[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 142 (Thursday, July 24, 2003)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 43895-43899]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-18595]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 571
[Docket No. NHTSA 2003-14306]
RIN 2127-AA44
Flammability of Interior Materials in School Buses
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice of termination of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: This notice terminates a rulemaking proceeding that NHTSA
began in 1988 to consider upgrading Standard No. 302's flammability
resistance requirements for school bus interiors. The rulemaking was
initiated in response to a severe 1988 crash in Carrollton, Kentucky,
in which a former school bus being used as a church activity bus burst
into flames after colliding head-on with a pickup truck. After
reviewing the available information and public comments, the agency has
decided to terminate this rulemaking because: The risks presented by
school bus fires pose a minimal safety problem; the agency's 1992
upgrade of Standard No. 217's emergency exit requirements to allow
faster evacuation from school buses has reduced further the risks posed
by fire; the bus involved in the Carrollton fire was built before
upgraded Federal school bus standards went into effect in 1977 and did
not meet the exit and fuel system integrity requirements; upgrading
Standard No. 302 would result in significant costs; and further
research would be necessary before the agency could propose a test
protocol, utilizing scarce agency resources.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues: Mr. Charles
Hott, Office of Crashworthiness Standards, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590,
Telephone: (202) 366-0247. For legal issues: Mr. Christopher Calamita,
Vehicle Safety Rulemaking and Harmonization Division, Office of Chief
Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Washington, DC, 20590, Telephone: (202) 366-2992.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
In the late 1980s, school bus safety received substantial public
and Congressional attention, especially in the aftermath of two
catastrophic crashes. On May 14, 1988, in Carrollton, Kentucky, a
former school bus \1\ being used as a church activity bus burst into
flames after colliding head-on with a pickup truck. This was a severe
crash, with a combined impact speed exceeding 100 miles per hour.
Twenty-seven of the 67 bus occupants died in the fire that ensued. On
September 21, 1989, in Alton, Texas, a school bus became submerged in a
water-filled pit after colliding with a tractor-semi trailer. Twenty-
one of the 81 students in the bus drowned because they were unable to
escape.
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\1\ The bus was manufactured in 1977 shortly before April 1,
1977, prior to the effective date of a final rule improving Standard
No. 217's emergency exit capacity requirements and Standard No.
301's fuel system integrity requirements. As a result, the
Carrollton bus lacked safety features, such as fuel tank guards and
improved access to emergency exits, required on most large school
buses that were built after 1977.
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In its investigation of the Carrollton crash, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded:
[[Page 43896]]
Contributing to the severity of the accident was the puncture of
the bus fuel tank and ensuing fire in the bus, the partial blockage
by the rear bench seats of the area leading to the rear emergency
door which impeded rapid passenger egress, and the flammability of
the material in the bus seat cushions.\2\
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\2\ Highway Accident Report--Pickup Truck/Church Activity Bus
Head-on Collision and Fire Near Carrollton, Kentucky, May 14, 1988,
Report No. NTSB/HAR/89/01 (March 28, 1989), at page 79.
The NTSB also determined that ``some fire-retardant and flame
blocking materials * * * when tested, will reduce the rate of spread of
fire from seat to seat over materials currently used.''\3\
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\3\ Id., at page 69.
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In 1988, in response to the New Carrollton crash, NHTSA initiated
two rulemaking proceedings to consider upgrading standards addressing
school bus safety.
II. NHTSA Rulemaking Activity on School Bus Safety
A. 1988 ANPRM on Standard No. 217
On November 4, 1988, the agency issued an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on the adequacy of Standard No. 217's
requirements for school bus emergency exits.\4\ Standard No. 217, ``Bus
Emergency Exits and Window Retention and Release,'' establishes
requirements for the retention of windows in buses and operating
forces, opening dimensions, and markings for bus emergency exits. The
purpose of the standard is to minimize the likelihood of occupants
being thrown from a bus and to provide bus occupants a readily
accessible means of emergency evacuation.
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\4\ 53 FR 44623, Docket No. 88-21, Notice 1.
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NHTSA ultimately revised Standard No. 217's requirements for school
bus emergency exits and access to school bus emergency doors in a 1992
final rule.\5\ That final rule set requirements for minimum emergency
exit space based upon the seating capacity of each bus. Thus, the rule
required larger school buses to have an increased number of emergency
exits. The final rule also required school buses to provide improved
access to side emergency doors and improved visibility of emergency
exits.
