[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 71 (Monday, April 14, 2003)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 17886-17890]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-9009]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

10 CFR Part 709

[Docket No. CN-03-RM-01]
RIN 1992-AA33


Office of Counterintelligence; Polygraph Examination Regulations

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity for public 
comment.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE or Department) publishes a 
notice of proposed rulemaking to begin a proceeding to consider whether 
to retain or modify its current Polygraph Examination Regulations. DOE 
is undertaking this action, among other reasons, to satisfy the 
directive of section 3152 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2002 that following issuance of the National Academy of 
Sciences' Polygraph Review (NAS Polygraph Review), DOE is to prescribe 
regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program, whose 
Congressionally-specified purpose is ``* * * to minimize the potential 
for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or 
information.''

DATES: Written comments (10 copies) are due June 13, 2003.

ADDRESSES: You may choose to address written comments to U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Counterintelligence (CN-1), Docket No. 
CN-03-RM-01, 1000 Independence Avenue. SW., Washington, DC 20585. 
Alternatively, you may e-mail your comments to: [email protected]. You 
may review or copy the public comments DOE has received in Docket No. 
CN-03-RM-01 and any other docket material DOE makes available at the 
DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room, Room 1E-190, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585. This notice of proposed rulemaking 
and supporting documentation is available on DOE's internet home page 
at the following address: http://www.energy.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Hinckley, U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Counterintelligence, CN-1, 1000 Independence Avenue, 
SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5901; or Lise Howe, U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of General Counsel, GC-

[[Page 17887]]

73, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-
2906.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction

    Under section 3152(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2002 (NDAA for FY 2002), DOE is obligated to prescribe 
regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program the stated 
purpose of which is ``* * * to minimize the potential for release or 
disclosure of classified data, materials, or information'' (42 U.S.C. 
7383h-1(a).) Section 3152(b) requires DOE to ``* * * take into account 
the results of the Polygraph Review,'' which is defined by section 
3152(e) to mean ``* * * the review of the Committee to Review the 
Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph of the National Academy of 
Sciences'' (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(b), (e)).
    Upon promulgation of final regulations under section 3152, and 
``effective 30 days after the Secretary submits to the congressional 
defense committees the Secretary's certification that the final rule * 
* * has been fully implemented, * * *'' section 3154 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (NDAA for FY 2000) (42 
U.S.C. 7383h), would be repealed by operation of law. (42 U.S.C. 7383h-
1(c).) The repeal of section 3154 would eliminate the existing 
authority which underlies DOE's counterintelligence polygraph 
regulations, which are codified at 10 CFR part 709, but would not 
preclude the retention of some or all of those regulations through this 
rulemaking pursuant to the later-enacted section 3152 of the NDAA for 
FY 2002.
    In Part II of this Supplementary Information, DOE reviews 
background information useful in understanding the existing statutory 
and regulatory provisions applicable to DOE's current 
counterintelligence polygraph examination program. In Part III of this 
Supplementary Information, DOE discusses its preliminary views with 
regard to the relevant factual and policy issues, including DOE's 
evaluation of the NAS Polygraph Review which is entitled ``The 
Polygraph and Lie Detection.'' That discussion explains why the 
Secretary of Energy has approved today's preliminary proposal to retain 
the regulations in 10 CFR part 709 as a balanced approach for the 
carefully circumscribed use of polygraph examinations as a tool that 
appears in current circumstances well-suited to accomplish the 
Congressionally-specified purpose ``* * * to minimize the potential for 
release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or information'' 
(42 U.S.C. 7383h-1).
    DOE invites interested members of the public to provide their views 
on the issues in this rulemaking by filing written comments. With an 
open mind, DOE intends carefully to evaluate the public comments 
received in response to this notice of proposed rulemaking. DOE will 
then consider whether to issue a supplemental notice of proposed 
rulemaking with additional policy options for public comment and 
whether it is necessary and timely to hold a public hearing to provide 
an opportunity for presentation of oral comments.

