[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 3 (Monday, January 6, 2003)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 463-471]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-155]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 72

RIN 3150-AG74


List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg]-24PT1; Addition

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its 
regulations to add the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] 
System to the list of approved spent fuel storage casks. The 
Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] System has improved 
shielding and the ability to withstand a higher seismic spectra than 
the Standardized NUHOMS[reg] System; otherwise, the cask 
designs are the same. This amendment allows the holders of power 
reactor operating licenses to store spent fuel in this approved cask 
system under a general license.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This final rule is effective on February 5, 2003.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jayne McCausland, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6219, e-mail 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Section 218(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended 
(NWPA), requires that ``[t]he Secretary [of the Department of Energy 
(DOE)] shall establish a demonstration program, in cooperation with the 
private sector, for the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel at civilian 
nuclear power reactor sites, with the objective of establishing one or 
more technologies that the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission may, by 
rule, approve for use at the sites of civilian nuclear power reactors 
without, to the maximum extent practicable, the need for additional 
site-specific approvals by the Commission.'' Section 133 of the NWPA 
states, in part, that ``[t]he Commission shall, by rule, establish 
procedures for the licensing of any technology approved by the 
Commission under Section 218(a) for use at the site of any civilian 
nuclear power reactor.''
    To implement this mandate, the NRC approved dry storage of spent 
nuclear fuel in NRC-approved casks under a general license by 
publishing a final rule in 10 CFR part 72 entitled, ``General License 
for Storage of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites'' (55 FR 29181; July 
18, 1990). This rule also established a new Subpart L within 10 CFR 
part 72, entitled ``Approval of Spent Fuel Storage Casks,'' containing 
procedures and criteria for obtaining NRC approval of spent fuel 
storage cask designs.

Discussion

    This rule will add the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] 
System (Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg]-24PT1) to the list 
of approved cask designs. Following the procedures specified in 10 CFR 
72.230 of subpart L, Transnuclear, Inc., (TN) submitted an application 
for NRC approval together with the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) 
entitled, ``Final Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] Horizontal Modular Storage System for Irradiated 
Nuclear Fuel.'' The NRC evaluated the TN submittal and issued a 
preliminary Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) and a proposed Certificate 
of Compliance (CoC) for the Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] System. The NRC published a proposed rule in the 
Federal Register (67 FR 6203; February 11, 2002) to add the 
Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg]-24PT1 cask system to the 
listing in 10 CFR 72.214. The comment period ended on April 29, 2002. 
Seven comment letters were received on the proposed rule.
    Based on its review and analysis of public comments, the NRC staff 
has determined that no modifications will be made to the proposed CoC, 
including its appendices, the Technical Specifications, and the 
Approved Contents and Design Features, for the Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] System. No modifications will be made to the 
PSER.
    The NRC finds that the Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg]-24PT1 cask system, as designed and when 
fabricated and used in accordance with the conditions specified in its 
CoC, meets the requirements of part 72. Thus, use of the TN 
Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg]-24PT1 cask system, as 
approved by the NRC, will provide adequate protection of public health 
and safety and the environment. With this final rule, the NRC is 
approving the use of the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg]-
24PT1 cask system under

[[Page 464]]

the general license in 10 CFR part 72, Subpart K, by holders of power 
reactor operating licenses under 10 CFR part 50. Simultaneously, the 
NRC is issuing a final SER and CoC that will be effective on February 
5, 2003. Single copies of the CoC and SER are available for public 
inspection and/or copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD.

Summary of Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

    The NRC received seven comment letters on the proposed rule. The 
commenters included a public citizens' petition, two public citizens, 
two public interest organizations, one environmental justice 
organization, and one health professional organization. Copies of the 
public comments are available for review at the NRC Public Document 
Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. The comments received are 
also available electronically at the NRC's Public Electronic Reading 
Room on the Internet at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From 
this site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and 
image files of NRC's public documents. For more information, contact 
the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 
or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected]. If you do not have access 
to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, contact the PDR.

Comments on the Transnuclear, Inc., Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] System

