[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 248 (Thursday, December 26, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78859-78863]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-32571]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Departmental Offices Designation of Nauru and Ukraine as Primary
Money Laundering Concerns
AGENCY: Departmental Offices, Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of designation.
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SUMMARY: This notice advises the public that the Department of the
Treasury, on December 20, 2002, designated the countries of Nauru and
Ukraine as primary money laundering concerns pursuant to section 5318A
of Title 31, U.S.C., as added by section 311 of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. Patriot Act) Act of 2001.
DATES: The designations made by this notice are effective December 20,
2002. Comments on certain aspects of this
[[Page 78860]]
notice should be submitted by January 27, 2003. In making comments,
please refer to the ``Public Comments Requested'' in the supplementary
information portion of this preamble.
ADDRESSES: Commenters are encouraged to submit comments by electronic
mail because paper mail in the Washington, DC area may be delayed.
Comments submitted by electronic mail may be sent to
[email protected] with the caption in the body of the text,
``Attn: Section 311--Designation of Jurisdictions.'' Comments also may
be submitted by paper mail (preferably and original and three copies)
to Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20220 ``Attn: 311--Designation of Jurisdictions.''
Comments should be sent by one method only. Comments may be inspected
at the Department of the Treasury between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m., in
Washington, DC. Persons wishing to inspect the comments submitted must
request an appointment by telephoning (202) 622-0990 (not a toll-free
number).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Enforcement, Department of
the Treasury, (202) 622-0400; Office of the Assistant General Counsel
(Enforcement), (202) 622-1927; or the Office of the Assistant General
Counsel (Banking and Finance), (202) 622-0480 (not toll-free numbers).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Designation of Nauru and Ukraine as Primary Money-Laundering
Concerns
This document formally designates the countries of Nauru and
Ukraine as primary money-laundering concerns under 31 U.S.C. 5318A, as
added by section 311(a) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (U.S.A. Patriot Act) Act of 2001 (Pub. L. 107-56) (the Act).
II. Imposition of Special Measures
The Department of the Treasury places these jurisdictions, and
those with whom they have dealings, upon notice of its intent, after
appropriate consultation, to follow this designation with the
imposition of special measures authorized by section 5318A(a). With
respect to Nauru, Treasury intends to impose the special measure
described in section 5318A(b)(5), which will prohibit financial
dealings by U.S. financial institutions with any Nauru licensed
institution, unless otherwise excepted. Under the terms of section
5318A(a)(2)(C), this special measure can be imposed only by
promulgation of a rule. Treasury intends to initiate a rulemaking
shortly.
With respect to Ukraine, Treasury intends to impose one or more of
the information-gathering and record-keeping requirements of the
special measures described in section 5318A(b)(1) through (4). Those
special measures can be imposed by an order, which is limited in
duration to 120 days, and which may be extended indefinitely through a
rulemaking (see section 5318A(a)(2) and (3)). Treasury intends to issue
an order while simultaneously initiating a rulemaking to impose special
measures on Ukraine.
III. Public Comments Requested
The Department of the Treasury solicits comments from all
interested persons concerning the appropriate special measures to
impose on Ukraine. Specifically, Treasury solicits comments from the
financial sector, including domestic financial institutions and
domestic financial agencies, concerning its ability to comply with
orders or regulations that impose actions under special measures one
through four authorized by section 5318A(a). Treasury has also
determined to propose imposition of special measure five upon Nauru,
but solicits comments from any institution licensed by Nauru as to
reasons the institution should be excepted from the prohibitions
imposed under this measure. The prohibitions of special measure five
would not apply to the Bank of Nauru.
IV. Background
On October 26, 2001, the President signed into law the U.S.A.
Patriot Act. Title III of the Act makes a number of amendments to the
anti-money laundering provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), which
are codified in subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States
Code. These amendments are intended to make it easier to prevent,
detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing
of terrorism.
BSA section 5318A, as added by section 311 of the Act, authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) to designate a foreign
jurisdiction, institution, class of transactions or type of account as
being of ``primary money laundering concern,'' and to impose one or
more of five ``special measures'' with respect to such a jurisdiction,
institution, class of transactions, or type of account. The Secretary
has delegated his authority under section 5318A to the Under Secretary
of the Treasury (Enforcement).
