[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 60 (Friday, March 28, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15227-15231]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-7390]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 00-24]


Robert A. Leslie, M.D., Revocation of Registration

    On May 8, 2000, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), issued an 
Order to Show Cause to Robert A. Leslie, M.D. (Respondent), proposing 
to deny his application for a DEA Certification of Registration 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) for reason that such registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest. Specifically, the Order to Show 
Cause alleged the following:
    (1) On August 17, 1990, Respondent's DEA Certificate of 
Registration, ALOO33186, was revoked based in part on findings that: 
(a) On or about October 3, 1986, Respondent was convicted in the 
Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, California of eight 
counts of unlawfully prescribing, administering, furnishing, or 
dispensing controlled substances; and (b) effective March 23, 1990, the 
California Board of Medical Quality Assurance suspended Respondent's 
license to practice medicine for ninety days and placed his medical 
license on probation for five years.
    (2) During February 1992, Respondent submitted a new application 
for registration. Following a hearing, the then-Administrator of DEA 
denied Respondent's application, effective March 15, 1995, noting, 
inter alia, that Respondent was either unable or unwilling to discharge 
the responsibilities inherent in a DEA registration. Respondent's 
petition for review of this decision was denied by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on August 5, 1996.
    (3) On or about December 13, 1996, Respondent submitted a new 
application for a DEA registration. The then-Deputy Administrator 
concluded that the previous administrative proceeding was res judicata 
for the purposes of the then-current proceeding. Effective June 14, 
1999, the Deputy Administrator again denied Respondent's application, 
concluding that other than the passage of time, the circumstances 
existing at the time of the prior proceeding had not sufficiently 
changed to warrant issuance of a DEA registration.
    Respondent, acting pro se, filed a timely request for a hearing on 
the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause. Following prehearing 
procedures, a hearing was held on September 21, 2000, and February 8, 
2001, in Los Angeles, California before Administrative Law Judge Mary 
Ellen Bittner (Judge Bittner). At the hearing, the Government called 
two witnesses to testify and the Respondent testified on his own 
behalf. Both parties also introduced documentary evidence. After the 
hearing, both parties submitted proposed findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and argument.
    On August 2, 2001, Judge Bittner issued her Opinion and Recommended 
Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision recommending 
that the Respondent's application be denied. On or around August 17, 
2001, the Respondent timely filed exceptions to Judge Bittner's 
recommended ruling. Thereafter, Judge Bittner transmitted the record of 
these proceedings to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.
    On March 4, 2002, the Respondent filed Judge Bittner, a letter (the 
March 2002 letter) in which he represented, among other things, that a 
provision under California law allows physician assistants to prescribe 
certain drugs ``with or without preprinted prescriptions from the 
supervising physician.'' The Respondent further requested that Judge 
Bittner transmit the additional document to the Deputy Administrator 
for consideration. It appears from a review of the record before the 
Deputy Administrator that matters involving the role of physician 
assistants and the prescribing of controlled substances were litigated. 
It is unclear however why the Respondent did not introduce the March 
2002 at the hearing or reference its contents in his post-hearing 
submissions. Therefore, in rendering his decision in this matter, the 
Deputy Administrator has not considered the Respondent's untimely

[[Page 15228]]

