[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 230 (Monday, December 1, 2003)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 67068-67086]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-29805]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 571 and 586
[Docket No. NHTSA-03-16523]
RIN 2127-AF36
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Fuel Systems Integrity
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, NHTSA is upgrading the rear impact test in
the Federal motor vehicle safety standard on fuel system integrity. To
simulate being struck in the rear by another vehicle, that standard
currently specifies that the full width of the rear of the test vehicle
be impacted with a flat, rigid barrier at speeds up to 48 km/h (30
mph). This final rule replaces that full rear impact test procedure
with an offset rear impact test procedure specifying that only a
portion of the width of the rear of the test vehicle be impacted at 80
km/h (50 mph). Under the new rear impact procedure, a lighter,
deformable barrier is used. The barrier is very similar to the one used
for dynamic testing in the agency's side impact protection standard,
except that the rear impact barrier's face is mounted slightly lower to
simulate the diving of the front end of a vehicle during pre-crash
braking. The agency has concluded that the new, more stringent rear
impact test procedure will save lives and prevent injuries.
This final rule replaces the standard's lateral (side) impact test
procedure with the procedure specified in the agency's side impact
protection standard at an impact speed range of 53 +/- 1 km/h. The
agency has concluded that this change will provide a more realistic
test, increase safety, and reduce testing costs.
DATES: This final rule is effective January 30, 2004. Voluntary
compliance is permitted on or after that date. If you wish to submit a
petition for reconsideration of this rule, your petition must be
received by January 15, 2004.
ADDRESSES: You may submit petitions for reconsideration [identified by
DOT DMS Docket Number] by any of the following methods:
[sbull] Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
[sbull] Fax: (202) 493-2251.
[sbull] Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590-001.
[sbull] Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif
Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
[sbull] Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and docket
number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking.
Note that all comments received will be posted without change to http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information provided. Please see
the Privacy Act heading under Regulatory Notices. Docket: For access to
the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to
http://
[[Page 67069]]
dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical and other non-legal
issues, you may call Dr. William J.J. Liu, Office of Crashworthiness
Standards, Telephone: (202) 366-2264, Fax: (202)-366-4329.
For legal issues, you may call Mr. Chris Calamita, Office of Chief
Counsel Telephone: (202) 366-2992, Fax: (202)-366-3820.
You may send mail to both of these officials at the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20590.
You may call Docket Management at (202)-366-9324. You may visit the
Docket on the plaza level at 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC,
from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Existing Standard
B. Safety Problem
II. 1995 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
III. 2000 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
A. Proposed Rear Impact Test Procedure
B. Proposed Side Impact Test Procedure
C. Door System Integrity
D. Lead Time
E. Costs and Benefits
F. Request for Comments on Additional Issues
IV. Summary of Comments
A. Rear Impact Test Procedure Upgrade
B. Side Impact Test Procedure Upgrade
C. Door System Integrity
D. Lead Time
1. Rear Impact Test Upgrade
2. Side Impact Test Upgrade
E. Costs and Benefits
F. Additional Issues
1. Real World Data
2. Head and Neck Injury Criteria
3. Seat Back Failure
4. Use of 5th Percentile Female Dummies
5. Test Vehicle Loading Conditions
6. Lowering the Barrier Face
7. Pole Side Impact Test
8. Prohibiting Fuel Leakage in Frontal Impact Crash Tests
9. Compliance Responsibility of Second-Stage Manufacturers
10. Fuel Siphoning
V. Final Rule
A. Summary of the Final Rule
B. Rear Impact Test Procedure
C. Side Impact Test Procedure
D. Door System Integrity
E. Lead Time
1. Rear Impact Test Upgrade
2. Side Impact Test Upgrade
F. Benefits
G. Costs
H. Additional Issues
1. Real World Data
2. Head and Neck Injury Criteria
3. Seat Back Failure
4. Use of 5th Percentile Female Dummies
5. Test Vehicle Loading Conditions
6. Lowering the Barrier Face
7. Pole Side Impact Test
8. Prohibiting Fuel Leakage in Frontal Impact Crash Tests
9. Compliance Responsibility of Second-Stage Manufacturers
10. Fuel Siphoning
VI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
I. Background
A. Existing Standard
Standard No. 301, Fuel system integrity, sets performance
requirements for the fuel systems of vehicles with a gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less. The standard,
which was issued in the 1970s, limits the amount of fuel spillage from
fuel systems of vehicles during and after being subjected to a frontal,
rear, or side impact test.
In the frontal impact test, the test vehicle is driven forward into
a fixed barrier at 48 km/h (30 mph). In the rear impact test, a 1,814
kg (4,000 pound) barrier moving at 48 km/h (30 mph) is guided into the
full width of the rear of a stationary test vehicle. In the side impact
test, a 1,814 kg (4,000 pound) barrier moving at 32 km/h (20 mph) is
guided into the side of a stationary test vehicle. The standard sets
three separate limits on fuel spillage from crash-tested vehicles: 28
grams (1 ounce) by weight, during the time period beginning with the
start of the impact and ending with the cessation of vehicle motion; a
total of 142 grams (5 ounces) by weight during the 5-minute time period
beginning with the cessation of vehicle motion; and 28 grams (1 ounce)
by weight during any 1-minute interval in the 25-minute period
beginning with the end of the 5-minute period.
Similar fuel spillage limits apply to vehicles tested in accordance
with the standard's static rollover test procedure.\1\ The rollover
test is conducted after frontal, rear, and side impact tests.
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\1\ Under S5.6, Fuel spillage; rollover., when a vehicle is
rotated along its longitudinal axis to each successive increment of
90 degrees, fuel spillage from the onset of rotational motion must
not exceed 142 grams (5 ounces) for the first 5 minutes of testing,
at each successive 90 degree increment. For the remaining test
period at each increment of 90 degrees, fuel spillage during any one
minute interval must not exceed 28 g (1 ounce).
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B. Safety Problem
Preserving fuel system integrity in a crash is critical to
preventing occupant exposure to fire. Although vehicle fires are
relatively rare events (occurring in less than 1 percent of vehicles in
towaway crashes), they tend to be severe in terms of the number of
casualties caused. According to an analysis of data in the agency's
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) in 2001, 3.5% percent (1,449
fatalities) of light vehicle occupant fatalities occurred in crashes
involving fire.\2\ Overall, the fire itself was deemed to be the most
harmful event in the vehicle for about 24 percent (341) of these
fatalities.
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\2\ These fatalities included fatalities due to burns and/or
impact injuries, but not due to asphyxiation.
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An analysis of 1993-2001 National Automotive Sampling System (NASS)
data indicated that each year an average of about 15,820 occupants were
exposed to a post-crash fire in passenger cars and light vehicles
(vans, pickup trucks, and multipurpose passenger vehicles) with a GVWR
of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less that were towed away after the
fire. Of those occupants, about 736 (6 percent) received moderate or
severe burns (AIS 2 and greater). Three-quarters of those with moderate
and more severe burns had second or third degree burns over more than
90 percent of the body. Moreover, the agency notes that maximum-
severity (AIS 6) burns are nearly always fatal. These statistics
underscore the importance of preserving fuel system integrity in a
crash in order to prevent vehicle fires.
II. 1995 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On April 12, 1995, NHTSA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) announcing the agency's plans to consider upgrading
Standard No. 301.\3\ The agency explained that it was considering using
a three-phase approach to upgrade the requirements of the standard.
Phase 1 would focus on requirements for component performance (e.g.,
fuel tanks, fuel pumps, and electrical systems); Phase 2 would address
system performance (e.g., shutting down fuel supply and potential
ignition sources in the event of a breach in the fuel system); and
Phase 3 would address issues related to environmental and aging effects
(e.g., the potential relationship of vehicle aging to fire occurrence).
The
[[Page 67070]]
agency sought comment on this approach as well as several other issues.
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\3\ 60 FR 18566. Previously, the agency published a Request for
Comments notice stating that NHTSA was ``considering initiating
rulemaking to upgrade the protection currently provided by''
Standard No. 301. 57 FR 59041, December 14, 1992; Docket No. 92-66,
Notice 1. The notice also requested answers to specific questions
related to test impact speeds, impact barriers, effect of vehicle
aging on the likelihood of fire, contribution of occupant entrapment
to the likelihood of fire-related injuries, etc.
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NHTSA received comments from component and vehicle manufacturers,
industry associations, consumer advocacy organizations, and other
organizations. After reviewing these comments and further analysis, the
agency made the following decisions.
First, after examining the effectiveness of fuel pump shut-off
devices in reducing post-crash vehicle fires, the agency decided not to
pursue rulemaking with respect to fuel system component performance.
The agency's review of NASS data did not reveal a significant
difference in the rate or severity of post-crash fire occurrence in
vehicles with and vehicles without fuel pump shut-off devices. Research
conducted under the General Motors (GM) C/K settlement agreement \4\
confirmed this finding during crash testing with and without fuel pump
shut-off devices. During crash testing, there was no difference in the
rate of fuel leakage or severity of post-crash fire occurrence between
vehicles equipped with shut-off switches (Ford) and those without (GM,
Chrysler and Honda).
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\4\ On December 2, 1994, the Secretary of Transportation
announced a settlement of an investigation by NHTSA of an alleged
safety defect in certain GM pickup trucks with fuel tanks mounted
outside the frame rails. Under that settlement, GM contributed over
$51.3 million for a variety of safety initiatives. Among other
things, the settlement funded research on ways to reduce the
occurrence and effects of post-crash fires. All relevant results of
this research are being placed in dockets NHTSA-98-3585, NHTSA-98-
3588, Docket No. 96-GMRSCH-GR, and Docket No. 95-20-GR.
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Second, the agency decided not to pursue rulemaking related to
environmental and aging effects. The agency agreed with vehicle
manufacturer comments that further studies were needed to define the
problems associated with environmental and aging effects and determine
whether rulemaking would be appropriate to address them. The agency
stated that it might revisit this issue upon further study. As part of
the GM settlement, GM contracted with Southwest Research Institute to
conduct research on the environmental factors and aging effects on fuel
system components. This report showed some effects of corrosion on
metal components and some effects of hot arid conditions on rubber
components, and little effect on plastic components. The findings were
inconclusive, but did not indicate serious problems affecting fuel
system crash performance. No further agency action is planned at this
time.\5\
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\5\ http://dms.dot.gov/search/document.cfm?doucmentid=183754&docketid=3588 Docket Number NHTSA-1988-3588-177 (Miller,
Michael et al. ``First, Second and Third Progress Reports and Final
Report--Inspection of Aging Vehicles and Testing Components'')
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Third, the agency decided to investigate the feasibility and
practicability of upgrading Standard No. 301's rear and side impact
requirements. The agency reviewed real world crash data to determine
what types of rear impact crashes resulted in ``moderate,'' ``severe,''
and ``very severe'' fires.\6\ Next, the agency analyzed the data to
determine whether it was the fire or the impact of the crash that
caused the fatalities and injuries in the fire-related crashes. NHTSA
then examined the data to determine the characteristics of rear crashes
that were causing fire-related fatalities and injuries and developed a
new crash test procedure to simulate the most frequent crash scenario
that leads to fire and fire-related fatalities and injuries in rear
impact crashes. The agency then performed seventeen crash tests using
the new crash test procedure.\7\
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\6\ A ``moderate'' fire is defined as fire damage to between 25
and 50 percent of the vehicle surface; a ``severe'' fire is fire
damage to between 50 and 75 percent of the vehicle surface; and a
``very severe'' fire is fire damage to more than 75 percent of the
vehicle surface.
\7\ The rear impact tests used a 1,368 kg (3,015 pound) moving
deformable barrier (MDB) with the barrier lowered by 50 mm (2
inches) to simulate pre-crash braking. The MDB impacted the test
vehicle at 80 km/h (50 mph) parallel to the longitudinal centerline
of the test vehicle with a 70 percent overlap on the side of the
vehicle where the fuel filler neck was located. However, the new
rear impact test allows the MDB to strike the rear with the overlap
on either side of the vehicle for all possible worst case scenarios,
including dual fuel tank designs with filler necks on both sides and
filler neck in the center of the rear.