Section 5318A specifies those factors that the Secretary must
consider before designating a jurisdiction, institution, transaction,
or account as of ``primary money laundering concern.'' The evaluation
of these factors against the summary of the administrative record, as
subsequently set forth in this designation, has resulted in the
conclusion that both jurisdictions are of primary money laundering
concern.\1\
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\1\ The following factors, in accordance with the requirements
of section 5318A(c)(2)(A), are considered to be potentially relevant
factors in evaluating the necessity of designating Nauru and
Ukraine. Nauru and Ukraine meet the majority of these factors.
First, whether organized criminal groups, international terrorists,
or both, have transacted business within the designated
jurisdiction. Second, with respect to its banking practices,
Treasury must also evaluate (1) The extent to which the jurisdiction
or financial institutions operating in the jurisdiction offer bank
secrecy or special regulatory advantages to non-residents or
nondomiciliaries of the jurisdiction; (2) the substance and quality
of administration of the bank supervisory and counter-money
laundering laws of the jurisdiction; (3) the relationship between
the volume of financial transactions occurring in the jurisdiction
and the size of the economy of the jurisdiction; and (4) the extent
to which the jurisdiction is characterized as an offshore banking or
secrecy haven by credible international organizations or
multilateral expert groups. Third, with respect to its enforcement
mechanisms, Treasury must evaluate whether the United States has a
mutual legal assistance treaty with the jurisdiction, and determine
the experience of United States law enforcement officials and
regulatory officials in obtaining information about transactions
originating in, or routed through to, such jurisdiction. Finally,
Treasury must evaluate the extent to which the jurisdiction is
characterized by high levels of official or institutional
corruption.
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Once the Secretary has considered the factors, consulted with the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General (or their designees), and
made a finding that a jurisdiction is a primary money laundering
concern, the Secretary is authorized to impose one or more of the five
``special measures'' described in 5318A(b). These special measures can
be imposed individually, jointly, or in combination with respect to a
designated ``primary money laundering concern.'' Four of the special
measures impose information-gathering and record-keeping requirements
upon those domestic financial institutions and agencies dealing either
directly with the jurisdiction designated as one of primary money
laundering concern, or dealing with those having direct dealings with
the designated jurisdiction.\2\ Those four measures require: (1)
Keeping records and filing reports on particular transactions,
including the identities of the participants in the transactions and
the beneficial owners of the funds involved; (2) obtaining information
on the beneficial ownership of any account
[[Page 78861]]
opened or maintained in the United States by a foreign person or a
foreign person's representative; (3) identifying and obtaining
information about customers permitted to use, or whose transactions are
routed through, a foreign bank's ``payable-through'' account; or (4)
identifying and obtaining information about customers permitted to use,
or whose transactions are routed through, a foreign bank's
``correspondent'' account.
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\2\ Treasury is currently examining the extent of the
applicability of these requirements on those financial institutions
enumerated under the U.S.A. Patriot Act.
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Under the fifth special measure, a domestic financial institution
or agency may be prohibited from opening or maintaining in the United
States a correspondent account or a payable-through account for or on
behalf of a foreign financial institution if the account involves the
designee.
In selecting which special measures to impose, the Secretary must
consider a number of factors.\3\ In addition, imposition of special
measures (1) through (4) requires consultation with the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other appropriate
Federal banking agency (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act), the Secretary of State, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National
Credit Union Administration Board, and any other agencies and
interested parties as the Secretary may find appropriate. Imposition of
special measure (5) requires consultation with the Secretary of State,
the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Board of the Federal
Reserve System.
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\3\ In determining generally what special measures to select and
to impose, the Secretary, in consultation with the agencies and
``interested parties'' set forth immediately above, must consider
the following factors: (1) Whether similar action has been or is
being taken by other nations or multilateral groups; (2) whether the
imposition of any particular special measure would create a
significant competitive disadvantage, including any undue cost or
burden associated with compliance, for financial institutions
organized or licensed in the United States; (3) the extent to which
the action or the timing of the action would have a significant
adverse systemic impact on the international payment, clearance, and
settlement system, or on legitimate business activities involving
the particular jurisdiction, institution or class of transactions;
and (4) the effect of the action on United States national security
and foreign policy.
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The Treasury intends, after consultation as provided above, to
impose the fifth special measure with respect to Nauru, and actions
under special measures one through four with respect to Ukraine.
