[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 65 (Friday, April 4, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16579-16593]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-8203]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical
Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding Mode Change
Limitations Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model application relating
to the modification of requirements regarding technical specifications
(TS) mode change limitations. The purpose of this model is to permit
the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to modify
requirements for TS mode change limitations as generically approved by
this notice. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the model
applies could request amendments utilizing the model application.
DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal Register Notice (67 FR 50475,
August 2, 2002) which provided a model safety evaluation relating to
modification of requirements regarding TS mode change limitations; \1\
similarly, the NRC staff, herein provides a Model Application,
including a revised model safety evaluation. The NRC staff can most
efficiently consider applications based upon the Model Application,
which reference the model safety evaluation, if the application is
submitted within a year of this Federal Register Notice.
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\1\ [In conjunction with the proposed change, technical
specifications (TS) requirements for a bases control program,
consistent with the TS Bases Control Program described in Section
5.5 of the applicable vendor's standard TS (STS), shall be
incorporated into the licensee's TS, if not already in the TS.
Similarly, the STS requirements of SR 3.0.1 and associated bases
shall be adopted by units that do not already contain them.]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Dennig, Mail Stop: O-12H4,
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone 301-415-1161.
[[Page 16580]]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to
improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished
by processing proposed changes to the standard technical specifications
(STS) in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment
applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to
comment on proposed changes to the STS following a preliminary
assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change will likely be
offered for adoption by licensees. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to
evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to
either reconsider the change or to proceed with announcing the
availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those
licensees opting to apply for the subject change to technical
specifications are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation,
referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any
necessary plant-specific information. The included model safety
evaluation provides the justification for the changes, stands alone,
and is not an endorsement of the TSTF-359, Revision 8, Change
Description and Justification. Each amendment application made in
response to the notice of availability will be processed and noticed in
accordance with applicable NRC rules and procedures.
This notice involves the modification of requirements regarding
mode change limitations in technical specifications. The change
referenced in the Federal Register Notice (FRN) 67 FR 50475, of August
2, 2002, is TSTF-359, Revision 7. TSTF-359, Revision 8, incorporates
most, but not all responses to the public comments. Two additional
changes to TSTF-359, Revision 8, are required and discussed in this
notice. TSTF-359, Revision 7; TSTF-359, Revision 8; and TSTF-359,
Revision 8, as modified; can all be viewed on the NRC's Web page at
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs/changes-issued-for-adoption.html.
Applicability
This proposed change to modify technical specification requirements
for TS mode change limitations is applicable to all licensees who
currently have or who will adopt, in conjunction with the proposed
change, technical specification requirements for a bases control
program consistent with the Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control
Program described in section 5.5 of the applicable vendor's STS, and
STS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.1 and associated bases.
To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications,
the staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed by
TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified, using the CLIIP to include bases for
the proposed technical specification consistent with the bases proposed
in the TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified by staff responses to public
comments 8 and 20 below. In addition, for those licensees that have not
adopted requirements for a bases control program or STS SR 3.0.1 by
converting to the improved STS or by other means, the staff requests
that they include the requirements for a bases control program and STS
SR 3.0.1 and associated bases consistent with the STS, in your request
for the proposed change. The need for a bases control program stems
from the need for adequate regulatory control of some key elements of
the proposal that are contained in the proposed bases for Limiting
Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4, SR 3.0.4, and SR 3.0.1. The staff
is requesting that the bases be included with the proposed license
amendments because, in this case, the changes to the technical
specifications and changes to the associated bases form an integrated
change to a plant's licensing basis. To ensure that the overall change,
including the bases, includes the appropriate regulatory controls, the
staff plans to condition the issuance of each license amendment on
incorporation of the changes to the bases document and on ensuring the
licensee's TS have a bases control program for controlling changes to
the bases. The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an
alternative approach or proposing the changes without the requested
bases and bases control program. Variations from the approach
recommended in this notice may, however, require additional
justification, additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the
time and resources needed for the review.
Public Notices
The staff issued a Federal Register Notice (67 FR 50475, August 2,
2002) that requested public comment on the NRC's pending action to
approve modification of technical specification (TS) requirements
regarding mode change limitations. In particular, following an
assessment and draft safety evaluation by the NRC staff, the staff
sought public comment on proposed changes to the standard technical
specifications (STS), designated as TSTF-359, Revision 7. TSTF-359,
Revision 8, incorporates most, but not all responses to the public
comments. Two additional changes to TSTF-359, Revision 8, are required
and discussed in this notice. TSTF-359, Revision 7; TSTF-359, Revision
8; and TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified; can all be viewed on the
NRC's Web page at, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs/changes-issued-for-adoption.html. The TSTF-359, Revision 7,
change request, the TSTF-359, Revision 8, change request, the TSTF-359,
Revision 8, change request as modified by this notice, as well as the
NRC staff's safety evaluation may be examined, and/or copied for a fee,
at the NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North,
11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly
available records are accessible electronically from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public Library component
on the NRC Web site, (the Electronic Reading Room).
In response to the notice soliciting comments from interested
members of the public about modifying the TS requirements regarding
mode change limitations, the staff received eight sets of comments
(three from individual licensees, one from an industry contractor, and
four from members of the public). Specific comments on the model SE are
discussed below:
1. Comment: The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section
3.0, ``Technical Evaluation'' states, ``Good practice should dictate
that such transitions should normally be initiated only when all
required equipment is operable and that mode transition with inoperable
equipment should be the exception rather than the rule.'' If the
required risk evaluation determines that it is acceptable to enter a
Mode with certain required equipment inoperable, then this restriction
is unnecessary. There may be some situations that recur routinely where
the plant would benefit by changing modes with certain equipment
inoperable. If the risk evaluation has determined that this change in
modes is acceptable, then it should not matter if it is done routinely
or as an ``exception rather than the rule.''
Staff Response: The statement reiterates a longstanding staff
position. On June 4, 1987, Generic Letter 87-09 provided the first step
in mode change flexibility, allowing mode changes where action
requirements permitted continued operation for an indefinite
[[Page 16581]]
period (the starting point for the current increase in flexibility). As
part of the discussion, that letter stated:
For an LCO that has Action Requirements permitting continued
operation for an unlimited period of time, entry into an operational
mode or other specified condition of operation should be permitted
in accordance with those action requirements * * *. However, nothing
in this staff position should be interpreted as endorsing or
encouraging a plant startup with inoperable equipment. The staff
believes that good practice should dictate that plant startup should
normally be initiated only when all required equipment is operable
and that startup with inoperable equipment must be the exception
rather than the rule.
Any risk, whether large or small, should be incurred only when
necessary. With appropriate planning, it should not be necessary to
``routinely'' start up with inoperable equipment.
2. Comment: Section 2.0, first paragraph, second to last sentence:
Change ``provide'' to ``provides.''
Staff Response: The staff agrees.
3. Comment: Section 3.0, second paragraph, third sentence: Change
``plants'' to ``plant's.''
Staff Response: The staff agrees.
4. Comment: Section 3.0, second paragraph, fourth sentence: Change
``allowances'' to ``allowance.''
Staff Response: The staff agrees.
5. Comment: Section 3.1.1, fifth paragraph, third sentence: Change
``the systems/components not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 or SR 3.0.4
allowances for the various modes listed'' to ``the systems/components
not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 or SR 3.0.4 allowances for the various
modes are listed.''
Staff Response: The staff agrees.
6. Comment: Section 3.1.2, first paragraph, second sentence: change
``delta DCDF'' to ``delta CDF.''
Staff Response: The staff agrees.
7. Comment: Section 2.1 Proposed Change to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4
where it talks about SR 3.0.4 wording changes (about halfway through
5th paragraph on page 50478): The revised new wording, ``The revised SR
3.0.4 will conform to the changes to LCO 3.0.4 and read: ``Entry into a
MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall
not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their
specified frequency.'' is incompatible with TSTF 359 regarding the new
SR 3.0.3 on missed surveillances that the NRC recently approved.
New SR 3.0.4 requires Surveillances to be met within their
specified Frequency prior to entry into a MODE or other specified
condition in the Applicability. If SR 3.0.3 is applied to a missed
Surveillance and a risk evaluation supports a delay beyond 24 hours,
new SR 3.0.4 would only allow this delay to be applied in the MODE or
other specified condition in the Applicability in which the plant is
operating at the time of discovery that the Surveillance has been
missed. While this provision does not prevent a shutdown, it would
prevent entry into a higher MODE of operation with a Surveillance that
had not been performed within its specified Frequency.