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\5\ 57 FR 49413, November 2, 1992, Docket No. 88-21, Notice 3.
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B. 1988 ANPRM on Standard No. 302
Also on November 4, 1988, NHTSA issued an ANPRM announcing the
agency's plans to consider upgrading Standard No. 302's requirements
for the flammability of interior materials in buses.\6\ Standard No.
302, ``Flammability of Interior Materials,'' specifies that the
horizontal burn rate of certain specified materials (e.g., seat
cushions and seat backs) may not exceed four inches per minute. The
purpose of the standard is to allow the driver time to stop the vehicle
and, if necessary, evacuate the vehicle occupants before untenable
conditions develop that could result in injuries or fatalities.
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\6\ 53 FR 44627, Docket No. 88-22, Notice 1.
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In the ANPRM, the agency requested comments on the safety need for
a rulemaking to upgrade Standard No. 302, types of buses that should be
covered, types of seating material available, toxicity of fumes emitted
by burning seating materials, upgraded test procedures, and costs and
benefits of such a rulemaking. The agency also noted that factors
related to the risk of injuries from fire are often interrelated. Among
these factors are a fire's source and magnitude, an occupant's ability
to escape from a burning vehicle, the time needed to escape, the
location and type of emergency exits, and the flammability resistance
of the vehicle's interior materials.
In response to the ANPRM on Standard No. 302, NHTSA received 54
comments from bus manufacturers, seating and material manufacturers,
State and local governments, trade associations, and individuals. The
commenters generally agreed that measures could be taken to increase
the flammability resistance of materials used in school buses.
Commenters also addressed other issues raised in the ANPRM, including
the rulemaking's scope, the availability of new flame-resistant
materials, possible performance requirements to enhance flammability
resistance, and the costs and benefits of the rulemaking. The comments
were discussed in the agency's 1991 notice requesting comments on
issues related to the flammability of interior materials in buses.\7\
That notice is discussed below.
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\7\ 56 FR 7826, February 26, 1991, Docket No. 88-22, Notice 3.
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C. 1990 NIST Research Report
In January 1989, NHTSA commissioned the Center for Fire Research of
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to conduct a
research program about the flammability resistance of various school
bus seat assemblies. The research focused on factors such as
ignitability, flame spread, rate of heat release, smoke generation, and
toxicity of combustion products. In July 1990, NIST published its
findings in a final report entitled ``Assessment of the Fire
Performance of School Bus Interior Components.''\8\ The major
conclusions of the NIST report were:
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\8\ A copy of this report was placed in Docket No. 88-22-GR.
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1. No one simple small-scale test should be used to measure fire
performance of a material.
2. A material's fire performance includes the examination of a
combination of factors, such as ease of ignition, flame spread, rate of
heat release, generation of gaseous species, smoke development, and
toxicity of the combustion products. In addition, the heat exposure
conditions and geometry of the school bus play a critical role.
3. A full-scale test procedure (testing a complete seat assembly)
will provide the best basis for testing school bus seats.
4. While toxicity is a concern, it appears that heat and/or smoke
generated by all likely school bus seating materials would cause
incapacitation before toxicity became an issue.
D. 1991 Notice Requesting Comments on Standard No. 302
On February 26, 1991, NHTSA published a notice requesting comment
on the NIST report and other issues to help the agency determine what
appropriate measures, if any, were needed to address the fire
resistance of materials used in school bus interiors. (56 FR 7826) The
questions included the following:
1. Can the agency develop test protocols for improving the fire
resistance of school bus interiors? What protocols and test criteria
should be adopted?
2. How can the agency best define objective measures of tenability,
e.g., exposure to temperature, material ignitability, flame spread,
rate of heat release, smoke generation, toxicity, etc.?
3. Does a small-scale (samples of seating materials) or full-scale
(complete seat assemblies) test exist that would result in the use of
seating materials that improve the fire resistance of school bus
interiors? What tests are recommended?
4. Is it necessary to include toxicity in any test protocols
designed to improve the fire resistance of school bus interiors? Are
there alternative technical requirements that could be established that
would result in negligible toxicity risks, such as establishing a
temperature limit?
5. Are there any guidelines that could be adopted that would ensure
that potentially carcinogenic materials are not utilized in the
manufacture of fire retardant or fire resistant materials?
[[Page 43897]]
6. Are there other changes or modifications that could be made to
school buses, such as changes in the number, location, and size of
emergency exits, that would affect the fire resistance requirements of
school buses? Should there be a correlation between the fire resistance
of materials and the amount of available emergency egress area?