Section 5318A lists several factors that the Secretary must consider,
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
before imposing these special measures. Pursuant to section 5318A, any
of these first four special measures can be imposed by order,
regulation or as otherwise permitted by law. Special measures imposed
by an order can be effective for not more than 120 days, unless
subsequently continued by a regulation promulgated before the end of
the 120-day period.
The fifth special measure can only be imposed through the issuance
of a regulation. The issuance of the fifth measure also requires
consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
A. Nauru
At one point in time, the island of Nauru had one of the highest
per capita incomes in the developing world due to the mining and export
of phosphates, a funding source expected to be completely depleted
within five to ten years. Most of the funds emanating from the
phosphate mining, originally contained in the country's trust funds,
have been depleted through waste, poor investments and fraud. In
addition to these problems, the Nauru government itself has been
characterized by extensive instability.
In an effort to raise funds, the island has resorted to several
alternate endeavors, including the selling of offshore banking
licenses. Nauru is notorious for permitting the establishment of
offshore banks with no physical presence in Nauru or in any other
country. These banks maintain no banking records that Nauru or any
other jurisdiction can review. The evidence indicates that the entities
that obtain these offshore banking licenses are subject to cursory and
wholly inadequate review by the country's officials and lack any
credible on-going supervision. In addition, one of the common
requirements imposed by Nauru on these offshore banks is they not
engage in economic transactions involving either the currency of Nauru
(currently the Australian dollar) or its citizens or residents.
Consequently, these offshore banks have no apparent legitimate
connection with the economy or business activity of Nauru. Indeed, only
one bank appears to be physically located in Nauru, the ``Bank of
Nauru.'' It is a local community bank that also serves as the Central
Bank.
Nauru's Banking Act also prohibits employees or officers of a
financial institution from revealing to anyone, including government
officials, any information relating to banking transactions in and out
of Nauru. In addition, foreign authorities may only receive, with the
prior approval of the Nauruan Minister of Finance, macro-level
information, such as the total sums of moneys and types of currency
transferred from a country into Nauru. Foreign authorities cannot
receive information regarding individual transactions. Consequently,
there is an extensive secrecy regime surrounding the Nauru banking
system.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has recently reported that
400 offshore banks have been granted licenses by Nauru.\4\ It has been
verified by on-site reports that a 1,000 square foot wooden structure
is ``home'' to some 400 of these banks who have no physical or legal
residence anywhere else in the world. The United States Government has
been able to verify the names of 161 of the institutions licensed by
Nauru, and they are presented as Appendix A to this designation. These
are institutions for which the limited information available indicated
that there is a strong likelihood as to their status as offshore shell
banks that are not subject to effective banking supervision. Although
the jurisdiction, and not the institutions themselves, are being
designated, the list of institutions demonstrates the extensive
opportunities for money-laundering activity on the island.
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\4\ FinCEN Advisory Issue 21 (July 2000).
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As a consequence of the current practices of Nauru, the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) placed Nauru on the ``Non-Cooperative Country
and Territory'' (NCCT) list in June 2000 for maintaining an inadequate
anti-money laundering (AML) regime according to international
standards. According to the FATF, Nauru's anti-money laundering
weaknesses included, but were not limited to, the following: money
laundering was not a criminal offense; offshore banks licensed by Nauru
were not required to maintain customer identification or transaction
records; Nauruan financial institutions were under no obligation to
report suspicious transactions; and Nauru maintained strong bank
secrecy laws. On August 28, 2001, Nauru passed the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001 (``the AML Act''). On September 25, 2001,
however, FATF indicated that the AML Act was not consistent with
international standards because it did not apply to the numerous
offshore banks licensed by Nauru. In response to FATF pressure, on
December 6, 2001, Nauru passed amendments to its AML Act. Nonetheless,
according to the FATF, the revised anti-money laundering law that now
exists provides for a wholly inadequate anti-money laundering
legislative and regulatory regime. In addition, Nauru has not yet
addressed the remaining and most important deficiency of its AML
[[Page 78862]]
legislation, that is, adequate procedures for licensing, regulating and
supervising its offshore banks. Thus, despite repeated warnings by FATF
of its concern with Nauru's practices, and the clear consequences of
not amending its practices, Nauru has not shouldered its responsibility
to establish a sufficient AML regime.
