[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 111 (Tuesday, June 10, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34660-34678]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-14277]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
I. Background
Pursuant to Pub. L. 97-415, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly
notice. Pub. L. 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to publish notice
of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, under a new
provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants the
Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any
amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the
Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards
consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a
request for a hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from, May 16, 2003, through May 29, 2003. The
last biweekly notice was published on May 27, 2003 (68 FR 28843).
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received
before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will
publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for
opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that
the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the Commission's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. The
filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene
is discussed below.
By July 10, 2003, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714, which is
available at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing
or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
a hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish
[[Page 34661]]
those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient
information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on
a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to
matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The
contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner
to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which
satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention
will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's PDR,
located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date.
Because of continuing disruptions in delivery of mail to United States
Government offices, it is requested that petitions for leave to
intervene and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of
the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to [email protected]. A copy of the request for
hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and because of continuing disruptions in
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested
that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to
301-415-3725 or by e-mail to [email protected]. A copy of the
request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be
sent to the attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will
not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the
presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there
are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the
NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to
[email protected].
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station,
Unit 1, DeWitt County, Illinois
Date of amendment request: January 29, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.5.1, ``Drywell,'' Surveillance
Requirement 3.6.5.1.3 to delay the performance of the next drywell
bypass leakage test to no later than November 23, 2008. The proposed
amendment would also revise TS 5.5.13, ``Primary Containment Leakage
Rate Testing Program,'' to remove an exception which is no longer
applicable and to reflect a one-time deferral of the primary
containment Type A test to no later than November 23, 2008.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes will revise TS 3.6.5.1, ``Drywell,''
Surveillance Requirement SR 3.6.5.1.3 to delay the performance of
the next drywell bypass leakage rate test (DBLRT) to no later than
November 23, 2008. This request will also revise CPS [Clinton Power
Station] TS 5.5.13, ``Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing
Program,'' to reflect a one-time deferral of the primary containment
Type A test to no later than November 23, 2008. The current Type A
test interval of 10 years, based on past performance, would be
extended on a one-time basis to 15 years from the last Type A test.
In addition, AmerGen is proposing to delete from TS 5.5.13 the
expired exception that allowed deferral of the leakage rate testing
of the primary containment penetration 1MC-042 until the seventh
refueling outage.
The drywell houses the reactor pressure vessel, the reactor
coolant recirculating loops, and branch connections of the Reactor
Coolant System (RCS), which have isolation valves at the primary
containment boundary. The function of the drywell is to maintain a
pressure boundary that channels steam from a Loss of Coolant
Accident (LOCA) to the suppression pool, where it is condensed. Air
forced from the drywell is released into the primary containment
through the suppression pool. The suppression pool is a concentric
open container of water with a stainless steel liner that is located
at the bottom of the primary containment. The suppression pool is
designed to absorb the decay heat and sensible heat released during
a reactor blowdown from safety/relief valve (SRV) discharges or from
a LOCA.
The function of the Mark III containment is to isolate and
contain fission products released from the RCS following a design
basis LOCA and to confine the postulated release of radioactive
material to within limits. The test interval associated with the
drywell bypass leakage and Type A testing is not a precursor of any
accident previously evaluated. Therefore, extending these test
intervals on a one-time basis from 10 years to 15 years does not
result in an increase in the probability of occurrence of an
accident. The successful performance history of the drywell bypass
leakage and Type A testing provides assurance that the CPS drywell
and primary containment will not exceed allowable leakage rate
values specified in the TS and will continue to perform its design
function following an accident. The risk assessment of the proposed
changes has concluded that there is an insignificant increase in
total population dose rate and an insignificant increase in the
conditional containment failure probability.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes for a one-time extension of the drywell
bypass leakage and Type A tests and deletion of an expired local
leak rate test exception for CPS, will not affect the control
parameters governing unit
[[Page 34662]]
operation or the response of plant equipment to transient and
accident conditions. The proposed changes do not introduce any new
equipment or modes of system operation. No installed equipment will
be operated in a new or different manner. As such, no new failure
mechanisms are introduced.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
CPS is a General Electric BWR/6 plant with a Mark III
containment system. The Mark III containment design is a single-
barrier pressure containment and a multi-barrier fission containment
system consisting of the drywell and primary containment. The
drywell houses the reactor pressure vessel, the reactor coolant
recirculating loops, and branch connections of the RCS, which have
isolation valves at the primary containment boundary. The function
of the drywell is to maintain a pressure boundary that channels
steam from a LOCA to the suppression pool, where it is condensed.
The suppression pool is an annular pool of demineralized water
between the drywell and the outer primary containment boundary. This
pool covers the horizontal vent openings in the drywell to maintain
a water seal between the drywell interior and the remainder of the
containment volume. The primary containment consists of a steel-
lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the RCS and
provides an essentially leak-tight barrier against an uncontrolled
release of radioactive material to the environment. Additionally,
this structure provides shielding from the fission products that may
be present in the primary containment atmosphere following accident
conditions. The primary containment is penetrated by access, piping
and electrical penetrations.
The integrity of the drywell is periodically verified by
performance of the DBLRT. This test ensures that the measured
drywell bypass leakage is bounded by the safety analysis
assumptions. The drywell integrity is further verified by a number
of additional tests, including drywell airlock door seal leakage
tests, overall drywell airlock leakage tests and periodical visual
inspections of exposed accessible interior and exterior drywell
surfaces. Additional confidence that significant degradation in the
drywell leaktightness has not developed is provided by the periodic
qualitative assessment of drywell performance.
The integrity of the primary containment penetrations and
isolation valves is verified through Type B and Type C local leak
rate tests (LLRTs) and the overall leak-tight integrity of the
primary containment is verified by a Type A integrated leak rate
test (ILRT) as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, ``Primary Reactor
Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.'' These
tests are performed to verify the essentially leak-tight
characteristics of the primary containment at the design basis
accident pressure. The proposed changes for a one-time extension of
the drywell bypass leakage and Type A tests and deletion of an
expired local leak rate test exception for CPS, do not effect the
method for drywell or containment testing or the test acceptance
criteria.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Edward J. Cullen, Deputy General Counsel
Exelon BSC--Legal, 2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101.
NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.
Arizona Public Service Company, et al., Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-
529, and STN 50-530, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2,
and 3, Maricopa County, Arizona
Date of amendments request: April 25, 2003.
Description of amendments request: The amendments would revise
Specification 5.3.1 in Section 5.3, ``Unit Staff Qualifications,'' of
the Technical Specifications, and add a new Specification 5.3.2.
Specification 5.3.1 states the qualifications of the unit staff. The
revision would state there is an exception for operator license
applicants and the new specification would provide the requirements for
these applicants. Only the qualifications of operator license
applicants are being changed. Because a new specification would be
added, the existing Specification 5.3.2 would also be renumbered 5.3.3.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed Technical Specification (TS) change is an
administrative change to clarify the current requirements for
licensed operator qualifications and licensed operator training
program. These changes conform to the current requirements of 10 CFR
[Part] 55. The TS requirements for all other unit staff
qualifications remain unchanged.
Although licensed operator qualifications and training may have
an indirect impact on accidents [involving operator action]
previously evaluated, the NRC considered this impact during the
rulemaking process, and by promulgation of the revised 10 CFR [Part]
55 rule, concluded that this impact remains acceptable as long as
the licensed operator training program is certified to be accredited
and is based on a systems approach to training. Palo Verde's
licensed operator training program is accredited by INPO [Institute
of Nuclear Power Operations] and is based on a systems approach to
training.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed TS change is an administrative change to clarify
the current requirements for licensed operator qualifications and
licensed operator training program and to conform to the revised 10
CFR [Part] 55. The TS requirements for all other unit staff
qualifications remain unchanged.
As noted above, although licensed operator qualifications and
training may have an indirect impact on the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident [involving operator action] from any
accident previously evaluated, the NRC considered this impact during
the rulemaking process, and by promulgation of the revised rule,
concluded that this impact remains acceptable as long as the
licensed operator training program is certified to be accredited and
is based on a systems approach to training. [That is to say an
accredited license operator training program that is based on a
systems approach to training would not introduce a new or different
kind of accident.] As previously noted, Palo Verde's licensed
operator training program is accredited by INPO and is based on a
systems approach to training.
Additionally, the proposed TS change does not affect plant
design, hardware, system operation, or procedures. Thus, the
proposed amendment request does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
The proposed TS change is an administrative change to clarify
the current requirements applicable to licensed operator
qualifications and licensed operator-training program. This change
is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR [Part] 55. The TS
qualification requirements for all other unit staff remain
unchanged.
Licensed operator qualifications and training can have an
indirect impact on a margin of safety. However, the NRC considered
this impact during the rulemaking process, and by promulgation of
the revised 10 CFR [Part] 55 [rule] determined that this impact
remains acceptable when licensees maintain a licensed operator
training program that is accredited and based on a systems approach
to training. As noted previously, Palo Verde's licensed operator
training program is accredited by INPO and is based on a systems
approach to training.
