[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 220 (Friday, November 14, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64611-64614]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-28506]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Amended Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 
Administration (DOE/NNSA) is amending its January 11, 2000 Record of 
Decision (ROD) (65 FR 1608) to allow for the fabrication of mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel lead assemblies in France on a one-time basis. The January 
2000 ROD stated that DOE would fabricate a limited number of lead 
assemblies at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). However, because 
of cost and schedule impacts and programmatic considerations, lead 
assembly fabrication at LANL is no longer feasible.
    The environmental impacts of fabricating lead assemblies in Europe 
were first evaluated in the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable 
Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(Storage and Disposition PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0229, December 1996). In 
accordance with DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
Implementing Procedures at Title 10, Sec.  1021.314(c), DOE/NNSA has 
prepared a Supplement Analysis (SA) for the Fabrication of Mixed Oxide 
Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe (DOE/EIS-0229-SA3). This SA updates the 
environmental impacts of fabricating lead assemblies in France using 
plutonium oxide from LANL. The SA concludes that the proposed 
fabrication of lead assemblies in France would not result in impacts 
significantly different from or significantly greater than those 
described in previous DOE NEPA documents. Therefore, DOE/NNSA will now 
pursue the fabrication of up to four lead assemblies in France at the 
existing Cadarache and MELOX facilities, using surplus plutonium from 
LANL. The lead assemblies will be returned to the United States for 
irradiation at Catawba Nuclear Station (Catawba)\1\ in South Carolina.
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    \1\ Because the plants' refueling schedules determine the 
availability for lead assembly use, Duke Power Company has submitted 
a license amendment request to the NRC to allow irradiation of MOX 
lead assemblies at Catawba. The SA also analyzes the use of the 
McGuire Nuclear Station (McGuire) in North Carolina, which could be 
used in lieu of Catawba, if a license amendment request were 
submitted and approved.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information concerning the 
fabrication of lead assemblies in France, the Supplement Analysis 
entitled Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe, or 
this amended ROD, contact Hitesh Nigam, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office 
of Fissile Materials Disposition, National Nuclear Security 
Administration, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585; or 
leave a message at 800-820-5134.
    For further information concerning DOE's NEPA process, contact Ms. 
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-
42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,

[[Page 64612]]

