[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 115 (Monday, June 16, 2003)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 35585-35589]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-15123]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
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 

  Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 115 / Monday, June 16, 2003 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 35585]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM-50-80 ]


Union of Concerned Scientists and Mothers for Peace; Receipt of 
Petition for Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; notice of receipt.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received and requests 
comments on a petition for rulemaking filed by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists and the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (MFP). The 
petition was docketed on May 2, 2003, and has been assigned Docket No. 
PRM-50-80. The petitioners request that the NRC amend its regulations 
to require nuclear power plant owners to formally evaluate whether 
proposed changes, tests, and experiments cause protection against 
radiological sabotage to be decreased, and to require licensees to 
formally evaluate specified intentional or accidental aerial hazards 
and make necessary changes to ensure that the plant can reach and 
maintain safe shutdown.

DATES: Submit comments by September 2, 2003. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include ``PRM-50-80'' in the subject line of your comments. 
Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be made 
available to the public in their entirety on the NRC rulemaking web 
site. Personal information will not be removed from your comments.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: [email protected]. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us 
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's 
rulemaking web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions 
about our rulemaking web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; email 
[email protected].
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. (Telephone 
(301) 415-1966).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
(301) 415-1101.
    Publicly available documents related to this petition may be 
examined and copied for a fee at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), 
Public File Area O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland. Selected documents, including comments, can be 
viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC rulemaking web site at 
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html. From this 
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or 
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the NRC's PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 
or by email to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Lesar, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555. Telephone: 301-415-7163 or Toll-Free: 1-800-368-5642 or E-mail: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Petitioners

    The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) describes itself as a 
nonprofit partnership of scientists and citizens who combine rigorous 
scientific analysis, innovative policy development, and effective 
citizen advocacy to achieve practical environmental solutions. Before 
September 11, 2001, UCS states that it was an active participant in a 
series of public meetings conducted by the NRC with its external 
stakeholders regarding security regulations and implementing procedures 
for nuclear power plant reactors and their spent fuel. UCS states that 
although NRC closed its doors to them and other non-industry, public 
stakeholders regarding security matters after September 11, 2001, it 
continues to articulate potential problems and recommend solutions in 
other public arenas.
    San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (MFP) states that it advocates 
safety and protection of the environment against the dangers of the 
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (DCNPP). MFP states that it has been 
the foremost DCNPP watchdog group, and is a nationally respected voice 
on nuclear safety issues. MFP requests that the Commission suspend the 
licensing proceedings for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation at the DCNPP while it is considering this petition. MFP 
believes suspension is necessary because consideration of the petition 
has the potential to bring about a significant redefinition of the 
fundamental design requirements that are considered adequate to protect 
independent spent fuel facilities against radiological sabotage.

Background

Discussion of the Petition

    The petitioners state that 10 CFR 50.59, changes, tests, and 
experiments, first promulgated in 1962 and last amended in 2001, 
contains requirements for the process through which plant owners can 
modify their facilities and procedures without prior NRC approval. The 
petitioners characterize the objective of 10 CFR 50.59 as ensuring that 
plant owners evaluate proposed changes to facilities and procedures for 
their effects on the licensing basis of the plant and obtain prior NRC 
approval for changes having a potential impact (as defined in Sec.  
50.59 (c)(2)(i)-(viii)) on the basis for issuing the plant's operating 
license.
    In practice, the petitioners note that Sec.  50.59 typically 
involves a three-tiered review of proposed changes to a nuclear

[[Page 35586]]