[[Page 34663]]
The NRC has concluded, as stated in NUREG-1262, ``Answers to
Questions at Public Meetings Regarding Implementation of Title 10,
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 55 on Operators' Licenses,'' that
the standards and guidelines applied by INPO in their training
accreditation program are equivalent to those put forth or endorsed
by the NRC. As a result, maintaining an INPO accredited, systems
approach based licensed operator training program is equivalent to
maintaining [an] NRC approved licensed operator training program
which conform[s] with applicable NRC Regulatory Guides or NRC
endorsed industry standards. The margin of safety is maintained by
virtue of maintaining an INPO accredited licensed operator training
program.
In addition, the NRC has published NRC Regulatory Issue Summary
2001-01, ``Eligibility of Operator License Applicants,'' dated
January 18, 2001, ``to familiarize addressees with the NRC's current
guidelines for the qualification and training of reactor operator
(RO) and senior operator (SO) license applicants.'' The document
again acknowledges that the INPO National Academy for Nuclear
Training (NANT) guidelines for education and experience, outline
acceptable methods for implementing the NRC's regulations in this
area.
Therefore, there is no change in the analysis results and the
proposed amendment request does not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
that review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
request for amendments involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Kenneth C. Manne, Senior Attorney, Arizona
Public Service Company, P.O. Box 52034, Mail Station 7636, Phoenix,
Arizona 85072-2034.
NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-293, Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts
Date of amendment request: December 10, 2002.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.E, ``Jet Pump Surveillance
Requirements'' and its Bases. Specifically, Notes 1 and 2 would be
added to the surveillance to provide clarity for performing the
surveillance under the designated condition. The proposed change would
also modify the applicability of the surveillance. Additionally, the
condition for flow imbalance of the two recirculation loops would be
changed from 15% to 10%. A reference in TS 4.11.C.1 to the bases for
Specification 3.3.B.5 would also be changed to reference TS Table
3.2.C.1, Note 5.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), section 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is
presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed Pilgrim TS 4.6.E imposes more restrictive
surveillance requirements in accordance with the Standard Technical
Specifications (STS) surveillance requirement 3.4.3.1 to ensure jet
pump integrity during startup and run modes. The more restrictive
conditions are: the recirculation loops have a flow imbalance of
less than 10%, instead of the current 15%, when the pumps are
operated at the same speed, and the occurrence of two of three
conditions, instead of the simultaneous occurrence of all three
conditions currently specified in TS 4.6.E for jet pump integrity.
The proposed more restrictive surveillance requirements ensure
safe operation of the plant during startup and run modes. The
requirements are not accident precursors. The proposed change that
corrects a reference in Surveillance 4.11.C.1 is an administrative
change with no impact on safety. These changes do not create
accident conditions or increase the probability of previously
evaluated accidents. The proposed changes provide additional
assurance that the assumptions (i.e., jet pump integrity) are met.
Therefore, the probability or the consequences of an accident
previously evaluated are not significantly increased.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident [from] any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a change to the plant design
or a new mode of equipment operation. As a result, the proposed
changes do not affect parameters or conditions that could contribute
to the initiation of any new or different kind of accident.
Therefore, these proposed changes do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed surveillance requirements increase the margin of
safety by providing additional assurance of jet pump integrity. The
proposed change to correctly reference the existing Specification is
administrative in nature. Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: J. M. Fulton, Esquire, Assistant General
Counsel, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 600 Rocky Hill Road, Plymouth,
Massachusetts 02360-5599.
NRC Section Chief: James W. Clifford.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-293, Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts
Date of amendment request: March 19, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
delete Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.3, ``Post Accident Sampling,''
requirements to maintain a Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).
Licensees were generally required to implement PASS upgrades as
described in NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI [Three Mile Island]
Action Plan Requirements,'' and Regulatory Guide 1.97,
``Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess
Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident.''
Implementation of these upgrades was an outcome of the lessons learned
from the accident that occurred at TMI, Unit 2. Requirements related to
PASS were imposed by an Order for many facilities and were added to, or
included in, the TSs for nuclear power reactors currently licensed to
operate. Lessons learned and improvements implemented over the last 20
years have shown that the information obtained from PASS can be readily
obtained through other means, or is of little use in the assessment and
mitigation of accident conditions.
The changes are based on NRC-approved Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-
413, ``Elimination of Requirements for a Post Accident Sampling System
(PASS).'' The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued a
notice of opportunity for comment in the Federal Register on December
27, 2001 (66 FR 66949), on possible amendments concerning TSTF-413,
including a model safety evaluation and model no significant hazards
consideration (NSHC) determination, using the consolidated line item
improvement process. The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of
availability of the models for referencing in license amendment
applications in the Federal Register on March 20, 2002 (67 FR 13027).
The licensee affirmed the
[[Page 34664]]
applicability of the following NSHC determination in its application
dated March 19, 2003.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) section 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no
significant hazards consideration is presented below:
Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated
The PASS was originally designed to perform many sampling and
analysis functions. These functions were designed and intended to be
used in post accident situations and were put into place as a result
of the TMI-2 accident. The specific intent of the PASS was to
provide a system that has the capability to obtain and analyze
samples of plant fluids containing potentially high levels of
radioactivity, without exceeding plant personnel radiation exposure
limits. Analytical results of these samples would be used largely
for verification purposes in aiding the plant staff in assessing the
extent of core damage and subsequent offsite radiological dose
projections. The system was not intended to and does not serve a
function for preventing accidents and its elimination would not
affect the probability of accidents previously evaluated.
In the 20 years since the TMI-2 accident and the consequential
promulgation of post accident sampling requirements, operating
experience has demonstrated that a PASS provides little actual
benefit to post accident mitigation. Past experience has indicated
that there exists in-plant instrumentation and methodologies
available in lieu of a PASS for collecting and assimilating
information needed to assess core damage following an accident.
Furthermore, the implementation of Severe Accident Management
Guidance (SAMG) emphasizes accident management strategies based on
in-plant instruments. These strategies provide guidance to the plant
staff for mitigation and recovery from a severe accident. Based on
current severe accident management strategies and guidelines, it is
determined that the PASS provides little benefit to the plant staff
in coping with an accident.
The regulatory requirements for the PASS can be eliminated
without degrading the plant emergency response. The emergency
response, in this sense, refers to the methodologies used in
ascertaining the condition of the reactor core, mitigating the
consequences of an accident, assessing and projecting offsite
releases of radioactivity, and establishing protective action
recommendations to be communicated to offsite authorities. The
elimination of the PASS will not prevent an accident management
strategy that meets the initial intent of the post-TMI-2 accident
guidance through the use of the SAMGs, the emergency plan (EP), the
emergency operating procedures (EOP), and site survey monitoring
that support modification of emergency plan protective action
recommendations (PARs).
Therefore, the elimination of PASS requirements from Technical
Specifications (TS) (and other elements of the licensing bases) does
not involve a significant increase in the consequences of any
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated.
The elimination of PASS related requirements will not result in
any failure mode not previously analyzed. The PASS was intended to
allow for verification of the extent of reactor core damage and also
to provide an input to offsite dose projection calculations. The
PASS is not considered an accident precursor, nor does its existence
or elimination have any adverse impact on the pre-accident state of
the reactor core or post accident confinement of radioisotopes
within the containment building.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in the Margin of Safety
The elimination of the PASS, in light of existing plant
equipment, instrumentation, procedures, and programs that provide
effective mitigation of and recovery from reactor accidents, results
in a neutral impact to the margin of safety. Methodologies that are
not reliant on PASS are designed to provide rapid assessment of
current reactor core conditions and the direction of degradation
while effectively responding to the event in order to mitigate the
consequences of the accident. The use of a PASS is redundant and
does not provide quick recognition of core events or rapid response
to events in progress. The intent of the requirements established as
a result of the TMI-2 accident can be adequately met without
reliance on a PASS.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request
involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: J.M. Fulton, Esquire, Assistant General
Counsel, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 600 Rocky Hill Road, Plymouth,
Massachusetts, 02360-5599.
NRC Section Chief: James W. Clifford.
Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South
Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne
County, Mississippi
Date of amendment request: May 8, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
change Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1, ``Primary Containment and
Drywell Isolation Instrumentation,'' to add a note allowing
intermittent opening of penetration flow paths, under administrative
control, that are isolated to comply with TS ACTIONS and to revise the
operability requirement for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
steam supply line low pressure isolation instrumentation to be
consistent with the RCIC system operability requirements.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change to adopt TSTF [Technical Specification Task
Force]-306 allows primary containment and drywell isolation valves
to be unisolated under administrative controls when the associated
isolation instrumentation is not operable. The isolation function is
an accident mitigating function and is not an initiator of an
accident previously evaluated. Administrative controls are required
to be in effect when the valves are unisolated so that the
penetration can be rapidly isolated when the need [for isolation] is
indicated. Therefore the probability or consequences of previously
evaluated accidents are not significantly increased.