Washington, DC 20585, telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 
800-472-2756. Additional information regarding the DOE NEPA process and 
activities is also available on the Internet through the NEPA home page 
at http://tis.eh.doe.gov/nepa.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    The Storage and Disposition PEIS evaluated the potential 
environmental consequences of alternative strategies for the long-term 
storage of weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium and the 
disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that has been or may be 
declared surplus to national security needs. As part of this 
evaluation, the Storage and Disposition PEIS analyzed the environmental 
impacts of fabricating lead assemblies (and some initial MOX batch 
assemblies) in existing facilities in Europe in the event that it would 
be necessary to begin production more quickly than could be 
accomplished in the United States. The fabrication of lead assemblies 
(small quantities of nuclear fuel used by a commercial nuclear power 
plant to confirm that a new fuel design will perform safely and 
predictably) involves the same basic process as full-scale fabrication 
of MOX fuel and is required to support Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) licensing activities and fuel qualification efforts. The Storage 
and Disposition PEIS evaluated transport of plutonium oxide from a 
storage facility at an existing DOE site to a U.S. port (Sunny Point, 
NC); port handling at the U.S. port; ocean transport to the European 
ports of Barrows, United Kingdom, and Cherbourg, France; ocean 
transport of MOX fuel back to the United States; and safe, secure 
trailer (SST) transport of MOX fuel from the U.S. port to either an 
existing commercial reactor site or a storage site in the United 
States. The shipping schedule projected two shipments of plutonium 
oxide per year and a maximum of four shipments of fresh (unirradiated) 
MOX fuel assemblies per year. The Storage and Disposition PEIS also 
discussed the potential effect of ocean transport on the global 
commons.
    Although the Storage and Disposition PEIS indicated that 
fabrication in Europe, if it occurred at all, would only be an interim 
measure, the PEIS analysis included not only the annual transportation 
impacts of shipments to and from Europe, but also the overall 
transportation impacts of performing all fuel fabrication work for the 
entire 50-metric-ton surplus plutonium inventory in Europe. These 
analyses indicate that total transportation fatalities resulting from 
both radiological and nonradiological risk to the public and workers 
for both routine and accident conditions associated with European MOX 
fuel fabrication for the entire inventory would range from 1.69 to 4.62 
fatalities, depending on the hypothetical one-way distance to be 
traveled (i.e., 1,000 km to 4,000 km). Port handling impacts were also 
analyzed in the PEIS. The analysis determined that annual accident 
risks from exporting two shipments of plutonium oxide and importing 
four shipments of MOX fuel would not result in any latent cancer 
fatalities (LCFs) among workers or the general public. The analysis 
also indicates that the probability that these shipments would be 
involved in a maritime accident of sufficient severity to cause release 
of radioactive materials resulting in catastrophic consequences would 
be extremely small (on the order of 1.0 x 10-\7\ yr to 1.0 x 
10-\8\ yr).
    The ROD for the Storage and Disposition PEIS, issued on January 21, 
1997 (62 FR 3014), outlined DOE's decision to pursue a hybrid 
disposition strategy. This strategy allowed for both the immobilization 
of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium and the 
fabrication of some of the surplus plutonium into MOX fuel to be 
irradiated in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The ROD made no 
decisions concerning lead assembly fabrication.
    The environmental impacts of domestic fabrication of lead 
assemblies were evaluated in detail as part of the MOX fuel fabrication 
alternatives in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition EIS (SPD EIS) (DOE/
EIS-0283, November 1999), which tiered from the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS. Specific facilities at five DOE sites were considered for this 
effort, based on site capabilities existing at that time: The Hanford 
Site in Washington, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory Argonne National Laboratory West (ANL-W) facilities in 
Idaho, the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, LANL in New 
Mexico, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The 
SPD EIS evaluated the environmental impacts of fabricating 10 fuel 
assemblies, irradiating up to 8 of them at existing commercial reactors 
(Catawba or McGuire), and performing post-irradiation examination at 
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) or ANL-W. This analysis 
included evaluation of transportation impacts.
    The SPD EIS analyses indicate that environmental impacts from 
modification and routine operation of lead assembly fabrication 
facilities would be small; no LCFs would be expected in the general 
population from the postulated bounding design basis accident; nor 
would there be any traffic fatalities or LCFs expected from the 
associated transportation.
    Among other decisions made in the ROD for the SPD EIS issued on 
January 11, 2000, DOE selected LANL as the site for lead assembly 
fabrication, to be followed by irradiation in U.S. commercial reactors 
and post-irradiation examination of selected fuel rods at ORNL.

II. Lead Assembly Fabrication in Europe

    In May 2000, DOE determined that cost and schedule impacts and 
other programmatic considerations precluded lead assembly fabrication 
at LANL, and DOE discontinued related activities at LANL. DOE/NNSA is 
now proposing to use U.S. surplus plutonium from LANL to fabricate up 
to four lead assemblies in the existing Cadarache and MELOX facilities 
in France, and return those lead assemblies to the United States for 
irradiation. Consistent with decisions in the January 2000 ROD for the 
SPD EIS, the lead assemblies would be irradiated at Catawba, after 
which selected rods from lead assemblies would be transported to ORNL 
for post-irradiation examination.
    As part of this proposed action, up to 140 kg of plutonium oxide 
from LANL would be transported by truck (one shipment consisting of 
three SST/Safeguards Transport [SGTs]) \2\ to a U.S. military port. The 
plutonium oxide would then be transferred to Pacific Nuclear Transport 
Limited (PNTL) ships \3\ at the port and transported

