its 
testing. The agency notes that the top edge of the deformable element 
of the barrier is 31 inches above the ground. Consequently, for the 
barrier face to underride the struck vehicle, the rear end of the 
vehicle would have to be lifted approximately 20 to 24 inches off the 
ground. The agency believes that such lifting is highly unlikely. 
Moreover, the agency believes that any possible effects from the 
phenomena observed by GM and Ford would be secondary since they occur 
after the maximum crush damage of the test. The agency notes that 
damage to the fuel systems tested by NHTSA and GM appeared to result 
from crush damage rather than from any secondary damage. Accordingly, 
the agency believes that the points raised by GM and Ford are not of 
concern.
    NHTSA is not adopting VW's suggestion to not lower the barrier face 
by 50 mm (2 inches) to simulate pre-crash braking. NHTSA has determined 
that this change will have no measurable effect on the performance of 
the barrier.\23\ The agency's tests indicate that the center of gravity 
of the barrier will drop about 7.4 mm (0.29 inches), which is well 
within the 25.4 mm (1 inch) allowed tolerance for center of gravity 
locations. The moment of inertia of the barrier about the longitudinal 
(roll) and transverse (pitch) axes will be reduced 0.1 percent and 0.02 
percent, respectively, and there will be no change in the vertical 
(yaw) axis. The agency notes that the device currently used to measure 
these parameters is not capable of measuring such small changes in the 
moment of inertia. Moreover, these small changes will not produce any 
measurable effect on the test results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The agency has docketed its findings on which this 
determination is based. See Docket No. NHTSA-00-8248, entry 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency is not adopting the recommendation of Advocates, IIHS, 
and AAD to specify the use of a heavier (4,000 pound) barrier because, 
as the agency noted in the NPRM, in an 80 km/h (50 mph) rear impact 
offset crash test, a 3,015-pound barrier effectively reproduces the 
damage profile seen in real world crashes that most often lead to 
fires. If a heavier barrier were used, the proposed rear impact crash 
test would no longer reproduce that profile. In addition, the agency 
has conducted its crash tests in support of this rulemaking with a 
3,015-pound barrier. The agency would have to conduct further research 
and development before a heavier barrier could be proposed for use in 
any test procedure.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The agency notes that the impact with the 3,015-pound 
barrier at 50 mph produces an impact energy 2.09 times greater than 
the impact energy produced by the current Standard No. 301 test. If 
the agency specified the use of a 4,000-pound barrier at 50 mph, the 
impact energy would be 2.78 times greater than the current Standard 
No. 301 test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Honda claimed that the MDB overrode the rear of the test vehicle 
but was not specific about the vehicle test in which the override 
occurred. We presume that Honda may have examined the test film of a 
Honda Accord test conducted by GM under the GM C/K settlement agreement 
with NHTSA. While NHTSA personnel made suggestions and witnessed the 
testing, we did not have direct control over the conduct of the tests. 
The Standard No. 301 upgrade test protocol was not precisely followed, 
but was instead modified according to what GM believed to be a worst 
case. Two major exceptions to the Standard No. 301 upgrade protocol 
were the test speed and the barrier height. GM believed that testing 
near the Standard No. 214 height and at 85 km/h would provide a worst 
case scenario. In GM's test with the Honda Accord, there was indeed 
severe override, which we believe was due to the additional 2.5 inches 
in the height of the MDB face, and to a lesser degree the additional 
speed of the test.
    VW also recommended that the proposed rear impact test be on the 
side of the vehicle where the filler pipe is located. Our test results 
indicated that fuel leakage is not dependent on the location of the 
filler pipe; rather, it is dependent on how the overall fuel system is 
protected against the impact. Therefore, we are not incorporating

[[Page 67078]]

VW's suggestion and vehicles must comply when the rear impact test is 
conducted on either side of the vehicle.
    Further, our cost study indicated that compliance with this final 
rule will not require major structural redesign (as stated by Alliance 
and DC), or necessitate an increase in vehicle stiffness (as stated by 
VW). Because there is no need to increase the vehicle stiffness, this 
final rule does not increase the potential for whiplash injuries in 
lower crashes as suggested by VW.

C. Side Impact Test Procedure

    The agency is replacing Standard No. 301's current lateral crash 
test with the side impact crash test specified in Standard No. 214. The 
Standard No. 214 side impact crash test specifies that a stationary 
vehicle be struck on either side by a 1,368 kg (3,015 pound) MDB. As 
noted above, Standard No. 214 currently specifies an impact speed of 54 
km/h. In order to provide an appropriate tolerance without affecting 
the stringency of the test, the agency proposed to change the test 
speed to 53 +/- 1 km/h and adopt it for Standard No. 301. No comments 
addressed this issue, and we are adopting that proposal.
    The agency is specifying that the MDB be lowered 50 mm (2 inches) 
for the rear impact test to simulate pre-braking. However, the agency 
is not specifying that the MDB be lowered for the side impact test. The 
test conditions of Standard No. 214 were intended to reflect a ``worst 
case'' scenario for occupants riding in the struck vehicle in that the 
striking vehicle was assumed not to be braking prior to impact. A 
braking vehicle would strike lower than a non-striking vehicle, 
potentially engaging more of the side sill of the struck vehicle. Full 
engagement of the sill dissipates the crush energy more effectively 
than engagement of the door structures located above the sill, 
resulting in les intrusion and deformation along the struck side where 
fuel system components (e.g., fuller filler neck and tube) are located. 
NHTSA believes the integrity of those fuel system components would be 
tested in a more severe environment if the barrier were not lowered. 
For these reasons, NHTSA has decided not to lower the MDB for the side 
impact test.

