[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 219 (Thursday, November 13, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64375-64379]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-28412]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on
Technical Specification Improvement Regarding Revision to the
Completion Time in STS 3.6.3, ``Containment Isolation Valves'' for
Combustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactors Using the
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Request for comment.
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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE)
relating to changes to the completion time in Standard Technical
Specifications (STS) 3.6.3 ``Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric
and Dual).'' The proposed change to the Technical Specifications (TS)
would extend to 7 days the completion time to isolate the affected
penetration flow path when selected containment isolation valves (CIVs)
are inoperable in either a penetration flow path with two CIVs or in a
penetration flow path with one CIV in a closed system. This change is
based on analyses provided in a generic topical report submitted by the
former Combustion Engineering Owner's Group (CEOG; now incorporated
into the Westinghouse Owners Group). The Owners Group participants in
the Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) proposed this change to
the STS in Change Traveler TSTF-373, Revision 2. This notice also
includes a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC)
determination relating to this matter.
The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently
process amendments to incorporate this change into plant-specific TS
for Combustion Engineering (CE) pressurized water reactors (PWRs).
Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply could
request amendments conforming to the models. In such a request, a
licensee should confirm the applicability of the SE and NSHC
determination to its reactor. The NRC staff is requesting comments on
the model SE and model NSHC determination before announcing their
availability for referencing in license amendment applications.
DATES: The comment period expires on December 15, 2003. Comments
received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do
so, but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for
comments received on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S.
mail.
Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch,
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail
Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001.
Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public
Document Room, One White Flint North, Public File Area O1-F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to [email protected].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Reckley, Mail Stop: O-7D1,
Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-1323.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) is intended to
improve the efficiency and transparency of NRC licensing processes.
This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the STS in a
manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The
CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed
changes to the STS following a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff
and finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by
licensees. This notice is soliciting comment on a proposed change to
the STS that changes the containment isolation valve (CIV) completion
times for the CE STS, NUREG-1432, Revision 2. The CLIIP directs the NRC
staff to evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the
STS and to either
[[Page 64376]]
reconsider the change or proceed with announcing the availability of
the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting
to apply for the subject change to TSs are responsible for reviewing
the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical
justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information.
Each amendment application made in response to the notice of
availability would be processed and noticed in accordance with
applicable rules and NRC procedures.
This notice involves an increase in the allowed completion times to
isolate the affected penetration flow path when selected CIVs are
inoperable at CE PWRs. The CEOG proposed this change for incorporation
into the STS as TSTF-373, Revision 2. This change is based on the staff
approved generic analyses contained in the CEOG Document CE NPSD-1168-
A, ``Joint Applications Report for Containment Isolation Valve AOT
Extension,'' dated January 2001, accessible electronically from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS Accession Number
ML010780257) at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter
problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, should contact
the NRC Public Document Room Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-
4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].
Applicability
This proposed change to revise the TS completion times for selected
CIVs is applicable to CE PWRs.
To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications,
the staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed by
TSTF-373 using the CLIIP to address the plant-specific verifications
identified in the model SE. Namely, each licensee should include in its
application that it has verified that:
(a) The supporting information in CE NPSD-1168-A is applicable to
their plant and the specific penetrations for which the licensee is
requesting an extended completion time (i.e., the specific penetrations
are consistent with those analyzed per the risk guidelines of
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-
Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications,'' and fall within
the 14 containment penetration configurations in the report).
(b) They have evaluated and substantiated that external events will
not affect the results of the analysis supporting the extended
completion times.
(c) Any plant-specific analyses used to support the amendment
request have used an acceptable probabilistic risk analyses (PRA)
quality as described in RG 1.177.
(d) Plant-specific implementation of this change includes
verification of the operability of the remaining CIV(s) in a
penetration flow path before entering the extended completion time for
corrective maintenance. Plant-specific implementation of this change
includes verification that the affected penetration will remain
physically intact or be isolated so as to not permit a release to the
outside environment.
(e) They have verified that the additive nature of multiple failed
CIVs and the possibility of entering multiple allowed outage times
(AOTs) have been addressed as part of the analysis.
(f) Applications that propose changes for configurations not
addressed by the groups described in CE NPSD-1168-A include a plant-
specific analysis to justify the completion time extension. [Note that
such proposals will require staff review of the specific penetrations
and related justifications for the proposed extension in completion
times.]