On the basis of FATF's determination, an evaluation of the factors
set forth in section 5318A, and after consulting with the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General, the Secretary has determined that
reasonable grounds exist for concluding that Nauru is a ``primary money
laundering concern.'' Accordingly, Treasury is prepared to subsequently
impose by regulation special measure five against Nauru, which would
prohibit any U.S. financial institution from opening or maintaining in
the United States any correspondent account or a payable-through
account for a foreign financial institution if the account involves
Nauru or any institution licensed by Nauru. This prohibition would not,
however, apply to the Bank of Nauru. Treasury has determined to except
the Bank of Nauru, which as noted, serves as the Central Bank, from
these prohibitions in order to ensure the people of Nauru can continue
to meet their legitimate banking needs. Those U.S. financial
institutions currently dealing with the Nauru licensed institutions
(Appendix A) should begin considering their compliance obligations in
anticipation of the imposition of this measure.
Treasury solicits submissions from any bank located in or licensed
by Nauru that would establish its legitimacy for purposes of being
granted an exception under any proposed regulation imposing special
measure five with respect to Nauru.
B. Ukraine
Ukraine suffers from widespread corruption. On Transparency
International's 2002 Corruption Perception Index, Ukraine ranked
eighty-fifth out of the 102 listed countries.\5\ Prosecutions of
corruption are based upon the law ``On Combating Corruption,'' that was
passed in October 1995. This law is, however, rarely enforced, and on
the rare occasions when it is enforced, it is normally aimed at lower
or middle-level state employees. With respect to the economy, the
Ukrainian system is primarily a cash-based system, with limited use of
non-cash financial instruments. The banking system of Ukraine has only
been in existence for approximately ten years and contains several
deficiencies, including the lack of any record-keeping requirements for
banks. While the current banking legislation prohibits the opening of
anonymous accounts, there nonetheless remain within the system
thousands of anonymous, coded, or numbered accounts containing a total
of more than U.S. $20,000,000. In addition, there is a thriving gray or
black market system within Ukraine. With regard to recordkeeping
requirements, the secrecy laws in the banking sector of Ukraine provide
administrative authorities with limited access to customer account
information. Furthermore, although banks in Ukraine are required to
report both large-scale and dubious transactions, they are not subject
to penalty or sanction for failing to make such reports, thus making
the requirement wholly voluntary. In addition, non-bank financial
institutions are under no obligation to identify beneficial owners when
their clients appear to be acting on behalf of another party.
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\5\ Transparency International (TI) is an international non-
governmental organization devoted to combating corruption. One of
its services is to conduct surveys of businesses and analysts (both
within and outside the country) in order to determine this annual
ranking. Each year, a composite index is compiled and Ukraine has
consistently been near the bottom of this ranking. TI's annual
Corruption Perceptions Index (``CPI'') is cited by the world's media
as the leading index in the field. The CPI ranks countries by
perceived levels of corruption among public officials.
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The FATF identified Ukraine in September 2001 as being non-
cooperative in the fight against money laundering and placed Ukraine on
the NCCT list. Ukraine was placed on the NCCT list because it lacked an
effective anti-money laundering regime, including an efficient and
mandatory system for reporting suspicious transactions to a financial
intelligence unit, adequate customer identification provisions, and
sufficient resources devoted to combating money laundering. Currently,
Ukraine does not have a comprehensive anti-money laundering law that
meets international standards. On the basis of Ukraine's lack of an
adequate anti-money laundering regime, the FATF decided that counter-
measures should take effect on December 15, 2002, unless Ukraine
enacted comprehensive legislation that meets international standards.
On November 28, 2002, Ukraine's Supreme Council (Parliament) passed a
Law on Prevention and Counteraction of the Legalization (Laundering) of
the Proceeds from Crime, and the President of Ukraine signed the Law on
December 7. Notwithstanding this new legislation, the system for
reporting suspicious transactions remains so constrained as to be
virtually ineffective. Additionally, the statute contains contradictory
language regarding the ability of Ukraine's financial intelligence unit
to share information with law enforcement. Thus, the unit's authority
to fulfill this fundamental responsibility remains very much in doubt.
Having analyzed the legislation, FATF has determined it to be
inadequate and has called on its members to apply counter-measures.