The proposed change also allows the RCIC turbine steam line low
pressure containment isolation instrumentation to be inoperable
during low startup operating pressures. These instruments primarily
provide automatic isolation when steam line pressure is too low for
RCIC turbine operation. The low pressure automatic isolation feature
will only be unavailable during the time that the RCIC system is not
required to be operable. Therefore the change does not adversely
affect the ability of the RCIC system to perform its safety
function.
The RCIC steam line low pressure instruments also provide a
diverse signal to indicate a possible system break. Even though the
low pressure automatic isolation function will not be available for
a short period during plant startup, the likelihood of a steam line
break during the short period of time is low due to the low
operating pressure. In addition, the safety function of providing
containment integrity is maintained since there are other diverse
leak detection instruments as well as other barriers or isolation
capabilities that provide the isolation function.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
[[Page 34665]]
The proposed change does not involve any physical alteration of
plant equipment and does not change the method by which any safety-
related system performs its function. The TS currently allow[s]
containment and drywell isolation valves to be open under
administrative controls after being closed to comply with TS ACTIONS
for inoperable valves. Extending this allowance to the supporting
instrumentation does not introduce any new method of isolation that
has not already been evaluated.
Allowing the RCIC turbine steam line low pressure isolation
instrumentation to be inoperable during low startup operating
pressures does not create the possibility of any new failure modes
other than those previously evaluated. No new or different type of
equipment will be installed. There are no new failure mechanisms or
accident initiators introduced. The low pressure isolation is
designed to terminate RCIC turbine operation at low steam pressures
for equipment protection. However, this function is not required
since the RCIC system is not required to be operable and the same
function is accomplished by maintaining the turbine trip/throttle
valve closed. The low pressure isolation function will continue to
be required when the RCIC system is required to be operable.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The change to allow containment and drywell isolation valves to
be unisolated under administrative control does not reduce any
margins to safety since the proposed allowance for the supporting
isolation instrumentation is no less restrictive than the allowance
for the equipment it supports. When the valves are unisolated, the
design basis function of containment isolation is maintained by
administrative controls.
The change to allow the RCIC turbine steam line low pressure
isolation instrumentation to be inoperable during low startup
operating pressures does not reduce any margins to safety. The
current bounding analysis for a steam line break outside of
containment remains bounding for a[n] RCIC steam break at lower
pressures. In addition, the current high energy line break
evaluations and subcompartment pressurization evaluations remain
bounding for the low pressure condition. The design basis functions
of containment isolation and containment integrity are maintained by
the diverse leak detection instruments as well as other barriers or
isolation capabilities that provide the isolation function.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005-3502.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South
Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne
County, Mississippi
Date of amendment request: May 12, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
change the Technical Specifications (TS) to remove the MODE
restrictions for performance of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.7
and SR 3.8.4.8 for the Division 3 direct current electrical power
subsystem.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The power supplied by the battery is used only as a source of
control and motive power for the HPCS [High Pressure Core Spray]
system logic, HPCS diesel-generator set control and protection, and
other Division 3 related controls. The loads supplied by this system
are only loads associated with Division 3 of the Emergency Core
Cooling Systems (ECCS).
The battery testing period is within the period of time that the
system is scheduled to be out of service for other planned
maintenance. The battery test does not increase unavailability of
the supported system or represent any change in risk above the
current practice of planned system maintenance outages as currently
allowed by the TS. Any risk associated with the testing of the
Division 3 batteries will be enveloped by the risk management of the
system outage.
The out of service condition is controlled and evaluated for
safety implications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The HPCS system
reliability and availability are monitored and evaluated in
relationship to Maintenance Rule goals to ensure that total outage
times do not degrade operational safety over time.
Therefore, the proposed change will have no effect on the
probability or consequences of any previously evaluated accident.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This request involves the testing of the HPCS battery on-line
while the system is already out of service. The testing will not add
additional out of service time. Testing during this period has no
influence on, nor does it contribute in any way to, the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident or malfunction from those
previously analyzed. The method of performing the test is not
changed. No new accident modes are created by testing during the
period when the system is already unavailable. Because the system is
already out of service, no safety-related equipment or safety
functions are altered as a result of this change.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The battery testing will be performed when the HPCS system is
already out of service for maintenance. The out of service condition
is controlled and evaluated for safety implications in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.65. The batteries are not expected to be unavailable
for more than 24 hours. This testing period is within the period of
time that the system is scheduled to be out of service for other
planned maintenance. Therefore, the battery test does not increase
unavailability of the supported system or represent any change in
risk above the current practice of planned system maintenance
outages as currently allowed by the TS. Timing of this test has no
effect on any fission product barrier.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005-3502.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South
Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne
County, Mississippi
Date of amendment request: May 12, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
change the Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1, ``Primary Containment
and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation,'' to add a provision to the
APPLICABILITY requirement specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1, to eliminate
the requirement that the instrumentation for the Residual Heat Removal
(RHR) System Isolation
[[Page 34666]]
Function on Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3, be OPERABLE during
certain conditions in MODE 5. Specifically, the proposed change would
remove the requirement when the upper containment reactor cavity is at
the High Water Level condition specified in TS 3.5.2, ``Emergency Core
Cooling Systems (ECCS) Shutdown.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change revises the applicability requirement for
the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Isolation function of the
Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation during
MODE 5. The change removes the requirement that the instrumentation
be operable during certain conditions during refueling outages. The
function is intended to mitigate reactor vessel draindown events.
Although draindown events during refueling operations are not
specifically evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR), these events were evaluated in support of licensing actions
for the Alternate Decay Heat Removal System (ADHRS). The probability
that a draindown event will be initiated is unrelated to operability
requirement for this instrumentation or the associated isolation
valves. The evaluation supporting this change determined that
mitigating actions can be taken to terminate all postulated
draindown events prior to fuel uncovery. As a result, the
probability of draindown events causing fuel uncovery and the
potential for radiological releases has not significantly increased.
The operation or failure of the shutdown cooling suction isolation
does not contribute to the occurrence of an accident. No active or
passive failure mechanisms that could lead to an accident are
affected by the proposed change.
The consequences of a vessel drainage event are not
significantly increased by the proposed change. Entergy [Entergy
Operations, Inc.] has evaluated various draindown and pumpdown
events through the shutdown cooling flow path and determined that
adequate time is available for operations personnel to identify and
take action to mitigate such events such that adequate core cooling
is maintained and a radiological release does not occur.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Entergy has evaluated various draindown events through the
shutdown cooling flow path and determined that adequate time is
available for operations personnel to identify and take action to
mitigate any events such that adequate core cooling is maintained.
With the containment refueling cavity flooded, sufficient inventory
is available to allow operator action to terminate the inventory
loss prior to reaching a low water level in the reactor. Installed
equipment is not operated in a new or different manner, no new or
different system interactions are created, and no new processes are
introduced. No new failures have been created by the proposed
changes.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not introduce any new setpoints at which
protective or mitigative actions are initiated. No current setpoints
are altered by this change. The design and functioning of the
containment and drywell isolation function is also unchanged. The
change simply modifies the applicability of the Technical
Specifications (TS) by removing the requirement that the RHR system
isolation on low reactor vessel level be operable with the upper
containment cavity flooded in MODE 5. During MODE 5, the RHR system
isolation mitigates postulated draindown events through the RHR
system. Entergy has evaluated various draindown events through this
flow path and determined that adequate time is available for
operations personnel to identify and take action to mitigate such
events such that adequate core cooling is maintained.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005-3502.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South
Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne
County, Mississippi
Date of amendment request: May 12, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
change administrative Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.12 regarding
containment integrated leakage rate testing (ILRT) and TS 3.6.5.1.1
regarding drywell bypass leak rate testing (DWBT). The change would
allow for a one-time extension of the interval (15 years) for
performance of the next ILRT and DWBT.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment to TS 5.5.12 adds a one-time extension to
the current interval for Type A testing (i.e., the ILRT) and the
DWBT. The current interval of ten years, based on past performance,
would be extended on a one-time basis to 15-years from the date of
the last test. The proposed extension to the Type A test cannot
increase the probability of an accident since there are no design or
operating changes involved and the test is not an accident
initiator. The proposed extension of the test interval does not
involve a significant increase in the consequences since research
documented in NUREG-1493, ``Performance Based Containment Leak Rate
Test Program,'' has found that, generically, fewer than 3% of the
potential containment leak paths are not identified by Type B and C
testing. A risk evaluation of the interval extension for GGNS [Grand
Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1] is consistent with these results. In
addition, the testing and containment inspections also provide a
high degree of assurance that the containment will not degrade in a
manner detectable only by a Type A test. Inspections required by the
Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) and by the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code are performed
to identify containment degradation that could affect leak
tightness.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed extension to the interval for the Type A test does
not involve any design or operational changes that could lead to a
new or different kind of accident from any accidents previously
evaluated. The tests are not being modified, but are only being
performed after a longer interval. The proposed change does not
involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type
of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing
normal plant operation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or
[[Page 34667]]
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The generic study of the increase in the Type A test interval,
NUREG-1493, concluded there is an imperceptible increase in the
plant risk associated with extending the test interval out to twenty
years. The evaluations done in support of this change confirm that
(conclusion). Further, the extended test interval would have a
minimal effect on this risk since Type B and C testing detects 97%
of potential leakage paths. For the requested change in the GGNS
ILRT/DWBT interval, it was determined that the risk contribution of
leakage will increase 0.99%. This change is considered very small
and does not represent a significant reduction in the margin of
safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005-3502.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374, LaSalle
County Station, Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County, Illinois
Date of amendment request: April 18, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
revise Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TS), of Facility Operating
License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18. Specifically, the proposed change will
modify TS Table 3.3.6.1-1, ``Primary Containment Isolation
Instrumentation,'' to add the requirement to perform a Channel Check in
accordance with Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.6.1.1 to thirteen
listed instrument functions. The proposed change is the result of the
replacement of existing plant equipment with equipment that has the
capability of permitting the performance of a Channel Check with the
plant in MODE 1, 2, and 3. The proposed change is consistent with the
wording specified in NUREG-1434, ``Standard Technical Specifications
General Electric Plants, BWR/6,'' Revision 2, dated June 2001.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change to Technical Specifications (TS) Table
3.3.6.1-1, ``Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation'' will
incorporate into the LaSalle County Station (LSCS) TS, wording
specified in NUREG-1434, ``Standard Technical Specifications General
Electric Plants, BWR/6,'' Revision 2, dated June 2001. The proposed
change will modify TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 to add the requirement to
perform a Channel Check in accordance with Surveillance Requirement
(SR) 3.3.6.1.1 to thirteen listed instrument functions. The
performance of TS surveillance testing is not a precursor to any
accident previously evaluated. A Channel Check is a monitoring
activity that does not represent an accident initiator. Thus, the
proposed change does not have any effect on the probability of an
accident previously evaluated.