submission, as it seeks to introduce evidence not submitted at the 
hearing in this matter. See Richard S. Wagner, M.D. 63 FR 6771 (1998).
    On August 20, 2002, the Deputy Administrator received from 
Government counsel a letter, with attachments, informing that due to an 
administrative oversight, DEA Certificate of Registration, BL6652312, 
was erroneously issued to the Respondent on February 9, 2000. In light 
of the Respondent's current registration status, the question for 
resolution now before the Deputy Administrator is whether or not the 
Respondent's continued registration with DEA is inconsistent with the 
public interest.
    The Deputy Administrator finds that the Respondent previously 
possessed DEA Certificate of Registration AL0033186. On June 21, 1989, 
an Order to Show Cause was issued proposing to revoke that Certificate 
of Registration. Robert A. Leslie, M.D. 64 FR 25908 (1999). The 
Respondent initially requested a hearing, but later requested the 
opportunity ot submit a written statement in lieu of a hearing. Based 
on the Government's investigative file and Respondent's written 
statement, the then-Acting Administrator revoked Respondent's 
registration effective August 17, 1990. See 55 FR 29,278 (July 18, 
1990).
    In February 1992, Respondent applied for a new DEA registration. An 
Order to Show Cause was issued on May 13, 1993, proposing to deny the 
application. Following a hearing before Judge Bittner, the then-Deputy 
Administrator adopted Judge Bittner's recommended ruling and denied the 
Respondent's application for registration, effective March 15, 1995. 
See 60 FR 14,004 (1995).
    During the 1993 proceeding before Judge Bittner, the record 
established that on October 9, 1986, after a jury trial, Respondent was 
found guilty in the Municipal Court of Long Beach, California, of eight 
misdemeanor counts of unlawfully prescribing, administering, 
furnishing, or dispensing controlled substances between July 1985 and 
January 1986. The convictions were affirmed on appeal by the Appellate 
Department of the Superior Court, State of California, on May 18, 1988. 
As a result of these convictions, the California Board of Medical 
Quality Assurance (Board), on a date not specified in the record, 
revoked the Respondent's medical license. However, the Board stayed the 
revocation for five years, suspended Respondent from the practice of 
medicine for ninety days, and placed him on probation subject to 
various conditions. In response to the Board's decision, the Respondent 
sued the Board, but was unsuccessful. The court in which Respondent 
brought the action ultimately fined him $10,000 and found that his 
appeal was frivolous. In addition, the court found that the Respondent 
must ``accept responsibility for his actions.''
    As outlined in a prior final order, the then-Deputy Administrator 
found at the 1993 hearing, the Respondent attacked his criminal 
convictions. See 64 FR 25908 (May 13, 1999). However, Judge Bittner and 
the then-Deputy Administrator found that the conviction was res 
judicata and that Respondent was therefore prohibited from relitigating 
the matter. The agency also found that although he was free to offer 
evidence that he would never again engage in the sort of conduct that 
resulted in his conviction, Respondent did not avail himself of that 
opportunity and offered no evidence of remorse for his misconduct, 
efforts at rehabilitation, or recognition of the severity of his 
conduct. Judge Bittner and the then-Deputy Administrator therefore 
concluded that Respondent was either unwilling or unable to discharge 
the responsibilities of a DEA registrant and recommended that his 
application be denied. Respondent filed a petition for review of the 
1995 final order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. The court denied that petition on August 5, 1996.
    On December 13, 1996, Respondent again applied for a DEA 
registration, and an Order to Show Cause was issued on December 23, 
1997, proposing to deny the application. Following a hearing, 
Administrative Law Judge Gail A. Randall recommended that the 
application be granted, subject to certain conditions. Judge Randall 
found that Respondent had been forthcoming on his registration 
application about his convictions and prior DEA proceedings, there were 
no new allegations that Respondent had handled controlled substances 
improperly after his 1986 conviction, and there had been no complaints 
or adverse actions against his medical license since the 1988 Board 
proceeding. Judge Randall further found that Respondent had continued 
to make valuable contributions to the medical profession; participated 
in continuing medical education; there were no restrictions on his 
medical license in California; and Respondent had become more 
conservative in his approach to prescribing controlled substances.
    In the May 13, 1999, Final Order, the then-Deputy Administrator 
found that the final order published on March 15, 1995, was res 
judicata for purposes of the proceeding before him, and adopted that 
final order in its entirety. 64 FR 25908, supra. While the then-Deputy 
Administrator adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
set forth, he did not adopt the recommended ruling of the 
Administrative Law Judge. Instead, the Deputy Administrator found that 
in addition to his criminal conviction and the suspension of his 
medical license, the Respondent was unrepentant, and continued to blame 
everyone but himself for his unlawful actions. Therefore, the then-
Deputy Administrator concluded that Respondent's registration would not 
be consistent with the public interest and denied the application.
    On June 29, 1999, Respondent again applied for a DEA registration 
to handle controlled substances. That application and the disposition 
of the Certificate of Registration that was mistakenly issued to the 
Respondent, are the subjects of the instant proceedings.
    The Deputy Administrator finds that the Respondent's June 1999 
application was forwarded to DEA's Los Angeles office for investigation 
because Respondent had answered ``yes'' to questions on the form that 
ask whether the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime in 
connection with controlled substances, ever surrendered or had adverse 
action taken on a federal controlled substance registration, or has 
ever had action taken against a state professional license or 
controlled substance registration. A DEA Diversion Investigator 
testified that on November 24, 1999, she spoke with the Respondent and 
asked him why he believed his application should be granted. According 
to the investigator, the Respondent attacked the prior DEA and criminal 
proceedings in which he had been involved, but did not say anything 
that would suggest that he would act responsibly in the future if his 
application were granted, nor did he divulge any actions he had taken 
that would support his application.
    Respondent then wrote a ten-page letter dated November 25, 1999, to 
the Diversion Investigator explaining his position with respect to the 
1986 conviction and his efforts first to maintain and then to regain 
DEA registration. Specifically, the Respondent made various claims 
regarding the inadequacy of the 1986 criminal proceedings resulting in 
his conviction, as well as his legal representation during those 
proceedings. In support of the latter assertion, Respondent offered 
into evidence in the instant matter a letter from the State Bar of 
California dated