The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative
approach or proposing the changes without the requested verifications.
Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may, however,
require additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the time
and resources needed for the review.
Public Notices
This notice requests comments from interested members of the public
within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register.
Following the staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of
this notice, the staff may reconsider the proposed change or may
proceed with announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent
notice (perhaps with some changes to the SE or proposed NSHC
determination as a result of public comments). If the staff announces
the availability of the change, licensees wishing to adopt the change
will submit an application in accordance with applicable rules and
other regulatory requirements. The staff will in turn issue for each
application a notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to
facility operating license(s), a proposed NSHC determination, and an
opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance of an amendment to
operating license(s) will also be issued to announce the revised
requirements for each plant that applies for and receives the requested
change.
Proposed Safety Evaluation
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, Consolidated Line Item Improvement.
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-373,
``Increase CIV Completion Time in Accordance with CE-NPSD-1168''.
1.0 Introduction
By application dated [ ], [Licensee] (the licensee) requested
changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for [facility]. The
proposed changes would revise TS 3.6.3, ``Containment Isolation Valves
(Atmospheric and Dual),'' by extending to 7 days the completion time to
isolate the affected penetration flow path when selected containment
isolation valves (CIVs) are inoperable in either a penetration flow
path with two CIVs or in a penetration flow path with one CIV in a
closed system.
2.0 Regulatory Evaluation
The existing Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3, requires
that each CIV be operable. The operability of CIVs ensures that the
containment is isolated during a design basis accident and is able to
perform its function as a barrier to the release of radioactive
material. If a CIV is inoperable in one or more penetrations, the
current required action is to isolate the penetration or restore the
inoperable CIV to operable status within 4 hours for penetrations with
2 CIVs and within 72 hours for penetrations with a single CIV and a
closed system. The times specified for performing these actions were
considered reasonable, given the time required to isolate the
penetration and the relative importance of ensuring containment
integrity during plant operation. In the case of a single CIV and a
closed system, the specified completion time takes into consideration
the ability of the closed system to act as a penetration boundary.
In June 1999, the Combustion Engineering (CE) Owners Group (CEOG)
submitted the joint application report (JAR) CE NPSD-1168 which
provided a risk-informed justification for extending the TS allowed
outage time (AOT) (also referred to as completion time), for an
inoperable CIV from the current 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. The
staff used the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach
for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-
[[Page 64377]]
Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing
Basis, 1998,'' and RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-
Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, 1998,'' in
performing its review of this topical report. RG 1.177 provides a
three-tiered approach to evaluate the risks associated with proposed
license amendments. The first tier evaluates the probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) model and the impacts of the changes on plant
operational risk. The second tier addresses the need to preclude
potentially high risk configurations, should additional equipment
outages occur during the AOT. The third tier evaluates the licensee's
configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that the removal
of equipment from service immediately prior to or during the proposed
AOT will be appropriately assessed from a risk perspective. RG 1.174
provided the guidelines to determine the risk level associated with the
proposed change. The staff's safety evaluation (SE) dated June 16,
2000, concluded that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters for
CE-designed plants, the proposed increase in the CIV AOT from 4 hours
(2 or more CIVs) or 72 hours (single CIV and closed system) to 7 days
does not result in an unacceptable incremental conditional core damage
probability (ICCDP) or incremental conditional large early release
probability (ICLERP), according to the criteria of RG 1.177, provided
that certain conditions specified in the staff SE were acceptably
addressed by individual licensees referencing the JAR in plant-specific
submittals.
The staff's SE associated with NPSD-1168 was issued prior to the
changes associated with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which became effective on
November 28, 2002. With the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4),
licensees are required to assess and manage the risk that may result
from proposed maintenance activities. The activities necessary for
implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) satisfy and supercede a number of
the conditions in the staff SE for implementing the JAR.
The approval of TSTF-373, Revision 2, followed the staff's review
of CE NPSD-1168 and specified the applicable conditions to be addressed
in order to implement the 7-day completion time for an inoperable CIV.
These conditions are as follows:
(a) The supporting information in CE NPSD-1168-A is applicable to
their plant and the specific penetrations for which the licensee is
requesting an extended completion time (i.e., the specific penetrations
are consistent with those analyzed per the risk guidelines of
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-
Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications,'' and fall within
the 14 containment penetration configurations in the report).