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III. 2000 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
A. Proposed Rear Impact Test Procedure
After reviewing the comments on the 1995 ANPRM and analyzing the
real world crash data and data from the seventeen crash tests with the
new crash test procedure, the agency published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) on November 13, 2000.\8\ In the NPRM, the agency
tentatively concluded that the proposed rear impact test procedure
would reduce fire-related fatalities and injuries from rear impact
crashes. Thus, the agency proposed to replace Standard No. 301's
current rear impact test procedure with one that would specify
impacting the rear of the test vehicle at 80 +/- 1 km/h (50 mph) with a
1,368 kg (3,015 pound) moving deformable barrier (MDB) at a 70 percent
overlap with the test vehicle. That barrier is very similar to that
used under Standard No. 214, Side impact protection, in dynamic side
impact testing except that the face of the MDB used in rear impact
testing under Standard No. 301 would be 50 mm (2 inches) lower than the
face of the Standard No. 214 barrier to simulate pre-crash braking.\9\
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\8\ 65 FR 67693, Docket No. NHTSA-2000-8248.
\9\ Standard No. 214, Side Impact Protection, specifies that the
bottom of the face of the barrier is 11 inches above the ground and
the bottom of the bumper is 13 inches above the ground. See Figure
2.
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The agency noted that the proposed test procedure would simulate a
type of rear vehicle-to-vehicle collision that can result in post-crash
fire in an otherwise survivable crash: a high speed offset rear strike
to the vehicle that results in fuel leakage from a breach in the fuel
system and, potentially, a rapidly spreading fire that results in
fatalities and injuries. The agency also noted that NASS estimates show
that the majority of fatal and nonfatal occupant burn injuries in rear
impact crashes occurred in crashes in the 34 to 48 km/h (21 to 30 mph)
delta-v range. The agency stated that the elements of the proposed
offset rear impact test procedure were accordingly chosen to simulate
vehicle-to-vehicle crashes with a delta-v range of 32 to 48 km/h (20 to
30 mph).
The agency tentatively concluded that the proposed offset rear
impact test procedure was practicable. The agency stated:
Crash test results indicate that large, medium, and small
vehicles could be designed to meet the standard under the proposed
upgraded rear impact procedure. In those tests, some small as well
as large existing light-duty vehicles already meet the proposed
upgrade. Several larger light-duty vehicles, including passenger
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and light trucks, all passed
the proposed upgrade. In addition, several small vehicles, the Mazda
Miata, Chevrolet Metro, Nissan Sentra, and Honda Civic, passed the
proposed upgrade. While we are aware that some existing smaller
vehicles leaked fuel when tested under the proposed upgraded test
procedure (e.g., the 1996 Suzuki Sidekick, Dodge Neon, and Geo
Prizm, and the 1998 Chevrolet Cavalier, VW Jetta, and Ford Escort),
we believe that relatively minor, inexpensive design changes would
correct the vast majority of the failures.\10\ For example, the fuel
lines in the Dodge Neon could be rerouted, and the area on top of
the tank around the fuel sender unit plastic sealing plate could be
reinforced on the VW Jetta.\11\
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\10\ The Ford Mustang test series demonstrated the technical
feasibility of redesigning a 1993 Ford Mustang so that it would pass
the proposed upgrade test procedure (the 1996 Ford Mustang test). It
demonstrated that structural and component design are critical,
regardless of the fuel tank location, for passing the upgrade.
\11\ 65 FR at 67701.
NHTSA did not propose to require manufacturers to place each
vehicle's
[[Page 67071]]
fuel tank forward of the rear axle, as suggested by Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) in its comment on the ANPRM,
because the agency believed such a requirement would be unnecessary and
too design restrictive. The agency noted that the fuel tank of the 1996
Ford Mustang, which passed the proposed upgraded test procedure, is
located behind the rear axle. The agency stated that this test
demonstrated that structural and component designs are more critical
factors than fuel tank location in maintaining fuel system integrity.
NHTSA also did not propose to use a heavier barrier (e.g., a 4,000-
pound barrier) to simulate impacts by light trucks and sport utility
vehicles, again as suggested by Advocates, because in an 80 km/h (50
mph) rear impact offset crash test, a 3,015-pound barrier effectively
reproduces the damage profile seen in real world crashes that most
often lead to fires. The agency stated that if a heavier barrier were
used, the proposed rear impact crash test would no longer reproduce
that profile. The agency also noted that it had conducted its research
crash tests with a 3,015-pound barrier, and that further research and
development would have to be conducted before a heavier barrier could
be proposed for use in any test procedure.
B. Proposed Side Impact Test Procedure
NHTSA proposed to replace the current lateral (side) impact crash
test in Standard No. 301 with the side impact crash test currently
specified in Standard No. 214. The Standard No. 214 side impact crash
test specifies that a stationary vehicle be struck on either side by a
1,368 kg (3,015 pound) MDB moving at a speed of 54 km/h.\12\
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\12\ Currently, Standard No. 214 specifies an impact speed of 54
km/h. In the NPRM, the agency proposed to change that specification
in Standard No. 214 to 53 +/- 1 km/h and adopt it for Standard No.
301. The agency noted that the new specification was very close to
the speed (52.9 +/- 0.8 km/h) at which NHTSA's Office of Vehicle
Safety Compliance was conducting Standard No. 214 tests. As
explained later, we are adopting this proposal. In addition, we are
also adopting the proposal to delete several paragraphs of outdated
requirements in Standard No. 214 that related solely to vehicles
manufactured in the mid-1990s.
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The agency reasoned that test analyses show that the Standard No.
214 side impact crash test exposes a tested vehicle to higher crush
energy and crash forces, and to greater changes in velocity, than the
existing Standard No. 301 side test. Test data also show the Standard
No. 214 test exposes the fuel system components to greater forces.
Moreover, the agency reasoned that replacing the Standard No. 301
side test with the Standard No. 214 side impact test would reduce
certification testing costs for manufacturers because they would only
have to conduct one type of side impact test instead of two. The agency
also noted that commenters on the ANPRM supported this change, stating
that the change would be beneficial from both a safety and a cost
perspective.
C. Door System Integrity
In the NPRM, the agency also stated that it was considering adding
a post-crash door openability test requirement to Standard No. 206.\13\
NHTSA noted that NASS data indicate that potential escape from a post-
crash vehicle fire was made more difficult for occupants with moderate
or more serious burns because, among other reasons, they were sitting
next to a door that was jammed shut by crash forces. The agency also
noted that real-world crash reports indicate that there were instances
in which fire suddenly started several minutes after the vehicle was
impacted. Thus, the agency concluded that it is critical that occupants
be able to exit the vehicle quickly and easily after a crash that could
lead to a fire. The agency requested comment on whether such a
requirement was necessary and, if so, what type of requirements would
be appropriate, objective, and repeatable.
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\13\ Standard No. 206 specifies requirements for door locks and
door retention components.
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D. Lead Time
NHTSA proposed a lead time of three years for the proposed upgraded
rear impact test and one year for the change to the Standard No. 214
side impact test. The agency stated that a three-year lead time
appeared to be necessary for the proposed upgraded rear impact test
because: (1) All of a manufacturer's makes and models would have to be
tested under the upgraded test to determine compliance; and (2) for
those vehicles that did not comply, countermeasures would have to be
incorporated into designs and then implemented in engineering and
manufacturing. The agency stated that only one year of lead time was
needed for the new side impact test because few, if any, design changes
would be necessary.
NHTSA stated that between the date the final rule was issued and
the date it took effect, manufacturers would be allowed the option of
certifying vehicles under the existing Standard No. 301 tests or under
the new tests. However, manufacturers would have to irrevocably select
a test when they certified the vehicle.
E. Costs and Benefits
The agency prepared a Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation (PRE)
describing the costs and benefits of the proposed upgraded test
procedures.\14\ NHTSA estimated that the average cost for vehicles that
need to be modified to comply with Standard No. 301's requirements
under the proposed test procedures would be $5 per vehicle. The agency
also estimated that 46 percent of the vehicle fleet would have to be so
modified.\15\ Since approximately 15.2 million vehicles are sold in the
United States each year, the agency estimated that the total cost of
the proposed rule would be $35 million each year.
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\14\ A copy of the PRE was placed in the docket. See Docket No.
NHTSA-2000-8248, entry 2.
\15\ A NHTSA-sponsored cost study indicated that none of the
proposed remedies for the noncompliant vehicles will require major
structural redesign that will change the vehicle's structural
stiffness (NHTSA Docket No. NHTSA-008248-4, Nov. 16, 2000).
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NHTSA estimated that the proposed rule would save from 8 to 21
lives annually, once all vehicles on the road meet Standard No. 301's
requirements under the proposed upgraded test procedures.
F. Request for Comments on Additional Issues
In the NPRM, the agency also requested comments on several issues.
The questions are repeated below.
1. Are there any real-world data, other than the data that the
agency has already analyzed for this proposed upgrade, that may better
describe the relationship between the risk of occupant injury due to
fire and crash severity?
2. Vehicle manufacturers. How many of your vehicle models would
need some redesign to comply with the proposed offset rear impact and
side impact test procedures? Describe the type and extent of design
changes. What costs would be associated with those redesigns? Would you
have any significant problems completing necessary redesigns within the
three-year lead time? If so, please identify those problems and
indicate how much lead time you would need.
3. What impact would the proposed changes have on vehicle safety?
4. Are the proposals sufficient and appropriate for the different
sizes and types of vehicles?
5. In the various crash tests that were performed during the
research for this rulemaking, the values of head and neck injury
criteria measured by the responses of the two front Hybrid III
anthropomorphic test devices were
[[Page 67072]]
much higher than acceptable thresholds. Direct contact of the head of
the dummy with the interior of the vehicle compartment, which occurred
when the front seat rotated backward excessively due to the rear
impact, contributed to these high values. These high values raise
concerns about head and neck protection of the occupants. The rear
impact testing also raised concerns about the seat back strength, as
most seat backs collapsed in those tests. What do the high HIC values
and neck loadings registered by the test dummies in those tests
indicate about the real world potential for trauma injury to vehicle
occupants in rear impacts? Could future vehicles be designed to provide
both the improved fuel system integrity necessary to meet the more
stringent requirements proposed in this NPRM and, at the same time,
provide improved occupant protection in such impacts?
6. How do seat back failures influence the injury potential in rear
impacts? Please provide data and other information that would aid the
agency in determining the need for improving seat back strength and the
appropriate requirements for doing so.
7. Should the agency require vehicles to retain fuel system
integrity in tests with 5th percentile female dummies, as well as with
50th percentile male dummies, as is currently required?
8. NHTSA is proposing to eliminate the second sentence in S7.1.6(b)
from Standard No. 301. That sentence reads: ``If the weight on any
axle, when the vehicle is loaded to unloaded vehicle weight plus dummy
weight, exceeds the axle's proportional share of the test weight, the
remaining weight shall be placed so that the weight on that axle
remains the same.'' Given the specifications in S7.1.6(a) concerning
the placement of rated cargo and luggage capacity weight in the luggage
area and the placement of dummies, is the second sentence in S7.1.6(b)
needed for conducting Standard No. 301 compliance tests?
9. For the rear offset MDB test conditions, the agency is proposing
that the barrier be the same as the one shown in Figure 2 of Standard
No. 214 and specified in 49 CFR Part 587, with one exception. The
exception is that the face of the barrier would be positioned in the
rear impact test so that it is 50 mm (2 inches) lower than the barrier
face height specified in the current Figure 2 of Standard No. 214.\16\
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\16\ The question also noted that positioning the barrier face
in that manner might make it necessary to slightly change the center
of gravity and moment of inertia specifications. NHTSA's subsequent
analysis indicated that there will be no measurable effect on the
center of gravity and the moment of inertia of the MDB by lowering
the face of the barrier two inches (NHTSA Docket No. NHTSA-008248-3,
November 16, 2000).