[[Page 64613]]

across the Atlantic Ocean to Cherbourg, France (one shipment consisting 
of a two-ship convoy). The plutonium oxide would then be transferred to 
existing fabrication facilities in France (Cadarache and MELOX). After 
fabrication, PNTL ships would transport the lead assemblies and 
remaining archive and scrap material across the Atlantic Ocean back to 
the same U.S. military port. The lead assemblies would be transferred 
from the PNTL ships to SST/SGTs, and transported from the port to 
Catawba (one shipment consisting of four SST/SGTs). Archive (MOX 
pellets meeting fuel specifications) and scrap (out-of-specification 
MOX fuel pellets and remains from the pellet-grinding process) material 
would be transported from the port to LANL for storage (one shipment 
consisting of two SST/SGTs). Once the MOX facility becomes operational, 
these archive and scrap materials would be used as feed material during 
pellet production for MOX fuel that would be irradiated in existing 
U.S. commercial nuclear reactors.
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    \2\ The SST/SGT is a specially designed component of an 18-wheel 
tractor-trailer vehicle. Although the details of the vehicle 
enhancements are classified, key characteristics are not, and 
include: Enhanced structural supports and a highly reliable tie-down 
system to protect cargo from impact; heightened thermal resistance 
to protect the cargo in case of a fire; deterrents to protect 
unauthorized removal of cargo; couriers who are armed Federal 
officers that receive rigorous training and are closely monitored 
through DOE's Personnel Assurance Program; an armored tractor to 
protect the crew from attack, equipped with advanced communications 
equipment; specially designed escort vehicles containing advanced 
communications and additional couriers; 24-hour-a-day real-time 
monitoring of the location and status of the vehicle; and stringent 
maintenance standards.
    \3\ The PNTL ships are vessels specially designed to carry 
radioactive materials. Special safety features include: Double hulls 
to withstand damage from a severe collision and remain afloat; 
enhanced buoyancy to ensure the ship stays afloat and maintains a 
stable attitude even in the most extreme circumstances; duplicate 
navigation, communications, electrical and cooling systems; dual 
propulsion systems; specialized fire fighting equipment; satellite 
navigation and tracking; and highly experienced crew members.
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    DOE would obtain an export license from the NRC to transport 
plutonium oxide from the United States to France and would require a 
Certificate of Competent Authority from the Department of 
Transportation (based on the NRC review) for the two shipping 
containers (FS47 and FS65) required for this project. DOE submitted the 
export license application to the NRC in October 2003, which is 
currently under review. The application for certification of the FS47 
was submitted on August 2003 and the FS65 is scheduled to be filed in 
December 2003.

III. NEPA Process for Amending ROD

    The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing 
NEPA at 40 CFR 1502.9(c) require Federal agencies to prepare a 
supplement to an EIS when an agency makes substantial changes in the 
proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns or when 
there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to 
environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its 
impacts. DOE NEPA Implementing Procedures at 10 CFR 1021.314(c) direct 
that when it is unclear whether a supplement to an EIS is required, an 
SA be prepared to assist in making that determination. DOE/NNSA has 
recently prepared the Supplement Analysis for the Fabrication of Mixed 
Oxide Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe (DOE/EIS-0229-SA3) in accordance 
with these CEQ and DOE Procedures. The conclusions of the SA are 
summarized in Section IV of this amended ROD.