[[Page 15229]]

August 3, 1999, indicating that his attorney ``resigned from the 
practice of law with charges pending'' in 1994.
    Respondent also contended in the aforementioned letter that his 
applications for habeas corpus, coram nobis, and declarative relief 
were denied, asserting that he was ``unable to submit an adequate 
habeas corpus petition because defense counsel refused to release 
[Respondent's] criminal file, although [sic] sued for its return in the 
legal malpractice suit, until given an ultimatum to do so by the state 
bar, when [Respondent] was no longer in custody.''
    With respect to the various DEA proceedings described above, the 
Respondent asserted in his letter that his registration was initially 
revoked ``without notice or hearing based on false, inadmissible 
hearsay evidence given to the agency by the medical board.'' The 
Respondent recited numerous additional allegations with respect to 
DEA's action against his previous registration, as well as his 
applications for registration, which are summarized as follows: DEA 
took action against the Respondent's registration because he advised 
the agency of the criminal activities taking place at a clinic in Long 
Beach; an undercover operative gave false information that Respondent 
supplied Schedule II drugs for weight control when in fact he used 
Schedule IV drugs; the then-Administrator did not consider all the 
pleadings and evidence; no other physician has had a registration 
revoked based on a misdemeanor conviction for improperly prescribing 
Schedule III drugs; he had three years of training in pharmacology and 
was familiar with the drugs he handled; hearsay was improperly 
admitted; and the then-Administrator's decision conflicted with those 
of the trial judge, the state administrative law judge for the Board, 
as well as the Board itself.
    The Respondent further contended in his letter that the denial of 
his 1992 application was based on his purported failure ``to take 
unspecified `rehabilitative' steps.'' With respect to the denial of his 
1996 application, Respondent asserted, inter alia, that the then-Deputy 
Administrator's order conflicted with the opinion of the administrative 
law judge who heard the evidence, and was made on the ``incorrect basis 
that in [Respondent's] administrative hearing he failed to offer any 
evidence that [he] has been rehabilitated and can handle restricted 
substances even on a restricted bas[i]s.''
    The Government also presented the testimony of a second Diversion 
Investigator from the agency's Los Angeles office. The investigator 
testified that on July 13, 2000, DEA personnel seized approximately 
13,000 prescriptions from Plaza Pharmacy in Hawthorne, California, in 
the course of an investigation unrelated to Respondent. Three of the 
seized prescriptions, which were admitted into evidence as Government 
exhibits appeared to be written by someone on a preprinted prescription 
pad with a caption that read, ``Robert M.D. Clinic.'' The prescriptions 
in question also bore the clinic's address as well as the Respondent's 
name. One of the prescriptions was issued to a patient hereinafter 
identified by his initials ``FU'' and dated January 12, 2000, for 
promethazine with codeine (a Schedule IV controlled substance); 
prescriptions were also issued to patient ``GB'' and dated January 19, 
2000, for forty cephalexinll (a non-controlled drug) and eight ounces 
of Phenergan with codeine (a brand name for promethazine); and the 
third prescription was issued to a ``JH'' and dated December 27, 1999, 
for cephalexin and promethazine with codeine. Further review of the 
third prescription reveals the Respondent's previous DEA registration 
number, AL0033186, written in the lower left corner of the document. As 
