[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 142 (Thursday, July 24, 2003)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 43895-43899]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-18595]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA 2003-14306]
RIN 2127-AA44


Flammability of Interior Materials in School Buses

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Notice of termination of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This notice terminates a rulemaking proceeding that NHTSA 
began in 1988 to consider upgrading Standard No. 302's flammability 
resistance requirements for school bus interiors. The rulemaking was 
initiated in response to a severe 1988 crash in Carrollton, Kentucky, 
in which a former school bus being used as a church activity bus burst 
into flames after colliding head-on with a pickup truck. After 
reviewing the available information and public comments, the agency has 
decided to terminate this rulemaking because: The risks presented by 
school bus fires pose a minimal safety problem; the agency's 1992 
upgrade of Standard No. 217's emergency exit requirements to allow 
faster evacuation from school buses has reduced further the risks posed 
by fire; the bus involved in the Carrollton fire was built before 
upgraded Federal school bus standards went into effect in 1977 and did 
not meet the exit and fuel system integrity requirements; upgrading 
Standard No. 302 would result in significant costs; and further 
research would be necessary before the agency could propose a test 
protocol, utilizing scarce agency resources.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues: Mr. Charles 
Hott, Office of Crashworthiness Standards, National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, 
Telephone: (202) 366-0247. For legal issues: Mr. Christopher Calamita, 
Vehicle Safety Rulemaking and Harmonization Division, Office of Chief 
Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW., Washington, DC, 20590, Telephone: (202) 366-2992.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    In the late 1980s, school bus safety received substantial public 
and Congressional attention, especially in the aftermath of two 
catastrophic crashes. On May 14, 1988, in Carrollton, Kentucky, a 
former school bus \1\ being used as a church activity bus burst into 
flames after colliding head-on with a pickup truck. This was a severe 
crash, with a combined impact speed exceeding 100 miles per hour. 
Twenty-seven of the 67 bus occupants died in the fire that ensued. On 
September 21, 1989, in Alton, Texas, a school bus became submerged in a 
water-filled pit after colliding with a tractor-semi trailer. Twenty-
one of the 81 students in the bus drowned because they were unable to 
escape.
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    \1\ The bus was manufactured in 1977 shortly before April 1, 
1977, prior to the effective date of a final rule improving Standard 
No. 217's emergency exit capacity requirements and Standard No. 
301's fuel system integrity requirements. As a result, the 
Carrollton bus lacked safety features, such as fuel tank guards and 
improved access to emergency exits, required on most large school 
buses that were built after 1977.
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    In its investigation of the Carrollton crash, the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded:


[[Page 43896]]


    Contributing to the severity of the accident was the puncture of 
the bus fuel tank and ensuing fire in the bus, the partial blockage 
by the rear bench seats of the area leading to the rear emergency 
door which impeded rapid passenger egress, and the flammability of 
the material in the bus seat cushions.\2\
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    \2\ Highway Accident Report--Pickup Truck/Church Activity Bus 
Head-on Collision and Fire Near Carrollton, Kentucky, May 14, 1988, 
Report No. NTSB/HAR/89/01 (March 28, 1989), at page 79.

    The NTSB also determined that ``some fire-retardant and flame 
blocking materials * * * when tested, will reduce the rate of spread of 
fire from seat to seat over materials currently used.''\3\
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    \3\ Id., at page 69.
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    In 1988, in response to the New Carrollton crash, NHTSA initiated 
two rulemaking proceedings to consider upgrading standards addressing 
school bus safety.