To address this situation, SR 3.0.4 needs to be modified to state
that SR 3.0.4 prohibits entry into a MODE or other specified condition
in the Applicability of an LCO unless the associated Surveillances have
been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR
3.0.3. The bases for SR 3.0.4 need to be modified also to provide the
flexibility for entry into higher MODES with a missed Surveillance
since the equipment is still OPERABLE and the risk evaluation is still
valid for this situation. SR 3.0.3 evaluation considers missed
surveillance equipment to be still OPERABLE, and new SR 3.0.4 would
allow going up in MODES except that it specifically says no mode entry
``unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified
frequency.'' and doesn't talk about OPERABLE equipment.
To fix this, reword new SR 3.0.3 to say, ``Entry into a MODE or
other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be
made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their
specified frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3.'' (And add the
bases wording indicated above.)
Rev. 7 of TSTF 359 had addressed this issue but it does not appear
to be addressed by the NRC in the FR notice. Staff Response: The staff
agrees. SR 3.0.4 will be modified to included the phrase, ``* * * ,
except as provided by SR 3.0.3.'' The bases wording will be modified
accordingly.
In reviewing LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4, the redundancy in stating the
criteria (items a, b and c) for allowing entry into a Mode or other
specified condition in the Applicability is unnecessary. The listing of
the criteria (items a, b and c) are more appropriately stated in LCO
3.0.4, since it controls the Mode transition; the LCO is not met due to
a SR not being met. Therefore, to eliminate the redundancy and make the
statements more accurate, SR 3.0.4 is changed to read, in its'
entirety:
``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the
Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's
Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency, except
as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances
not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition
in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO
3.0.4.
This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other
specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to
comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.''
Related consistency changes are made throughout the SE.
8. Comment: If the NRC requires a Revision 8 be prepared before the
Notice of Availability is published, then the Notice of Availability
should use that revision (8) as the basis for licensee
applications.
Staff Response: The staff agrees; the staff will reference the
latest approved TSTF-359 revision; TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified by
the response to Comment 20 below and the following modification to the
TSTF-359 Revision 8 LCO 3.0.4 bases Insert. The 11th paragraph shall be
re-written to read:
``Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the
Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require
entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for no
more than the duration of the applicable ACTIONS Completion Time or
until the LCO is met or the unit is not within the Applicability of
the TS.''
9. Comment: For Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) with Mark 1
containments, the Table lists the Hardened Wetwell Vent as such a SSC
that should be excluded. However, the Hardened Wetwell Vent is not a
SSC included within Technical Specifications (TS). Thus, the proposed
TSTF implies that TS Actions should be applied to a non-TS SSC. This is
inappropriate and not necessary to properly manage overall risk. The
existing plant programs that implement paragraph (a)(4) of the
Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) are the appropriate mechanism for this
specific SSC. Consequently, we request that TSTF-359 be clarified to
not include the Hardened Wetwell Vent.
Staff Response: The tables included in TSTF-359 and the draft
safety evaluation were provided by the BWR Owners Group as a result of
generic analysis, which the staff has reviewed and accepted. The
analysis and tables are comprehensive and do cover systems that are not
in TS. The staff does not believe that the presence in the analysis and
tables implies that TS actions are required for those systems such as
the Hardened Wetwell Vent system.
[[Page 16582]]
10. Comment: Second, this table and the accompanying mark-up of the
actual TS pages for BWRs included in TSTF-359, Revision 7, state that
the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4.b exclusion note
should be added to the TS LCO 3.4.9, Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown, such that a MODE change from
MODE 5 to MODE 4 would be precluded with LCO 3.4.9 not met. However,
LCO 3.0.4 only applies to MODE changes in MODES 1, 2, or 3. Thus, the
proposed change to LCO 3.4.9 is inconsistent with the existing wording
of the LCO 3.0.4 applicability. Therefore, we believe that the LCO
3.0.4 Note to LCO 3.4.9 should not be included in the proposed changes.
Staff Response: The notes limiting the applicability (to Modes 1,
2, 3, and 4 for PWRS, and to Modes 1, 2, and 3 for BWRs) of the current
STS LCO 3.0.4 and STS SR 3.0.4 are holdovers from the existing Standard
Technical Specifications (STS). The notes limiting the applicability of
LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are no longer needed and are removed by TSTF-
359, Revision 8. The industry owners groups' analyses would
subsequently support adding notes to various TS, as defined by the
tables of higher risk systems in the FRN, precluding entry into Modes 5
and 6 for PWRs, and Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs. However, the addition of
notes in these cases is made unnecessary by action statements that
require immediate completion times, which means that entry into the
Mode or other specified condition in the Applicability is not allowed
and the notes would be superfluous.
11. Comment: Two editorial corrections to TSTF-359, Revision 7, are
needed. First, in INSERT 6 (SR 3.0.4 BASES) the word ``that'' in the
second line, after the word ``Surveillance,'' should be deleted.
Second, the second sentence to INSERT 8 (RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY BASES)
should be deleted, since it is redundant to the existing Bases and
therefore need not be included.
Staff Response: The staff agrees.
12. Comment: Reliance on a licensee's 50.65 (a)(4) ``program''
appears to be a flawed basis. While this proposed change to the TS as
well as the previous one for surveillance interval and completion time
extensions (66 FR 49714) rely on the ``program'', that program is not
required by 50.65 (a)(4) to be a written program, it's not required by
the regulation to meet the risk management objectives of RG 1.177 or
any other standard, nor does it require a licensee to find any
particular level of risk to be unacceptable. It, in fact, only requires
that the risk be assessed (without specifying a method, a degree of
rigor or even that the assessment be documented) and managed (with no
definition what that means). While Page 23 of the document states
``Risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance
endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing Risk
Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'', licensee
adherence to this standard or the NUMARC guidance it endorses is
neither required in the regulation nor are any licensees committed to
those documents through their license or FSAR. The fact that licensees
will be inspected in this area using IP 71111.13 and Supplemental IP
62709 is of little value if those inspections are not being done
against specific standards that the licensees are required to meet
rather than the general standard of (a)(4) which has the limitations
discussed above.
Staff Response: A licensee adopting this change will be required to
commit in the bases to the Technical Specifications to follow
Regulatory Guide 1.182. In addition, the licensee will be required to
adopt a bases control program identical to that contained in the
Standard Technical Specifications. Regulatory Guide 1.182, ``Assessing
and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power
Plants,'' endorses NUMARC 93-01 Section 11, ``Assessment of Risk
Resulting from Performance of Maintenance Activities,'' which provides
risk assessment and management ``methods that are acceptable to the NRC
staff for complying with the provision of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4).'' NUMARC
93-01 Section 11 requires that this assessment process be
proceduralized. Furthermore, Inspection Procedure 71111.13 provides
inspection guidance on, among other things, the verification of the
performance of maintenance risk assessments, the adequacy of risk
assessments and the management of the resulting risk.
13. Comment: It is noted that the Standard TS Bases for the revised
TS 3.0.4 has not been provided for comment. Are the standards above
such as Reg Guide 1.182 being included in the TS Bases and therefore
subject to the bases control program? If not, why not?
Staff Response: The proposed STS bases are included in TSTF-359 and
were open for comment. The portion of the question related to the TS
Bases and bases control program was answered in the response to comment
12 above.
14. Comment: Notwithstanding statements like ``Good practice should
dictate that such transitions should normally be initiated only when
all required equipment is operable and that mode transition with
inoperable equipment should be the exception rather than the rule'' and
``* * * the expected low frequency of the proposed mode changes with
inoperable equipment * * *'', isn't it just as likely (and perfectly
acceptable under this proposed change) that once the licensee has
justified a mode change with a certain piece of equipment inoperable
during a particular startup, that during subsequent startups the
licensee could actually plan into the startup the return of that
equipment after the Mode change it was required for, by using that
previous assessment? What would prevent the licensee from doing that
(assuming other system alignments are equivalent)? Taking it a step
further, what will prevent the licensee from, over time, developing a
whole combination of assessments that justify not having multiple
pieces of equipment operable during a particular mode change and
routinely using those assessments in subsequent startups? Similarly,
wouldn't the proposed TS allow multiple mode changes in the same
startup with same piece(s) of inoperable equipment as along as the
assessment covers each mode? Is that what was intended?
Staff Response: See the response to comment 1 above. It is
acceptable for licensees to utilize pre-existing risk assessments, as
long as they adequately address the existing plant conditions. The
applicability of TS frequently covers multiple modes, and therefore
mode changes within the applicability of the TS would be allowed, as
long as the risk assessment is re-evaluated prior to each mode change.
