[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 236 (Monday, December 9, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 72946-72951]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-31075]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-02-49-A (Auction No. 49); DA 02-3287]


Auction No. 49 Auction of Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled 
for April 16, 2003; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening 
Bids and Other Auction Procedures

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of 251 licenses in the 
Lower 700 MHz band C block (710-716/740-746 MHz) scheduled to commence 
on April 16, 2003. This document also seeks comment on reserve prices 
or minimum opening bids and other auction procedures.

DATES: Comments are due on or before December 16, 2002, and reply 
comments are due on or before December 23, 2002.

ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail 
to the following address: [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Legal questions: Howard Davenport 
(202) 418-0660; General auction questions: Lyle Ishida (202) 418-0660 
or Linda Sanderson (717) 338-2888. For service rule questions: Amal 
Abdallah, Policy and Rules Branch, or Joanne Epps and Melvin Spann, 
Licensing and Technical Analysis Branch, at (202) 418-0620.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 49 
Comment Public Notice released December 2, 2002. The complete text of 
the Auction No. 49 Comment Public Notice, including attachments, is 
available for public inspection and copying during regular business 
hours at the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th 
Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. Auction No. 49 Comment 
Public Notice may also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating 
contractor, Qualex International, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202-863-2893, facsimile 
202-863-2898, or via e-mail [email protected].
    1. By the Auction No. 49 Comment Public Notice, the Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') announces the auction of 251 
licenses in the Lower 700 MHz band C block (710-716/740-746 MHz) 
scheduled to commence on April 16, 2003 (Auction No. 49). This auction 
will include the C block licenses that remained unsold in Auction No. 
44, which closed on September 18, 2002. A complete list of licenses 
available for Auction No. 49 is included as Attachment A of the Auction 
No. 49 Comment Public Notice. The C block is a 12-megahertz spectrum 
block, consisting of a pair of 6-megahertz segments, which is licensed 
over 734 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (``MSAs'') and Rural Service 
Areas (``RSAs'').
    2. The following table contains the block/frequency cross-reference 
for the 710-716/740-746 MHz bands:

[[Page 72947]]



 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Geographic   No. of
             Block                   Frequencies (MHz)           Bandwidth        Pairing    area type  licenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.............................  710-716, 740-746...........  12 MHz...........  2 x 6 MHz   MSA/RSA      251
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (Note: For Auction No. 49, licenses are not available in every 
market for the frequency block listed in the table. See Attachment A 
of the Auction No. 49 Comment Public Notice to determine which 
licenses will be offered.)
    3. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to 
``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this 
subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of 
bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction 
procedures * * *.'' Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced 
Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to 
familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern the 
day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, 
under its existing delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of 
auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction. The 
Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following issues relating to 
Auction No. 49.

I. Auction Structure

A. Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) Auction Design

    4. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction 
No. 49 in a simultaneous multiple-round auction. As described further, 
this methodology offers every license for bid at the same time with 
successive bidding rounds in which bidders may place bids. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility

    5. The Bureau has been delegated authority and discretion to 
determine an appropriate upfront payment for each license being 
auctioned, taking into account such factors as the population in each 
geographic license area, and the value of similar spectrum. As 
described further, the upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by 
each bidder to establish eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront 
payments related to the specific spectrum subject to auction protect 
against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with 
a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of 
the auction. With these guidelines in mind for Auction No. 49, the 
Bureau proposes to calculate upfront payments on a license-by-license 
basis using the following formula:
    $0.005 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license. Accordingly, the Bureau lists all licenses, including the 
related license area population and proposed upfront payment for each, 
in Attachment A of the Auction No. 49 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.
    6. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront 
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the number of bidding 
units on which a bidder may place bids. This limit is a bidder's 
``maximum initial eligibility.'' Each license is assigned a specific 
number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in 
Attachment A of the Auction No. 49 Comment Public Notice, on a bidding 
unit per dollar basis. This number does not change as prices rise 
during the auction. A bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to 
specific licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on any combination 
of licenses as long as the total number of bidding units associated 
with those licenses does not exceed its maximum initial eligibility. 
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction. Thus, in 
calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine the 
maximum number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold high 
bids on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment covering 
that number of bidding units. The Bureau seeks comment on this 
proposal.

