[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 115 (Monday, June 16, 2003)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 35585-35589]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-15123]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 115 / Monday, June 16, 2003 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 35585]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[Docket No. PRM-50-80 ]
Union of Concerned Scientists and Mothers for Peace; Receipt of
Petition for Rulemaking
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; notice of receipt.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received and requests
comments on a petition for rulemaking filed by the Union of Concerned
Scientists and the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (MFP). The
petition was docketed on May 2, 2003, and has been assigned Docket No.
PRM-50-80. The petitioners request that the NRC amend its regulations
to require nuclear power plant owners to formally evaluate whether
proposed changes, tests, and experiments cause protection against
radiological sabotage to be decreased, and to require licensees to
formally evaluate specified intentional or accidental aerial hazards
and make necessary changes to ensure that the plant can reach and
maintain safe shutdown.
DATES: Submit comments by September 2, 2003. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Please include ``PRM-50-80'' in the subject line of your comments.
Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be made
available to the public in their entirety on the NRC rulemaking web
site. Personal information will not be removed from your comments.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: [email protected]. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's
rulemaking web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions
about our rulemaking web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; email
[email protected].
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. (Telephone
(301) 415-1966).
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
(301) 415-1101.
Publicly available documents related to this petition may be
examined and copied for a fee at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR),
Public File Area O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland. Selected documents, including comments, can be
viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC rulemaking web site at
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html. From this
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the NRC's PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737
or by email to [email protected].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Lesar, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555. Telephone: 301-415-7163 or Toll-Free: 1-800-368-5642 or E-mail:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Petitioners
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) describes itself as a
nonprofit partnership of scientists and citizens who combine rigorous
scientific analysis, innovative policy development, and effective
citizen advocacy to achieve practical environmental solutions. Before
September 11, 2001, UCS states that it was an active participant in a
series of public meetings conducted by the NRC with its external
stakeholders regarding security regulations and implementing procedures
for nuclear power plant reactors and their spent fuel. UCS states that
although NRC closed its doors to them and other non-industry, public
stakeholders regarding security matters after September 11, 2001, it
continues to articulate potential problems and recommend solutions in
other public arenas.
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (MFP) states that it advocates
safety and protection of the environment against the dangers of the
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (DCNPP). MFP states that it has been
the foremost DCNPP watchdog group, and is a nationally respected voice
on nuclear safety issues. MFP requests that the Commission suspend the
licensing proceedings for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation at the DCNPP while it is considering this petition. MFP
believes suspension is necessary because consideration of the petition
has the potential to bring about a significant redefinition of the
fundamental design requirements that are considered adequate to protect
independent spent fuel facilities against radiological sabotage.
Background
Discussion of the Petition
The petitioners state that 10 CFR 50.59, changes, tests, and
experiments, first promulgated in 1962 and last amended in 2001,
contains requirements for the process through which plant owners can
modify their facilities and procedures without prior NRC approval. The
petitioners characterize the objective of 10 CFR 50.59 as ensuring that
plant owners evaluate proposed changes to facilities and procedures for
their effects on the licensing basis of the plant and obtain prior NRC
approval for changes having a potential impact (as defined in Sec.
50.59 (c)(2)(i)-(viii)) on the basis for issuing the plant's operating
license.
In practice, the petitioners note that Sec. 50.59 typically
involves a three-tiered review of proposed changes to a nuclear
[[Page 35586]]
power plant or its procedures. The first tier screens the proposed
changes against the criteria in Sec. 50.59 (c)(2)(i)-(viii). If at
least one criterion might be invoked by the proposed changes, the
second tier provides for a more rigorous evaluation. However, if the
proposed changes do not invoke any of the criteria at tier one and if
the evaluation determines that none of the criteria are invoked at tier
two, the change can be made at the owner's discretion. Otherwise, the
third tier requires that NRC approve the change in advance, the change
be revised so that none of the criteria are invoked, or the change must
be abandoned.
