[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 55 (Friday, March 21, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13897-13901]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-6846]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration


Notice of Proposed Modification of Agency Practice Under Section 
123 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and Request for Public Comment

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Request for public comment.

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SUMMARY: On January 8, 2003, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted the report of the WTO Appellate 
Body in United States--Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain 
Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R (December 9, 
2002), that recommends that the United States bring its administrative 
practice regarding privatization, both as such and as applied in twelve 
challenged administrative determinations, into conformity with its 
obligations under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement (Subsidies Agreement). Section 123 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (URAA) governs changes in the Department of Commerce's 
(Department) practice when a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate 
Body of the World Trade Organization finds such practice to be 
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round agreements. Consistent with 
section 123(1)(g)(C), we are hereby publishing the proposed 
modification and the explanation for the proposed modification of the 
Department's privatization methodology, and are providing opportunity 
for public comment.

DATES: Written affirmative comments must be received by 5 p.m. on April 
11, 2003. Written rebuttal comments must be received by 5 p.m. on the 
28th day after the date of publication of this notice. If the 
applicable time limit expires on a non-business day, comments that are 
filed by 5 p.m. on the next business day will be accepted.
    Submission of Comments: Parties should submit four written copies 
and an electronic copy (in WordPerfect, MS Word, or Adobe Acrobat 
format) of all affirmative and rebuttal comments to Jeffrey May, 
Director of Policy, Central Records Unit, Room B-099, Import 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. Attention: 
Privatization Methodology. Each party submitting comments is requested 
to include his or her name

[[Page 13898]]

and address, and give reasons for any recommendation. Affirmative 
comments must be double-spaced and limited, in total, to twenty-five 
pages. Rebuttal comments must be double-spaced and limited, in total, 
to ten pages. All comments will be made available for public viewing in 
the Department's Central Records Unit, which is located in room B-099 
of the main Department building.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg Campbell, Office of Policy, 
Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 3712, 14th 
Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230; telephone: 
(202) 482-2239.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Applicable Statute

    Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the statute are 
references to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act). Citation to 
``section 123'' refers to section 123 of the URAA.

Background

    On February 2, 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in Delverde Srl v. United States, 202 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000), reh'g granted in part (June 20, 2000) (Delverde III), 
rejected the Department's application of its change-in-ownership 
methodology, as explained in the General Issues Appendix, to the facts 
before it in that case.\1\ The Federal Circuit held that the Act, as 
amended, did not allow the Department to presume conclusively that the 
subsidies granted to the former owner of Delverde's corporate assets 
automatically ``passed through'' to Delverde following the sale. 
Rather, where a subsidized company has sold assets to another company, 
the Court held that the Act requires the Department to examine the 
particular facts and circumstances of the sale and determine whether 
the purchasing company directly or indirectly received both a financial 
contribution and benefit from the government. Delverde III, 202 F.3d at 
1364-1368.
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    \1\ Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain 
Steel Products from Austria, 58 FR 37217, 37225 (July 9, 1993).
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    Pursuant to the Federal Circuit's finding, the Department developed 
a new change-in-ownership methodology, first announced in a remand 
determination on December 4, 2000, following the Federal Circuit's 
decision in Delverde III, and also applied in Grain-Oriented Electrical 
Steel from Italy; Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative 
Review, 66 FR 2885 (January 12, 2001). The first step under this 
methodology was to determine whether the legal person to which the 
subsidies were given was, in fact, distinct from the legal person that 
produced the subject merchandise exported to the United States. If we 
determined that the two persons were distinct, we then analyzed whether 
a subsidy was provided to the purchasing entity as a result of the 
change-in-ownership transaction. If we found, however, that the 
original subsidy recipient and the current producer/exporter were the 
same person, then we determined that the person continued to benefit 
from the original subsidies, and its exports were subject to 
countervailing duties to offset those subsidies.
    This ``same-person'' privatization methodology is currently the 
subject of appeals to the Federal Circuit in three cases: Acciai 
Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. United States, Ct. No. 01-00051; Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp. v. United States, Ct. Nos. 03-1189 and 03-1248; and GTS 
Industries, S.A. v. United States, Ct. Nos. 03-1175 and 03-1191.
    On August 8, 2001, the European Communities requested that the DSB 
establish a dispute settlement panel to examine the practice of the 
United States of imposing countervailing duties on certain products 
exported from the European Communities by privatized companies. A panel 
was established, the case was briefed and argued, and the Panel 
circulated its final report on July 31, 2002. United States--
Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European 
Communities, WT/DS212/R (July 31, 2002) (Panel Report). The United 
States appealed certain findings and conclusions in the Panel Report, 
and the Appellate Body circulated its report on December 9, 2002. 
United States--Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from 
the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R (December 9, 2002) (AB Report). 
The AB Report, and the Panel Report as modified by the AB Report, were 
adopted by the DSB on January 8, 2003. On January 27, 2003, the United 
States informed the DSB that it would implement the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations.
    Section 123 of the URAA is the applicable provision governing the 
actions of the Department when a WTO dispute settlement panel or the 
Appellate Body finds that a regulation or practice of the Department is 
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round agreements. Specifically, 
section 123(g)(1) provides that, ``[i]n any case in which a dispute 
settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds in its report that a 
regulation or practice of a department or agency of the United States 
is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, that 
regulation or practice may not be amended, rescinded, or otherwise 
modified in the implementation of such report unless and until * * * 
(C) the head of the relevant department or agency has provided an 
opportunity for public comment by publishing in the Federal Register 
the proposed modification and the explanation for the modification; * * 
*.'' Accordingly, consistent with section 123(g)(1)(C), we are 
publishing this proposed modification and the explanation for the 
proposed modification of the Department's privatization methodology, 
and are providing opportunity for public comment.