D. Door System Integrity

    NHTSA believes that a post-crash door operability requirement could 
be a practicable, reasonable safety enhancement. However, the agency 
has decided not to add a post-crash door operability requirement to 
Standard No. 301 or Standard No. 206 in this rulemaking. The agency has 
not developed a practical, objective, and repeatable test procedure for 
testing door operability. The agency is specifically concerned with 
developing specifications for the type and magnitude of force needed to 
test door operability. The agency notes that none of the commenters who 
supported a door operability requirement suggested a test procedure.
    Accordingly, NHTSA will need to conduct research before proposing 
any post-crash door operability requirement and will consider adding a 
post-crash door operability requirement to Standard No. 206 or Standard 
No. 301 in a separate rulemaking.

E. Lead Time

1. Rear Impact Test Upgrade
    In the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation for the NPRM, the agency 
said that most vehicles needing modification to meet the upgrade rear 
impact test would need only minor modifications and estimated that 
those modifications could be completed in 33 months. Based on that 
estimate, we provided a lead time of three years.
    The Alliance said ``significant vehicle redesign and retooling for 
production will likely be required in a number of vehicles.'' It 
suggested ``(t)he small number of tests conducted by the NHTSA, often 
with a sample size of one vehicle, simply is inadequate to identify 
whether vehicle changes are required or for any manufacturer to assure 
compliance for all its vehicles.'' The Alliance suggested that the 
agency phase in the requirements, beginning not earlier than three 
years after the issuance of the final rule, according to the following 
annually increasing percentages of production: 25%, 40%, 70% and 100%.
    In their comments on the NPRM, DC and Honda argued that some 
vehicles would need more than just minor modifications and that 
therefore additional lead time should be provided. Both suggested that 
the entire rear ends of some vehicles would have to be redesigned, 
although neither identified any specific models in need of such 
changes. Honda generally cited crash testing in support of its 
argument, but gave no details about that testing. DC suggested the same 
phase-in recommended by the Alliance. Honda suggested that the agency 
phase in the requirements, beginning not earlier than three years after 
the issuance of the final rule, according to the following percentages 
of production: 10%, 30%, 70% and 100%.
    While the agency continues to believe that a three-year lead time 
is sufficient for most vehicles in need of modification, it agrees that 
it is desirable to provide additional lead time to accommodate any new 
models that were designed and developed based upon the current 
requirements. The agency recognizes that vehicle platforms, once 
developed, are typically used for a number of years without major 
structural modification. We also recognize that in order to meet the 
requirements of FMVSS No. 301, a vehicle, without modification, must 
meet the static roll over requirements following an impact in a barrier 
test. Consequently, we have decided that the upgraded rear impact test 
will be phased-in, beginning on September 1, 2006, according to the 
following percentages of production: 40%, 70% and 100%. We believe that 
this combination of lead time and phase-in will allow sufficient time 
for existing platforms to be redesigned to comply with all of the 
requirements of FMVSS No. 301, and that the four year phase-in proposed 
by the Alliance is not necessary.
    We also believe that it is not necessary to allow an optional ``0%, 
0%, 100%'' three-year phase-in for limited-line manufacturers as 
proposed by Porsche. A similar phase-in exception for limited line 
manufacturers is present for the advanced air bag requirements of 
Standard No. 208. However, the advanced technology requirements that 
compounded the disparity between the phase-in requirements of the 
Advanced Air Bag Rule for limited line manufacturers and more diverse 
manufacturers is not present here.
2. Side Impact Test Upgrade
    In the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation for the NPRM, we said:

    Since almost all vehicles pass the Standard No. 214 test without 
fuel leakage and all manufacturers have done these tests on their 
passenger cars and light trucks and vans up to 6,000 pounds GVWR, 
the agency is proposing a one year leadtime after the final rule for 
implementing the Standard No. 214 test requirement for the lateral 
test.

    Some vehicle manufacturers supported the one-year lead time 
proposed in the NPRM for the side impact test upgrade, but recommended 
that the agency add a phase-in after this lead time. The Alliance asked 
for additional lead time for vehicles not previously subject to 
Standard No. 214, saying;

    Until a complete and thorough evaluation program is completed 
for each model, the actual and exact extent of changes to each

[[Page 67079]]

vehicle cannot be ascertained. For this reason, we recommend that 
vehicles not previously subject to FMVSS 214 requirements also have 
the same three-year lead time and four year phase-in schedule as 
proposed above for the rear impact requirement, with the allowance 
for early compliance. Starting the lead time and the phase-in for 
both the rear and side impact requirements at the same time would 
also be logical and provide clarity since both are contained in the 
single notice.

    As we note below in the section on costs, only one out of more than 
100 vehicles tested failed Standard No. 301's fuel leakage requirements 
using Standard No. 214's side impact test. Based on those test results, 
the agency believes that few vehicles, approximately 1%, will have to 
be modified to meet Standard No. 301's leakage requirements using 
Standard No. 214's side impact test. Therefore, the one-year lead time 
without a phase-in is adopted, as was proposed.