15. Comment: [Page 21][The SE] states ``For systems and components
which are not higher risk, any temporary risk increase associated with
the proposed allowance will be smaller than what is considered
acceptable when the same systems and components are inoperable at
power. This is due to the fact that the CTs associated with the
majority of TS systems and components were developed for power
operation and pose smaller plant risk for action statement entries
initiated or occurring at lower modes operation as compared to power
operations.'' The first sentence above is only restricted by whether
something is higher or lower risk but the justifying statement only
applies to the majority of TS systems which are associated with power
operations. What is the minority of TS systems for which plant risk is
higher in lower modes of operation? Are all those systems on the list
of higher risk systems? If all those systems are not included on the
list of high risk systems
[[Page 16583]]
how is the first quoted sentence true?! How do the lists of high and
low risk systems at power and in lower modes discussed in this proposal
compare with the results of the shutdown risk analysis the NRC now has
underway? If there are differences what is the justification?
Staff Response: The ``minority of TS systems for which plant risk
is higher in lower modes of operation,'' are those systems identified
in the analyses and listed in the SE. These systems are determined by a
qualitative analysis that compares risk in the shutdown mode with that
at power. The qualitative analysis also takes into account potential
risk increases (e.g., due to realignments and human errors) when
entering a new mode or configuration. Those systems that have a
potential to be more important to risk in the lower modes, are
conservatively selected and mode changes are precluded when there is an
inoperability associated with any of these potentially higher risk
systems. The lists of ``higher risk'' systems, being based on both
deterministic and probabilistic arguments with conservative
assumptions, are not expected to conflict with the results of any
shutdown risk analysis.
16. Comment: Appendix A Examples--In a number of the examples it
says ``if there is reasonable assurance'' that the inoperable component
will be restored within the CT, a risk assessment has been done, and
the requisite risk management actions have been taken. Where does this
need for ``reasonable assurance'' come from and how does the LCO
require it? If a component is inoperable, what in the new LCO prevents
the licensee from assuming the full CT in the risk assessment, managing
the risk for that full time and simply hoping (whether that is
reasonable or not) that they will get the component back before the end
of the CT?
Staff Response: Unplanned reactor scrams and unplanned power
changes are two of the Reactor Safety Performance Indicators that the
ROP utilizes to assess licensee performance and inform the public.
Thus, the ROP provides a disincentive to entering a mode or other
specified condition in the applicability of an LCO and moving up into
power operation (Mode 1), when there is a significant likelihood that
the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore
the unavailable equipment within the completion time. Additional
disincentives are the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR
50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) reporting requirements. NUREG-1022, ``Event Reporting
Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,'' makes it clear that a report is
required when a nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical
Specifications is initiated or completed.
17. Comment: Carrying the logic above a step further--What in the
LCO (not in some voluntary cumulative risk monitoring) will prevent a
licensee from changing Mode without a piece of equipment after doing
the assessment and management of risk, reaching the CT, returning to a
nonapplicable mode doing another assessment for the same piece of
equipment that is still inoperable, changing Mode again with the proper
management of the risk and simply hoping that the equipment is operable
before the CT expires yet again?
Staff Response: While feasible from a legalistic perspective, such
actions by a licensee would be indication of a poorly run plant and
should result in close scrutiny by plant management and the NRC. Such
licensee actions would constitute clear evidence of poor performance
that would be reviewed by the performance based ROP, and management
corrective oversight should result. Also, see the related response to
comment 16 above.
18. Comment: Are the provisions of SR 3.0.2 applicable if a
licensee changes mode without first doing a required surveillance? If
the provisions are to be applicable, there appears to be a problem in
the language of SR 3.0.2. For example, if the surveillance has a 7-day
frequency but has not been performed for some months, the wording of SR
3.0.2 would require that the surveillance be performed within 1.25
times ``as measured from the previous performance or as measured from
the time a specified condition of Frequency is met.'' Given that the
surveillance had last been performed months before application of 1.25
from the previous performance would appear problematic. The language of
SR 3.0.2 appears to assume (based on the present requirements of SR
3.0.4 that the surveillance be successfully performed within the
required frequency before the mode change) that there will be a
previous ``in-frequency'' performance of the surveillance from which
the 1.25 can be measured. Assuming that the 1.25 interval is supposed
to be available, it should start from the time of entry into the
applicable Mode, however that does not appear to be ``a specified
condition of Frequency'' as now defined in TS usage examples or bases.
Staff Response: SR 3.0.2 (25% extension) does not apply; the SR
must be met within the required action completion time, except as
provided by SR 3.0.3.
19. Comment: Is the ``which ever is greater'' provision of SR 3.0.3
meant to apply to cases where a licensee changes modes without
performing a surveillance? While the word ``discover'' would appear to
argue against such a use, the first sentence of the Bases for SR 3.0.3
make it less clear ``* * * when a surveillance has not been met * *
*''?
Staff Response: See the response to Comment 7 above. The applicable
portion of SR 3.0.4 will be reworded to say, ``Entry into a MODE or
other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be
made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified
frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3.''
20. Comment: Section 3.1.3 states ``It should be noted that, the
risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4(b) and SR 3.0.4(b), must
take into account all inoperable TS equipment regardless of whether the
equipment is included in the licensee's normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk
assessment scope.'' How is the NRC going to require this ``must''
provision if it is not incorporated into the requirements of 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4), the TS themselves, the license or the plant FSAR?
Staff Response: If TS equipment is not covered by the 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4) program, in order to transition up in mode with that TS
equipment inoperable, the licensee would have to incorporate it into
the program. The following sentence is to be added to the one-sentence
fourth paragraph of the LCO 3.0.4 bases insert that begins, ``The risk
assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches * *
*'':
The risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4 (b), must
take into account all inoperable TS equipment regardless of whether
the equipment is included in the licensee's normal 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4)risk assessment scope.''
21. Comment: Similarly Section 3.1.3 goes on to state ``The
requirements associated with the proposed change are established to
ensure that such conditions will not occur.'' What is the legal basis
for calling voluntary conformance with the guidelines of RG 1.174,
1.177 and 1.182, a set of requirements? Will findings under the ROP
that find deviations from implementation of these standards constitute
legal violations?
Staff Response: Paragraph (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65, by itself, does
not prohibit putting a plant in high-risk configurations due to
maintenance activities. It only requires that maintenance-related risk
be assessed
[[Page 16584]]
and managed. The industry guidance for implementation of (a)(4), the
revised Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide
1.182, is more restrictive. Section 11 states that configurations for
which the incremental core damage probability (ICDP) is greater than
10EXP-5 should not be entered voluntarily. While the regulatory
guidance is not a regulatory requirement with respect to compliance
with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the requirements associated with the proposed
change to TS 3.0.4 are a different matter.
Unlike (a)(4), the revised TS 3.0.4 is intended to ensure that
high-risk configurations are not allowed; although like (a)(4), the TS
is also intended to ensure that any risk that is allowed is adequately
managed. Therefore, mode changes with a potentially ``higher-risk
system'' inoperable (see definition of ``higher risk system'' in the
SE) are prohibited by the TS; and in addition to this restriction, the
revised TS 3.0.4 will also require licensees to comply in all other
respects with their programs established to implement 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4). Note that the Commission has determined that such a
program is a satisfactory replacement for a configuration risk
management program (CRMP). With regard to the basis for treatment of RG
1.182 provisions, it is noted that: (1) The regulatory guide is one way
to meet the TS requirements; (2) the licensee would commit to follow RG
1.182 in the TS Bases (see also the staff's response to Comment No.
12); and, (3) if the licensee did not follow RG 1.182, the ROP would
inspect the licensees process for acceptability.
With regard to ROP inspection findings in support of the
requirements in the proposed change to TS 3.0.4, the associated TS
Bases will reference the provisions of certain regulatory guides and
the industry guidance that they endorse. This will, in effect, make a
licensee's compliance with the provisions of certain otherwise
voluntary industry guidance documents be governed by the TS Bases
Control Program. It is envisioned that the significance of this
potential TS violation, to the extent that the violation involves
inadequate risk assessment and/or inadequate risk management, will be
determined in a manner similar to that in which the significance of
(a)(4) violations is determined. When issued, the specialized
significance determination process (SDP) designed for (a)(4) violations
would be used under such circumstances.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of March 2003.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William D. Beckner,
Program Director, Operating Reactor Improvements Program, Division of
Regulatory Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Model Safety Evaluation
1.0 Introduction
On July 17, 2002, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Risk Informed
Technical Specifications Task Force (RITSTF) submitted proposed change,
TSTF-359, Revision 7, to the standard technical specifications (STS)
(NUREGs 1430-1434) on behalf of the industry. TSTF-359, Revision 7, is
a proposal to change the STS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
3.0.4 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4 requirements regarding
mode change limitations. The proposed change would modify LCO 3.0.4 and
SR 3.0.4 by risk informing limitations on entering the mode of
applicability of a LCO. The first Consolidated Line Item Improvement
Process (CLIIP) Federal Register Notice with respect to this change was
published on August 2, 2002, requesting public comments. In response to
the public comments, the NRC staff decided that TSTF-359, Revision 7,
be revised. The RITSTF submitted TSTF-359, Revision 8, on December 4,
2002. Two additional changes were deemed necessary. The NRC staff has
prepared this revised model safety evaluation incorporating changes
resulting from public comments. TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified,
provides the complete approved change. This proposal is one of the
industry's initiatives under the risk-informed technical specifications
program. These initiatives are intended to maintain or improve safety
while reducing unnecessary burden and to make technical specification
requirements consistent with the Commission's other risk-informed
regulatory requirements, in particular the maintenance rule.
