[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 36 (Monday, February 24, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8637-8640]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-4263]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement Regarding Scram Discharge Volume 
Vent and Drain Valves Actions for Boiling Water Reactors Using the 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) 
relating to a change in the technical specification (TS) required 
actions for inoperable vent and drain valves for the scram discharge 
volume (S.V.) for boiling water reactors (BWRs). This proposed change 
was proposed for incorporation into the standard technical 
specifications (STS) by the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) participants in 
the Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-
404, Revision 0. The proposed change to TS would allow isolation of one 
or more S.V. vent or drain lines within 7 days if a single vent or 
drain valve in the line is determined to be inoperable. The TS for most 
BWRs do not currently include the option of isolating a vent or drain 
line but instead require restoring a single inoperable S.V. vent or 
drain valve to operable status within 7 days. Requirements are 
maintained to isolate a line within 8 hours if both vent or drain 
valves in a line are inoperable. This notice also includes a model no 
significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination relating to this 
matter.
    The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently 
process proposed amendments to incorporate this change into plant-
specific TS for BWRs. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the 
models apply could request amendments conforming to the models. In such 
a request, a licensee should confirm the applicability of the SE and 
NSHC-determination to its reactor. The NRC staff is requesting comments 
on the model SE and model NSHC determination before announcing their 
availability for referencing in license amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires March 26, 2003. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail.
    Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, 
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail 
Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
    Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Reckley, Mail Stop: O-7D1, 
Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-1323.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specifications 
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) is intended to 
improve the efficiency and transparency of NRC licensing processes. 
This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the STS in a 
manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The 
CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed 
changes to the STS following a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff 
and finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by 
licensees. This notice is soliciting comment on a proposed change to 
the STS that revises requirements for the S.V. vent and drain valves 
for BWRs. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments 
received for a proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the 
change or proceed with announcing the availability of the change for 
proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting to apply for the 
subject change to TSs are responsible for reviewing the staff's 
evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and 
providing any necessary plant-specific information. Each amendment 
application made in response to the notice of availability would be 
processed and noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC 
procedures.
    This notice involves changes to required actions for inoperable 
S.V. vent and drain valves for BWRs. This proposed change was proposed 
for incorporation into the STS by the BWROG as TSTF-404, Revision 0. 
The changes, provided in terms of Limiting Condition for Operation 
(LCO) 3.1.8 in the STS for BWRs are provided below:

Current Requirements

LCO 3.1.8 Each S.V. Vent and Drain Valve Shall be Operable
    Applicability: Modes 1 and 2.
    Actions:

    Note: Separate Condition Entry is allowed for each S.V. vent and 
drain line.


------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Condition               Required action      Completion time
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. One or more S.V. vent or     A.1 Restore Valve to   7 days.
 drain lines with one valve      Operable status.
 inoperable.
B. One or more S.V. vent or     B.1 Isolate the        8 hours.
 drain lines with both valves    associated line.
 inoperable.                    Note: An isolated
                                 line may be
                                 unisolated under
                                 administrative
                                 control to allow
                                 draining and venting
                                 of the S.V.
C. Required Action and          C.1 Be in Mode 3.....  12 hours.
 associated Completion Time
 not met.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 8638]]

Revised Requirements

LCO 3.1.8 Each S.V. Vent and Drain Valve Shall be Operable
    Applicability: Modes 1 and 2.
    Actions:

    Notes: 1. Separate Condition Entry is allowed for each S.V. vent 
and drain line.
    2. An isolated line may be unisolated under administrative 
control to allow draining and venting of the S.V.


------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Condition               Required action      Completion time
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. One or more S.V. vent or     A.1 Isolate the        7 days.
 drain lines with one valve      associated line.
 inoperable.
B. One or more S.V. vent or     B.1 Isolate the        8 hours.
 drain lines with both valves    associated line.
 inoperable.
C. Required Action and          C.1 Be in Mode 3.....  12 hours.
 associated Completion Time
 not met.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Applicability

    This proposed change to required actions for inoperable S.V. vent 
and drain valves is applicable to BWRs.
    The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative 
approach or proposing changes other than those proposed in TSTF-404. 
Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may, however, 
require additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the time 
and resources needed for the review.