(b) They have evaluated and substantiated that external events will
not affect the results of the analysis supporting the extended
completion times.
(c) Any plant-specific analyses used to support the amendment
request have used an acceptable probabilistic risk analyses (PRA)
quality as described in RG 1.177.
(d) Plant specific implementation of this change includes
verification of the operability of the remaining CIV(s) in a
penetration flow path before entering the extended completion time for
corrective maintenance. Plant specific implementation of this change
includes verification that the affected penetration will remain
physically intact or be isolated so as to not permit a release to the
outside environment.
(e) They have verified that the additive nature of multiple failed
CIVs and the possibility of entering multiple allowed outage times
(AOTs) have been addressed as part of the analysis.
(f) Applications that propose changes for configurations not
addressed by the groups described in CE NPSD-1168-A include a plant-
specific analysis to justify the completion time extension. [Note that
such proposals will require staff review of the specific penetrations
and related justifications for the proposed extension in completion
times.]
3.0 Technical Evaluation
3.1 Statement of Proposed Changes
The proposed changes to TS 3.6.3 include:
1. The existing Condition A, with related required action and
completion time, is replaced by new Conditions A and B. The new
Condition A retains the required actions and completion times of
existing Required Action A; however, the new Condition A is applicable
to the containment sump supply valves to the ECCS and containment spray
pumps, and those penetrations that do not meet the related criteria and
analyses contained in CE NPSD-1168-A. The new Required Action B retains
the required actions of existing Required Action A and the completion
times for existing Required Action A.2. New Condition B is the same as
existing Condition A, except that it does not apply to Conditions A, E,
and F. In addition, the completion time for Required Action B.1 is 7
days.
2. Existing Required Action C is relabeled Required Action D and
the completion time for Required Action C.1 (new D.1) is changed from
``72 hours'' to ``72 hours for those penetrations that do not meet the
7-day criteria and 7 days for those penetrations that meet the 7-day
criteria.''
3. Existing Required Actions B, D, E, and F and references to those
Actions in the specification are relabeled C, E, F, and G respectively.
3.2 Evaluation of Proposed Changes
The CIV penetration configurations may be categorized into three
groups. These groups are:
1. CIV penetration configurations that were not analyzed in the JAR
and in the plant specific analysis;
2. CIV penetration configurations that fall within the 14
containment penetration configurations considered in the JAR; and
3. CIV penetration configurations that were not considered in the
JAR but a plant specific analysis was provided to justify a 7 day
completion time.
The CIVs for which no analysis was provided include the containment
sump supply valves to the ECCS and containment spray pumps, valves
associated with the Main Feedwater System, Main Steam Isolation Valves,
and [list of plant specific valves]. For these CIVs, the completion
times for an inoperable valve will not change. Thus, either the 4 hour
completion time of Required Action A.1 or the 72 hour completion time
for Required Action D.1 will apply, depending on whether the
penetration has two valves or has a single CIV within a closed system.
For those CIV penetration configurations that fall within the 14
containment penetration configurations considered in the JAR, the
licensee verified that the JAR results were applicable to [plant name].
[The analysis also evaluated the risk for those CIV penetration
configurations that were not considered in the JAR. The risk measures
used to assess the impact of the proposed changes for these
configurations in this analysis are consistent with the measures
defined in RGs 1.174 and 1.177. This analysis also took into
consideration plant-specific external events to show how they would
affect the results of the analysis supporting the extended completion
times.]
In addition, the licensee verified that the additive nature of
multiple failed CIVs, and the possibility of entering multiple AOTs,
had been addressed as
[[Page 64378]]
part of the analysis. The results demonstrated that these situations
resulted in risk consistent with the ICCDP and ICLERP guidelines of RG
1.177, so that defense-in-depth for the safety systems is maintained.
The analysis demonstrated that there would be no impact from any of the
above considerations, and that the ICCDP and ICLERP for [plant name]
are well within the RG 1.1.77 guidelines of 5.0 E-7 and 5.0 E-8,
respectively. The staff finds that, from the analysis perspective, the
increase in the completion times from 4 hours (2 CIVs) or 72 hours
(single CIV and closed system) to 7 days is justified.