The current technical specifications (TS) specify that a nuclear
power plant cannot go to higher modes of operation \2\ (i.e., move
towards power operation) unless all TS systems, normally required for
the higher mode, are operable. This limitation is included (with
several exceptions for some plants) in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4. LCO
3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 in the STS currently state in part that when an LCO
or SR is not met, ``entry into a MODE or other specified condition in
the applicability shall not be made except when the associated actions
to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified
condition in the applicability for an unlimited period of time.'' The
industry believes that this requirement is unnecessarily restrictive
and can unduly delay plant startup while considerable resources are
being used to resolve startup issues that are risk insignificant or low
risk. A maintenance activity that takes longer than planned can delay a
mode change and adversely impact a utility's orderly plant startup and
return to power operation. The objective of the proposed change is to
provide additional operational flexibility without compromising plant
safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ MODE numbers decrease in the transition ``up to a higher
mode of operation;'' power operation is MODE 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 would allow, for
systems and components, mode changes into a TS condition that has a
specific required action and completion time. The licensee will utilize
the LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 allowances only when they determine that
there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied within the
LCO completion time (CT), after the mode change. In addition, the LCO
3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 allowances can be applied to values and parameters
in specifications when explicitly stated in the TS (non-system/
component TS such as: Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity). These
changes are in addition to the current mode change allowance when a
required action has an indefinite completion time. The LCO 3.0.4 and SR
3.0.4 mode change allowances are not permitted for the systems and
components (termed ``higher risk'') listed in Section 3.1.1,
``Identification of Risk-Important TS Systems and Components,'' for the
modes specified. Two examples are: (1) Westinghouse plants cannot
transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without a High Head Safety Injection
System train operable; and, (2) Westinghouse plants cannot transition
up into any mode with an inoperable required emergency diesel
generator.
2.0 Regulatory Evaluation
In 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission established its regulatory
requirements related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS
are required to include items in the following five specific categories
related to station operation: (1) Safety limits, limiting safety system
settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for
operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design
features; and (5) administrative controls. The rule does not specify
the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS. As stated
in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the ``Limiting conditions for operation
[[Page 16585]]
are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment
required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition
for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut
down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the
technical specification * * *'' By convention, the LCOs are contained
in Sections 3.1 through 3.10 of the TS. TS Section 3.0, on ``LCO and SR
Applicability,'' provides details or ground rules for complying with
the LCOs. LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 address requirements for LCO
compliance when transitioning between modes of operation.
Technical specifications have taken advantage of risk technology as
experience and capability have increased. Since the mid-1980's, the NRC
has been reviewing and granting improvements to technical
specifications that are based, at least in part, on probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) insights. In its final policy statement on technical
specification improvements of July 22, 1993, the Commission stated that
it expects that licensees will utilize any plant specific PRA or risk
survey in preparing their technical specification-related submittals.
In evaluating these submittals, the staff applies the guidance in RG
1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-
Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,''
dated July 1998 and in RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific,
Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' dated August
1998. The staff has appropriately adapted this guidance to assess the
acceptability of upward mode changes with equipment inoperable. This
review had the following objectives:
[sbull] To ensure that the plant risk does not increase
unacceptably during the actual implementation of the proposed change
(e.g., when the plant enters a higher mode while an LCO is not met).
This risk increase is referred to as ``temporary.''
[sbull] To compare and assess the risk impact of the proposed
change to the acceptance guidelines of the Commission's Safety Goal
Policy Statement, as documented in RG 1.174. The risk impact, which is
measured by the average yearly risk increase associated with the
change, aims at minimizing the ``cumulative'' risk associated with the
proposed change so that the plant's average baseline risk is maintained
within a minimal range.
[sbull] To assess the licensee's ability to identify risk-
significant configurations resulting from maintenance or other
operational activities and take appropriate compensatory measures to
avoid such configurations.
The staff reviewed the reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the non-
higher-risk systems and components, and related guidance to assess and
manage the risk of upward mode changes. The Commission has found that
compliance with the industry guidance for implementation of 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4), as endorsed by RG 1.182 and mandated by LCO 3.0.4, SR
3.0.4 and SR 3.0.3, satisfies the configuration risk management
objectives of RG 1.177 for technical specification surveillance
interval and completion time extensions. Reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)
processes that are consistent with the provisions of the NRC-endorsed
industry guidance was also found adequate for managing risk of missed
surveillances as described in the Federal Register on September 28,
2001 (66 FR 49714).
The staff review also had the objective of ensuring that existing
inspection programs have the necessary controls in place to allow NRC
staff to oversee the implementation of the proposed change, reliance on
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes or programs, and the ability to adequately
assess the licensee's performance associated with risk assessments. The
review encompassed inspection procedures (i.e., NRC Inspection
Procedure 62709 (12/28/00), ``Configuration Risk Assessment and Risk
Management Process,'' and NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.13 (1/17/02),
``Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control''), the
significance determination process (SDP) (i.e., draft ``Maintenance
Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination
Process''), enforcement guidance (i.e., draft Enforcement Manual
Section 8.1.11, ``Actions Involving the Maintenance Rule''), and the
associated reactor oversight process.
2.1 Proposed Change to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4
Currently LCO 3.0.4 does not allow entrance into a higher mode (or
other specified condition) in the applicability when an LCO is not met,
except when the associated actions to be entered permit continued
operation in that mode or condition indefinitely or a specific
exception is granted. Similarly, when an LCO's surveillances have not
been met within their specified frequency, entry into a higher mode (or
other specified condition) is not allowed by SR 3.0.4. The current STS
\3\ LCO 3.0.4 reads:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Plant specific wording for current equivalent LCO 3.0.4 is
similar to current STS LCO 3.0.4 wording.
``When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified
condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the
associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the
MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an
unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not prevent
changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability
that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a
shutdown of the unit.
Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual
Specifications. These exceptions allow entry into MODES or other
specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated
ACTIONS to be entered allow unit operation in the MODE or other
specified condition in the Applicability only for a limited period
of time.
LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other
specified conditions in the Applicability in [MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4
{for PWRs{time} ][MODES 1, 2, and 3 {for BWRs{time} ].''
The revised LCO 3.0.4 will read:
``When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified
condition in the Applicability shall only be made
(a) When the associated Actions to be entered permit continued
operation in that MODE or other specified condition in the
Applicability for an unlimited period of time, or
(b) After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable
systems and components, consideration of the results, determination
of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified
condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management
actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated
in the individual Specifications, or
(c) When an allowance is stated in the individual value or
parameter Specification.
This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other
specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to
comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.''
The current STS \4\ SR 3.0.4 reads:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Plant specific wording for current equivalent SR 3.0.4 is
similar to current STS SR 3.0.4 wording.
``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the
Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's
Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency. This
provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified
conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with
ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.
SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other
specified conditions in the Applicability in [MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4
{for PWRs{time} ][MODES 1, 2, and 3 {for BWRs{time} ].''
The revised SR 3.0.4 will conform to the changes to LCO 3.0.4 and
read:
[[Page 16586]]
``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the
Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's
Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency, except
as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances
not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition
in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO
3.0.4.
This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other
specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to
comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.''
The proposed LCO 3.0.4(a) retains the current allowance for when
the required actions allow indefinite operation. The proposed LCO
3.0.4(b) allows entering modes or other specified conditions in the
applicability except when higher-risk systems and components (listed in
Section 3.1.1), for the mode being entered, are inoperable. The
decision for entering a higher mode or condition in the applicability
of the LCO will be made by plant management after the required risk
assessment has been performed and requisite risk management actions
established, through the program established to implement 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4). Entry into the modes or other specified conditions in the
applicability of the TS shall be for no more than the duration of the
applicable required actions completion time, or until the LCO is met.