II. Background

    Consistent with section 3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000, DOE published 
a notice of final rulemaking establishing 10 CFR part 709 on December 
17, 1999 (64 FR 70975). The provisions of 10 CFR part 709 list the 
types of employees and positions that are subject to polygraph 
examinations. Under 10 CFR 709.4, the polygraph program applies to all 
DOE employees and contractor employees, applicants for employment, and 
other individuals assigned or detailed to positions in eight categories 
which are discussed in detail in part III of this Supplementary 
Information. Employees may request exculpatory polygraph examinations 
to deal with unresolved counterintelligence or personnel security 
issues. Part 709 also describes the polygraph examination protocols DOE 
uses, the policies for safeguarding the privacy rights of employees, 
and the requirements that apply to ensure well qualified and well 
trained polygraph examiners.
    After DOE promulgated 10 CFR part 709, Congress amended section 
3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000 by section 3135 in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. 106-398). Section 3135 
amended the earlier definition of ``covered persons'' contained in 
section 3154 to include assignees, detailees and applicants. The 
definition of ``high risk program'' was revised to include programs 
using information known as Sensitive Compartmented Information, SAP, 
PSAP, PAP, and any other program or position category specified in 
section 709.4(a) of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 3135 
amended section 3154(f) to add the terms ``terrorism'' after 
``sabotage'' and ``deliberate damage to or malicious misuse of a United 
States Government information or defense system'' to the statutory 
definition of the scope of a counterintelligence polygraph examination. 
Section 3135 also amended section 3154 by adding language that limited 
the Secretary's authority to waive the examination requirement.

III. DOE's Proposal To Implement Section 3152(a) of the NDAA for FY 
2002

    The focal point for analysis of the factual information and policy 
considerations relevant to this rulemaking is the Congressionally 
stated purpose of the counterintelligence polygraph regulations which 
is ``* * * to minimize the potential for release or disclosure of 
classified data, material, or information'' (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(a)). 
Given the nature of this directive--as a statement of the purpose of 
the program, not as a standard that the program must meet--DOE does not 
construe this directive as a mandate mechanistically to construct a 
program that takes all steps to protect classified data, materials, or 
information, no matter what the countervailing considerations. 
Construing the directive in that fashion could lead to absurd results, 
potentially requiring DOE to expend so much of its resources on 
polygraphs and associated provisions that the program would 
significantly detract from DOE's ability to accomplish its national 
security mission. At the same time, however, DOE does believe that the 
directive signals a Congressional hierarchy in the weighing of various 
considerations, pursuant to which DOE must take potential jeopardy of 
classified data, materials, or information very seriously in 
considering the potential consequences that may flow from how it 
constructs its program. DOE has evaluated the question whether to 
retain or modify the list of positions currently set forth in its 
regulations as subject to polygraph examinations over a five-year 
period against this Congressionally-stated purpose so construed.
    As noted above, that list is set forth at 10 CFR 709.4. It 
includes: ``(1) Positions that DOE has determined include 
counterintelligence activities or access to counterintelligence sources 
and methods; (2) positions that DOE has determined include intelligence 
activities or access to intelligence sources and methods; (3) positions 
requiring access to information that is protected within a non-
intelligence special access program (SAP) designated by the Secretary 
of Energy; (4) positions that are subject to the Personnel Security 
Assurance Program (PSAP); (5) positions that are subject to the 
Personnel Assurance program (PAP); (6) positions that DOE has 
determined have a need-to-know or access to information specifically 
designated by the Secretary

[[Page 17888]]