The function of instrumentation listed on TS Table 3.3.6.1-1, in
combination with other accident mitigation features, is to limit
fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis
Accidents (DBAs) to within limits. The surveillance testing
specified in TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 will provide assurance that the
instrumentation will perform as designed. Thus, the radiological
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed change does not affect the control parameters
governing unit operation or the response of plant equipment to
transient conditions. The failure modes of the new instrumentation
do not give rise to a new or different kind of accident. The
proposed change does not introduce any new modes of system operation
or failure mechanisms.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
The leak detection system at LaSalle County Station uses ambient
or differential temperature increases to detect small primary
coolant boundary leaks in the Main Steam Line Tunnel and in various
rooms of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and the
Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System. The existing thermocouple
monitors did not have the capability to allow a Channel Check to be
performed without undue risk of initiating an inadvertent system
isolation in MODE 1, 2 and 3. Thus, the LSCS TS took exception to
the guidance contained in NUREG-1434 and did not specify on TS Table
3.3.6.1-1 that a SR 3.3.6.1.1 Channel Check be performed on the
above listed thirteen instrument functions.
The new thermocouple monitors have continuously reading digital
displays that permit the performance of a Channel Check with the
Unit in MODE 1, 2 and 3 without risk of inadvertent system
isolations. The new thermocouple digital displays have been
installed on Unit 2 during the January/February 2003 refuel outage
and are scheduled to be installed in Unit 1 during the upcoming
January 2004 refuel outage. LSCS after the return to service of Unit
2 in March of 2003, verified that the thermocouple digital displays
do permit a Channel Check to be successfully performed on the above
listed thirteen instrument functions. Therefore, LSCS is requesting
that TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 is modified to specify that a SR 3.3.6.1.1
Channel Check be performed in MODE 1, 2 and 3, consistent with the
guidance contained in NUREG-1434, Rev. 2.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Based upon the above, Exelon Generation Company concludes that
the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration
under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly,
a finding of ``no significant hazards consideration'' is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. Edward J. Cullen, Deputy General
Counsel, Exelon BSC--Legal, 2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101.
NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374, LaSalle
County Station, Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County, Illinois
Date of amendment request: April 18, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
revise Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TS), of Facility Operating
License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18. Specifically, the proposed change will
modify TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.8 to identify that the
specified testing requirement is applicable to reactor instrumentation
lines. The proposed change is consistent with the SR wording specified
in
[[Page 34668]]
NUREG-1433, ``Standard Technical Specifications General Electric
Plants, BWR/4,'' Revision 2, dated June 2001.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the Technical Specifications (TS)
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.8 will incorporate into the
SR, wording specified in NUREG-1433, ``Standard Technical
Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/4,'' Revision 2, dated
June 2001. The proposed change will specify that the testing
required by SR 3.6.1.3.8 is applicable to reactor instrumentation
line excess flow check valves (EFCVs). The performance of TS
surveillance testing is not a precursor to any accident previously
evaluated. Thus, the proposed change does not have any affect on the
probability of an accident previously evaluated.
The function of reactor instrumentation line EFCVs, in
combination with other accident mitigation features, is to limit
fission product release. The surveillance testing specified in SR
3.6.1.3.8 will provide assurance that the reactor instrumentation
line EFCVs will perform as designed. Thus, the radiological
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed change does not affect the control parameters
governing unit operation or the response of plant equipment to
transient conditions. The proposed change does not introduce any new
equipment, modes of system operation or failure mechanisms.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
NUREG-1433, Rev. 2, provided licensees with the latest NRC
recommended content and format for TS. The NUREG-1433 SR for testing
EFCVs, SR 3.6.1.3.10, specifies that this testing is associated with
reactor instrumentation line EFCVs. The Bases to SR 3.6.1.3.10 in
NUREG-1433, Rev. 2, provides a reference to NEDO-32977-A, ``Excess
Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation,'' dated June 2000. NEDO-32977-A
was approved for use by licensees in a NRC letter dated March 14,
2000. NEDO-32977-A states the following on the scope of TS testing
associated with EFCVs:
EFCVs in instrument lines which connect to the reactor coolant
pressure boundary (RCPB) are normally tested during refueling
outages to meet Technical Specification requirements. Instrument
lines that connect to the containment atmosphere, such as those
which measure drywell pressure, or monitor the containment
atmosphere or suppression pool water level, are considered
extensions of primary containment. A failure of one of these
instrument lines during normal operation would not result in the
closure of the associated EFCV, since normal operating containment
pressure is not sufficient to operate the valve. Such EFCVs will
only close with a downstream line break concurrent with a Loss of
Coolant Accident (LOCA). Since these conditions are beyond the plant
design basis, EFCV closure is not needed and containment atmospheric
instrument line EFCVs need not be tested.
The proposed change will incorporate the wording from NUREG-1433
into LaSalle County Station SR 3.6.1.3.8 to limit the scope of TS
required testing to EFCVs that are directly connected to the RCPB.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Based upon the above, Exelon Generation Company concludes that
the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration
under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly,
a finding of ``no significant hazards consideration'' is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. Edward J. Cullen, Deputy General
Counsel, Exelon BSC--Legal, 2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101.
NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Ottawa County, Ohio
Date of amendment request: May 14, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
modify the Technical Specifications by allowing entry into Mode 3
operation (shutdown with reactor coolant system temperature equal to or
greater than 280 degrees Fahrenheit) during the current outage only
with neither high pressure injection (HPI) pump capable of taking
suction from the low pressure injection system trains when aligned for
containment sump recirculation. The HPI system will otherwise be
operable.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows the plant to operate in Mode 3 in
support of RCS [reactor coolant system] leakage inspection
activities conducted during the ongoing Thirteenth Refueling Outage,
utilizing a limited exception to Limiting Condition for Operation
(LCO) 3.5.2. This LCO applies in plant operational Modes 1 (Power
Operation), 2 (Startup), and 3 (Hot Standby). Under the proposed
exception, for entry into Mode 3, both HPI trains would be required
to be operable except for the capability of maintaining suction from
the containment emergency sump during the recirculation phase.
The ability of the HPI pumps to draw suction from the
containment emergency sump (via the LPI [low pressure injection]
pumps) is a design feature credited by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Station Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for mitigation of
various types of loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). Due to the
potential susceptibility to damage from debris contained in the
pumped fluid, the existing HPI pumps may not be capable of
maintaining suction from the containment emergency sump without an
increased probability for malfunction. However, the current plant
conditions are unique in that decay heat generation rate in the
reactor core is extremely low due to the fact that the plant has not
operated in more than 14 months and 76 unirradiated fuel assemblies
have been loaded into the core, replacing irradiated fuel
assemblies.