Legal Context

    To provide a context for the discussion of changes to our new 
privatization methodology, we first review the statutory provisions 
governing the Department's analysis of changes in ownership in the 
countervailing duty context, as explained in the Statement of 
Administrative Action (SAA) and interpreted by the Court. The statute 
provides, at section 771(5)(F), that ``[a] change in ownership of all 
or part of a foreign enterprise or the productive assets of a foreign 
enterprise does not by itself require a determination by the 
administering authority that a past countervailable subsidy received by 
the enterprise no longer continues to be countervailable, even if the 
change in ownership is accomplished through an arm's length 
transaction.'' The SAA explains that ``* * * the term `arm's-length 
transaction' means a transaction negotiated between unrelated parties, 
each acting in its own interest, or between related parties such that 
the terms of the transaction are those that would exist if the 
transaction had been negotiated between unrelated parties.'' SAA, at 
258. The SAA further explains that

    [s]ection 771(5)(F) is being added to clarify that the sale of a 
firm at arm's length does not automatically, and in all cases, 
extinguish any prior subsidies conferred. * * * The issue of the 
privatization of a state-owned firm can be extremely complex and 
multifaceted. While it is the Administration's intent that Commerce 
retain the discretion to determine whether, and to what extent, the 
privatization of a government-owned firm eliminates any previously 
conferred countervailable subsidies, Commerce must exercise this 
discretion carefully through its consideration of the facts of each 
case and its determination

[[Page 13899]]

of the appropriate methodology to be applied.
Id.

    The Federal Circuit reviewed the statute's change-in-ownership 
provisions in Delverde III. In that decision, in striking down the 
Department's previous ``gamma'' privatization methodology on the basis 
that, inter alia, it was a per se rule, the Federal Circuit opined

    Had Commerce fully examined the facts, it might have found that 
[the respondent] paid full value for the assets and thus received no 
benefit from the prior owner's subsidies, or Commerce might have 
found that [the respondent] did not pay full value and thus did 
indirectly receive a `financial contribution' and a `benefit' from 
the government by purchasing its assets from a subsidized company 
`for less than adequate remuneration.' * * * Commerce might have 
reached the conclusion that [the respondent] indirectly received a 
subsidy by other means.
Delverde III, 202 F.3d at 1368.