II. NHTSA Rulemaking Activity on School Bus Safety

A. 1988 ANPRM on Standard No. 217

    On November 4, 1988, the agency issued an Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on the adequacy of Standard No. 217's 
requirements for school bus emergency exits.\4\ Standard No. 217, ``Bus 
Emergency Exits and Window Retention and Release,'' establishes 
requirements for the retention of windows in buses and operating 
forces, opening dimensions, and markings for bus emergency exits. The 
purpose of the standard is to minimize the likelihood of occupants 
being thrown from a bus and to provide bus occupants a readily 
accessible means of emergency evacuation.
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    \4\ 53 FR 44623, Docket No. 88-21, Notice 1.
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    NHTSA ultimately revised Standard No. 217's requirements for school 
bus emergency exits and access to school bus emergency doors in a 1992 
final rule.\5\ That final rule set requirements for minimum emergency 
exit space based upon the seating capacity of each bus. Thus, the rule 
required larger school buses to have an increased number of emergency 
exits. The final rule also required school buses to provide improved 
access to side emergency doors and improved visibility of emergency 
exits.
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    \5\ 57 FR 49413, November 2, 1992, Docket No. 88-21, Notice 3.
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B. 1988 ANPRM on Standard No. 302

    Also on November 4, 1988, NHTSA issued an ANPRM announcing the 
agency's plans to consider upgrading Standard No. 302's requirements 
for the flammability of interior materials in buses.\6\ Standard No. 
302, ``Flammability of Interior Materials,'' specifies that the 
horizontal burn rate of certain specified materials (e.g., seat 
cushions and seat backs) may not exceed four inches per minute. The 
purpose of the standard is to allow the driver time to stop the vehicle 
and, if necessary, evacuate the vehicle occupants before untenable 
conditions develop that could result in injuries or fatalities.
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    \6\ 53 FR 44627, Docket No. 88-22, Notice 1.
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    In the ANPRM, the agency requested comments on the safety need for 
a rulemaking to upgrade Standard No. 302, types of buses that should be 
covered, types of seating material available, toxicity of fumes emitted 
by burning seating materials, upgraded test procedures, and costs and 
benefits of such a rulemaking. The agency also noted that factors 
related to the risk of injuries from fire are often interrelated. Among 
these factors are a fire's source and magnitude, an occupant's ability 
to escape from a burning vehicle, the time needed to escape, the 
location and type of emergency exits, and the flammability resistance 
of the vehicle's interior materials.
    In response to the ANPRM on Standard No. 302, NHTSA received 54 
comments from bus manufacturers, seating and material manufacturers, 
State and local governments, trade associations, and individuals. The 
commenters generally agreed that measures could be taken to increase 
the flammability resistance of materials used in school buses. 
Commenters also addressed other issues raised in the ANPRM, including 
the rulemaking's scope, the availability of new flame-resistant 
materials, possible performance requirements to enhance flammability 
resistance, and the costs and benefits of the rulemaking. The comments 
were discussed in the agency's 1991 notice requesting comments on 
issues related to the flammability of interior materials in buses.\7\ 
That notice is discussed below.
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    \7\ 56 FR 7826, February 26, 1991, Docket No. 88-22, Notice 3.
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C. 1990 NIST Research Report

    In January 1989, NHTSA commissioned the Center for Fire Research of 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to conduct a 
research program about the flammability resistance of various school 
bus seat assemblies. The research focused on factors such as 
ignitability, flame spread, rate of heat release, smoke generation, and 
toxicity of combustion products. In July 1990, NIST published its 
findings in a final report entitled ``Assessment of the Fire 
Performance of School Bus Interior Components.''\8\ The major 
conclusions of the NIST report were:
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    \8\ A copy of this report was placed in Docket No. 88-22-GR.
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    1. No one simple small-scale test should be used to measure fire 
performance of a material.
    2. A material's fire performance includes the examination of a 
combination of factors, such as ease of ignition, flame spread, rate of 
heat release, generation of gaseous species, smoke development, and 
toxicity of the combustion products. In addition, the heat exposure 
conditions and geometry of the school bus play a critical role.
    3. A full-scale test procedure (testing a complete seat assembly) 
will provide the best basis for testing school bus seats.
    4. While toxicity is a concern, it appears that heat and/or smoke 
generated by all likely school bus seating materials would cause 
incapacitation before toxicity became an issue.

