[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 27 (Monday, February 10, 2003)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 6689-6694]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-3262]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Part 173

[Docket No. RSPA-99-6223 (HM-213B)]
RIN 2137-AD36


Hazardous Materials: Safety Requirements for External Product 
Piping on Cargo Tanks Transporting Flammable Liquids

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM).

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SUMMARY: RSPA is considering alternatives for reducing safety risks 
associated with the transportation of flammable liquids in unprotected 
product piping (wetlines) on DOT specification cargo tank motor 
vehicles. In this notice, RSPA is soliciting comments and information 
regarding methods to reduce the risks posed by wetlines. In addition, 
we are seeking answers to questions to assist in determining whether 
further regulatory action is warranted. Regulatory amendments that may 
be promulgated as a result of comments to this notice will be developed 
jointly with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), 
which has primary enforcement authority for cargo tank motor vehicles 
and highway transportation.

DATES: Comments must be received by June 10, 2003.

ADDRESSES: Written Comments: Submit written comments to the Dockets 
Management System, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL. 401, 400 
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. Comments should 
identify the docket number, RSPA-99-6223 (HM-213B), and be submitted in 
two copies. If you wish to receive confirmation that RSPA has received 
your comments, include a self-addressed stamped postcard. You may also 
submit comments via e-mail by accessing the Dockets Management System 
Web site at ``http:/[chyph]/dms.dot.gov''. Click on ``Help & 
Information'' to obtain instructions for filing the document 
electronically. You may also send your comments by facsimile to (202) 
366-3753.
    The Docket Management System is located on the Plaza Level of the 
Nassif Building at the U.S. Department of Transportation at the above 
address. You may review public dockets between the hours of 9 a.m. and 
5 p.m., Monday

[[Page 6690]]

through Friday, excluding Federal holidays. Internet users may review 
all comments on-line at the DOT Docket Management System Web site at 
``http://dms.dot.gov''.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Michael Stevens, Office of 
Hazardous Materials Standards, Research and Special Programs 
Administration, telephone (202) 366-8553; Mr. Philip Olson, Office of 
Hazardous Materials Technology, Research and Special Programs 
Administration, telephone (202) 366-4545; or Mr. Danny Shelton, Office 
of Safety and Technology; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 
telephone (202) 366-6121, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 
Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    The Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180), at 
Sec.  173.33(e), prohibit the retention of certain liquid hazardous 
materials in the external product piping of a DOT specification cargo 
tank, unless the cargo tank motor vehicle is equipped with bottom 
damage protection devices. The bottom damage protection devices must 
meet the requirements of Sec.  178.337-10 for the MC 331 specification; 
Sec.  178.345-8(b) for DOT 400-series specifications; or the accident 
damage protection requirements of the specification under which any 
other cargo tank motor vehicle was manufactured. The current 
prohibition applies to liquid hazardous materials in Divisions 6.1 
(toxic), 5.1 (oxidizer), 5.2 (organic peroxide), and Class 8 (corrosive 
to skin only). The prohibition does not apply to a residue that remains 
after the product piping is drained to the extent possible or to the 
retention of flammable liquids in product piping.
    The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA; we) adopted 
the current requirements in final rules published under Docket No. HM-
183, on June 12, 1989 (54 FR 24982) and September 7, 1990 (55 FR 
37028). In the June 12, 1989 final rule, we amended the regulations to 
require accident damage protection devices on product piping containing 
liquid hazardous materials in Divisions 6.1 (toxic), 5.1 (oxidizer), 
5.2 (organic peroxide), Classes 8 (corrosive to skin only), and 3 
(flammable liquids), except for flammable liquid fuels transported in 
cargo tank motor vehicles equipped with meters for fuel tax purposes. 
These latter tanks were excluded because of the potential costs to 
modify the cargo tank motor vehicles and the apparent unavailability of 
a practical system to empty wetlines after bottom-loading. We also 
imposed limitations for the inside diameter and aggregate volume of all 
unprotected product piping on a cargo tank motor vehicle as a means to 
limit the quantity of lading retained in wetlines (54 FR 24987).
    In the preamble of the June 12, 1989 final rule, we stated that 
bottom loading and unloading outlets on a cargo tank motor vehicle 
present an inherent risk that, if the outlets are damaged, the entire 
contents of the cargo tank may be released. To counteract this risk, we 
required product piping attached to the outlet valve to have a 
sacrificial device designed to break under accident loads. We also 
stated that during the 1980's, the petroleum industry chose to equip 
their cargo tanks with top vapor recovery systems and to bottom load as 
a means of complying with state implementation plans promulgated under 
the Clean Air Act. In implementing this system, the industry did not 
provide for draining or purging product from the cargo tank piping 
after it was bottom-loaded.
    After publication of the June 12, 1989 final rule, we received 
hundreds of petitions for reconsideration. Several petitioners 
requested that we broaden the exception for flammable liquid fuels 
metered for fuel tax purposes to include all flammable liquids and 
certain other hazardous materials and to remove the quantity 
limitations for product retention in wetlines. Many of the concerns 
raised in these petitions, about the difficulties of removing product 
from loading lines or compliance with the accident damage protection 
requirements, had not been brought to our attention during the comment 
period for the NPRM or during any of the subsequent hearings or public 
meetings.
    In the September 7, 1990 final rule that responded to the petitions 
for reconsideration, we amended the June 12, 1989 final rule to remove 
all of the adopted restrictions on transporting flammable liquids in 
wetlines. We realized that the petroleum industry needed additional 
time to implement design and operational changes before a prohibition 
against unprotected product piping could be adopted. We recognized the 
inherent difficulties in draining or purging product from the loading 
lines while maintaining an accurate metering system. However, we 
stated:

    We strongly encourage the petroleum industry to consider the 
risk it accepts in operating cargo tank motor vehicles over the 
highway with hazardous materials retained in the piping and that the 
hazardous materials industry consider and recommend possible 
alternatives to eliminate this risk in the most cost-effective 
manner.

    We reiterated that the prohibition of lading in product piping was 
applicable only to DOT specification cargo tanks used to transport 
liquid hazardous materials. We also clarified that the prohibition in 
Sec.  173.33(e) does not apply to cargo tank motor vehicles used to 
transport hazardous materials having relatively low hazards, such as 
combustible liquids, where the use of a specification cargo tank is not 
required. See 55 FR 37030.
    On October 9, 1997, in Yonkers, New York a westbound MC 306 cargo 
tank motor vehicle containing 8,800 gallons of gasoline was struck 
broadside in the area of the piping manifold by a southbound passenger 
vehicle. The initial impact fractured the cargo tank's product piping 
and released approximately 28 gallons of gasoline. After surviving the 
initial impact, the 62-year-old operator of the passenger vehicle died 
from burns sustained in the fire that ignited immediately following the 
collision. Once ignited, the fire eventually spread and consumed the 
entire contents of the cargo tank, destroying both vehicles and a New 
York State Thruway overpass.
    As part of the accident investigation, investigators from the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reviewed data related to MC 
306 cargo tank motor vehicles in the Hazardous Materials Information 
System (HMIS) for the period January 1990 through August 1997. NTSB 
identified 501 cargo tank motor vehicle accidents reported during this 
period; 47 involved external product piping incidents due to outside 
forces. Of those 47 incidents, 27 involved collisions with other motor 
vehicles, 16 involved trucks hitting stationary objects, and four 
involved overturned cargo tank motor vehicles. Fires occurred in five 
of the 47 product piping incidents, resulting in two deaths, three 
major injuries, and reported damage estimates of over $800,000.
    NTSB issued its accident summary report on May 5, 1998. The NTSB 
report (H 98-27) is available in this docket and by visiting the NTSB 
Internet Web site. In its report, NTSB stated that the immediate result 
of the Yonkers collision was a fire inside and below the car and that 
the fuel for the initial fire was the gasoline released from the cargo 
tank's loading lines during impact. The fire was then fed by gasoline 
from the cargo tank's compartments. NTSB concluded that had the loading 
lines been empty, the fire likely would not have occurred. Based on its