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10. With respect to side impact crashes that result in fire, this
proposal to upgrade Standard No. 301 addresses vehicle-to-vehicle
crashes. There are approximately two to eight times as many side
collision fires (depending on vehicle type) when the object struck is
another vehicle compared to a narrow object such as a pole. However,
the side collision fire rate for cars, light trucks, and vans is
highest when a narrow object is struck. Would it therefore be
reasonable to consider a pole side impact test as part of a subsequent
upgrading of Standard No. 301?
11. Should the agency amend Standard No. 301 to prohibit fuel
leakage in any crash test under Standard No. 208?
IV. Summary of Comments
NHTSA received comments to the NPRM from seven vehicle
manufacturers (Subaru, DaimlerChrysler, Porsche, Volkswagen, Ford,
Honda, and General Motors), two vehicle manufacturer associations
(Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers \17\ and National Truck Equipment
Association), three engineering firms (American Automotive Design,
Dynamic Safety, and Syson-Hille and Associates), a test laboratory
(Transportation Research Center), the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety, and a consumer advocate group, Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety. Their comments are summarized below by issue.
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\17\ The members of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
are: BMW Group, DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Ford Motor Company, General
Motors, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Nissan, Porsche, Toyota,
Volkswagen, and Volvo.
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A. Rear Impact Test Procedure Upgrade
None of the commenters opposed the proposed rear impact test
procedure upgrade.
The Alliance suggested that significant vehicle redesign will
likely be required to meet the high speed rear crash requirements.
Volkswagen (VW) stated that the rear end structure of small cars will
need to be made stiffer, which could result in increased acceleration
imposed on occupants in more common lower speed rear crashes. Honda
commented that increased vehicle body and fuel tank deformation would
occur, even on vehicles that pass the fuel leak requirements.
DaimlerChrysler (DC) stated its belief ``that the proposal is
likely to require significant changes to vehicle structure and design,
which are yet to be fully defined and realized.'' DC argued that the
proposed upgrade is a ``major rulemaking effort which will present many
challenges to the industry that may not yet be fully identified.''
DC also expressed concerns with using a MDB at the proposed impact
speed (80 km/h). DC stated that in impacts between a MDB and a vehicle
at 80 km/h, DC has observed complete crushing of the barrier face and
ensuing contact with the rigid cart backer plate and contact between
the cart uprights and the impacted vehicle. DC recommended that NHTSA
reevaluate the proposed test procedure upgrade to determine if the
anticipated benefits could be achieved with a lower impact speed (such
as 56-64 km/h), or provide design changes to the MDB and cart system.
GM and Ford observed bottoming of the barrier face to the backing
plate and contact between the barrier uprights and the vehicle in some
rear impact crash tests. GM also stated that the barrier face can
underride the struck vehicle and, upon rebound, the upright that
contacted the vehicle can become ``caught'' on vehicle structure (e.g.,
bumper, frame cross member, etc.), with undetermined effects on the
struck vehicle. GM and Ford suggested that some changes to the MDB
might be necessary. Ford recommended that the agency investigate
``rounding the corners of the deformable portion of the barrier and
increasing its depth.'' Ford stated that its testing indicated that the
right angle corners of the barrier face can ``hang up on trim,''
potentially affecting test repeatability.
Honda commented that it had conducted rear impact crash tests in
accordance with the proposed test procedure. Honda noted that the MDB
sometimes over-rode the rear of the test vehicle, and that in these
instances, the rear frame structure of the vehicle could not absorb
crash energy sufficiently to meet the fuel leaking requirements of
Standard No. 301. Honda also noted, ``Even in instances when the rear
frame functioned somewhat to absorb energy, the increased speed and the
off-set impact caused extensive deformation of the fuel tank.'' Honda
stated that a vehicle in compliance with the proposed upgrade would
have to absorb twice as much energy as a vehicle in compliance with
Standard No. 301 as currently written. Honda argued that under the
proposed upgrade, significant changes would have to be made to each of
its vehicle models.
VW noted that the proposed rear impact would be to either side of
the vehicle. VW recommended that this be
[[Page 67073]]
changed so that the impact is on the side of the vehicle where the fuel
filler pipe or filler neck is located. VW argued that impacting the
side of the vehicle where the fuel filler pipe or filler neck is
located would represent the worst case condition and establish a more
objective requirement for enforcement purposes.
VW also commented that in order to assure compliance with the
higher speed rear impact test, the vehicle rear end structure would
have to be made stiffer, particularly in smaller cars. VW stated that
this would tend to increase the potential for whiplash type injuries in
lower speed crashes. VW recommended that NHTSA address this issue
before issuing a final rule.
Ford commented that it has conducted voluntary, in-house 80 km/h
vehicle-to-vehicle rear impact crash tests to evaluate fuel system
integrity since the mid-1980s. Ford supported the agency's proposed
test upgrade, stating, ``Ford believes this test can provide a robust
evaluation of a fuel system's integrity.''
Syson-Hille commented that other vehicle manufacturers, such as GM,
began conducting 80 km/h vehicle-to-vehicle rear impact crash tests in
the 1980s, and that Mercedes-Benz marketing materials note that its
vehicles have been designed to provide fuel system integrity in offset
rear impact crashes since the early 1980s.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates), and American Automotive Design
(AAD), urged NHTSA to require the use of a 4,000-pound rigid barrier,
instead of the 3,015-pound MDB. IIHS and Advocates urged this based on
their view that the Standard No. 214 barrier does not reflect the
characteristics of pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles (SUV) and
thus may not reproduce the patterns or extent of deformation seen when
those types of vehicles strike cars in the side or rear.
B. Side Impact Test Procedure Upgrade
None of the commenters opposed the proposed side impact test
procedure upgrade.
DC recommended that, as in the proposed rear impact test procedure,
the agency specify that the MDB be lowered 50 mm (2 inches) in the
proposed side impact test procedure. DC stated that data indicate that
pre-impact braking occurs in 54 percent of side impacts.
C. Door System Integrity
Vehicle manufacturers generally opposed adding a post-crash test
door operability requirement to Standard No. 206. The Alliance and GM
agreed with and supported the logic regarding a post-crash test door
operability requirement. However, the Alliance and GM stated that
Standard No. 206 addresses component level performance, while a post-
crash test door operability requirement would address vehicle level
performance. The Alliance stated that adding such a requirement to
Standard No. 206 would necessitate the addition of vehicle crash test
requirements to the standard as well. The Alliance also stated,
Prior to proposing such requirements in future rulemakings,
NHTSA would need to develop and define an objective set of
meaningful and measurable requirements pertaining to the
applicability of doors (front rear, sliding, etc.), number of doors
(per row, per vehicle, etc.), and methodology by which operability
would be assessed (without the use of tools is an insufficient
measure, as NHTSA has concluded in past rulemaking efforts).
GM stated that such a requirement would be more appropriate if it
were added to crash tests that are already required for other safety
standards, such as Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection,
Standard No. 214, Side impact protection, or Standard No. 301. GM noted
that it currently performs door operability evaluations following most
barrier tests.\18\ GM argued that NHTSA should develop meaningful,
appropriate, objective, and repeatable requirements for post-crash test
door operability after further research and through separate
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ GM stated, ``These evaluations start by first actuating the
door latch. Assuming the door unlatches a nominal force of
approximately 100 pounds is applied to open the door using a hook-
type dial gage. A measurement of how far the door could be opened is
made and recorded.''
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DC argued that NHTSA has not provided sufficient evidence to
demonstrate the need for adding a post-crash test door operability
requirement to Standard No. 206. DC recommended that NHTSA conduct
research to determine such a requirement's real world benefits,
feasibility, and effects on vehicle design, cost, and weight. DC
suggested that if NHTSA persists in such a rulemaking, the agency
require only one operable door per vehicle.
Advocates supported adding a post-crash test door operability
requirement to Standard No. 206. Advocates stated:
Advocates believes that ensuring that doors can be opened after
crashes is not a safety problem involving only fire-related
collisions. It is a major safety issue long overdue for agency
regulatory attention. Many thousands of crashes every year result in
vehicle deformation preventing door opening. In these crashes,
numerous people are seriously injured whose lives could be saved or
the severity of their injuries substantially reduced if rescue
squads could quickly reach them without recourse either to the use
of Jaws of Life or to being forced to extricate a seriously injured
person through a window or windshield, a common practice.
Syson-Hille also supported a post-crash test door operability
requirement. Syson-Hille recommended that the agency require at least
one door on two-door vehicles and three doors on four-door vehicles to
be operable after a crash test.
D. Lead Time
1. Rear Impact Test Upgrade
The vehicle manufacturers all supported the three-year lead time
proposed in the NPRM for the rear impact test upgrade, but recommended
that the agency add a phase-in after that period. The Alliance
recommended a four-year phase-in with an implementation schedule of 25
percent compliance the first year, 40 percent the second year, 70
percent the third year, and 100 percent the fourth year. The Alliance
also recommended that the agency grant carry forward credits for early
compliance.
The Alliance argued that a phase-in is necessary because the
Alliance considered this to be a ``major rulemaking, particularly in
response to the substantially increased impact energy of the high speed
rear offset impact testing proposed.'' The Alliance stated:
Significant vehicle redesign and retooling for production will
likely be required in a number of vehicles. The small number of
tests conducted by the NHTSA, often with a sample size of one
vehicle, simply is inadequate to identify whether vehicle changes
are required or for any manufacturer to assure compliance for all
its vehicles.
DC supported the Alliance's recommended phase-in schedule. DC
argued that such a phase-in would ``allow the efficient phasing out of
older models designed to the current requirements with replacements
that are thoroughly designed, constructed and tested to meet the more
stringent requirements without very costly and disruptive mid cycle
manufacturing changes.''
Subaru recommended a three-year full phase-in, with complete
compliance after the third year. Honda suggested a four-year phase-in
with an implementation schedule of 10 percent, 30 percent, 70 percent,
and 100 percent. Porsche supported the Alliance's recommended lead time
but requested that the agency provide small volume manufacturers the
option of coming into compliance at the 100 percent level in
[[Page 67074]]
the third year of the phase-in with no requirements in the first two
years.
IIHS stated that the proposed three-year lead time for the rear
impact test upgrade should be sufficient.
2. Side Impact Test Upgrade
Vehicle manufacturers supported the one-year lead time proposed in
the NPRM for the side impact test upgrade, but recommended that the
agency add a phase-in after this lead time. The Alliance and Ford
recommended a four-year phase-in with an implementation schedule of 25
percent compliance the first year, 40 percent the second year, 70
percent the third year, and 100 percent the fourth year. The Alliance
also recommended that the agency grant carry forward credits for early
compliance.
IIHS stated that the one-year lead time proposed by the agency in
the NPRM should be sufficient.
E. Costs and Benefits
Honda commented that the agency's cost estimates were insufficient.
Honda stated, ``The cost of managing all the accompanying issues is at
least 10 times greater than NHTSA's cost estimation.'' Honda claimed
that to meet the proposed rear impact test upgrade, ``It will be
necessary to change the thickness of the vehicle's rear structure,
which requires the modification of existing dies and manufacturing of
new dies and parts.''
VW questioned the safety benefits of the proposed test upgrades. VW
stated:
The accident data base of the Medical University of Hanover in
Germany indicates that in the universe of crashes with at least one
injured occupant, only 0.58 percent resulted in after-crash fire and
only 0.4 percent of the injuries in the data base were fire related.
In the same sample of crashes, the whiplash injuries were reported
in 11 percent of the cases. Although the vehicle fleet population in
Germany is different from that in the U.S., Volkswagen submits that
the statistics support the very low incidence of post-crash fires
and fire related injuries.
F. Additional Issues
1. Real World Data
The agency asked in the NPRM whether there were any real-world
data, other than the data that NHTSA had already analyzed, that may
better describe the relationship between the risk of occupant injury
due to fire and crash severity.
The Alliance, GM, DC, and Ford stated that there were no such data.
The Alliance and GM commented that both the FARS and NASS files might
need to be modified to more accurately define any remaining fire risk.
2. Head and Neck Injury Criteria
In the NPRM, the agency noted that in the various crash tests that
were performed during the research for this rulemaking, the values of
head and neck injury criteria measured by the two front seat dummies
were much higher than acceptable thresholds. The agency asked what
these high injury values indicate about the real world potential for
trauma injury to vehicle occupants in rear impacts.