On the basis of FATF's determination, an evaluation of the factors
set forth in section 311 and the appropriate consultations, the
Secretary has determined reasonable grounds exist for concluding that
Ukraine is a ``primary money laundering concern.'' Furthermore, unless
Ukraine demonstrates that it has taken proactive steps to address the
concerns giving rise to its designation, Treasury anticipates issuing a
notice of proposed rule making, subsequent to this designation,
concurrent with an order imposing actions under special measures one
through four for a period of 120 days. While this order is in effect,
the imposition of a final rule imposing these measures would be
evaluated. There are two measures under consideration by Treasury. U.S.
financial institutions would be required to identify and record the
nominal or beneficial owners of accounts with any one of the following
characteristics: (1) The accountholder has an address in Ukraine; (2)
$50,000 or more is transferred from a U.S. account into an account in
the Ukraine; or (3) $50,000 or more is transferred from an account in
the Ukraine into a U.S. account. A broader requirement would require
U.S. financial institutions to identify and record the beneficial
owners involved in a financial transaction that is captured
electronically and that is over $50,000.
V. Designation of Nauru and Ukraine as Primary Money Laundering
Concerns
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Under Secretary of the
Treasury, including section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, for
the foregoing reasons I hereby designate the countries of Nauru and
Ukraine as ``primary money laundering concerns'' for purposes of
section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
[[Page 78863]]
Dated: December 20, 2002.
Jimmy Gurul[eacute],
Under Secretary of the Treasury.
Richard S. Carro,
Senior Advisory to the General Counsel, (Regulatory Affairs).
Appendix A
The following is a list of financial institutions believed to be
licensed by Nauru. It is not intended to be an exhaustive list, and
the requirement to terminate correspondent relationships will apply
to all Nauru institutions, not just those on this list.
Certain Nauru institutions on this list are known to bear a name
resembling that of an unrelated U.S. regulated institution or of an
international organization. In addition, there may be other entities
unrelated to the Nauru institutions with similar or identical names.
As such, financial institutions should not assume that any
institution that they may encounter with a name similar or identical
to any entity on this list, is in fact, related to any Nauru entity
without additional inquiry.
NAURU-Registered Banks
Access Bank International Ltd.
Adriatica Bank.
Agro Trust Bank, Inc.
Ako Bank (A.K.A. Akobank/Ako-Bank/Akkobank) Corp.
Alliance Bank (possibly A.K.A. European Credit Alliance Bank, Inc.).
Amoko Bank Corporation.
Apollo Bank, Inc.
Ardex International Bank.
Atlantic Capital Trust PLC.
Augusta Bank Corp.
Babylon Bank Corp.
Baltic Pacific Bank.
Bank for International Settlements Corp. (A.K.A. Bis Corp.).
Bank of the Nations.
Bank Thalia.
Bartang Bank and Trust, Inc.
Benmore Union Bank.
Business Mediterranean Bank.
Capital Bank Inc.
Capital International Bank Ltd. Corp.
Caribbean Unified Bank.
Carlton Bank Trust Inc.
Cassaf Bank Corp. (A.K.A. Casaf, Kasaf).
Central Pacific Bank.
Central Pacific National Bank.
Chierici Bank.
City Trading Bank, Inc.
Cometa Bank (A.K.A. Kometa).
Commercial Intercontinental Bank, Inc.
Commex Bank.
Communication Pacific Bank Corp.
Continental Assets, Ltd.
Cortex Bank of London.
CP Bank.
Creditbankinc (A.K.A. Credit Bank Inc.).
Crystal Merchant Bank.
Diffusion (A.K.A. Diffusion Finance) Bank, Inc.
Dom Mitra Bank (A.K.A. Dom Mitra National).
Doris Bank.
East and Central Asian Bankers Trust, Inc.
East Investment Bank Corp.
Eastock Bank (A.K.A. Eastok).
East-West International Bank S.A.
Ecumene Bank, Inc. (A.K.A. Ecumene Bank Ltd.).
Elmstone Bank, Inc.
Energy Capital Bank S.A.
Euro-American Bank.
Euro-Atlantic Bank Corp. (A.K.A. Euro-Atlantik).
Euro Capital Bank Inc.
Euro-Central Investment Bank, Inc.
Euro-Nord Bank Corp.
European Credit Alliance Bank, Inc. (A.K.A. ECAB)(possibly A.K.A.
Alliance Bank).