[[Page 6691]]

investigation, the NTSB identified as a safety issue the danger of 
operating a truck when its cargo tank's unprotected loading lines are 
carrying hazardous materials. In its report, NTSB expressed particular 
concern about the severity of the Yonkers accident. As a result of its 
investigation, NTSB recommended (NTSB Recommendation H-98-27) that the 
Secretary of Transportation prohibit the carrying of hazardous 
materials in external product piping, such as loading lines, that may 
be vulnerable to damage in an accident.
    On July 22, 1999, RSPA met with industry and trade representatives, 
at their request, to discuss the NTSB recommendation. Attendees 
included representatives from the American Petroleum Institute (API), 
Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (TTMA), Petroleum Marketers 
Association of America (PMAA), National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. 
(NTTC), Sigma, Sunoco, BP Amoco, and Marathon Ashland. Discussions 
focused on the cargo tank industry's development of alternative 
solutions for unprotected product piping. We indicated that we were 
aware of a purging system under development and invited industry to 
provide cost data or information on any other potential solutions.
    On December 4, 2000, the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 
General Counsel, on behalf of RSPA, submitted a significant NPRM to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for consideration. In the NPRM, 
we proposed to adopt a performance standard for substantially 
eliminating product from unprotected piping that could be met with 
current technology or by other innovative systems developed by 
industry.
    The proposal required that all affected cargo tanks conform to the 
performance standard within seven years, allowing for two years of 
research and development, and, dependent upon the cargo tank's pressure 
test date, a maximum of five years for retrofits to achieve compliance.
    The proposed rule provided an exception for truck-mounted tanks, 
based on inherent safety features, significantly reducing compliance 
costs to small businesses. The Petroleum Marketers Association of 
America (PMAA), a federation of 42 state and regional trade 
associations, represents 7,850 small, independent petroleum marketers 
that sell nearly half the gasoline consumed in this country. In a May 
23, 2000 letter, PMAA suggested that straight trucks should not be 
included in any proposed rulemaking because it was unaware of any wet-
lines-related fatalities involving straight trucks. The PMAA supported 
its suggestion by noting that the general design and construction of 
straight trucks is such that the placement of external product piping 
is afforded protection by the frame of the truck, the meter box and 
tool boxes. (The PMAA letter is in the docket for this rulemaking.)
    On January 22, 2001, the NPRM was withdrawn for review by the 
current administration in accordance with a White House Chief of Staff 
directive. After review by the Secretary of Transportation, the NPRM 
was resubmitted to OMB for consideration.
    On August 10, 2001, OMB returned the NPRM to the Department for 
reconsideration. In its return letter, OMB expressed concern with the 
methodology used to determine benefits and the true costs required to 
achieve them. First, regarding the retrofit of existing cargo tank 
motor vehicles, OMB was concerned that RSPA was engaging in a ``risk-
risk'' tradeoff, that is, the increase in risk to install (i.e., 
welding) a system to eliminate wetlines outweighed the benefits 
realized in lives saved on public highways. Second, OMB questioned 
whether some or all of the reported fatalities in the NPRM were the 
result of causes unrelated to wetlines (e.g., blunt force trauma). 
Third, OMB questioned why RSPA would extrapolate the number of 
fatalities and injuries multiplied by a factor of 1.5 due to suspected 
under-reporting of incidents involving wetlines. OMB cited RSPA's 
``Preliminary Assessment of Risk/Benefit-Cost,'' dated January 25, 
1999, as stating that this increase in benefits might overstate the 
risks but was necessary when considering any rulemaking action. (This 
document is available for review at the RSPA Hazardous Materials Safety 
Web site, http://hazmat.dot.gov/risk_analyses.htm, and the DOT Docket 
Management System Web site, http://dms.dot.gov.) Finally, OMB did, 
however, indicate support for the prohibition of wetlines on newly 
constructed cargo tank motor vehicles based on the proposal's greater 
net benefits to society. (The August 16, 2001 OMB letter is in the 
docket for this rulemaking.)
    It is because of these and other uncertainties with regard to cost 
vs. benefit and new construction vs. retrofit that we have chosen to 
issue an advance notice of proposed rulemaking. It is our intent to 
take a ``fresh look'' at this issue by soliciting comments on the 
narrative discussion and answers to the questions posed in Section V of 
this notice.