F. Benefits

    The target population of crashes includes multi-vehicle crashes in 
which a passenger vehicle is struck in the rear by another passenger 
vehicle and the fire starts in the struck vehicle. There are an 
estimated 58 burn-related fatalities and 119 non-fatal burn-related 
injuries annually in the target population. The non-fatal burn injuries 
in that population of crashes were mostly minor and were typically not 
the most severe injury to the occupant. The agency estimates that 
approximately 8 to 21 fatalities will be prevented once all vehicles on 
the road comply with the upgraded rear impact test. The cost per life 
saved is estimated to be $1.96 million to $5.13 million ($41 million/21 
lives to $41 million/8 lives). The agency is not estimating the number 
of reduced non-fatal burn-related injuries because there are only a few 
cases each year in which the injured person's most serious injury was a 
burn injury.
    There are fewer than 100 fatalities annually in multi-vehicle side 
impacts that result in fire. The agency believes that the Standard No. 
214 side impact test is somewhat stricter than the existing lateral 
impact test in Standard No. 301. However, the agency was unable to 
quantify any benefits from switching to the Standard No. 214 side 
impact test.
    NHTSA disagrees with the VW comment that the benefits of this 
rulemaking are too low compared to its costs. VW did not provide any 
data to support their comment. However, the agency believes that VW's 
cost estimates may be based on costs of issues, such as post-crash door 
operability, seat back failures, and dummy responses, which were 
discussed in the NPRM but not adopted in this final rule.

G. Costs

    The agency estimates that the average cost for vehicles that will 
need to be modified to comply with the upgraded rear impact test is 
$5.31 per vehicle.\25\ Based on its belief that the test failures in 
the agency's testing were more the result of design differences than 
vehicle weight differences, the agency estimates that 46 percent of the 
vehicle fleet does not currently meet the upgraded rear impact test. It 
further estimates that approximately 16.7 million vehicles are sold 
each year in the U.S. Together, this information indicates that the 
total cost for the fleet will be approximately $41 million per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ This is a $0.31 increase from the figure used in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using the Standard No. 214 side impact test as the Standard No. 301 
side impact test will eliminate the cost of conducting a unique 
Standard No. 301 test as well as the cost of an extra test vehicle. 
Since the average current Standard No. 301 side impact test is roughly 
$4,300 and the average test vehicle costs about $21,000, the total 
savings would be about $25,200 per vehicle model.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The figures in the NPRM were $4,000 for the average lateral 
test for Standard No. 301 costs, $20,000 for average test vehicle 
cost, and a total of about $24,000 per vehicle model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Only one out of more than 100 vehicles tested failed Standard No. 
301's fuel leakage requirements using Standard No. 214's side impact 
test. Based on those test results, the agency believes that few 
vehicles will have to be modified to meet Standard No. 301's side 
impact leakage requirements using Standard No. 214's side impact test.
    NHTSA disagrees with the Honda comment that the agency's cost 
estimates are too low. The agency's cost estimates are based on the 
changes that will be needed to remedy those noncompliant vehicles 
needing only minor modifications. Since most vehicles readily pass the 
fuel leakage requirements using the Standard No. 214 side impact test, 
we do not believe modifications will be required which are not minor. 
Neither Honda nor any of the other vehicle manufacturers provided data 
indicating that the costs of modifying vehicles to comply will be 
greater than the agency's estimates.\27\ Furthermore, 54 percent of the 
vehicles tested were able to pass at the higher test speed and the 
measures required to address the failing vehicles do not involve 
structural changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ The agency believes that Honda's cost estimates are 
overstated since they include vehicle models that complied with the 
amendments in this final rule when the agency tested them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Additional Issues

1. Real World Data
    None of the commenters provided any real-world data on the 
relationship between crash severity and the risk of occupant injury due 
to fire. Thus, as discussed above in the section on Costs and Benefits, 
it appears that the data files NHTSA used in developing the NPRM are 
the best available data sources.
2. Head and Neck Injury Criteria
    The agency agrees with the Alliance's comment that the issue of 
occupant protection would best be discussed in the context of a 
rulemaking focused on that issue. The agency notes that it is in the 
process of developing a final rule for Standard No. 202 and a proposed 
rule for Standard No. 207, and will address rear impact protection in 
those rulemakings.
3. Seat Back Failure
    NHTSA agrees with the DC comment that the issue of seat back 
failure best be discussed in the context of a rulemaking focused on 
that issue. The agency notes that it is considering an upgrade of 
Standard No. 207, where this issue will be addressed.
4. Use of 5th Percentile Female Dummies
    NHTSA agrees with the GM comment that using various dummy sizes to 
study the safety consequences to vehicle occupants due to the rear 
impact test upgrade should be a subject for future research. The agency 
will address the use of various dummy sizes in rear impact tests in 
separate rulemakings.
5. Test Vehicle Loading Conditions
    The agency is adopting GM's suggested revision of S7.1.6(b) of 
Standard No. 301. That paragraph is revised to read as follows:

    S7.1.6(b) Except as specified in S7.1.1, a multipurpose 
passenger vehicle, truck, or bus with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less is 
loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight, plus the necessary test 
dummies as specified in S6, plus 136 kg or its rated cargo and 
luggage capacity weight, whichever is less, secured in the load 
carrying area and distributed as nearly as possible in proportion to 
its GAWR. For the purpose of this standard, unloaded vehicle weight 
does not include the weight of work-performing accessories. Each 
dummy is restrained only by means that are installed in the vehicle 
for protection at its seating position.

