[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 80 (Friday, April 25, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20380-20383]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-10212]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary


Record of Decision To Establish a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 
Initial Defensive Operations Capability at Fort Greely, AK

AGENCY: Missile Defense Agency, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is issuing this Record of 
Decision (ROD) to establish an Initial Defensive Operations (IDO) 
capability at Fort Greely, Alaska. The Fort Greely IDO is a capability 
of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element within the broader 
conceptual Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The Fort Greely IDO 
components will consist of up to 40 silos, equipped with Ground-Based 
Interceptor (GBI) missiles, In-Flight Interceptor Communications System 
(IFICS) Data Terminals (IDT), and support facilities and 
infrastructure. These IDO components and their support facilities at 
Fort Greely are a subset of the preferred alternative for a GBI site in 
the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) (July 2000), which evaluated the environmental effects 
of deploying up to 100 GBI missiles with related facilities and 
infrastructure at alternative sites in Alaska (AK) and North Dakota 
(ND).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the NMD 
Deployment EIS or this ROD contact: Ms. Julia Elliot, U.S. Army Space 
and Missile Defense Command, Attn: SMDC-EN-V, P.O. Box 1500, 
Huntsville, Alabama 35807-3801, (256) 955-4822. Public reading copies 
of the Final EIS and the ROD are available for review at the public 
libraries within the communities near proposed activities and at the 
MDA Internet site: http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/nmd.html.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The MDA is issuing this ROD to establish an IDO capability at Fort 
Greely, AK. The Fort Greely IDO is a capability of the GMD element 
within the broader conceptual BMDS. The Fort Greely IDO components will 
consist of up to 40 silos, equipped with GBI missiles, IDTs, and 
support facilities and infrastructure at the existing Validation of 
Operational Concept (VOC) Test Site. These IDO components and their 
support facilities at Fort Greely are a subset of the preferred 
alternative for a GBI site in the NMD Deployment EIS (July 2000), which 
evaluated the environmental effects of deploying up to 100 GBI missiles 
with related facilities and infrastructure at alternative sites in AK 
and ND. Specific sites for the IDTs, as well as additional support 
infrastructure and security measures and Command and Control, Battle 
Management, and Communications facilities at Fort Greely, were further 
evaluated in the VOC Environmental Assessment (EA) (March 2002) and VOC 
Supplemental EA (January 2003).
    The Fort Greely IDO components, when combined with existing GMD 
test assets, early warning radars, satellites, communications networks, 
and command and control facilities, will provide a capability to 
protect the United States from a limited ballistic missile attack. 
Additional GMD flight test assets, including a Sea-Based Test X-Band 
Radar (SBX) to be located in the Pacific region, are being evaluated in 
the GMD Extended Test Range (ETR) EIS. These assets, if selected and 
integrated into the test architecture, would complement the Fort Greely 
components and enhance the IDO capability.
    As a separate action to be supported by independent National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis, existing silos and other 
facilities and infrastructure at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) may 
be modified to accommodate GBIs. These proposed components, when 
combined with the existing GMD ETR test assets, would provide an IDO 
capability at VAFB that could be used independently of the Fort Greely 
IDO components and would provide additional protection for the United 
States (U.S.).
    This decision is based on the President's determination that there 
is a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. The Secretary of Defense and 
MDA's Director have further determined that establishment of the IDO 
capability at Fort Greely, supported by existing test assets, is the 
best way to counter that threat initially. Other factors considered in 
reaching this decision to establish IDO components at Fort Greely, AK, 
include cost, technical maturity of the GMD element, and strategic arms 
reduction objectives.
    This ROD has been prepared pursuant to the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing the NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-
1508), DoD Instruction 4715.9, and the applicable service environmental 
regulations that implement these laws and regulations. The U.S. Air 
Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
participated as cooperating agencies in preparing the NMD Deployment 
EIS. The Proposed Action described in the EIS was to deploy a NMD 
System at several locations consisting of GBIs, Battle Management 
Command and Control (BMC2), an X-Band Radar (XBR), IDTs, satellite 
detection system, Early Warning Radar (EWRs), and fiber optic cable 
(FOC).
    Since the NMD Deployment EIS was completed, several events related 
to this ROD have occurred. In September 2000, President Clinton 
determined that the deployment decision should be deferred and more 
robust testing be conducted to gain greater confidence in the missile 
defense technologies under development.
    On January 2, 2002, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization was 
administratively re-aligned as MDA, with the objective of developing an 
integrated BMDS. The NMD system was renamed the GMD element, with the 
focus on more realistic testing. Two types of testing, ground testing 
of operational components and flight-testing of the GBI, were planned 
as independent parts of a GMD test bed.
    To evaluate construction and ground testing of potential 
operational components in a realistic environment, as well as specific 
siting for IDTs and FOC, and communication lines not

