[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 125 (Monday, June 30, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 38725-38727]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-16415]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-272]


PSEG Nuclear, LLC; Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1; 
Exemption

1.0 Background

    PSEG Nuclear, LLC (PSEG or the licensee) is the holder of Facility 
Operating License No. DPR-70 which authorizes operation of the Salem 
Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Unit No. 1. The license provides, 
among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, 
regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 
the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of a pressurized-water reactor located in 
Salem County in the State of New Jersey.

2.0 Request/Action

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Sec.  50.48 
requires that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to 
January 1, 1979, have a fire protection plan that satisfies 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) No. 3, ``Fire 
Protection.'' Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, ``Fire Protection Program 
for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,'' 
hereinafter referred to as ``Appendix R,'' establishes fire protection 
requirements to satisfy GDC 3. Furthermore, 10 CFR 50.48(b) 
specifically requires that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate 
prior to January 1, 1979, implement fire protection features described 
in Appendix R, Section III.G.
    Appendix R requires that, if a licensee cannot meet the separation 
criteria delineated in Section III.G.2, and if redundant trains of safe 
shutdown cables or equipment are in the same fire area, the licensee 
must implement the alternative shutdown requirements of Section 
III.G.3. Section III.G.3 requires that plants have a shutdown 
capability independent of the area where redundant trains are located, 
and further requires that the area with redundant trains have an 
automatic fire detection and fixed fire suppression system. In 
addition, a Federal court decision \1\ has held that, if a licensee 
implements the requirements of Section III.G.3, the licensee must also 
comply with Section III.L of Appendix R. Section III.L requires that 
the licensee assume that offsite power is lost for a fire in a fire 
area crediting Section III.G.3 alternative shutdown.
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    \1\ Connecticut Light and Power, et al., v. NRC, 673 F2d. 525 
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
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    Salem, Unit No. 1, began power operations prior to January 1, 1979. 
Therefore, the technical requirements of Appendix R, including Sections 
III.G and III.L, are directly applicable to Salem, Unit No. 1.
    By letter dated May, 1, 2002, as supplemented on August 15, 2002, 
PSEG requested an exemption from Appendix R, Section III.G.3, fixed 
suppression requirements for Fire Areas 1(2)-FA-AB-64B (Reactor Plant 
Auxiliary Building, 64' Elevation) and 1(2)-FA-AB-84C (11 and 21 
Component Cooling Water (CCW) System pump and heat exchanger areas, 84' 
Elevation). In addition, the licensee requested an exemption from 
Appendix R, Section III.L.3, loss of offsite power requirements for 
Fire Areas 1(2)-FA-AB-64B and 1(2)-FA-AB-84B (Reactor Plant Auxiliary 
Equipment Area, 84' Elevation).
    On July 20, 1989, the Commission granted an exemption from the 
technical requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.2, to the extent 
that Fire Areas 1(2)-FA-AB-64B and 1(2)-FA-AB-84B are not protected by 
automatic fire suppression systems. However, because these areas are 
being reclassified as alternate shutdown (Section III.G.3) fire areas, 
this exemption supercedes the specific exemptions granted on July 20, 
1989, for Fire Areas 1-FA-AB-64B and 1-FA-AB-84B.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. Special circumstances exist 
if the application of the technical requirements of 10 CFR part 50, is 
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the regulation. The 
underlying purpose of Sections III.G.3 and III.L.3 of Appendix R to 10 
CFR part 50 is to provide reasonable assurance that at least one means 
of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions will remain 
available during, and after, any postulated fire.