A LOCA evaluation has been performed considering the current
reactor core decay heat generation rate. The evaluation shows that
in the unlikely event that a LOCA did occur while operating in Mode
3 under the proposed exception, the accident can be mitigated
without crediting HPI flow during the recirculation phase, while
crediting additional operator actions not presently credited in the
USAR. In addition, a risk evaluation has been performed and shows
that the increase in core damage frequency, accounting for human
error probability for the additional operator actions, is very
small. Also, in the unlikely event that a LOCA did occur while
operating in Mode 3 under the proposed exception, radiological
consequences would be very small compared to the accident analyses
results of record, given the fission product decay over the extended
plant shutdown. Therefore, the proposed change would not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
[[Page 34669]]
There are no new or different accident initiators introduced by
the proposed change to allow the plant to operate n Mode 3 under a
limited exception, with the HPI pumps not capable of maintaining
suction from the containment emergency sump (via the LPI pumps)
during the recirculation phase of a LOCA. Therefore, the proposed
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows the plant to operate in Mode 3 under
a limited exception, with the HPI pumps not capable of maintaining
suction from the containment emergency sump (via the LPI pumps)
during the recirculation phase of a LOCA. Although the ability of
the HPI pumps to draw suction from the containment emergency sump
(via the LPI pumps) is a design feature credited by the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station USAR for mitigation of various types of LOCAs,
an evaluation shows that given the extremely low decay heat
generation rate in the reactor core under current plant conditions,
and crediting additional operator actions, in the unlikely event
that a LOCA did occur while operating in Mode 3 under the proposed
exception, the accident can be mitigated without crediting HPI flow
during the recirculation phase. In addition, a risk evaluation has
been performed and shows that the increase in core damage frequency,
accounting for human error probability for the additional operator
actions, would be expected to be very small. Also, in the unlikely
event that a LOCA did occur while operating in Mode 3 under the
proposed exception, radiological consequences would be very small
compared to the accident analyses results of record, given the
fission product decay over the extended plant shutdown. Accordingly,
given that accident severity or consequences will not be
significantly increased under the proposed change, a significant
reduction in a margin of safety is not involved.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mary E. O'Reilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy
Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308.
NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Ottawa County, Ohio
Date of amendment request: May 19, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the Technical Specifications (TS) by removing the designation of
safety grade as a description of the flow indication for the motor
driven feedwater pump system. The licensee inadvertently requested that
the flow indication be designated as safety grade in an amendment
request that was approved as license Amendment No. 193.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change corrects a post modification and repair
Surveillance Requirement for the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump System.
This surveillance is not an initiator to any accident previously
evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an accident previously
evaluated is not significantly increased. The Technical
Specifications continue to require the MDFP System to be operable
and capable of performing its design function. As a result, the
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not
significantly affected. Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed correction does not involve a physical alteration
of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be
installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed correction does not result in a significant
reduction in the margin of safety. The corrected Surveillance
Requirement continues to ensure that the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump
System can perform its required function. Thus, appropriate
equipment continues to be tested in a manner that provides
confidence that the equipment can perform its assumed function.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mary E. O'Reilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy
Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308.
NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Ottawa County, Ohio
Date of amendment request: May 21, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the Technical Specifications (TS) by relocating to the
licensee's Technical Requirements Manual the TS surveillance
requirement pertaining to flow balance testing of the emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) high pressure injection and low pressure
injection subsystems following system modifications that alter
subsystem flow characteristics. Also, the proposed amendment would add
an ECCS pump operability requirement to the TS consistent with NUREG-
1430, Standard Technical Specifications-Babcock and Wilcox Plants,
Revision 2.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed surveillance requirement relocation and replacement
does not alter the design, operation, or testing of any structure
system or component. No previously analyzed accident scenario is
changed. Initiating conditions and assumptions remain as previously
analyzed. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed surveillance requirement relocation and replacement
does not alter the design, operation, or testing of any structure
system or component. No new or different accident initiators are
created as a result of the proposed changes. Therefore, the proposed
changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
[[Page 34670]]
The proposed surveillance requirement relocation and replacement
does not reduce or adversely affect the capabilities of the ECCS.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mary E. O'Reilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy
Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308.
NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Nuclear
Power Plant, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin; Docket No. 50-255, Palisades
Plant, Van Buren County, Michigan; and Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301,
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc
County, Wisconsin
Date of amendment request: April 30, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
revise the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification (TS)
Section 6.3, ``Plant Staff Qualifications,'' Palisades Plant TS Section
5.3, ``Plant Staff Qualifications,'' and Point Beach Nuclear Plant TS
5.3, ``Facility Staff Qualifications,'' to specify an exception to the
current TS minimum qualifications. This exception requires licensed
operators to meet the education and experience eligibility requirements
of the National Academy for Nuclear Training (NANT) (ACAD 00-003),
``Guidelines for Initial Training and Qualification of Licensed
Operators,'' dated January 2000.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed Technical Specification (TS) amendments are
administrative changes to clarify the current requirements for
licensed operator qualifications and licensed operator training
program. With these amendments, the TS continue to meet the current
requirements of 10 CFR 55.
Although licensed operator qualifications and training may have
an indirect impact on accidents previously evaluated, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) considered this impact during the
rulemaking process, and by issuance of the revised 10 CFR 55 rule,
concluded that this impact remains acceptable, as long as the
licensed operator training programs are certified to be accredited
and are based on a systems approach to training. NMC licensed
operator training programs are accredited by the National Nuclear
Accrediting Board (NNAB) and are based on a systems approach to
training. The proposed TS amendments take credit for the NNAB
accreditation of the licensed operator training programs. The TS
requirements for all other facility staff qualifications remain
unchanged.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed TS amendments are administrative changes to clarify
the current requirements for licensed operator qualifications and
licensed operator training programs and to conform to the revised 10
CFR 55.
As discussed above, although licensed operator qualifications
and training may have an indirect impact on the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated, the NRC considered this impact during the rulemaking
process, and by issuance of the revised rule, concluded that this
impact remains acceptable, as long as licensed operator training
programs are certified to be accredited and based on a systems
approach to training. As previously noted, NMC licensed operator
training programs are accredited by NNAB and are based on a systems
approach to training. The proposed TS amendments take credit for the
NNAB accreditation of the licensed operator training programs. The
TS requirements for all other facility staff qualifications remain
unchanged.
Additionally, the proposed TS amendments do not affect plant
design, hardware, system operation, or procedures. Therefore, the
proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed TS amendments are administrative changes to clarify
the current requirements applicable to licensed operator
qualifications and licensed operator training programs. With these
changes the TS continue to be consistent with the requirements of 10
CFR 55. The TS qualification requirements for all other facility
staff remain unchanged.
Licensed operator qualifications and training can have an
indirect impact on a margin of safety. However, the NRC considered
this impact during the rulemaking process, and by issuance of the
revised 10 CFR 55, determined that this impact remains acceptable,
when licensees maintain a licensed operator training program that is
accredited and based on a systems approach to training. As noted
previously, NMC licensed operator training programs are accredited
by NNAB and are based on a systems approach to training.
The NRC has concluded, as stated in NUREG-1262, ``Answers to
Questions at Public Meetings Regarding Implementation of Title 10,
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 55 on Operators' Licenses,'' that
the standards and guidelines applied by the Institute for Nuclear
Power Operations in their training accreditation program are
equivalent to those put forth or endorsed by the NRC. As a result,
maintaining NNAB accredited, systems approach based, licensed
operator training programs is equivalent to maintaining NRC approved
licensed operator training programs, which conform to applicable NRC
Regulatory Guides or NRC endorsed industry standards. The margin of
safety is maintained by virtue of maintaining the NNAB accredited
licensed operator training programs.
In addition, the NRC published NRC Regulatory Issue Summary
2001-01, ``Eligibility of Operator License Applicants,'' dated
January 18, 2001, ``to familiarize addressees with the NRC's current
guidelines for the qualification and training of reactor operator
(RO) and senior operator (SO) license applicants.'' This document
acknowledges that the National Academy for Nuclear Training
guidelines for education and experience outline acceptable methods
for implementing the NRC's regulations in this area.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Bradley D. Jackson, Esq., Foley and Lardner,
P.O. Box 1497, Madison, WI 53701-1497.
NRC Section Chief: L. Raghavan.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Nuclear
Power Plant, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin
Date of amendment request: May 22, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) operating license and
Technical Specifications (TSs) to increase the licensed rated power by
6.0 percent from 1673 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 1772 MWt.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
[[Page 34671]]
licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration, which is presented below:
Proposed Power Level Changes
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The stretch uprate evaluations performed included performance of
accident analyses at uprated power parameters using approved
methodologies. Results of these analyses continue to meet the event
acceptance criteria. An evaluation of components and systems,
including interface and control systems, that could be affected by
the change in power level, were performed for the stretch power
uprate. Components and systems will continue to function as designed
and performance requirements for these systems will continue to be
met. Additionally, the proposed change in power level was not found
to initiate any accident, and therefore, does not increase the
probability of an accident.
Dose consequences were evaluated using the uprated power
parameters. Acceptance criteria continue to be met. Therefore, the
change also does not increase the consequences of an accident.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting
single failures are introduced as a result of the proposed change.
The change has no adverse effect on any safety related system and
does not change the performance or integrity of any safety related
system. Additionally, no new safety related equipment is being added
or changed as a result of this proposed change in power. Therefore,
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not
created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
All analyses supporting the proposed uprated power condition
continue to meet the appropriate acceptance criteria. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the
margin of safety.