The petitioners state that 10 CFR 73.55, requires plant owners to
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high
assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to public health and safety. The petitioners state
that the physical protection system shall be designed to protect
against the design basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage as
stated in Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii). The petitioners note that the DBT
is being revised in light of the events on September 11, 2001, but
currently specifies protection against a determined violent external
assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons
with the following attributes, assistance and equipment that include:
(A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) dedicated
individuals, (B) inside threat and assistance from a knowledgeable
individual (an employee) who may provide information, facilitate
entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, or participate in
a violent attack, (C) suitable weapons, including hand-held automatic
weapons with silencers and long range capability, (D) hand-carried
equipment and explosives to be used for destroying reactor, facility,
transporter, or container integrity features of the safeguards system,
and (E) a four wheel drive land vehicle used as a bomb, or for
transporting personnel, and their equipment to the proximity of vital
areas.
The physical protection system features elements such as perimeter
fences, locked doors, access controls, intrusion detection systems, and
armed responders. The petitioners note that 10 CFR 50.54(p) compared to
10 CFR 50.59 permits plant owners to change their physical protection
equipment and procedures without prior NRC approval as long as the
changes do not decrease their effectiveness. The petitioners state that
in practice, a security evaluation process determines if a proposed
change to physical protection equipment or procedures can be made with
NRC's approval, or cannot be made.
The petitioners state that U.S. nuclear power plants were designed
and licensed to provide reasonable assurance that an accidental
aircraft crash would not adversely harm public health and safety. The
petitioners state that the process involved a mathematical exercise to
determine the likelihood that an errant aircraft could damage vital
part(s) of the plant by impact. The petitioners state further that the
inputs to the number-crunching were the proximity of the nuclear power
plant to aircraft flight paths, the amenity of the site to aircraft
crashes, and any spatial parameters (e.g. vital plant areas being
shielded by non-vital areas that the aircraft could destroy without
consequence).
The petitioners state that nuclear power plants were also designed
and licensed to provide reasonable assurance that an accidental fire
within the facility would not adversely harm public health and safety,
but note that a very serious fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant
showed that the original regulation and associated implementing
procedures were insufficient. The petitioners have included a detailed
history of the fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant and a
presentation of the formal structured approach by the owner of the
plant. The petitioners state that while the initial regulations
attempted to provide adequate protection, the Browns Ferry fire
demonstrated regulatory deficiencies and caused a more formal,
structured approach. The petitioners assert that U.S. nuclear power
plants are protected from aerial hazards by pre-September 11 and pre-
Browns Ferry fire regulations that rely in large part on the low
probability of an aircraft impacting the site.
The petitioners state that the requested changes to 10 CFR part 50
for aerial hazards are analogous to the regulations promulgated by the
NRC to rectify the fire protection regulation shortcomings exposed by
the Browns Ferry fire (i.e., the addition of 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix
R to 10 CFR part 50).
The MFP also requests that the NRC suspend licensing proceedings on
the Diablo Canyon Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation until the
issues presented in the petition are resolved. The petitioners believe
the proposed amendments would provide better protection to Independent
Spent Fuel Facilities (ISFSIs) against radiological sabotage. In an
order dated May 16, 2003, the Commission denied the petitioner's
request. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-04.
Proposed Amendments
The petitioners request the following amendment:
Revise 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 10 CFR 50.59 to require plant owners to
formally evaluate whether proposed changes, tests, and experiments
cause protection against radiological sabotage to be decreased and, if
so, that such actions only be conducted with prior NRC approval.
Revise 10 CFR part 50 to require that plant owners formally
evaluate their facilities against specified aerial hazards and make
changes as necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the ability
of the facility to reach and maintain safe shutdown would not be
compromised by an aerial assault, whether accidental or intentional.
Rationale for the Changes
Safety and Security Evaluation Integration
The petitioners state that 10 CFR 50.59 requires plant owners to
evaluate proposed changes, tests, and experiments and to obtain prior
NRC approval for those having more than minimal adverse impact on the
licensing basis, and that 10 CFR 50.54(p) requires plant owners to
evaluate proposed changes to their physical protection equipment and
procedures and to obtain prior NRC approval for those that decrease
effectiveness.
The petitioners believe that the current safety and security change
control regulations have minimal overlap, and note that a proposed
modification to the decay heat removal system typically does not
involve a formal evaluation of whether it makes radiological sabotage
easier unless it directly affects a piece of physical protection
equipment or the response capability of an armed guard. The petitioners
state that many changes, tests, and experiments have no effect, direct
or indirect, on nuclear plant security, but some may, particularly
those involving short-term and temporary applications.