Fire Area 1-FA-AB-64B

    PSEG requested an exemption from the fixed suppression requirement 
of Appendix R, Section III.G.3, and the loss of offsite power 
requirement of

[[Page 38726]]

Appendix R, Section III.L for Fire Area 1-FA-AB-64B. This area contains 
waste gas compressors, waste gas tanks, storage tank recirculation 
pumps, a laundry pump, a chemical drain tank pump, and holdup tanks and 
pumps.
    Fire Area 1-FA-AB-64B is made up of multiple rooms that are 
separated by reinforced concrete barriers. Each room contains either a 
single component or groups of similar components. The area boundaries 
are also constructed of reinforced concrete. In-situ combustibles in 
the fire area consist of lubricating oil in pumps and motors, paper, 
electrical cabinet internals, and cable insulation. A fire detection 
system is installed throughout the area except in the Holdup Tank 
Rooms, No. 1 Pump Waste Monitor Hold-up Tank Pump Room, the Waste 
Evaporator Feed Pump Room, and in unused space.
    Manual fire alarm stations are provided in the area, and, along 
with the fire detection system, annunciate in the Control Room. Manual 
fire suppression capability is provided in the form of portable fire 
extinguishers and manual hose stations. As previously stated, the 
Commission granted an exemption for the lack of a fixed suppression 
system on July 20, 1989.

Technical Evaluation for Fire Area 1-FA-AB-64B

    Fire Area 1-FA-AB-64B credits alternative shutdown capability to 
ensure post-fire safe shutdown. Therefore, because the area does not 
have a fixed suppression system and offsite power is necessary to 
accomplish safe shutdown, the licensee does not meet the technical 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and 
III.L.3.
    In its letter dated May 1, 2002, PSEG stated that a fire in this 
area has the potential to result in a loss of the emergency diesel 
generators (EDGs). However, the fire area contains no cables or 
equipment that could cause the station to lose offsite power. 
Therefore, offsite power would not be adversely affected by a fire, and 
would be available to support safe shutdown activities. Alternative 
shutdown capability, independent of the fire area, is provided to 
ensure post-fire safe shutdown. Based on its review, the NRC staff 
agrees that the licensee would be able to accomplish required safe 
shutdown activities for a fire in this fire area using offsite power.
    The fire area also has a low in-situ combustible loading with few 
potential ignition sources. Areas containing significant amounts of 
combustible materials also have a detection system to warn plant 
operators in the event of a fire. If a fire were to ignite in this 
area, the low combustible loadings, the inherent protection offered by 
the concrete wall construction, and the limited propagation pathways, 
would restrict the size of the fire. Fire detectors in the area would 
alarm, and the site fire brigade would be able to extinguish the fire 
using manual equipment. The NRC staff agrees that an automatic fire 
suppression system is not necessary to control a fire with the 
configuration of this fire area. Control Room operators would be able 
to promptly detect a fire, and the station fire brigade would rapidly 
respond and extinguish a fire in this area.
    Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the lack of fire 
suppression specified in Section III.G.3, and the capability to 
accommodate a loss of offsite power required by Section III.L.3, in 
Fire Area 1-FA-AB-64B does not present an undue risk to the public 
health and safety, and is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of Sections III.G.3 and III.L.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 
50.

Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84B

    The licensee requested an exemption from the loss of offsite power 
requirement of Section III.L.3 of Appendix R. The fire area contains 
pumps, heat exchangers, tanks and control centers for the chemical and 
volume control, CCW, safety injection, containment spray, auxiliary 
feedwater, waste disposal, and spent pool cooling systems.
    Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84B consists of multiple rooms separated by 
reinforced concrete barriers. Each room contains either a single 
component or groups of similar components. In-situ combustibles in the 
area consist of lubricating oil in pumps and motors, flammable liquids 
stored in cabinets, and cable insulation. The area contains few 
ignition sources and few paths for fire propagation.
    As previously stated, the Commission granted an exemption for the 
partial fire detection system on July 20, 1989. Fire suppression is 
provided for the auxiliary feedwater pumps by automatically actuated 
pre-action sprinkler systems. Fire suppression is provided for the 
charging pump area by a wet pipe sprinkler system.