    The proposed listing of the TN Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] System within 10 CFR 72.214, ``List of approved 
spent fuel storage casks,'' has not been changed as a result of the 
public comments. A review of the comments and the NRC staff's responses 
follow:
    Comment 1: Several commenters strongly opposed the storage or 
transportation of spent fuel as proposed by Southern California Edison 
(SCE) at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). These 
commenters raised a number of site-specific issues relating to the 
SONGS site and the potential storage of spent fuel at the site. One 
commenter stated that the development and operation of a ``nuclear 
dump'' in a highly populated, dangerously seismically active geological 
region, without a site-specific examination of critical, scientific, 
technical, economic, and other relevant issues, is unconscionable as an 
arrogant and indifferent treatment of the local population's welfare 
and safety in both short- and long-term effects. The site-specific 
issues raised by the commenters included comments related to costs to 
ratepayers, exact transportation routes for removal of spent fuel from 
SONGS, notification of public officials along transportation routes, 
number of shipments, total population along transportation routes, cost 
of transportation, training of SONGS employees, creation of jobs at 
SONGS and in the vicinity, decrease in property values near SONGS, 
concern over the increased capacity of the spent fuel pool, etc. The 
comments also included several related to emergency planning at SONGS. 
One commenter stated that the proposed NUHOMS casks that SCE intends to 
bring onsite at SONGS were not the safest and most secure casks 
available on the market and that the NRC must force SCE to use the 
safest cask design for a site that sits in an earthquake fault zone. 
The commenters believed that the seismic issue must be addressed and 
independently reviewed by the United States Geological Survey and the 
NRC and that the issues should be aired in public forums in Southern 
California. One commenter made reference to several California laws and 
actions that California should require SONGS to implement. One 
commenter stated that all television stations should conduct an 
emergency broadcast check announcement for SONGS.
    Response: The site-specific issues related to SCE potentially using 
the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] System are beyond the 
scope of this rulemaking. Similarly, transportation issues are beyond 
the scope of this rulemaking. This rulemaking is focused solely on 
whether to add a particular design, the Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] System, to the list of approved casks. The 
rulemaking will enable licensees to use this cask system under the 
general license provisions of 10 CFR part 72. By rulemaking, in Sec.  
72.210, the NRC granted a general license to all reactor facilities to 
operate an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). For SCE 
to be able to operate an ISFSI at SONGS under a general license, 
certain conditions in Part 72 must be met, which include using casks 
which have been approved by the NRC via rulemaking, and performing 
written evaluations which establish, among other things, that the 
reactor site parameters, including analyses of earthquake intensity, 
are enveloped by the cask design bases.
    This rulemaking is the authority for general licensees and not 
specific licensees. Any licensee who chooses to use this cask under a 
general license will need to comply with the Technical Specifications 
(TS) and the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) conditions, such as 
training of staff. Decisions made by specific utilities on why a 
specific cask is chosen over another design are beyond the scope of 
this rulemaking. If SCE chooses to use the Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] System at the San Onofre site, the licensee will 
be required to perform an evaluation in accordance with Sec.  72.212 to 
determine whether activities related to storage of spent fuel under the 
general license would involve any changes, tests, or experiments under 
Sec.  50.59. In addition, licensees would evaluate programs, such as 
emergency planning, as a part of their evaluations under Sec.  72.212. 
In accordance with Sec.  50.59, the licensee would make changes as 
necessary to existing systems and any physical changes to the facility 
as necessary to accommodate new cask designs. Each of these changes 
would need to be evaluated per Sec.  50.59 to determine the impact on 
other systems and on existing safety analyses.
    Comment 2: One of the commenters stated that all meetings regarding 
high-level waste storage at SONGS or the transportation of irradiated 
fuel casks off site must be public and be held near the site and that 
all documents should be made public.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. 
However, it is NRC policy that meetings with licensees be noticed in 
advance and be open to the public, unless proprietary, safeguards, or 
other protected information is to be discussed. It is also NRC policy 
that documents be made public through the Agencywide Document Access 
and Management System (ADAMS), unless they contain proprietary, 
safeguards, or other protected information.
    Comment 3: One commenter recommended that no transportation be 
allowed without limitation or phase out of the production of the high-
level radioactive waste at SONGS. The commenter further recommended 
that the NRC, Southern California Counties, and the State of California 
require SCE to replace and phase out energy that increases production 
of high-level waste with increased renewable sources and conservation 
technologies ideally before irradiated fuel pools are full in 2006. The 
commenter believed that any spent fuel stored at SONGS will never leave 
the site. One commenter stated that the license for SONGS should not be 
approved until the health effects of offsite radioactive exposure are 
included in a risk analysis by the

[[Page 465]]