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evaluated in the NMD Deployment EIS, the MDA prepared the VOC EA. Based 
on its Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) from the analysis in 
the VOC EA, the MDA decided to construct the VOC GBI test site at Fort 
Greely. MDA subsequently prepared the Supplemental VOC EA and resulting 
FONSI to evaluate security and other upgrades at the designated VOC GBI 
test site at Fort Greely. Concurrently, MDA began preparation of the 
ETR EIS to examine the effects of more realistic GBI flight-testing in 
the Pacific region.
    On December 17, 2002, following a number of flight test successes, 
President Bush announced plans to build and field an IDO capability, 
building on the capabilities of existing and planned test components. 
This ROD implements that decision, with the main focus of this initial 
capability at the Fort Greely GBI VOC test site. An additional IDO 
capability at VAFB has been proposed, which could be used independently 
of the Fort Greely components. It would provide more protection for the 
U.S. as the BMDS develops and matures. Development of an IDO capability 
at VAFB was not part of the NMD Deployment EIS and would require 
additional NEPA analysis. That capability is not included in this ROD.
    The NMD Deployment EIS preferred alternative examined the effects 
of deploying up to 100 GBI missiles and related facilities and 
infrastructure at Fort Greely. This ROD implements a limited subset of 
that alternative. Under this ROD, the Fort Greely portion of the GMD 
IDO capability selectively integrates existing and planned assets into 
a system that would provide a limited, operational missile defense 
capability as a first step to a more robust, future GMD deployment 
described and analyzed in the NMD Deployment EIS. As such, this ROD 
implements actions that are within the scope of the activities analyzed 
in the NMD Deployment EIS. The following existing and planned BMDS 
assets would be fielded and/or integrated to make up the Fort Greely 
GMD IDO capability:
    [sbull] Six silos and GBI missiles, BMC2, Defense Satellite 
Communication System (DSCS), one IDT, support facilities and 
infrastructure, and FOC at Fort Greely, AK, which are part of the GMD 
VOC test bed currently under construction.
    [sbull] Up to forty missile silos, equipped with GBI missiles, one 
additional IDT, supporting facilities (including backup power plant), 
infrastructure, and FOC communication links at Fort Greely, AK. MDA 
currently plans only a maximum of 20 GBI missiles at Fort Greely, but 
this ROD documents a total of 40 silos equipped with GBI missiles in 
order to provide maximum flexibility for maintenance and future 
operational needs.
    [sbull] Upgrades to the EWRs at Beale AFB, CA and the Cobra Dane 
radar at Eareckson Air Station (AS) Shemya AK, and an IDT, DSCS, BMC2 
and FOC at Eareckson AS, that are part of the GMD VOC test bed 
currently under construction.
    [sbull] Existing GMD BMC2 nodes throughout the U.S., which are a 
part of the GMD VOC test bed. These nodes include Cheyenne Mountain 
Complex, CO; Shriever AFB, CO; and Peterson AFB, CO.

NEPA Process

    The Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare an EIS for the deployment of 
the NMD system was published in the Federal Register on November 17, 
1998, initiating the public scoping process. Public scoping meetings 
were held in December 1998 in communities perceived to be affected by 
the NMD system. The Notice of Availability (NOA) of the NMD Deployment 
Draft EIS was published in the Federal Register on October 1, 1999. 
This initiated a public review and comment period for the Draft EIS. 
Seven public hearings were held from October 26 through November 9, 
1999 in the same locations as the public scoping meetings. 
Subsequently, a supplement to the Draft EIS was prepared to evaluate 
the potential impacts of upgrading existing EWRs for use by the NMD 
system. A public hearing was held in Bourne, MA, for the Supplement. 
Comments on the Draft EIS and the Supplement to the Draft EIS were 
considered in the preparation of the Final EIS. The NOA for the Final 
EIS was published in the Federal Register on 21 July 2000, initiating 
an additional 30-day comment period. Comments were considered in the 
decision process, culminating in this ROD.