D. 1991 Notice Requesting Comments on Standard No. 302

    On February 26, 1991, NHTSA published a notice requesting comment 
on the NIST report and other issues to help the agency determine what 
appropriate measures, if any, were needed to address the fire 
resistance of materials used in school bus interiors. (56 FR 7826) The 
questions included the following:
    1. Can the agency develop test protocols for improving the fire 
resistance of school bus interiors? What protocols and test criteria 
should be adopted?
    2. How can the agency best define objective measures of tenability, 
e.g., exposure to temperature, material ignitability, flame spread, 
rate of heat release, smoke generation, toxicity, etc.?
    3. Does a small-scale (samples of seating materials) or full-scale 
(complete seat assemblies) test exist that would result in the use of 
seating materials that improve the fire resistance of school bus 
interiors? What tests are recommended?
    4. Is it necessary to include toxicity in any test protocols 
designed to improve the fire resistance of school bus interiors? Are 
there alternative technical requirements that could be established that 
would result in negligible toxicity risks, such as establishing a 
temperature limit?
    5. Are there any guidelines that could be adopted that would ensure 
that potentially carcinogenic materials are not utilized in the 
manufacture of fire retardant or fire resistant materials?

[[Page 43897]]

    6. Are there other changes or modifications that could be made to 
school buses, such as changes in the number, location, and size of 
emergency exits, that would affect the fire resistance requirements of 
school buses? Should there be a correlation between the fire resistance 
of materials and the amount of available emergency egress area?
    7. What would the costs of upgrading the fire resistance of school 
bus interiors be? Would the costs affect the ability of school 
districts to replace older, less safe school buses or to order school 
buses with other safety features that could have potentially higher 
benefits?

E. Comments on the 1991 Notice

    In response to the 1991 Notice, NHTSA received comments from State 
and local governments, school bus and seat manufacturers, trade 
associations, a test laboratory, and the NTSB.
1. The Need To Upgrade Standard No. 302
    The commenters expressed differing views about the need to improve 
the fire resistance of school bus interiors. Several commenters, 
including the NTSB, American Medical Association (AMA), the Connecticut 
Department of Motor Vehicles (Connecticut), and the Delaware Department 
of Pupil Instruction (Delaware), believed that the flammability test in 
Standard No. 302 needed to be upgraded. Other commenters, including the 
National School Transportation Association (NSTA), Maryland Department 
of Education (Maryland), West Virginia Department of Education (West 
Virginia), Marysville Washington School District (Marysville), Blue 
Bird Corporation and Thomas Built Buses, Inc. (bus manufacturers), and 
Lichter Rubber Products Company (a manufacturer of school bus seats and 
seat backs) questioned the need for upgrading the flammability 
resistance requirements in Standard No. 302.
    Marysville stated that NHTSA should direct its resources to other 
school bus safety matters because the Carrollton crash represented an 
extremely rare situation and because seat flammability was a very low 
causal factor to the occupant deaths and injuries in that crash. Thomas 
Built and Lichter Rubber believed that it was not realistic to require 
seating to withstand fuel-fed fires like the Carrollton fire, which 
Lichter Rubber characterized as an ``explosion.'' Maryland stated that 
during the past 30 years, its public school buses have transported 
students without a single student fatality related to fire.
2. Test Protocol
    The commenters also expressed differing views about the form of an 
upgraded test protocol. Some commenters favored small-scale laboratory 
tests. Other commenters favored large-scale tests. Delaware recommended 
having both a small-scale and a large-scale test. The commenters did 
not provide any convincing information that would allow NHTSA to 
compare the desirability of requiring either small-scale or large-scale 
tests, or both. Similarly, while several commenters expressed concern 
about toxicity, no generally accepted protocol to establish acceptable 
toxicity levels was apparent from the comments.
3. Costs
    Most commenters indicated that upgrading Standard No. 302 would 
result in significant costs. SFT, a foam manufacturer, stated that the 
cost of flame retardant foam cushioning for a 66-passenger bus could be 
$275 more than the cost of current foam cushioning. SFT also stated 
that equipping a bus with seat covers made of Kevlar-backed barrier 
fabric could increase the cost of a bus by $460, if this upgraded 
material were required. Thomas Built estimated that using fire block 
upholstery would increase the total seating cost for a bus by about 
$1,000, and requiring fire resistant seat foam and fire block seat 
covers could add $1,500 to $2,000 to the cost of bus. The Oregon 
Department of Education (Oregon) estimated that if NHTSA upgraded the 
fire resistance requirements in Standard No. 302 as well as the 
emergency exit requirements in Standard No. 217, the cost of a school 
bus could increase by $1,300 to $1,500.
4. Cost-Effectiveness
    Several commenters, including NSTA and Blue Bird, stated that the 
costs of upgrading Standard No. 302 would be unjustified. Other 
commenters, including Arizona and Delaware, believed upgrading Standard 
No. 302 would be justified, notwithstanding the significant costs.
    TAM-USA, a bus manufacturer, Blue Bird, and the Nebraska Department 
of Education (Nebraska) commented that even though increased 
flammability resistance was a desirable goal, other efforts, such as 
improving the emergency exit capacity requirements in Standard No. 217, 
would be more cost-effective. Similarly, NSTA recommended that the 
agency pursue requiring additional emergency exits rather than 
upgrading the flammability resistance requirements.
    Maryland and TAM-USA stated that along with flammability, many 
other factors are involved in determining the risk from school bus 
fires. These factors include the type of fuel used, location and 
construction of the fuel tank, type of fire barriers between the engine 
and occupant compartments, and number and location of emergency exits.