    In light of the SAA and the Court's findings, we believe the 
statute grants the Department flexibility and discretion in the 
countervailing duty context for analyzing changes in ownership, 
including privatizations.

WTO Findings and Recommendations

    We now turn to the findings of the Panel and Appellate Body. At the 
outset, the Panel clarified that its findings apply only to changes in 
ownership that involve privatizations in which the government retains 
no controlling interest in the privatized producer and transfers all or 
substantially all the property. Panel Report at para. 7.62; noted in AB 
Report at paras. 85 and 117, footnote 177. The Panel then stated that, 
``[w]hile Members may maintain a rebuttable presumption that the 
benefit from prior financial contributions (or subsidization) continues 
to accrue to the privatized producer, privatization at arm's length and 
for fair market value is sufficient to rebut such a presumption. Panel 
Report at para. 7.82, upheld at AB Report at para 126. This finding led 
the Panel to hold, inter alia, that the Department's same-person 
methodology is contrary to the requirements of the Subsidies Agreement.
    While the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the same-person 
methodology is contrary to the requirements of the Subsidies Agreement, 
it clarified that

[p]rivatization at arm's length and for fair market value may

result in extinguishing the benefit. Indeed, we find that there is a 
rebuttable presumption that a benefit ceases to exist after such a 
privatization. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily do so. There is no 
inflexible rule requiring that investigating authorities, in future 
cases, automatically determine that a `benefit' derived from pre-
privatization financial contributions expires following privatization 
at arm's length and for fair market value. (Emphasis in original)

AB Report at para. 127.

    The Appellate Body identified examples of circumstances where the 
conditions necessary for ``market prices'' to fairly and accurately 
reflect subsidy benefits are not present, or are ``severely affected'' 
by the government's economic and other policies:

    Markets are mechanisms for exchange. Under certain conditions 
(e.g., unfettered interplay of supply and demand, broad-based access 
to information on equal terms, decentralization of economic power, 
an effective legal system guaranteeing the existence of private 
property and the enforcement of contracts), prices will reflect the 
relative scarcity of goods and services in the market. Hence, the 
actual exchange value of the continuing benefit of past non-
recurring financial contributions bestowed on the state-owned 
enterprise will be fairly reflected in the market price. However, 
such market conditions are not necessarily always present and they 
are often dependent on government action.
    Of course, every process of privatizing public-owned productive 
assets takes place within the concrete circumstances prevailing in 
the market in which the sale occurs. Consequently, the outcome of 
such a privatization process, namely the price that the market 
establishes for the state-owned enterprise, will reflect those 
circumstances. However, governments may choose to impose economic or 
other policies that, albeit respectful of the market's inherent 
functioning, are intended to induce certain results from the market. 
In such circumstances, the market's valuation of the state-owned 
property may ultimately be severely affected by those government 
policies, as well as by the conditions in which buyers will 
subsequently be allowed to enjoy property.
    The Panel's absolute rule of ``no benefit'' may be defensible in 
the context of transactions between two private parties taking place 
in reasonably competitive markets; however, it overlooks the ability 
of governments to obtain certain results from markets by shaping the 
circumstances and conditions in which markets operate. 
Privatizations involve complex and long-term investments in which 
the seller--namely the government--is not necessarily always a 
passive price taker and, consequently, the ``fair market price'' of 
a state-owned enterprise is not necessarily always unrelated to 
government action. In privatizations, governments have the ability, 
by designing economic and other policies, to influence the 
circumstances and the conditions of the sale so as to obtain a 
certain market valuation of the enterprise.

AB Report at paras. 122-124.