Public Notices

    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register. 
Following the staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of 
this notice, the staff may reconsider the proposed change or may 
proceed with announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent 
notice (perhaps with some changes to the SE or proposed NSHC 
determination as a result of public comments). If the staff announces 
the availability of the change, licensees wishing to adopt the change 
will submit an application in accordance with applicable rules and 
other regulatory requirements. The staff will in turn issue for each 
application a notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to 
facility operating license(s), a proposed NSHC determination, and an 
opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance of an amendment to 
operating license(s) will also be issued to announce the revised 
requirements for each plant that applies for and receives the requested 
change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, Consolidated Line Item Improvement, Technical Specification 
Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-404, Scram Discharge Volume Vent and 
Drain Valves

1.0 Introduction

    By application dated [ ], [Licensee] (the licensee) requested 
changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for [facility]. The 
proposed changes would revise the required action within TS [3.1.8, 
``Scram Discharge Volume (S.V.) Vent and Drain Valves''] for the 
condition of having one or more S.V. vent or drain lines with one valve 
inoperable. These changes are based on Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF-404 (Revision 0) that has been 
approved generically for the BWR [boiling water reactor]/4[6] Standard 
Technical Specifications (STS), NUREG-1433 [1434], Revision 2. A notice 
announcing the availability of this proposed TS change using the 
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) was published in the 
Federal Register on [ ] (xx FR yyyyy).

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    NRC regulations and review standards such as Appendix A, ``General 
Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50 of Title 
10 of the Code oF Federal Regulations (10 CFR), include specific 
requirements for reactor protection and reactivity control systems. The 
reactor protection systems for BWRs use a hydraulic system to insert 
control rods into the reactor core. During an actuation of the reactor 
protection system (a scram), water is exhausted from the control rod 
drive mechanisms to the SDVs. Proper maintenance and operation of the 
SDVs in terms of instrumentation and limiting water volumes are 
essential for assuring the reliability of the reactor protection system 
(see NRC Bulletin 80-17, ``Failure of Control Rods to Insert During A 
Scram at a BWR,'' related Orders to specific facilities, and 
information provided in plant final safety analysis reports and TS 
Bases). Maintaining the SDVs to ensure that accumulated water does not 
hamper or slow the insertion of control rods requires vent and drain 
valves. The vent and drain valves isolate during a scram to limit the 
amount of coolant discharged so that adequate core cooling is 
maintained and offsite doses remain within regulatory limits.
    Specific regulatory requirements for S.V. vent and drain valves are 
defined in TS [3.1.8, ``Scram Discharge Volume (S.V.) Vent and Drain 
Valves.''] The existing LCO [limiting condition for operation] [3.1.8], 
requires that each S.V. vent and drain valve be operable. The 
operability of all S.V. vent and drain valves ensures that the S.V. 
vent and drain valves will close during a scram to contain reactor 
water discharged to the S.V. piping. Since the vent and drain lines are 
provided with two valves in series, the single failure of one valve in 
the open position will not impair the isolation function of the system. 
Additionally, the valves are required to open on scram reset and during 
plant operation to control the amount of water accumulating in the S.V.
    If one or more S.V. vent and drain lines have a single valve that 
is inoperable, the existing required action is to restore the valve(s) 
to operable status within 7 days. If an inoperable valve is not 
restored to operable status, a plant shutdown to MODE 3 is required 
within 12 hours. If one or more S.V. vent or drain lines have both 
valves inoperable, the associated line must be isolated within 8 hours. 
In this condition, the plant is allowed to operate indefinitely. A note 
associated with the required action clarifies that the valves may be 
opened under administrative controls to allow draining of the S.V. The 
S.V. vent and drain valve actions are inconsistent in

[[Page 8639]]