California Coastal Commission, State of California, or the NRC. The 
commenter recommended that the Coastal Commission and the State of 
California research the legality of SCE's proposed storage site at 
SONGS.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The 
NRC approval process for a dry cask CoC does not require site-specific 
actions such as an independent approval or analysis by a State 
government or entity.
    Comment 4: One commenter supported the view that the structure and 
financing of the Nuclear Waste Fund requires a major overhaul.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The 
decision to initiate a major overhaul of the Nuclear Waste Fund is a 
policy matter for the current Administration to consider in conjunction 
with Congress. The NRC does not oversee the Nuclear Waste Fund.
    Comment 5: One commenter stated that the technical analyses, which 
are required under Sec.  72.212 to demonstrate how proposed casks will 
be capable of safely storing spent fuel, being monitored, and safely 
transporting the fuel and how the public health, safety, and welfare 
will be maintained, must be made public. The commenter stated that 
withholding these important technical analyses is a serious breach of 
faith and the rules. Several commenters requested that the public 
comment period be extended until all of the technical analyses and 
reports have been made fully and publicly available.
    Response: The NRC agrees that all documents that support the 
approval of the cask design must be made public. The documents 
referenced in the proposed rule which provide the basis for the rule 
are publicly available. Documents related to SONGS are not part of and 
do not support this rulemaking and, therefore, a request for those 
documents is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The request to extend 
the public comment period until all of SCE's Sec.  72.212 technical 
analyses and reports have been made fully and publicly available is 
beyond the scope of this rulemaking, since it deals with site-specific 
issues. The availability of the studies is not relevant to the question 
on which public comment is invited; i.e., whether this generic cask 
design should be certified by the NRC. A request for extension of the 
comment period filed by Ms. Patricia Borchmann was denied by letter 
dated March 27, 2002, from Dr. Donald A. Cool, Director of the NRC's 
Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety.
    Comment 6: One commenter stated that the NRC's risk assessment and 
its methodology needs another look and is outdated. The commenter 
stated that the probability of an extreme hazard (such as tsunami, 
earthquake, and terrorist attack) is not as low as the outcome of 
computer modeling and simulations indicate. The commenter stated that 
during the entire history of the nuclear industry in the United States, 
the NRC has been in denial about the real risks of operating nuclear 
generating stations, especially the sites located in highly populated, 
seismically active areas, as well as the sites that are in areas that 
make them totally vulnerable to tsunamis.
    Response: The commenter did not specifically identify what NRC risk 
assessment was of concern, hence this comment is beyond the scope of 
this rulemaking which is related to the safety review of a storage 
cask. Risk assessment and methodology development are an evolving 
process in the NRC. Thus, the risk insights obtained from this process 
are based on many quantitative and qualitative factors, such as 
statutory requirements and public and stakeholder interests, before 
conclusions and recommendations affecting safety are made. Comments 
about terrorist attacks and seismic conditions are also beyond the 
scope of this rulemaking. The consideration of seismic conditions at or 
near a spent fuel storage facility, where a storage cask would be 
placed, must be addressed by the licensee who uses the casks. Prior to 
use, each licensee must evaluate the seismic and other site-specific 
conditions at the site to determine that the design of the cask is 
suited to the conditions it would be expected to experience during its 
operational lifetime. This would include seismic loads. The site-
specific parameters are delineated in TS 4.4.3.
    Comment 7: One commenter strongly believed that dry cask storage 
raises many troubling public health questions. However, the commenter 
did not provide any specific examples.
    Response: The mission of the NRC is to provide reasonable assurance 
that the health and safety of the general public will be protected from 
the dangers involved in the commercial use of radioactive materials. 
The rulemaking process involves a detailed technical review of the 
storage cask design to ensure the safety of the cask for storage of 
spent fuel.
    Comment 8: One commenter asked that NRC reconsider the refusal to 
require or provide a site-specific consideration of this extensive 
modification of an existing license and its related nuclear facility. 
The residents of Southern California have a right to formal, legal, and 
fully adjudicated hearings in any such critical and extensive change at 
San Onofre.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. This 
rulemaking is focused solely on whether to add a particular design, the 
Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] System, to the list of 
approved casks. The rulemaking will enable licensees to use this cask 
system under the general license provisions of Part 72. The rulemaking 
does not address site-specific issues related to potential users. This 
design could be used by any general licensee. By rulemaking, in Sec.  
72.210, NRC granted a general license to all reactor facilities to 
operate an ISFSI without any further site-specific licensing actions.
    Comment 9: A commenter raised the question that, while bolting 
NUHOMS casks to the pad may prevent tipping, what will keep the 
concrete pad from cracking leading to possible offsite radioactive 
exposure.
    Response: The concrete storage pad is a site-specific design 
component of a storage facility, which is beyond the scope of this cask 
design rulemaking. In accordance with Sec.  72.212, the cask operators 
(licensees) are required to perform written evaluations to ensure that 
storage pads have been designed to adequately support the storage 
casks. See TS Section 4.4.3, Item 8, which provides the 
seismic parameter that would need to be evaluated. The earthquake 
motions are defined for the top surface of the concrete storage pad. A 
specific ISFSI site utilizing the cask system must demonstrate that the 
design seismic condition for that facility does not produce seismic 
effects greater than those specified for the top of the storage pad. 
Further, the pads provide a flat, stable surface for resting the 
storage casks, and any cracks in the pads would have no effect on cask 
integrity.
    Comment 10: One commenter stated that withholding from the public 
important technical analyses which would demonstrate how proposed casks 
will be capable of safely storing spent fuel for the entire lifetime 
that spent fuel will be stored on site, how it will be monitored, how 
casks can later be safely transported at some time in the distant 
future, and how the public health, safety, and welfare will be fully 
maintained is a serious breach of faith and the rules. Another 
commenter stated that currently casks are licensed (approved) for 20 
years, and was concerned that many utilities, including SCE, have 
stated in their applications that the casks may remain on site for up 
to 100 years.

[[Page 466]]