power plant or its procedures. The first tier screens the proposed 
changes against the criteria in Sec.  50.59 (c)(2)(i)-(viii). If at 
least one criterion might be invoked by the proposed changes, the 
second tier provides for a more rigorous evaluation. However, if the 
proposed changes do not invoke any of the criteria at tier one and if 
the evaluation determines that none of the criteria are invoked at tier 
two, the change can be made at the owner's discretion. Otherwise, the 
third tier requires that NRC approve the change in advance, the change 
be revised so that none of the criteria are invoked, or the change must 
be abandoned.
    The petitioners state that 10 CFR 73.55, requires plant owners to 
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and 
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high 
assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not 
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an 
unreasonable risk to public health and safety. The petitioners state 
that the physical protection system shall be designed to protect 
against the design basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage as 
stated in Sec.  73.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii). The petitioners note that the DBT 
is being revised in light of the events on September 11, 2001, but 
currently specifies protection against a determined violent external 
assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons 
with the following attributes, assistance and equipment that include: 
(A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) dedicated 
individuals, (B) inside threat and assistance from a knowledgeable 
individual (an employee) who may provide information, facilitate 
entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, or participate in 
a violent attack, (C) suitable weapons, including hand-held automatic 
weapons with silencers and long range capability, (D) hand-carried 
equipment and explosives to be used for destroying reactor, facility, 
transporter, or container integrity features of the safeguards system, 
and (E) a four wheel drive land vehicle used as a bomb, or for 
transporting personnel, and their equipment to the proximity of vital 
areas.
    The physical protection system features elements such as perimeter 
fences, locked doors, access controls, intrusion detection systems, and 
armed responders. The petitioners note that 10 CFR 50.54(p) compared to 
10 CFR 50.59 permits plant owners to change their physical protection 
equipment and procedures without prior NRC approval as long as the 
changes do not decrease their effectiveness. The petitioners state that 
in practice, a security evaluation process determines if a proposed 
change to physical protection equipment or procedures can be made with 
NRC's approval, or cannot be made.
    The petitioners state that U.S. nuclear power plants were designed 
and licensed to provide reasonable assurance that an accidental 
aircraft crash would not adversely harm public health and safety. The 
petitioners state that the process involved a mathematical exercise to 
determine the likelihood that an errant aircraft could damage vital 
part(s) of the plant by impact. The petitioners state further that the 
inputs to the number-crunching were the proximity of the nuclear power 
plant to aircraft flight paths, the amenity of the site to aircraft 
crashes, and any spatial parameters (e.g. vital plant areas being 
shielded by non-vital areas that the aircraft could destroy without 
consequence).
    The petitioners state that nuclear power plants were also designed 
and licensed to provide reasonable assurance that an accidental fire 
within the facility would not adversely harm public health and safety, 
but note that a very serious fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant 
showed that the original regulation and associated implementing 
procedures were insufficient. The petitioners have included a detailed 
history of the fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant and a 
presentation of the formal structured approach by the owner of the 
plant. The petitioners state that while the initial regulations 
attempted to provide adequate protection, the Browns Ferry fire 
demonstrated regulatory deficiencies and caused a more formal, 
structured approach. The petitioners assert that U.S. nuclear power 
plants are protected from aerial hazards by pre-September 11 and pre-
Browns Ferry fire regulations that rely in large part on the low 
probability of an aircraft impacting the site.
    The petitioners state that the requested changes to 10 CFR part 50 
for aerial hazards are analogous to the regulations promulgated by the 
NRC to rectify the fire protection regulation shortcomings exposed by 
the Browns Ferry fire (i.e., the addition of 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix 
R to 10 CFR part 50).
    The MFP also requests that the NRC suspend licensing proceedings on 
the Diablo Canyon Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation until the 
issues presented in the petition are resolved. The petitioners believe 
the proposed amendments would provide better protection to Independent 
Spent Fuel Facilities (ISFSIs) against radiological sabotage. In an 
order dated May 16, 2003, the Commission denied the petitioner's 
request. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Power Plant 
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-04.

Proposed Amendments

    The petitioners request the following amendment:
    Revise 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 10 CFR 50.59 to require plant owners to 
formally evaluate whether proposed changes, tests, and experiments 
cause protection against radiological sabotage to be decreased and, if 
so, that such actions only be conducted with prior NRC approval.
    Revise 10 CFR part 50 to require that plant owners formally 
evaluate their facilities against specified aerial hazards and make 
changes as necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the ability 
of the facility to reach and maintain safe shutdown would not be 
compromised by an aerial assault, whether accidental or intentional.

Rationale for the Changes

Safety and Security Evaluation Integration

    The petitioners state that 10 CFR 50.59 requires plant owners to 
evaluate proposed changes, tests, and experiments and to obtain prior 
NRC approval for those having more than minimal adverse impact on the 
licensing basis, and that 10 CFR 50.54(p) requires plant owners to 
evaluate proposed changes to their physical protection equipment and 
procedures and to obtain prior NRC approval for those that decrease 
effectiveness.
    The petitioners believe that the current safety and security change 
control regulations have minimal overlap, and note that a proposed 
modification to the decay heat removal system typically does not 
involve a formal evaluation of whether it makes radiological sabotage 
easier unless it directly affects a piece of physical protection 
equipment or the response capability of an armed guard. The petitioners 
state that many changes, tests, and experiments have no effect, direct 
or indirect, on nuclear plant security, but some may, particularly 
those involving short-term and temporary applications.
    According to the petitioners, degraded conditions and off-normal 
configurations are often deemed acceptable from a safety evaluation 
perspective because of the low