noted above, the DEA registration number was revoked, effective August 
17, 1990.
    The second DEA Diversion Investigator further testified at the 
hearing that the handwriting on each of the Plaza Pharmacy 
prescriptions appeared to be different, and that the person who signed 
each prescription appeared to be someone other than the person who 
wrote the patient's name, the medication to be dispensed, and date. The 
investigator further testified that the DEA registration number written 
on these prescriptions did not appear to be in Respondent's 
handwriting.
    Respondent testified that he was retained as a physician in the 
Robert M.D. Clinic in Hawthorne in December 1999 as a supervisor of 
physician assistants, that he did not personally see patients or write 
prescriptions, and that he only went to the clinic once or twice per 
week to sign charts. The Respondent further testified that he neither 
wrote the prescriptions at issue nor authorized anyone else to write 
them, and did not know any of the patients to whom the prescriptions 
were issued. Respondent also testified that he did not think he signed 
the prescriptions because he usually wrote out his whole name when 
signing prescriptions and some letters appeared to be missing from the 
prescriptions at issue. However, Respondent also acknowledged that 
``[i]t might be'' his signature on the prescription for GB, and if so, 
he may have signed the prescription in blank, as he would not have 
issued the prescription as written. With respect to the prescription to 
JH, Respondent testified that the physician signature, instructions, 
and the patient's name and address were not in his handwriting.
    DEA's investigation did not reveal whether the Respondent actually 
issued the above referenced prescriptions. The Deputy Administrator 
concurs with Judge Bittner's finding that the record is not sufficient 
to determine whether or not Respondent signed the three prescriptions 
in evidence. However, Respondent testified that his practice was to 
sign ``a bunch of'' blank prescriptions preprinted with his name and 
make them available to the clinic's physician assistants, with a 
``proviso that they did not prescribe any restricted substances.'' 
Respondent further testified that he told the physician assistants not 
to issue prescriptions for controlled substances, and that a sign 
posted in the clinic advised patients that the clinic would not issue 
controlled substances prescriptions.
    In addition, a part time physician assistant employed at the Robert 
M.D. Clinic for two or three months beginning in early August 2000, 
testified that she had seen blank pads with prescriptions similar in 
appearance to the prescriptions issued to GB and FU. The physician 
assistant added that the DEA and license numbers on the prescriptions 
were those that the owner of the clinic had told her she would need to 
provide to pharmacists in order to have prescriptions filled. The DEA 
and license numbers referenced by the physician assistant belonged to 
the Respondent. The physician assistant further testified that she was 
told by both the clinic owner and Respondent that she could use the 
Respondent's DEA number when calling a pharmacy to authorize 
prescriptions for medications to treat high blood pressure and 
diabetes.
    Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4), the Deputy 
Administrator may revoke a DEA Certificate of Registration and deny any 
pending application for renewal for such registration, if he determines 
that the continued registration would be inconsistent with the public 
interest. Section 823(f) requires that the following factors be 
considered in determining the public interest:
    (1) The recommendation of the appropriate state licensing board or 
professional disciplinary authority.