    Response: Technical documents related to this rulemaking are 
publicly available for inspection and copying at the NRC Public 
Document Room and may also be viewed and downloaded electronically via 
the rulemaking website. In accordance with current NRC regulations, a 
site may store spent nuclear fuel in a given cask for a period of 20 
years. Storage of spent nuclear fuel for a period beyond 20 years is 
beyond the scope of this rulemaking. TS Section 5.2.5 includes a 
requirement to monitor the thermal performance of each cask, and 
Section 5.2.3 includes a requirement to develop a radiological 
environmental monitoring program.
    Comment 11: One commenter asked who at the NRC has approved cranes, 
other moving equipment, and casks, and what independent verification 
process was used.
    Response: The equipment qualification for lifting and moving heavy 
loads is addressed in the CoC for the cask design as Condition 
5. This item states that a plant-specific safety review (under 
Sec.  50.59 or Sec.  72.48) is required to show operational compliance 
with plant-specific heavy load requirements. Each licensee who uses the 
storage cask is responsible for ensuring that any moving equipment that 
will be used meets NRC regulatory requirements. The NRC conducts 
inspections of licensees' loading activities, and such inspections 
would verify that heavy load issues would be addressed by licensees. 
The NRC approves cask designs for spent nuclear fuel storage in 
accordance with the requirements of Part 72.
    Comment 12: One commenter asked how the NRC's independent 
verification process for the proposed NUHOMS casks has changed to 
address problems that arose with other cask designs. Problems included 
flammable hydrogen gas bubbles, zinc interactions that can cause an 
explosion, welding problems, procedure adherence, quality control, 
cracking, helium leaks, cask loading, flaws in neutron shielding 
material, faulty O-rings, unloading procedures, and cask deterioration 
within a few years of installation.
    Response: When problems have arisen, the NRC has taken appropriate 
action to avoid future problems. The NRC staff conducted its 
independent safety review of the proposed cask design, keeping in mind 
design issues that have occurred in other cask designs over the past 
several years. It found no evidence of design-specific characteristics 
or issues that could lead to repeat of the design concerns raised in 
this comment.
    Comment 13: One commenter stated that the NRC must guarantee the 
public that the following will not occur if NUHOMS casks are allowed 
for storage of high-level radioactive waste: (a) Design flaws; (b) 
vents cut off from air flow due to debris; (c) faulty parts and 
equipment; (d) cracking; (e) casks approved without NRC's CoC; and (f) 
exemptions from NRC policies granted to any casks or cask siting, 
loading, transferring, or transportation procedures.
    Response: The NRC takes its responsibility as a regulatory agency 
very seriously along with its mission to protect the health and safety 
of the public from dangers associated with the use of radioactive 
materials. The NRC staff of technical experts has completed a thorough 
review of the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] System cask 
design. As needed, NRC may conduct inspections of vendors and 
contractors and may witness dry run exercises and the first fuel 
loading of the cask when it occurs to verify that the design methods 
were acceptable, that cooling capability will be maintained, and that 
proper parts have been used in the fabrication process. No casks can be 
approved without a CoC being issued, and any exemptions from NRC 
regulations must be justified and approved by the NRC. In addition, any 
licensee that uses one of these casks in the future must purchase, use, 
and maintain the casks in accordance with an NRC-approved Quality 
Assurance (QA) program. A QA program provides checks and balances to 
ensure that the quality of the casks is addressed during all stages of 
design, fabrication, use, maintenance, loading, and unloading (if 
required).
    Comment 14: One commenter asked if there is video footage 
demonstrating an actual fuel removal into NUHOMS casks at any other 
nuclear facility? If so, where can the public view a copy? If not, the 
commenter requested that one be required and sent to all communities 
that will use NUHOMS casks to store high level radioactive waste onsite 
for 10-100 years, if not permanently.
    Response: The commenter's request for such a video is beyond the 
scope of this rulemaking. There are no NRC regulatory requirements for 
licensees to use, or submit as part of an application, video footage 
demonstrating the loading of spent nuclear fuel into a NUHOMS cask.
    Comment 15: One commenter believed that all information, including 
the NRC independent verification of SCE's studies, demonstrating that 
NUHOMS casks are capable of withstanding a 7.5-magnitude earthquake 
should be made available to communities within a 50-mile radius of 
SONGS.
    Response: The comment about verification of SCE's studies is a 
site-specific issue and therefore beyond the scope of this rulemaking. 
It is NRC policy that documents be made public through ADAMS, unless 
they contain proprietary, safeguards, or other protected information. 
In this case, NRC staff completed its review of the seismic capability 
of the cask design to withstand the forces of an earthquake that 
produces accelerations in two horizontal directions of 1.5 g and a 
vertical acceleration of 1.0 g acting simultaneously, as documented in 
the SER.
    Comment 16: One commenter stated that, according to the NRC in 
1990, the ``conservative'' approach to financing assumptions would 
entail no repository until 2025, and onsite dry cask storage in the 
interim. The commenter questioned what assurances (real tests) do 
residents near the reactor have that casks will not leak, corrode, or 
in any way negatively impact safety, as the casks are only certified 
for 20 years and taking into consideration the NRC quote above. The 
commenter asked what state-of-the-art testing has been done to assure 
residents within 50 miles of the ISFSI that NUHOMS casks can withstand 
earthquakes, faulty welds, corroded welds, fuel leakage, and/or 
terrorism for 100 years, if not permanently.
    Response: The NRC staff completed its review of the seismic 
capability of the cask design to withstand the forces of an earthquake, 
and this is documented in the SER. The capability to deal with security 
threats or terrorism attacks is addressed under Part 73 and is beyond 
the scope of this rulemaking. Problems with welds and fuel leaking 
would be addressed by procedures and the QA program of the licensee and 
implemented during fabrication and loading which is beyond the scope of 
this rulemaking as well. Dry casks are designed to maintain their 
confinement integrity for the licensed period; i.e., 20 years. During 
the life of a cask, the licensee must conduct periodic inspections and 
maintenance to ensure that the cask design functions remain as 
specified in the CoC. Storage of spent fuel in this cask design, beyond 
20 years, is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. A separate NRC review 
and approval would be needed for storage beyond the 20-year period.
    Comment 17: One commenter asked how damaged fuel assemblies will be 
handled and what independent verification has the NRC done to assure