[[Page 35587]]

probability that an initiating event occurs during the brief period of 
the impairment. The petitioners state that initiating events like pipe 
breaks, earthquakes, etc. are low probability events assumed to occur 
randomly such that the chances of the initiating event happening during 
any short time period are a mere fraction of an already small number.
    The petitioners state further that the same impairment, judged from 
a radiological sabotage perspective, may be unacceptable because the 
initiating event for sabotage is not random. According to the 
petitioners, saboteurs can cause actions to happen precisely at the 
time of the impairment. Thus, the chances of an initiating event 
occurring, instead of being reduced to a mere fraction of a small 
number, increase towards 100 percent. The petitioners state that the 
NRC's design basis threat is supposed to consider both an act of malice 
perpetuated by an insider acting alone and an act by an insider aided 
by several outsiders. The petitioners believe that, as long as one or 
more insiders remain part of the design basis threat, it is reasonable 
to assume that sabotage will be timed to coincide with the plant 
configuration being most, or at least more, vulnerable.
    Therefore, the petitioners believe it is imperative to evaluate 
proposed changes, tests, and experiments from both a safety and a 
security perspective. They note that a security perspective will not 
necessarily prevent proposed actions from being performed; but in the 
case of short-term or temporary applications, the security perspective 
review might flag a heightened vulnerability to radiological sabotage 
but accept it based on having compensatory measures put in place. The 
petitioners offer that compensatory measures might entail posting armed 
guards around the in-service safety widget while the redundant safety 
widget is removed from service for extended maintenance.
    The petitioners believe without the regulatory change sought by 
this petition to integrate the safety evaluations performed under 10 
CFR 50.59 with the security evaluation performed under 10 CFR 50.54(p), 
changes, tests, and experiments may continue to occur at U.S. nuclear 
power plants with proper consideration of safety implications, but with 
insufficient consideration of their security implications. The 
petitioners believe the regulatory changes sought by this petition 
would not necessarily prevent the changes, tests, and experiments from 
happening. The petitioners assert the requested regulatory changes 
would, in all likelihood--
    (1) Allow many changes, tests, and experiments to proceed as 
planned;
    (2) Require some changes, tests, and experiments to proceed with 
compensatory measures in place to offset the radiological sabotage 
risk;
    (3) Require very few changes, tests, and experiments to be approved 
by the NRC because they decrease the effectiveness of physical 
protection equipment and/or procedures; and
    (4) Prevent a very small number of changes, tests, and experiments 
on the grounds of undue risk from radiological sabotage.

Aerial Hazards

    The petitioners state that none of the 103 nuclear power plants 
operating in the United States at the time were designed to withstand 
suicide attacks from the air as we tragically experienced on September 
11, 2001. This vulnerability prompted the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) 
to establish no-fly zones around nuclear plants in the Fall of 2001. 
The petitioners assert this response was largely symbolic since FAA 
sanctions would probably not deter a suicide bomber, but it marked an 
implicit concession by the Federal Government that nuclear plants were 
vulnerable to air assault. The petitioners state further that nuclear 
plant owners would like the public to believe their facilities are 
hardened structures virtually immune to attack from the air due to the 
thick reinforced concrete walls of plant structures.\1\
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    \1\ NEI Report dated December 2002, ``Deterring Terrorism: 
Aircraft Crash Impact Analyses Demonstrated Nuclear Power Plant's 
Structural Strength.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Petitioners do not agree with this rationale, asserting that the 
thick reinforced walls do not surround all vital parts of a nuclear 
power plant. They note that one study of aircraft hazards, jointly 
prepared by the owners of two similar nuclear power plants more than 20 
years ago, concluded ``The control building is the only single building 
which, if hit, could lead to core melt.'' \2\ The petitioners state the 
control buildings at every nuclear plant in the U.S. are located 
outside the robust structures described by the industry, and therefore 
offers that the nuclear industry's proclamations about the robustness 
of thick, reinforced walls may be accurate, but they fail to tell the 
entire story. The petitioners state that the incompleteness of 
industry's position is further evidenced by the fire hazards analyses 
required by NRC's regulations. The petitioners state that NRC did not 
restrict the scope of the fire hazards analyses to only those areas 
within the reactor containment structure, but that the regulations 
recognize the reality that reactor core damage can result from fires 
outside the reactor containment structure. The petitioners state that 
security tests conducted since 1991 under the NRC's Operational 
Safeguards Readiness Evaluation (OSRE) program also detail why the 
nuclear industry's current assurances are incomplete. Each OSRE, 
according to the petitioners involved force-on-force exercises with a 
small group of mock intruders going up against the facility's armed 
responders. The petitioners included the following quote from the 
testimony presented to Congress last year by the NRC individual 
responsible for the OSRE program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Report from Spring 1982 by the Power Authority of the State 
of New York and the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, 
``Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study,'' Section 7.6.2, 
``Aircraft Hazards Analysis.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Eighty-one OSREs have been conducted to date. At 37 of them, the 
expert NRC team identified a significant weakness; significant being 
defined as the adversary team simulating sabotaging a target set, which 
would lead to core damage and in many cases, to a probable radioactive 
release.\3\
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    \3\ Testimony on April 11, 2002, by David N. Orrik, Reactor 
Security Specialist, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 
Response, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, before the U.S. House 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, ``A Review of Enhanced 
Security Requirements at NRC Licensed Facilities.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The petitioners state that the ``target set,'' attacked and 
defended by the adversary team and the security force respectively 
during the force-on-force exercises is defined by the NRC as follows:

    A target set is a minimum combination of equipment or operator 
actions which, if prevented from performing its intended safety 
function or prevented from being accomplished, would result in core 
damage.\4\
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    \4\ NRC memo dated November 17, 2000, from Glenn M. Tracy, 
Chief, Operator Licensing, Human Factors and Plant Support Branch, 
to John R. White, Chief, Radiation Safety and Safeguards Branch, 
Region I; Kenneth P. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Region II, 
James R. Creed, Team Leader, Safeguards Staff, Region III; and Gail 
M. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Region IV, ``Conduct, Agenda, 
and Rules of Engagement for Operational Safeguards Response 
Evaluations,'' page 4.

    The petitioners state that target sets vary from plant to plant and 
generally involve more than a single pump, a single valve, or a single 
wall (however thick and reinforced). The petitioners note that the 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) issued guidance to assist plant owners 
in developing their target sets.

[[Page 35588]]

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NEI described the process for determining target sets as follows:

    Analysis identifies target sets that, if all targets within a 
target set are destroyed, could lead to significant core damage. 
Using these target sets provides a basis for evaluating the 
protective strategy and assessing the significance of issues based 
on the risk involved.\5\

    \5\ Nuclear Energy Institute draft report dated October 2000, 
``Safeguards Performance Assessment Program.''
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    The petitioners included a table provided by NEI that illustrates 
ten (10) sample target sets. See Table A-1, Sample Target Sets 
(reproduced below). The table shows that reactor core damage can be 
prevented if cooling water is supplied from any one of four possible 
sources listed: Normal (high pressure supply), safety backup (emergency 
high pressure supply), another safety back-up (low pressure supply), 
and an additional back-up (alternate low pressure supply). In these 
sample target sets, each cooling water supply can be disabled by any 
one of five ways: (1) Power from the pump motor can be interrupted;
    (2) Control for the pump and/or valves upstream and downstream of 
the pump can be lost;
    (3) The pathway from a water source to the pump can be eliminated;
    (4) The pathway from the pump to the reactor vessel can be 
eliminated; and
    (5) The location of the pump itself can be rendered unusable such 
as by fire.
    The petitioners state that NEI reported only one of the four ways 
of cooling the reactor need to survive the attack:

    Each target set is developed to provide assurance that, if any 
element is protected, public health and safety will not be 
endangered by a significant radiological release.\6\

    \6\ Nuclear Energy Institute draft report dated October 2000, 
``Safeguards Performance Assessment Program.''
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    The petitioners state that in 37 of the 81 OSREs conducted, the 
security forces were unable to successfully defend even one element of 
the target set from simulated ground assaults. The petitioners included 
names and details of several power plants that had failures.
    The petitioners state that sample target sets illustrate the 
conclusions reached more than 20 years ago about the control building 
being an Achilles heel. The petitioners note that Target Set 6 in the 
table shows that knocking out the control element for all four water 
supplies can result in core damage.