Current notes in individual specifications that permitted mode changes
are now encompassed by LCO 3.0.4(b) and can be removed. Notes that
prohibit mode changes under LCO 3.0.4(b) must be added (i.e., for
higher-risk systems and components). The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b)
allowance can involve multiple components in a single LCO or in
multiple LCOs; however, use of the LCO 3.0.4(b) provisions are always
contingent upon completion of a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) based risk
assessment.
The notes limiting the applicability (to Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 for
PWRS, and to Modes 1, 2, and 3 for BWRs) of the current STS LCO 3.0.4
and STS SR 3.0.4 are holdovers from the existing Standard Technical
Specifications (STS). The notes limiting the applicability of LCO 3.0.4
and SR 3.0.4 are no longer needed and are removed by TSTF-359, Revision
8. The industry owners groups analyses would subsequently support
adding notes to various TS, as defined by the tables of higher-risk
systems, precluding entry into Modes 5 and 6 for PWRs, and Modes 4 and
5 for BWRs. However, the addition of notes in these cases is made
unnecessary by action statements that require immediate completion
times, which means that entry into the Mode or other specified
condition in the Applicability is not allowed and the notes would be
superfluous.
LCO 3.0.4 allowances related to values and parameters of TS are not
typically addressed by LCO 3.0.4(b) risk assessments, and are therefore
addressed by a new LCO 3.0.4 (c). LCO 3.0.4 (c) refers to allowances
already in the TS and annotated in the individual TS. LCO 3.0.4 (c)
also allows for entry into the modes or other specified conditions in
the applicability of a TS for no more than the duration of the
applicable required actions completion time or until the LCO is met or
the unit is not within the Applicability of the TS.
3.0 Technical Evaluation
During the development of the current STS, improvements were made
to LCO 3.0.4, such as clarifying its applicability with respect to
plant shutdowns, cold shutdown mode and refueling mode. In addition,
during the STS development, almost all the LCOs with completion times
greater than or equal to 30 days, and many LCOs with completion times
greater than or equal to 7 days, were given individual LCO 3.0.4
exceptions. During some conversions to the STS, individual plants
provided acceptable justifications for other LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. All
of these specific LCO 3.0.4 exceptions allow entry into a mode or other
specified condition in the TS applicability while relying on the TS
required actions and associated completion times. The proposed change
under evaluation would provide standardization and consistency to the
use and application of LCO 3.0.4, both internal to and between each of
the specifications and STS NUREGs. This proposed change will also
ensure consistency through the utilization of appropriate levels of
risk assessment of plant configurations for application of LCO 3.0.4.
However, nothing in this safety evaluation should be interpreted as
encouraging upward mode transition with inoperable equipment. Good
practice should dictate that such transitions should normally be
initiated only when all required equipment is operable and that mode
transition with inoperable equipment should be the exception rather
than the rule.
The current LCO 3.0.4(a) allowances are retained in the proposal
and do not represent a change in risk from the current situation. The
LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances apply to systems and components, and require a
risk assessment prior to utilization to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained. The LCO 3.0.4(c) allowances apply to parameters
and values which have been previously approved by the NRC in a plant's
specific TS. The licensee will provide in their TS Bases a discussion
and list of each NRC-approved, LCO 3.0.4(c)-specific value and
parameter allowance. The bases of LCO 3.0.4 will be revised to explain
the new allowances and their utilization.
The staff did a qualitative assessment of the risk impact of the
proposed change in LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances by evaluating how the
licensee's implementation of the proposed risk-informed approach is
expected to meet the requirements of the applicable RGs. The staff
referred to the guidance provided in RG 1.174, ``An Approach for Using
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-
Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' and in RG 1.177, ``An
approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical
Specifications.'' RG 1.177 provides the staff's recommendations on
utilizing risk information to assess the impact of proposed changes to
nuclear power plant technical specifications on the risk associated
with plant operation. Although RG 1.177 does not specifically address
the type of generic change in this proposal, the staff considered the
approach documented in RG 1.177 in evaluating the risk information
provided in support of the proposed changes in LCO 3.0.4.
The staff's evaluation of how the implementation of the proposed
risk-informed approach, used to justify LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, agrees
with theobjectives of the guidance outlined in RG 1.177 is discussed in
Section 3.1. Oversight of the risk-informed approach associated with
the LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances is discussed in Sections 3.2.
3.1 Evaluation of Risk Management
Both the temporary and cumulative risk of the proposed change are
adequately limited. The temporary risk is limited by the exclusion of
higher-risk systems and components, and completion time limits
contained in technical specifications (Section 3.1.1). The cumulative
risk is limited by the temporary risk limitations and by the expected
low frequency of the proposed mode changes with inoperable equipment
(Section 3.1.2). Adequate NRC oversight of the licensee's ability to
use the LCO 3.0.4(b) provisions under appropriate circumstances, i.e.,
to identify risk-significant configurations when entering a higher mode
or condition in the applicability of an LCO (Section 3.1.3) is provided
by NRC inspection of the licensee's
[[Page 16587]]
implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) as applied to the proposed change.
3.1.1 Temporary Risk Increases
RG 1.177 proposes the incremental conditional core damage
probability (ICCDP) and the incremental conditional large early release
probability (ICLERP) as appropriate measures of the increase in
probability of core damage and large early release, respectively,
during the period of implementation of a proposed TS change. In
addition, RG 1.177 stresses the need to preclude potentially high risk
configurations introduced by the proposed change. The ICCDP associated
with any specified plant condition, such as the condition introduced by
entering a higher mode with plant equipment inoperable, is expressed by
the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN04AP03.023
Where:
[Delta]R = the conditional risk increase, in terms of core damage
frequency (CDF), caused by the specified condition
d = the duration of the specified plant condition
R1 = the plant CDF with the specified condition permanently
present
R0 = the plant CDF without the specified condition
The same expression can be used for ICLERP by substituting the
measure of risk, i.e., large early release frequency (LERF) for CDF.
The magnitude of the ICCDP and ICLERP values associated with plant
conditions applicable to LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances can be managed by
controlling the conditional risk increase, [xutri]R (in terms of both
CDF and LERF) and the duration, d, of such conditions. The following
sections discuss how the key elements of the proposed risk-informed
approach, used to justify LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, are expected to
limit [xutri]R and d and, thus, prevent any significant temporary risk
increases.
Identification of Risk-Important TS Systems and Components
A major element that limits the risk of the proposed mode change
flexibility is the exclusion of certain systems and associated LCOs for
the mode change allowance. Technical specifications allow operation in
Mode 1 (power operation) with specified levels of inoperability for
specified times. This provides a benchmark of currently acceptable risk
against which to measure any incremental risk inherent in the proposed
LCO 3.0.4(b). If a system inoperability accrues risk at a higher rate
in one or more of the transition modes than it would in Mode 1, then an
upward transition into that mode should not be allowed without
demonstration of a high degree of experience and sophistication in risk
management. However, the risk management process evaluated in Section
3.1.3 is adequate if higher-risk systems/components are excluded from
the scope of LCO 3.0.4(b).
The importance of most TS systems in mitigating accidents increases
as power increases. However, some TS systems are relatively more
important during lower power and shutdown operations, because:
[sbull] Certain events are peculiar to modes of plant operation
other than power operation,
[sbull] Certain events are more probable at modes of plant
operation other than power operation,
[sbull] Some modes of plant operation have less mitigation system
capability than power operation.
The risk information submitted in support of the proposed changes
to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 includes qualitative risk assessments
performed by each owners group to identify higher risk systems and
components at the various modes of operation, including transitions
between modes, as the plant moves upward from the refueling mode of
operation toward power operation. The owners groups' generic
qualitative risk assessments are included as attachments to TSTF-359,
Revision 8. Each of the owners groups' generic qualitative risk
assessments discuss the technical approach used and the systems/
components subsequently determined to be of higher risk significance;
the systems/components not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 allowances for
the various modes are listed. The owners groups generic qualitative
risk assessments are:
[sbull] BWR owners' group Risk-Informed Technical Specification
Committee, ``Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed
Improvements to Technical Specification Mode Restraints for BWR
Plants,'' General Electric Company GE-NE A13-00464 (Rev[2])
[sbull] ``B&W owners group Qualitative Risk Assessment for
Increased Flexibility in MODE Restraints,'' Framatome Technologies BAW-
2383
[sbull] Combustion Engineering owners group (CEOG) Task 1181,
``Qualitative Risk Assessment for Relaxation of Mode Entry
Restraints,'' CE Nuclear Power LLC, CE NPSD-1207 (Rev[0])
[sbull] ``WOG Qualitative Risk Assessment Supporting Increased
Flexibility in MODE Restraints.''