II. Fatal Accidents Attributed to Wetlines

    The unprotected product piping on a five-compartment cargo tank 
motor vehicle carrying gasoline typically contains 30-50 gallons of 
gasoline. If a passenger vehicle strikes the side of a cargo tank motor 
vehicle, the impact likely will fracture the wetlines. In such 
collisions, the passenger vehicle is often wedged under the cargo tank 
motor vehicle. With the automobile driver and passenger(s) trapped in 
the vehicle under the cargo tank and the fractured product piping 
releasing 30-50 gallons of gasoline, the gasoline spills onto, 
underneath, or into the passenger vehicle. If ignited, fire rapidly 
engulfs the driver and passenger(s) inside their vehicle. When ignited, 
a gasoline spill of 50 gallons will be fatal to persons within a zone 
of approximately 41 feet, dooming those trapped in a vehicle at the 
site of the release and fire. If the fire is not extinguished 
immediately, it may spread from the gasoline originally contained in 
the product piping to the gasoline contained in the cargo tank motor 
vehicle. In this instance, the safety threat to the surrounding 
community is significant.
    Since 1992, there have been seven reported accidents, resulting in 
eight fatalities, where wetlines were damaged and gasoline released. 
These fatal accidents primarily involve collisions with passenger 
vehicles. Our experience with the HMIS indicates that there is a degree 
of under-reporting of hazardous materials transportation accidents of 
all types. In addition, prior to October 1, 1998, certain intrastate 
highway carriers were not required to report hazardous materials 
releases to RSPA. Therefore, the HMIS data probably do not include all 
accidents involving damage to wetlines on cargo tank motor vehicles.
    In this section, we describe a sampling of five fatal wetlines 
accidents. These descriptions provide an indication of the nature of 
the safety problem and its possible consequences. In these five 
accidents, six fatalities appear to have resulted from fires that 
ignited after passenger vehicles struck wetlines that then released 
gasoline.
    Long Beach, CA (one fatality). On November 22, 1992, in Long Beach, 
California, a passenger vehicle struck a cargo tank motor vehicle on 
the right side and ruptured the unprotected product piping. 
Approximately 26 gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel were released and 
ignited immediately. The driver of the passenger vehicle died in the 
accident.
    Houston, TX (one fatality). On October 1, 1994, in Houston, Texas, 
the

[[Page 6692]]

driver of a passenger vehicle died after his westbound vehicle struck a 
northbound cargo tank motor vehicle broadside and the product piping 
sheared off the cargo tank and released 38 gallons of gasoline. A fire 
broke out. The driver was trapped inside the vehicle wedged under the 
cargo tank and died in the automobile.
    Yonkers, NY (one fatality). On October 9, 1997, in Yonkers, New 
York, a passenger vehicle struck a cargo tank motor vehicle in the area 
of the external loading and unloading lines, fracturing the cargo 
tank's product piping and releasing approximately 28 gallons of 
gasoline. After surviving the initial impact of the collision, the 62-
year old driver of the passenger vehicle died from burns and smoke 
inhalation from the fire that ignited immediately.
    Hammond, IN (two fatalities). On November 12, 1999, in Hammond, 
Indiana, the 21-year old driver of a passenger vehicle and a four-year 
old passenger died from burns sustained in a fire that ignited 
immediately following the collision of their vehicle with a cargo tank 
motor vehicle. The passenger vehicle struck the cargo tank in the area 
of the piping manifold releasing the gasoline contained in the product 
piping. Both vehicles were destroyed by the fire that subsequently 
spread from the product piping and consumed the entire contents of the 
cargo tank.
    Detroit, MI (one fatality). On July 11, 2001, near Detroit, 
Michigan, an out of control automobile crashed into a highway barrier 
and then collided with the underside of a cargo tank motor vehicle. The 
trapped automobile driver died as a result of the ignition of 
approximately 50 gallons of gasoline.