[[Page 15230]]

    (2) The applicant's experience in dispensing or conducting research 
with respect to controlled substances.
    (3) The applicant's conviction record under federal or state laws 
relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled 
substances.
    (4) Compliance with applicable state, federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health or 
safety.
    These factors are to be considered in the disjunctive; the Deputy 
Administrator may rely on any one or a combination of factors and may 
give each factor the weight he deems appropriate in determining whether 
a registration should be revoked or an application for registration 
denied. See Henry J. Schwartz, Jr., M.D., 54 FR 16422 (1989).
    Regarding factor one, in 1990, the Board revoked the Respondent's 
medical license, stayed the revocation, but suspended his license for 
90 days and then placed it on probation for five years. There is no 
evidence before the Deputy Administrator demonstrating that 
Respondent's medical license is currently restricted in any form. 
Nevertheless, state license is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for registration, and therefore, this factor is not 
dispositive. See e.g., Wesley G. Harline, M.D., 65 FR 5665 (2000); 
James C. LaJevice, D.M.D., 64 FR 55962 (1999).
    Factors two and four, Respondent's experience is dispensing 
controlled substances and compliance with applicable controlled 
substance laws are relevant in determining whether Respondent's 
continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. 
Respondent improperly prescribed, administered, or otherwise dispensed 
controlled substances in 1985 and 1986. Although the Respondent has 
maintained that he has done nothing wrong, a jury convicted him of 
eight misdemeanor counts as a result of this conduct, and the judgment 
was affirmed on appeal.
    In the most recent proceeding, the Respondent, by his own 
admission, signed blank prescriptions and made them available to 
physician assistants. While there was no evidence presented that 
Respondent issued or signed any of the three controlled substance 
prescriptions, his pre-signing prescription forms made it possible for 
``prescriptions'' to be issued in violation of 21 U.S.C. 829, 841, and 
843. Therefore, the Deputy Administrator finds that factors two and 
four weigh in favor of a finding that Respondent's continued 
registration would be inconsistent with the public interest.
    With respect to factor five, the Deputy Administrator concurs with 
Judge Bittner that the Respondent continues to argue that his 
convictions were improper, continues to blame others for his 
misconduct, and refuses to accept responsibility for his actions. In 
addition, the Respondent made a practice of making pre-signed 
prescriptions available to physician assistants at the Robert, M.D. 
Clinic, who were then free to issue those prescriptions with no 
supervision from Respondent. The Deputy Administrator further concurs 
with Judge Bittner that Respondent knew or should have known that he 
would be liable for those prescriptions, but nonetheless appears to 
think that posting signs in the clinic and advising physician 
assistants not to issue prescriptions for controlled substances absolve 
him from liability.
    After reviewing the record, Judge Bittner found that based on the 
Respondent's refusal to take responsibility for past misconduct and his 
irresponsible pre-signing of prescription pads, he continues to be 
unwilling or unable to accept the obligations that the Controlled 
Substances Act and its implementing regulations impose upon DEA 
registrants. Judge Bittner therefore concluded that a preponderance of 
the credible evidence in the record established that Respondent's 
continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest, 
and recommended that his application be denied. In light of the 
subsequent issuance of a Certificate of Registration to the Respondent, 
the Deputy Administrator must now determine whether or not that 
registration should be continued.
    The Respondent filed exceptions to Judge Bittner's recommended 
ruling. With respect to findings that he provided blank prescriptions 
bearing his signature in violation of 21 U.S.C. 829, 841, and 843, the 
Respondent argued that was simply complying with California law which, 
according to the Respondent, allows for the establishment of a 
prescription protocol between physician and physician assistant. With 
respect to pre-signed prescriptions, Respondent further argued that the 
protocol he established with his physician assistant did not allow for 
the prescribing of controlled substances; the physician assistant must 
account for all prescriptions before receiving more prescription 
blanks; the Respondent did not put his DEA number on blank 
prescriptions given to physician assistants; and that such a policy 
would be violative of the equal protection clause of the United States 
constitution. The Respondent further argued that ``physician assistants 
are allowed to prescribe Schedule III and IV drugs whether or not the 
supervising physician has a narcotic registration.''
    The Deputy Administrator finds that the Respondent's exceptions 
with respect to pre-signed prescriptions lack merit. First, the 
Respondent's assertion that he did not place his DEA registration 
number on blank prescriptions is of no moment. As noted above, 
testimony was offered at the hearing that the Respondent not only left 
pre-signed prescriptions with the staff of the Robert M.D. Clinic, but 
also authorized the use of his previous DEA number by a physician 
assistant. The unlawful practice of pre-signing prescriptions has been 
a contributing factor in DEA determinations that a registration is 
inconsistent with the public interest. See e.g., Christopher E. Castle, 
M.D., 67 FR 71196-97 (2002); James C. Womack, M.D., 67 FR 35137 (2002); 
Edward L.C. Broomes, M.D., 61 FR 3946-47 (1996); Jude R. Hayes, M.D., 
59 FR 41785 (1994); Veera Sripinyo, M.D. 56 FR 64809 (1991).
    Second, the establishment of a prescription protocol with a 
physician assistant does not absolve the Respondent from liability that 
arises out of improperly issued prescriptions for controlled 
substances. The Respondent's conduct in this regard created a situation 
that allowed unauthorized persons to issue prescriptions without 
supervision. The Deputy Administrator finds that the Respondent's 
counter argument regarding his compliance with the terms of a 
prescription protocol is yet another demonstration of his unwillingness 
to accept responsibility for his misconduct.
    The Deputy Administrator similarly finds no merit in the 
Respondent's challenge of the applicability of the 21 U.S.C. 829, 841, 
and 843 as they relate to his providing blank, pre-signed prescriptions 
to his staff. The referenced statutory provisions address the proper 
manner in which prescriptions for controlled substances are to be 
issued (section 829) and/or prohibited acts with respect to the 
prescribing of controlled substances (sections 841 and 843). 
Specifically, section 843(a) states in pertinent part:

    It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally--
(2) to use in the course of the * * * dispensing of a controlled 
substance * * * a registration number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, expired, or issued to another person.

    The Respondent's action in providing to the staff of the Robert 
M.D. Clinic, presigned prescriptions, his giving

[[Page 15231]]

authorization to others to use a revoked DEA number, and the controlled 
substances ordered under that number, are clearly conduct and 
circumstance contemplated under sections 829, 841 and 843.
    The Respondent's remaining argument regarding the hearsay nature of 
the presigned prescriptions at issue is similarly without merit. 
Despite the Respondent's objections to the admissibility of such 
evidence, it is well established that hearsay is admissible in these 
proceedings. See Nicholas A. Sychak, d/b/a/ Medicap Pharmacy, 65 FR 
75959 (2000); Arthur Sklar, R.Ph., d/b/a King Pharmacy, 54 FR 34627 
(1989). ``Hearsay is both admissible, and may, standing by itself, 
constitute substantial evidence in support of an administrative 
decision.'' Klinestiver v. DEA, 606 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
    In the DEA Final Order of May 1999, the then-Deputy Administrator 
found that any determination regarding the Respondent's fitness to 
obtain a DEA Certificate of Registration was contingent, not merely 
upon the passage of time, but whether circumstances existing at the 
time of the prior proceeding had sufficiently changed to warrant 
issuance of such registration. With the additional passage of time, and 
the Respondent having obtained a DEA Certificate of Registration 
(albeit by way of an administrative error), obviously circumstances 
have changed with respect to the Respondent's handling of controlled 
substances. The Deputy Administrator also finds it noteworthy that 
there is no evidence that Respondent has mishandled controlled 
substances under his present registration. Nevertheless, the Deputy 
Administrator remains unconvinced that the Respondent possesses the 
fitness to maintain that registration.
    The Deputy Administrator agrees with Judge Bittner that the 
Respondent refuses to take responsibility for his past misconduct. In 
addition, the Respondent demonstrated irresponsible conduct by pre-
signing prescription pads and providing his revoked DEA registration 
number for the use of his staff.
    The Deputy Administrator finds the Respondent's recalcitrance 
puzzling. In the face of DEA's repeated concerns regarding his lack of 
contrition, the Respondent remains steadfast in his insistence upon 
denying any previous wrongdoing. Despite previous findings that his 
criminal convictions were res judicata, the Respondent in his support 
of his most recent application for registration attempted yet again to 
re-litigate his criminal convictions and attack the quality of his 
previous legal representation.
    In three previous final orders, DEA has essentially provided the 
Respondent with a roadmap to reacquiring his DEA registration by 
outlining concerns relating to Respondent's previous misconduct and 
pointing to his refusal to accept responsibility for such actions. If 
the Respondent were to satisfactorily address the agency's concerns, 
and conform his conduct accordingly, he would at the very least, 
improve his prospects for reacquiring and maintaining a DEA Certificate 
of Registration. In the absence of such reassurances, the Deputy 
Administrator is left with the conclusion that the Respondent remains 
unwilling or unable to accept the obligations that the Controlled 
Substances Act and its implementing regulations impose upon DEA 
registrants. Therefore, the Deputy Administrator concludes that the 
Respondent's continued registration would be inconsistent with the 
public interest.
    Accordingly, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, pursuant to the authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 
823 and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.014, hereby orders that DEA 
Certificate of Registration BL6652312, previously issued to Robert A. 
Leslie, M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. This order is effective 
April 28, 2003.

    Dated: March 6, 2003.
John B. Brown III,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 03-7390 Filed 3-27-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-M