Therefore, there are no significant hazards associated with the
changes in rated power level.
Proposed Safety Limit Change
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change is an industry accepted safety limit
applicable to the KNPP transition to Westinghouse fuel. Therefore,
the change does not increase the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms or limiting single
failures are introduced as a result of the proposed change in fuel
centerline temperature. The change has no adverse effect on the fuel
or the performance or integrity of the fuel. Therefore, the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The proposed safety limit change is backed by technical
evaluations performed by Westinghouse and experimental data. The
limit is shown to be met as part of reload safety evaluations
performed on a cycle specific basis. All applicable analyses
supporting the proposed uprated power condition continue to meet the
appropriate acceptance criteria. Therefore, the proposed change does
not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Therefore, there are no significant hazards associated with the
change in the safety limit.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Setting Change
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The stretch power uprate evaluations performed included
performance of accident analyses. Results of the accident analyses
have verified that the acceptance criteria continue to be met.
Neither the change in the analytical limit nor the change in the TS
setting limit changes how the system functions. Systems will
continue to function as designed and system performance criteria
will continue to be met. Dose consequences have also been evaluated
at uprate conditions and doses remain within the appropriate
acceptance criteria. Therefore, the change does not increase the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting
single failures are introduced as a result of the proposed change.
The change has no adverse effect on any safety related system and
does not change the performance or integrity of any safety related
system. Additionally, no new safety related equipment is being added
or changed as a result of the proposed change in the high-high steam
flow TS setting limit. Therefore, the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident is not created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The results of the accident analyses demonstrate the acceptance
criteria continue to be met. Systems will continue to function as
designed and system performance criteria continue to be met.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
Therefore, there are no significant hazards associated with the
change in the high-high steam flow TS setting limit.
Proposed Containment Cooling Systems Change
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Removal of the LCO [limiting condition for operation] is
conservative in that it eliminates relaxation of a design
requirement for system redundancy. Deletion of the less conservative
condition is more conservative by definition. Maintaining the system
in a more conservative condition cannot create new challenges to
components and systems that could adversely affect their ability to
mitigate accident consequences or diminish the integrity of any
fission product barrier. Therefore, the deletion of the LCO does not
increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
Maintaining the system in a more conservative condition does not
adversely affect any fission product barrier, nor does it alter the
safety function of safety related systems, structures, and
components depended upon for accident prevention or mitigation.
Equipment important to safety will continue to function at its
design capacity. No new equipment is being added, replaced, or taken
away by the deletion of the LCO. Therefore, the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident is not created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Safety analysis acceptance criteria continue to be satisfied for
containment heat removal with deletion of this LCO. Therefore, the
proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the
margin of safety.
Therefore, there are no significant hazards associated with the
containment cooling systems change.
Proposed Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Changes
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The stretch power uprate project evaluations performed included
a review of the SBO [station blackout] event. Results of the
evaluation verified that with the increase in the CST [condensate
storage tanks] inventory, the evaluation criteria continue to be
met. Systems will continue to function as designed and system
performance criteria will continue to be met. Additionally, dose
consequences have been evaluated for the power uprate and results
remain within the appropriate acceptance criteria. Therefore, the
changes to CST inventory do not increase the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting
single failures are introduced as a result of the proposed changes.
The changes have no adverse effect on any safety related system and
do not change the performance or integrity of any safety related
system. Additionally, no new safety related equipment is being added
or changed as a result of the proposed changes in inventory.
Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident is
not created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The results of the SBO event review have verified that the
analysis criteria continue to be met. Systems will continue to
function as designed and system performance criteria
[[Page 34672]]
continue to be met. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Therefore, there are no significant hazards associated with the
changes in CST inventory.
Proposed Auxiliary Feedwater System Changes
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The LONF accident analyses have demonstrated that the TS
required AFW [auxiliary feedwater] trains at the minimum assumed
flow capability provide sufficient heat removal capacity to mitigate
the LONF accident such that acceptance criteria are satisfied.
Single failure criteria are still met, and no physical system
changes have been made. Dose consequences have been evaluated for
the power uprate and the results remain within the appropriate
acceptance criteria. Therefore, the changes to the auxiliary
feedwater system technical specifications do not increase the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting
single failures are introduced as a result of the proposed change.
The change has no adverse effect on any safety related system and
does not change the performance or integrity of any safety related
system. Additionally, no new safety related equipment is being added
or changed as a result of these proposed changes to technical
specifications. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident is not created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The LONF analysis supporting the proposed changes to technical
specifications meets the appropriate acceptance criteria. Therefore,
the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the
margin of safety.
Therefore, there are no significant hazards associated with the
auxiliary feedwater system technical specification changes.
Proposed Editorial and Administrative Changes
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The editorial and administrative changes do not affect the
analysis performed in support of the stretch power uprate.
Therefore, the changes do not increase the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The editorial and administrative changes do not affect the
analysis performed in support of the stretch power uprate. No new
accident scenarios, failure mechanisms or limiting single failures
are introduced as a result of the proposed editorial and
administrative changes. Therefore, the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident is not created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The editorial and administrative changes do not affect the
analysis performed in support of the stretch power uprate.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in the margin of safety.
Therefore, there are no significant hazards associated with the
editorial changes.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: John H. O'Neill, Jr., Esq., Shaw Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N. Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037-1128.
NRC Section Chief: L. Raghavan.
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear
Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey
Date of amendment request: April 10, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The amendments would modify the
Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Technical
Specifications (TSs) Table 3.3-1 ``Condition and Setpoint'' description
for permissive P-7 to reflect the new location of pressure
transmitters.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), section 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The NRC
staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis against the standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c). The NRC staff's review is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change to replace the words ``impulse chamber''
with ``steam line input'' in the descriptive text associated with
the P-7 function of the Reactor Trip System does not involve any
physical or design change to the P-7 function. The proposed change
renames the turbine inlet pressure to reflect the change in turbine
design and the new location where the pressure is sensed. Because
the P-7 function is not affected by the proposed amendment request,
the changes to the Salem TSs are effectively editorial in nature.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The intent of the proposed change is to revise the description
of the P-7 permissive as a result of changes to the design of the
turbine. The P-7 permissive function is based on a relationship
between first stage turbine inlet pressure and rated thermal power
(RTP). Although the pressure sensed at the new location will be
slightly higher, the instrument and controls logic, and all design
basis functions that rely on the P-7 function, will remain the same.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident than any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
As previously stated, the proposed change is editorial in nature
and maintains the design basis functions associated with the P-7
permissive interlock. This is accomplished because the turbine
pressure input to the P-7 function will continue to exhibit a
consistent and accurate relationship to RTP following plant
modifications. Therefore, because there will be no changes to the
input assumptions associated with Salem's accident analysis, the
proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the
margin of safety.
Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine
that the amendment request involves no significant hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jeffrie J. Keenan, Esquire, Nuclear Business
Unit--N21, P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
NRC Section Chief: James W. Clifford.
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear
Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey
Date of amendment request: April 11, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The amendment would modify
Surveillance Requirements and Bases regarding response time testing of
the Engineered Safeguards System Actuation System (ESFAS) and the
Reactor Trip System (RTS).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), section 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is
presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This change to the Technical Specifications does not result in a
condition where the design, material, and construction
[[Page 34673]]
standards that were applicable prior to the change are altered. The
same RTS and ESFAS instrumentation is being used; the time response
allocations/modeling assumptions in the Chapter 15 analyses are
still the same; only the method of verifying time response is
changed. The proposed change will not modify any system interface
and could not increase the likelihood of an accident since these
events are independent of this change. The proposed activity will
not change, degrade or prevent actions or alter any assumptions
previously made in evaluating the radiological consequences of an
accident described in the SAR [safety analysis report]. Therefore,
the proposed amendment does not result in any increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change to remove the footnote from Unit 1
Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.3 is an administrative change and
does not result in any increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This change does not alter the performance of the pressure and
differential pressure transmitters and switches used in the plant
protection systems. All sensors will still have response time
verified by test before placing the sensor in operational service
and after any maintenance that could affect response time. Changing
the method of periodically verifying instrument response for certain
sensors (assuring equipment operability) from time response testing
to calibration and channel checks will not create any new accident
initiators or scenarios. Periodic surveillance of these instruments
will detect significant degradation in the sensor response
characteristic. Implementation of the proposed amendment does not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change to remove the footnote from Unit 1
Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.3 is an administrative change and
does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
This change does not affect the total system response time
assumed in the safety analysis. The periodic system response time
verification method for selected pressure and differential pressure
sensors is modified to allow use of actual test data or engineering
data. The method of verification still provides assurance that the
total system response is within that defined in the safety analysis,
since calibration tests will detect any degradation which might
significantly affect sensor response time. Based on the above, it is
concluded that the proposed license amendment does not result in a
reduction in margin with respect to plant safety.