III. Alternatives for Addressing Safety Risk

    In 1994, the American Petroleum Institute (API) initiated a two-
phased study to assess the risks posed by petroleum products in 
unprotected product piping. Phase I of the study, titled Alternative 
Means of Loading Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles, analyzed the risks posed by 
the existing industry practice. This phase was completed in February 
1994 and concluded:

    There is a small but definable risk to the public from a wet 
line spill. * * *the consequences can be more severe for the 
occupants of an automobile that impacts and fractures the wet lines 
and ignites the wet line contents. The majority of reported wet line 
spills are under 20 gallons. For this spill size of 20 gallons, the 
calculated maximum injury radius is 36 feet.

    Phase II of the study was to identify engineering designs that 
would have the potential for eliminating wetlines or provide collision 
protection to reduce or eliminate the risk. Because Phase I of the 
study concluded that the probability of a fatality being directly 
attributed to wetlines is ``quite low,'' the second phase of the study 
was not considered. In its Executive Summary API stated, ``Based on the 
information gathered, the fatality rate from wetline spills is one for 
every 1.8 x 10\10\ miles traveled, or one fatality every eleven 
years.'' It also noted that additional information indicated the 
fatality rate could be considerably higher. In fact, this information 
indicated that ``the fatality rate for these conditions is one for 
every 1.1 x 10\9\ miles'' traveled, or 0.7 fatalities per year.
    We are aware of two systems that have been demonstrated to reduce 
risks from wetlines. The first is an onboard system that evacuates the 
wetlines by forcing the lading out of the product piping and into the 
cargo tank body. After loading is complete and the main cargo 
compartment valves are closed, the system introduces compressed air 
from an auxiliary tank into the product piping under low pressure and 
at a low flow rate. Lading in the product piping flows through separate 
purging lines into the cargo tank body. This purging process is 
controlled automatically and lasts approximately six minutes. The 
system is also capable of detecting and automatically purging any 
leakage of product through the cargo tank's internal shutoff valve into 
the product piping, thereby eliminating a potential wetline condition 
during transportation. For an average cargo tank motor vehicle, the 
weight increase for a manual purging system is approximately 48 pounds.
    The second system involves adding a set of short lines for loading 
that are independent of the unloading lines. These short loading lines, 
placed on the lower part of the cargo tank, are accessible and are not 
exposed to damage in case of rollover. Each short four-inch inside 
diameter pipe extends from the cargo tank wall and contains 
approximately one gallon of hazardous material; depending on the number 
of compartments on the cargo tank motor vehicle, the short line piping 
system on the vehicle could contain 4-5 gallons of hazardous material 
rather than the 30 to 50 gallons contained in a typical product piping 
system. For an average cargo tank motor vehicle, the weight increase 
for the short external product piping option is approximately 50 
pounds.
    For a system using separate loading lines, it may be feasible to 
recess the loading connections into the interior cargo tank body so 
that the surface of the loading inlet is flush with the cargo tank 
wall. This option may be preferred by cargo tank manufacturers and 
owners because it eliminates the need to ensure that external product 
piping is designed and positioned so as to protect the integrity of the 
cargo tank wall in the event of an accident. Recessing of loading 
inlets within the cargo tank wall would be expected to eliminate the 
risks posed by external product piping and could be designed to meet 
the appropriate accident damage protection requirements. At the present 
time, however, this option may be unrealistic because substantial 
modifications to existing loading racks would be necessary or loading 
times would increase due to the cargo tank being moved to reach loading 
arms. In addition, there are questions about the effectiveness of such 
a design and whether it might adversely impact the structural integrity 
of the cargo tank.
    We understand that one major oil company, representing less than 
one percent of the potentially affected cargo tank population, has 
chosen to outfit its fleet with a system that purges product from 
unprotected external piping. Two additional carriers installed the same 
purging system on a small portion of their fleets as part of a 
successful field evaluation and expressed interest in equipping their 
entire fleets. However, these carriers have chosen to defer 
installation pending possible RSPA rulemaking.
    There may also be other ways to reduce wetlines risk. For example, 
many of the incidents of which we are aware appear to be caused because 
automobile drivers do not see the cargo tank motor vehicle. Perhaps 
marking or other systems that increase vehicle conspicuity could be 
effective in reducing collisions between cargo tank motor vehicles and 
automobiles.
    Further, we are aware that at least one cargo tank operator has 
installed under-ride protection on its cargo tank motor vehicles. 
Although this protection may not meet the bottom damage protection 
requirements under Sec.  178.345-8(b), we invite comments on whether 
this may or may not substantially reduce the risks posed by unprotected 
product piping.