    Accordingly, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's conclusion 
that once an importing Member has determined that a privatization has 
taken place at arm's length and for fair market value, it must reach a 
conclusion that no benefit resulting from the prior financial 
contribution continues to accrue to the privatized producer. AB Report 
at paras. 161(b). However, the Appellate Body nevertheless found the 
Department's same-person privatization methodology to be inconsistent 
with the WTO obligations of the United States because, under that 
methodology, where the entity that produced the subject merchandise was 
the very same entity that received the subsidy, the Department could 
not find that an arm's-length, fair market value privatization 
transaction extinguished the pre-privatization subsidy benefit. 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body recommended that the DSB request the 
United States to bring its measures and administrative practice (i.e., 
the same-person methodology) into conformity with its obligations under 
the Subsidies Agreement. AB Report at para. 162.

Proposed Methodology

    Pursuant to the statement of the United States to the DSB that we 
would implement the recommendations and ruling of the DSB in this 
matter, and in light of the Department's flexibility and discretion 
under the statute in analyzing changes in ownership, we propose the 
following new privatization methodology that is fully consistent with 
the statute.
    This proposed methodology is structured as a sequence of rebuttable 
presumptions, reflecting the conclusions of the Panel and Appellate 
Body. The ``baseline presumption'' is that non-recurring subsidies can 
benefit the recipient over a period of time (i.e., allocation period) 
normally corresponding to the average useful life of the recipient's 
assets. However, an interested party may rebut this baseline 
presumption by demonstrating that, during the allocation period, a 
privatization occurred in which the government sold its ownership of 
all or substantially all of a company or its assets, retaining no 
controlling interest in the company or its assets, and the sale was an 
arm's-length transaction for fair market value.
    Our first point of inquiry under this proposed methodology, 
therefore, is whether the change in ownership in fact involves a 
government's sale to a private party of all or substantially all of a 
subsidized company or its assets, with

[[Page 13900]]

the government retaining no controlling interest in the company or its 
assets. If we determine that the government has not transferred, as a 
result of the sale, ownership and effective control over all or 
substantially all of the company or its assets, then our analysis of 
the transaction will stop and the baseline presumption of a continuing 
benefit will not be rebutted. Otherwise, we will proceed to a 
consideration of whether the sale was at arm's length for fair market 
value.
    In considering whether the evidence presented demonstrates that the 
transaction was conducted at arm's length, we will be guided by the 
SAA's definition of an arm's-length transaction, noted above, as a 
transaction negotiated between unrelated parties, each acting in its 
own interest, or between related parties such that the terms of the 
transaction are those that would exist if the transaction had been 
negotiated between unrelated parties.
    With regard to an analysis of the transaction price, there is no 
statutory definition of fair market value, nor does the SAA give any 
guidance in this area.\2\ We note, however, that in the context of 
several recent remand redeterminations in privatization cases before 
the Court of International Trade (CIT), the Department has applied a 
process-oriented approach to analyzing the facts and circumstances of 
particular privatizations and the resulting value paid.\3\ Given that 
certain of these redeterminations are now on appeal before the Federal 
Circuit, our approach and findings in these remand redeterminations may 
or may not reflect the full extent of the analysis of the transaction 
appropriate under this proposed new methodology. However, the CIT 
remand redeterminations may provide a useful initial framework for an 
approach to determining whether a transactions price was fair market 
value.
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    \2\ We encourage parties to include in their comments specific 
suggestions on what, if any, explicit definition of fair market 
value the Department should adopt in the context of a countervailing 
duty proceeding.
    \3\ See, e.g., Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand, 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, CIT No. 99-09-00566 
(January 4, 2002); Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand, 
GTS Industries, S.A. v. United States, CIT No. 00-03-00118 (January 
4, 2002).
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    The basic question before us in analyzing fair market value is 
whether the government, in its capacity as seller, sought and received, 
in the form of monetary or equivalent compensation, the full amount 
that the company or its assets were actually worth under existing 
market conditions.\4\ Accordingly, in determining whether the evidence 
presented, including, inter alia, information on the process through 
which the sale was made, demonstrates that the transaction price was 
fair market value, we propose the following non-exhaustive list of 
factors that might be considered.\5\
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    \4\ One possible standard to apply here may be whether the 
government, in its capacity as seller, acted in a manner consistent 
with the usual sales practices of private, commercial sellers in 
that country.
    \5\ We propose below various factors that might be considered at 
each stage of inquiry under this new methodology. These are not 
meant to represent an exhaustive list of all factors that should be 
considered, and we invite comment on any additional factors that 
might be considered. Moreover, we encourage comment on any factors 
that might more appropriately be considered under a different stage 
of inquiry than the stage proposed here.