                                                             Table A-1.--Sample Target Sets
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Structures, sys, & comps.                   1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9        10
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Pressure Supply:
    Power...........................................  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........        X   ........  ........
    Control.........................................        X         X   ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........
    Suction.........................................  ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X
    Discharge.......................................  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........
    Location........................................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........
Emergency HP supply:
    Power...........................................        X   ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........        X   ........  ........
    Control.........................................  ........        X   ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........
    Suction.........................................  ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X
    Discharge.......................................  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........
    Location........................................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........
Low Pressure supply:
    Power...........................................        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........
    Control.........................................  ........  ........  ........        X   ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........
    Suction.........................................  ........        X   ........  ........        X   ........  ........        X   ........        X
    Discharge.......................................  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........
    Location........................................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........        X   ........
Alternate LP supply:
    Power...........................................        X   ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........
    Control.........................................  ........  ........  ........        X   ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........
    Suction.........................................  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........        X
    Discharge.......................................  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........
    Location........................................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........        X   ........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 The petitioners state that an aircraft hitting the control building 
may destroy the control elements for all four water supplies, and much 
more.
    The petitioners believe these target sets should be used to 
evaluate nuclear power plants for destruction caused by postulated 
aircraft impact and subsequent fire. According to the petitioners, this 
aircraft hazard evaluation approach mirrors the approach taken for in-
plant fire hazards. The petitioners believe the fire hazards analyses 
conducted by plant owners are `living documents' in that proposed 
changes to plant procedures and proposed modifications to plant 
structures must be formally reviewed against to verify that protection 
against fires will not be lessened.
    The petitioners assert the way to ensure adequate protection of 
nuclear plants from aerial threats would be to replicate the fire 
hazards analysis process.\7\ The petitioners believe the NRC should 
define, as part of its design basis threat, the size and nature of an 
aerial threat that the plant must be protected against. As a minimum, 
according to the petitioners, it would seem to include general aviation 
aircraft since the post-September 11, airport security measures 
generally overlook

[[Page 35589]]

general aviation. The petitioners state the aerial threat may also 
entail explosives delivered via mortars and other means (e.g., rocket 
propelled grenades) as deemed appropriate by the NRC. The petitioners 
assert that if the aerial hazards evaluation determines that all 
targets within a target set are likely to be disabled, at least three 
options are available to the plant's owner to remedy the vulnerability:

    \7\ While the existing fire hazards analyses will be useful 
input to the aircraft hazards analyses, they do not eliminate the 
need for further study for two reasons: (1) The fire hazards 
analyses assumed that the postulated fire would be confined to a 
single room, whereas the aircraft impact and resulting fire(s) may 
affect multiple rooms, and (2) many rooms were summarily accepted 
as-is by the fire hazards analyses due to insufficient combustibles 
being present to sustain a fire--assumptions invalidated by the 
large amount of fuel carried by aircraft. The fire hazards analyses 
will expedite the aircraft hazards analyses by defining the 
equipment needed to cool the reactor if the room is hit. If that 
equipment could also be disabled by an aircraft impacting the room, 
action will be required to eliminate that vulnerability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Other equipment outside of and not affected by the impact 
zone could be added to the target set. Using the sample target sets, 
a fifth makeup water supply system could be added if it were outside 
the impact zone and could adequately cool the reactor core.
    (2) Protection in place for at least one of the targets within 
the existing target set could be provided. Using Target Set 9 from 
the sample target sets, if an aircraft impact at the location of the 
low pressure supply system and the alternate low pressure supply 
system potentially caused collateral damage to the discharge pathway 
for the emergency high pressure supply system, it might be possible 
to install a shield wall or screen to protect the exposed pathway.
    (3) Affected portions of a system could be relocated to a safe 
place outside the impact zone. Using Target Set 5 from the sample 
target sets, if the only part of the Emergency High Pressure Supply 
System within the impact zone was the power cable for the pump, that 
power cable could be rerouted.

    The petitioners believe that while an aerial hazards analysis 
established adequate protection, for those that may not be at nuclear 
power plants, it would also provide the means to ensure that future 
changes to plant structures and procedures do not compromise that 
protection.

Conclusion

    The petitioners believe that the proposed changes to 10 CFR 50.59 
and 10 CFR 50.54(p) integrate the safety and security evaluations 
performed for proposed changes to plant safety equipment and 
procedures, thereby providing better protection against radiological 
sabotage. Also, the petitioners believe the proposed changes to part 50 
provide a formal, structured approach for managing the risk from aerial 
hazards comparable to the regulatory approach already adopted for 
managing the risk from fire hazards. The petitioners state that if 
September 11, 2001, featured one of the hijacked aircraft hitting a 
U.S. nuclear power plant, the formal, structured approach being sought 
by this petition would have been undertaken as a necessary step to 
prevent another event. The petitioners state that if these changes are 
good measures to prevent recurrence, they represent even better 
measures to prevent occurrence in the first place.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of June, 2003.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary for the Commission.
[FR Doc. 03-15123 Filed 6-13-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-U