    This provision is revised to simplify the language and provide 
clearer

[[Page 67080]]

instruction as to how weight is to be distributed on a vehicle under 
test conditions. NHTSA is not adopting Alliance's recommendation to 
retain the language that addressed distribution when the axle's 
proportional share is exceeded. While the revised provision eliminates 
that language, it does provide that weight is to be distributed as 
nearly as possible in proportion to the GAWR.
    NHTSA is not adopting GM's recommendation that the agency replace 
the language in S8.1.1 of Standard No. 208, S6.1 of Standard No. 212, 
S7.7 of Standard No. 219, S7.1.6 of Standard No. 301, S7.1.6 of 
Standard No. 303, and S7.2.3 of Standard No. 305 with identical 
language. The agency believes that such revisions are outside the scope 
of this rulemaking. However, the agency will treat GM's recommendation 
as a petition for rulemaking and will make a decision on whether or not 
to grant the petition within the next 120 days.
    NHTSA is also not adopting GM's and VW's suggested revision of 
S7.1.6(a). The agency believes that the language in that paragraph is 
sufficiently clear.
6. Lowering the Barrier Face
    For the reasons discussed above in the section on Rear Impact Test 
Procedure, the agency is specifying that the barrier face in the rear 
impact test procedure is lowered 50 mm (2 inches).
7. Pole Side Impact Test
    NHTSA agrees with the comments from the Alliance, GM, DC, Porsche, 
and Ford that the agency must assess the safety basis for a pole side 
impact test, as well as develop an objective, repeatable test 
procedure, including pole contact locations, closing velocities, pole 
sizes, and modes of testing, before the agency proposes such a test. 
Any future proposals to utilize a pole side impact test will address 
these issues.
8. Prohibiting Fuel Leakage in Frontal Impact Crash Tests
    NHTSA agrees with the comments from the Alliance and GM that the 
agency should consider a future revision limiting fuel system leakage 
in any Standard No. 208 crash test to the levels currently specified in 
Standard No. 301. In frontal impacts at 35 mph (56 km/hr) into the 
barrier, there have been 10 failures out of 406 NCAP (New Car 
Assessment Program) tests, since 1979. While rare, the agency will 
continue to monitor fuel system leakage in the NCAP tests to determine 
whether future upgrades would be appropriate.
9. Compliance Responsibility of Second-Stage Manufacturers
    NHTSA believes that there will be no change to the certification 
responsibilities of second-stage and final-stage manufacturers as a 
result of this rulemaking. The agency has reviewed the conformity 
statements from first-stage manufacturers submitted by the NTEA and 
believes them to be reasonable. Under these conformity statements, the 
first-stage manufacturer installs the entire fuel system, and the 
second-stage or final-stage manufacturer can make minor alterations 
without violating the pass-through certification from the first-stage 
manufacturer.\28\ Further, vehicles manufactured in two or more stages 
will not be required to comply with the rear impact upgrade until the 
final stage of the phase-in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The first-stage manufacturer typically certifies that the 
incomplete vehicle meets the requirements of Standard No. 301. This 
relieves second-stage or final-stage manufacturers of the burden of 
conducting Standard No. 301 compliance tests, unless those 
manufacturers make substantial changes to the fuel system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In cases in which the second-stage or final-stage manufacturers 
make significant changes to the fuel system, they may not be able to 
use the pass-through certification, and may have to certify that the 
vehicle complies with Standard No. 301. If it is not economically 
feasible for these manufacturers to perform the compliance testing or 
engineering analysis, the manufacturers may apply for a temporary 
exemption under 49 CFR Part 555.
    The agency also notes that it is currently involved in a negotiated 
rulemaking process with the NTEA, first-stage manufacturers, and other 
stakeholders regarding the certification process for vehicles 
manufactured in two or more stages. The agency intends to develop 
changes to the regulations governing the certification of such vehicles 
through this process.
10. Fuel Siphoning
    The issues raised by Dynamic Safety concerning fuel siphoning and 
by IIHS and Advocates concerning fuel cutoff devices all pertain to 
frontal fire protection. NHTSA research identified rear impacts as the 
most common type of crashes that result in fires. The agency would need 
to conduct research to determine the extent of the problem related to 
fuel siphoning as described by Dynamic Safety. If future NHTSA analysis 
of real-world crash data indicates that there is a safety problem that 
warrants further regulatory action, the agency will consider additional 
changes to Standard No. 301. The agency notes that preliminary research 
of frontal impacts under the GM settlement agreement indicated that the 
vehicles equipped with fuel cutoff devices performed similarly to 
vehicles without such devices. Consequently, the agency does not 
anticipate that any real world benefits would result if the agency 
required fuel cutoff devices.

VI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR 
51735, October 4, 1993), provides for making determinations whether a 
regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore subject to OMB 
review and to the requirements of the Executive Order. The Order 
defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as one that is likely to 
result in a rule that may:
    (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the 
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public 
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or 
communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an 
action taken or planned by another agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, 
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients 
thereof; or
    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal 
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in 
the Executive Order.
    NHTSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 
and the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and 
procedures and has determined that it is not significant.
    NHTSA has prepared a Final Regulatory Evaluation (FRE) describing 
the economic and other effects of this final rule.\29\ If only minor 
modifications are needed to comply with the upgraded rear impact test, 
the agency estimates that the average cost for vehicles that will need 
to be modified is $5.31 per vehicle. The agency estimates that 46 
percent of the vehicle fleet does not currently meet the upgraded rear 
impact test and that approximately 16.7 million vehicles are sold each 
year in the U.S. Together, this information indicates that the total 
cost for the fleet will be approximately $41 million per year. To the 
extent that any vehicles need more than minor modifications, the total 
cost may be higher. However, none of the