7. What would the costs of upgrading the fire resistance of school
bus interiors be? Would the costs affect the ability of school
districts to replace older, less safe school buses or to order school
buses with other safety features that could have potentially higher
benefits?
E. Comments on the 1991 Notice
In response to the 1991 Notice, NHTSA received comments from State
and local governments, school bus and seat manufacturers, trade
associations, a test laboratory, and the NTSB.
1. The Need To Upgrade Standard No. 302
The commenters expressed differing views about the need to improve
the fire resistance of school bus interiors. Several commenters,
including the NTSB, American Medical Association (AMA), the Connecticut
Department of Motor Vehicles (Connecticut), and the Delaware Department
of Pupil Instruction (Delaware), believed that the flammability test in
Standard No. 302 needed to be upgraded. Other commenters, including the
National School Transportation Association (NSTA), Maryland Department
of Education (Maryland), West Virginia Department of Education (West
Virginia), Marysville Washington School District (Marysville), Blue
Bird Corporation and Thomas Built Buses, Inc. (bus manufacturers), and
Lichter Rubber Products Company (a manufacturer of school bus seats and
seat backs) questioned the need for upgrading the flammability
resistance requirements in Standard No. 302.
Marysville stated that NHTSA should direct its resources to other
school bus safety matters because the Carrollton crash represented an
extremely rare situation and because seat flammability was a very low
causal factor to the occupant deaths and injuries in that crash. Thomas
Built and Lichter Rubber believed that it was not realistic to require
seating to withstand fuel-fed fires like the Carrollton fire, which
Lichter Rubber characterized as an ``explosion.'' Maryland stated that
during the past 30 years, its public school buses have transported
students without a single student fatality related to fire.
2. Test Protocol
The commenters also expressed differing views about the form of an
upgraded test protocol. Some commenters favored small-scale laboratory
tests. Other commenters favored large-scale tests. Delaware recommended
having both a small-scale and a large-scale test. The commenters did
not provide any convincing information that would allow NHTSA to
compare the desirability of requiring either small-scale or large-scale
tests, or both. Similarly, while several commenters expressed concern
about toxicity, no generally accepted protocol to establish acceptable
toxicity levels was apparent from the comments.
3. Costs
Most commenters indicated that upgrading Standard No. 302 would
result in significant costs. SFT, a foam manufacturer, stated that the
cost of flame retardant foam cushioning for a 66-passenger bus could be
$275 more than the cost of current foam cushioning. SFT also stated
that equipping a bus with seat covers made of Kevlar-backed barrier
fabric could increase the cost of a bus by $460, if this upgraded
material were required. Thomas Built estimated that using fire block
upholstery would increase the total seating cost for a bus by about
$1,000, and requiring fire resistant seat foam and fire block seat
covers could add $1,500 to $2,000 to the cost of bus. The Oregon
Department of Education (Oregon) estimated that if NHTSA upgraded the
fire resistance requirements in Standard No. 302 as well as the
emergency exit requirements in Standard No. 217, the cost of a school
bus could increase by $1,300 to $1,500.
4. Cost-Effectiveness
Several commenters, including NSTA and Blue Bird, stated that the
costs of upgrading Standard No. 302 would be unjustified. Other
commenters, including Arizona and Delaware, believed upgrading Standard
No. 302 would be justified, notwithstanding the significant costs.
TAM-USA, a bus manufacturer, Blue Bird, and the Nebraska Department
of Education (Nebraska) commented that even though increased
flammability resistance was a desirable goal, other efforts, such as
improving the emergency exit capacity requirements in Standard No. 217,
would be more cost-effective. Similarly, NSTA recommended that the
agency pursue requiring additional emergency exits rather than
upgrading the flammability resistance requirements.
Maryland and TAM-USA stated that along with flammability, many
other factors are involved in determining the risk from school bus
fires. These factors include the type of fuel used, location and
construction of the fuel tank, type of fire barriers between the engine
and occupant compartments, and number and location of emergency exits.
III. Agency Decision
After reviewing the available information and public comments,
NHTSA has decided to terminate the rulemaking to upgrade Standard No.
