[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 137 (Thursday, July 17, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 42456-42458]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-18120]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration


Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission 
Pipelines

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice; response to petition for reconsideration.

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SUMMARY: RSPA/OPS issued a final rule in August 2002 defining high 
consequence areas (HCAs) for gas transmission pipelines. Trade 
associations representing pipeline companies transporting the majority 
of natural gas delivered to customers in the United States petitioned 
RSPA for reconsideration of the final rule that defined HCAs. Certain 
aspects of that petition are being addressed through the related 
rulemaking to require operators to adopt integrity management programs 
that include additional protective measures for pipeline segments whose 
failure could affect HCAs. In addition, an advisory bulletin published 
separately today in the Federal Register provides clarification of how 
operators are expected to implement the ``identified sites'' aspect of 
the HCA rule. This document indicates where the response to each issue 
in the petition is being addressed and responds to the issues in the 
petition not addressed elsewhere.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Israni by phone at (202) 366-
4571, by fax at (202) 366-4566, or by e-mail at 
[email protected], regarding the subject matter of this 
response. General information about the RSPA/OPS programs may be 
obtained by accessing RSPA's Internet page at http://RSPA.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    On August 6, 2002, RSPA/OPS published a final rule on how to 
identify the populated areas near a pipeline for which the additional 
protections would be required; (67 FR 50824). These HCAs include not 
only higher population areas already identified by pipeline operators 
through the longstanding Class location definitions based on 
population, but also ``identified sites'' which are intended to pick up 
additional places where people are located. These additional places 
could include nursing homes, schools, and campgrounds that may be close 
enough to the pipeline to be at risk should there be a pipeline 
failure. In publishing the

[[Page 42457]]

final rule, RSPA/OPS announced that it intended to immediately initiate 
a related rulemaking that would describe the substantive requirements 
for integrity management programs to add further protections for HCAs.

Petition for Reconsideration

    On September 5, 2002, the American Gas Association (AGA), the 
American Public Gas Association (APGA), the Interstate Natural Gas 
Association of America (INGAA) and the New York Gas Group (NYGAS) 
(called collectively, ``Petitioners'') filed a petition for 
reconsideration of the final rule. When the petition was received, 
RSPA/OPS was in the final stages of developing an NPRM in the related 
rulemaking on the substantive requirements for integrity management 
programs. In addition to the substantive requirements, the draft NPRM 
proposed an expanded definition of HCAs and described how an operator 
would determine whether failure of a pipeline segment could impact the 
HCA and thus be subject to the assessment requirements. RSPA/OPS 
decided that it would be appropriate to address many aspects of the 
petition in the NPRM. On January 28, 2003, RSPA/OPS published the NPRM 
for the substantive requirements. (68 FR 4278) The preamble to the NPRM 
addressed the petition at 68 FR 4295-4296 and indicated RSPA/OPS's 
belief that the proposal, and the final rule to follow, would address 
the more significant of the issues of the petition. This document 
discusses the remainder of items raised by petitioners but not 
explicitly addressed in the NPRM.