Technical Evaluation of Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84B

    The licensee does not meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix R, in that Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84B credits alternative 
shutdown capability, and offsite power is required to accomplish safe 
shutdown.
    Although a fire in this area has the potential to result in a loss 
of power from the EDGs to the 4160 Volt vital buses, the fire area 
contains no cables or equipment that could cause the station to also 
lose offsite power. Consequently, offsite power would not be adversely 
affected by a fire, and would, thus, be available to support safe 
shutdown activities in lieu of the EDGs. Alternative shutdown 
capability, independent of the fire area, is provided through the 
Chemical and Volume Control System cross-tie from the opposite unit to 
ensure post-fire safe shutdown. Based on its review, the staff agrees 
that the licensee would be able to accomplish required safe shutdown 
activities for a fire in this fire area using offsite power.
    Therefore, because the licensee would still be able to achieve safe 
shutdown, the NRC staff concludes that the lack of capability to 
accommodate a loss of offsite power required by Section III.L.3, in 
Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84B does not present an undue risk to the public 
health and safety, and is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of Section III.L.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84C

    The licensee requested an exemption from the fixed suppression 
requirement of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R for Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84C. 
This area contains the CCW Pump and Heat Exchanger.
    The fire area boundaries are constructed of reinforced concrete. 
The area has a low combustible material loading, consisting of 
lubricating oil for the CCW pump and motor and cable insulation. The 
area contains few fixed ignition sources.
    An area-wide fire detection system is installed in the area. A 
manual fire alarm station is provided in the corridor outside the room. 
Both systems alarm in the Control Room. Manual fire suppression 
capability is provided by portable fire extinguishers and manual hose 
stations located in the corridor outside of the fire area. A fire in 
this area could affect several systems required for redundant safe 
shutdown. Therefore, alternative shutdown capability, independent of 
the fire area, is provided to ensure post-fire safe shutdown.

Technical Evaluation of Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84C

    The licensee does not meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3, in that Fire Area 1(2)-FA-AB-84C 
credits alternative shutdown capability and

[[Page 38727]]

does not have a fixed fire suppression system.
    The fire area boundaries consist of reinforced concrete. 
Alternative shutdown capability exists independent of the fire area to 
ensure that the plant can be safely shutdown for a fire in this area. 
The low combustible loadings, principally electrical cable insulation, 
would result in a fire of limited size with slow growth 
characteristics. In the event of a fire in the area, the fire detectors 
would alarm and the fire brigade would extinguish the fire using manual 
equipment. The NRC staff agrees that an automatic fire suppression 
system is not necessary to control a fire in this configuration in this 
fire area. Control Room operators could detect a fire, and the station 
fire brigade would rapidly respond and extinguish a fire in this area.
    Therefore, based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the 
lack of fixed fire suppression specified in Appendix R, Section 
III.G.3, in Fire Area 1-FA-AB-84C does not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety, and is not necessary to achieve the 
underlying purpose of the rule.

NRC Staff's Conclusion

    The staff examined the licensee's rationale to support the 
exemption requests and concludes that the fire protection measures 
implemented in Fire Areas 1-FA-AB-64B, 1-FA-AB-84B, and 1-FA-AB-84C 
provide reasonable assurance that at least one means of achieving and 
maintaining safe shutdown conditions will remain available during and 
after any postulated fire.
    Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii), there are special circumstances present, in that the 
application of Sections III.G.2. and III.L.3 of 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix R, is not necessary in order to achieve the underlying purpose 
of those regulatory provisions.

4.0 Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. 
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants PSEG Nuclear, LLC an exemption 
from 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3, fixed suppression 
requirements for Fire Areas 1-FA-AB-64B and 1-FA-AB-84C; and 10 CFR, 
Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3, loss of offsite power 
requirements for Fire Areas 1-FA-AB-64B and 1-FA-AB-84B for Salem, Unit 
No. 1.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (68 FR 22742).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24 day of June 2003.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John A. Zwolinski,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 03-16415 Filed 6-27-03; 8:45 am]
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