Alternatives Considered

No-Action Alternative

    As required by the CEQ regulations, the NMD Deployment EIS 
evaluated a No-action Alternative. Under this alternative, the GMD 
deployment decision would be deferred, while development and testing of 
GMD technologies and architectures would continue. Since they are a 
subset of the proposed action, the activities that are described in 
this ROD would not be implemented under the No-action Alternative. Non-
GMD activities currently occurring or planned at potential fielding 
sites would continue.

Proposed Action

    The proposed action analyzed in the NMD Deployment EIS was to field 
a fixed, land-based, non-nuclear missile defense system with a land and 
space-based detection system capable of responding to limited strategic 
ballistic missile threats to the U.S. The NMD system analyzed in the 
Deployment EIS consisted of GBIs, BMC2, XBR, IDTs, satellite detection 
system, EWRs, and FOC. The initial space-based detection capability 
would be the existing Defense Support Program early-warning satellites 
to be replaced by Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites 
currently being developed by the U.S. Air Force. Since the NMD 
Deployment EIS was completed, the NMD system architecture has evolved 
into the BMDS multi-layered approach that does not distinguish between 
national and theater threats. The BMDS consists of the same components, 
at the same preferred locations, as the NMD system analyzed in the NMD 
Deployment EIS. As noted, this ROD implements a subset of the 
activities in the proposed action described above.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    The NMD Deployment EIS analyzed the environment in terms of 15 
resource areas including: air quality, airspace, biological resources, 
cultural resources, geology and soils, hazardous materials and wastes, 
health and safety, land use and aesthetics, noise, socioeconomics, 
transportation, utilities, water resources, environmental justice, and 
subsistence. Each resource area with a foreseeable impact at the 
respective alternative sites was addressed in the EIS. The analysis in 
the EIS was commensurate with the importance of the potential impacts. 
Where it was determined through initial evaluation that no impacts 
would occur to resources at certain sites, these resources were not 
analyzed in the EIS. The potential for cumulative impacts was also 
evaluated in the EIS.

No-Action Alternative--Environmental Impacts

    Under the No-action Alternative described in the EIS, only the 
locations and environmental resources discussed below were anticipated 
to have environmental impacts from continued ongoing operations.
    Eielson AFB. There would be potential impacts in the areas of land 
use and noise from continued U.S. Air Force operations. The presence of 
residential units in the community of Moose Creek within the Clear and

[[Page 20382]]

Approach Zones at the end of the runway is considered an incompatible 
land use. Low density housing in the community of Moose Creek is 
subjected to noise levels that exceed the recommended day-night level 
of 65 decibels. The local government, Eielson AFB, and the community of 
Moose Creek are working to minimize future noise impacts.
    Fort Greely. There would be impacts to geology and soils, 
socioeconomics, and water resources from continued activities at Fort 
Greely. These impacts could include some soil damage from vehicles, 
weapons, and fires. Some soil erosion with net soil loss and water 
quality impacts would occur near training activities. Localized long-
term damage to permafrost could occur as a result of ground training 
and fire damage from training. The Army has developed mitigation 
measures to minimize these impacts. Training maneuvers, if conducted 
repeatedly in the same area, could result in cumulative impacts to 
water resources. The Army has implemented measures to minimize impacts 
to water resources.
    Yukon Training Area. Impacts to geology and soils and water 
resources would be similar to those described for Fort Greely.

