[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 15 (Thursday, January 23, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3304-3306]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-1468]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Advisory 2003-01.

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory 2003-01.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2003-01 addressing the 
importance of the hazardous materials offeror's requirement to verify 
the compatibility of all packaging components, such as valves and 
gaskets, in the event a change is made to the chemical constituents of 
a hazardous material in a railroad tank car. This action is being taken 
to improve the safety and reliability of hazardous material shipments 
in transportation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William S. Schoonover, Specialist, 
Hazardous Materials Division, Office of Safety Assurance and 
Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. 
Telephone: 202-493-6229, e-mail: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On February 18, 1999, railroad tank car number UTLX 643593, spotted 
on an unloading rack at the Essroc Cement Corporation's Logansport 
cement plant near Clymers, Indiana, sustained a sudden and catastrophic 
rupture that propelled the tank an estimated 750 feet over a multistory 
storage tank. The 20,000-gallon tank car initially contained about 
161,700 pounds (14,185 gallons) of a toxic and flammable hazardous 
waste being used as fuel for the plant's kilns. Fortunately, there were 
no injuries or fatalities. However, total damages, including property 
damage and costs from lost production, were estimated at nearly $8.2 
million. During the investigation of this incident, the safety relief 
device from this car and four other cars built to the same design were 
tested at a tank car repair facility to determine compliance with 
Federal regulations. Investigators determined that the gasket material 
in the safety relief devices exhibited varying degrees of brittleness, 
swelling, hardness, and cracking that contributed to the failure of the 
pressure relief devices to comply with Federal and industry 
requirements.
    Incidents such as the one near Clymers, Indiana, result from 
noncompliance with the requirements in the Hazardous Materials 
Regulations (HMR). Specifically, these incidents derive from improper 
material selection and consideration of all components. The safety and 
reliability of hazardous materials shipments in transportation depend 
on a disciplined approach to material selection and maintenance.
    FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2003-01 to further discuss the 
requirements concerning gasket material selection in the event a change 
is made in the chemical constituents of the hazardous material shipped. 
This document provides general guidance only. Shippers should not rely 
on this document as a substitute for sound engineering, material 
selection, and maintenance management.
    Tank car UTLX 643593, a DOT specification 111J100W1 tank car built 
in early 1993, was one of 52 tank cars designed for toluene 
diisocyanate (TDI) transportation. The certificate of construction for 
UTLX 643593, and the other cars listed on the built certificate, 
indicates that these cars were approved for carriage of ``Non-regulated 
commodities and commodities authorized in DOT Part 173 for which there 
are no other requirements and which are compatible with this design and 
class of car.'' [Emphasis Added] The service equipment from UTLX 643593 
was on a 10-year maintenance and qualification cycle and was not due 
for requalification until 2003. The O-rings and gaskets for the 
pressure relief device were made of ethylene propylene rubber and 
Teflon[reg], respectively.
    The hazardous material within the tank car, TDI waste matter, was 
loaded in October 1993 and stored until March 1998. It was transported 
to the Logansport facility for further storage until being moved for 
unloading in February 1999. On February 18, 1999, while spotted on an 
unloading rack, tank car UTLX 643593 sustained a sudden and 
catastrophic rupture that propelled the tank an estimated 750 feet over 
a multistory storage tank. Immediately after the incident, an 
investigation was conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board 
and FRA. Laboratory analysis obtained during the investigation revealed 
that two other constituents had been added to the material before 
shipping to the Logansport facility. A blending agent was added to the 
TDI to reduce its viscosity. The blending agents were HAN 906[reg] (a 
mixture of flammable petroleum hydrocarbons such as naphthalene and 
trimethylbenzene) and monochlorobenzene (MCB). Both blending agents are 
classified as hazardous materials when shipped individually.
    The transportation of the solvent blend wastes and TDI matter 
wastes in UTLX 643593 and the other tank cars approved for the 
transport of pure TDI constituted a change in the ``compatibility 
status'' of the tank and service equipment. This change in 
compatibility status, which resulted in deterioration of the 
components, was a key contributor to the pressure relief devices 
failure to meet Federal requirements (See 49 CFR 173.24(e)).
    After the Clymers accident, FRA mandated, in a letter to the tank 
car owner, that the pressure relief devices from four of the 24 tank 
cars containing the TDI matter wastes in storage at the Logansport rail 
yard be pressure-tested in accordance with the HMRs before any of the 
tank cars could be transported for unloading. The tear down and 
inspection of the pressure relief devices from these five tank cars 
(the four cars that FRA required to be tested and UTLX 643593) 
demonstrated that the

[[Page 3305]]