IV. Summary of Impacts

    The SA focuses on the potential impacts (from both routine 
operations and postulated accidents) of transportation of materials, 
including cargo-handling activities at three alternative U.S. military 
ports, and the effects on the global commons of ocean transport. This 
is because the domestic activities proposed, other than those 
associated with transportation, remain essentially unchanged compared 
to the manner in which they were analyzed in the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS and the SPD EIS.\4\ The ports evaluated in the SA are 
Charleston Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina, and Yorktown Naval 
Weapons Station and Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia.
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    \4\ The only additional action needed for lead assembly 
fabrication in France, beyond those evaluated in previous NEPA 
documents, is the transport of archive and scrap materials to LANL 
for storage.
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    Based on the analyses in the SA, the proposed fabrication of lead 
assemblies in France, specifically, overland transportation of 
plutonium oxide from LANL to any of the three ports, ocean transport to 
France, the return shipment of fresh MOX fuel lead assemblies to the 
United States, and subsequent transport of the lead assemblies to 
Catawba and archive and scrap materials to LANL, would not result in 
impacts significantly different from or greater than those described in 
either the Storage and Disposition PEIS or the SPD EIS. Where there are 
differences in impacts, they are small changes to impacts that are 
themselves small. Therefore, the activities evaluated do not represent 
substantial changes in any proposed actions or result in any new 
circumstances relevant to environmental concerns.
    Impacts additional to or different from those previously evaluated 
would result from transportation of materials to implement this 
activity, such as movement of archive and scrap materials from the port 
to LANL. Some of the origins and destinations, and hence the routes, 
would be different than previously evaluated, and the shipping 
containers, although also approved Type B packages, would be different. 
However, there would be fewer shipments of material than previously 
anticipated.
    The risk to the maximally exposed individual from the postulated 
severe truck accident involving shipment of plutonium oxide powder is 
extremely low. The risk estimated in the SA, 1 x 10-8 latent 
cancer fatality, is less than the risk estimated in the SPD EIS, 3.5 x 
10-8 latent cancer fatality. Although more plutonium oxide 
powder would be available for release from the accident in the SA in 
the extremely unlikely event of a transportation accident involving a 
breach of the Type B package, there are fewer shipments, so the 
frequency of occurrence, hence overall risk, is lower.
    Implementation of the proposed action would involve a very small 
increase in the use of the port facilities, with no construction at or 
modification of these facilities. Only three trucks (SST/SGTs) would 
arrive at the port to deliver the plutonium oxide to the dock where two 
PNTL ships, traveling in a two-ship convoy, would receive the cargo. 
The lead assemblies, archive, and scrap material would be transported 
back to the United States, also in a two-ship convoy, and would leave 
the port in a total of six trucks. It is not expected that the minimal 
additional transportation and cargo handling activities would result in 
any impacts to the local environment.
    The SA analyzes a severe accident that involves a collision between 
the PNTL ship and another ship with an ensuing fire, resulting in the 
release of plutonium oxide powder. The SA analyzed the identical 
accident scenario for each of the three proposed U.S. ports, which 
would result in a population accident risk of 1.2 x 10-7 LCF 
for Charleston NWS, 1.1 x 10-7 LCF for Naval Station 
Norfolk, and 3.5 x 10-8 LCF for Yorktown NWS. The resulting 
individual LCF risk to the maximally exposed individual is 3.5 x 
10-11 for Charleston NWS, 4.3 x 10-11 for NS 
Norfolk, and 2.0 x 10-11 for Yorktown NWS. By way of 
comparison, the Storage and Disposition PEIS reported an earlier DOE 
study that estimated the likelihood of a maritime accident of 
sufficient severity to cause significant release of radioactive 
material to be in the range of 1.0 x 10-8 to 1.0 x 
10-9 per port call.
    The probability of an accident at sea involving the PNTL is very 
unlikely because of the limited number of shipments (one two-ship 
convoy each way) as well as the redundant modern navigation systems on 
the ship. The probability of a significant release is further reduced 
because of the ruggedness of the PNTL design and the Type B packages. 
If plutonium oxide were released to waters of the global commons, the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS reports that plutonium oxide would 
dissolve very slowly, and would

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combine with sediments rather than remaining dissolved in the ocean 
water.
    Archive and scrap materials meeting the stabilization criteria of 
DOE Standard DOE-3013-2000 would be stored in two Type B shipping 
packages. There is very little risk of either an inadvertent 
criticality, or dispersion of plutonium in the event of an accident, 
because the plutonium would be incorporated in a non-dispersible 
ceramic material. The dose rate at 1 m from the packages would not 
exceed 0.1 mrem/hr, which would result in only minimal personnel 
exposure, and would not exceed the dose rate from storage of archive 
and scrap materials as anticipated in the SPD EIS, which is estimated 
to be 0.15 mrem/hr at 1 m.
    Both the Storage & Disposition PEIS (at Section G.1.2.6) and the 
SPD EIS (at Section L.6.5) acknowledged that a threat could be 
presented by sabotage or terrorism, and concluded that adequate 
safeguards are in place to meet such a threat. Although the likelihood 
of an attempted act of sabotage or terrorism occurring is not precisely 
knowable, the chance of success of any such attempt was judged to be 
very low, particularly in light of the transport methods to be employed 
by DOE in these shipments, which are designed specifically to afford 
security against sabotage or terrorism, as well as safety in the event 
of an accident. In preparing the SA, DOE again considered sabotage or 
terrorism and determined that adequate safeguards remain in place to 
meet such threats.
    Based on these analyses, DOE/NNSA has determined that the potential 
environmental impacts associated with lead assembly fabrication in 
France are within the impacts evaluated in the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS and the SPD EIS. Fabricating lead assemblies at existing MOX fuel 
fabrication facilities in France would not constitute significant new 
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and 
bearing on the previously analyzed action or its impacts either in the 
United States or affecting the global commons. Therefore, pursuant to 
10 CFR 1021.314(c), no additional NEPA analysis is required by DOE/NNSA 
in order to fabricate MOX fuel lead assemblies in France.