[[Page 467]]

that this is the safest method of handling damaged fuel assemblies. The 
commenter asked where the public can view this independent 
verification.
    Response: NRC Spent Fuel Project Office Interim Staff Guidance--1 
(ISG-1) states that spent nuclear fuel with known or suspected cladding 
defects greater than a hairline crack or a pinhole leak (damaged fuel) 
should be canned for storage. TS 2.1.a states that damaged fuel 
assemblies shall be placed in confinement cans. The purpose of canning 
is to confine gross fuel particles to a known, subcritical volume 
during off-normal and accident conditions, and to facilitate handling 
and retrievability. ISG-1 is publicly available on the NRC Web site.
    Comment 18: One commenter asked what risk analysis studies the NRC 
did to assure that high level radioactive waste can be safely 
transferred to barges, trains, and/or trucks for eventual 
transportation. The analysis should have included seismic issues 
regarding an earthquake during transfer of radioactive fuel from pools 
to casks and from casks to transportation modes. The commenter further 
stated that if no risk analysis was done, one must be completed before 
high level radioactive waste is allowed to be transferred from 
irradiated fuel pools to NUHOMS casks, much less transferred to 
transportation modes.
    Response: Transportation comments are beyond the scope of this Part 
72 rulemaking. The NRC has performed a number of transportation risk 
studies, and currently the Package Performance Study is in progress to 
study what the effects of impact and fire conditions beyond current 
regulations would be for a recently approved transportation cask 
design. The effects of the forces from an earthquake during transfer of 
radioactive fuel from a spent fuel pool to a storage cask would have to 
be considered in the procedures and the design of handling equipment in 
accordance with Part 50 requirements that would be in effect by the 
licensed utility that would be conducting fuel movement. Dealing with 
the impact of an earthquake during the movement of casks to a truck or 
train would be addressed by the requirements of Part 71 which specifies 
that a number of tests and analyses be performed to determine that the 
cask can withstand the forces expected to be seen during normal and 
accident conditions. The forces that a transportation cask can 
withstand exceed those that would be experienced during an earthquake.
    Comment 19: One commenter stated that the NRC has issued a report 
admitting that irradiated fuel assemblies can still spontaneously 
combust even after cooling 5 years in pools. The commenter questioned 
what assurances are there that fuel being transferred into dry casks 
has been cooled for the minimum 5 years.
    Response: The CoC includes TS that state that the fuel that will be 
loaded in the casks must be cooled a minimum of 10 years. The loading 
of casks and the records thereof will be subject to NRC inspection for 
verification that the TS have been met.
    Comment 20: One commenter stated that the NRC must demonstrate that 
the storage casks can be safely opened after loading, if necessary, 
before allowing the cask to be filled with radioactive waste.
    Response: There are no regulatory requirements for a licensee to 
demonstrate that fuel can be safely unloaded from a cask prior to the 
actual loading of fuel. The CoC does, however, specify that the 
licensee conduct a dry run of an unloading operation. That exercise 
would not be performed with spent nuclear fuel but would be conducted 
using ``dummy'' assemblies.
    Comment 21: One commenter stated that the design basis for the 
proposed casks must be verifiably certified to withstand a 9/11 style 
terrorist attack (a minimum of one kiloton) and that the cask should 
not be approved unless it can withstand a 9/11 type terrorist attack.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The 
design basis of the casks must address the Part 72 criteria to 
withstand a number of hypothetical accidents. Currently, there are no 
regulatory requirements for a storage cask to withstand a 9/11 style 
terrorist attack. Since 9/11, the NRC has issued advisories to 
licensees who operate storage facilities to augment certain aspects of 
their security plans and capability. Further, the NRC has issued orders 
to impose certain security requirements beyond current regulations on 
these licensees. In addition, the NRC is conducting a thorough review 
of its current security regulations and is conducting a vulnerability 
study for spent fuel storage cask designs to determine what the effects 
would be from a terrorist attack of a different nature, including the 
crash of a jumbo jet filled with fuel. After completion of these 
efforts, the NRC will determine what changes are needed to its security 
regulations and will make them as appropriate.
    Comment 22: One commenter stated that no casks have been tested for 
their anticipated lifetime on site at nuclear plants.
    Response: Spent fuel storage casks are designed to withstand normal 
and hypothetical accident conditions for their license period of 20 
years, in accordance with Part 72 requirements. Licensees must also 
periodically monitor and inspect casks to verify that safety functions 
are maintained during operational lifetime. Storage of spent nuclear 
fuel beyond the 20-year license period is beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking.
    Comment 23: A commenter stated that, in 1984, the NRC issued its 
waste confidence decision. A summary of the findings includes the 
temporary storage of spent fuel after cessation of reactor operations 
and generic determination of no significant environmental impact. The 
Commission also announced that although it could reach favorable 
conclusions, it recognized that significant and unexpected events might 
affect its decision. The commenter stated that it should be obvious to 
all Americans that the events of 9/11 meet the criteria of ``unexpected 
events'' to revisit the NRC's Waste Confidence Decision.
    Response: This request to revisit the Waste Confidence Decision is 
beyond the scope of this rulemaking. Since 9/11, the NRC has taken a 
number of actions that have affected its licensees. Specifically in the 
area of spent fuel interim storage, the NRC has issued advisories to 
licensees who operate storage facilities to augment certain aspects of 
their security plans and capability. Further, the NRC has issued orders 
to impose certain security requirements beyond current regulations on 
these licensees. In addition, the NRC is conducting a thorough review 
of its current security regulations and is conducting a vulnerability 
study for spent fuel storage cask designs to determine what the effects 
would be from a terrorist attack of a different nature, including the 
crash of a jumbo jet filled with fuel. After completion of these 
efforts, the NRC will determine what changes are needed to its security 
regulations and will make them as appropriate.
    Comment 24: One commenter asked for information about the number of 
additional personnel necessary to prepare for an ISFSI.
    Response: There is no requirement for a particular level of 
staffing in the CoC. The question raised by the commenter is unclear 
and lacks specificity as to what is being requested. The NRC believes 
the comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
    Comment 25: One commenter recommended that all training of 
personnel be reviewed and