C. Activity Rules

    7. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a 
percentage of their maximum bidding eligibility during each round of 
the auction rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder 
that does not satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding 
eligibility in the next round or must use an activity rule waiver (if 
any remain). The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into three 
stages, each characterized by an increased activity requirement. The 
auction will start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes that the auction 
generally will advance to the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to Stage 
Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when the auction activity 
level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new 
high bids, is approximately twenty percent or below for three 
consecutive rounds of bidding. However, the Bureau further proposes 
that it retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by 
announcement during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the 
Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder activity, 
including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the 
percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there 
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in 
revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
    8. For Auction No. 49, the Bureau proposes the following activity 
requirements:
    Stage One: In each round of the first stage of the auction, a 
bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be 
active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its current 
bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level 
will result in a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the 
next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During 
Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths (5/4).
    Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 90 percent 
of its current bidding eligibility. During Stage Two, reduced 
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the 
current round activity by ten-ninths (10/9).
    Stage Three: In each round of the third stage, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 98 percent 
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final

[[Page 72948]]

stage, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the current round activity by fifty/forty-ninths (50/49).
    9. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that 
believe these activity rules should be modified should explain their 
reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. 
Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and 
suggested alternative activity rules.

D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

    10. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current 
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round 
being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies 
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity 
waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a 
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction 
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from 
placing a bid in a particular round.

    Note: Once a proactive waiver is submitted during a round, that 
waiver cannot be unsubmitted.

    11. The FCC Automated Auction System assumes that bidders with 
insufficient activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if 
available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system 
will automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at 
the end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below 
the minimum required unless: (i) There are no activity rule waivers 
available; or (ii) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a 
waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum 
requirements.

    Note: If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy 
the required activity level, its current eligibility will be 
permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from the 
auction.

    12. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the 
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
during the bidding period by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function 
in the bidding system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is 
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the 
activity rules as described. Once eligibility has been reduced, a 
bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
    13. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means 
to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a 
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding 
system) during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are 
submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility 
will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which 
there are no new valid bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction 
open.
    14. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 49 be 
provided with five activity rule waivers that may be used at the 
bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth. The 
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

    15. For Auction No. 49, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice 
or by announcement during the auction, it may delay, suspend, or cancel 
the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical obstacle, 
evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity, 
administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason that 
affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In such 
cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the 
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its 
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend 
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is 
solely within its discretion, and its use is not intended to be a 
substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply their 
activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

II. Bidding Procedures

A. Round Structure

    16. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 49 over the Internet. 
Telephonic Bidding will also be available. As a contingency, the FCC 
Wide Area Network will be available as well. The telephone number 
through which the backup FCC Wide Area Network may be accessed will be 
announced in a later public notice. Full information regarding how to 
establish such a connection, and related charges, will be provided in 
the public notice announcing details of auction procedures.
    17. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public 
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the 
auction, and will be included in the registration mailings. The 
simultaneous multiple round format will consist of sequential bidding 
rounds, each followed by the release of round results. Details 
regarding the location and format of round results will be included in 
the same public notice.
    18. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, 
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

    19. The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe 
methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum 
opening bid when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the 
Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is 
not in the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the 
Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a 
minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each 
auction.
    20. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below 
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can 
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other 
hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction 
below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate 
the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the 
discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the 
auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the 
reserve price to be the same amount.
    21. In light of the Balanced Budget Act's requirements, the Bureau 
proposes to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 49. The 
Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been utilized in other 
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.
    22. Specifically, for Auction No. 49, the Commission proposes the 
following license-by-license formula for calculating minimum opening 
bids:
    $0.01 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license. The specific minimum opening bid for each license available in 
Auction No. 49 is set forth in

[[Page 72949]]

Attachment A of the Auction No. 49 Comment Public Notice. Comment is 
sought on this proposal.
    23. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will 
result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not reasonable 
amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should 
explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an 
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims 
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening 
bid levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bids, the 
Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the amount of 
spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of 
technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service 
areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other 
relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of 
the Lower 700 MHz band spectrum. Alternatively, comment is sought on 
whether, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest 
would be served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

C. Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments

    24. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a 
given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Automated 
Auction System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for 
each license. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening 
bid. In the rounds after an acceptable bid is placed on a license, the 
minimum acceptable bid for that license will be equal to the standing 
high bid plus the defined increment.
    25. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the FCC 
Automated Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for 
that license for the following round, as described. The difference 
between the minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid for each 
license will define the bid increment. The nine acceptable bid amounts 
for each license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the standing 
high bid plus one bid increment) and additional amounts calculated 
using multiple bid increments (i.e., the second bid amount equals the 
standing high bid plus two times the bid increment, the third bid 
amount equals the standing high bid plus three times the bid increment, 
etc.).
    26. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening 
bid. The additional bid amounts for licenses that have not yet received 
a bid will be calculated differently, as explained.
    27. For Auction No. 49, the Bureau proposes to calculate minimum 
acceptable bids by using a smoothing methodology, as it has done in 
several other auctions. The smoothing formula calculates minimum 
acceptable bids by first calculating a percentage increment, not to be 
confused with the bid increment. The percentage increment for each 
license is based on bidding activity on that license in all prior 
rounds; therefore, a license which has received many bids throughout 
the auction will have a higher percentage increment than a license 
which has received few bids.
    28. The calculation of the percentage increment used to determine 
the minimum acceptable bids for each license for the next round is made 
at the end of each round. The computation is based on an activity 
index, which is a weighted average of the number of bids in that round 
and the activity index from the prior round. The current activity index 
is equal to a weighting factor times the number of new bids received on 
the license in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the 
weighting factor times the activity index from the prior round. The 
activity index is then used to calculate a percentage increment by 
multiplying a minimum percentage increment by one plus the activity 
index with that result being subject to a maximum percentage increment. 
The Commission will initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the 
minimum percentage increment at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage 
increment at 0.2 (20%). Hence, at these initial settings, the 
percentage increment will fluctuate between 10% and 20% depending upon 
the number of bids for the license.
Equations
Ai=(C*Bi)+((1-C)*Ai-1)
Ii+1=smaller of ((1+Ai)*N) and M
Xi+1=Ii+1*Yi

Where,

Ai=Activity index for the current round (round i)
C=Activity weight factor
Bi=Number of bids in the current round (round i)
Ai-1=Activity index from previous round (round i-1), 
A0 is 0
Ii+1=Percentage increment for the next round (round i+1)
N=Minimum percentage increment or percentage increment floor
M=Maximum percentage increment or percentage increment ceiling
Xi+1=Dollar amount associated with the percentage increment
Yi=High bid from the current round
    29. Under the smoothing methodology, once a bid has been received 
on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in the 
following round will be the high bid from the current round plus the 
dollar amount associated with the percentage increment, with the result 
rounded to the nearest thousand if it is over ten thousand or to the 
nearest hundred if it is under ten thousand.
Examples
License 1
C=0.5, N=0.1, M=0.2
    Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid=$1,000,000)

    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using the 
smoothing formula:
A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1
I2 = The smaller of ( (1 + 1) * 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)
    ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
increment for round 2 (using I2):

X2 = 0.2 * $1,000,000 = $200,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = $1,200,000
    Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = $2,000,000)
    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using the 
smoothing formula:

A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2
I3 = The smaller of ( (1 + 2) * 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)
    ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
increment for round 3 (using I3):

X3 = 0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = $2,400,000
    Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = $2,400,000)
    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using the 
smoothing formula:

A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5
I4 = The smaller of ( (1 + 1.5) * 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)
    ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
increment for round 4 (using I4):

X4 = 0.2 * $2,400,000 = $480,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = $2,880,000
    30. As stated, until a bid has been placed on a license, the 
minimum acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum 
opening bid. The

[[Page 72950]]

additional bid amounts are calculated using the difference between the 
minimum opening bid times one plus the minimum percentage increment, 
rounded as described, and the minimum opening bid. That is, I = 
(minimum opening bid)(1 + N){rounded{time} -(minimum opening bid). 
Therefore, when N equals 0.1, the first additional bid amount will be 
approximately ten percent higher than the minimum opening bid; the 
second, twenty percent; the third, thirty percent; etc.
    31. In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has 
been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second 
highest bid received for the license. The additional bid amounts are 
calculated using the difference between the second highest bid times 
one plus the minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second 
highest bid.
    32. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bids and bid increments if it determines that circumstances 
so dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the FCC Automated 
Auction System. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.