302's flammability requirements for school bus interiors for the
following reasons: (1) The risks presented by school bus fires pose a
minimal safety problem for current designs of school buses; (2) the
agency's upgrade of Standard No. 217's emergency exit requirements to
allow faster evacuation from school buses reduced further the risks
posed by fire; (3) the bus involved in the Carrollton fire did not meet
then current Federal standards; (4) upgrading Standard No. 302 would
result in significant costs that would be disproportionate to minimal
benefits; and (5) further research would be necessary before the agency
could propose a test protocol, utilizing scarce agency resources.
A. Minimal Safety Problem
The agency notes that school bus fires are extremely rare. Most
school bus fires are small-scale, non-crash engine fires that pose a
low risk of injury because ample time is available to evacuate the bus.
Large-scale, fuel-fed fires, like the Carrollton fire, are even more
rare.
Other than the Carrollton fire, from 1975 through 2002, there were
no school bus crashes in which fatalities were attributed to fire as
the most harmful event. During this period, there were ten school bus-
related fatalities in crashes in which fire was present. However, these
fatalities were caused by the crash forces and were not attributed to
fire.\9\ The 1988 Carrollton crash resulted in 27 fatalities. Since
that crash, there have been no fire-related fatalities in school buses.
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\9\ Nine of the ten fatalities resulted from a 1984 crash in
Essex, Montana, in which a pre-1977 school bus was struck head-on by
a tractor-semi trailer carrying jet fuel, which leaked from the
trailer and caused the post-crash fire.
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B. Upgrade of Standard No. 217 Reduced Risks Associated With Fires
NHTSA believes that the limited risk posed by school bus fires was
further reduced by the agency's issuance of the November 2, 1991 final
rule upgrading Standard No. 217's emergency exit
[[Page 43898]]
requirements to allow faster evacuation from school buses.
Specifically, the final rule increased the number of emergency exits in
larger school buses, improved access to side emergency doors, and
improved the visibility of the emergency exits. These amendments have
made possible shorter evacuation times from a school bus in case of
fire or other emergency situations (e.g., submersion in water). Thus,
the benefits of the Standard No. 217 rulemaking are potentially broader
than those that might have resulted from a Standard No. 302 rulemaking
since the latter standard addresses only those emergencies involving
fire.
NHTSA agrees with the comments of Blue Bird, TAM-USA, Nebraska,
Maryland, and NSTA that the agency's improvement of the emergency exit
capacity requirements in Standard No. 217 better addresses the risks
associated with post-crash fires than upgrading the flammability
resistance requirements in Standard No. 302 would. Accordingly, given
that the agency's upgrade of Standard No. 217 has reduced the already
minimal risk posed by school bus fires, the agency believes that
upgrading Standard No. 302 is not warranted.
The agency also notes that the NTSB has accepted NHTSA's upgrade of
Standard No. 217 as an acceptable alternative to upgrading Standard No.
302. In a December 17, 1998 letter to NHTSA's Administrator, the
Chairman of the NTSB stated:
Safety Recommendation H-89-4 was issued to NHTSA as a result of
the Safety Board's investigation of the truck and bus collision near
Carrollton, Kentucky on May 14, 1988.
Safety Recommendation H-89-4 asked NHTSA to incorporate in FMVSS
302 the recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology concerning the new material acceptance criteria to reduce
the rate of fire spread in all buses.
The Safety Board commends NHTSA for changing the emergency exit
requirements so that school buses are required to have emergency
exits. * * * As a result of NHTSA's efforts to upgrade the emergency
exit requirements for school buses, thus reducing the need to
upgrade the flammability requirements for school bus seats, Safety
Recommendation H-89-4 has been classified ``Closed `` Acceptable
Alternate Action.''\10\
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\10\ A copy of this letter has been placed in the docket.
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C. Carrollton Bus Did Not Meet the Then Current Federal Standards
The agency also notes that the bus involved in the Carrollton fire
did not meet the then current Federal motor vehicle safety standards.
That bus was built before April 1, 1977, prior to the effective date of
the final rule improving Standard No. 217's emergency exit capacity
requirements and Standard No. 301's fuel system integrity
requirements.\11\ As a result, the Carrollton bus lacked safety
features, such as fuel tank guards and improved access to emergency
exits, required on large school buses that were built after 1977.
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\11\ Standard No. 301, ``Fuel System Integrity,'' specifies fuel
spillage limitations after each of several crash tests. The purpose
of the standard is to reduce the probability of injuries and
fatalities in post-crash fires. School buses were not required to
comply with Standard No. 301 until April 1, 1977. See 41 FR 36026,
August 26, 1976.