[[Page 67081]]

commenters provided data indicating that the cost of remedying 
noncompliant vehicles will be greater than the agency's estimates. 
Using the Standard No. 214 side impact test as the Standard No. 301 
side impact test will eliminate the cost of conducting a unique 
Standard No. 301 test as well as the cost of an extra test vehicle. The 
total savings would be about $25,200 per vehicle model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ A copy of the FRE has been placed in the docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice 
of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare and make 
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that 
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small 
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions). 
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121 
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates 
primarily within the United States.'' (13 CFR 121.105(a)). No 
regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency 
certifies the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. SBREFA amended the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to provide a statement of 
the factual basis for certifying that a rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    NHTSA has considered the effects of this final rule under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act. I certify that this final rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The rationale for this certification is that the amendments 
made in this final rule primarily affect manufacturers of passenger 
cars and light trucks. These manufacturers typically do not qualify as 
small entities under 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
    NHTSA estimates that there are about four small manufacturers of 
passenger cars in the U.S., and no small manufacturers of light trucks, 
producing a combined total of at most 500 vehicles each year. It is 
unknown how many of their vehicle models will meet the amendments made 
in this final rule. The agency requested comments on this issue in the 
NPRM, but received none.
    As discussed above in the section on Compliance Responsibility of 
Second-Stage Manufacturers, there are a large number of second-stage 
and final-stage manufacturers. The agency believes that there will be 
no change to the certification responsibilities of second-stage and 
final-stage manufacturers as a result of this rulemaking.
    Consequently, the agency has concluded that this rulemaking will 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.

C. National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the 
National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that 
implementation of this rule will not have any significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment.

D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    Executive Order 13132 requires NHTSA to develop an accountable 
process to ensure ``meaningful and timely input by State and local 
officials in the development of regulatory policies that have 
federalism implications.'' ``Policies that have federalism 
implications'' is defined in the Executive Order to include regulations 
that have ``substantial direct effects on the States, on the 
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency may not issue a 
regulation with Federalism implications, that imposes substantial 
direct compliance costs, and that is not required by statute, unless 
the Federal government provides the funds necessary to pay the direct 
compliance costs incurred by State and local governments, the agency 
consults with State and local governments, or the agency consults with 
State and local officials early in the process of developing the 
regulation. NHTSA also may not issue a regulation with Federalism 
implications and that preempts State law unless the agency consults 
with State and local officials early in the process of developing the 
regulation.
    The agency has analyzed this final rule in accordance with the 
principles and criteria set forth in Executive Order 13132 and has 
determined that it will not have sufficient federalism implications to 
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation 
of a federalism summary impact statement. The final rule will not have 
any substantial effects on the States, or on the current Federal-State 
relationship, or on the current distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various local officials.

E. Civil Justice Reform

    This final rule will not have any retroactive effect. Under 49 
U.S.C. 30103, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in 
effect, a State may not adopt or maintain a safety standard applicable 
to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to the Federal 
standard, except to the extent that the state requirement imposes a 
higher level of performance and applies only to vehicles procured for 
the State's use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets forth a procedure for judicial 
review of final rules establishing, amending, or revoking Federal motor 
vehicle safety standards. That section does not require submission of a 
petition for reconsideration or other administrative proceedings before 
parties may file suit in court.

F. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the procedures established by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995, a person is not required to respond to a collection of 
information by a Federal agency unless the collection displays a valid 
OMB control number. For the phase-in reporting requirements, which were 
not proposed in the notice of proposed rulemaking, but are added in 
this Final Rule, NHTSA is submitting to OMB a request for approval of 
the following collection of information. Public comment is sought on 
the proposed collection.
    Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
    Title: Phase-In Production Reporting Requirements for Fuel Systems 
Integrity Upgrade.
    Type of Request: New collection.
    OMB Clearance Number: None assigned.
    Form Number: This collection of information will not use any 
standard forms.
    Requested Expiration Date of Approval: Three years from the date of 
approval.
Summary of the Collection of Information
    So that NHTSA can ensure that vehicle manufacturers are certifying 
their applicable vehicles as meeting the rear impact test upgrades that 
are specified in this final rule, in this proposed collection, NHTSA 
would require vehicle manufacturers to provide reports on compliance of 
their vehicles with the rear impact test upgrade.
    For the rear impact test upgrade, NHTSA established a six year 
schedule; a three year lead time, then a 3-year phase-in period during 
which, in the

[[Page 67082]]