D. High Bids

    33. At the end of a bidding round, the high bids will be determined 
based on the highest gross bid amount received for each license. In the 
event of identical high bids on a license in a given round (i.e., tied 
bids), the Bureau proposes to use a random number generator to select a 
high bid from among the tied bids. The remaining bidders, as well as 
the high bidder, will be able to submit a higher bid in a subsequent 
round. If no bidder submits a higher bid in a subsequent round, the 
high bid from the previous round will win the license. If any bids are 
received on the license in a subsequent round, the high bid again will 
be determined by the highest gross bid amount received for the license.
    34. A high bid will remain the high bid until there is a higher bid 
on the same license at the close of a subsequent round. A high bid from 
a previous round is sometimes referred to as a ``standing high bid.'' 
Bidders are reminded that standing high bids confer activity credit.

E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

    35. For Auction No. 49, the Bureau proposes the following bid 
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding 
period, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that 
round. By removing selected bids in the bidding system, a bidder may 
effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal 
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
    36. A high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids from previous 
rounds using the withdraw function in the bidding system. A high bidder 
that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject 
to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission rules. The 
Bureau seeks comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal 
procedures.
    37. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 63 FR 770 (January 7, 
1998), the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals 
facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of 
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the 
course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some 
instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The 
Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit 
the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission 
stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion, 
consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw 
bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the 
Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal 
procedures.
    38. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each 
bidder in Auction No. 49 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more 
than two rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to 
withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere 
bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The 
two rounds in which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's 
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the 
Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high 
bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals 
are utilized. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal 
payment provisions specified in the Commission's rules. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.

A. Stopping Rule

    39. The Bureau has discretion ``to establish stopping rules before 
or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction 
within a reasonable time.'' For Auction No. 49, the Bureau proposes to 
employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping 
rule means that all licenses remain open until bidding closes 
simultaneously on all licenses.
    40. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the 
first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive waivers, or 
withdrawals are received. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, 
bidding will remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every 
license.
    41. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to 
exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 49:
    i. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. 
The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses 
after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver, 
withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing 
high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing 
a new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would 
not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau 
further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be 
used at any time or only in stage three of the auction.
    ii. Keep the auction open even if no new acceptable bids or 
proactive waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are 
withdrawn. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder 
had submitted a proactive waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will 
apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity will either 
lose bidding eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver.
    iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes 
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final 
round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least 
one of a specified preceding number of rounds.
    42. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain 
circumstances, such as, for example, where the auction is proceeding 
very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears 
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of 
time. Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt 
to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the 
number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the 
minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there 
is still a high level of bidding activity. The

[[Page 72951]]

Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.

III. Conclusion

    43. Comments are due on or before December 16, 2002, and reply 
comments are due on or before December 23, 2002. Because of the 
disruption of regular mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the 
Bureau requires that all comments and reply comments be filed 
electronically. Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic 
mail to the following address: [email protected]. The electronic mail 
containing the comments or reply comments must include a subject or 
caption referring to Auction No. 49 Comments. The Bureau requests that 
parties format any attachments to electronic mail as Adobe[reg] 
Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word documents. Copies of comments 
and reply comments will be available for public inspection during 
regular business hours in the FCC Public Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 
445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554.
    44. In addition, the Bureau requests that commenters fax a courtesy 
copy of their comments and reply comments to the attention of Kathryn 
Garland at (717) 338-2850.
    45. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte 
rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that 
memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the 
substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects 
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and 
arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to 
oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose 
proceedings are set forth in Sec.  1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.

Federal Communications Commission.
Margaret Wiener,
Chief, Auctions & Industry Analysis Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 02-31075 Filed 12-6-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P