IV. Costs and Benefits of Risk Reduction Measures

    It is our understanding that the useful life of a cargo tank motor 
vehicle is at least 20 years. However, we are aware that many cargo 
tank motor vehicles may remain in service for up to 30 years. Based on 
information in the U.S. Census Bureau's 1997 Vehicle Inventory and Use 
Survey (VIUS), it appears that the average annual population of cargo

[[Page 6693]]

tank motor vehicles that would be affected by any rulemaking action is 
approximately 63,000. This number includes bottom-loaded single-unit 
trucks, straight trucks pulling trailers, and truck-tractors pulling 
trailers in flammable liquid service. Cargo tank motor vehicles average 
four compartments each, with piping that contains an aggregate total of 
approximately 40 gallons of product.
    As previously discussed, we are aware of two systems that may 
reduce risk from wetlines. A manual onboard purging system can be 
installed on a newly constructed cargo tank motor vehicle for about 
$2,100 (welded) or $2,250 (non-welded) (2002 dollars). Equipment and 
installation costs are the same for the retrofit of existing cargo tank 
motor vehicles; however, additional costs in the form of lost profit or 
installation risk may be incurred. The independent short loading line 
system can be installed for $1,540 per cargo tank motor vehicle (2002 
dollars). Because of the complexity of such a design, however, it may 
not be appropriate for the retrofit of existing cargo tank motor 
vehicles. We invite comments on the feasibility of retrofits of 
existing vehicles to reduce or eliminate product in wetlines and on 
costs that may be associated with such a retrofit.
    We believe there may be other cost-effective solutions that could 
significantly reduce or eliminate the current level of risk. We 
encourage commenters to identify other possible approaches to reducing 
or eliminating the risks posed by the transportation of flammable 
liquids in wetlines.
    Quantified and monetized benefits realized from action to reduce 
the transportation risks associated with wetlines would be in the form 
of reductions in fatalities, major and minor injuries, product losses, 
carrier damages, public and private property damages, risks to 
emergency responders, decontamination and cleanup costs, and evacuation 
costs. Through the HMIS database and information provided by the NTSB, 
we identified 194 reported incident cases involving wetlines during the 
period of 1990-2001. As previously discussed, we are aware of at least 
six fatalities as a result of five of those incidents where piping was 
damaged and gasoline released.
    In addition to quantified/monetized benefits, measures to reduce 
wetlines risks would reduce losses by the private sector (in terms of 
time and productivity), by government (in terms of allocation of scarce 
resources, including emergency responders, their support vehicles and 
equipment), and by the general public (in terms of time and 
inconvenience). Some elements of actual and potential losses are: (1) 
The closure of transportation arteries; (2) the evacuation of homes, 
businesses and other facilities that are in harm's way; and (3) 
productivity losses in terms of facility and/or personnel down time 
attributed to traffic delays and/or facility evacuations.