that, although the operational and safety concerns are similar for 
having one or both valves in a line being inoperable, the actions for a 
single inoperable valve do not allow for the isolation of the line and 
administrative controls to support the draining of the S.V.
    The proposed change would revise the required actions to be more 
consistent with the safety significance of one inoperable valve in a 
S.V. line versus two inoperable valves in an S.V. line.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    The proposed changes to TS 3.1.8 are:
    1. Required Action A.1 is revised from restoring the single 
inoperable S.V. vent and drain valve in one or more S.V. vent and drain 
lines to operable status to isolating the associated line.
    2. The Note to Required Action B.1 which allows an isolated line to 
be unisolated under administrative controls for the purpose of draining 
and venting the S.V. is moved to a note that applies to both Conditions 
A (single inoperable valve) and B (both valves inoperable).
    With one S.V. vent or drain valve inoperable in one or more lines, 
the isolation function would be maintained since the redundant valve in 
the affected line would perform its safety function of isolating the 
S.V. The current ACTION statement allows 7 days to repair the 
inoperable valve; the proposed change is to allow for the isolation of 
the affected line and continue operation. If the affected line is not 
isolated within the 7 day time period (or the required action is not 
required because the valve is repaired), the licensee would then be 
required to proceed to MODE 3 in the next 12 hours. Maintaining the 7 
day Completion Time is acceptable because of the low probability of the 
concurrent events of a scram within the 7days of the Completion Time 
and a failure of the redundant valve(s). Alternately, if the inoperable 
valve was initially closed, there would generally be ample time and 
warning available to drain the S.V. before an automatic scram due to 
S.V. high level would occur.
    The allowance to administratively open a line that is isolated to 
comply with the actions (to permit draining and venting the S.V.) is 
allowed by existing Required Action B.1. This allowance is being moved 
to apply to all ACTIONS based on the change proposed to Action A. This 
would allow any accumulated water in the line to be drained, to 
preclude a reactor scram on S.V. high level. A reactor scram is 
initiated if the S.V. water level in the instrument volume exceeds a 
specified setpoint. The setpoint is chosen so that all control rods are 
inserted before the S.V. has insufficient volume to accept a full 
scram. Regarding the isolation of the S.V., the remaining operable S.V. 
vent and drain valve(s) would close automatically on a scram signal to 
isolate the lines. Or, if both valves in a line were inoperable (and 
opened under this provision), the reactor coolant release could be 
terminated by resetting the scram from the control room, or by manually 
closing the valves locally. Resetting the scram automatically closes 
the scram outlet valves, isolating the control rod drive discharge path 
to the S.V.
    Based on the low probability of an event occurring during defined 
Completion Time associated with this condition, the subsequent 
isolation of the affected lines, and the ability to open and drain the 
lines before an automatic scram due to S.V. high water level, the 
proposed change maintains the necessary safety features and is 
therefore acceptable. [Note-optional section if licensee provides 
markup of affected Bases pages: The change to TS [3.1.8] requires that 
the licensee revise the discussion in the associated Bases section. 
Although the licensee's application included possible wording for the 
revised Bases discussion for TS [3.1.8], the licensee will formally 
address the change to the Bases in accordance with [the Bases Control 
Program or its administrative procedure for revising Bases]. The staff 
does not believe that the Bases change will require prior NRC approval 
when evaluated against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.59, ``Changes, tests, 
and experiments,'' and, therefore, agrees that the revision of the 
Bases to TS [3.1.8] should be addressed separately from this amendment 
and should be included in a future update of the TS Bases in accordance 
with [the Bases Control Program or the licensee's administrative 
controls].

4.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the staff].

5.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendments change a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. The NRC staff has 
determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the 
amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that 
may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in 
individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The 
Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments 
involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no 
public comment on such finding (FR). Accordingly, the amendments meet 
the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection 
with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or 
to the health and safety of the public.

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendment revises TS 
[3.1.8, ``Scram Discharge Volume (S.V.) Vent and Drain Valves,''] to 
allow a vent or drain line with one inoperable valve to be isolated 
instead of requiring the valve to be restored to Operable status within 
7 days.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
    Criterion 1.--The proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    A change is proposed to allow the affected S.V. vent and drain line 
to be isolated when there are one or more S.V. vent or drain lines with 
one valve inoperable instead or requiring the valve to be restored to 
operable status within 7 days. With one S.V. vent or drain valve 
inoperable in one or more lines, the isolation function would be 
maintained since the redundant valve in the affected line would perform 
its safety function of isolating the S.V. Following the completion of 
the required action, the isolation function is fulfilled since the 
associated line is

[[Page 8640]]

isolated. The ability to vent and drain the SDVs is maintained and 
controlled through administrative controls. This requirement assures 
the reactor protection system is not adversely affected by the 
inoperable valves. With the safety functions of the valves being 
maintained, the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated are not significantly increased.
    Criterion 2.--The proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. Thus, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any previously evaluated.
    Criterion 3.--The proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.
    The proposed change ensures that the safety functions of the S.V. 
vent and drain valves are fulfilled. The isolation function is 
maintained by redundant valves and by the required action to isolate 
the affected line. The ability to vent and drain the SDVs is maintained 
through administrative controls. In addition, the reactor protection 
system will prevent filling of an S.V. to the point that it has 
insufficient volume to accept a full scram. Maintaining the safety 
functions related to isolation of the S.V. and insertion of control 
rods ensures that the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.
    Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February 2003.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William H. Ruland,
Director, Project Directorate IV, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 03-4263 Filed 2-21-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P