V. Response to Public Comments

    DOE has received letters requesting that it prepare a supplemental 
EIS on the fabrication of lead assemblies in Europe. These requests 
convey concerns that public safety is put at risk by the proposal to 
fabricate MOX fuel lead assemblies in Europe. In particular, concerns 
have been expressed about the transportation of plutonium to and from 
Europe and the safety of the facilities in France. One letter received 
by DOE alleges that the proposal to fabricate lead assemblies in Europe 
has not been analyzed in an EIS, and therefore that an SA is not an 
appropriate document in which to analyze the proposal.
    DOE disagrees with the last assertion. Fabrication of MOX fuel 
assemblies in Europe was specifically analyzed in the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS. In that evaluation, the transportation impacts of 
fabricating the entire 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium in Europe 
(as opposed to the current proposal to use up to 0.14 metric tons to 
fabricate four lead assemblies) was analyzed. The Storage and 
Disposition PEIS was issued for public review and comment in accordance 
with NEPA requirements. DOE/NNSA believes that this afforded the public 
ample opportunity to comment on fabrication of MOX fuel in Europe.
    As the analysis presented in the SA makes clear, the potential 
environmental impacts associated with lead assembly fabrication in 
Europe are within the impacts evaluated in the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS and the SPD EIS. In this analysis, particular attention has been 
given to the impacts of transportation. As part of this analysis, the 
SA evaluates impacts of activities that affect the global commons 
outside the jurisdiction of any one nation. The SA does not address the 
impacts of the proposal in France, however, because DOE believes that 
it is neither required nor appropriate under NEPA to evaluate the 
safety or environmental impacts of an activity within and under the 
jurisdiction and control of another sovereign nation. Nevertheless, DOE 
wishes to emphasize that the transportation activities and facilities 
in France will be government-licensed and conducted and operated under 
strict standards. Accordingly, DOE/NNSA has concluded that preparation 
of a supplemental EIS is not needed.

VI. Amended Decision

    DOE/NNSA will use U.S. surplus plutonium from LANL to fabricate up 
to four mixed oxide fuel lead assemblies in France on a one-time basis. 
The plutonium oxide will be transported overland from LANL to 
Charleston NWS,\5\ and then shipped across the Atlantic Ocean to 
Cherbourg, France. The plutonium oxide will be fabricated at existing 
facilities in France (Cadarache and MELOX). After fabrication, lead 
assemblies and archive and scrap materials will be returned to the 
United States through Charleston NWS.
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    \5\ However, if Charleston Naval Weapons Station is not 
available to support the schedule, either Yorktown Naval Weapons 
station or Naval Station Norfolk could be used for both the outbound 
and return shipments, after appropriate notifications and agreements 
have been made.
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    Consistent with decisions in the January 2000 ROD for the SPD EIS, 
these lead assemblies will be transported to Catawba \6\ for 
irradiation, and selected rods from the irradiated lead assemblies will 
be transported to ORNL for post-irradiation examination. Archive and 
scrap materials will be stored at LANL. This decision will allow DOE to 
fabricate lead assemblies on a schedule compatible with DOE's MOX fuel 
fabrication schedule.
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    \6\ The plants' refueling schedules determine availability for 
lead assembly use. Duke Power Company submitted a license amendment 
request to the NRC for Catawba. However, if needed, McGuire could 
also be used, provided a license amendment request was submitted and 
approved.

    Issued in Washington, DC, this 7th day of November, 2003.
Charles S. Przybylek,
Chief Operating Officer, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 03-28506 Filed 11-13-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P