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If the Carrollton bus had been built after 1977, and thus had been
equipped with a fuel tank guard, the post-crash fire might never have
occurred. According to the NTSB report, a puncturing of the bus' fuel
tank caused the fire.\12\
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\12\ Highway Accident Report--Pickup Truck/Church Activity Bus
Head-on Collision and Fire Near Carrollton, Kentucky, May 14, 1988,
Report No. NTSB/HAR/89/01 (March 28, 1989).
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Finally, the agency agrees with the comments of Thomas Built,
Lichter Rubber, and Blue Bird that even if the Carrollton bus had
complied with a hypothetical upgraded Standard No. 302, the increased
flammability resistance might not have increased the survivability of a
Carrollton-type crash. As noted above, the Carrollton crash was
extremely severe, with a combined impact speed exceeding 100 miles per
hour, and the fire that ensued was fuel-fed and explosive in nature.
D. Significant Costs of Upgrading Standard No. 302
While NHTSA believes that the weighing of regulatory costs and
benefits should not be the only basis for a decision, and while the
costs of improving flammability resistance are not definitive since
performance levels and compliance test procedures were not specifically
defined in the agency's earlier notices, these costs would have been
substantial and disproportionate to the minimal benefits. The
commenters' estimated costs ranged from $275 to equip a 66-passenger
bus with only fire retardant foam cushioning, to $2,000 to equip a bus
with fire retardant foam cushions and fire block upholstery. The
agency's own range of estimates is from $300 for fire retardant foam to
$850 for fire block upholstery.
Based on its estimates, the agency believes that the costs of
upgrading Standard No. 302 could exceed the costs associated with other
school bus-related rulemakings. For example, the agency estimated that
the costs of upgrading Standard No. 217's emergency exit requirements
were $557 per bus. Accordingly, NHTSA concludes that the low level of
risk posed by school bus fires, which was even further reduced by the
agency's upgrade of Standard No. 217, does not justify the significant
additional costs that would result from upgrading Standard No. 302's
flammability resistance requirements.
The agency notes that an upgrade of Standard No. 302 would increase
the costs of school buses, forcing States and local school districts to
spend more funds. The agency believes that these funds would be better
spent on other school bus safety programs and devices that could save
more lives and reduce more injuries, such as purchasing school buses
complying with the upgraded emergency exit requirements or retrofitting
school buses with stop signal arms and improved mirror systems.
E. Test Protocol
Finally, the agency does not believe it could propose a test
protocol and criteria regarding conditions vital for survivability in a
fire without first conducting further research evaluating the
flammability of school bus interiors during high intensity fires.
Similarly, additional research would be necessary to develop a protocol
for toxicity tests if it were determined that toxicity is an important
component of upgrading flammability. While the absence of an existing
test protocol would not, by itself, justify terminating this
rulemaking, NHTSA notes that the additional costs and time involved in
developing such a protocol contributed to the agency's decision to
terminate this rulemaking.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, NHTSA has decided to terminate
this rulemaking action.
Although NHTSA has decided not to upgrade Standard No. 302, the
agency notes that States and local school districts may purchase school
buses with interiors that exceed the minimum Federal requirements. At
the 11th National Conference on School Transportation in May 1990, the
State delegates voted to recommend a large-scale test procedure for
measuring flammability resistance with performance levels exceeding
those required by Standard No. 302. The Conference's recommendations
were re-affirmed at the 12th National Conference, which was held in May
1995, and the 13th National Conference, which was held in May 2000.
While the 11th National Conference's
[[Page 43899]]
recommendations only provide guidance to most State school
transportation personnel, a number of local school districts and
States, including Connecticut, Mississippi, North Dakota, Tennessee,
South Carolina, and Utah, have adopted the Body and Chassis
specifications issued by the 11th Conference. Therefore, some school
buses will be equipped with more flame-resistant interiors,
notwithstanding NHTSA's decision not to upgrade Standard No. 302.\13\
In addition, the agency's decision not to upgrade Standard No. 302's
requirements does not preclude States from adopting flammability
resistance requirements that impose a higher performance requirement
than the Federal standard for vehicles procured for the State's own
use. If a State is disposed to regulate in this area concerning public
school buses, it may do so.
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\13\ To assure that school districts are aware of the ability to
procure buses with more flame-resistant interiors, NHTSA wrote to
the heads of State Pupil Transportation Services on November 24,
1995, to inform them of the availability of these materials.
Issued: July 11, 2003.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.
[FR Doc. 03-18595 Filed 7-23-03; 8:45 am]
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