According to the petitioners, degraded conditions and off-normal
configurations are often deemed acceptable from a safety evaluation
perspective because of the low
[[Page 35587]]
probability that an initiating event occurs during the brief period of
the impairment. The petitioners state that initiating events like pipe
breaks, earthquakes, etc. are low probability events assumed to occur
randomly such that the chances of the initiating event happening during
any short time period are a mere fraction of an already small number.
The petitioners state further that the same impairment, judged from
a radiological sabotage perspective, may be unacceptable because the
initiating event for sabotage is not random. According to the
petitioners, saboteurs can cause actions to happen precisely at the
time of the impairment. Thus, the chances of an initiating event
occurring, instead of being reduced to a mere fraction of a small
number, increase towards 100 percent. The petitioners state that the
NRC's design basis threat is supposed to consider both an act of malice
perpetuated by an insider acting alone and an act by an insider aided
by several outsiders. The petitioners believe that, as long as one or
more insiders remain part of the design basis threat, it is reasonable
to assume that sabotage will be timed to coincide with the plant
configuration being most, or at least more, vulnerable.
Therefore, the petitioners believe it is imperative to evaluate
proposed changes, tests, and experiments from both a safety and a
security perspective. They note that a security perspective will not
necessarily prevent proposed actions from being performed; but in the
case of short-term or temporary applications, the security perspective
review might flag a heightened vulnerability to radiological sabotage
but accept it based on having compensatory measures put in place. The
petitioners offer that compensatory measures might entail posting armed
guards around the in-service safety widget while the redundant safety
widget is removed from service for extended maintenance.
The petitioners believe without the regulatory change sought by
this petition to integrate the safety evaluations performed under 10
CFR 50.59 with the security evaluation performed under 10 CFR 50.54(p),
changes, tests, and experiments may continue to occur at U.S. nuclear
power plants with proper consideration of safety implications, but with
insufficient consideration of their security implications. The
petitioners believe the regulatory changes sought by this petition
would not necessarily prevent the changes, tests, and experiments from
happening. The petitioners assert the requested regulatory changes
would, in all likelihood--
(1) Allow many changes, tests, and experiments to proceed as
planned;
(2) Require some changes, tests, and experiments to proceed with
compensatory measures in place to offset the radiological sabotage
risk;
(3) Require very few changes, tests, and experiments to be approved
by the NRC because they decrease the effectiveness of physical
protection equipment and/or procedures; and
(4) Prevent a very small number of changes, tests, and experiments
on the grounds of undue risk from radiological sabotage.
Aerial Hazards
The petitioners state that none of the 103 nuclear power plants
operating in the United States at the time were designed to withstand
suicide attacks from the air as we tragically experienced on September
11, 2001. This vulnerability prompted the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
to establish no-fly zones around nuclear plants in the Fall of 2001.
The petitioners assert this response was largely symbolic since FAA
sanctions would probably not deter a suicide bomber, but it marked an
implicit concession by the Federal Government that nuclear plants were
vulnerable to air assault. The petitioners state further that nuclear
plant owners would like the public to believe their facilities are
hardened structures virtually immune to attack from the air due to the
thick reinforced concrete walls of plant structures.\1\
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\1\ NEI Report dated December 2002, ``Deterring Terrorism:
Aircraft Crash Impact Analyses Demonstrated Nuclear Power Plant's
Structural Strength.''
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Petitioners do not agree with this rationale, asserting that the
thick reinforced walls do not surround all vital parts of a nuclear
power plant. They note that one study of aircraft hazards, jointly
prepared by the owners of two similar nuclear power plants more than 20
years ago, concluded ``The control building is the only single building
which, if hit, could lead to core melt.'' \2\ The petitioners state the
control buildings at every nuclear plant in the U.S. are located
outside the robust structures described by the industry, and therefore
offers that the nuclear industry's proclamations about the robustness
of thick, reinforced walls may be accurate, but they fail to tell the
entire story. The petitioners state that the incompleteness of
industry's position is further evidenced by the fire hazards analyses
required by NRC's regulations. The petitioners state that NRC did not
restrict the scope of the fire hazards analyses to only those areas
within the reactor containment structure, but that the regulations
recognize the reality that reactor core damage can result from fires
outside the reactor containment structure. The petitioners state that
security tests conducted since 1991 under the NRC's Operational
Safeguards Readiness Evaluation (OSRE) program also detail why the
nuclear industry's current assurances are incomplete. Each OSRE,
according to the petitioners involved force-on-force exercises with a
small group of mock intruders going up against the facility's armed
responders. The petitioners included the following quote from the
testimony presented to Congress last year by the NRC individual
responsible for the OSRE program.