devices were in a deteriorated condition. The ethylene propylene rubber 
``O''-rings showed evidence of swelling, hardness, and brittleness, and 
the metallic components exhibited varying degrees of rust, scale, 
pitting, and grit. While the deteriorated ``O''-rings in the pressure 
relief devices did not cause the failure alone, the ``O''-rings clearly 
demonstrated improper material selection.
    ``A Chemical Resistance Guide to Elastomers'' provided to the 
investigators by the tank car manufacturer contained guidance about the 
resistance of available gasket, ``O''-ring, and sealing materials to 
degradation upon exposure to various chemicals. According to this 
guide, ethylene propylene rubber, the material that constituted the 
``O''-rings in the pressure relief devices from the tank cars, offers 
good to excellent resistance to chemical attack from pure TDI at 
temperatures up to 70 [deg]F and should not exhibit more than minor 
swelling, softening, or surface deterioration. The guide also 
recommends against using ethylene propylene rubber with either MCB or 
naphthalene, one of the primary components of the HAN 906[reg] solvent. 
Investigators concluded that the swelling, hardness, and brittleness of 
the ethylene propylene rubber ``O''-rings in the pressure relief 
devices from the tank cars that were examined likely resulted from 
exposure to the MCB in the TDI matter waste.
    The offeror of tank car UTLX 643593 apparently did not consider 
that the presence of MCB and HAN 906[reg] solvent in the TDI waste 
mixtures might adversely affect the ``O''-rings in the pressure relief 
devices and other gaskets on the tank cars used to store and transport 
these wastes. Consequently, the offeror did not find that the presence 
of these chemicals changed the compatibility status from the transport 
of pure TDI. The investigation, however, showed that the presence of 
MCB and HAN 906[reg] solvent in the TDI waste mixtures was sufficient 
to chemically attack the ``O''-rings in the pressure relief devices on 
tank cars carrying TDI waste mixtures. Therefore, the transportation of 
the solvent-blend wastes and TDI-matter wastes in the tank cars 
approved for the transport of pure TDI constituted a change in product 
compatibility.

Federal Requirements

    The HMR, 49 CFR parts 171-180, set forth requirements for the safe 
transportation of hazardous materials in commerce by railcar, aircraft, 
vessel, and motor vehicle. In general, the HMR apply to each person who 
performs, or causes to be performed, functions related to the 
transportation of hazardous materials in commerce. The HMR prescribe 
requirements for classification, packaging, hazard communication, 
shipping papers, incident reporting, handling, loading, unloading, 
segregation, and movement of hazardous materials.
    Material selection and use of an appropriate packaging for a 
hazardous material are essential to ensuring the safety and reliability 
of the shipment while in transportation. Only packagings compatible 
with the hazardous material may be used to ship hazardous materials in 
transportation. Persons must ensure that a packaging will retain its 
contents during temperature variances, changes in atmospheric pressure, 
vibration, or other conditions that may be encountered during normal 
conditions of transport. These requirements also apply to tank cars 
containing only a residue of a hazardous material.
    The HMR place the responsibility for ensuring that a package is 
appropriate for transportation on the offeror (typically the shipper) 
of the material. The selection should be made with input from the tank 
car owner and the component/gasket manufacturer to ensure that the 
configuration is appropriate for the device and that other entities 
having similar responsibilities in relation to the tank car's 
maintenance are aware of the requirements and can modify inspection and 
maintenance cycles as necessary. In addition, the tank car manufacturer 
and tank car repair facilities each have a responsibility to ensure 
that the approved materials are used during the assembly of the tank 
car and for repairs or replacement. The HMR require the offeror to 
ensure that the components on the tank car are correct before offering 
the tank car for transportation.
    Even when appropriate test intervals are established and followed, 
carriage of cargos that chemically attack gaskets and ``O''-rings in 
valves and fittings can undermine the integrity of the valves and 
fittings. The addition of a new chemical constituent to a commodity 
approved for transportation in a tank car changes the chemical 
composition of that commodity and results in the exposure of gaskets 
and seals on the tank car to a new mixture. The concentration of a 
newly added chemical constituent may be sufficiently diluted so as to 
present little or no risk of chemical attack to gaskets and seals, but 
the risk level can best be ascertained by tests or verification through 
technical literature that the new chemical constituent is compatible 
with the gaskets and seals on the tank car.
    While no information or guidance regarding gasket and fitting 
compatibility in conjunction with changes in product service has yet 
been issued by FRA, the topic continues to be addressed through various 
programs. For example, on September 21, 1995, the Research and Special 
Programs Administration amended the performance standards for the 
gaskets used on tank cars. The regulations require that each tank car 
used in anhydrous ammonia, division 2.1 or division 2.3, service have 
gaskets designed according to temperature, application, media, 
pressure, and size, so that a positive seal is created and the safety 
and reliability of the shipment will be maintained.

Recommended Action

    In recognition of the need to assure safety, FRA strongly urges all 
persons involved in the packaging and offering of hazardous materials 
to carefully examine all of their internal procedures and processes to 
ensure proper compliance. In addition, FRA reminds offerors of 
hazardous materials of their responsibility to verify the compatibility 
of all tank car components, such as valves and gaskets, to resist 
corrosion, permeability, premature aging, pitting, or embrittlement. In 
making these determinations, offerors should combine their knowledge of 
the materials to be shipped with component compatibility information 
available from the component and gasket manufacturers and communicate 
their requirements to the tank car owner. Technical organizations such 
as the National Association of Corrosion Engineers (http://www.nace.org), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (http://www.asme.org), the American Chemistry Council (http://americanchemistry.com), the Fluid Sealing Association (http://www.fluidsealing.com), and the Gasket Fabricators Association (http://gasketfab.org) provide additional sources of information. Tank car 
owners are required to use the information received from offerors to 
develop appropriate maintenance and inspection cycles based on the 
information.

Additional Information

    Interested parties can obtain additional information through 
several methods. You may request an informal written interpretation, a 
regulatory clarification, or a response to a question, or offer an 
opinion concerning hazardous materials transportation by sending a 
written submission to the

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Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance (RRS-12), Federal Railroad 
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1120 Vermont Avenue, 
NW., Washington, DC 20590-0001 or to our e-Mail address at 
[email protected]. Additional information, including accident/
incident information, guidance, and telephone contact numbers, is also 
available on our Web site at http://www.fra.dot.gov.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on January 17, 2003.
George A. Gavalla,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. 03-1468 Filed 1-22-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P