first year, 40% of the applicable vehicles must meet the rear impact 
test upgrade, and in the second and third years, 70% and 100% 
respectively.
    For each year of the rear impact test phase-in period, 
manufacturers must, within 60 days after the end of the ``production 
year,'' provide to NHTSA information identifying the vehicles (by make, 
model, and vehicle identification number (VIN)) that have been 
certified as complying with the rear impact test upgrade. Furthermore, 
until December 31, 2009, each manufacturer must maintain records of the 
VIN for each vehicle for which information is reported.
Description of the Need for the Information and Proposed Use of the 
Information
    NHTSA requires this information to ensure that vehicle 
manufacturers are certifying their applicable vehicles as meeting the 
new rear impact test upgrades that are specified in this final rule. 
NHTSA will use this information to determine whether a manufacturer has 
complied with the amended requirements of Standard No. 301 during the 
phase-in period.
Description of the Likely Respondents (Including Estimated Number, and 
Proposed Frequency of Response to the Collection of Information)
    NHTSA estimates that 21 vehicle manufacturers will submit the 
required information. The manufacturers are makers of passenger cars, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses that have gross 
vehicle weight ratings of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less, and use 
fuel with a boiling point above 0 degrees Celsius. For each report, the 
manufacturer will provide, in addition to its identity, several 
numerical items of information. This information would include:
    (a) Total number of vehicles manufactured for sale during the 
preceding production year,
    (b) Total number of vehicles manufactured during the production 
year that meet the new regulatory requirements, and
    (c) Information identifying the vehicles (by make, model, and 
vehicle identification number (VIN)) that have been certified as 
complying with the side impact test upgrade or the rear impact test 
upgrade.
    During the phase-in period, each manufacturer will provide 1 report 
per year for three years for the rear impact phase-in, for a total of 3 
reports over 3 years.
Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden 
Resulting From the Collection of Information
    NHTSA estimates that each manufacturer will incur two burden hours 
per year per report. This estimate is based on the fact that data 
collection will involve only computer tabulation and that manufacturers 
will provide the information to NHTSA in an electronic (as opposed to 
paper) format. Thus, for the rear impact test upgrade reporting, each 
manufacturer will incur a burden of two hours or a total on industry of 
42 hours a year (assuming there are 21 manufacturers) to provide the 
rear impact test upgrades.
    NHTSA estimates that the recordkeeping burden resulting from the 
collection of information will be 0 hours because the information will 
be retained on each manufacturer's existing computer systems for each 
manufacturer's internal administrative purposes.
    NHTSA estimates that the total annual cost burden will be 1050 
dollars (42 total annual burden hours x 25 dollars/hour). There would 
be no capital or start-up costs as a result of this collection. 
Manufacturers can collect and tabulate the information by using 
existing equipment. Thus, there would be no additional costs to 
respondents or recordkeepers.
    NHTSA requests comment on its estimates of the total annual hour 
and cost burdens resulting from this collection of information. Please 
submit any comments to the NHTSA Docket Number referenced in the 
heading of this notice or to: Dr. William J. J. Liu, Office of 
Crashworthiness Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 Seventh St., SW., Washington, DC 20590. Dr. Liu's 
telephone number is: (202) 366-2264. Comments are due by January 30, 
2004.

G. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement 
Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Pub. L. 104-113, section 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272) 
directs NHTSA to use voluntary consensus standards in its regulatory 
activities unless doing so would be inconsistent with applicable law or 
otherwise impractical. Voluntary consensus standards are technical 
standards (e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling 
procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by 
voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as the Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE). The NTTAA directs NHTSA to provide Congress, through 
OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and 
applicable voluntary consensus standards.
    There are no voluntary consensus standards available at this time. 
However, NHTSA will consider any such standards when they become 
available.

H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) 
requires Federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more 
than $100 million in any one year (adjusted for inflation with base 
year of 1995). Before promulgating a rule for which a written statement 
is needed, section 205 of the UMRA generally requires NHTSA to identify 
and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and adopt 
the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative 
that achieves the objectives of the rule. The provisions of section 205 
do not apply when they are inconsistent with applicable law. Moreover, 
section 205 allows NHTSA to adopt an alternative other than the least 
costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative if the 
agency publishes with the final rule an explanation why that 
alternative was not adopted.
    This final rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local, 
or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of 
more than $100 million annually. Consequently, no Unfunded Mandates 
assessment has been prepared.

I. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier 
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of 
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center 
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may 
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document 
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

J. Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all submissions 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may

[[Page 67083]]

review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register 
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or 
you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Tires.

49 CFR Part 586

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

0
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA is amending 49 CFR part 571 
and revising part 586 as follows:

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

0
2. In Sec.  571.214, paragraphs S3(b), (c), (d), and (f) are revised to 
read as follows:


Sec.  571.214  Standard No. 214; Side impact protection.

* * * * *
    S3 Requirements. (a) * * *
    (b) When tested under the conditions of S6, each passenger car 
manufactured on or after September 1, 1996, shall meet the requirements 
of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 in a 53 +/- 1.0 km/h impact in which the car is 
struck on either side by a moving deformable barrier. 49 CFR part 572, 
subpart F test dummies are placed in front and rear outboard seating 
position on the struck side of the car. However, the rear seat 
requirements do not apply to passenger cars with a wheelbase greater 
than 3,300 mm, or to passenger cars that have rear seating areas that 
are so small that 49 CFR part 572, subpart F test dummies cannot be 
accommodated according to the positioning procedure specified in S7.
    (c) [Reserved].
    (d) [Reserved].
    (e) * * *
    (f) When tested according to the conditions of S6, each 
multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, and bus manufactured on or after 
September 1, 1998, shall meet the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 
in a 53 +/- 1.0 km/h impact in which the vehicle is struck on either 
side by a moving deformable barrier. A 49 CFR part 572, subpart F test 
dummy is placed in the front outboard seating position on the struck 
side of the vehicle, and if the vehicle is equipped with rear seats, 
then another 49 CFR part 572, subpart F test dummy is placed in the 
outboard seating position of the second seat on the struck side of the 
vehicle. However, the second seat requirements do not apply to side-
facing seats or to vehicles that are so small that the 49 CFR part 572, 
subpart F test dummy cannot be accommodated according to the procedure 
specified in S7.
* * * * *

0
3. In Sec.  571.301, paragraphs S6.2, S6.3, S7.1.6(b), S7.2, and S7.3 
are revised, paragraph S8 is added, and Figure 3 is added following 
Figure 2, to read as follows:


Sec.  571.301  Standard No. 301; Fuel system integrity.