Preferred Alternative--Environmental Impacts

    The Preferred Alternative identified in the NMD Deployment EIS was 
to deploy up to 100 GBI missiles in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, to 
include supporting infrastructure and components with an XBR at 
Eareckson AS, Shemya, Alaska, and to upgrade existing EWRs. No 
locations for IDTs were identified in the EIS, but several IDT sites 
were subsequently evaluated in the GMD VOC EA. Environmental impacts 
expected to result from a deployment decision are summarized below. 
Building and fielding of an IDO capability at Fort Greely, as a subset 
of activities evaluated in the EIS, would have the same as or 
incrementally fewer impacts than those described in the EIS.
    Fort Greely, Alaska. This was the preferred GBI siting alternative 
in the Final EIS and is the selected site for up to 40 GBI silos, BMC2, 
1 additional IDT, supporting facilities (including backup power) and 
infrastructure, and FOC. The EIS concluded that deployment of the GBI 
at Fort Greely could result in impacts to health, safety, and 
socioeconomics. In the unlikely event of a liquid propellant leak from 
the GBI system, hazardous propellant gases could extend beyond the base 
boundary. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
Permissible Exposure Limit for nitrogen tetroxide could be exceeded up 
to 760 meters (2,493 feet) from the source of the leak, affecting less 
than 14 hectares (35 acres) of undeveloped land outside the base 
boundary and would not affect the Fort Greely Cantonment area. Exposure 
at these levels in the open-air conditions would be mildly irritating 
to the eyes and nose and could induce coughing. Given the small 
quantities of liquid propellant, multiple safety systems in system 
design, and the presence of an emergency response team, the overall 
risk to public health and safety would be low. Mutual aid agreements 
with local fire departments would need to be updated to inform them of 
the additional hazards and safety considerations of GBI deployment. To 
reduce the potential for forest fires affecting the GBI element site, 
the fire protection status for the proposed area would need to be 
changed from Full Protection to Critical Protection. Critical 
Protection status would give the highest level of fire fighting 
provided by the Bureau of Land Management Alaska Fire Service. The U.S. 
Army would need to coordinate this revision with the Alaska Fire 
Service. It is anticipated that construction and operation of the GBI 
element at Fort Greely would provide an economic benefit to the 
surrounding regions, partially offsetting the loss of jobs at the base 
as a result of previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) cutbacks.
Upgraded Early Warning Radars
    Under the Preferred Alternative in the EIS, the EWRs at Beale AFB, 
CA; Clear AFS, AK; and Cape Cod AFS, MA would be upgraded. The VOC EA 
analyzed upgrades to the Beale EWR, with similar upgrades to the Cobra 
Dane radar at Eareckson AS. The upgrades would involve replacement of 
electronic hardware and computer software. The radiated peak and 
average power, radar antenna patterns, and operating bands of the 
radars would remain unchanged from current operations. Consequently, 
the public exposure to radio frequency radiation from the UEWRs over a 
30-minute averaging period would be similar to that from the existing 
early warning radars and would be well within the most applicable 
criteria, the American National Standards Institute/Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers standard. The U.S. Air Force is in 
the process of preparing a supplement to their Atmospheric Interceptor 
Technology Program Environmental Assessment, 1979 to address 
maintenance and sustainment of operations for the early warning radars.

Alternatives Not Selected--Environmental Impacts

    Several alternative locations for deployment of GBIs in the NMD 
Deployment EIS are not selected at this time. In addition, this ROD 
does not include a decision concerning construction or operation of an 
XBR. Potential environmental impacts at those sites not selected for 
IDO fielding of GBIs are summarized below. As with the preferred 
alternative, fielding of an IDO capability at any of these sites would 
have similar or incrementally fewer impacts than those described in the 
EIS.
GBI and BMC2 Locations
    Clear AFS, Alaska. Deployment of the GBI at this location could 
result in impacts to biological resources, geology and soils, health 
and safety, and socioeconomics. Construction activities could cause 
impacts to approximately 2.7 hectares (6.6 acres) of wetlands under the 
GBI Alternative Site A or 55 hectares (135 acres) under the GBI 
Alternative Site B. The wetland permitting process would be coordinated 
with appropriate Federal and state agencies and would entail review of 
proposed activities and development of mitigation measures. There would 
be the potential to impact permafrost during construction on Clear AFS. 
Prior to final design and construction, a comprehensive geotechnical 
investigation would be conducted to determine the exact nature of the 
soils and ground-water levels in the area. The site layout would be 
adjusted to minimize any impacts in the unlikely event that unstable 
permafrost were encountered. Depending on the ground-water levels, 
missile silos might be slightly elevated to avoid water incursion 
during construction and operations. The potential health hazard from 
liquid propellant leaks at the GBI Alternative Site B would be similar 
to that at Fort Greely. However, OSHA exposure limits for nitrogen 
tetroxide could affect up to 122 hectares (302 acres) of undeveloped 
land outside of the base boundary and the on-base administrative and 
housing areas. It is anticipated that construction and operation of the 
GBI element at Clear AFS would provide an economic benefit to the 
surrounding regions.
    Yukon Training Area (Fort Wainwright)/Eielson AFB, Alaska. 
Deployment of the GBI at this location could result in impacts to 
biological resources, cultural resources, geology and soils, and 
socioeconomics. Construction activities could impact approximately 46 
hectares (113 acres) of