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\2\ Report from Spring 1982 by the Power Authority of the State
of New York and the Consolidated Edison Company of New York,
``Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study,'' Section 7.6.2,
``Aircraft Hazards Analysis.''
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Eighty-one OSREs have been conducted to date. At 37 of them, the
expert NRC team identified a significant weakness; significant being
defined as the adversary team simulating sabotaging a target set, which
would lead to core damage and in many cases, to a probable radioactive
release.\3\
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\3\ Testimony on April 11, 2002, by David N. Orrik, Reactor
Security Specialist, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident
Response, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, before the U.S. House
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, ``A Review of Enhanced
Security Requirements at NRC Licensed Facilities.''
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The petitioners state that the ``target set,'' attacked and
defended by the adversary team and the security force respectively
during the force-on-force exercises is defined by the NRC as follows:
A target set is a minimum combination of equipment or operator
actions which, if prevented from performing its intended safety
function or prevented from being accomplished, would result in core
damage.\4\
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\4\ NRC memo dated November 17, 2000, from Glenn M. Tracy,
Chief, Operator Licensing, Human Factors and Plant Support Branch,
to John R. White, Chief, Radiation Safety and Safeguards Branch,
Region I; Kenneth P. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Region II,
James R. Creed, Team Leader, Safeguards Staff, Region III; and Gail
M. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Region IV, ``Conduct, Agenda,
and Rules of Engagement for Operational Safeguards Response
Evaluations,'' page 4.
The petitioners state that target sets vary from plant to plant and
generally involve more than a single pump, a single valve, or a single
wall (however thick and reinforced). The petitioners note that the
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) issued guidance to assist plant owners
in developing their target sets.
[[Page 35588]]
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NEI described the process for determining target sets as follows:
Analysis identifies target sets that, if all targets within a
target set are destroyed, could lead to significant core damage.
Using these target sets provides a basis for evaluating the
protective strategy and assessing the significance of issues based
on the risk involved.\5\
\5\ Nuclear Energy Institute draft report dated October 2000,
``Safeguards Performance Assessment Program.''
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The petitioners included a table provided by NEI that illustrates
ten (10) sample target sets. See Table A-1, Sample Target Sets
(reproduced below). The table shows that reactor core damage can be
prevented if cooling water is supplied from any one of four possible
sources listed: Normal (high pressure supply), safety backup (emergency
high pressure supply), another safety back-up (low pressure supply),
and an additional back-up (alternate low pressure supply). In these
sample target sets, each cooling water supply can be disabled by any
one of five ways: (1) Power from the pump motor can be interrupted;
(2) Control for the pump and/or valves upstream and downstream of
the pump can be lost;
(3) The pathway from a water source to the pump can be eliminated;
(4) The pathway from the pump to the reactor vessel can be
eliminated; and
(5) The location of the pump itself can be rendered unusable such
as by fire.
The petitioners state that NEI reported only one of the four ways
of cooling the reactor need to survive the attack:
Each target set is developed to provide assurance that, if any
element is protected, public health and safety will not be
endangered by a significant radiological release.\6\
\6\ Nuclear Energy Institute draft report dated October 2000,
``Safeguards Performance Assessment Program.''
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The petitioners state that in 37 of the 81 OSREs conducted, the
security forces were unable to successfully defend even one element of
the target set from simulated ground assaults. The petitioners included
names and details of several power plants that had failures.
The petitioners state that sample target sets illustrate the
conclusions reached more than 20 years ago about the control building
being an Achilles heel. The petitioners note that Target Set 6 in the
table shows that knocking out the control element for all four water
supplies can result in core damage.
Table A-1.--Sample Target Sets
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Structures, sys, & comps. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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High Pressure Supply:
Power........................................... ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ X ........ ........
Control......................................... X X ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........
Suction......................................... ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X
Discharge....................................... ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........
Location........................................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........
Emergency HP supply:
Power........................................... X ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ X ........ ........
Control......................................... ........ X ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........
Suction......................................... ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X
Discharge....................................... ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........