III. Agency Decision

    After reviewing the available information and public comments, 
NHTSA has decided to terminate the rulemaking to upgrade Standard No. 
302's flammability requirements for school bus interiors for the 
following reasons: (1) The risks presented by school bus fires pose a 
minimal safety problem for current designs of school buses; (2) the 
agency's upgrade of Standard No. 217's emergency exit requirements to 
allow faster evacuation from school buses reduced further the risks 
posed by fire; (3) the bus involved in the Carrollton fire did not meet 
then current Federal standards; (4) upgrading Standard No. 302 would 
result in significant costs that would be disproportionate to minimal 
benefits; and (5) further research would be necessary before the agency 
could propose a test protocol, utilizing scarce agency resources.

A. Minimal Safety Problem

    The agency notes that school bus fires are extremely rare. Most 
school bus fires are small-scale, non-crash engine fires that pose a 
low risk of injury because ample time is available to evacuate the bus. 
Large-scale, fuel-fed fires, like the Carrollton fire, are even more 
rare.
    Other than the Carrollton fire, from 1975 through 2002, there were 
no school bus crashes in which fatalities were attributed to fire as 
the most harmful event. During this period, there were ten school bus-
related fatalities in crashes in which fire was present. However, these 
fatalities were caused by the crash forces and were not attributed to 
fire.\9\ The 1988 Carrollton crash resulted in 27 fatalities. Since 
that crash, there have been no fire-related fatalities in school buses.
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    \9\ Nine of the ten fatalities resulted from a 1984 crash in 
Essex, Montana, in which a pre-1977 school bus was struck head-on by 
a tractor-semi trailer carrying jet fuel, which leaked from the 
trailer and caused the post-crash fire.
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B. Upgrade of Standard No. 217 Reduced Risks Associated With Fires

    NHTSA believes that the limited risk posed by school bus fires was 
further reduced by the agency's issuance of the November 2, 1991 final 
rule upgrading Standard No. 217's emergency exit