V. Questions for Commenters

    In general, we seek comments to determine whether regulatory 
changes are needed and can be made in a cost-effective manner. In 
particular, we invite commenters to respond to the following questions:

A. General

    1. Are the statistics and data (e.g., cargo tank population, useful 
life of a cargo tank, accident frequency and consequences), costs 
(e.g., purging system, short-loading lines, new construction, 
retrofit), and potential benefits (e.g., fatalities, injuries, and 
property damages prevented) provided in this ANPRM accurate?
    2. What is the useful life of a cargo tank motor vehicle utilized 
for the transportation of flammable liquids?
    3. What percentage of cargo tank motor vehicles are operated at 
maximum weight limits such that any additional weight of a system to 
eliminate wetlines would impose a weight penalty?
    4. For cargo tank motor vehicles in flammable liquid service, what 
is the average distance per trip?
    5. In addition to the potential benefits described in this ANPRM, 
are there additional benefits, measurable or otherwise, that would 
result from implementation of measures to reduce wetlines risks?
    6. Should a benefit-cost analysis include the reduction of risks 
associated with low-frequency, high-consequence events?
    7. Would requirements for systems to reduce the risk posed by 
wetlines for all newly constructed cargo tank motor vehicles result in 
significant reductions in per unit cost because of economies of scale?

B. Current Market Practices

    1. What safety practices, other than those described in this ANPRM, 
are motor carriers currently utilizing to reduce the risks associated 
with the transportation of flammable liquids in wetlines?
    2. How effective are these safety practices in reducing the risks 
associated with wetlines on cargo tanks?
    3. What are the costs of these safety practices currently utilized?
    4. Would an industry or industry/government sponsored research 
initiative to explore new methods to eliminate wetlines be of value?
    5. If so, what would be the value of such a partnership?

C. Facility Modification

    1. Concerning the short and recessed loading lines systems 
described in this ANPRM, what modifications to loading arms or hoses at 
existing loading racks would be necessary to accommodate short, 
including recessed within the cargo tank wall, loading lines?
    2. What would be the cost of these modifications?
    3. Can loading rack fuel tax accounting systems be modified to 
allow for product reversal once the cargo tank is full and the internal 
valves are closed, thus draining the loading lines?
    4. Is this option viable?
    5. What would such a modification cost?

D. Alternatives

Independent Loading Lines
    1. Are the short and recessed loading lines options practicable for 
installation on new cargo tank motor vehicles?
    2. Are either of these options practicable for installation on 
existing cargo tank motor vehicles (i.e., retrofit)?
    3. Are there any motor carriers actively operating or contemplating 
operating cargo tank motor vehicles with such a design?
    4. If so, what configuration was utilized and what was the cost to 
modify the cargo tank?
    5. Would maintaining a vehicle with such a design (i.e., 
independent loading lines) result in higher or lower costs than 
currently utilized designs?
Purging System
    1. How effective is a purging system in reducing the risks posed by 
wetlines?
    2. Is a purging system practicable for installation on new cargo 
tank motor vehicles?
    3. Is a purging system practicable for installation on existing 
cargo tank motor vehicles (i.e., retrofit)?
    4. Are there any motor carriers actively operating or contemplating 
operating cargo tank motor vehicles with a purging system?
    5. If so, what configuration is utilized (automatic, manual, other) 
and what was the cost to modify the cargo tank?
    6. What are the costs to maintain a cargo tank motor vehicle with a 
purging system installed?

[[Page 6694]]