[[Page 468]]

independently verified by experts outside the cask designers and the 
utility.
    Response: TS 5.2.2 requires licensees to train and verify the 
expertise of personnel to maintain and operate the Standardized 
Advanced NUHOMS[reg] System at nuclear plants. CoC Condition 
8 requires that the licensee perform a full dry run of loading 
and unloading operations prior to first fuel loading of the cask. The 
NRC conducts independent inspections of dry run activities at ISFSIs.
    Comment 26: One commenter asked what agency approves transportation 
methods.
    Response: Transportation issues are beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking. The NRC is not certain of the commenter's request when it 
refers to ``transportation methods.'' For the selection of routes, mode 
of transportation, or physical protection and control of material, the 
NRC, in conjunction with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the 
Department of Energy (DOE), regulates the safe transport of high level 
radioactive material from beginning to final destination. It is, 
however, the responsibility of the shipper to choose the mode of 
transportation along with routes to be used in accordance with 
applicable regulations and guidance.
    Comment 27: One commenter asked for information as to how 
transportation methods are independently confirmed to be safe. The 
commenter cited an incident which occurred in late March in which a 
truck hauling radioactive waste blew over in Wyoming. The incident was 
supposedly due to high winds. Regarding this incident, the commenter 
questioned what would happen in an earthquake and if high winds are 
considered when licenses for transport are granted. The commenter 
questioned that if this were considered, how did the incident happen. 
If it were not considered, why wasn't it?
    Response: This comment, which deals with transportation issues, is 
beyond the scope of this rule which is for approval of a storage cask 
design. The NRC, DOE, and DOT have comprehensive and stringent 
regulations for the safe transport of high level radioactive waste. 
These regulations address the packaging that must be used and, in the 
case of spent nuclear fuel, a package would be a cask that would need 
to be reviewed and approved for safety considerations by the NRC. 
Choosing a mode of transportation (rail, truck, or barge) would be made 
by the shipper, and safety in each mode is addressed by DOT and its 
independent activities. However, the NRC and DOT rely on the robust 
design of shipping packages to provide reasonable assurance of safe 
transportation during routine or accident conditions. The packages 
protect the contents from damage and release and protect the public 
from unnecessary exposure to radiation. (See also Comment 26.)
    Comment 28: One commenter stated that transportation of high level 
radioactive waste has been postponed several times since 9/11 due to 
possible terrorist threats. The commenter also stated that one 
shipment, in the planning stages for years, to ship 125 spent fuel rods 
on a 2,360-mile journey, was delayed due to 9/11. The casks, unable to 
be certified in temperatures below 10 degrees Fahrenheit, had to be 
removed from the train and stored inside for the winter. The commenter 
stated that the NRC has approved casks for storage and transportation 
that are unable to hold up to wind and temperature. The commenter 
questioned how transportation out of their earthquake-prone coastal 
zone will ever be assured by SCE, by DOE, or by the NRC.
    Response: Transportation and site-specific issues are beyond the 
scope of this rulemaking which deals with the approval of a design for 
dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. See response to Comments 21 and 23, 
above, for a discussion of security concerns. The NRC has reviewed the 
cask design capability to withstand forces of wind and temperature 
during storage as documented in the SER.
    Comment 29: One commenter questioned how leaking casks could be 
unloaded if the spent fuel pool were no longer available after the 
reactor shut down operations.
    Response: A licensee who uses an approved spent fuel cask at its 
storage facility is responsible for continually monitoring the 
conditions of each of its casks and the radiation levels around the 
casks. In addition, it must develop procedures to deal with off-normal 
events and accidents including dealing with the event of a cask that 
has lost its confinement capability. In the situation where a plant was 
decommissioned and no longer had a spent fuel pool available, the 
licensee would have contingency plans in place to deal with a leaking 
cask on site. Such a plan would include actions to minimize dose to 
workers and to the public in accordance with NRC regulations.
    Comment 30: The commenter asked if the design basis for the outer 
cement covering for NUHOMS casks has been approved for transportation.
    Response: The Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] System is designed 
for dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, and not for transportation of 
spent nuclear fuel. If a component of the Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] System were to be transported, it would need to be approved 
by the NRC for use in the transportation system being used.
    Comment 31: One commenter requested that NRC address the concerns 
about the risks of operating nuclear generating stations, especially 
spent fuel pools which will remain totally vulnerable to terrorist 
attack. Another commenter referenced a September 2000 report by the 
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements dealing with 
the threat of nuclear terrorism that warned that ``Targeting nuclear 
spent fuel elements kept in a storage facility would be an easier 
target than an operating plant.'' A successful attack on such a 
facility using 1,000 pounds of high explosives could cause radiation 
contamination over a wide area. This commenter asked what the 
additional costs and requirements of county, State, and military 
personnel would be should there be a terrorist attack of vulnerable 
irradiated fuel pools. The commenter also asked who will bear the 
additional costs should there be a terrorist attack, especially after 
termination of operations when irradiated fuel must remain in pools for 
at least 5 years for cooling.
    Response: Comments related to spent fuel pools and security 
provisions for protection of licensed facilities are beyond the scope 
of this rulemaking. The NRC reviewed potential issues related to 
possible radiological sabotage of storage casks at reactor site ISFSIs 
in the 1990 rulemaking that added Subparts K and L to Part 72 (55 FR 
29181; July 18, 1990). NRC regulations in Part 72 establish physical 
protection requirements for an ISFSI located within the owner-
controlled area of a licensed power reactor site. Spent fuel in the 
ISFSI is required to be protected against radiological sabotage using 
provisions and requirements as specified in Sec.  72.212(b)(5). 
Further, specific performance criteria are specified in Part 73. Each 
utility licensed to have an ISFSI at its reactor site is required to 
develop physical protection plans, response plans, and to install 
systems that provide high assurance against unauthorized activities 
that could constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.
    The physical protection systems at an ISFSI and its associated 
reactor are similar in design features to ensure the detection and 
assessment of unauthorized activities. Alarm annunciations at the 
general license