The Alliance stated that its members would need access to more
details of NHTSA's test program in order to respond to this
question.\19\ However, the Alliance argued that the issue of occupant
protection in rear impacts is outside the scope of this rulemaking. The
Alliance recommended that the agency address this issue in the ongoing
Standard No. 202, Head restraints, rulemaking or in a possible future
upgrade of Standard No. 207, Seating systems. The Alliance also
commented that more research is needed to provide an appropriate level
of seating system performance dealing with the proposed rear impact
test upgrade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ The agency notes that it docketed a detailed list of all
the rear impact crash test results discussed in the NPRM and other
related dockets. See Docket No. NHTSA-99-5825-1, June 8, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Syson-Hille commented that both GM and Mercedes-Benz have been
using 50 mph vehicle-to-vehicle rear impact tests, with occupant
survival space criteria, since the 1980s. Advocates suggested that the
agency consider upgrading requirements for the entire seating system
(seat, seat back, and head restraint) to provide improved occupant
protection in the proposed Standard No. 301 rear impact test upgrade.
3. Seat Back Failure
In the NPRM, the agency asked how seat back failures influence
injury potential in rear impacts. The agency also asked for data that
would aid it in determining the need for improving seat back strength
and the appropriate requirements for doing so.
The Alliance stated that without a definition of ``seat back
failure'' it could not answer the question. However, the Alliance
defined the optimal seat back strength as the balance between strength
and flexibility to address both severe and minor impacts.
DC and Ford supported the Alliance's comments. DC commented that
the issue of seat back strength is outside the scope of this
rulemaking, and should be addressed in a possible future upgrade of
Standard No. 207. Ford stated that seat back strength should be
designed to enhance occupant safety in real-world crashes.
GM agreed with an upgrade of Standard No. 207 seat back strength
requirements in the future. However, GM stated that this should be done
in a separate rulemaking.
VW commented that a single optimal level of seat back strength is
extremely difficult to define because of the range in impact severity
(a function of impact speed and the impacting vehicle structure in
real-world crash situations).
Advocates stated:
Advocates thinks it would be difficult for the agency to justify
instituting the proposed rear impact fuel integrity test without
reforming Standard No. 207 to prevent seat back collapse while also
ensuring much better head restraint protection against whiplash
injuries. It is obvious that it is unacceptable to propose a new
crash test in which the majority of seatbacks in the test vehicles
collapse or occupants suffer severe whiplash injuries in seats which
maintain their upright positions. * * * Advocates is concerned that,
in the short term, manufacturers may simply increase seat back
strength, especially rigidity, to prevent seat backs from collapsing
in the new No. 301 rear impact test.
4. Use of 5th Percentile Female Dummies
In the NPRM, the agency asked whether it should require vehicles to
meet the requirements of Standard No. 301 in tests with 5th percentile
female dummies as well as with the currently-required 50th percentile
male dummies.
The Alliance, DC, GM, VW, and Ford opposed requiring the use of 5th
percentile female dummies in Standard No. 301 rear impact tests. The
Alliance stated that different dummy sizes would only change the total
impact weight of the tested vehicles and would have little or no effect
on the performance of the fuel system. However, GM supported the
voluntary use of instrumented test dummies for research to understand
better the mechanics and magnitude of the potential for injury for
various dummy sizes in different crash situations.
Advocates supported requiring the use of 5th percentile female
dummies in the proposed rear impact test procedure. Advocates stated
this would help prevent occupant injury due to ramp up of the seat
back. In addition, Advocates suggested that the agency require use of
the 95th percentile male dummy in Standard No. 301 rear impact tests to
help prevent occupant injury due to seat back failure.
5. Test Vehicle Loading Conditions
In the NPRM, the agency proposed to eliminate the second sentence
of
[[Page 67075]]
S7.1.6(b) of Standard No. 301. That sentence reads:
If the weight on any axle, when the vehicle is loaded to
unloaded vehicle weight plus dummy weight, exceeds the axle's
proportional share of the test weight, the remaining weight shall be
placed so that the weight on that axle remains the same.
The Alliance, Ford, and VW opposed the elimination of that
sentence. The Alliance stated:
The 136 kg load specified for impact testing by FMVSS [Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard] 301 is relatively small for many
trucks. Even with this load directly over the rear axle, the test
axle loads will generally not be in the same proportions as the
specified GAWRs [gross axle weight ratings] for a full-sized truck.
The second sentence allows the manufacturer to conduct the test when
the conditions specified in the first sentence cannot be met.
VW recommended that the agency incorporate the load distribution
provisions of S7.1.6(b), which apply to multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses, in S7.1.6(a), which applies to passenger
cars. VW also suggested that the text of S7.1.6(a) and (b) be clarified
to state that the weight placement and attachment must be out of the
vehicle crush zone and done in a manner that does not interfere with
vehicle crash deformation.
GM recommended that the agency revise the test vehicle loading
conditions to read as follows:
Passenger cars. A passenger car is loaded to its unloaded
vehicle weight plus the weight of the necessary anthropomorphic test
devices, plus its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight, secured
in the luggage area.
Multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses. A
multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, or bus is loaded to its
unloaded vehicle weight plus the weight of the necessary
anthropomorphic test devices, plus 136 kilograms or its rated cargo
and luggage capacity weight, whichever is less, secured in the load
carrying area and distributed as nearly as possible in proportion to
its gross axle weight ratings. For the purposes of this standard,
unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-
performing accessories.
GM also recommended that the agency replace the language in S8.1.1
of Standard No. 208, S6.1 of Standard No. 212, S7.7 of Standard No.
219, S7.1.6 of Standard No. 301, S7.1.6 of Standard No. 303, and S7.2.3
of Standard No. 305 with the same language as that quoted above.\20\ GM
stated that these changes would facilitate common understanding,
eliminate any ambiguity that might be due to any differences in the
language of these standards, parallel the wording of the test
procedure, and agree with the agency's intent for the loading
conditions to be consistent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ GM recommended that the following sentence be included in
the language for Standard Nos. 208, 212, and 219: ``Vehicles are
tested to a maximum unloaded vehicle weight of 2,495 kilograms.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Lowering the Barrier Face
In the NPRM, the agency proposed that the MDB that would be used in
the proposed rear impact test procedure upgrade be the same as the one
shown in Figure 2 of Standard No. 214, except that the barrier face
would be 50 mm (2 inches) lower. The agency requested comments on this
proposed change.
DC, GM, and Ford supported the proposed lowering of the barrier
face for rear impact testing. The Alliance and VW, however, questioned
NHTSA's proposal to lower the barrier face for the rear impact testing.
VW commented that the statistics used by NHTSA to justify the proposed
change had not been verified. VW also stated,
The speed distribution of rear end crashes in which pre-impact
braking might occur has not been fully addressed and it is possible
that pre-impact braking of either the target vehicle or the
impacting vehicle or both is not as common as NHTSA assumes in the
high speed rear impact crashes that the very severe upgraded rear
crash test is intended to address.
7. Pole Side Impact Test
In the NPRM, the agency noted that the side collision fire rate for
passenger cars, light trucks, and vans is highest when a narrow object
is struck. Thus, the agency asked whether it would be reasonable to
consider a pole side impact test as part of a subsequent upgrading of
Standard No. 301.
The Alliance, DC, GM, Ford, and Porsche opposed a pole side impact
test. The Alliance stated that NHTSA would need to provide a full
assessment of the safety basis if the agency undertook such a
rulemaking. The Alliance also stated that the agency would need to
propose a detailed test procedure, including pole contact locations,
closing velocities, pole sizes, and modes of testing.
DC commented that any potential benefits of a pole side impact test
``would be far outweighed by the added counter measures that such
testing would require.'' DC stated:
We believe that the benefits to real world safety and the scope
and magnitude, and impact on motor vehicle design of such
requirements would need to be verified through detailed studies,
testing, and be evaluated by the agency prior to consideration of
such potentially invasive regulation with apparent major impact on
motor vehicles. We believe that such studies would not demonstrate
an appreciable benefit in overall real world occupant safety.
Advocates supported adding a pole side impact test to Standard No.
301. Advocates stated,
Such a test would provide concurrent safety information on both
upper and lower interior occupant protection (because of severe side
structure deformation and localized intrusion), door integrity both
during and after the crash, and of fuel system integrity.
8. Prohibiting Fuel Leakage in Frontal Impact Crash Tests
In the NPRM, the agency asked whether it should amend Standard No.
301 to prohibit fuel leakage in any crash test performed under Standard
No. 208.
The Alliance and GM supported a future revision limiting fuel
system leakage in any Standard No. 208 crash test to current Standard
No. 301 requirements, if a meaningful safety benefit could be
determined.
DC and Ford opposed a fuel leakage requirement in Standard No. 208
crash tests.
Advocates commented that the rates of fuel release and quantities
currently permitted by Standard No. 301 are not consonant with fire
prevention and occupant safety following a crash. Advocates recommended
that the agency should show the real-world consequences of the rates
and amounts of fuel spillage permitted by Standard No. 301, and, if the
amounts are judged to be too lenient, revise them to minimize the
chances of a post-crash fire.
IIHS and Dynamic Safety recommended that the agency adopt frontal
offset crash test requirements in Standard No. 301. IIHS stated,
``Frontal offset deformable barrier crash tests create deformation
patterns commonly found in severe real-world crashes. The offset
loading challenges the vehicle's ability to retain its structural
integrity.''
9. Compliance Responsibility of Second-Stage Manufacturers
In the NPRM, the agency noted that there are a large number of
second-stage manufacturers that could be affected by the proposed rule.
Second-stage manufacturers buy a chassis from a first-stage
manufacturer and finish it to the consumer's specifications. The
manufacturers that put a work-related body on a pickup truck chassis
(such as a small tow truck) often perform manufacturing operations
affecting the fuel system, both in the structure around the fuel tank
and where the fuel filler neck attaches to the body. Other second-stage
manufacturers use a van chassis or an incomplete vehicle for
ambulances, small mobile homes, small school buses, etc.
[[Page 67076]]
Typically, the first-stage manufacturer provides the second-stage
manufacturer with a body builder's guide that tells the second-stage
manufacturer what additions or other modifications it can make and
still either pass along the original equipment manufacturer's
certification for compliance with Standard No. 301 (for chassis cabs)
or otherwise be confident that the vehicle will comply (for other types
of incomplete vehicles). To the extent that a second-stage manufacturer
deviates from the guide, it would have to certify compliance on its
own.
In the NPRM, the agency tentatively concluded that few final stage
manufacturers would deviate from the body builder's guide.
The National Truck Equipment Association (NTEA) \21\ disagreed with
this tentative conclusion. The NTEA commented:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ The NTEA represents second-stage manufacturers, most of
whom are small businesses.
It is not inconceivable that a major upgrade of the standard
could force a chassis manufacturer to forbid the completion of
certain chassis with certain body types or equipment in order to
reduce their liability to an acceptable level. In any event, it will
be impossible for the chassis manufacturers to test or even envision
all types of multi-stage vehicles and will likely allow no
modifications of any sort while leaving as much liability with the
final stage manufacturer as possible, even when no fuel system
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
modifications are made by the final stage manufacturer.
The NTEA stated that the proposed upgrade of Standard No. 301 could
require second-stage manufacturers to conduct compliance testing, and
that since most second-stage manufacturers are small businesses, such
testing would be an unreasonable burden.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The NTEA submitted several conformity statements from
first-stage manufacturers as evidence that the certification
responsibilities of second-stage manufacturers would change as a
result of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Fuel Siphoning
Dynamic Safety, IIHS, and Advocates all raised the issue of fuel
siphoning after a fuel line is breached. Dynamic Safety stated:
Any fuel system integrity standard upgrade should address the
issue of fuel line siphoning. The standard should require that
vehicles not siphon fuel if a fuel line is breached.