Following interactions with the staff, all owners groups used the
same systematic approach in their qualitative risk assessments to
identify the higher-risk systems in the STS, consisting of the
following steps:
[sbull] Identification of plant conditions (i.e., plant parameters
and availability of key mitigation systems) associated with changes in
plant operating modes while returning to power
[sbull] Identification of key activities that have the potential to
impact risk and which are in progress during transitions between modes
while the plant is returning to power
[sbull] Identification of applicable accident initiating events for
each mode or other specified condition in the applicability
[sbull] Identification of the higher-risk systems and components by
combining the information in the first three steps (qualitative risk
assessment)
The risk assessments properly used the results and insights from
previous deterministic and probabilistic studies to systematically
search for plant conditions in which certain key plant components are
more important in mitigating accidents than during operation at power
(Mode 1). This search was systematic, taking the following factors into
account for the various stages of returning the plant to power:
[sbull] The status of accident mitigation and normally operating
systems
[sbull] The status of key plant parameters such as reactor coolant
system pressure
[sbull] The key activities that are in progress during transitions
between modes which have the potential to impact risk (e.g., the
transfer from auxiliary to main feedwater at some PWR plants when Mode
1 is entered)
[sbull] The applicable accident initiating events for each mode of
plant operation
[sbull] Design and operational differences among plants or groups
of plants
The following systems and components were identified by each of the
four owners groups as higher-risk systems and components, when the
plant is entering a new mode.
[[Page 16588]]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System BWR type Entering mode
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) Plants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Pressure Coolant Injection BWR 3 & 4............. 2, 1.
(HPCI) System.
High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS).... BWR 5 & 6............. 2, 1.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling BWR 3, 4, 5 & 6....... 2, 1.
(RCIC) System.
Isolation Condenser................ BWR 2................. 2, 1.
Diesel Generators (including other All................... All.
Emergency/Shutdown AC Power
Supplies).
Hardened Wetwell Vent System....... BWR 2, 3 & 4 with Mark 3, 2, 1.
I Containment.
Residual Heat Removal System....... All................... 4.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Entering mode
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group (B&WOG) Plants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) & Hydro- 5, 4, 3, 2, 1.
Electric Units for Oconee.
Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System............... 1.
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System................ 5, 4.
------------------------------------------------
Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) Plants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)............. 5, 4, 3, 2, 1.
Auxiliary Feedwater/Emergency Feedwater (AFW/ 4, 3, 2, 1.
EFW) System.
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) System... 4, 3 (below 1700 psia).
LTOP/PORVs (when used for Low Temperature 5, 4 (below set temperature)
Overpressure Protection (LTOP)).
Shutdown Cooling System (Low Pressure Safety 5.
Injection (LPSI) pumps).
------------------------------------------------
Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Plants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)............. 5, 4, 3, 2, 1.
Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (for plants 4, 3, 2, 1.
depending on AFW for startup).
High Head Safety Injection System.............. 4.
Cold Overpressure Protection System............ 5, 4.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System............. 5.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If a licensee identifies a higher-risk system for only some of the
modes of applicability, the TS for that system would be modified by a
note that reads, for example, ``LCO 3.0.4(b) is not applicable when
entering MODE 1 from MODE 2.'' Systems identified as higher risk for
Modes 5 and 6 for PWRs, and Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs, are also excluded
from transitioning up to the mode of higher risk, and as previously
discussed, notes for those transitions are superfluous. In addition,
mode transitions for Modes 5 and 6 for PWRs, and Modes 4 and 5 for
BWRs, will be addressed by administrative controls.
In summary, the staff's review of the owners groups qualitative
risk assessments finds that they are of adequate quality to support the
application (i.e., they identify the higher-risk systems and
components) associated with entering higher modes of plant operation
with equipment inoperable while returning to power.
[Plant Specific changes will be described here.]
Limited Time in TS Required Actions
Any temporary risk increase will be limited by, among other
factors, duration constraints imposed by the TS CTs of the inoperable
systems. For the systems and components which are not higher risk, any
temporary risk increase associated with the proposed allowance will be
smaller than what is considered acceptable when the same systems and
components are inoperable at power. This is due to the fact that CTs
associated with the majority of TS systems and components were
developed for power operation and pose a smaller plant risk for action
statement entries initiated or occurring at lower modes of operation as
compared to power operation.
The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance will be used only when the licensee
determines that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be
satisfied following the mode change. This will minimize the likelihood
of additional temporary risk increases associated with the need to exit
a mode due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the
CT. In most cases, licensees will enter into a higher mode with the
intent to move up to Mode 1 (power operation). As discussed in Section
3.2, the revised reactor oversight process monitors unplanned power
changes as a performance indicator. The reactor oversight process thus
discourages licensees from entering a mode or other specified condition
in the applicability of an LCO, and moving up in power, when there is a
likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to
failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. Another
disincentive for licensees to enter a higher mode when an LCO is not
met is related to reporting requirements. 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 make
it clear that a report is required when a nuclear plant shutdown or
mode change is required by TS. The NRC's oversight program will provide
the framework for inspectors and other staff to follow the history at a
specific plant of entering higher modes while an LCO is not met, and
use such information in assessing the licensee's actions and
performance.
3.1.2 Cumulative Risk Increases
The cumulative risk impact of the change to allow the plant to
enter a higher mode of operation with one or more safety-related
components unavailable (as proposed here), is measured by the average
yearly risk increase associated with the change. In general, this
cumulative risk increase is assessed in terms of both CDF and LERF
(i.e., [Delta]CDF and [Delta]LERF, respectively). The increase in CDF
due to the proposed change is expressed by the following equation,
which integrates the
[[Page 16589]]
risk impact from all expected specified conditions (i.e., all expected
plant conditions caused by mode changes with various TS systems and
components unavailable).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN04AP03.024
Where:
[Delta]CDFi = the CDF increase due to specified condition i
ICCDPi = the ICCDP associated with specified condition i
fi = the average yearly frequency of occurrence of specified
condition i
A similar expression can be used for [Delta]LERF by substituting
the measure of risk, i.e., LERF for CDF. The magnitude of the
[Delta]CDF and [Delta]LERF values associated with plant conditions
applicable to LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances can be managed by controlling the
temporary risk increases, in terms of both CDF and LERF (i.e., ICCDP
and ICLERP), and the frequency (f), of each of such conditions. In
addition to the points made in the previous section regarding temporary
risk increases, the following points put into perspective how the key
elements of the proposed risk-informed approach, used to justify an LCO
3.0.4(b) allowance, are expected to prevent significant cumulative risk
increases by limiting the frequency of its use:
[sbull] The frequency of risk significant conditions will be
limited by not providing the LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances to the higher risk
systems and components.
[sbull] The frequency of risk significant conditions will be
limited by the requirement to assess the likelihood that the LCO will
be satisfied following the mode change.
[sbull] The frequency of risk significant conditions is limited by
the fact that such conditions can occur only when the plant is
returning to power following shutdown, i.e., during a small fraction of
time per year (data over the past five years indicate that the plants
are averaging 2.1 startups per year).
The addition of the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances to the plant
maintenance activities is not expected to change the plant's average
(cumulative) risk significantly.
3.1.3 Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Mode Changes
With all safety systems and components operable, a plant can
transition up in mode to power operation. With one or more system(s) or
component(s) inoperable, this change permits a plant to transition up
in mode to power operation if the inoperable system(s) or component(s)
are not in the pre-analyzed higher risk category, a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)
based risk assessment is performed prior to the mode transition, and
the requisite risk management actions are taken. The proposed TS Bases
state, ``When an LCO is not met, LCO 3.0.4 also allows entering MODES
or other specified conditions in the Applicability following assessment
of the risk impact and determination that the impact can be managed.
The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended
approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant
program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities
to be assessed and managed.'' It should be noted that, the risk
assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4(b), must take into account
all inoperable TS equipment regardless whether the equipment is
included in the licensee's normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment
scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and
guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing
Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'' The
results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the
acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the
Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. * * * A
risk assessment and establishment of risk management actions, as
appropriate, are required for determination of acceptable risk for
entering MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when
an LCO is not met. Elements of acceptable risk assessment and risk
management actions are included in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01
``Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance
Activities,'' as endorsed by RG 1.182, which addresses general guidance
for conduct of the risk assessment, gives quantitative and qualitative
guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and provides
example risk management actions. These risk management actions include
actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls
overall risk, actions to increase risk awareness by shift and
management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the conditions,
actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of
backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that
the proposed MODE change is acceptable.