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ISFSI are monitored by the alarm stations at the reactor site. Response 
to intrusion alarms is required. Each ISFSI is subject to inspection by 
NRC. The licensee ensures that the physical protection systems are 
operating within their design limits. It is the ISFSI licensee who is 
responsible for protecting spent fuel in the casks from sabotage rather 
than the certificate holder.
    Comment 32: One commenter quoting Ray Shadis stated that the public 
must be informed of all potential radiological consequences, including 
radioactive dose levels and dose distribution, that would result from 
massive releases or dispersal of radioactive material.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. 
However, Chapter 10 of the SER documents the staff's review of the cask 
design to ensure that its use will meet the regulatory dose 
requirements of Parts 20 and 72.
    Comment 33: One commenter asked about the proposed security at the 
high level radioactive waste site (both reactor and irradiated fuel 
pools) during operation and after retirement.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking which 
is focused solely on whether to place the Standardized Advanced 
NUHOMS[reg] System on the list of approved casks. See response to 
Comment 31, above.
    Comment 34: One commenter asked how SCE and the NRC provide 
assurance to the public that terrorism cannot occur or cause a 
radioactive release.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. See 
response to Comment 31, above.
    Comment 35: One commenter stated that the Holtec and NUHOMS casks 
(both steel liner and concrete) could be penetrated by 757 and 767 
aircraft and that the NRC must address this issue before any permits 
are granted and questioned how this concern has been addressed by SCE 
and the NRC.
    Response: The NRC considers the comment to be beyond the scope of 
this rulemaking which is focused solely on whether to place the 
Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] cask system on the list of approved 
casks for storage. See response to Comment 21, above.
    Comment 36: One commenter stated that because the spent fuel pools 
contain many reactor cores, the amount of radioactive material 
available for release to the environment and therefore the anticipated 
consequences, are much greater than for a reactor meltdown, and that 
``* * * dispersal of just one portion of one spent fuel assembly by 
means of high explosives would have radiological consequences much 
greater than those of a Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapon and would yield 
near term lethal doses ranging downwind over 60 miles.'' However, 
emergency response planning, aimed at reactor accidents, has not been 
adjusted accordingly. The commenter believed that the issues must be 
addressed in a risk analysis by the NRC.
    Response: Comments related to spent fuel pools and security issues 
are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. See response to Comment 31, 
above.
    Comment 37: One commenter stated that the design basis threat must 
encompass not only a 9/11 air assault, but a ground-based assault for 
more than 10 people, a truck-bomb assault, or weapons launched from a 
truck or water craft. The commenter stated that nuclear reactors, 
adjacent spent fuel storage deposits, nuclear fuel reprocessing 
facilities, transport vehicles, or any high-level waste site are 
potential targets for the use of high explosives to disperse into the 
atmosphere the very high levels of radioactivity associated with 
materials at these facilities. A successful incursion into a nuclear 
power reactor would require a very heavily armed force, since 
commercial reactors are very well protected. The core of a commercial 
reactor is protected by a containment structure sufficient to prevent 
atmospheric release even if a large airplane were to crash into the 
facility. Only when the reactor is being refueled and the containment 
structure is open would atmospheric dispersion of the reactor's nuclear 
fuel be likely as a result of the use of high explosives. The commenter 
stated that targeting spent nuclear fuel elements kept in a storage 
facility would be an easier target than an operating nuclear plant.
    Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. See 
response to Comment 31, above.

Summary of Final Revisions

    Based on public comments, no changes from the proposed rule were 
made to the final CoC for the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] cask 
system, nor its appendices, the Technical Specifications, and the 
Approved Contents and Design Features. In addition, no changes were 
made to the PSER.

Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-113) 
requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are 
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless the 
use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise 
impractical. In this final rule, the NRC is adding the TN Standardized 
Advanced NUHOMS[reg] cask system to the list of NRC-approved cask 
systems for spent fuel storage in Sec.  72.214. This action does not 
constitute the establishment of a standard that establishes generally-
applicable requirements.

Agreement State Compatibility

    Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of 
Agreement State Programs'' approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997, 
and published in the Federal Register on September 3, 1997 (62 FR 
46517), this rule is classified as Compatibility Category ``NRC.'' 
Compatibility is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC 
program elements in this category are those that relate directly to 
areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended (AEA), or the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations. Although an Agreement State may not adopt program 
elements reserved to NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of 
certain requirements via a mechanism that is consistent with the 
particular State's administrative procedure laws but does not confer 
regulatory authority on the State.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, 
and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, the 
NRC has determined that this rule is not a major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and 
therefore an environmental impact statement is not required. This final 
rule adds an additional cask to the list of approved spent fuel storage 
casks that power reactor licensees can use to store spent fuel at 
reactor sites without additional site-specific approvals from the 
Commission. The environmental assessment and finding of no significant 
impact on which this determination is based are available for 
inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, O-1F23, 11555 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, MD. Single copies of the environmental assessment and 
finding of no significant impact are available from Jayne M. 
McCausland, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 
415-6219, e-mail [email protected].