Dynamic Safety commented that anti-siphon devices are readily
available. Dynamic Safety stated that Ford and DC have been using fuel
return line one-way check valves (known as ``duckbill valves'') on many
of their vehicles since the 1980s, and that GM has installed ``siphon
break'' holes in some of its passenger car fuel return lines since the
late 1980s.
IIHS stated, ``The Institute strongly supports implementation of
requirements designed to stop the flow of fuel after a collision.''
Advocates strongly supported research into and consideration of fuel
system flow interdiction through the use of various technologies, such
as electric current shut-off devices that stop fuel pump delivery after
a crash and manual or electrical inertia switches and check valves to
block fuel delivery.
V. Final Rule
A. Summary of the Final Rule
The amendments in this final rule are essentially the same as those
proposed in the NPRM, but with compliance requirements for the rear
impact upgrade to be phased-in. Instead of providing that all vehicles
must comply at the end of a several year period, as proposed in the
NPRM, the agency is providing that compliance with the rear impact
upgrade will be phased-in over an additional three-year period, without
credits for early compliance. The lead time for the side impact upgrade
is the same as proposed.
As proposed in the NPRM, the final rule establishes a rear impact
test procedure that specifies striking the rear of the test vehicle at
80 +/- 1 km/h (50 mph) with a 1,368 kilogram (3,015 pound) MDB at a 70
percent overlap with the test vehicle. The MDB is located 50
millimeters (2 inches) lower than the face of the Standard No. 214
barrier to simulate pre-crash braking. This replaces the 48 km/h rear
moving barrier crash test previously required under S6.2 of Standard
No. 301.
Also as proposed, the final rule eliminates Standard No. 301's side
crash test and replaces it with the side impact crash test currently
specified in Standard No. 214. S6.3 of Standard No. 301 had required a
vehicle's side to be impacted by a barrier moving at 48 km/h. This
final rule incorporates into S6.3 the side impact crash test in
Standard No. 214, which is also amended by the final rule to specify
that a stationary vehicle be struck on either side by a 1,368 kg (3,015
pound) MDB moving at a speed of 53 +/- 1km/h.
NHTSA notes that while it has conducted research to explore the
desirability of revising the Standard No. 214 barrier, additional
research would have to be conducted before the agency could decide
whether proposing a revision might be worthwhile. Thus, even if a
revision were ultimately adopted, it could not be implemented until
well beyond the implementation of this upgrade to Standard No. 301.
Instead of providing that all vehicles comply at the end of a
several year period, as proposed in the NPRM, the agency is providing
that compliance with the rear impact upgrade will be phased in by
increasing percentages of production over an additional three-year
period, without credits for early compliance or compliance above the
required percentages.
At least 40 percent of vehicles manufactured on or after September
1, 2006, but before September 1, 2007, must comply with the new rear
impact requirements. At least 70 percent of the vehicles manufactured
on or after September 1, 2007, but before September 1, 2008, will have
to comply, and starting September 1, 2008, all vehicles manufactured
will have to comply with the upgraded rear impact requirements. The
final rule amends 49 CFR Part 586, establishing reporting and record
keeping requirements concerning the phase-in. However, vehicles
manufactured in two or more stages will not be required to meet the
rear impact upgrade requirements until September 1, 2008, when all
vehicles must be certified as complying.
All vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2004, must
comply with the upgraded side impact requirements.
B. Rear Impact Test Procedure
After reviewing real-world fire-related crash data, various vehicle
offset crash tests, and the comments, NHTSA is adopting the rear impact
test procedure as proposed. The final rule replaces Standard No. 301's
current rear impact test procedure with one that specifies striking the
rear of the test vehicle at 80 +/- 1 km/h (50 mph) with a 1,368
kilogram (3,015 pound) MDB at a 70 percent overlap with either side of
the test vehicle. The MDB face is located 50 millimeters (2 inches)
lower than the face of the Standard No. 214 barrier to simulate pre-
crash braking.
The agency is not adopting DC's recommended impact speed of 56-64
km/h for the reasons stated in the NPRM. Namely, the agency believes
that the upgraded test procedure will simulate a type of rear vehicle-
to-vehicle collision that can result in post-crash fire in an otherwise
survivable crash: a high speed offset rear strike to the vehicle that
results in fuel leakage from a breach in the fuel system and,
potentially, a rapidly spreading fire that results in fatalities and
injuries. As NHTSA noted in the NPRM, NASS estimates show that the
majority of fatal and nonfatal occupant burn injuries in rear impact
crashes were in the 34 to 48
[[Page 67077]]
km/h (21 to 30 mph) delta-v range. The agency believes that the offset
rear impact test procedure specified in this final rule will simulate
vehicle-to-vehicle crashes with a delta-v range of 32 to 48 km/h (20 to
30 mph).
The agency is also not adopting the recommendations of DC, GM, and
Ford to specify design changes to the MDB and cart system. DC, GM, and
Ford commented that, in their rear impact testing under the proposed
test procedure, the MDB honeycomb appeared to bottom out. NHTSA, in the
rear impact testing that it conducted in support of this rulemaking,
took detailed post-crash test honeycomb crush measurements. None of the
measurements indicated complete bottoming out of the honeycomb, and
only a few of the measurements indicated about 85 percent compression.
Honeycomb, by design, is limited to approximately 85 percent
compression, at which point it begins to stiffen considerably until it
becomes infinitely stiff at 90-95 percent compression. During the 85-90
percent compression phase, it is similar to vehicle structures that
become progressively stiffer as the crush in a crash increases. The
measurements that were at 85 percent compression were observed near the
edges of the MDB face, and since the total area was miniscule compared
to the overall block of honeycomb, there will be little or no effect on
the total or local forces exerted. Therefore, the energy absorbing
honeycomb element has fully served its function of spreading the loads
to the soft and hard structures of the vehicle and dissipating its
share of the crash energy by the time that nearly full compression
occurs. Accordingly, the agency believes that bottoming out of the
honeycomb is not a concern.
DC, GM, and Ford also commented that, in their rear impact testing,
the uprights supporting the cart face inadvertently contacted the
struck vehicle. None of the commenters provided details on specific
tests. However, the agency observed such contact in several of its rear
impact tests. The NHTSA tests were conducted with the Standard No. 214
barrier, which has uprights that extend approximately 100 mm (4 inches)
above the backing plate. The agency conducted film analysis of its
tests and found there was no contact between the uprights and any
significant vehicle structural components. The only vehicle components
that contacted the uprights were trunks or tailgates that were already
deformed. These contacts came late in the crash event and did not
influence the outcomes.
The agency also notes that GM conducted several rear impact crash
tests with a non-Standard No. 214 barrier. The cart used by GM had
uprights extending approximately 600 mm (24 inches) above the backing
plate, or 20 inches taller than the uprights on the barrier used by
NHTSA. Despite this significant difference, there was no difference in
the GM and NHTSA test results. Accordingly, the agency believes that
contact between the cart uprights and the struck vehicle is not a
concern.
GM noted that in some of its tests the barrier face underrode the
struck vehicle and, upon rebound, the upright that contacted the
vehicle became ``caught'' on vehicle structure (e.g., bumper, frame
cross member, etc.), with undetermined effects on the struck vehicle.
Ford stated that, in some of its tests, right angle corners of the
barrier face hung up on vehicle trim, potentially affecting test
repeatability.
NHTSA did not observe either of these phenomena in any of its
testing. The agency notes that the top edge of the deformable element
of the barrier is 31 inches above the ground. Consequently, for the
barrier face to underride the struck vehicle, the rear end of the
vehicle would have to be lifted approximately 20 to 24 inches off the
ground. The agency believes that such lifting is highly unlikely.
Moreover, the agency believes that any possible effects from the
phenomena observed by GM and Ford would be secondary since they occur
after the maximum crush damage of the test. The agency notes that
damage to the fuel systems tested by NHTSA and GM appeared to result
from crush damage rather than from any secondary damage. Accordingly,
the agency believes that the points raised by GM and Ford are not of
concern.
NHTSA is not adopting VW's suggestion to not lower the barrier face
by 50 mm (2 inches) to simulate pre-crash braking. NHTSA has determined
that this change will have no measurable effect on the performance of
the barrier.\23\ The agency's tests indicate that the center of gravity
of the barrier will drop about 7.4 mm (0.29 inches), which is well
within the 25.4 mm (1 inch) allowed tolerance for center of gravity
locations. The moment of inertia of the barrier about the longitudinal
(roll) and transverse (pitch) axes will be reduced 0.1 percent and 0.02
percent, respectively, and there will be no change in the vertical
(yaw) axis. The agency notes that the device currently used to measure
these parameters is not capable of measuring such small changes in the
moment of inertia. Moreover, these small changes will not produce any
measurable effect on the test results.
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\23\ The agency has docketed its findings on which this
determination is based. See Docket No. NHTSA-00-8248, entry 3.
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The agency is not adopting the recommendation of Advocates, IIHS,
and AAD to specify the use of a heavier (4,000 pound) barrier because,
as the agency noted in the NPRM, in an 80 km/h (50 mph) rear impact
offset crash test, a 3,015-pound barrier effectively reproduces the
damage profile seen in real world crashes that most often lead to
fires. If a heavier barrier were used, the proposed rear impact crash
test would no longer reproduce that profile. In addition, the agency
has conducted its crash tests in support of this rulemaking with a
3,015-pound barrier. The agency would have to conduct further research
and development before a heavier barrier could be proposed for use in
any test procedure.\24\
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\24\ The agency notes that the impact with the 3,015-pound
barrier at 50 mph produces an impact energy 2.09 times greater than
the impact energy produced by the current Standard No. 301 test. If
the agency specified the use of a 4,000-pound barrier at 50 mph, the
impact energy would be 2.78 times greater than the current Standard
No. 301 test.
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Honda claimed that the MDB overrode the rear of the test vehicle
but was not specific about the vehicle test in which the override
occurred. We presume that Honda may have examined the test film of a
Honda Accord test conducted by GM under the GM C/K settlement agreement
with NHTSA. While NHTSA personnel made suggestions and witnessed the
testing, we did not have direct control over the conduct of the tests.
The Standard No. 301 upgrade test protocol was not precisely followed,
but was instead modified according to what GM believed to be a worst
case. Two major exceptions to the Standard No. 301 upgrade protocol
were the test speed and the barrier height. GM believed that testing
near the Standard No. 214 height and at 85 km/h would provide a worst
case scenario. In GM's test with the Honda Accord, there was indeed
severe override, which we believe was due to the additional 2.5 inches
in the height of the MDB face, and to a lesser degree the additional
speed of the test.
VW also recommended that the proposed rear impact test be on the
side of the vehicle where the filler pipe is located. Our test results
indicated that fuel leakage is not dependent on the location of the
filler pipe; rather, it is dependent on how the overall fuel system is
protected against the impact. Therefore, we are not incorporating
[[Page 67078]]
VW's suggestion and vehicles must comply when the rear impact test is
conducted on either side of the vehicle.
Further, our cost study indicated that compliance with this final
rule will not require major structural redesign (as stated by Alliance
and DC), or necessitate an increase in vehicle stiffness (as stated by
VW). Because there is no need to increase the vehicle stiffness, this
final rule does not increase the potential for whiplash injuries in
lower crashes as suggested by VW.
C. Side Impact Test Procedure
The agency is replacing Standard No. 301's current lateral crash
test with the side impact crash test specified in Standard No. 214. The
Standard No. 214 side impact crash test specifies that a stationary
vehicle be struck on either side by a 1,368 kg (3,015 pound) MDB. As
noted above, Standard No. 214 currently specifies an impact speed of 54
km/h. In order to provide an appropriate tolerance without affecting
the stringency of the test, the agency proposed to change the test
speed to 53 +/- 1 km/h and adopt it for Standard No. 301. No comments
addressed this issue, and we are adopting that proposal.