regarding the design and operation of nuclear weapons and associated 
use control features; (7) positions within the Office of Independent 
Oversight and Performance Assurance, or any successor thereto, involved 
in inspection and assessment of safeguards and security functions, 
including cyber security, of the Department; (8) positions within the 
Office of Security and Emergency Operations, or any successor thereto * 
* *'' This list reflects, but is not restricted to, the positions 
listed in section 3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000. Consistent with section 
3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002, DOE proposes to retain these eight 
position categories because in each category there are individuals who 
possess or have routine access to classified data, material, or 
information that would likely be targeted for acquisition by foreign 
powers. DOE has not reached a firm conclusion that all the position 
categories on the list should be retained, or that all should be 
retained in their current form, but it believes that a sufficient basis 
for their retention exists that it is not prepared to propose the 
modification or removal of any at this time. DOE accordingly 
particularly invites comment on the question whether the list, or any 
of the position categories on the list, is overinclusive or 
underinclusive, and if so, how and on what basis the list, or any of 
the position categories on the list, should be modified.
    The list of position categories in 10 CFR 709.4(a) also includes 
two categories of individuals who volunteer for polygraph examinations. 
There is a category of applicants for employment who opt for the 
Accelerated Access Authorization Program (AAAP) (10 CFR 709.4(a)(9)). 
These applicants choose to be polygraphed in order to obtain expedited 
interim ``Q'' clearances pending completion of field investigations. 
There is also a category composed of incumbent employees who volunteer 
for so-called exculpatory polygraph examinations to resolve questions 
that have arisen in the context of counterintelligence investigations 
or personnel security issues (10 CFR 709.4(a)(10).
    The NAS Polygraph Review examined the scientific evidence with 
regard to the validity of polygraph examinations used for the screening 
of applicants for employment and incumbent employees, as well as for 
specific-event investigations (which include what DOE calls 
``exculpatory polygraph examinations''). The NAS pointed out that the 
available scientific evidence is generally of low quality and consisted 
of 57 studies of which 53 are specific-event investigations and four 
are flawed studies of employee screening. While noting that the 
available empirical research has not established the underlying factors 
that produce the physiological responses observed during polygraph 
examinations, and that generalizing from such responses in research 
settings to real world settings is hazardous, the NAS nevertheless 
concluded that ``* * * specific-incident polygraph tests discriminate 
lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below 
perfection * * *'' (NAS Polygraph Review at p. 3). DOE is inclined to 
accept this conclusion with regard to exculpatory polygraph 
examinations under 10 CFR 709.4(a)(10), but given the limitations of 
the tool, DOE does not treat the results of such examinations as 
conclusive as to truthfulness or mendacity. Accordingly, DOE may follow 
up an exculpatory polygraph result with additional investigative 
activities if DOE considers that action appropriate. DOE does not now 
contemplate any change in this policy.
    With regard to polygraph examinations for employee screening under 
10 CFR part 709, the NAS takes a significantly different view. Against 
the background of what it acknowledges is very sparse evidence, the NAS 
is dubious about both the validity and the advisability of such 
examinations.
    Validity. According to the NAS, the proportion of the employee 
population at DOE that poses a major national security threat 
(presumably including threats to classified information) is extremely 
low. In the NAS's view, screening in a population with a very low rate 
of target transgressions will necessarily yield, as a function of how 
sensitively the polygraph test is set, either a large number of false 
positives or a large of false negatives (NAS Polygraph Review at 4, 2-4 
through 2-7, 2-20 though 2-21, and 7-2 through 7-4). On that basis, the 
NAS concludes that polygraph examinations are too inaccurate to be used 
for employee screening. (NAS Polygraph Review, p.4.)
    In reaching its negative conclusion, the NAS acknowledged that a 
screening polygraph, even if set to reduce the number of false 
positives, will identify true positives who are being deceptive. 
Accordingly, DOE does not believe that the issues that the NAS has 
raised about the polygraph's accuracy are sufficient to warrant a 
decision by DOE to abandon it as a screening tool. Doing so would mean 
that DOE would be giving up a tool that, while far from perfect, will 
help identify some individuals who should not be given access to 
classified data, materials, or information. DOE does not believe 
wholesale abandonment of a tool that has some admitted value for that 
purpose can be squared with Congress's overall direction to implement a 
polygraph program whose purpose is `` * * * to minimize the potential 
for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or 
information.''
    Advisability. The NAS's main conclusion is that lack of evidence of 
validity and accuracy justifies not using polygraph examinations for 
screening purposes. In arriving at this conclusion, the NAS also took 
into account the expense associated with invalid polygraph results, the 
potential loss of competent or highly skilled individuals due to false 
positives or the fear of such a test result, and claims of adverse 
impact on civil liberties. The NAS also acknowledged but considered 
less significant the deterrent effect that the prospect of being 
polygraphed could have on employment applicants who are national 
security risks. In short, what NAS conducted was a cost-benefit 
analysis that (given the nature of the costs and benefits) inevitably 
rested in no small part on value judgments made by the NAS. There is 
nothing inappropriate about this approach in light of the NAS's mission 
and charge.
    DOE, however, has a significantly different mission--one that is 
intimately involved in science, but directed to a particular end--the 
national security of the United States; therefore, not surprisingly, 
section 3152 gave the Department a particular charge for its polygraph 
program. That charge was not to devise a program based on the NAS's or 
the Department's own weighing of costs and benefits based on its own 
value judgments. Rather, Congress directed DOE to develop a polygraph 
program focused on minimizing the risk of release or disclosure of 
classified information. That amounts to a Congressional specification 
that the most important cost about which DOE should be concerned is the 
risk of release or disclosure of classified information. DOE believes 
that Congress's judgment in that regard was reasonable. Given that 
DOE's classified information consists in significant measure of 
information regarding nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the 
consequences of compromise of that information can be profoundly 
significant. Those consequences make it sensible for Congress to 
conclude that DOE's priority should be on deterrence and detection of 
potential security risks with a secondary priority of mitigating the 
consequences of false positives and false negatives. Moreover, whatever 
may be the importance of other