Conspicuity
    1. Would improved conspicuity for cargo tank motor vehicles 
generally, or wetlines in particular, reduce wetlines risks?
    2. How effective would improved conspicuity be?
    3. Are there marking or lighting systems currently available that 
could improve the visibility of cargo tank motor vehicles or components 
of those vehicles to other drivers?
Accident Damage Protection
    1. Are there cost-effective designs for accident damage or under-
ride protection (e.g., guards), specification or otherwise, that would 
reduce the risks posed by unprotected product piping?
    2. What would these designs cost?
    3. What level of protection (i.e., impact forces sustained) would 
be both cost-effective and provide a significant reduction in risks 
associated with wetlines?
Non-Regulatory
    Would a non-regulatory approach, such as an awareness campaign to 
alert the public as to the hazards posed by wetlines, be successful in 
helping to reduce the risks posed by wetlines?
Other
    1. In addition to the purging and short-line systems described in 
this ANPRM, are there other systems currently being marketed or in 
development that can evacuate wetlines after loading or prevent 
wetlines from retaining liquid during loading operations?
    2. What are the costs or projected costs of such systems?
    3. How effective are they?
    4. How close to implementation are systems currently in the 
development phase?
    5. Are there other concepts, either related to vehicles or 
facilities, that might have application in reducing the risks posed by 
wetlines?

VI. Regulatory Notices

    There are a number of additional issues that we must address in 
determining whether to proceed with any rulemaking action. These 
include the analyses required under the following statutes and 
Executive Orders:

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review

    This rulemaking is considered a significant regulatory action under 
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and the Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures of the Department of Transportation (44 FR 11032). This 
ANPRM was reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.
    E.O. 12866 requires agencies to regulate in the ``most cost-
effective manner,'' to make a ``reasoned determination that the 
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs,'' and to develop 
regulations that ``impose the least burden on society.'' We therefore 
request comments, including specific data if possible, concerning the 
costs and benefits that may be associated with regulatory measures to 
reduce the safety risks associated with transportation of flammable 
liquids in wetlines. We would also be interested in comments on the 
several issues relating to the measurement of costs and benefits and 
the treatment of newly constructed as opposed to retrofitted cargo tank 
motor vehicles raised in the OMB Return Letter (discussed in Section I 
of this notice). To the extent feasible systems may be available to 
achieve compliance with a proposal to reduce wetlines risks, we invite 
commenters to discuss the effectiveness of such systems and to provide 
estimates of the unit cost of new construction and the unit cost to 
retrofit a cargo tank motor vehicle in the existing fleet. 
Alternatively, if there are feasible means to comply with a proposal by 
modifying equipment or procedures at the loading facility, interested 
parties are invited to provide comments on their cost and 
effectiveness.

B. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

    E.O. 13132 requires agencies to assure meaningful and timely input 
by state and local officials in the development of regulatory policies 
that may have a substantial, direct effect on the States, on the 
relationship between the national government and the states, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. We invite State and local governments with an interest in 
this rulemaking to comment on the effect that regulatory measures to 
reduce wetlines risks may have on State or local safety or 
environmental protection programs.

C. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribal Governments

    E.O. 13175 requires agencies to assure meaningful and timely input 
from Indian tribal government representatives in the development of 
rules that ``significantly or uniquely affect'' Indian communities and 
that impose ``substantial and direct compliance costs'' on such 
communities. We invite Indian tribal governments to provide comments as 
to the effect that regulatory measures to reduce wetlines risks may 
have on Indian communities.

D. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) 
requires each agency to review regulations and assess their impact on 
small entities unless the agency determines that a rule is not expected 
to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
``Small entities'' include small businesses, not-for-profit 
organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not 
dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with 
populations under 50,000. Interested parties are invited to comment on 
estimates of the costs and benefits of rulemaking scenarios that would 
reduce wetlines risks, including any impact on small businesses.

E. National Environmental Policy Act

    The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires that 
Federal agencies consider the consequences of major Federal actions and 
that they prepare a detailed statement on actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment. Interested parties are 
invited to review the Environmental Assessment available in the docket 
at http://dms.dot.gov, and to comment on what environmental impact, if 
any, a regulatory proposal to reduce wetlines risks would have.

F. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier 
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of 
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center 
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. The RIN 
number contained in the heading of this document may be used to cross-
reference this action with the Unified Agenda.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on February 4, 2003, under authority 
delegated in 49 CFR Part 106.
Robert McGuire,
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety.
[FR Doc. 03-3262 Filed 2-7-03; 8:45 am]
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