    (1) Artificial barriers to entry: Did the government impose 
exclusions on foreign purchasers or purchasers from other 
industries, or overly burdensome/unreasonable bidder qualification 
requirements that artificially suppressed demand for the company? 
\6\
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    \6\ The fundamental consideration here is not necessarily the 
number of bidders per se but, rather, whether the market is 
contestable, i.e., anyone who wants to buy the company or its assets 
has a fair and open opportunity to do so.
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    (2) Independent analysis: Did the government perform due 
diligence in determining the appropriate sales price, and did it 
follow the recommendations of any independent analysis, indicating 
that maximizing its return was the primary consideration?
    (3) Highest bid: Was the highest bid accepted and was the price 
paid in cash or close equivalent (and not, e.g., with an imbalanced 
bond-for-equity swap), again indicating that maximizing its return 
was the government's primary consideration?
    (4) Committed investment: Were there price discounts or other 
inducements in exchange for promises of additional future investment 
that private, commercial sellers would not normally seek (e.g., 
retaining redundant workers, building or maintaining unwanted 
capacity), indicating that maximizing its return was not the 
government's primary consideration?

    If we determine that the evidence presented does not demonstrate 
that the privatization was at arm's length for fair market value, then 
we will find that the company continues to benefit from subsidies. 
Otherwise, if it is demonstrated that the privatization was at arm's 
length for fair market value, any subsidies will be presumed to be 
extinguished and, therefore, to be non-countervailable.
    However, a party can rebut this presumption of extinguishment by 
demonstrating that, at the time of the privatization, the broader 
conditions necessary for the transaction price to fairly and accurately 
reflect the subsidy benefit were not present, or were severely 
distorted by government action (or, where appropriate, inaction).\7\ In 
other words, although in our analysis we may find that the sale price 
was a ``market value,'' parties can demonstrate that the market itself 
was so distorted by the government that there is a reasonable basis for 
believing that the transaction price was meaningfully different from 
what it would otherwise have been absent the distortive government 
action.\8\ A non-exhaustive list of factors that might be considered in 
determining whether these broader market distortions existed might 
include:
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    \7\ We would generally be concerned here only with the actions 
of government in its role ``as government,'' and not the actions of 
the government in its role as the seller to the extent its actions 
as seller are consistent with the normal commercial practices of a 
private seller.
    \8\ Neither the parties nor the Department would be required to 
quantify by how much the actual transaction price differed from an 
``undistorted market'' value.

    1. Basic Conditions: Are the basic requirements for a properly 
functioning market present in the economy in general as well as in 
the particular industry or sector, including unfettered interplay of 
supply and demand, broad-based and equal access to information, 
decentralization of economic power including effective safeguards 
against collusive behavior, effective legal guarantees and 
enforcement of contracts and private property?\9\
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    \9\ We encourage comment on how this analysis might intersect 
with the Department's practices regarding nonmarket economies in the 
subsidies and countervailing duty context.
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    2. Related Incentives: Has the government used the prerogatives 
of government in other areas to facilitate, or affect the outcome 
of, a sale in a way that a private seller could not, e.g., by using 
its authority to tax or set duty rates to make the sale more 
attractive to potential purchasers generally, or to particular 
(e.g., domestic) purchasers?
    3. Legal requirements: Where there special regulations 
pertaining to this privatization (or privatizations generally) 
affecting worker retention, etc., that distorted the market price of 
the company or its assets?
    4. Creation/Maintenance: Did the presence of other heavily 
subsidized companies severely distort the market price of the 
company or its assets in that industry?