The agency is specifying that the MDB be lowered 50 mm (2 inches)
for the rear impact test to simulate pre-braking. However, the agency
is not specifying that the MDB be lowered for the side impact test. The
test conditions of Standard No. 214 were intended to reflect a ``worst
case'' scenario for occupants riding in the struck vehicle in that the
striking vehicle was assumed not to be braking prior to impact. A
braking vehicle would strike lower than a non-striking vehicle,
potentially engaging more of the side sill of the struck vehicle. Full
engagement of the sill dissipates the crush energy more effectively
than engagement of the door structures located above the sill,
resulting in les intrusion and deformation along the struck side where
fuel system components (e.g., fuller filler neck and tube) are located.
NHTSA believes the integrity of those fuel system components would be
tested in a more severe environment if the barrier were not lowered.
For these reasons, NHTSA has decided not to lower the MDB for the side
impact test.
D. Door System Integrity
NHTSA believes that a post-crash door operability requirement could
be a practicable, reasonable safety enhancement. However, the agency
has decided not to add a post-crash door operability requirement to
Standard No. 301 or Standard No. 206 in this rulemaking. The agency has
not developed a practical, objective, and repeatable test procedure for
testing door operability. The agency is specifically concerned with
developing specifications for the type and magnitude of force needed to
test door operability. The agency notes that none of the commenters who
supported a door operability requirement suggested a test procedure.
Accordingly, NHTSA will need to conduct research before proposing
any post-crash door operability requirement and will consider adding a
post-crash door operability requirement to Standard No. 206 or Standard
No. 301 in a separate rulemaking.
E. Lead Time
1. Rear Impact Test Upgrade
In the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation for the NPRM, the agency
said that most vehicles needing modification to meet the upgrade rear
impact test would need only minor modifications and estimated that
those modifications could be completed in 33 months. Based on that
estimate, we provided a lead time of three years.
The Alliance said ``significant vehicle redesign and retooling for
production will likely be required in a number of vehicles.'' It
suggested ``(t)he small number of tests conducted by the NHTSA, often
with a sample size of one vehicle, simply is inadequate to identify
whether vehicle changes are required or for any manufacturer to assure
compliance for all its vehicles.'' The Alliance suggested that the
agency phase in the requirements, beginning not earlier than three
years after the issuance of the final rule, according to the following
annually increasing percentages of production: 25%, 40%, 70% and 100%.
In their comments on the NPRM, DC and Honda argued that some
vehicles would need more than just minor modifications and that
therefore additional lead time should be provided. Both suggested that
the entire rear ends of some vehicles would have to be redesigned,
although neither identified any specific models in need of such
changes. Honda generally cited crash testing in support of its
argument, but gave no details about that testing. DC suggested the same
phase-in recommended by the Alliance. Honda suggested that the agency
phase in the requirements, beginning not earlier than three years after
the issuance of the final rule, according to the following percentages
of production: 10%, 30%, 70% and 100%.
While the agency continues to believe that a three-year lead time
is sufficient for most vehicles in need of modification, it agrees that
it is desirable to provide additional lead time to accommodate any new
models that were designed and developed based upon the current
requirements. The agency recognizes that vehicle platforms, once
developed, are typically used for a number of years without major
structural modification. We also recognize that in order to meet the
requirements of FMVSS No. 301, a vehicle, without modification, must
meet the static roll over requirements following an impact in a barrier
test. Consequently, we have decided that the upgraded rear impact test
will be phased-in, beginning on September 1, 2006, according to the
following percentages of production: 40%, 70% and 100%. We believe that
this combination of lead time and phase-in will allow sufficient time
for existing platforms to be redesigned to comply with all of the
requirements of FMVSS No. 301, and that the four year phase-in proposed
by the Alliance is not necessary.
We also believe that it is not necessary to allow an optional ``0%,
0%, 100%'' three-year phase-in for limited-line manufacturers as
proposed by Porsche. A similar phase-in exception for limited line
manufacturers is present for the advanced air bag requirements of
Standard No. 208. However, the advanced technology requirements that
compounded the disparity between the phase-in requirements of the
Advanced Air Bag Rule for limited line manufacturers and more diverse
manufacturers is not present here.
2. Side Impact Test Upgrade
In the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation for the NPRM, we said:
Since almost all vehicles pass the Standard No. 214 test without
fuel leakage and all manufacturers have done these tests on their
passenger cars and light trucks and vans up to 6,000 pounds GVWR,
the agency is proposing a one year leadtime after the final rule for
implementing the Standard No. 214 test requirement for the lateral
test.
Some vehicle manufacturers supported the one-year lead time
proposed in the NPRM for the side impact test upgrade, but recommended
that the agency add a phase-in after this lead time. The Alliance asked
for additional lead time for vehicles not previously subject to
Standard No. 214, saying;
Until a complete and thorough evaluation program is completed
for each model, the actual and exact extent of changes to each
[[Page 67079]]
vehicle cannot be ascertained. For this reason, we recommend that
vehicles not previously subject to FMVSS 214 requirements also have
the same three-year lead time and four year phase-in schedule as
proposed above for the rear impact requirement, with the allowance
for early compliance. Starting the lead time and the phase-in for
both the rear and side impact requirements at the same time would
also be logical and provide clarity since both are contained in the
single notice.
As we note below in the section on costs, only one out of more than
100 vehicles tested failed Standard No. 301's fuel leakage requirements
using Standard No. 214's side impact test. Based on those test results,
the agency believes that few vehicles, approximately 1%, will have to
be modified to meet Standard No. 301's leakage requirements using
Standard No. 214's side impact test. Therefore, the one-year lead time
without a phase-in is adopted, as was proposed.
F. Benefits
The target population of crashes includes multi-vehicle crashes in
which a passenger vehicle is struck in the rear by another passenger
vehicle and the fire starts in the struck vehicle. There are an
estimated 58 burn-related fatalities and 119 non-fatal burn-related
injuries annually in the target population. The non-fatal burn injuries
in that population of crashes were mostly minor and were typically not
the most severe injury to the occupant. The agency estimates that
approximately 8 to 21 fatalities will be prevented once all vehicles on
the road comply with the upgraded rear impact test. The cost per life
saved is estimated to be $1.96 million to $5.13 million ($41 million/21
lives to $41 million/8 lives). The agency is not estimating the number
of reduced non-fatal burn-related injuries because there are only a few
cases each year in which the injured person's most serious injury was a
burn injury.
There are fewer than 100 fatalities annually in multi-vehicle side
impacts that result in fire. The agency believes that the Standard No.
214 side impact test is somewhat stricter than the existing lateral
impact test in Standard No. 301. However, the agency was unable to
quantify any benefits from switching to the Standard No. 214 side
impact test.
NHTSA disagrees with the VW comment that the benefits of this
rulemaking are too low compared to its costs. VW did not provide any
data to support their comment. However, the agency believes that VW's
cost estimates may be based on costs of issues, such as post-crash door
operability, seat back failures, and dummy responses, which were
discussed in the NPRM but not adopted in this final rule.
G. Costs
The agency estimates that the average cost for vehicles that will
need to be modified to comply with the upgraded rear impact test is
$5.31 per vehicle.\25\ Based on its belief that the test failures in
the agency's testing were more the result of design differences than
vehicle weight differences, the agency estimates that 46 percent of the
vehicle fleet does not currently meet the upgraded rear impact test. It
further estimates that approximately 16.7 million vehicles are sold
each year in the U.S. Together, this information indicates that the
total cost for the fleet will be approximately $41 million per year.
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\25\ This is a $0.31 increase from the figure used in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using the Standard No. 214 side impact test as the Standard No. 301
side impact test will eliminate the cost of conducting a unique
Standard No. 301 test as well as the cost of an extra test vehicle.
Since the average current Standard No. 301 side impact test is roughly
$4,300 and the average test vehicle costs about $21,000, the total
savings would be about $25,200 per vehicle model.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ The figures in the NPRM were $4,000 for the average lateral
test for Standard No. 301 costs, $20,000 for average test vehicle
cost, and a total of about $24,000 per vehicle model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only one out of more than 100 vehicles tested failed Standard No.
301's fuel leakage requirements using Standard No. 214's side impact
test. Based on those test results, the agency believes that few
vehicles will have to be modified to meet Standard No. 301's side
impact leakage requirements using Standard No. 214's side impact test.
NHTSA disagrees with the Honda comment that the agency's cost
estimates are too low. The agency's cost estimates are based on the
changes that will be needed to remedy those noncompliant vehicles
needing only minor modifications. Since most vehicles readily pass the
fuel leakage requirements using the Standard No. 214 side impact test,
we do not believe modifications will be required which are not minor.
Neither Honda nor any of the other vehicle manufacturers provided data
indicating that the costs of modifying vehicles to comply will be
greater than the agency's estimates.\27\ Furthermore, 54 percent of the
vehicles tested were able to pass at the higher test speed and the
measures required to address the failing vehicles do not involve
structural changes.
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\27\ The agency believes that Honda's cost estimates are
overstated since they include vehicle models that complied with the
amendments in this final rule when the agency tested them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Additional Issues
1. Real World Data
None of the commenters provided any real-world data on the
relationship between crash severity and the risk of occupant injury due
to fire. Thus, as discussed above in the section on Costs and Benefits,
it appears that the data files NHTSA used in developing the NPRM are
the best available data sources.
2. Head and Neck Injury Criteria
The agency agrees with the Alliance's comment that the issue of
occupant protection would best be discussed in the context of a
rulemaking focused on that issue. The agency notes that it is in the
process of developing a final rule for Standard No. 202 and a proposed
rule for Standard No. 207, and will address rear impact protection in
those rulemakings.
3. Seat Back Failure
NHTSA agrees with the DC comment that the issue of seat back
failure best be discussed in the context of a rulemaking focused on
that issue. The agency notes that it is considering an upgrade of
Standard No. 207, where this issue will be addressed.
4. Use of 5th Percentile Female Dummies
NHTSA agrees with the GM comment that using various dummy sizes to
study the safety consequences to vehicle occupants due to the rear
impact test upgrade should be a subject for future research. The agency
will address the use of various dummy sizes in rear impact tests in
separate rulemakings.
5. Test Vehicle Loading Conditions
The agency is adopting GM's suggested revision of S7.1.6(b) of
Standard No. 301. That paragraph is revised to read as follows:
S7.1.6(b) Except as specified in S7.1.1, a multipurpose
passenger vehicle, truck, or bus with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less is
loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight, plus the necessary test
dummies as specified in S6, plus 136 kg or its rated cargo and
luggage capacity weight, whichever is less, secured in the load
carrying area and distributed as nearly as possible in proportion to
its GAWR. For the purpose of this standard, unloaded vehicle weight
does not include the weight of work-performing accessories. Each
dummy is restrained only by means that are installed in the vehicle
for protection at its seating position.
This provision is revised to simplify the language and provide
clearer
[[Page 67080]]
instruction as to how weight is to be distributed on a vehicle under
test conditions. NHTSA is not adopting Alliance's recommendation to
retain the language that addressed distribution when the axle's
proportional share is exceeded. While the revised provision eliminates
that language, it does provide that weight is to be distributed as
nearly as possible in proportion to the GAWR.
NHTSA is not adopting GM's recommendation that the agency replace
the language in S8.1.1 of Standard No. 208, S6.1 of Standard No. 212,
S7.7 of Standard No. 219, S7.1.6 of Standard No. 301, S7.1.6 of
Standard No. 303, and S7.2.3 of Standard No. 305 with identical
language. The agency believes that such revisions are outside the scope
of this rulemaking. However, the agency will treat GM's recommendation
as a petition for rulemaking and will make a decision on whether or not
to grant the petition within the next 120 days.
NHTSA is also not adopting GM's and VW's suggested revision of
S7.1.6(a). The agency believes that the language in that paragraph is
sufficiently clear.
6. Lowering the Barrier Face
For the reasons discussed above in the section on Rear Impact Test
Procedure, the agency is specifying that the barrier face in the rear
impact test procedure is lowered 50 mm (2 inches).
7. Pole Side Impact Test
NHTSA agrees with the comments from the Alliance, GM, DC, Porsche,
and Ford that the agency must assess the safety basis for a pole side
impact test, as well as develop an objective, repeatable test
procedure, including pole contact locations, closing velocities, pole
sizes, and modes of testing, before the agency proposes such a test.
Any future proposals to utilize a pole side impact test will address
these issues.