[[Page 43898]]

requirements to allow faster evacuation from school buses. 
Specifically, the final rule increased the number of emergency exits in 
larger school buses, improved access to side emergency doors, and 
improved the visibility of the emergency exits. These amendments have 
made possible shorter evacuation times from a school bus in case of 
fire or other emergency situations (e.g., submersion in water). Thus, 
the benefits of the Standard No. 217 rulemaking are potentially broader 
than those that might have resulted from a Standard No. 302 rulemaking 
since the latter standard addresses only those emergencies involving 
fire.
    NHTSA agrees with the comments of Blue Bird, TAM-USA, Nebraska, 
Maryland, and NSTA that the agency's improvement of the emergency exit 
capacity requirements in Standard No. 217 better addresses the risks 
associated with post-crash fires than upgrading the flammability 
resistance requirements in Standard No. 302 would. Accordingly, given 
that the agency's upgrade of Standard No. 217 has reduced the already 
minimal risk posed by school bus fires, the agency believes that 
upgrading Standard No. 302 is not warranted.
    The agency also notes that the NTSB has accepted NHTSA's upgrade of 
Standard No. 217 as an acceptable alternative to upgrading Standard No. 
302. In a December 17, 1998 letter to NHTSA's Administrator, the 
Chairman of the NTSB stated:

    Safety Recommendation H-89-4 was issued to NHTSA as a result of 
the Safety Board's investigation of the truck and bus collision near 
Carrollton, Kentucky on May 14, 1988.
    Safety Recommendation H-89-4 asked NHTSA to incorporate in FMVSS 
302 the recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology concerning the new material acceptance criteria to reduce 
the rate of fire spread in all buses.
    The Safety Board commends NHTSA for changing the emergency exit 
requirements so that school buses are required to have emergency 
exits. * * * As a result of NHTSA's efforts to upgrade the emergency 
exit requirements for school buses, thus reducing the need to 
upgrade the flammability requirements for school bus seats, Safety 
Recommendation H-89-4 has been classified ``Closed `` Acceptable 
Alternate Action.''\10\
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    \10\ A copy of this letter has been placed in the docket.
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C. Carrollton Bus Did Not Meet the Then Current Federal Standards

    The agency also notes that the bus involved in the Carrollton fire 
did not meet the then current Federal motor vehicle safety standards. 
That bus was built before April 1, 1977, prior to the effective date of 
the final rule improving Standard No. 217's emergency exit capacity 
requirements and Standard No. 301's fuel system integrity 
requirements.\11\ As a result, the Carrollton bus lacked safety 
features, such as fuel tank guards and improved access to emergency 
exits, required on large school buses that were built after 1977.
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    \11\ Standard No. 301, ``Fuel System Integrity,'' specifies fuel 
spillage limitations after each of several crash tests. The purpose 
of the standard is to reduce the probability of injuries and 
fatalities in post-crash fires. School buses were not required to 
comply with Standard No. 301 until April 1, 1977. See 41 FR 36026, 
August 26, 1976.
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    If the Carrollton bus had been built after 1977, and thus had been 
equipped with a fuel tank guard, the post-crash fire might never have 
occurred. According to the NTSB report, a puncturing of the bus' fuel 
tank caused the fire.\12\
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    \12\ Highway Accident Report--Pickup Truck/Church Activity Bus 
Head-on Collision and Fire Near Carrollton, Kentucky, May 14, 1988, 
Report No. NTSB/HAR/89/01 (March 28, 1989).
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    Finally, the agency agrees with the comments of Thomas Built, 
Lichter Rubber, and Blue Bird that even if the Carrollton bus had 
complied with a hypothetical upgraded Standard No. 302, the increased 
flammability resistance might not have increased the survivability of a 
Carrollton-type crash. As noted above, the Carrollton crash was 
extremely severe, with a combined impact speed exceeding 100 miles per 
hour, and the fire that ensued was fuel-fed and explosive in nature.