* * * * *
    S6.2 Rear moving barrier crash. (a) Vehicles manufactured before 
September 1, 2006. When the vehicle is impacted from the rear by the 
barrier specified in S7.3(a) of this standard moving at 48 km/h, with 
50th percentile test dummies as specified in part 572 of this chapter 
at each front outboard designated seating position, under the 
applicable conditions of S7, fuel spillage must not exceed the limits 
of S5.5.
    (b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2006. When the 
vehicle is impacted from the rear by a moving deformable barrier 80 +/- 
1.0 km/h with a 70 percent overlap, with 50th percentile test dummies 
as specified in part 572 of this chapter at each front outboard 
designated seating position, under the applicable conditions of S7, 
fuel spillage must not exceed the limits of S5.5.
    S6.3 Side moving barrier crash. (a) Vehicles manufactured before 
September 1, 2004. When the vehicle is impacted laterally on either 
side by a barrier moving at 32 km/h with 50th percentile test dummies 
as specified in part 572 of this chapter at positions required for 
testing to Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208), under the applicable 
conditions of S7, fuel spillage must not exceed the limits of S5.5.
    (b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2004. When the 
vehicle is impacted laterally on either side by a moving deformable 
barrier at 53 +/- 1.0 km/h with 49 CFR part 572, subpart F test dummies 
at positions required for testing by S3(b) of Standard No. 214, under 
the applicable conditions of S7 of this standard, fuel spillage shall 
not exceed the limits of S5.5 of this standard.
* * * * *
    S7.1.6 * * *
    (a) * * *
    (b) Except as specified in S7.1.1, a multipurpose passenger 
vehicle, truck, or bus with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less is loaded to its 
unloaded vehicle weight, plus the necessary test dummies as specified 
in S6, plus 136 kg or its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight, 
whichever is less, secured in the load carrying area and distributed as 
nearly as possible in proportion to its GAWR. For the purpose of this 
standard, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-
performing accessories. Each dummy is restrained only by means that are 
installed in the vehicle for protection at its seating position.
* * * * *
    S7.2 Side moving barrier test conditions. (a) Vehicles manufactured 
before September 1, 2004. The side moving barrier crash test conditions 
are those specified in S8.2 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208).
    (b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2004. The side 
moving deformable barrier crash test conditions are those specified in 
S6 and S7 of Standard No. 214 (49 CFR 571.214).
    S7.3 Rear moving barrier test conditions. (a) Vehicles manufactured 
before September 1, 2006. The rear moving barrier test conditions are 
those specified in S8.2 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208), except 
for the positioning of the barrier and the vehicle. The barrier and 
test vehicle are positioned so that at impact--
    (1) The vehicle is at rest in its normal attitude;
    (2) The barrier is traveling at 48 km/h with its face perpendicular 
to the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle; and
    (3) A vertical plane through the geometric center of the barrier 
impact surface and perpendicular to that surface coincides with the 
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle.
    (b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2006. The rear 
moving deformable barrier is the same as that shown in Figure 2 of 
Standard No. 214 (49 CFR 571.214) and specified in 49 CFR part 587, 
except as otherwise specified in paragraph S7.3 (b). The barrier and 
test vehicle are positioned so that at impact--
    (1) The vehicle is stationary;
    (2) The deformable face of the barrier is mounted on the barrier 50 
mm (2 inches) lower than the height from the ground specified in Figure 
2 of Standard No. 214 (49 CFR 571.214) (All dimensions from the ground 
in Figure 2, Front View should be reduced by 50 mm (2 inches.));
    (3) The barrier is traveling 80 +/- 1.0 km/h; and
    (4) The barrier impacts the test vehicle with the longitudinal 
centerline

[[Page 67084]]

of the vehicle parallel to the line of travel and perpendicular to the 
barrier face within a tolerance of +/- 5 degrees. The test vehicle and 
barrier face are aligned so that the barrier strikes the rear of the 
vehicle with 70 percent overlap toward either side of the vehicle. So 
aligned, the barrier face fully engages one half of the rear of the 
vehicle and partially engages the other half. At impact, the vehicle's 
longitudinal centerline is located inboard either of the side edges of 
the barrier by a distance equal to 20 percent of the vehicle's width +/
- 50 mm (see Figure 3). The vehicle's width is the maximum dimension 
measured across the widest part of the vehicle, including bumpers and 
molding, but excluding such components as exterior mirrors, flexible 
mud flaps, marker lamps, and dual rear wheel configurations.
* * * * *
    S8 Phase-In schedule.
    S8.1 Rear impact test upgrade. (a) Vehicles manufactured on or 
after September 1, 2006 and before September 1, 2007. For vehicles 
manufactured on or after September 1, 2006, and before September 1, 
2007, the number of vehicles complying with S6.2(b) of this standard 
must not be less than 40 percent of:
    (1) The manufacturer's average annual production of vehicles 
manufactured on or after September 1, 2003, and before September 1, 
2006; or
    (2) The manufacturer's production on or after September 1, 2005, 
and before September 1, 2006.
    (b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2007 and before 
September 1, 2008. For vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
2007 and before September 1, 2008, the number of vehicles complying 
with S6.2(b) of this standard must not be less than 70 percent of:
    (1) The manufacturer's average annual production of vehicles 
manufactured on or after September 1, 2004, and before September 1, 
2007; or
    (2) The manufacturer's production on or after September 1, 2006, 
and before September 1, 2007.
    (c) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2008. For 
vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2008, the number of 
vehicles complying with S6.2(b) of this standard must be 100 percent of 
the manufacturer's production during that period.
    S8.2 Vehicles manufactured in two or more stages. A final stage 
manufacturer or alterer may, at its option, comply with the 
requirements set forth in S8.2.1 and S8.2.2.
    S8.2.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2006 and 
before September 1, 2008 are not required to comply with the 
requirements specified in S6.2(b) of this standard.
    S8.2.2 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2008 shall 
comply with the requirements specified in S6.2(b) of this standard.
    S8.3 Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer.
    S8.3.1 For the purpose of calculating average annual production of 
vehicles for each manufacturer and the number of vehicles manufactured 
by each manufacturer under S8.1, a vehicle produced by more than one 
manufacturer must be attributed to a single manufacturer as follows, 
subject to S8.3.2:
    (a) A vehicle that is imported must be attributed to the importer.
    (b) A vehicle manufactured in the United States by more than one 
manufacturer, one of which also markets the vehicle, must be attributed 
to the manufacturer that markets the vehicle.
    S8.3.2 A vehicle produced by more than one manufacturer must be 
attributed to any one of the vehicle's manufacturers specified by an 
express written contract, reported to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration under 49 CFR part 590, between the manufacturer 
so specified and the manufacturer to which the vehicle would otherwise 
be attributed under S8.3.1.
* * * * *
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[[Page 67086]]