[[Page 17889]]

considerations, DOE believes that at this time, when the United States 
is engaged in hostilities precisely in order to address the potentially 
disastrous consequences that may flow from weapons of mass destruction 
falling into the wrong hands, it is under a particular obligation to 
make sure that no action that it takes be susceptible to 
misinterpretation as a relaxation of controls over information 
concerning these kinds of weapons. For all these reasons, while fully 
respecting the questions the NAS has raised about the use of polygraphs 
as a screening tool, DOE does not believe it can endorse the NAS's 
conclusion that the tool should be laid down.
    Perhaps in recognition that its main conclusion was less tenable in 
the context of Federal agencies with national security missions 
established by law, the NAS went on to conclude in the alternative that 
if polygraph screening is to be used at all, it should only be used as 
a trigger for follow-up detailed investigations and not as a sole basis 
for personnel action (NAS Polygraph Review, p. 5). This alternative 
conclusion appears to DOE to be much more compatible with the priority 
DOE is statutorily invited to place on minimizing the potential for 
release or disclosure of classified information. It is also consistent 
with the way DOE currently uses screening polygraphs.
    Under DOE's current regulations, neither DOE nor its contractors 
may take an adverse personnel action against an individual solely on 
the basis of a polygraph result indicating deception (10 CFR 709.25). 
If, after an initial polygraph examination, there are remaining 
unresolved issues, DOE must advise the individual and provide an 
opportunity for the individual to undergo an additional polygraph 
examination. If the additional polygraph examination is not sufficient 
to resolve the matter, DOE must undertake a comprehensive investigation 
using the polygraph examination as an investigative lead (10 CFR 
709.15(b)). In DOE's view, this regulatory scheme is consistent both 
with the NAS's alternative conclusion and with the statutory priority 
on minimizing release or disclosure of classified information. 
Therefore, pursuant to section 3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002, DOE today 
proposes on a preliminary basis to retain the regulatory provisions in 
part 709. DOE invites public comment on its evaluation of the NAS 
Polygraph Review with regard to employee screening and on its 
assessment that the existing provisions of part 709 are consistent with 
the NAS's alternative conclusion.

IV. Regulatory Review

A. National Environmental Policy Act

    The proposed rule would retain the existing procedures for 
counterintelligence evaluations to include polygraph examinations and 
therefore will have no impact on the environment. DOE has determined 
that this rule is covered under the Categorical Exclusion in DOE's 
National Environmental Policy Act regulations in paragraph A.5 of 
appendix A to subpart D, 10 CFR part 1021, which applies to rulemakings 
amending an existing regulation that does not change the environmental 
effect of the regulations being amended. Accordingly, neither an 
environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is 
required.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, requires 
preparation of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis for every 
rule that must be proposed for public comment, unless the agency 
certifies that the rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This 
rulemaking will not directly regulate small businesses or small 
governmental entities. It will apply principally to individuals who are 
employees of, or applicants for employment by, some of DOE's prime 
contractors, which are large businesses. There may be some affected 
small businesses that are subcontractors, but the rule will not impose 
unallowable costs. Accordingly, DOE certifies that the proposed rule, 
if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    DOE has determined that this proposed rule does not contain any new 
or amended record-keeping, reporting or application requirements, or 
any other type of information collection requirements that require the 
approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the 
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq. The OMB has defined 
the term ``information'' to exclude certifications, consents, and 
acknowledgments that entail only minimal burden [5 CFR 1320.3(h)(1)].

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., 
requires a Federal agency to perform a detailed assessment of the costs 
and benefits of any rule imposing a Federal mandate with costs to 
state, local, or tribal governments, or to the private sector of $100 
million or more. The proposed rule does not impose a Federal mandate 
requiring preparation of an assessment under the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995.

E. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999

    Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations 
Act of 1999, (Pub. L. No. 105-277), requires Federal agencies to issue 
a Family Policymaking Assessment for any proposed rule that may affect 
family well being. This proposed rule will not have any impact on the 
autonomy or integrity of the family as an institution. Accordingly, DOE 
has concluded that it is not necessary to prepare a Family Policymaking 
Assessment.

F. Executive Order 12866

    Executive Order 12866, 58 FR 51735 (October 4, 1993) provides for a 
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the 
Office of Management and Budget of a ``significant regulatory action,'' 
which is defined as an action that may have an effect on the economy of 
$100 million or more or adversely affect the economy, competition, 
jobs, productivity, environment, public health or safety, or state, 
local or tribal governments. DOE has concluded that this proposed rule 
(10 CFR Part 709) is not a significant regulatory action. Accordingly, 
this rulemaking has not been reviewed by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs.