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wetlands. Potential impacts to these wetlands and mitigation measures 
would be similar to those described for Clear AFS. An archaeological 
site (Site FAI 157) is located approximately 262 meters (860 feet) west 
of the GBI site. If avoidance of this site were not feasible, adverse 
affects could be mitigated through data recovery. Building 3425 at 
Eielson AFB (a Cold War era warehouse) may be eligible for listing in 
the National Register of Historic Places and could be affected by 
modifications from the GBI deployment. Appropriate mitigation measures 
would be developed in consultation with the Alaska State Historic 
Preservation Officer (SHPO). Best Management Practices would be used to 
reduce the potential for soil erosion at the GBI site. Geotechnical 
investigations at the proposed site indicate the presence of permafrost 
on north facing slopes. Permafrost areas would be avoided if possible. 
It is anticipated that construction and operation of the GBI element at 
this location would provide an economic benefit to the surrounding 
regions.
    Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. Deployment of the GBI at this 
location could result in impacts to biological resources, geology and 
soils, health and safety, and socioeconomics. Construction activities 
could affect approximately 5 hectares (12 acres) of wetlands at the 
Ordnance Training-5 (OT-5) area site. The wetland permitting process 
would be coordinated with appropriate Federal and state agencies and 
would entail review of proposed activities and development of 
mitigation measures. Best Management Practices would be implemented to 
minimize wind erosion of soils during construction. The potential for 
health hazards from liquid propellant leaks and reporting requirements 
would be similar to that at Fort Greely. OSHA exposure limits for 
nitrogen tetroxide could be exceeded on up to 306 hectares (757 acres) 
outside of the base, including two residential units, three commercial 
units, and two churches, and on the alert apron and portions of the 
administration area on base. Given the small quantities of liquid 
propellant, multiple safety systems in system design, and the presence 
of an emergency response team, the overall risk to public health and 
safety would be low. Mutual aid agreements with local fire departments 
would need to be updated to inform them of the additional hazards and 
safety considerations of GBI deployment. It is anticipated that 
construction and operation of the GBI element at this location would 
provide an economic benefit to the surrounding regions.

Mitigation Measures and Monitoring

    The applicable mitigation measures specified for each of the sites 
selected to build and field an IDO capability at Fort Greely will be 
implemented as part of the GMD IDO action. A Mitigation Monitoring Plan 
has been developed to assist in tracking and implementing these 
mitigation measures. With the implementation of the mitigation 
measures, all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm 
from fielding of the GMD IDO at Fort Greely, AK considered in this ROD 
have been adopted.

Environmentally Preferred Alternative

    The environmentally preferred alternative in the EIS is the No-
action Alternative (not proceeding with GMD deployment) since there 
would be no construction and operation of GMD elements at any of the 
potential deployment sites. With the action in this ROD to field an IDO 
capability at Fort Greely, the No-action Alternative remains the 
environmentally preferred alternative. Continuation of current site 
operations at these locations would result in few additional 
environmental impacts.
    Under the Proposed Action in the EIS, Fort Greely, AK is the 
environmentally preferred location for deployment of GBIs, with 
supporting facilities (including a backup power plant) and 
infrastructure, IDTs, and FOC. No sensitive habitats or wetlands would 
be affected; construction of the silos would not impact groundwater or 
permafrost; and Fort Greely is remote from any major population 
centers. Fort Greely remains the environmentally preferred alternative 
to field an IDO capability with up to 40 GBIs.

Conclusion

    In accordance with NEPA, MDA has considered the information 
contained within the NMD Deployment EIS in deciding to field the GMD 
IDO capability as described above. The decision is to build and field 
up to 40 GBI silos, BMC2, 1 additional IDT, supporting facilities 
(including backup power plant), infrastructure, and FOC at Fort Greely, 
AK.

    Dated: April 21, 2003.
L.M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 03-10212 Filed 4-24-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-08-P