    Where a party demonstrates that the broader market or economic 
environment was severely distorted by government action such that there 
is a reasonable basis for believing that the transaction price was 
meaningfully different from what it would otherwise have been absent 
the distortive government action, the presumption of extinguishment 
will be rebutted. Where a party does not establish a reasonable

[[Page 13901]]

basis for believing that the transaction price was meaningfully 
different from what it would otherwise have been absent the distortive 
government action, we will find all subsidies to be extinguished and, 
therefore, to be non-countervailable.
    We recognize that there are many important details of this proposed 
new methodology that require further elaboration. We encourage parties, 
in their comments, to provide suggestions on these details and, in 
particular, to address the following issues:
    1. Continuing benefit amount: In those instances where we determine 
that the privatization did not result in the extinguishment of the 
benefits of pre-privatization subsidies, how should we quantify the 
amount of the benefit from those subsidies that the privatized company 
continues to enjoy?
    2. Concurrent subsidies: The Department has long wrestled with the 
issue of subsidies given to encourage, or that are otherwise concurrent 
with, a privatization. Should a subsidy, e.g., debt forgiveness, given 
to a company to encourage or facilitate a privatization be considered a 
``pre-privatization'' subsidy that can be extinguished during the 
privatization, or a new subsidy to the new owner(s)?\10\
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    \10\ Speaking to this issue in the Preamble to the CVD 
Regulations (63 FR 65348, 35355), the Department stated that
    [w]hile we have not developed guidelines on how to treat this 
category of subsidies, we note a special concern because this class 
of subsidies can, in our experience, be considerable and can have a 
significant influence on the transaction value, particularly when a 
significant amount of debt is forgiven in order to make the company 
attractive to prospective buyers. As our thinking on changes in 
ownership continues to evolve we will give careful consideration to 
the issue of whether subsidies granted in conjunction with planned 
changes in ownership should be given special treatment.
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    3. Private sales: Our proposed methodology only addresses 
government-to-private sales of all or substantially all of a company or 
its assets. However, changes in ownership can take a variety of forms, 
for instance, private-to-private transactions. In Delverde III, the 
Federal Circuit stated that there are significant differences between 
privatization and private-to-private sales and that a case involving 
privatization does not necessarily govern a private-to-private 
situation. Can a private-to-private sale extinguish pre-sale subsidy 
benefits?
    4. Partial or gradual sales: What, if any, percentage of shares or 
assets sold should the threshold be for triggering application of this 
proposed methodology? How should our proposed methodology be applied in 
situations where assets or shares are sold incrementally over months or 
years?\11\ What if certain incremental sales are for fair market value 
and others are not?
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    \11\ See, e.g., Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination: Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate from 
France, 64 FR 73277 (December 29, 1999); Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination: Pure Magnesium from Israel, 66 FR 
49351 (September 27, 2001).
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    5. Effective control: What factors should be considered in 
determining whether the government has relinquished effective control 
over the company or assets sold? One possibility here is to apply a 
standard similar to the ``use or direct'' standard of our cross-
ownership provision, though that standard may not be fully applicable 
in the case of a government-to-private sale for both theoretical and 
practical reasons. In analyzing any transfer of control, however, we 
would propose examining closely any mechanisms (e.g., special or 
``golden'' shares) that allow the government to retain effective (if 
implicit) control over the company's commercial decisions after the 
privatization regardless of the explicit share of the government's 
ownership in the property.
    6. Holding or parent companies: Another complicated change-in-
ownership variation we have encountered is the situation where the 
ownership changes occur at a level several times removed from the 
actual respondent in a particular countervailing duty case. Should 
application of our methodology be triggered when a partial owner of a 
holding company that, in turn, owns another holding company that owns 
the recipient, sells its shares?

    Dated: March 17, 2003.
Joseph Spetrini,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 03-6846 Filed 3-20-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P