0
4. Part 586 is revised to read as follows:

PART 586--FUEL SYSTEM INTEGRITY UPGRADE PHASE-IN REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS

Sec.
586.1 Scope.
586.2 Purpose.
586.3 Applicability.
586.4 Definitions.
586.5 Response to inquiries.
586.6 Reporting requirements.
586.7 Records.
586.8 Petition to extend period to file report.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.


Sec.  586.1  Scope.

    This part establishes requirements for manufacturers of passenger 
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross 
vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less to 
submit a report, and maintain records related to the report, concerning 
the number of such vehicles that meet the upgraded requirements of 
Standard No. 301, Fuel systems integrity (49 CFR 571.301).


Sec.  586.2  Purpose.

    The purpose of these requirements is to assist the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration in determining whether a manufacturer has 
complied with the upgraded requirements of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR 
571.301).


Sec.  586.3  Applicability.

    This part applies to manufacturers of passenger cars, multipurpose 
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle weight 
rating of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.


Sec.  586.4  Definitions.

    (a) All terms defined in 49 U.S.C. 30102 are used in their 
statutory meaning.
    (b) Bus, gross vehicle weight rating, multipurpose passenger 
vehicle, passenger car, and trucks are used as defined in 49 CFR 571.3.
    (c) Production year means the 12-month period between September 1 
of one year and August 31 of the following year, inclusive.


Sec.  586.5  Response to inquiries.

    At any time during the production years ending August 31, 2007, 
August 31, 2008, and August 31, 2009, each manufacturer must, upon 
request from the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, provide 
information identifying the vehicles (by make, model, and vehicle 
identification number) that have been certified as complying with 
S6.2(b) of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR 571.301). The manufacturer's 
designation of a vehicle as a certified vehicle is irrevocable.


Sec.  586.6  Reporting requirements.

    (a) Phase-in reporting requirements. Within 60 days after the end 
of the production years ending August 31, 2007, August 31, 2008, and 
August 31, 2009, each manufacturer must submit a report to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning its compliance with 
S6.2(b) of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR 571.301) for its passenger cars, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle 
weight rating of less than 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) produced in 
that year. Each report must--
    (1) Identify the manufacturer;
    (2) State the full name, title, and address of the official 
responsible for preparing the report;
    (3) Identify the production year being reported on;
    (4) Contain a statement regarding whether or not the manufacturer 
complied with the requirements of S6.2(b) of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR 
571.301) for the period covered by the report and the basis for that 
statement;
    (5) Provide the information specified in paragraph (b) of this 
section;
    (6) Be written in the English language; and
    (7) Be submitted to: Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
    (b) Phase-in report content.
    (1) Basis for statement of compliance. Each manufacturer must 
provide the number of passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, 
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kilograms 
(10,000 pounds) or less manufactured for sale in the United States for 
each of the three previous production years, or, at the manufacturer's 
option, for the previous production year. A new manufacturer that has 
not previously manufactured these vehicles for sale in the United 
States must report the number of such vehicles manufactured during the 
current production year.
    (2) Production. Each manufacturer must report for the production 
year for which the report is filed: the number of passenger cars, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle 
weight rating of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less that meet 
S6.2(b) or S6.3(b) of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR 571.301).
    (3) Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer. Each 
manufacturer whose reporting of information is affected by one or more 
of the express written contracts permitted by S8.3.2 of Standard No. 
301 (49 CFR 571.301) must:
    (i) Report the existence of each contract, including the names of 
all parties to the contract, and explain how the contract affects the 
report being submitted.
    (ii) Report the actual number of vehicles covered by each contract.


Sec.  586.7  Records.

    Each manufacturer must maintain records of the Vehicle 
Identification Number for each vehicle for which information is 
reported under Sec.  586.6(b)(2) until December 31, 2010.


Sec.  586.8  Petition to extend period to file report.

    A manufacturer may petition for extension of time to submit a 
report under this part. A petition will be granted only if the 
petitioner shows good cause for the extension and if the extension is 
consistent with the public interest. The petition must be received not 
later than 15 days before expiration of the time stated in Sec.  
586.6(a). The filing of a petition does not automatically extend the 
time for filing a report. The petition must be submitted to: 
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.

    Issued: November 21, 2003.
Jeffrey W. Runge,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 03-29805 Filed 11-25-03; 1:17 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P