8. Prohibiting Fuel Leakage in Frontal Impact Crash Tests
NHTSA agrees with the comments from the Alliance and GM that the
agency should consider a future revision limiting fuel system leakage
in any Standard No. 208 crash test to the levels currently specified in
Standard No. 301. In frontal impacts at 35 mph (56 km/hr) into the
barrier, there have been 10 failures out of 406 NCAP (New Car
Assessment Program) tests, since 1979. While rare, the agency will
continue to monitor fuel system leakage in the NCAP tests to determine
whether future upgrades would be appropriate.
9. Compliance Responsibility of Second-Stage Manufacturers
NHTSA believes that there will be no change to the certification
responsibilities of second-stage and final-stage manufacturers as a
result of this rulemaking. The agency has reviewed the conformity
statements from first-stage manufacturers submitted by the NTEA and
believes them to be reasonable. Under these conformity statements, the
first-stage manufacturer installs the entire fuel system, and the
second-stage or final-stage manufacturer can make minor alterations
without violating the pass-through certification from the first-stage
manufacturer.\28\ Further, vehicles manufactured in two or more stages
will not be required to comply with the rear impact upgrade until the
final stage of the phase-in.
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\28\ The first-stage manufacturer typically certifies that the
incomplete vehicle meets the requirements of Standard No. 301. This
relieves second-stage or final-stage manufacturers of the burden of
conducting Standard No. 301 compliance tests, unless those
manufacturers make substantial changes to the fuel system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In cases in which the second-stage or final-stage manufacturers
make significant changes to the fuel system, they may not be able to
use the pass-through certification, and may have to certify that the
vehicle complies with Standard No. 301. If it is not economically
feasible for these manufacturers to perform the compliance testing or
engineering analysis, the manufacturers may apply for a temporary
exemption under 49 CFR Part 555.
The agency also notes that it is currently involved in a negotiated
rulemaking process with the NTEA, first-stage manufacturers, and other
stakeholders regarding the certification process for vehicles
manufactured in two or more stages. The agency intends to develop
changes to the regulations governing the certification of such vehicles
through this process.
10. Fuel Siphoning
The issues raised by Dynamic Safety concerning fuel siphoning and
by IIHS and Advocates concerning fuel cutoff devices all pertain to
frontal fire protection. NHTSA research identified rear impacts as the
most common type of crashes that result in fires. The agency would need
to conduct research to determine the extent of the problem related to
fuel siphoning as described by Dynamic Safety. If future NHTSA analysis
of real-world crash data indicates that there is a safety problem that
warrants further regulatory action, the agency will consider additional
changes to Standard No. 301. The agency notes that preliminary research
of frontal impacts under the GM settlement agreement indicated that the
vehicles equipped with fuel cutoff devices performed similarly to
vehicles without such devices. Consequently, the agency does not
anticipate that any real world benefits would result if the agency
required fuel cutoff devices.
VI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR
51735, October 4, 1993), provides for making determinations whether a
regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore subject to OMB
review and to the requirements of the Executive Order. The Order
defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as one that is likely to
result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or
communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in
the Executive Order.
NHTSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866
and the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and
procedures and has determined that it is not significant.
NHTSA has prepared a Final Regulatory Evaluation (FRE) describing
the economic and other effects of this final rule.\29\ If only minor
modifications are needed to comply with the upgraded rear impact test,
the agency estimates that the average cost for vehicles that will need
to be modified is $5.31 per vehicle. The agency estimates that 46
percent of the vehicle fleet does not currently meet the upgraded rear
impact test and that approximately 16.7 million vehicles are sold each
year in the U.S. Together, this information indicates that the total
cost for the fleet will be approximately $41 million per year. To the
extent that any vehicles need more than minor modifications, the total
cost may be higher. However, none of the
[[Page 67081]]
commenters provided data indicating that the cost of remedying
noncompliant vehicles will be greater than the agency's estimates.
Using the Standard No. 214 side impact test as the Standard No. 301
side impact test will eliminate the cost of conducting a unique
Standard No. 301 test as well as the cost of an extra test vehicle. The
total savings would be about $25,200 per vehicle model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ A copy of the FRE has been placed in the docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice
of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare and make
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions).
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates
primarily within the United States.'' (13 CFR 121.105(a)). No
regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency
certifies the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. SBREFA amended the Regulatory
Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to provide a statement of
the factual basis for certifying that a rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
NHTSA has considered the effects of this final rule under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. I certify that this final rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The rationale for this certification is that the amendments
made in this final rule primarily affect manufacturers of passenger
cars and light trucks. These manufacturers typically do not qualify as
small entities under 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
NHTSA estimates that there are about four small manufacturers of
passenger cars in the U.S., and no small manufacturers of light trucks,
producing a combined total of at most 500 vehicles each year. It is
unknown how many of their vehicle models will meet the amendments made
in this final rule. The agency requested comments on this issue in the
NPRM, but received none.
As discussed above in the section on Compliance Responsibility of
Second-Stage Manufacturers, there are a large number of second-stage
and final-stage manufacturers. The agency believes that there will be
no change to the certification responsibilities of second-stage and
final-stage manufacturers as a result of this rulemaking.
Consequently, the agency has concluded that this rulemaking will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
C. National Environmental Policy Act
NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the
National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that
implementation of this rule will not have any significant impact on the
quality of the human environment.
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
Executive Order 13132 requires NHTSA to develop an accountable
process to ensure ``meaningful and timely input by State and local
officials in the development of regulatory policies that have
federalism implications.'' ``Policies that have federalism
implications'' is defined in the Executive Order to include regulations
that have ``substantial direct effects on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency may not issue a
regulation with Federalism implications, that imposes substantial
direct compliance costs, and that is not required by statute, unless
the Federal government provides the funds necessary to pay the direct
compliance costs incurred by State and local governments, the agency
consults with State and local governments, or the agency consults with
State and local officials early in the process of developing the
regulation. NHTSA also may not issue a regulation with Federalism
implications and that preempts State law unless the agency consults
with State and local officials early in the process of developing the
regulation.
The agency has analyzed this final rule in accordance with the
principles and criteria set forth in Executive Order 13132 and has
determined that it will not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement. The final rule will not have
any substantial effects on the States, or on the current Federal-State
relationship, or on the current distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various local officials.
E. Civil Justice Reform
This final rule will not have any retroactive effect. Under 49
U.S.C. 30103, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in
effect, a State may not adopt or maintain a safety standard applicable
to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to the Federal
standard, except to the extent that the state requirement imposes a
higher level of performance and applies only to vehicles procured for
the State's use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets forth a procedure for judicial
review of final rules establishing, amending, or revoking Federal motor
vehicle safety standards. That section does not require submission of a
petition for reconsideration or other administrative proceedings before
parties may file suit in court.
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the procedures established by the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, a person is not required to respond to a collection of
information by a Federal agency unless the collection displays a valid
OMB control number. For the phase-in reporting requirements, which were
not proposed in the notice of proposed rulemaking, but are added in
this Final Rule, NHTSA is submitting to OMB a request for approval of
the following collection of information. Public comment is sought on
the proposed collection.
Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
Title: Phase-In Production Reporting Requirements for Fuel Systems
Integrity Upgrade.
Type of Request: New collection.
OMB Clearance Number: None assigned.
Form Number: This collection of information will not use any
standard forms.
Requested Expiration Date of Approval: Three years from the date of
approval.
Summary of the Collection of Information
So that NHTSA can ensure that vehicle manufacturers are certifying
their applicable vehicles as meeting the rear impact test upgrades that
are specified in this final rule, in this proposed collection, NHTSA
would require vehicle manufacturers to provide reports on compliance of
their vehicles with the rear impact test upgrade.
For the rear impact test upgrade, NHTSA established a six year
schedule; a three year lead time, then a 3-year phase-in period during
which, in the
[[Page 67082]]
first year, 40% of the applicable vehicles must meet the rear impact
test upgrade, and in the second and third years, 70% and 100%
respectively.
For each year of the rear impact test phase-in period,
manufacturers must, within 60 days after the end of the ``production
year,'' provide to NHTSA information identifying the vehicles (by make,
model, and vehicle identification number (VIN)) that have been
certified as complying with the rear impact test upgrade. Furthermore,
until December 31, 2009, each manufacturer must maintain records of the
VIN for each vehicle for which information is reported.
Description of the Need for the Information and Proposed Use of the
Information
NHTSA requires this information to ensure that vehicle
manufacturers are certifying their applicable vehicles as meeting the
new rear impact test upgrades that are specified in this final rule.
NHTSA will use this information to determine whether a manufacturer has
complied with the amended requirements of Standard No. 301 during the
phase-in period.
Description of the Likely Respondents (Including Estimated Number, and
Proposed Frequency of Response to the Collection of Information)
NHTSA estimates that 21 vehicle manufacturers will submit the
required information. The manufacturers are makers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses that have gross
vehicle weight ratings of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less, and use
fuel with a boiling point above 0 degrees Celsius. For each report, the
manufacturer will provide, in addition to its identity, several
numerical items of information. This information would include:
(a) Total number of vehicles manufactured for sale during the
preceding production year,
(b) Total number of vehicles manufactured during the production
year that meet the new regulatory requirements, and
(c) Information identifying the vehicles (by make, model, and
vehicle identification number (VIN)) that have been certified as
complying with the side impact test upgrade or the rear impact test
upgrade.
During the phase-in period, each manufacturer will provide 1 report
per year for three years for the rear impact phase-in, for a total of 3
reports over 3 years.
Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden
Resulting From the Collection of Information
NHTSA estimates that each manufacturer will incur two burden hours
per year per report. This estimate is based on the fact that data
collection will involve only computer tabulation and that manufacturers
will provide the information to NHTSA in an electronic (as opposed to
paper) format. Thus, for the rear impact test upgrade reporting, each
manufacturer will incur a burden of two hours or a total on industry of
42 hours a year (assuming there are 21 manufacturers) to provide the
rear impact test upgrades.
NHTSA estimates that the recordkeeping burden resulting from the
collection of information will be 0 hours because the information will
be retained on each manufacturer's existing computer systems for each
manufacturer's internal administrative purposes.
NHTSA estimates that the total annual cost burden will be 1050
dollars (42 total annual burden hours x 25 dollars/hour). There would
be no capital or start-up costs as a result of this collection.
Manufacturers can collect and tabulate the information by using
existing equipment. Thus, there would be no additional costs to
respondents or recordkeepers.
NHTSA requests comment on its estimates of the total annual hour
and cost burdens resulting from this collection of information. Please
submit any comments to the NHTSA Docket Number referenced in the
heading of this notice or to: Dr. William J. J. Liu, Office of
Crashworthiness Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh St., SW., Washington, DC 20590. Dr. Liu's
telephone number is: (202) 366-2264. Comments are due by January 30,
2004.
G. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Pub. L. 104-113, section 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272)
directs NHTSA to use voluntary consensus standards in its regulatory
activities unless doing so would be inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical. Voluntary consensus standards are technical
standards (e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling
procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE). The NTTAA directs NHTSA to provide Congress, through
OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and
applicable voluntary consensus standards.
There are no voluntary consensus standards available at this time.
However, NHTSA will consider any such standards when they become
available.
H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires Federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more
than $100 million in any one year (adjusted for inflation with base
year of 1995). Before promulgating a rule for which a written statement
is needed, section 205 of the UMRA generally requires NHTSA to identify
and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and adopt
the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative
that achieves the objectives of the rule. The provisions of section 205
do not apply when they are inconsistent with applicable law. Moreover,
section 205 allows NHTSA to adopt an alternative other than the least
costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative if the
agency publishes with the final rule an explanation why that
alternative was not adopted.
This final rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local,
or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of
more than $100 million annually. Consequently, no Unfunded Mandates
assessment has been prepared.
I. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.
J. Privacy Act
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all submissions
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may
[[Page 67083]]
review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or
you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.
List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 571
Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Tires.