The guidance references state that a licensee's risk assessment
process should be sufficiently robust and comprehensive to assess risk
associated with maintenance activities during power operation, low
power and shutdown conditions (all modes of operation), including
changes in plant conditions. NUMARC 93-01 states that the risk
assessment should include consideration of: the degree of redundancy
available for performance of the safety function(s) served by the out-
of-service equipment; the duration of the out-of-service condition;
component and system dependencies that are affected; the risk impact of
performing the maintenance during shutdown versus at power; and, the
impact of mode transition risk. For power operation, key plant safety
functions are those that ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant
pressure boundary, ensure the capability to shut down and maintain the
reactor in safe shutdown condition, and ensure the capability to
prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in
potentially significant offsite exposures.
While the inoperabilities permitted by the completion times of
technical specification required actions take into consideration the
safety significance and redundancy of the system or components within
the scope of an LCO, the completion times generally do not address or
consider concurrent system or component inoperabilities in multiple
LCOs. Therefore, the performance of the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk
assessment which looks at the entire plant configuration is essential
(and required) prior to changing operational mode. The 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4) based risk assessment will be used to confirm (or reject)
the appropriateness of transitioning up in mode given the actual status
of plant safety equipment.
The risk impact on the plant condition of invoking an LCO 3.0.4(b)
allowance will be assessed and managed through the program established
to
[[Page 16590]]
implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This program is consistent with RG 1.177
and RG 1.174 in its approach. The implementation guidance for paragraph
(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule addresses controlling temporary risk
increases resulting from maintenance activities. This guidance,
consistent with guidance in RG 1.177, establishes action thresholds
based on qualitative and quantitative considerations and risk
management actions. Significant temporary risk increases following an
LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance are unlikely to occur unless:
[sbull] High-risk configurations are allowed (e.g., certain
combinations of multiple component outages), or
[sbull] Risk management of plant operation activities is
inadequate.
The requirements associated with the proposed change are established to
ensure that such conditions will not occur.
The thresholds of the cumulative (aggregate) risk impacts, assessed
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the associated implementation
guidance, are based on the permanent change guidelines in NRC RG 1.174.
Therefore, licensees will manage the risk exercising LCO 3.0.4 in
conjunction with the risk from other concurrent plant activities to
ensure that any increase, in terms of core damage frequency (CDF) and
large early release frequency (LERF) will be small and consistent with
the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement.
3.2 Oversight
The reactor oversight process (ROP) provides a means for assessing
the licensee's performance in the application of the proposed mode
change flexibility. The adequacy of the licensee's assessment and
management of maintenance-related risk is addressed by existing
inspection programs and guidance for 50.65(a)(4). Although the current
versions of that guidance do not specifically address application of
the licensee's (a)(4) program to support risk-informed technical
specifications, it is expected that in most cases, risk assessment and
management associated with risk-informed technical specifications would
be required by (a)(4) anyway because maintenance activities will be
involved.
Adoption of the proposed change will make failure to assess and
manage the risk of an upward mode change with inoperable equipment
covered by technical specifications, prior to commencing such a mode
change, a violation of technical specifications. Further, as explained
above in general, under most foreseeable circumstances, such a change
in configuration would also require a risk assessment under 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4). Inoperable systems or components will necessitate
maintenance to restore them to operability, and hence a 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4) risk assessment would be performed prior to the performance
of those maintenance actions (except for immediate plant stabilization
and restoration actions if necessary). Further, before altering the
plant's configuration, including plant configuration changes associated
with mode changes, the licensee must update the existing (a)(4) risk
assessment to reflect those changes.
The Federal Register Notice issuing a revision to the maintenance
rule, 10 CFR 50.65, (Federal Register, Vol 64 No 137, Monday, July 19,
1999, pg 38553), along with NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.13, and
Section 11, dated February 22, 2000, ``Assessment of Risk Resulting
from Performance of Maintenance Activities,'' of NUMARC 93-01, all
indicate that to determine the safety impact of a change in plant
conditions during maintenance, a risk assessment must be performed
before changing plant conditions. The bases for the proposed TS change
mandate that the risk assessment and management of upward mode changes
will be conducted under the licensee's program and process for meeting
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Oversight of licensee performance in assessing and
managing the risk of plant maintenance activities is conducted
principally by inspection in accordance with Reactor Oversight Program
Baseline Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.13, ``Maintenance Risk
Assessment and Emergent Work Control.'' Supplemental IP 62709,
``Configuration Risk Assessment and Risk Management Process,'' is
utilized to evaluate the licensee's process, when necessary.
The ROP is described in overview in NUREG-1649, Rev 3, ``Reactor
Oversight Process,'' and in detail in the NRC Inspection Manual.
Inspection Procedure 71111.13 requires verification of performance of
risk assessments when they are required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and in
accordance with licensee procedures. The procedure also requires
verification of the adequacy of those risk assessments and verification
of effective implementation of licensee-prescribed risk management
actions. The rule itself requires such assessment and management of
risk prior to maintenance activities, including preventive maintenance,
surveillance and testing, (and promptly for emergent work) during all
modes of plant operation. The guidance documents for both industry
implementation of (a)(4) and NRC oversight of that implementation
indicate that changes in plant configuration (which would include mode
changes) in support of maintenance activities must be taken into
account in the risk assessment and management process. Revisions to NRC
inspection guidance and licensee implementation procedures will be
needed to address oversight of risk assessment and management required
by TS in support of mode changes that are not already required under
the circumstances by (a)(4). This consideration provides performance-
based regulatory oversight of the use of the proposed flexibility, and
a disincentive to use the flexibility without the requisite care in
planning.
In addition, the staff is in the process of developing detailed
significance determination process (SDP) guidance for use in assessing
inspection findings related to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This guidance was
issued in draft for comment and is anticipated to become final during
2003. The ROP considers inspection findings and performance indicators
in evaluating licensee ability to operate safely. The SDP is used to
determine the significance of inspection findings related to licensee
assessment and management of the risk associated with performing
maintenance activities under all plant operating or shutdown
conditions. Unplanned reactor scrams and unplanned power changes are
two of the Reactor Safety Performance Indicators that the ROP utilizes
to assess licensee performance and inform the public. The ROP will
provide a disincentive to entering into power operation (Mode 1), when
there is a significant likelihood that the mode would have to be
subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment
within the completion time.
3.3 Summary
The industry, through the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Risk
Informed Technical Specifications Task Force (RITSTF), has submitted a
proposed technical specification (TS) change to allow entry into a
higher mode of operation, or other specified condition in the TS
applicability, while relying on the TS conditions, and associated
required actions and completion times, provided a risk assessment is
performed to confirm the acceptability of that action. The proposal
revises standard technical specification (STS) LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4,
and their application to the TS. New paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) are
proposed for LCO 3.0.4.
The proposed LCO 3.0.4(a) retains the current allowance, permitting
the mode
[[Page 16591]]
change when the TS required actions allow indefinite operation.
Proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) is the change to allow entry into a higher
mode of operation, or other specified condition in the TS
applicability, while relying on the TS conditions and associated
required actions and completion times, provided a risk assessment is
performed to confirm the acceptability of that action for the existing
plant configuration. The staff review finds that the process proposed
by industry for assessing and managing risk during the implementation
of the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, meets Commission guidance for
technical specification changes. Key elements of this process are
listed below.
[sbull] A risk assessment shall be performed before any LCO
3.0.4(b) allowance is invoked.
[sbull] The risk impact on the plant condition of invoking an LCO
3.0.4(b) allowance will be assessed and managed through the program
established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the associated guidance
in RG 1.182. Allowing entry into a higher mode or condition in the
applicability of an LCO after an 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) based risk
assessment and appropriate risk management actions are taken for the
existing plant configuration will ensure that plant safety is
maintained.
[sbull] The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance will be used only when the
licensee determines that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will
be satisfied within the required action's completion time.
[sbull] TS systems and components which may be of higher risk
during mode changes have been identified generically by each owner's
group for each plant operational mode or condition. Licensees will
identify such plant-specific systems and components in the individual
plant TS. The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance does not apply to these
systems and components for the mode or condition in the applicability
of an LCO at which they are of higher risk.
[sbull] Plants adopting LCO 3.0.4(b) will ensure that plant
procedures in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) address the
situation where entering a mode or other specified condition in the
applicability is contemplated with plant equipment inoperable. Such
plant procedures typically follow the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, Section
11, as revised in February 2000 and endorsed by NRC RG 1.182.
The NRC's reactor oversight process provides the framework for
inspectors and other staff to oversee the implementation of 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4) requirements at a specific plant and assess the licensee's
actions and performance.