Location........................................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........
Low Pressure supply:
Power........................................... X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Control......................................... ........ ........ ........ X ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........
Suction......................................... ........ X ........ ........ X ........ ........ X ........ X
Discharge....................................... ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Location........................................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X ........
Alternate LP supply:
Power........................................... X ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Control......................................... ........ ........ ........ X ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........
Suction......................................... ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X
Discharge....................................... ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Location........................................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X ........
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The petitioners state that an aircraft hitting the control building
may destroy the control elements for all four water supplies, and much
more.
The petitioners believe these target sets should be used to
evaluate nuclear power plants for destruction caused by postulated
aircraft impact and subsequent fire. According to the petitioners, this
aircraft hazard evaluation approach mirrors the approach taken for in-
plant fire hazards. The petitioners believe the fire hazards analyses
conducted by plant owners are `living documents' in that proposed
changes to plant procedures and proposed modifications to plant
structures must be formally reviewed against to verify that protection
against fires will not be lessened.
The petitioners assert the way to ensure adequate protection of
nuclear plants from aerial threats would be to replicate the fire
hazards analysis process.\7\ The petitioners believe the NRC should
define, as part of its design basis threat, the size and nature of an
aerial threat that the plant must be protected against. As a minimum,
according to the petitioners, it would seem to include general aviation
aircraft since the post-September 11, airport security measures
generally overlook
[[Page 35589]]
general aviation. The petitioners state the aerial threat may also
entail explosives delivered via mortars and other means (e.g., rocket
propelled grenades) as deemed appropriate by the NRC. The petitioners
assert that if the aerial hazards evaluation determines that all
targets within a target set are likely to be disabled, at least three
options are available to the plant's owner to remedy the vulnerability:
\7\ While the existing fire hazards analyses will be useful
input to the aircraft hazards analyses, they do not eliminate the
need for further study for two reasons: (1) The fire hazards
analyses assumed that the postulated fire would be confined to a
single room, whereas the aircraft impact and resulting fire(s) may
affect multiple rooms, and (2) many rooms were summarily accepted
as-is by the fire hazards analyses due to insufficient combustibles
being present to sustain a fire--assumptions invalidated by the
large amount of fuel carried by aircraft. The fire hazards analyses
will expedite the aircraft hazards analyses by defining the
equipment needed to cool the reactor if the room is hit. If that
equipment could also be disabled by an aircraft impacting the room,
action will be required to eliminate that vulnerability.
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(1) Other equipment outside of and not affected by the impact
zone could be added to the target set. Using the sample target sets,
a fifth makeup water supply system could be added if it were outside
the impact zone and could adequately cool the reactor core.
(2) Protection in place for at least one of the targets within
the existing target set could be provided. Using Target Set 9 from
the sample target sets, if an aircraft impact at the location of the
low pressure supply system and the alternate low pressure supply
system potentially caused collateral damage to the discharge pathway
for the emergency high pressure supply system, it might be possible
to install a shield wall or screen to protect the exposed pathway.
(3) Affected portions of a system could be relocated to a safe
place outside the impact zone. Using Target Set 5 from the sample
target sets, if the only part of the Emergency High Pressure Supply
System within the impact zone was the power cable for the pump, that
power cable could be rerouted.
The petitioners believe that while an aerial hazards analysis
established adequate protection, for those that may not be at nuclear
power plants, it would also provide the means to ensure that future
changes to plant structures and procedures do not compromise that
protection.
Conclusion
The petitioners believe that the proposed changes to 10 CFR 50.59
and 10 CFR 50.54(p) integrate the safety and security evaluations
performed for proposed changes to plant safety equipment and
procedures, thereby providing better protection against radiological
sabotage. Also, the petitioners believe the proposed changes to part 50
provide a formal, structured approach for managing the risk from aerial
hazards comparable to the regulatory approach already adopted for
managing the risk from fire hazards. The petitioners state that if
September 11, 2001, featured one of the hijacked aircraft hitting a
U.S. nuclear power plant, the formal, structured approach being sought
by this petition would have been undertaken as a necessary step to
prevent another event. The petitioners state that if these changes are
good measures to prevent recurrence, they represent even better
measures to prevent occurrence in the first place.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of June, 2003.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary for the Commission.
[FR Doc. 03-15123 Filed 6-13-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-U