49 CFR Part 586
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
0
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA is amending 49 CFR part 571
and revising part 586 as follows:
PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
0
1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
0
2. In Sec. 571.214, paragraphs S3(b), (c), (d), and (f) are revised to
read as follows:
Sec. 571.214 Standard No. 214; Side impact protection.
* * * * *
S3 Requirements. (a) * * *
(b) When tested under the conditions of S6, each passenger car
manufactured on or after September 1, 1996, shall meet the requirements
of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 in a 53 +/- 1.0 km/h impact in which the car is
struck on either side by a moving deformable barrier. 49 CFR part 572,
subpart F test dummies are placed in front and rear outboard seating
position on the struck side of the car. However, the rear seat
requirements do not apply to passenger cars with a wheelbase greater
than 3,300 mm, or to passenger cars that have rear seating areas that
are so small that 49 CFR part 572, subpart F test dummies cannot be
accommodated according to the positioning procedure specified in S7.
(c) [Reserved].
(d) [Reserved].
(e) * * *
(f) When tested according to the conditions of S6, each
multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, and bus manufactured on or after
September 1, 1998, shall meet the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3
in a 53 +/- 1.0 km/h impact in which the vehicle is struck on either
side by a moving deformable barrier. A 49 CFR part 572, subpart F test
dummy is placed in the front outboard seating position on the struck
side of the vehicle, and if the vehicle is equipped with rear seats,
then another 49 CFR part 572, subpart F test dummy is placed in the
outboard seating position of the second seat on the struck side of the
vehicle. However, the second seat requirements do not apply to side-
facing seats or to vehicles that are so small that the 49 CFR part 572,
subpart F test dummy cannot be accommodated according to the procedure
specified in S7.
* * * * *
0
3. In Sec. 571.301, paragraphs S6.2, S6.3, S7.1.6(b), S7.2, and S7.3
are revised, paragraph S8 is added, and Figure 3 is added following
Figure 2, to read as follows:
Sec. 571.301 Standard No. 301; Fuel system integrity.
* * * * *
S6.2 Rear moving barrier crash. (a) Vehicles manufactured before
September 1, 2006. When the vehicle is impacted from the rear by the
barrier specified in S7.3(a) of this standard moving at 48 km/h, with
50th percentile test dummies as specified in part 572 of this chapter
at each front outboard designated seating position, under the
applicable conditions of S7, fuel spillage must not exceed the limits
of S5.5.
(b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2006. When the
vehicle is impacted from the rear by a moving deformable barrier 80 +/-
1.0 km/h with a 70 percent overlap, with 50th percentile test dummies
as specified in part 572 of this chapter at each front outboard
designated seating position, under the applicable conditions of S7,
fuel spillage must not exceed the limits of S5.5.
S6.3 Side moving barrier crash. (a) Vehicles manufactured before
September 1, 2004. When the vehicle is impacted laterally on either
side by a barrier moving at 32 km/h with 50th percentile test dummies
as specified in part 572 of this chapter at positions required for
testing to Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208), under the applicable
conditions of S7, fuel spillage must not exceed the limits of S5.5.
(b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2004. When the
vehicle is impacted laterally on either side by a moving deformable
barrier at 53 +/- 1.0 km/h with 49 CFR part 572, subpart F test dummies
at positions required for testing by S3(b) of Standard No. 214, under
the applicable conditions of S7 of this standard, fuel spillage shall
not exceed the limits of S5.5 of this standard.
* * * * *
S7.1.6 * * *
(a) * * *
(b) Except as specified in S7.1.1, a multipurpose passenger
vehicle, truck, or bus with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less is loaded to its
unloaded vehicle weight, plus the necessary test dummies as specified
in S6, plus 136 kg or its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight,
whichever is less, secured in the load carrying area and distributed as
nearly as possible in proportion to its GAWR. For the purpose of this
standard, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-
performing accessories. Each dummy is restrained only by means that are
installed in the vehicle for protection at its seating position.
* * * * *
S7.2 Side moving barrier test conditions. (a) Vehicles manufactured
before September 1, 2004. The side moving barrier crash test conditions
are those specified in S8.2 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208).
(b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2004. The side
moving deformable barrier crash test conditions are those specified in
S6 and S7 of Standard No. 214 (49 CFR 571.214).
S7.3 Rear moving barrier test conditions. (a) Vehicles manufactured
before September 1, 2006. The rear moving barrier test conditions are
those specified in S8.2 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208), except
for the positioning of the barrier and the vehicle. The barrier and
test vehicle are positioned so that at impact--
(1) The vehicle is at rest in its normal attitude;
(2) The barrier is traveling at 48 km/h with its face perpendicular
to the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle; and
(3) A vertical plane through the geometric center of the barrier
impact surface and perpendicular to that surface coincides with the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle.
(b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2006. The rear
moving deformable barrier is the same as that shown in Figure 2 of
Standard No. 214 (49 CFR 571.214) and specified in 49 CFR part 587,
except as otherwise specified in paragraph S7.3 (b). The barrier and
test vehicle are positioned so that at impact--
(1) The vehicle is stationary;
(2) The deformable face of the barrier is mounted on the barrier 50
mm (2 inches) lower than the height from the ground specified in Figure
2 of Standard No. 214 (49 CFR 571.214) (All dimensions from the ground
in Figure 2, Front View should be reduced by 50 mm (2 inches.));
(3) The barrier is traveling 80 +/- 1.0 km/h; and
(4) The barrier impacts the test vehicle with the longitudinal
centerline
[[Page 67084]]
of the vehicle parallel to the line of travel and perpendicular to the
barrier face within a tolerance of +/- 5 degrees. The test vehicle and
barrier face are aligned so that the barrier strikes the rear of the
vehicle with 70 percent overlap toward either side of the vehicle. So
aligned, the barrier face fully engages one half of the rear of the
vehicle and partially engages the other half. At impact, the vehicle's
longitudinal centerline is located inboard either of the side edges of
the barrier by a distance equal to 20 percent of the vehicle's width +/
- 50 mm (see Figure 3). The vehicle's width is the maximum dimension
measured across the widest part of the vehicle, including bumpers and
molding, but excluding such components as exterior mirrors, flexible
mud flaps, marker lamps, and dual rear wheel configurations.
* * * * *
S8 Phase-In schedule.
S8.1 Rear impact test upgrade. (a) Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2006 and before September 1, 2007. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1, 2006, and before September 1,
2007, the number of vehicles complying with S6.2(b) of this standard
must not be less than 40 percent of:
(1) The manufacturer's average annual production of vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1, 2003, and before September 1,
2006; or
(2) The manufacturer's production on or after September 1, 2005,
and before September 1, 2006.
(b) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2007 and before
September 1, 2008. For vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2007 and before September 1, 2008, the number of vehicles complying
with S6.2(b) of this standard must not be less than 70 percent of:
(1) The manufacturer's average annual production of vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1, 2004, and before September 1,
2007; or
(2) The manufacturer's production on or after September 1, 2006,
and before September 1, 2007.
(c) Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2008. For
vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2008, the number of
vehicles complying with S6.2(b) of this standard must be 100 percent of
the manufacturer's production during that period.
S8.2 Vehicles manufactured in two or more stages. A final stage
manufacturer or alterer may, at its option, comply with the
requirements set forth in S8.2.1 and S8.2.2.
S8.2.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2006 and
before September 1, 2008 are not required to comply with the
requirements specified in S6.2(b) of this standard.
S8.2.2 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2008 shall
comply with the requirements specified in S6.2(b) of this standard.
S8.3 Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer.
S8.3.1 For the purpose of calculating average annual production of
vehicles for each manufacturer and the number of vehicles manufactured
by each manufacturer under S8.1, a vehicle produced by more than one
manufacturer must be attributed to a single manufacturer as follows,
subject to S8.3.2:
(a) A vehicle that is imported must be attributed to the importer.
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the United States by more than one
manufacturer, one of which also markets the vehicle, must be attributed
to the manufacturer that markets the vehicle.
S8.3.2 A vehicle produced by more than one manufacturer must be
attributed to any one of the vehicle's manufacturers specified by an
express written contract, reported to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration under 49 CFR part 590, between the manufacturer
so specified and the manufacturer to which the vehicle would otherwise
be attributed under S8.3.1.
* * * * *
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0
4. Part 586 is revised to read as follows:
PART 586--FUEL SYSTEM INTEGRITY UPGRADE PHASE-IN REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
Sec.
586.1 Scope.
586.2 Purpose.
586.3 Applicability.
586.4 Definitions.
586.5 Response to inquiries.
586.6 Reporting requirements.
586.7 Records.
586.8 Petition to extend period to file report.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
Sec. 586.1 Scope.
This part establishes requirements for manufacturers of passenger
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross
vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less to
submit a report, and maintain records related to the report, concerning
the number of such vehicles that meet the upgraded requirements of
Standard No. 301, Fuel systems integrity (49 CFR 571.301).
Sec. 586.2 Purpose.
The purpose of these requirements is to assist the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration in determining whether a manufacturer has
complied with the upgraded requirements of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR
571.301).
Sec. 586.3 Applicability.
This part applies to manufacturers of passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle weight
rating of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.
Sec. 586.4 Definitions.
(a) All terms defined in 49 U.S.C. 30102 are used in their
statutory meaning.
(b) Bus, gross vehicle weight rating, multipurpose passenger
vehicle, passenger car, and trucks are used as defined in 49 CFR 571.3.
(c) Production year means the 12-month period between September 1
of one year and August 31 of the following year, inclusive.
Sec. 586.5 Response to inquiries.
At any time during the production years ending August 31, 2007,
August 31, 2008, and August 31, 2009, each manufacturer must, upon
request from the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, provide
information identifying the vehicles (by make, model, and vehicle
identification number) that have been certified as complying with
S6.2(b) of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR 571.301). The manufacturer's
designation of a vehicle as a certified vehicle is irrevocable.
Sec. 586.6 Reporting requirements.
(a) Phase-in reporting requirements. Within 60 days after the end
of the production years ending August 31, 2007, August 31, 2008, and
August 31, 2009, each manufacturer must submit a report to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning its compliance with
S6.2(b) of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR 571.301) for its passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of less than 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) produced in
that year. Each report must--
(1) Identify the manufacturer;
(2) State the full name, title, and address of the official
responsible for preparing the report;
(3) Identify the production year being reported on;
(4) Contain a statement regarding whether or not the manufacturer
complied with the requirements of S6.2(b) of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR
571.301) for the period covered by the report and the basis for that
statement;
(5) Provide the information specified in paragraph (b) of this
section;
(6) Be written in the English language; and
(7) Be submitted to: Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
(b) Phase-in report content.
(1) Basis for statement of compliance. Each manufacturer must
provide the number of passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kilograms
(10,000 pounds) or less manufactured for sale in the United States for
each of the three previous production years, or, at the manufacturer's
option, for the previous production year. A new manufacturer that has
not previously manufactured these vehicles for sale in the United
States must report the number of such vehicles manufactured during the
current production year.
(2) Production. Each manufacturer must report for the production
year for which the report is filed: the number of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less that meet
S6.2(b) or S6.3(b) of Standard No. 301 (49 CFR 571.301).
(3) Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer. Each
manufacturer whose reporting of information is affected by one or more
of the express written contracts permitted by S8.3.2 of Standard No.
301 (49 CFR 571.301) must:
(i) Report the existence of each contract, including the names of
all parties to the contract, and explain how the contract affects the
report being submitted.
(ii) Report the actual number of vehicles covered by each contract.
Sec. 586.7 Records.
Each manufacturer must maintain records of the Vehicle
Identification Number for each vehicle for which information is
reported under Sec. 586.6(b)(2) until December 31, 2010.
Sec. 586.8 Petition to extend period to file report.
A manufacturer may petition for extension of time to submit a
report under this part. A petition will be granted only if the
petitioner shows good cause for the extension and if the extension is
consistent with the public interest. The petition must be received not
later than 15 days before expiration of the time stated in Sec.
586.6(a). The filing of a petition does not automatically extend the
time for filing a report. The petition must be submitted to:
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
Issued: November 21, 2003.
Jeffrey W. Runge,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 03-29805 Filed 11-25-03; 1:17 pm]
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