Response to Remaining Issues

    First, Petitioners asked for a stay of the HCA definition pending 
resolution of the petition. The HCA definition imposes no requirement 
on any operator to do anything until program requirements in the 
related rulemaking are made final. Thus a stay is not appropriate in 
this case. However, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2003 
requires operators to begin conducting baseline integrity assessments 
of facilities that could affect HCAs by June 17, 2004, and to have 
integrity management programs in place by December 17, 2004, whether or 
not RSPA/OPS issues regulations on the matter. This statutory 
requirement means that operators need to immediately begin identifying 
HCAs. The guidance provided by Advisory Bulletin ADB-03-03, published 
in today's Federal Register, provides the assurance needed by operators 
to meet the statutory deadline. With the guidance in the advisory 
bulletin, operators can identify sites in preparation for required 
integrity management programs and the public will receive the assurance 
that the search for ``identified sites'' for inclusion in integrity 
management programs is clearly understood.
    Petitioners' second and third requests--to clarify that the 
definition applies only to segments of transmission lines and to define 
potential impact zones--are addressed by language in the proposed 
integrity management rule. Petitioners' fourth request--that isolated 
and infrequently occupied buildings be included only to the extent that 
they would be included under the Class 3 definition--is denied in the 
preamble to the proposed rule. However, RSPA/OPS requested comment on 
possible modifications with respect to buildings that are in the 
category of ``rural churches'' that might alleviate some of the 
concern. Further response will be made in the final rule. Petitioners' 
last two requests--for clarification of specified points and for 
clarification of the HCA definition itself--have been largely addressed 
in the proposed rule. In addition to points already discussed, the 
proposed rule addressed concerns about the breadth of the term ``public 
officials'' by seeking comment on whether the term should be limited to 
safety or emergency response officials as the ones most likely to have 
relevant information. To address these concerns, RSPA/OPS is publishing 
separately in today's Federal Register, an advisory bulletin providing 
guidance for operators in conducting a good faith search. In addition, 
RSPA/OPS has asked the TPSSC to discuss and vote on recommended 
guidance on how to clarify, in the final rule, the process of 
identifying certain sites as high consequence areas.
    We now discuss the remaining points on clarification:
    1. Petitioners question the inclusion in the HCA definition of two 
slightly different methods to identify outside areas as HCAs. The first 
method is by use of the Class 3 location language in 49 CFR 192.5, 
which uses the concept of a ``well-defined'' area used by at least 20 
persons 5 days per week for 10 weeks per year. This method would 
include a playground used during the week by a day care facility as 
well as a summer camp, but would not include weekend recreational 
areas. The second method of identifying outside areas to be protected 
as HCAs is through the identified sites definition which looks to 
evidence of the area's use by at least 20 persons on 50 days a year. 
This second method was intended to identify weekend recreational areas. 
It is not inconsistent with the first method, but merely adds to the 
outside areas to be protected. The guidance contained in Advisory 
Bulletin ADB 03-03 will simplify the process of identifying the 
additional areas.
    2. Petitioners question whether, in identifying an HCA, the 
building or the pipeline is the reference point for applying the 
distances. Because an HCA is determined by calculating the radius of 
potential concern, based on the diameter and pressure of the pipeline, 
the reference point is not critical to identifying the HCA. Rather, 
what is important is the distance between the center line of the 
pipeline and the closest corner of an identified site. The HCA 
definition uses threshold radii of 300, 660, or 1000 feet, depending on 
the diameter and pressure of the pipeline, which can be calculated 
using either the centerline of the pipeline or the closest corner of a 
building. The proposed integrity management rule would expand the 
definition to include calculated radii to greater than 100 feet for 
certain large-diameter, high pressure pipelines, but the method of 
calculation would not change. As discussed at the advisory committee, 
RSPA is considering using calculated potential impact radii instead of 
the threshold distances. But again, the calculated distance would be 
the same whether the measurement is made from the centerline or from 
the corner of the building.
    3. Petitioners argue that the requirement for identifying as an HCA 
a building occupied by persons of impaired mobility could raise 
``privacy and discrimination concerns'' because it would require ``an 
invasive procedure'' to determine the occupancy of these buildings. 
There is no requirement for an operator to conduct an invasive search 
to identify buildings housing people of limited ability. The means 
provided in the rule--visible marking, licensing, consultation with 
public officials, and official lists--are external and do not involve 
any invasion of privacy.
    4. Petitioners note that it would be difficult to determine if 
licensed facilities would meet the definition. As an example, 
petitioners argue that it would be difficult to determine if a 
registered home day care facility has more than 20 persons in 
residence. This is not the best example since such a facility would be 
included as a facility with persons of limited mobility. A more 
appropriate example would be a licensed bingo hall. Even though the 
facility is licensed, an operator is not required to include it as an 
identified site unless there is evidence of use by

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at least 20 persons. Physical checking may provide that evidence. The 
license itself may provide sufficient information for the 
determination. Consultation with public officials may also provide that 
information. As stated in Advisory Bulletin ADB 03-03, RSPA/OPS does 
not require an exhaustive search, only a good faith one.
    5. Petitioners note that a facility used by persons of limited 
mobility may be listed only on an obscure Web site and an operator may 
miss it. RSPA/OPS does not intend to hold an operator responsible for 
identifying a facility as an HCA solely on the basis of its listing on 
an obscure Web site. The final rule pointed to the Federal Government's 
web portal (http://www.Firstgov.gov) and telephone directories for 
information available about assisted-living, nursing, and elder care 
facilities and schools. Official State Web sites would also be 
appropriate. RSPA/OPS does not require an exhaustive search, only a 
good faith one.
    6. Petitioners note that maps maintained by government agencies may 
not be updated sufficiently often and provide sufficient detail to be 
helpful in identifying HCAs. It is an operator's choice as to which 
maps to rely on. If an operator determines that maps are not up-to-date 
or are not sufficiently detailed, an operator should not rely on them.
    7. Petitioners argue that requiring an operator to utilize four 
criteria to locate ``identified sites'' is an ``incomprehensible and 
impossible'' task since operators now rely on the weekday patrolling to 
locate population for the purposes of determining Class locations. 
RSPA/OPS continues to insist that operators must go beyond the existing 
practice and identify HCAs that are outside the traditional Class 3 and 
4 locations, but where the impacts on population may be significant. 
However, RSPA/OPS recognizes the importance of providing the regulated 
community assurance that good faith efforts at compliance will be 
recognized. Guidance provided in Advisory Bulletin ADB 03-03 will help 
the operator and ensure that these additional sites are identified.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on July 11, 2003.
Stacey L. Gerard,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 03-18120 Filed 7-16-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P