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This final rule does not contain a new or amended information 
collection

[[Page 470]]

requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of 
Management and Budget, Approval Number 3150-0132.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a request for information or an information collection 
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid 
OMB control number.

Regulatory Analysis

    On July 18, 1990 (55 FR 29181), the Commission issued an amendment 
to 10 CFR Part 72. The amendment provided for the storage of spent 
nuclear fuel in cask systems with designs approved by the NRC under a 
general license. Any nuclear power reactor licensee can use cask 
systems with designs approved by the NRC to store spent nuclear fuel if 
it notifies the NRC in advance, the spent fuel is stored under the 
conditions specified in the cask's CoC, and the conditions of the 
general license are met. In that rule, four spent fuel storage casks 
were approved for use at reactor sites and were listed in 10 CFR 
72.214. That rule envisioned that storage casks certified in the future 
could be routinely added to the listing in Sec.  72.214 through the 
rulemaking process. Procedures and criteria for obtaining NRC approval 
of new spent fuel storage cask designs were provided in Part 72, 
Subpart L.
    The alternative to this action is to withhold approval of this new 
design and issue a site-specific license to each utility that proposes 
to use the casks. This alternative would cost both the NRC and 
utilities more time and money for each site-specific license. 
Conducting site-specific reviews would ignore the procedures and 
criteria currently in place for the addition of new cask designs that 
can be used under a general license, and would be in conflict with NWPA 
direction to the Commission to approve technologies for the use of 
spent fuel storage at the sites of civilian nuclear power reactors 
without, to the maximum extent practicable, the need for additional 
site reviews. This alternative also would tend to exclude new vendors 
from the business market without cause and would arbitrarily limit the 
choice of cask designs available to power reactor licensees. This final 
rulemaking will eliminate the above problems and is consistent with 
previous Commission actions. Further, the rule will have no adverse 
effect on public health and safety.
    The benefit of this rule to nuclear power reactor licensees is to 
make available a greater choice of spent fuel storage cask designs that 
can be used under a general license. The new cask vendors with casks to 
be listed in Sec.  72.214 benefit by having to obtain NRC certificates 
only once for a design that can then be used by more than one power 
reactor licensee. The NRC also benefits because it will need to certify 
a cask design only once for use by multiple licensees. Casks approved 
through rulemaking are to be suitable for use under a range of 
environmental conditions sufficiently broad to encompass multiple 
nuclear power plants in the United States without the need for further 
site-specific approval by NRC. Vendors with cask designs already listed 
may be adversely impacted because power reactor licensees may choose a 
newly listed design over an existing one. However, the NRC is required 
by its regulations and NWPA direction to certify and list approved 
casks. This rule has no significant identifiable impact or benefit on 
other Government agencies.
    Based on this discussion of the benefits and impacts of the 
alternatives, the NRC concludes that the requirements of the final rule 
are commensurate with the Commission's responsibilities for public 
health and safety and the common defense and security. No other 
available alternative is believed to be as satisfactory, and thus, this 
action is recommended.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule will not, if 
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities. This rule affects only the licensing and operation 
of nuclear power plants, independent spent fuel storage facilities, and 
Transnuclear, Inc. The companies that own these plants do not fall 
within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth in 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards set 
out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 
CFR Part 121.

Backfit Analysis

    The NRC has determined that the backfit rule (Sec.  50.109 or Sec.  
72.62) does not apply to this final rule because this amendment does 
not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in the 
backfit rule. Therefore, a backfit analysis is not required.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a 
major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 72

    Administrative practice and procedure, Criminal penalties, Manpower 
training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health, 
Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel, Whistleblowing.
    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting 
the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 72.

PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF 
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

    1. The authority citation for Part 72 continues to read as follows:


    Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 
184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 
954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 
2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat. 
688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); 
Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102-
486, sec. 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 
137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, 
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153, 
10155, 10157, 10161, 10168).
    Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d), 
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b), 
10168(c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat. 
955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 
U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub. 
L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)). Subpart J also 
issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224, (42 U.S.C. 10101, 
10137(a), 10161(h)). Subparts K and L are also issued under sec. 
133, 98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 
(42 U.S.C. 10198).


[[Page 471]]



    2. In Sec.  72.214, Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 1029 is added 
to read as follows:


Sec.  72.214  List of approved spent fuel storage casks.

* * * * *
    Certificate Number: 1029.
    Initial Certificate Effective Date: February 5, 2003.
    SAR Submitted by: Transnuclear, Inc.
    SAR Title: Final Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized 
Advanced NUHOMS[reg] Horizontal Modular Storage System for 
Irradiated Nuclear Fuel.
    Docket Number: 72-1029.
    Certificate Expiration Date: February 6, 2023.
    Model Number: Standardized Advanced NUHOMS[reg] -24PT1.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of December, 2002.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William D. Travers,
Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 03-155 Filed 1-3-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P