European Overseas Bank Incorporated.
Exchange Bank and Trust.
Export and Import Bank Corp. (A.K.A. EXIM).
Federal Commercial Bank.
Fidelity International Bank, Inc.
Financial Continent Bank, Inc.
First American International Bank.
First Capital Bank.
First Credit and Trade Bank.
First European Charter Bank, Inc.
First Fidelity Bank, Inc.
First Financial Security Bank, Inc.
First International Bank.
First Investment Bank.
First Republic Bank of Nauru.
First Sky Bank Corp.
First Southern Banking Corp.
First Southern Bank of Nauru.
First Trading Bank Corp. (A.K.A. First Trading Bank Inc.).
Founders Bank Ltd.
General Europe Bank Inc.
Global Heritage Bank.
Global Market Development Bank.
Global Specialty Bank.
Greater International Bank of Nauru (A.K.A. Greater International
Bank Corp.).
Guardian Bank Corp.
Guardian Banking Corp.
Hampshire Bank and Trust Inc. (A.K.A. H-Bank).
Harmony Investment Bank, Inc.
IMRI Credit Bank, Inc.
Info Assets Management Bank Corp.
Innovation Development Bank.
Intercredit Bank (A.K.A. Interkredit Bank).
Inter Development Bank.
International Bank for Economic Affairs Corp.
International Cassaf Bank.
International Commercial Bank Corp. (A.K.A. International Commercial
Banking Corp.) (possibly A.K.A. International Commerce Bank Corp.).
International Exchange Bank.
International Industrial and Investment Bank, Inc.
International Metal Trading Bank (A.K.A. IMTB).
International Overseas Bank, Inc. (A.K.A. Interoverseas Bank).
International Prime Bank Corp.
International Trade and Finance Bank Corp.
International Treasury Banking Corporation, Inc.
Intertrust Credit (A.K.A. Intertrust and Credit) Bank.
Investment Bank of London Inc.
Jefferson Bank and Trust Inc.
Liberty International Bank and Trust.
Maritime Pacific Bank, Inc.
Mars Bank.
MC Bank.
Mediterranean International Bank Corp.
Merchant Deposit Bank Corp.
Meridian Merchants Bank, Inc.
MFC Bank Ltd.
Millenium Bank Corp.
National Commerce Bank Inc.
Nations Bank.
Nations Trust Bank.
Nistru Bank, Inc.
Nord-West Investment Bank, Inc.
Northern Security Bank.
North-West Bank, Inc.
NR Bank.
NTBank.
Pam Bank.
Panacea Bank and Trust.
Panin Bank International.
Pioneer (A.K.A. Pioner) Invest Bank.
Prime International Bank.
Private Finance Bank and Trust, Inc.
Ram Bank.
Reconversion and Development Bank (A.K.A. RDB-Bank).
Republic and Commercial Bank, Inc.
Rockland Bank.
Royal Meridian International Bank Inc.
Russian Clearing and Commercial Bank, Inc.
SCB Bank.
Sinex Bank.
South Pacific Commercial Bank.
Sovereign Allied Bank.
Sprint Bank, Inc.
Standard Capital Bank Corp.
Standard Hellier Bank Inc.
Standard Investments Bank, Inc.
Sterling International Bank, Inc.
Supreme Banking Corporation.
Swiss American Bank.
Swiss Trading Bank, Inc.
Swiss Union Bank Corp.
T-Bank, Inc.
TOCA Bank.
Tower Bank.
Tridal Investment Bank, Inc.
Trust Investment Bank, Inc.
Trust Merchant Bank, Inc.
Unibank International, Inc.
Union Credit Bank, Inc.
Union Lombard Bank and Trust Corp.
United Bank and Trust Company.
United Bank of Industry and Trade (A.K.A. UBIT Bank).
United Industrial Bank, Inc. (A.K.A. Uninbank, A.K.A. Unin Bank).
United West Bank (A.K.A. Unwest Bank), Inc.
Universal Bank.
Universal Baltic Bank Inc.
Universal European Bank, Inc. (A.K.A. Unieurobank).
Veksmarkbank.
Westerhall Private Bank.
Westock (A.K.A. Westok) Bank.
White Knight Merchant Bank.
[FR Doc. 02-32571 Filed 12-20-02; 3:54 pm]
BILLING CODE 4810-25-P