The proposed change to remove the footnote from Unit 1
Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.3 is an administrative change and
does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jeffrie J. Keenan, Esquire, Nuclear Business
Unit--N21, P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
NRC Section Chief: James W. Clifford.
STP Nuclear Operating Company, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South
Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas
Date of amendment request: March 31, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The proposed change would replace
``Central Power and Light Company (CPL)'' with ``AEP Texas Central
Company'' throughout the Operating License of each unit.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed administrative license amendment only changes the
name of one of the owners of STP in the Operating Licenses. This is
not an initiator for accidents nor does this action affect the
consequences of an accident. Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed administrative license amendment only changes the
name of one of the owners of STP in the Operating Licenses. This is
not an initiator for accidents. Therefore, the change does not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is associated with confidence in the ability of
the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel and fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to limit the
level of radiation dose to the public. The proposed administrative
license amendment only changes the name of one of the owners of STP
in the Operating Licenses. The proposed action does not affect
margin of safety at all. Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, STPNOC concludes that the proposed amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration under the standards
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and, accordingly, a finding of ``no
significant hazards consideration'' is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
request for amendments involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: A. H. Gutterman, Esq., Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20004.
NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf Creek
Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas
Date of amendment request: April 30, 2003.
Description of amendment request: The amendment would modify
several surveillance requirements (SRs) in Technical Specifications
(TSs) 3.8.1 and 3.8.4 on alternating current and direct current
sources, respectively, for plant operation. The revised SRs would have
notes deleted or modified to allow the SRs to be performed, or
partially performed, in reactor modes that are currently not allowed by
the TSs. The current SRs are not allowed to be performed in Modes 1 and
2. Several of the current SRs also cannot be performed in Modes 3 and
4.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The design of plant equipment is not being modified by the
proposed changes. In addition, the DGs [diesel generators] and their
associated emergency loads are accident mitigating features. As
such, testing of the DGs themselves is not associated with any
potential accident-initiating mechanism. Therefore, there will be no
significant impact on any accident probabilities by the approval of
the requested changes.
The changes include an increase in the online time that a DG
under test will be paralleled to the grid (for SRs 3.8.1.10 and
[[Page 34674]]
3.8.1.14). As such, the ability of the tested DG to respond to a
design basis accident [(DBA)] could be adversely impacted by the
proposed changes. However, the impacts are not considered
significant based, in part, on the ability of the remaining DG to
mitigate a DBA or provide safe shutdown. With regard to SR 3.8.1.10
and SR 3.8.1.14, experience shows that testing per these SRs
typically does not perturb the electrical distribution system. In
addition, operating experience and qualitative evaluation of the
probability of the DG or bus loads being adversely affected
concurrent with or due to a significant grid disturbance, while the
DG is being tested, support the conclusion that the proposed changes
do not involve any significant increase in the likelihood of a
safety-related bus blackout or damage to plant loads.
The SR changes that are consistent with TSTF [Technical
Specification Task Force]-283 have been approved by the NRC for
submittal by licensees. The on-line tests allowed by the TSTF are
only to be performed for the purpose of establishing OPERABILITY [of
the DG being tested]. Performance of these SRs during restricted
MODES will require an assessment to assure plant safety is
maintained or enhanced.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The capability to synchronize a DG to the offsite source (via
the associated plant bus) and test the DG in such a configuration is
a design feature of the DGs, including the test mode override in
response to a safety injection signal. Paralleling the DG for longer
periods of time during plant operation may slightly increase the
probability of incurring an adverse effect from the offsite source,
but this increase in probability is judged to be still quite small
and such a possibility is not a new or previously unrecognized
consideration.
The proposed changes would not require any new or different
accidents to be postulated since no changes are being made to the
plant that would introduce any new accident causal mechanisms. This
license amendment request does not impact any plant systems that are
potential accident initiators; nor does it have any significantly
adverse impact on any accident mitigating systems.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in
the margin of safety. The margin of safety is related to the
confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform
their design [safety] functions during and following an accident
situation. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor
coolant system, and the containment system. The proposed changes do
not directly affect these barriers, nor do they involve any
significantly adverse impact on the DGs which serve to support these
barriers in the event of an accident concurrent with a loss of
offsite power. The proposed changes to the testing requirements for
the plant DGs do not affect the OPERABILITY requirements for the
DGs, as verification of such OPERABILITY will continue to be
performed as required (except during different allowed MODES [of
operation]). These changes have an insignificant impact on DG
availability, as continued verification of OPERABILITY supports the
capability of the DGs to perform their required [safety] function of
providing emergency power to plant equipment that supports or
constitutes the fission product barriers. Only one DG is to be
tested at a time, so that the remaining DG will be available to
safely shut down the plant if required. Consequently, performance of
the fission product barriers will not be impacted by implementation
of the proposed amendment.
In addition, the proposed changes involve no changes to [safety]
setpoints or limits established or assumed by the accident analyses.
On this and the above basis, no safety margins will be impacted.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.
NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.
Previously Published Notices of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments
to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards
Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The following notices were previously published as separate
individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were
published as individual notices either because time did not allow the
Commission to wait for this biweekly notice or because the action
involved exigent circumstances. They are repeated here because the
biweekly notice lists all amendments issued or proposed to be issued
involving no significant hazards consideration.
For details, see the individual notice in the Federal Register on
the day and page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period
of the original notice.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad
Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County,
Illinois
Date of amendment request: May 1, 2003, as supplemented by letter
dated May 2, 2003.
Brief description of amendment request: The proposed amendments
would modify Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements to
provide an alternative means of testing the Unit 1 main steam
electromatic relief valves, including those that provide the automatic
depressurization and the low set relief functions, and provide an
alternative means for testing the Units 1 and 2 dual function Target
Rock safety/relief valves.
Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: May
13, 2003 (68 FR 25645).
Expiration date of individual notice: May 27, 2003.
Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses
During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice,
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR chapter I, which are set
forth in the license amendment.
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility
Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these
actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in
10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment,
it is so indicated.
For further details with respect to the action see (1) the
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's
related letter, Safety
[[Page 34675]]
Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as indicated. All of these
items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there
are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the
NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-
415-4737 or by e-mail to [email protected].
Detroit Edison Company, Docket No. 50-16, Enrico Fermi Atomic Power
Plant, Unit 1, (Fermi 1) Monroe County, Michigan
Date of amendment request: January 28, 2003 (Reference NRC-03-
0011).
Brief description of amendment: This amendment revises the Fermi 1,
Technical Specifications by removing the requirements for Water
Intrusion alarms, associated surveillances, and liquid waste tank level
check surveillance. The sections containing Reactor Building and Fuel
and Repair Building drains descriptions are removed in their entirety,
clarification is added for evolutions when tritium sampling is not
required. This amendment also removes previously deleted items and re-
numbers/letters remaining sections, and makes several editorial
corrections.
Date of issuance: May 16, 2003.
Effective date: On the date of issuance of this amendment and must
be fully implemented no later than 60-calendar days from the date of
issuance.
Amendment No.: 20.
Facility Operating License No. DPR-9: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications by: (1) Deleting Sections A.1, 2, 4, 8, C.1,
D, E.1, H.3.b, I.5, I.7b, I.9.d, which were previously deleted and the
word ``Deleted'' used as a place marker to alleviate the need to
renumber or re-letter the remaining sections. Also, the remaining
sections were renumbered or re-lettered as appropriate. (2) Deleting
Sections C.2 and E.2 which cover the Reactor Building and Fuel and
Repair Building Drains. These requirements are no longer necessary in
this phase of Fermi 1 decommissioning. (3) In Section F, the following
words were added, ``Monitoring or sampling for tritium will not be
required if the sample results have determined that tritium is not
present during a given evolution.'' This wording was added to clarify
during which evolutions resulting in radioactive gaseous effluents the
effluents would be monitored or sampled and analyzed for tritium. (4)
Sections H.1 and H.2, which covered water intrusion monitoring system
alarms, including surveillances, allowed out-of-service time,
compensatory measures and alarm readouts for alarms associated with
water intrusion, were deleted. (5) In Section H.3 the surveillance
requirement for radiation for the sump pump serving the reactor
building annulus will not be required once the pump is made inactive
and the surveillance requirement for radiation of the steam cleaning
room access plug is deleted. In Section H.4 the requirement for a
monthly level check of the liquid waste tanks was deleted. (6) Table H-
1, which only lists water intrusion alarms, was deleted. (7) Editorial
changes included in this amendment are in Section I.2, the word
``employes'' was changed to ``employees'; in Section I.2.b the word
``He'' was changed to ``The Health Physicist'; in Section I.7 the word
``his'' was removed from the following sentence, ``The Custodian may
temporarily change a procedure by Written Order following his
determination that the change does not constitute a significant
increase in the hazards associated with the operation.'' In Section
I.9.h the word ``usual'' will be changed to ``unusual.''
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 15, 2003 (68 FR
18271). The NRC's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments: None received.