D. Significant Costs of Upgrading Standard No. 302

    While NHTSA believes that the weighing of regulatory costs and 
benefits should not be the only basis for a decision, and while the 
costs of improving flammability resistance are not definitive since 
performance levels and compliance test procedures were not specifically 
defined in the agency's earlier notices, these costs would have been 
substantial and disproportionate to the minimal benefits. The 
commenters' estimated costs ranged from $275 to equip a 66-passenger 
bus with only fire retardant foam cushioning, to $2,000 to equip a bus 
with fire retardant foam cushions and fire block upholstery. The 
agency's own range of estimates is from $300 for fire retardant foam to 
$850 for fire block upholstery.
    Based on its estimates, the agency believes that the costs of 
upgrading Standard No. 302 could exceed the costs associated with other 
school bus-related rulemakings. For example, the agency estimated that 
the costs of upgrading Standard No. 217's emergency exit requirements 
were $557 per bus. Accordingly, NHTSA concludes that the low level of 
risk posed by school bus fires, which was even further reduced by the 
agency's upgrade of Standard No. 217, does not justify the significant 
additional costs that would result from upgrading Standard No. 302's 
flammability resistance requirements.
    The agency notes that an upgrade of Standard No. 302 would increase 
the costs of school buses, forcing States and local school districts to 
spend more funds. The agency believes that these funds would be better 
spent on other school bus safety programs and devices that could save 
more lives and reduce more injuries, such as purchasing school buses 
complying with the upgraded emergency exit requirements or retrofitting 
school buses with stop signal arms and improved mirror systems.

E. Test Protocol

    Finally, the agency does not believe it could propose a test 
protocol and criteria regarding conditions vital for survivability in a 
fire without first conducting further research evaluating the 
flammability of school bus interiors during high intensity fires. 
Similarly, additional research would be necessary to develop a protocol 
for toxicity tests if it were determined that toxicity is an important 
component of upgrading flammability. While the absence of an existing 
test protocol would not, by itself, justify terminating this 
rulemaking, NHTSA notes that the additional costs and time involved in 
developing such a protocol contributed to the agency's decision to 
terminate this rulemaking.

IV. Conclusion

    For the reasons set forth above, NHTSA has decided to terminate 
this rulemaking action.
    Although NHTSA has decided not to upgrade Standard No. 302, the 
agency notes that States and local school districts may purchase school 
buses with interiors that exceed the minimum Federal requirements. At 
the 11th National Conference on School Transportation in May 1990, the 
State delegates voted to recommend a large-scale test procedure for 
measuring flammability resistance with performance levels exceeding 
those required by Standard No. 302. The Conference's recommendations 
were re-affirmed at the 12th National Conference, which was held in May 
1995, and the 13th National Conference, which was held in May 2000. 
While the 11th National Conference's

[[Page 43899]]

recommendations only provide guidance to most State school 
transportation personnel, a number of local school districts and 
States, including Connecticut, Mississippi, North Dakota, Tennessee, 
South Carolina, and Utah, have adopted the Body and Chassis 
specifications issued by the 11th Conference. Therefore, some school 
buses will be equipped with more flame-resistant interiors, 
notwithstanding NHTSA's decision not to upgrade Standard No. 302.\13\ 
In addition, the agency's decision not to upgrade Standard No. 302's 
requirements does not preclude States from adopting flammability 
resistance requirements that impose a higher performance requirement 
than the Federal standard for vehicles procured for the State's own 
use. If a State is disposed to regulate in this area concerning public 
school buses, it may do so.
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    \13\ To assure that school districts are aware of the ability to 
procure buses with more flame-resistant interiors, NHTSA wrote to 
the heads of State Pupil Transportation Services on November 24, 
1995, to inform them of the availability of these materials.

    Issued: July 11, 2003.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.
[FR Doc. 03-18595 Filed 7-23-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P