The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance does not apply to values and parameters
of the technical specifications that have their own respective LCOs
(e.g., Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity), but instead those
values and parameters are addressed by LCO 3.0.4(c). The TS values and
parameters for which mode transition allowances apply, will have a note
that states LCO 3.0.4(c) is applicable.
The objective of the proposed change is to provide additional
operational flexibility without compromising plant safety.
4.0 State Consultation
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with
subsequent disposition by the staff].
5.0 Environmental Consideration
The amendments change a requirement with respect to the
installation or use of a facility component located within the
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance
requirements. [For licensees adding a bases control program: The
amendment also changes record keeping, reporting, or administrative
procedures or requirements.] The NRC staff has determined that the
amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no
significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released
offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or
cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has
previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no
significant hazards considerations, and there has been no public
comment on the finding [insert FR number]. Accordingly, the amendments
meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10
CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and (c)(10)]. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
6.0 Conclusion
The Commission has concluded, on the basis of the considerations
discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health
and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or
to the health and safety of the public.
Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination
Description of Amendment Request: A change is proposed to the
standard technical specifications (STS)(NUREGs 1430 through 1434) and
plant specific technical specifications (TS), to allow entry into a
mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a TS, while
in a condition statement and the associated required actions of the TS,
provided the licensee performs a risk assessment and manages risk
consistent with the program in place for complying with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). LCO 3.0.4 exceptions in individual
TS would be eliminated, and SR 3.0.4 revised to reflect the LCO 3.0.4
allowance.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions of the TS. Being in a TS
condition and the associated required actions is not an initiator of
any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of an
accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The
consequences of an accident while relying on required actions as
allowed by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than the consequences
of an accident while entering and relying on the required actions while
starting in a condition of applicability of the TS. Therefore, the
consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly
affected by this change. The addition of a requirement to assess and
manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize
possible concerns. Therefore, this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
[[Page 16592]]
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed).
Entering into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability
of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the associated required
actions of the TS, will not introduce new failure modes or effects and
will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an
accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents
previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and
manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize
possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in the Margin of Safety
The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions of the TS. The TS allow
operation of the plant without the full complement of equipment through
the conditions for not meeting the TS Limiting Conditions for Operation
(LCO). The risk associated with this allowance is managed by the
imposition of required actions that must be performed within the
prescribed completion times. The net effect of being in a TS condition
on the margin of safety is not considered significant. The proposed
change does not alter the required actions or completion times of the
TS. The proposed change allows TS conditions to be entered, and the
associated required actions and completion times to be used in new
circumstances. This use is predicated upon the licensee's performance
of a risk assessment and the management of plant risk. The change also
eliminates current allowances for utilizing required actions and
completion times in similar circumstances, without assessing and
managing risk. The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous
discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not
involve a significant hazards consideration.
The following example of an application was prepared by the NRC
staff to facilitate use of the consolidated line item improvement
process (CLIIP). The model provides the expected level of detail and
content for an application to revise technical specifications regarding
mode change limitations (and adoption of a technical specification
bases control program)* using CLIIP. Licensees remain responsible for
ensuring that their actual application fulfills their administrative
requirements as well as Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.
Subject: Plant Name
Docket No. 50-
Application for technical specification change regarding mode change
limitations (and adoption of a technical specifications bases
control program, and STS SR 3.0.1 and associated bases)* using the
consolidated line item improvement process
Gentleman: In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90
[LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an amendment to the technical
specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements for mode
change limitations in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4, (and, in conjunction
with the proposed change, TS requirements for a bases control
program consistent with TS Bases Control Program described in
Section 5.5 of the applicable vendor's Standard Technical
Specifications, and STS SR 3.0.1 and associated bases.)
Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed change
(including a table of affected TS with a brief descriptor of the
change), the requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-
specific verifications. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages
marked up to show the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides revised
(clean) TS pages. Attachment 4 provides a summary of the regulatory
commitments made in this submittal. Attachment 5 provides the
existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed change.
[LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed License Amendment
by [DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X
DAYS].
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application,
with attachments, is being provided to the designated [STATE]
Official.
* If not already in the facility Technical Specifications
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
Stats of America that I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this
request and that the foregoing s true and correct. (Note that
request may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or affirmation
statement).
If you should have any questions regarding this submittal,
please contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER]
Sincerely,
[Name, Title]
Attachments:
1. Description and Assessment
2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
3. Revised Technical Specification Pages
4. If applicable: Regulatory Commitments
5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes
cc:
NRC Project Manager
NRC Regional Office
NRC resident Inspector
State Contact
Attachment 1--Description and Assessment
1.0 Description
The proposed amendment would modify technical specifications (TS)
requirements for mode change limitations in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ [In conjunction with the proposed change, technical
specifications (TS) requirements for a bases control program,
consistent with the TS Bases Control Program described in Section
5.5 of the applicable vendor's standard TS (STS), shall be
incorporated into the licensee's TS, if not already in the TS.
Similarly, the STS requirements of SR 3.0.1 and associated bases
shall be adopted by units that do not already contain them.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS change
TSTF-359 Revision 8, as modified by the notice in the Federal Register
published on [DATE]. That Federal Register notice announced the
availability of this TS improvement through the consolidated line item
improvement process (CLIIP).
2.0 Assessment
2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation
[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part
of the CLIIP. This review included a review of the NRC staff's
evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support
TSTF-359 Revision 8. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the justifications
presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by
the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.] and justify this
amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the [PLANT] TS.
2.2 Optional Changes and Variations
[LICENSEE] is not proposing any variations or deviations from the
TS changes described in the modified TSTF-359 Revision 8 and the NRC
staff's model safety evaluation dated [DATE].
[[Page 16593]]
3.0 Regulatory Analysis
3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination
[LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register
as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed NSHCD
presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to [PLANT] and
is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10
CFR 50.91(a).
3.2 Verification and Commitments
As discussed in the notice of availability published in the Federal
Register on [DATE] for this TS improvement, plant-specific
verifications were performed as follows:
The licenses has established TS Bases for [LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4]
which state that use of the TS mode change limitation flexibility
established by [LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4] is not to be interpreted as
endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring
systems or components to operable status before entering an associated
mode or other specified condition in the TS Applicability.
The modification also includes changes to the bases for [LCO 3.0.4
and SR 3.0.4] that provide details on how to implement the new
requirements. The bases changes provide guidance for changing Modes or
other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met.
The bases changes describe in detail how: [LCO 3.0.4.a] allows entry
into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the
LCO not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued
operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability
for an unlimited period of time; [LCO 3.0.4.b] allows entry into a MODE
or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met
after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems
and components, consideration of the results, determination of the
acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the
Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if
appropriate; and [LCO 3.0.4.c] allows entry into a MODE or other
specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met based on
a Note in the Specification, which is typically applied to
Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., [Containment
Air Temperature, Containment Pressure, MCPR, Moderator Temperature
Coefficient]), though it may be applied to other Specifications based
on NRC plant-specific approval. The bases also state that any risk
impact should be managed through the program in place to implement 10
CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide
1.182. ``Assessing and Managing Risks Before Maintenance Activities at
Nuclear Power Plants,'' and that the results of the risk assessment
shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the
MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any
corresponding risk management actions. In addition, the bases state
that upon entry into a Mode or other specified condition in the
Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require
entry in to the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for no more
than the duration of the applicable Completion Time or until the LCO is
met or the unit is not within the Applicability of the TS. The bases
also state that SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other
specified conditions of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not
been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement
to declare the LCO not met has been delayed in accordance with SR
3.0.3. Finally, the licensee is expected to have a bases control
program consistent with Section 5.5 of the STS, and the equivalent of
STS SR 3.0.1 and associated bases.
4.0 Environmental Evaluation
[LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in
the model safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part of the CLIIP.
[LICENSEE] has concluded that the staff's findings presented in that
evaluation are applicable to [PLANT] and the evaluation is hereby
incorporated by reference for this application.
Attachment 2--Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)
Attachment 3--Proposed Technical Specification Pages
Attachment 4--List of Regulatory Commitments
The following table identifies those actions committed to by
[LICENSEE] in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are
provided for information purposes and are not considered to be
regulatory commitments. Please direct questions regarding these
commitments to [CONTACT NAME].
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory commitments Due date/event
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[LICENSEE] will establish the Technical [Complete, implemented with
Specification Bases for TS 3.0.3 as amendment OR within X days of
adopted with the applicable license implementation of amendment]
amendment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attachment 5--Proposed Changes to Technical Specification Bases Pages
[FR Doc. 03-8203 Filed 4-3-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P