G. Executive Order 12988

    Section 3(a) of Executive Order 12988, 61 FR 4729 (February 7, 
1996) imposes on executive agencies the general duty to adhere to the 
following requirements: (1) Eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity; 
(2) write regulations to minimize litigation; and (3) provide a clear 
legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard, and 
promote simplification and burden reduction. Section 3(b) of Executive 
Order 12988 specifically requires that executive agencies make every 
reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly specifies 
the preemptive effect, if any; (2) clearly specifies any effect on 
existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard 
for affected conduct while promoting simplification and burden 
reduction; (4) specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately 
defines key terms; and (6) addresses

[[Page 17890]]

other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship 
under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General. Section 3(c) of 
Executive Order 12988 requires executive agencies to review regulations 
in light of applicable standards in section 3(a) and section 3(b) to 
determine whether they are met or it is unreasonable to meet one or 
more of them. DOE has completed the required review and determined 
that, to the extent permitted by law, this proposed rule meets the 
relevant standards of Executive Order 12988.

H. Executive Order 13084

    Under Executive Order 13084, 63 FR 27655 (May 19, 1998), DOE may 
not issue a discretionary rule that significantly or uniquely affects 
Indian tribal governments and imposes substantial direct compliance 
costs. This proposed rulemaking would not have such effects. 
Accordingly, Executive Order 13084 does not apply to this rulemaking.

I. Executive Order 13132

    Executive Order 13132, 64 FR 43255 (August 10, 1999), requires 
agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure meaningful and 
timely input by state and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that have ``federalism implications.'' Policies 
that have federalism implications are defined in the Executive Order to 
include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.'' On March 14, 2000, DOE published a 
statement of policy describing the intergovernmental consultation 
process it will follow in the development of such regulations (65 FR 
13735). DOE has examined this proposed rule and determined that it 
would not have a substantial direct effect on the states, on the 
relationship between the national government and the states, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. No further action is required by the Executive Order.

J. Review Under Executive Order 13211

    Executive Order 13211 (Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy, Supply, Distribution, or Use), 66 FR 28355 
(May 22, 2001) requires preparation and submission to OMB of a 
Statement of Energy Effects for significant regulatory action under 
Executive Order 12866 that are likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. This rulemaking, 
although significant, will not have such an effect. Consequently, DOE 
has concluded that there is no need for a Statement of Energy Effects.

K. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999

    The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001 (44 
U.S.C. 3516, note) provides for agencies to review most disseminations 
of information to the public under guidelines established by each 
agency pursuant to general guidelines issues by OMB. OMB's guidelines 
were published at 67 FR 8452 (February 22, 2001), and DOE's guidelines 
were published at 67 FR 62446 (October 7, 2002). DOE has reviewed this 
notice of proposed rulemaking under the OMB and DOE guidelines, and has 
concluded that it is consistent with applicable policies in those 
guidelines.

V. Opportunity for Public Comment

    Interested members of the public are invited to participate in this 
proceeding by submitting data, views, or comments on this proposed 
rule. Ten copies of written comments should be submitted to the address 
indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this notice. Comments should be 
identified on the outside of the envelope and on the comments 
themselves with the designation ``Polygraph Examination Regulation, 
Docket No. CN-03-RM-01.'' If anyone wishing to provide written comments 
is unable to provide ten copies, alternative arrangements can be made 
in advance with the DOE. All comments received on or before the date 
specified at the beginning of this notice, and other relevant 
information before final action is taken on the proposed rule, will be 
considered.
    All submitted comments will be available for public inspection as 
part of the administrative record on file for this rulemaking in the 
DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room at the address indicated in the 
ADDRESSES section of this notice. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 
1004.11, anyone submitting information or data that he or she believes 
to be confidential and exempt by law from public disclosure should 
submit one complete copy of the document, as well as two copies, if 
possible, from which the information has been deleted. The DOE will 
make its determination as to the confidentiality of the information and 
treat it accordingly.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 709

    Lie detector tests, Privacy.

    Issued in Washington, DC on April 8, 2003.
Stephen W. Dillard,
Director, Office of Counterintelligence.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, DOE hereby proposes to 
amend 10 CFR part 709 to read as follows:

PART 709--POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION REGULATIONS

    1. The authority citation for 10 CFR part 709 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq., 7101, et seq., 7383h-1.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 03-9009 Filed 4-11-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P