Detroit Edison Company, Docket No. 50-341, Fermi 2, Monroe County,
Michigan
Date of application for amendment: May 23, 2002.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment deletes License
Condition 2.C.(19) of the Operating License which pertains to
historical actions that have been met. The amendment also deletes
Section 2.F of the Operating License which requires reporting
violations of the requirements in Section 2.C of the Operating License.
The reporting requirements in Section 2.F are either adequately
addressed by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73, or are
not needed because more restrictive requirements are contained in the
specific License Condition.
In its May 23, 2003, application, the licensee also proposed to
delete License Conditions 2.C.(20) and 2.C.(21) which pertain to
historical actions that have been met. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission staff's evaluation of the proposed deletion of License
Conditions 2.C.(20) and 2.C.(21) will be addressed under separate
cover.
Date of issuance: May 16, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 60 days.
Amendment No.: 155.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-43: Amendment revises the
Operating License.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: June 25, 2002 (67 FR
42817).
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Power
Station, Unit No. 1, New London County, Connecticut
Date of amendment request: May 13, 2002.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised selected
radiological-related technical specifications of the Millstone Unit 1
Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications. These changes are a
result of the revision to part 20 of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
Date of issuance: May 15, 2003.
Effective date: May 15, 2003, and shall be implemented within 120
days from the date of issuance.
Amendment No.: 112.
Facility Operating License No. DPR-21: The amendment revised the
Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 23, 2002 (67 FR
48215). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 15, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423,
Millstone Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, New London County,
Connecticut
Date of application for amendments: May 13, 2002.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the
Millstone Power Station, Unit No. 2 (MP2) and Unit No. 3 (MP3)
Technical Specifications (TSs) changing selected MP2 and MP3
radiological-related TSs. These changes are due to the revision to part
20 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Date of issuance: May 15, 2003.
[[Page 34676]]
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 120 days from the date of issuance.
Amendment Nos.: 276 and 215.
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49: These amendments
revised the TSs.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 9, 2002 (67 FR
45562). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 15, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Duke Energy Corporation, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Oconee
Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee County, South Carolina
Date of application of amendments: February 17, 2003.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the
Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement 3.10.1.9 to increase
the loading requirements for the Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel
Generator from = 3000 kW to = 3280 kW.
Date of Issuance: May 19, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 90 days from the date of issuance.
Amendment Nos.: 331, 331, and 332.
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55:
Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 1, 2003 (68 FR
15759). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 19, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-333, James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York
Date of application for amendment: February 27, 2003.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment deletes Technical
Specification 5.5.3, ``Post Accident Sampling,'' and thereby eliminates
the requirements to have and maintain the post accident sampling system
for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
Date of issuance: May 16, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within
60 days.
Amendment No.: 278.
Facility Operating License No. DPR-59: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 15, 2003 (68 FR
18276). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-247, Indian Point
Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Westchester County, New York
Date of application for amendment: December 12, 2002, as
supplemented on April 3, 2003 and May 2, 2003.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the Facility
Operating License and the Technical Specifications (TSs) to increase
the licensed core thermal power level to 3114.4 megawatts (MWt), which
is a 1.4% increase above the currently authorized power level of 3071.4
MWt. The power uprate is based on the improvement in the core power
uncertainty allowance originally required for the emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) evaluations performed in accordance with Appendix
K, ``ECCS Evaluation Models,'' to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations. Specifically, the reduced uncertainty is obtained
by using a more accurate measurement of feedwater flow. In addition,
changes were made to TS Sections 1.1, 2.1, 2.3, 3.1, 3.4, 6.9, and the
applicable TS Bases to account for the change in power level.
Date of issuance: May 22, 2003.
Effective date: May 22, 2003.
Amendment No.: 237.
Facility Operating License No. DPR-26: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications and License.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: January 7, 2003 (68 FR
00801). The April 3 and May 3, 2003, letters provided clarifying
information that did not enlarge the scope of the original Federal
Register notice or change the initial proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the
amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 22, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of application for amendment: November 22, 2002, as
supplemented by letter dated March 13, 2003.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment allows for a one-time
change to revise the steam generator in-service inspection frequency
requirements in Technical Specification 4.4.5.3.a to allow a 40-month
inspection interval after one inspection, rather than after two
consecutive inspections, based on the results falling into the C-1
classification.
Date of issuance: May 28, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within
60 days from the date of issuance.
Amendment No.: 247.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-6: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 24, 2002 (67
FR 78520). The March 13, 2003, supplemental letter provided clarifying
information that did not change the scope of the original Federal
Register notice or the original no significant hazards consideration
determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 28, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455,
Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Ogle County, Illinois; Docket Nos.
STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, Braidwood Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Will
County, Illinois
Date of application for amendments: December 12, 2002.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments would add a new
Surveillance Requirement to Technical Specification Section 3.7.5,
``Auxillary Feedwater (AF) System,'' which requires operation of the
diesel-driven AF pump on a monthly frequency (i.e., once every 31 days)
for greater than or equal to 15 minutes.
Date of issuance: May 22, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 30 days.
Amendment Nos.: 132/127.
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72 and NPF-77:
The amendments revised the Technical Specifications 3.7.5.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 18, 2003 (68
FR 7817). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 28, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
[[Page 34677]]
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
277 and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, York
County, Pennsylvania
Date of application for amendments: November 27, 2002.
Brief description of amendments: These amendments deleted TS 5.5.3,
``Post Accident Sampling,'' and thereby eliminated the requirements to
have and maintain the post accident sampling system for Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3.
Date of issuance: May 22, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance, to be implemented
within 180 days.
Amendments Nos.: 248 and 251.
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56: The
amendments revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: January 21, 2003 (68 FR
2802). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 22, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald
C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan
Date of application for amendments: August 30, 2002 as supplemented
by letters dated February 27, April 7, April 29, and May 2, 2003.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the reactor
trip system and engineered safety features actuation system
surveillance requirements, increasing selected surveillance intervals
for analog channels, logic cabinets, and reactor trip breakers.
Additionally, the amendments revise the reactor trip system and
engineered safety features actuation system surveillance requirements,
increasing the completion time and bypass time for the reactor trip
breakers.
Date of issuance: May 23, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 30 days.
Amendment Nos.: 277 and 260.
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74: Amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 15, 2002 (67 FR
63695). The supplemental letters contained clarifying information and
did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration
determination and did not expand the scope of the original Federal
Register notice. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments
is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 23, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy
Center, Linn County, Iowa
Date of application for amendment: March 11, 2003.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment changes the operating
license by adding a paragraph authorizing the licensee to revise the
updated final safety analysis report by deleting the notation that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not endorse the reactor building
crane as single-failure-proof.
Date of issuance: May 16, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
no later than the update of the final safety analysis report to be
submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).
Amendment No.: 251.
Facility Operating License No. DPR-49: The amendment revised the
Facility Operating License.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 15, 2003 (68 FR
18278). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328, Sequoyah
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee
Date of application for amendments: July 10, 2002, as supplemented
May 9, 2003.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments change the Sequoyah
Nuclear Plant (SQN) Technical Specifications (TSs) by modifying the
requirements applicable when actions or other requirements direct
suspension of activities that involve a positive reactivity change for
the SQN TSs. The proposed change will remove the requirement to not
make positive reactivity changes during certain conditions. The changes
will permit limited positive reactivity changes that are necessitated
by plant operations. These changes will limit the amount of reactivity
changes to those that will continue to assure appropriate reactivity
limits are met, either shutdown margin or refueling boron
concentration, as appropriate.
Date of issuance: May 22, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 45 days of issuance.
Amendment Nos.: 285 and 274.
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79: Amendments
revise the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 6, 2002 (67 FR
50961). The supplemental letters provided clarifying information that
was within the scope of the initial notice and did not change the
initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated May 22, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50-327, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,
Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee
Date of application for amendment: November 15, 2002, as
supplemented February 28, 2003, March 14, 2003, and April 25, 2003.
Brief description of amendment: The Amendments revise the Technical
Specification (TS) 3.7.1.3, ``Condensate Storage Water,'' Limiting
Condition for Operation by increasing the required minimum amount of
stored water from 190,000 gallons to 240,000 gallons. This change is
being made to support the replacement steam generator requirements.
Date of issuance: May 27, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 45 days of issuance.
Amendment Nos.: 286 and 275.
Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and DPR-79: Amendments revise
the TSs.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 4, 2003 (68 FR
5682). The supplemental letters provided clarifying information that
was within the scope of the initial notice and did not change the
initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated May 27, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
STP Nuclear Operating Company, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South
Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas
Date of amendments request: August 19, 2002.
Brief description of amendments: The amendment revised Technical
Specification Section 3/4.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Features Actuation
System Instrumentation,'' to extend the interval between slave relay
tests.
[[Page 34678]]
Date of issuance: May 19, 2003.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 30 days from the date of issuance.
Amendment Nos.: Unit 1-152 ; Unit 2-140.
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80: The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 1, 2002 (67 FR
61685). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 19, 2003.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of June, 2003.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John A. Zwolinski,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 03-14277 Filed 6-9-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P