The JAR and the plant-specific analysis assumed that the
penetrations remain physically intact so that their integrity is
maintained. In instances where corrective or preventive maintenance
activities would be performed on penetrations and CIVs while in modes
requiring these valves to be operable, the licensee has confirmed that
these activities will be monitored to ensure that the integrity of the
penetration is not compromised during the maintenance. The licensee has
stated that the operability of the remaining CIV(s) in a penetration
flow path will be verified before entering the extended completion time
for corrective maintenance and that measures will be taken to ensure
that each penetration will remain physically intact or be isolated so
as to not permit a release to the outside environment. The staff has
reviewed the licensee's statements regarding its measures to ensure
penetration integrity is maintained and finds them acceptable.
Based on the low probability of an event occurring during the
inoperability of a CIV and the ability to maintain the integrity of the
CIV penetration, the staff finds the proposed changes are consistent
with previous staff reviews of CE NPSD-1168-A and TSTF-373, and are
acceptable.
4.0 State Consultation
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [State] State
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The
State official had [choose one: (1) no comments, or (2) the following
comments--with subsequent disposition by the staff].
5.0 Environmental Consideration
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the
installation or use of a facility component located within the
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. The NRC staff has
determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the
amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that
may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in
individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The
Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments
involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no
public comment on such finding (XX FR XXXXX). Accordingly, the
amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set
forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 Conclusion
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed
above, that: (1) There is reasonable assurance that the health and
safety of the public will not be endangered by the operation in the
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the
amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to
the health and safety of the public.
Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination
Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendment extends
the completion time for penetration flow paths with one valve
inoperable from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. The change is applicable
to both penetrations with two containment isolation valves and with one
containment isolation valve in a closed system. This change is not
applicable to the containment sump supply valves to the emergency core
cooling system and containment spray pumps.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The
proposed change revises the completion time (CT) for an inoperable
containment isolation valve (CIV) within the scope of the Combustion
Engineering (CE) Owner's Group (CEOG) Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-
1168-A from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. CIVs are not accident
initiators in any accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly
increased.
CIVs, individually and in combination, control the extent of
leakage from the containment following an accident. The proposed CT
extension applies to the reduction in redundancy in the containment
isolation function by the CIVs for a limited period of time but does
not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall containment
leakage requirements. In order to evaluate the proposed CT extension, a
probabilistic risk assessment evaluation was performed in the CEOG
Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168-A. The risk assessment concluded
that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters for the CE designed
plants, the proposed increase in the CIV CT from 4 hours to 7 days does
not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall containment
leakage requirements. It also concluded that the proposed change does
not result in an unacceptable incremental conditional core damage
probability or incremental conditional large early release probability
according to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177. As a
result, there would be no significant increase in the consequences of
an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does
not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The
change revises the allowed outage time for an inoperable CIV within the
scope of the CEOG Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168-A from 4 hours
or 72 hours to 7 days. CIVs, individually and in combination, control
the extent of leakage from the containment following an accident. The
proposed CT extension applies to the reduction in redundancy in the
containment isolation function by the CIVs for a limited period of time
but does not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall
containment leakage requirements. The proposed change does not change
the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The
proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no
new or different type of equipment
[[Page 64379]]
will be installed). Therefore, the proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The proposed change revises the CT for an inoperable
CIV within the scope of the CEOG Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168-
A from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. CIVs, individually and in
combination, control the extent of leakage from the containment
following an accident. The proposed CT extension applies to the
reduction in redundancy in the containment isolation function by the
CIVs for a limited period of time but does not alter the ability of the
plant to meet the overall containment leakage requirements. In order to
evaluate the proposed CT extension, a probabilistic risk assessment
evaluation was performed in CEOG Joint Application Report CE-NPSD-1168-
A. The risk assessment concluded that, based on the use of bounding
risk parameters for CE-designed plants, the proposed increase in the
CIV CT from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days does not alter the ability of
the plant to meet the overall containment leakage requirements. It also
concluded that the proposed change does not result in an unacceptable
incremental conditional core damage probability or incremental
conditional large early release probability according to the guidelines
of RG 1.177. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, the proposed change presents no significant
hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c),
and accordingly, a finding of ``no significant hazards consideration''
is justified.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of November, 2003.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Herbert N. Berkow, Director,
Project Directorate IV, Division of Licensing Project Management,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 03-28412 Filed 11-12-03; 8:45 am]
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